Iran’s Energy Security: Western’s

Sanctions against Iran and refering China to Saudi’s Energy

Industries

By

Nafiseh Darvish

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contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………… 3

The concept of Energy Security………………………………………..5

Iran’s energy …………………………………………………………...6

The demand in chinies energy………………………………………….7

Iran And China…………………………………………………………8

China and Saudi Arabia………………………………………………..9

China’s Energy Security and Iran’s Strategic Alternatives…………...10

Conclusion…………………………………………………………….15

Sources………………………………………………………………..16

Table

Table-1: Top proven world oil reserves, January 1, 2007……………6

Table-2: Top individual countries of Iranian Crude Exports, 2006….7

2

Abstract

Iran is facing large challenges in the area of energy policy during 2000 to 2006 Sino-

Iranian petroleum relations contained significant importance in economic relations of the

two countries. This article asks whether the political situations especially sanctions is a

threat to the China’s energy supply and will refer China to import energy from Saudi

instead of Iran? The main argument is that while Chinese energy hungry to Gulf energy is

rising, oil supply security in Saudi will encourage china to notice Saudi’s energy industry

instead of Iran. Therefore, according to the fact that China is the main importance energy

market for Iran, it is vital Iran recognizes alternatives to have more cooperation in the

energy field. After noting the concept of energy security, Iran’s energy and Chinese

energy demand, China’s energy relation with Iran and Saudi have been analyzed. Based

on this analysis’s, China’s Energy Security and Iran’s Strategic Alternatives have been

studied.

Key Words: Energy Policy, Foreign Policy, Persian Gulf, cooperation

IntroductionSince the beginning of this century, energy is continuing to have an important role in

economic and social develompent of nations in the whole world.Today, more than 80%

of the global energy needs are solved by fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal. On the

other hand, the global reserves of these scarce and non-renewable sources are very

limited.

The Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the

United Arab Emirates) alone hold over half (57%) of the world’s oil reserves, and the

Middle East Region produces about 31% of the world’s oil.1 The Persian Gulf region also

holds an estimated 2,400 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas reserves, representing

45% of the world’s total gas. Algeria is estimated to hold (161tcf), and Libya (52tcf).2

1. For additional information see “Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet,” Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.

2. See Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum (BP), June 2006.

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Chinese rising energy demand dramatically became a very important issue of internatinal

politics. over the past decade, trade relations between China and the six countries of the

Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) have risen dramatically. China is going to be a

major customer for OPEC. IEA estimates China will increase its petroleum consumption

eightfold by 2030.

Energy security is not the combination of energy and security. This distinction is

particularly relevant when international factors come into play.(Zah Daojiong, 2006, p. 2)

Having relationship with Iran as one of the major oil and gas producing countries in the

middle East, China will engage in direct conflict with US. Indeed, since China has

became a viable alternative to the Middle East as a primary oil supplier for its Asian

neighbors, the competition on supplying energy into China has increased betwean Middle

East producing energy countries especially Iran and Saudi. By 2002 the Saudi had

become China’s leading foreign supplier of crude oil, and remained the largest supplier to

china with the exception of January 2006 when it was surpassed by Iran.

China should try to count on ensuring reliable supplies of gas, oil and so on, while the

current events in the Middle east made it hard for china. First, the US invasion of Iraq

forcefully showed China the danger of relying on energy supplies from the Persian Gulf. 

On the other hand, ships carrying oil and gas would be vulnerable to naval interception. It

is more clear that china’s energy supply in Gulf depends on the capability of the US Navy

to ensure the accessibility of sea lanes carrying the chinese energy.

China’s energy requirments made it a competitor to the US for influence in the Middle

East. The tendency of Chinese relations with Iran and Saudi is going to be critical on

energy security. China recognizes Saudi Arabia’s uniquely dominant role among the

world’s oil producers and countinues to work hard at building closer ties to the Kingdom.

The need for energy security has now raised the possibility of competition and

confrontation in the energy sphere. China’s foreign policy behavior has been influenced

by growing energy dependence. As a majoe importer, acorging to the improtance of

energy vulnerability, it might encourage china to provide Energy reqirements from a

country with the less risk totally.

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Tehran leaders recognize energy is an important strategic issue in relationship between

Iran and China. One of the principle concerns over energy security in Iran is the

perception that whether china, as a main importer of petroleum in the world after US, will

turn into Saudi to solve energy problem. Tehran requires a delicate balancing act between

its energy supply and its foreign policy calculations to get its energy interests.

1 .The concept of Energy SecurityEnergy security contains three essential goals: the availability of energy needed for stable

economic and social development, freedom from interruption of the energy supply, and

the affordability of energy prices. As such, thinking about possible instruments for

achieving energy security does not have to begin by assessing a nation’s military options.

Considerations of energy and security, on the other hand, have more to do with

geopolitical factors and the national policies of countries affecting the control of energy

development and transportation around the world. (Zha Daojiong, 2006, p. 3 )

Energy security policy is not only about securing acces to primary energy, but also, more

importantly, securing the reliable final energy supplies that depend on a number of

factors: market reforms to improve economic and energy efficiency, alleviation of

transportation bottlenecks, prevention of large-area power outages ( such as the one in

New York and Ontario in 2003 ), protection of power plants and power grids from

terrorist attacks, and energy conservation. ( Xu YI- Chong, 2006, p. 266)

There are three primary security models today: the traditional model of competitive

Realpolitik and the evolving, conflicting models of hegemony and cooperative security.

It is so clear that the last model is more useful and practical in this time.( Michael Kraig,

2004)

Iran’s energyIran is OPEC’s second-largest producer after Saudi Arabia. Iran is OPEC’s second-

largest exporter after Saudi Arabia, and is the fourth-largest exporter of crude oil globally

after Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Norway. Natural gas accounts for half of Iran’s total

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domestic energy consumption, while the remaining half is predominately oil

consumption. The continued exploration and production of the offshore South Pars

natural gas field in the Persian Gulf is a key part of in Iran’s energy sector development

plan.(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Background.html)

Iran was the world's fourth largest producer of crude oil and the second largest exporter

of petroleum at the peak of its oil industry in the mid-1970s. The war with Iraq cut Iran's

production in the 1980s, although Iranian oil reserves remained the fourth largest in the

world. In spite of sanctions during the early 1990s, Iran’s oil production has maintained a

steady balance and Iran even exported its residual oil in the same manner as before.

Iran has 136 billion barrels of proven oil reserves ( table 1) , or roughly 10 percent of the

world's total proven petroleum reserves as of January 1, 2007 (Oil and Gas Journal,

January 01, 2007) In 2006, Iran produced an estimated 4.2 million barrels per day (bbl/d)

of total liquids, of which 3.8 million bbl/d was crude oil, equal to 5 percent of global

production. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html

Table-1: Top proven world oil reserves, January 1, 2007

According to International Energy Agency’s Monthly Oil Data Service and Global Trade

Atlas, Iran’s net crude and product exports in 2006 ( table 2 ) averaged 2.5 million bbl/d,

primarily to Japan, China, India, South Korea, Italy, and other Organization for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations, making it the fourth-largest

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exporter of crude oil in the world. In 2006, Iran’s oil export revenues amounted to $54

billion.

Table-2: Top individual countries of Iranian Crude Exports, 2006

The demand in chinies energyChina is the newest major player in the global energy system. Energy security is vital for

Chinese economic growth, energy security, social stability, national security and

envoronmental protection. That is why energy is one of the biggest china’s concerns in

making national and international decisions. The fact that, in 2005, 43 percent of China’s

oil demand came from abroad has showen that energy shortages and securing its energy

supply are threats and risks which china is facing. Therfore, China should pay attention

more to the mutual dependence between China and the world’s energy suppliers. China

have the opportunity to see two volatil regions as majoe energy resourses.the forst one

located in Persian Gulf( the Straits of Hormuz and the straits of Malacca).Central Asia is

the secound one.

Aware of its growing dependency on imported energy and foreign investment and

technology, China seeks a more prominent position in the existing global energy system.

Where they can, the Chinese try to open new connections. So external energy policies are

increasingly entwined with foreign economic and security policies in general. (IEA

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Examines China’s Quest for Worldwide Energy Security). China’s interest in the Middle

East is more energy related, and less of a political agenda. Today, 58 percent of China's

oil imports come from the Middle East, mostly from the G.C.C. states. (Julian Madsen)

The Middle East is emerging as the main supplier of China’s crude imports. Russia,

Central Asia, ASEAN and West Africa will also be important areas in China’s future

energy supply.

China needs oil to fuel its impressive economic growth. The country became a net

importer of oil in 1993. Its net oil import has grown since then from 0.16 to 3.76mn b/d)

in 2006. The country relied on the Middle East for 44% of its oil import in 2006 (some

source put this figure as high as 58%2), making the region China’s top supplier, ahead of

Africa (32%) and Eurasia (20%).(Oil and Gas Journal, as quoted on US Department of

Energy website, Saudi Arabia page) The mere size of the country’s demand for imported

oil would not be met without the strong support from the Middle East region.

By 2015, it will be importing some 70 percent of its oil from the Middle East, with the

rest being supplied by pipeline, rail or tanker from Russia, Central Asia, and Africa—and possibly from Latin America, too, in limited quantities.(Heinrich Kreft, 2006, p.

110)

The International Energy Agency (I.E.A.) predicts that by 2030, Chinese imports will

equal U.S. imports, impressing upon China the need to ensure a stable supply of oil.

Iran And ChinaChina and Iran first established diplomatic relations in 1971. Energy security is important

not only for energy suppliers but also for energy consumers in the world. Iran is keen to

relate With China as an existing supplier to export energy and pursue new energy

investments overseas.

Iran views China as a powerful ally among the world’s leading nations-- a country that

because of a shared interest in stemming the dominance of the United States will

advocate on its behalf. Iran hopes that its relationship with a global economic

powerhouse like China will attract business from other countries wary of Iran’s pariah

status. China, however, with its export-led economy that shipped $762 billion worth of

goods in 2005 and its deep integration into the global economy, is far more willing to live

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with the reality of U.S. dominance than Iran. (John Keefer Douglas, Matthew B. Nelson,

Kevin Schwartz, 2006, p. 7)

Iran is the second largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia and the second largest gas

reserves after Russia. Iran has become the top oil exporter to China, surpassing Saudi

Arabia in 2006. Official Iranian statistics have stated that China's oil imports from Iran

more than doubled in 2006. In June 2007, China reportedly imported around 567,000

barrels per day (b/d). In 2006, China signed oil and gas contracts worth over $100 billion

with Iran. China is heavily involved in developing the huge Yadavaran oil field.

Accorging to business monitor international China has become one of the most important

trade partners of Iran. (Business Monitor International, 25 July 2007)

China and Saudi ArabiaOf the G.C.C. states, it is unsurprising that China has the closest relations with Saudi

Arabia, the world's largest oil producing country. Saudi Arabia and China began their

strategic relationship slowly, commencing with Chinese purchases of Saudi Arabian

crude oil. Today, China is Saudi Arabia's fourth largest importer and fifth largest

exporter. Saudi Arabia is China's tenth largest importer and biggest oil supplier.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce,trade between the two exceeded $15

billion in 2005, having grown an average of 41 percent a year since 1999. In 1995, Saudi

Arabia was the 25th largest supplier of crude oil to China; while in 2007, Saudi Arabia

was China’s largest crude oil supplier (competing with Iran, Angola and Oman). In 2007,

China imported approximately 520,000 bbl/d from Saudi Arabia. Trade press indicates

that China boosted contracted oil purchases from Saudi Arabia by 38 percent for 2008,

rising to approximately 790,000 bbl/d. China and Saudi Arabia recently signed a MoU

which indicates that imports could rise to 1 million bbl/d by 2010, according to EIA.

It has been reported that during the 2006-2010 period, Guangdong Province will invest

180 billion yuan (US$22.3 billion) to build five petrochemical bases, namely Dayawan,

Maoming-Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Yamenkou and Shantou-Chaozhou-Jieyang.

Additionally, five refining expansion and new refining projects, five ethylene projects

and some downstream chemical projects are to be built during the same period, with the

assistance of foreign partners. (Julian Madsen)

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While the new Chinese approach to energy security is taking place with a number of

Middle Eastern oil and gas producers including Iran, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, it is

perhaps most significant in respect of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the world largest

petroleum exporter. (P Matthews, Baker Botts L.L.P) With proven crude oil reserves of

261.9 billion barrels. (Oil and Gas Journal)

China’s Energy Security and Iran’s Strategic AlternativesIn its 2005 white paper titled “China’s peacful Development Road”, the People’s Daily

Online (PRS) explained its official energy policy as follows: “Through dialogue and

cooperation regarding energy” energy, China is working with other countries to safeguard

energy safety and stability (Full Text: China’s Peaceful Development Road). China’s

foreign policy on energy security is on the base of international cooperative strategies.

China’s rapid economic growth has boosted oil and natural gas consumption remarkably.

It had to China to make strengthen cooperation on energy whereever it can. . On the other

hand, it provides the chance to enhence its “go out strategy” which seeks business

opportunities overseas.

The united States has a critical role with its own interests in oil supply and price stability,

energy diversification, and crisis management. (Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn,

2005,P. 285) China’s energy strategy is rooted in the US Middle East policies and the

vulnerability of its access to energy both in Percian Gulf and Central Asia, as China’s

main energy resources. China is seaking to minimize its dependece on Middle Eastern

oil. Although China is going to expand domestic production, it simply isn’t remarkable at

all for its growing domestic production.

China is trying to invest in upstream and downstream of Middle Eastern countries

especially in Iran, Iraq, kuwait in which US has powerfully role. In spite of China’s

attempts to secure overland supply from Russia and Central Asia, the Middle East will

remain in first rank as energy supplier.

Although China is willing to have closed relationship with Iran as one of the biggest

fossil energy suppliers in the world, it is unclear whether China will be ready to ignore its

bilateral interests with US. It isn’t clear that whether China will protect its energy progect

arrangment with Iran while they are afraid of implicating of sanctions to put Chinese

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investments in danger. According to US hegemony, it is very likely that, China, as

Eastern ally of Iran, would want to overlook investments in Iran and turn to Saudi which

is more secure.

Under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act passed by the Clinton Administration in 1996 and

since renewed, sanctions are imposed on companies that invest US$20 million or more

annually in oil and gas projects in Iran, but this has not deterred many large companies

from seeking access to Iran's reserves. China, which will need a huge amounts of

additional oil and gas to fuel its economy, is paying particular attention to Iran.

The U.S. arms embargo and economic sanctions against Iran have indirectly benefited

China.(John Calabrese, 2006,p.4) Beijing’s resistance to using economic sanctions

against Iran. In spite of the fact that Iran sanctions had bad influence on the most

countries veiw to have economical relation with Iran (Cherie Canning, 2007,p.57),China

opposes resorting to sanctions or the use of force against Iran, believing this will only

provoke Iran unnecessarily. Instead, China urged all parties to reduce their sabre rattling.

The final solution has to be reconciling the seemlingly irreconcilable relationship

between the United States and Iran. It seems China has real strenght in dealing with Iran.

(Tom Johanson )

Although Iran has tried to encourage China tended on Iran’s oil industry to invest in oil,

the current political issues especially because of Iran's nuclear program will have

negative effect on China’s leaders in making decision especialy in the field of new

infrastructure investment.

There are some opposing idea regarding energy demand. China’s leadership views its

energy policy quite differently. As Zhang Guobao1 explained “Some people show they

are biased against China's economic development by blaming China for boosting

international oil prices. Why are other countries' oil imports justified, but it is called 'a

threat' when it comes to China?" Zhang Guobao’s recent comments on the willingness of

Chinese oil firms to cooperate with U.S. firms in overseas upstream and downstream

activities suggest that China is actively trying to allay U.S. fears of neo-mercantilist

policy. Multinational oil firms may see no advantage in cooperative ventures with

Chinese firms. Nonetheless, it may be in U.S. policy interests to promote such ventures as

1 . Deputy minister of the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC)

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a way of highlighting U.S.-Chinese common interests as consumers, and mitigating the

threat of bidding wars with China over oil fields (John Keefer Douglas, Matthew B.

Nelson, Kevin Schwartz, 2006, p.12). The related view is critical on energy security

betwean Iran and China because of Iran’s sanctions which don’t allow US’s oil

companies to invest in Iran’s oil industry.

In Saudi Arabia, China sees a way in which it can diversify its Middle Eastern oil

suppliers and depend less on Iran for Middle Eastern oil. Additionally, a closer economic

relationship with Saudi Arabia should be absent of the possible political consequences

and image concerns that occur in Sino-Iranian relations. The PRC sees a great economic

opportunity in expanded relations with Saudi Arabia, but not a replacement for their

political and strategic partnership with Iran. (John Keefer Douglas, Matthew B. Nelson,

Kevin Schwartz). It is likely that Iran loses china’s cooperation in its oil industry because

of Iran politically position in the world. According to the fact that the Gulf region is

becoming more and more important for investment by China’s energy companies and the

growing relationship betwean Chana and Saudi it is necessary Iran makes some strategy

on its foreign policy in orther to protect its interests in the Gulf.

US is the most important external treat for China’s sea- lane security. For example, in

1993, the US Navy stopped a Chinese container ship suspected of stransporting “sensitive

material” to Iran. China is trying to gain Military capabilities to control the vulnerability

of the oil transportation routs enforced by US. Iran can benefit of this situation to

negotiate with China to build overland pipline. It also will let China to reduce its

dependency on Middle East oil.

Russian and Central Asian region- maintaining stability, preventing terrorism, separatism

and religious extremism, and controlling narcotics trafficking - could help China reduce

its dependence on Middle Eastern energy sources and thus enhance its security. Pipelines,

after all, are generally a more reliable form of transportation than tankers. Central Asian

and Russian oil occupy the second tier in Chinese priorities. (Charles E. Ziegler, 2006,

pp.10 & 12)

oil pipelined from Russia can be more economically transported to areas of high-

consumption regions. oil and gas pipelines from central Asia are useful not just for

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importing oil and gas, but also for cutting the transportation costs of moving oil from the

east to the west of China. (Zha Daojiong, 2006, p. 8)

China could certainly benefit from such a pivotal geostrategic position. China is

reasonably confident that its involvement in an international pipeline network would

facilitate Japanese and Korean investment in China's internal pipelines. That process will

take time, in the medium term, there will be no alternative for China's voracious energy

demand to return to the Persian Gulf decisively.The fact that all of China’s imported oil

comes via tankers which is threatened by terrorist actions. China has only to rely on the

US’s military power to protect these vital sea lanes. The growing attention of China to

the Persian Gulf energy resourses makes it necessary for Iran take more severe policy on

cooperation with china. Some of its alternative strategies regarding to China as an Eastern

ally are as following:

1.Enhancing cooperationEnergy supply security requires cooperation betwean both importers and exporters. With

the Middle East's share of China's oil imports such a heavy dependence on the Middle

East for oil, Iran should view cooperation as a vital strategy over the world. Enhancing

cooperation is very essential to Iran to solve it’s own international political and

economical problems in the world especialy in the Middle East.

could go a long way to building trust. If Iran wants to take a more active diplomatic role

in the stability of the Middle East, such trust is critical.

2. Try to create peace in the GulfInternal and external elements influence on the Gulf security system. Fight against

radicalism and terrorism can only be won by more cooperation between Gulf countries

and by using China’s increasing role in the world. Although this idea seems idealism,

because of the US hegemony in the region, in this regard, dialogue with suppliers and

exporters to strengten energy security is essential.

Internally working power balance as a preventive strategy should be constructed between

Arabs, Persians and Israelis with the support of NATO, EU, US and Asia-Pacific

originated existing and newly integrated mechanisms. (S-amil S-ena, Tuncay Babalı)

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3. Enhancing look to the east strategyThe Iranian regim is looking for economic opportunity in the East to decrease its

vulnerability in the world and develop its economic, political relations, etc. Iran must

purrsue confidence- building measures with major powers in the East to pose “look to the

east” strategy.

4 .causing and increasing cooperation in Iran’s energy industryIran should notice to take benefit of the competion between Us and China in on hand, and

Japan and other East Asian states and China in orther hand to enqurage them to invest in

Iran’s oil industry and develop its oil economy and growth in exporting energy. in the

persian Gulf. Poor relations betwean Iran and US have provided a good opportunity to

china especially for investment.

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ConclusionIran has faced a severe crisis in its oil industry after the Revolution in the context of

increasing isolationist policy by the US. Enhancing cooperation with China is vital for

Iran that not only provides the opportunity to revive and accelerate its oil business but

also to receive Chinese support in international orgenization. Iran is going to concider

China as stable markets for its future energy trade. It is undoubtly that the search for a

good market by Iran is its most important concern.

Energy security not only is important for access to oil, but it is also essential for China's

global ambitions which trying to have more cooperation with Middle Easter countries in

which almost all of them resent the U.S. presence.Studies indicated that in spite of

China’s try to diversify away from the middle East, economic interests dictate it must

come back to the perchia Gulf, still the world’s lowest- cost oil producer.

In the short time, the importance of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia is

countinuing to increase. China, mostly as a result of U.S.-sponsored sanctions against

Iran and its political situation in the word are facing extremly risks and threat to invest t

in Iran’s oldaged oil fasilities. Altough some China’s leaders view threats of Western

sanctions against Iran are unlikly to impact iran’s international relations, especially

Iranian energy sector, it is unclear that China will be able to enforce signed project with

Iran. Because of the imporance of developing oil industry, Iran should take place policies

to protect the extension of oil economy. Peacful coexistence, detente, confidence-

builgingand, coalition - building should be of primery external foreign policy.China is

one of the biggest potential trade markets of Iran. At the present time, saudi recognizes as

an “ oppourtunity” in china’s view in comparision with Iran which might be a “ threat”. If

iran don’t make an appropriate strategy on foreign polical field, China will refer to Saudi

as a main oil and gas producer.

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of Chinese Political Science, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 2006

- Cherie Canning, Pursuit of the Pariah: Iran, Sudan and Myanmar in China’s

Energy Security Strategy , Security Challenges, Volume 3 Number 1 (February 2007)

- China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security

http://www.oecdchina.org/OECDpdf/china2000.pdf

- Dan Blumenthal, China and the Middle East, Middle East Quarterly. Spring 2005

- “Full Text: China’s Peaceful Development Road,” People’s Daily Online, December 22,

2005.http://english.peopledaily.com.cn

- Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, Energy and security: toward a new foreign

policy strategy, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., 2005

-John Calabrese, China and Iran: Mismtched Partners, August 2006,

http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-ChinaIranMismatch.pdf.

- John Keefer Douglas, Matthew B. Nelson, Kevin Schwartz, Fueling the Dragon’s

Flame: How China's Energy Demands Affect its Relationships in the Middle East, U.S.-

China Economic and Security Review Commission In fulfillment of Contractual

Obligations September 14, 2006

- Julian Madsen, ''China's Policy in the Gulf Region: From Neglect to Necessity'', PINR,

27 October 2006.

- Heinrich Kreft, China’s Energy Security Conundrum, The Korean Journal of Defense

Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 107–120.

- IEA Examines China’s Quest for Worldwide Energy Security

http://www.iea.org/Textbase/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESS_REL_ID=214

- “Iran Becomes China's Main Oil Supplier” (July 25, 2007), Business Monitor

International, http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute

- Michael Kraig, Assessing alternative security frameworks for the Persian Gulf , Volume

XI, Fall 2004, Number 3 

- S-amil S-ena, Tuncay Babalı, Security concerns in the Middle East for oil supply:

Problems and solutions, Elsevier Ltd., 2006

http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1999/fall_china_troush.aspx

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- Tom Johanson, “ China’s economic ties to Iran comlicate nuclear issue,” Knight

Ridder newspapers, 27 January 2006.

- Xu YI- Chong, China’s Energy Security, Australian Journal of International Affairs

VOL. 60, No. 2, June 2006.

- Zha Daojiong, Energy Interdependence, China Security, Summer 2006

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