october 2020icrier.org/pdf/working_paper_398.pdf · table of contents list of abbreviations .....i
TRANSCRIPT
1
October 2020
W O R K I N G P A P E R
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ i
Acknowledgement .................................................................................................................. iii
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... iv
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Secondary Data ........................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Primary Survey ........................................................................................................... 5
3. Before and During COVID-19: Data Localisation Globally and in India .................... 6
3.1 Before COVID-19 Data Localisation: Globally ......................................................... 6
3.2 During COVID-19 Data Localisation: Globally ....................................................... 7
3.3 Before COVID-19 Data Localisation: India ............................................................. 11
3.4 During COVID-19 Data Localisation: India ............................................................ 12
4. Manufacturing, Trade and Investment.......................................................................... 14
4.1 Manufacturing of ESDM Products and/or Digital Goods ........................................ 14
4.2 Trade in Goods and Services .................................................................................... 15
4.3 Trade in Select Equipment Required for Data Centres ............................................ 17
4.3.1 India’s Trade in Select Equipment Required for Data Centres: By Country .... 18
4.3.2 India’s Trade in Equipment Required for Data Centres: By Products ........ 19
4.3.3 India’s Export Competitiveness in Goods required for Data Centres.......... 20
4.4 India’s Value-Added in Trade of Select Equipment Required for Data Centres ...... 23
5. Findings from the Primary Survey ................................................................................ 23
5.1 Perception and Impact of Data Localisation and Data Localisation Policies ......... 24
5.2 Financial Viability of Data Localisation and Role of Government .......................... 28
5.3 Impact on Trade Balance .......................................................................................... 28
5.4 Future Relationship with China ................................................................................ 29
5.5 Impact on Job Creation ............................................................................................ 29
5.6 Infrastructure Readiness ........................................................................................... 30
6. Challenges for India ......................................................................................................... 30
7. Developments on Data Localisation in G20 ................................................................... 35
8. G20 Saudi Presidency, India’s Position and the Way Forward .................................. 36
References ............................................................................................................................... 41
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................. 44
List of Tables
Table 2.1: Sampling Framework ......................................................................................... 5
Table 3.1: Policies to Allow Data Sharing during COVID-19 Across Select G20
Countries ............................................................................................................ 8
Table 4.1 (a): Top 10 Export Markets for India in Select Equipment for Data Centres (2017
and 2019) ......................................................................................................... 18
Table 4.1 (b): Top 10 Countries from which India Imports Select Equipment for Data
Centres (2017 and 2019) .................................................................................. 18
Table 4.2: Revealed Comparative Advantage of India’s Select Exports of Equipment for
Data Centres (2010, 2017 and 2019) ............................................................... 21
Table 4.3: Value-Added in Trade of Select Equipment Required for Data Centres -2015
.......................................................................................................................... 23
Table A1: Select Equipment Required for Data Centres (at HS-6-digit level) ................. 44
Table A2: Top 10 Products Exported from India: 2017and 2019..................................... 46
Table A3: Top 10 Products Imported by India: 2017and 2019 ........................................ 47
List of Figures
Figure 4.1: India’s Trade in Goods: March-June 2019 versus March-June 2020 .............. 17
Figure 4.2: India’s Trade in Select Equipment Required for Data Centres (2010-2019) ... 17
Figure 4.3: India-China Trade in Goods: January-March 2019 versus January-March
2020.................................................................................................................. 19
Figure 5.1: Overall Stance on On-Soil Data Localisation .................................................. 24
Figure 5.2: Stakeholder Perceptions about different Data Localisation Policies ............... 24
List of Box
Box 3.1: Key Initiatives to Address COVID-19 Pandemic: Examples of Some Countries ... 10
Box 3.2: Key Practices during COVID-19 in India ........................................................... 13
i
List of Abbreviations
4IR Fourth Industrial Revolution
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
ASCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWS Amazon Web Services
B20 Business 20
CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate
CDPCA Contagious Disease Prevention and Control Act
CLOUD Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data
DGCI&S Directorate of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics
DSS Decision Support System
EDBP European Data Protection Board
Edu-tech Education Technology
EHR Electronic Health Record
ESDM Electronics System Design and Manufacturing
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
Fin-tech Financial Technology
FTA Foreign Trade Agreement
GAFA Google Inc, Amazon Inc, Facebook Inc and Apple Inc
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
GeM Government e-Marketplace
Health-tech Health Technology
HHS Health and Human Services
ii
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HS Harmonised System
IT/ITeS Information Technology/Information Technology-enabled Services
ITA Information Technology Agreement
MeitY Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
MoCI Ministry of Commerce and Industry
NASSCOM National Association of Software and Service Companies
NPE National Policy on Electronics
OCR Office for Civil Rights
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDP Personal Data Protection
PIPA Personal Information Protection Act
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RCA Revealed Comparative Advantage
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
TiVA Trade in Value-Added
UK United Kingdom
US United States
USTR United States Trade Representative
WHO World Health Organization
WITS World Integrated Trade Solutions
WTO World Trade Organization
iii
Acknowledgement
We express our gratitude to Dr. Rajat Kathuria, Director and Chief Executive, ICRIER, for
giving us the opportunity to work in this area and for his constant support. We would like to
thank experts, policymakers and industry bodies for their valuable inputs. We would like to
thank the survey participants for taking time off from their busy schedules to contribute to the
survey. We would especially like to thank Mr. Brahma Chauhan, Founder and CEO,
Rocketflyer Technology Private Limited, and Mr. Keiichi Onozawa, Policy Director, JETRO
New Delhi, for their valuable inputs.
We are indebted to our reviewers. We are especially thankful to Dr. Rupa Chanda, RBI Chair
Professor in Economics, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore (IIMB); Dr. Souvik
Dutta, Assistant Professor, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology; Dr. Prabir De,
Professor, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) and Ms. Tanu
M. Goyal, Consultant, ICRIER.
We would like to thank Tara Nair for copyediting this paper. We would also like to thank Ms.
Chhaya Singh for her help in procuring the research materials and Mr. Anu Mohandas for
fixing the meetings. The ICRIER administrative team deserves a special mention for their
help in formatting and uploading the paper.
iv
Abstract
With a large pool of engineers and scientists, the presence of over 9300 technology-based
startups and its strengths in exports of information technology/information technology-
enabled services (IT/ITeS), India is uniquely placed to become a global technology and
innovation hub. Yet there is a fear that Indian companies may not be able to access and
monetise the data generated in the country and there can be national security, governance,
and privacy issues. The debate on “data localisation” has gathered momentum in the last five
years as India tries to design its own regulations; globally, too, many countries have imposed
some form of data localisation measures.
With the onset of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, services like healthcare,
retail and education are online and there has been a change in data regulations in several
countries to access and share sensitive patient data across borders for research/clinical trials.
As the traditional model of trade, consisting of exchange of goods and labour mobility, stands
disrupted, cross-border data flows are gaining traction. The Government of India has also
actively engaged in data sharing, public-private partnerships and joint research to tackle the
pandemic.
This paper, using secondary data and a primary survey, presents the changing perceptions of
stakeholders related to data localisation – before and during COVID-19. It assesses India’s
strength in manufacturing and exports (goods and services). It analyses how the discussions
on data localisation evolved in the G20 and identifies commonalities and differences across
G20 countries. It identifies the challenges for India, makes recommendations for the
upcoming G20 Saudi Presidency, and looks at how India can leverage on its strengths as it
takes over the G20 Presidency in 2022.
________
Keywords: data localisation, trade, pandemic, services, technology, G20
JEL: F01, F10, F13, I18
Authors’ email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]
_________
Disclaimer: Opinions and recommendations in the report are exclusively of the author(s) and not of
any other individual or institution including ICRIER. This report has been prepared in good faith on
the basis of information available at the date of publication. All interactions and transactions with
industry sponsors and their representatives have been transparent and conducted in an open, honest
and independent manner as enshrined in ICRIER Memorandum of Association. ICRIER does not
accept any corporate funding that comes with a mandated research area which is not in line with
ICRIER’s research agenda. The corporate funding of an ICRIER activity does not, in any way, imply
ICRIER’s endorsement of the views of the sponsoring organization or its products or policies.
ICRIER does not conduct research that is focused on any specific product or service provided by the
corporate sponsor.
1
COVID-19, Data Localisation and G20: Challenges, Opportunities and
Strategies for India
Arpita Mukherjee, Soham Sinha, Angana Parashar Sarma
Nibha Bharti and Drishti Vishwanath
1. Introduction
The onset of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has caused dramatic changes in
the way the economy operates. While the pandemic, through its demands for anti-contagion
policies, has caused a global economic slowdown, it has simultaneously enhanced the pace at
which fourth industrial revolution (4IR) technologies are being adopted. As the traditional
model of trade, consisting of exchange of goods and labour mobility, stands disrupted, cross-
border data flows are gaining traction. There is now a global requirement for tracking and
monitoring patient data. Due to the need for social distancing and mandatory stay-at-home
orders, services like e-commerce, online consultancies and online education have become
essential. As a result of this, great volumes of data are being generated across the world, and
there is now a requirement to process and share this data.
Despite the sharp rise in COVID-19 cases since mid-June 2020 and the economic slowdown,
India has certain advantages. With a large pool of around 1.5 million engineers and scientists,
the presence of over 9300 technology-based startups [National Association of Software and
Service Companies (NASSCOM), 2019] and its strengths in services like information
technology/information technology-enabled services (IT/ITeS), India is uniquely placed to
become a technology and innovation hub. Such a hub can create employment, lead to exports
and eventually contribute to growth. Indian firms are providing services to global clients in
sub-sectors such as education technology (edu-tech), financial technology (fin-tech) and
health technology (health-tech), and a number of global multinationals such as Facebook Inc.
and Google Inc. have either invested or shown interest in investing in India. However, to reap
the benefits of 4IR, India needs to have clear strategies and policies to harness opportunities
related to cross-border data flows in this crucial time of changing geo-political relations.
Cross-border data flows have been one of the key drivers of economic growth in the last
decade (Bailey and Parsheera, 2018). As of 2014, free flow of data has contributed to an
estimated US$2.8 trillion to the global economy and this contribution is expected to reach
US$11 trillion by 2025 (Meltzer and Lovelock, 2018). While the merits of data and its
contribution to the ecomony are well-known, global data flows are controlled by a few large
multinationals such as Apple Inc., Google LLC, Amazon.com Inc., Facebook Inc., Microsoft
Corporation and Alibaba Group Holdings Limited – companies that are mostly based out of
the United States (US) or China. As a result of this concentration of data, these countries are
major exporters of data while countries such as India are importers of data-related services.
However, with a large population of 1.2 billion people, India is one of the largest data
generating countries in the world and there is interest from global technology firms to access
Indian data.
2
Given the importance of data, ownership and control of data has been an issue of debate in
domestic policymaking and in international forums such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and G20. As has been underscored by recent events like the Cambridge Analytica
case wherein Facebook data was used to influence election results,1 data can be easily
misused. The concerns raised by a number of countries against the Chinese 5G company,
Huawei Technologies Company Limited is another example of how data is likely to be
misused. Therefore, there is need for some form of data protection and data sharing with
trust. While the privacy of individuals and national security need to be protected,
governments may require access to data for law enforcement and good governance.Thus,
globally there is an on-going debate on ‘access to’ versus ‘restrictions on’ data and, in the last
five years preceding the COVID-19 outbreak, several countries have imposed some form of
data localisation requirements, which can serve to act as a barrier to trade (Kathuria et al.,
2019).
The debates on data localisation also extend to the nature of the data – sensitive versus non-
sensitive data. Data on healthcare, financial services, etc., are generally treated as sensitive
data, and many countries, including India, have imposed specific regulations to regulate such
data prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. With the outbreak of COVID-19 in December 2019,
even developed countries with sophisticated healthcare systems are struggling to cope with
the scale, complexities and rapid spread of this disease, which transmits through physical
contact with those who may have come in contact with a COVID +ve patient. Thus, the
spread of the disease has made it a requirement to track patients, doctors, healthcare workers
and other vulnerable groups and their contacts. This requires access to sensitive patient data,
which is also used for cross-country research and clinical trials. Hence, the pandemic has
generated a requirement for data sharing.
Since early 2020, countries have seen a number of interventions that require relaxation of
existing data localisation requirements. Some of these interventions are contact tracing
applications; others include initiatives such as the multinational SOLIDARITY trial on
clinical therapies sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO). While the former
requires adequate laws to track individuals in COVID-19 environments, the latter requires the
management, sharing and processing of sensitive health data from a global database of
multinational clinical trials for potential COVID-19 therapies.
In the context of the G20, the importance of data has been discussed since 2016 during the
Chinese Presidency, which introduced the Digital Economy Taskforce. Between 2016 and
2018, the taskforce discussed various aspects of the digital economy including innovation,
digitalisation and digital inclusion. In 2018, the Business 20 (B20) had recommended that
G20 members should commit to not prevent free flow of data across borders and strengthen
interoperable data protection standards. The Japanese Presidency in 2019 was the first to
specifically discuss the concept of data localisation in detail with an emphasis on facilitating
free flow of data (Kathuria et al., 2020). The forthcoming G20 Presidency of Saudi Arabia in
1 Source:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/26/india-to-investigate-alleged-cambridge-analytica-
data-breach-facebook (last accessed May 23, 2020)
3
November 2020 is also taking up this topic, and in the light of the on-going pandemic, the
G20 Leaders’ Statement2 published on March 27, 2020, made commitments to fight the
pandemic by sharing timely and transparent data in a sensitive sector like health. An extract
from the statement is given below:
“We commit to take (sic) all necessary health measures and seek to ensure
adequate financing to contain the pandemic and protect people, especially the
most vulnerable. We will share timely and transparent information; exchange
epidemiological and clinical data; share materials necessary for research and
development; and strengthen health systems globally, including through
supporting the full implementation of the WHO International Health
Regulations (IHR 2005).”
Thus, the pandemic has created a need for accessing sensitive patient data whilst overruling
concerns regarding data sharing and privacy across the globe.
India is uniquely placed in the data localisation versus data flow debate. With a population of
over 1.2 billion people and 627 million Internet users in 2019 (Kantar IMRB, 2019), India is
amongst the largest data generating countries. The Government of India acknowledges the
critical role and use of data in the development of an economy and, therefore, several
measures and policies, such as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Payment Directives of 2018,
the Draft National E-Commerce Policy of 2019 and the Non-Personal Data Protection
Framework 2020, have been initiated to localise and protect data. All of these policies refer to
certain restrictions on data flows and some of them also refer to creation of
infrastructure/data centres in the country through the development of local manufacturing
capabilities.
In global forums, India has demonstrated an unwillingness to participate in talks related to
data flows, protection and data localisation. For example, India did not join the WTO
plurilateral group on e-commerce and has also refused to sign the “Osaka Track” at the G20
summit held in Osaka, Japan, in 2019, which focused on the concept of “data free flow with
trust”. While these global efforts were directed towards a framework to securely generate,
collect and exchange data, India kept away from such global discussions. However, it
continued its efforts to develop a robust domestic data regulatory regime.
As of September 2020, economic growth in India has contracted by 23.9 per cent.3 Therefore,
there is a need for the country to leverage on its strengths in knowledge-based manpower and
technology to spur economic recovery. India has the potential to develop as a technology and
data processing hub and COVID-19 offers unique opportunities in both off-shore services
delivery and manufacturing, much of which is yet to be explored. Today, there is need for
2 For details see, G20 Leaders Statement available at
https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20_Extraordinary%20G20%20Leaders%E2%80%99%20Summit_St
atement_EN%20(3).pdf (last accessed August 23, 2020) 3 Source: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/gdp-contraction-23-9-the-economics-behind-the-math-
6578046/ (last accessed September 23, 2020)
4
more services to be offered online and delivered remotely, which is an opportunity for India.
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, India was a net importer of technology goods, resulting in
a large trade deficit in goods.4 However, now for some time, India has been trying to develop
its domestic manufacturing capabilities in technology goods and has been able to attract some
global firms such as Apple Inc. to set up a manufacturing base in the country. With the onset
of COVID-19 from the Wuhan province in China, technology firms from developed
economies like the US, European Union (EU) and Japan are looking to relocate their
production bases from China and India is a strong contender to be the next manufacturing
hub. While developed countries and global firms are actively considering India as a
manufacturing destination for electronic goods, in the long run, firms will also look at ease of
doing business, regulatory certainty, compliance burden, etc., which includes the ease of data
sharing with the home country and other locations, before making a final decision on their
investment destinations. India, therefore, needs the right polices and strategies to harness its
true potential.
Given this background, the paper (a) presents an overview of the changing perceptions
related to data localisation across the globe – before and during COVID-19, (b) assesses
India’s manufacturing capabilities and trade in digital products and services, (c) highlights
India’s unique strengths during COVID-19 (d) discusses developments in different
international forums, (e) identifies the concerns, commonalities and differences across the
G20 countries on data localisation, and (f) makes recommendations to the Indian government
for the upcoming G20 Saudi Presidency, providing strategies for India as it takes over the
G20 Presidency in 2022.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and survey
framework. Section 3 presents how policies with respect to data localisation have evolved
globally and in India, before and during COVID-19. Section 4 presents India’s trade in digital
products and services and examines its manufacturing capabilities and export
competitiveness in select products used in data centres. Section 5 presents findings from the
survey. Section 6 identifies the barriers and challenges in India; Section 7 examines the
developments on data localisation in G20 and Section 8 makes recommendations on the way
forward to India’s Presidency in 2022.
2. Methodology
This paper is based on secondary data and information analysis and a primary survey.
Conventionally, data localisation policies (see Section 3.1) only impose restrictions on the
collection, processing, storage and transmission of data. However, in India, data localisation
policies (for example, the Draft National E-Commerce Policy of 2019) also talk about the
creation of data centres. Since government policies tie in the issue of data protection to the
issue of digital infrastructure creation, the secondary data analysis tries to focus on changes in
the pattern of India’s trade in digital goods and services, value addition in India’s exports of
4 Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Statistics (last accessed July 19, 2020)
5
digital goods needed for data centres, and India’s export competitiveness in select digital
goods needed for data centres.
2.1 Secondary Data
To examine India’s trade flows and how it has changed over time, data from the WTO, UN
Comtrade and the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S)
has been analysed. To assess trade flows and India’s competitiveness in data centre
equipment, 45 products (see Table A1 in Appendix) have been identified, in consultation
with industry experts, at the Harmonised System (HS) 6-digit level out of the 111 products
covered under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA)-1 of the WTO.5 India signed
the ITA-1 in 1996 and committed itself to zero duty on imports for a set of information
technology products. Export competitiveness of the select 45 products was calculated using
the Balassa (1965) Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA).
India’s domestic and foreign value added in gross exports and gross imports of select
equipment required for data servers was computed using the Trade in Value-Added (TiVA)
database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The
principal indicators include the domestic value-added content of gross exports/gross imports
and foreign value-added content of gross exports for the year 2015.6 The industry category
selected is D26T27: Computers, Electronic and Electrical Equipment.
2.2 Primary Survey
The primary survey, covering in-depth interviews with 60 stakeholders (see Table 2.1), was
conducted in three phases between May 2018 and June 2020. Interviews with key informants
were conducted using semi-structured questionnaires. The time periods have been selected to
see changes in policies and understand the perceptions of respondents before and during
COVID-19. The survey covered global and Indian multinationals and Indian startups.
Companies were selected from sectors such as e-commerce, healthcare technology,
logistics/express delivery services, IT/ITeS and finance. A mix of both established firms and
new entrants were interviewed. Multinational firms were selected from G20 member
countries such as the US, EU member states, United Kingdom (UK), Republic of Korea and
Japan.
Table 2.1: Sampling Framework
Stakeholders Numbers Companies 30 Industry Associations 10 Policy Makers 10 Academics, Experts and Lawyers 10
Total 60
5 The ITA-1 was signed by India in 1997; the agreement includes a list of products in which India is obliged
by commitments in the WTO to offer zero duty to trading partners. 6 The latest data available in the TiVA database is for the year 2015.
6
The first phase of the survey was conducted between May and July 2018, after RBI
introduced the directive,7 DPSS.CO.OD No. 2785/06.08.005/2017-2018, on April 6,
2018, regarding “storage of payment system data”. This directive required that all data
related to payments have to be stored in systems only in India. Interviews were conducted
with online payment companies, credit card companies, software companies and banks
operating in the financial sector and/or have outsourcing centres in India.
The second set of interviews was conducted after the release of the Draft National E-
Commerce Policy of 2019. The interviews were conducted between March and June 2019
with software companies, electronic equipment manufacturers, engineering companies, e-
commerce companies, data analytics firms, courier companies and off-shoring
companies.
The third and final set of interviews was conducted between May 2020-June 2020 during
the COVID-19 pandemic. The targets for this round of the survey were health-tech
companies, e-commerce companies, foreign digital goods manufacturing, IT services and
data analytics companies.
Interviews in the first two phases were conducted in person and over telephone calls.
Interviews in the third phase were conducted through telephone and video conferencing
facilities. Forty per cent of stakeholders were repeated between the second and final phase of
the interviews to understand changes in perceptions. The aim of the primary survey is to (a)
understand perceptions about data localisation, policies related to data localisation and how
this perception has changed overtime (b) examine the impact of data localisation on select
sectors (c) identify issues and barriers faced in developing India as a technology hub,
including issues related to infrastructure and regulations (d) examine the views of
stakeholders on the right policy with a focus on how India can develop domestic
manufacturing capabilities and enhance exports of digital goods and services and (e)
understand the views of stakeholders on what India’s position in international forums should
be.
3. Before and During COVID-19: Data Localisation Globally and in India
3.1 Before COVID-19 Data Localisation: Globally
In the past few years preceding COVID-19, many developed and developing countries have
implemented some form of data localisation measures. For example, the Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, 2018, in the US requires trans-border access to
communications data in criminal law enforcement investigations. In the EU, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), implemented in 2018, aims to give control to individuals
(data subjects) over their personal data, and allows conditional flow of personal data without
local storage requirement. The GDPR applies to all companies processing and holding
7 For details, see Storage of Payment System Data available at
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/153PAYMENTEC233862ECC4424893C558DB75B3E2B
C.PDF (last accessed July 19, 2020)
7
personal data of subjects residing in the EU, regardless of the company’s location.8 The
regulation (Article 5.1-2) outlines seven protection and accountability principles namely (a)
lawfulness, fairness and transparency (b) purpose limitation (c) data minimisation (d)
accuracy (e) storage limitation (f) integrity and confidentiality and (f) accountability. The
GDPR is viewed as one of the most comprehensive data protection policies in recent times,
and has acted as a reference for G20 countries such as Brazil, which has passed its data
protection law-Lei Geral de Protecao de Dados (LGPD) in 2018 to unify over 40 statutes that
govern personal data (both online and offline).9 As of June 2019, around 1 in 3 businesses
across the world were found to be GDPR compliant (Capgemini Research Institute, 2019).
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) reported10 that close to 11 major countries
have imposed localisation requirements on the flow of both sensitive and non-sensitive data
such as geo-location data, health data and service suppliers’ data. For example, the Republic
of Korea restricted the export of geo-location data, which acts as a barrier for international
suppliers that incorporate services such as traffic updates and navigation into their
products. Australia’s My Health Records Act of 2012 restricted the storage of all identifiable
electronic health records (EHR) to local data centres only. China’s Cyber security Law of
2016 (implemented in 2017) prohibited or severely restricted routine cross-border transfers of
information, including a broad range of information falling into the undefined category of
being “important”. The law also imposed requirements on companies, which operate “critical
information infrastructure.” China’s 2012 Cloud Computing Policy prohibited foreign
companies from directly providing cloud computing services to customers in China, and
required that foreign service suppliers partner with a Chinese company and turn over their
technology, intellectual property and brands to that partner in order to enter the market. In
addition, in 2019, China issued a guideline that required cloud service operators to submit
their platforms for a government assessment. 11
3.2 During COVID-19 Data Localisation: Globally
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries have started taking steps to stop the
rapid transmission of the disease. Since the disease spreads through personal contact, it has
become essential to build contact tracing applications, which requires sharing of citizens’
data and monitoring their whereabouts/locations, which may be at the cost of their privacy.
At the same time, a number of outpatient services such as primary care physician visits,
specialist visits, etc., are being offered through tele-health services, generating a lot of data
and information that need analysis.
G20 countries such as Republic of Korea, US and Australia have facilitated data sharing
through additional provisions or amendments in their policies in the domain of data
8 Source: https://eugdpr.org/the-regulation/gdpr-faqs/(last accessed June 3, 2019) 9 Source: https://gdpr.eu/gdpr-vs-lgpd/ (last accessed October 1, 2020) 10 Source: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2019/march/fact-sheet-2019-
national-trade-estimate (last accessed June 12, 2019) 11 Source: https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinas-new-
security-reviews-cloud-services/ (last accessed October 1, 2020)
8
localisation, pandemic/disaster management and health. (see Table 3. 1 for a comparison
across select G20 countries).
Table 3.1: Policies to Allow Data Sharing during COVID-19 Across Select G20
Countries
Country Data Localisation Policy Pandemic/Disaster
Management Policy Health Policy
Republic of Korea
Australia
United States
European Union
Indonesia
India
Source: Compiled from various government sources
In the Republic of Korea, The Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA), 2011, banned the
collection, use, and disclosure of personal data without prior informed consent of the
individuals whose data are involved prior to the pandemic. However, during COVID-19,
amendments were made to the Contagious Disease Prevention and Control Act (CDPCA) of
2009 and authority was granted under the said Act to override certain provisions of the PIPA
and other privacy laws. The said amendments allowed sharing of seven categories of data,
which included sharing of sensitive data such as geo-location data, personal identification
information and prescription and other medical records, among others (Park et al., 2020).
In the US, the onset of the pandemic led to almost all outpatient clinical establishments
offering services via tele-health. Health care providers in the US are subject to data privacy
laws laid out in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996.
However, as these providers seek to communicate with patients, and provide tele-health
services through remote communication technologies, these technologies and the manner in
which they are used may not fully comply with the requirements of HIPAA Rules. As a result
of this new necessity for seamless tele-health services, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on March 30, 2020, issued a
notification12 under which it decided “to not impose penalties for noncompliance with the
HIPAA Rules in connection with the good faith provision of telehealth using non-public
facing audio or video communication products during the COVID-19 nationwide public
health emergency.”
In Australia, while the My Health Records Act of 2012 prohibited any kind of sharing of
health data (Kathuria et al., 2019), the COVID Safe Privacy Policy of 202013 facilitates the
operation of Australia’s contact tracing app, and has provisions that allow COVID +ve
12 For details, see Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, available at https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/special-topics/emergency-preparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-
telehealth/index.html (last accessed July 18, 2020) 13 For details, see https://covidsafe.gov.au/privacy-policy.html (last accessed September 29, 2020)
9
patients to share their health data with public health officials for effective contact tracing.
Under this policy, patients are also allowed to share geo-location data so that officials can
identify COVID hotspots in the country.
In the EU, the European Data Protection Board (EDBP), in the wake of the pandemic,
emphasised that the “GDPR and Directive 2002/58/EC (the “ePrivacy Directive”) both
contain specific rules allowing for the use of anonymous or personal data to support public
authorities and other actors at national and EU levels in monitoring and containing the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus”, and reiterated that data and technology can leverage the
effectiveness of public health measures.14
These changing localisation policies indicate a shift towards more liberal policies to manage
the pandemic. The pandemic has also led to increased partnerships between the government
and private sector in areas like data analytics, online application development, online
platforms, etc., which have created new opportunities for small businesses across the world to
participate in technology initiatives, scale up quickly and compete against more established
firms.15
As a result of this more favourable stance towards data sharing, countries across the world
have been able to take a number of initiatives to tackle the pandemic by implementing
contract tracing applications, participating in global clinical trials, collaborating with
researchers to study the impact of the pandemic and implementing large scale telemedicine
services in relevant healthcare settings. Some of these initiatives are listed in Box 3.1.
14 For details, see Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the
COVID-19 outbreak available at
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_tracing_covid_with_a
nnex_en.pdf(last accessed August 23, 2020) 15 For details, see https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2020/march/fact-sheet-2020-
national-trade-estimate-strong-binding-rules-advance-digital-trade (last accessed August 23, 2020)
10
Box 3.1: Key Initiatives to Address COVID-19 Pandemic: Examples of Some Countries
Contact Tracing Applications - While a number of countries such as the US, Sweden and
Finland are only doing limited contact tracing, countries such as the Republic of Korea,
Australia, Canada and China are engaging in comprehensive contact tracing, which means that
all individuals in the country are being tracked. In fact, the Republic of Korea’s entire reponse
to the pandemic is rooted in its successful contact tracing strategies.
Expanding Telemedicine Services - Telemedicine has emerged as a critical tool in providing
medical care to patients, while reducing the risk of transmission of COVID-19 among other
patients, clinicians, etc. The adoption of telemedicine has grown in early adopter markets such
as China, Singapore and Australia (Bain and Company, 2020). Countries such as Japan and
Indonesia have seen entry of new players in the telemedicine market. In the US, all outpatient
services across major health systems are only being offered through telemedicine. In fact,
insurance companies and the federal government are adequately reimbursing providers for
offering telemedicine services.
Global Cinical Trials - Pharmaceutical companies and research organisations across the globe
are running cross-border clinical trials to develop vaccines/treatments to combat SARS-CoV-2
pandemic. For example, AstraZeneca PLC in collaboration with the University of Oxford, UK,
has tied up with Serum Institute of India Private Limited, to develop a vaccine by the end of the
year 2021, which has begun human trials in Australia. Gilead Sciences, Inc. (US) is running its
global trial in 84 locations across the world to test the efficacy of its drug Remdesivir.
Source: Compiled from https://healthadvancesblog.com/2020/05/08/how-covid-19-is-
accelerating-telemedicine-adoption-in-asia-pacific/; https://www.who.int/news-
room/feature-stories/detail/tracking-covid-19-contact-tracing-in-the-digital-age;
https://theprint.in/health/oxfords-new-covid-vaccine-begins-human-trials-in-partnership-
with-serum-institute-of-india/498548/ (last accessed October 1, 2020)
While it is now a need to share data, the evolving policy landscape for data protection has
also led to concerns regarding breach of data privacy and misuse. For example, the EDPB in
its Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of Location Data and Contact Tracing Tools in the context
of the COVID-19 Outbreak has cautioned that “data and technology used to fight COVID-19
should be used to empower, rather than to control, stigmatise, or repress individuals”. In
China, the government agencies have also issued additional cybersecurity and personal
information protection notices (such as the Notice on Ensuring Personal Information
Protection and Utilisation of Big Data to Support Joint efforts for COVID-19 Prevention and
Control) as a step towards protecting personal information.16 In the US, the Coronavirus
Containment Corps Act, 2020 includes plans to prevent the misuse of individuals’ data by
ensuring automatic deletion of data, prohibition of data sharing within and with the federal
government (with the exception of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and Indian Health Service).17
16 Source: https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2020/03/data-privacy-issues-in-connection-with-the-
covid-19-outbreak (last accessed October 1, 2020) 17 Source: https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/One%20Pager-
Coronavirus%20Containment%20Act1.pdf (last accessed October 1, 2020)
11
3.3 Before COVID-19 Data Localisation: India
In 2015, the Indian government, with the Ministry of Electronics and Information
Technology (MeitY) as the nodal ministry, launched the “Digital India” initiative. The policy,
based on three key vision areas, namely, (a) digital infrastructure as a core utility to every
citizen (b) governance and services on demand and (c) digital empowerment of citizens, aims
to “transform India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy.”18
Apart from the Digital India campaign, the government also came up with a number of
policies to encourage domestic electronic goods/digital products manufacturing, support
domestic firms and create data infrastructure within the country. These policies encompass
(a) how data is required to be stored, managed and protected in India, i.e., the issue of data
localisation, and (b) manufacturing of products that store data. For example, the RBI
directive released on April 6, 2018, made it mandatory for all direct data related to payments
to be stored physically in India without a provision for data mirroring.
Subsequently, the Draft National E-commerce Policy19 was introduced on February 23, 2019.
The policy is based on six key pillars – the critical role of data, infrastructure development, e-
commerce marketplaces, regulatory issues, stimulating domestic digital economy and export
promotion through e-commerce. The draft policy acknowledges the role of data as a critical
factor in enabling economic growth and emphasises the creation and development of physical
infrastructure “on soil” for managing various types of data. Hence, the policy proposes the
grant of infrastructure status to data centres, server farms, towers and tower stations,
equipment, etc., which would (a) allow easier access to credit and finance and (b) facilitate
last mile connectivity across rural and urban areas. Thus, while the draft policy talks about
restrictions on sharing of cross-border data, it also talks about the creation of digital
infrastructure including data centres in the country. Therefore, the discussions related to data
localisation in India cover concerns about both data protection and manufacturing of digital
products [such as Electronic Systems Design and Manufacturing (ESDM) products].
India is yet to have a comprehensive regulation on data privacy and protection. The Draft
Personal Data Protection (PDP) of 2018 lays down localisation requirements for the storage
and handling of both sensitive and critical personal data. However, as of July 2020, the bill
was still pending in the Parliament. Since the PDP 2018 bill only covers provisions related to
personal data, the MeitY in 2019 set up a committee of experts to draft a framework for
handling non-personal data. The committee released its draft report titled ‘Report by the
Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework’20 on July 13, 2020.
18 Source: https://digitalindia.gov.in/content/introduction (last accessed June 24, 2019) 19 For details, see Draft National E-Commerce Policy, pp.9, available at
https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/DraftNational_e-commerce_Policy_23February2019.pdf (last accessed
July 11, 2019) 20 Source: https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159453381955063671.pdf (last accessed October
10, 2020)
12
In order to support the manufacturing of digital products, MeitY released the National Policy
on Electronics (NPE) 2019.21 The core aim of the policy is to develop India as a hub to
develop and manufacture ESDM products by (a) increasing domestic value addition and by
reducing dependence on import of electronic goods (b) integrating India with global value
chains to boost Indian ESDM exports (c) developing capacities for manufacturing in all sub-
sectors of electronics (d) introducing new fiscal incentives or augmenting existing incentives
for electronics manufacturing (e) promoting research and development (R&D) for electronic
products and (f) incentivising the establishment of production bases for the manufacture of
components.
In addition to support domestic manufacturing, the Indian government has also initiated
measures to restrict imports through tariff restrictions (such as an increase in smart phone
tariffs) and by imposing labelling and other non-tariff measures.22
Apart from the above, the Indian government opposed the “Osaka Track” at the G20 Japan
Presidency in 2019, and expressed its position favouring a more stringent form of on-soil data
localisation (for details see Section 7). However, this position has altered with the onset of
the pandemic. The next section discusses developments in India since the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic. While it is known that COVID-19 began in December 2019,
restrictions related to COVID-19 in India were only introduced in March 2020. Therefore,
this paper makes note of developments in India since March 2020.
3.4 During COVID-19 Data Localisation: India
Two key things happened following the outbreak of COVID-19 in India. In light of the
looming public health crisis, India went into an immediate lockdown on March 23, 2020, and
from May 5, 2020, altercations between Chinese and Indian troops led to increased geo-
political tensions between the two nations. In order to tackle the above situations, several
measures were taken by the government, which are explored in this section.
The outbreak of the pandemic made it necessary for citizens to share health information with
the government and allow the government to share and process such data. However, unlike
some of the countries discussed in Section 3.2, India does not have a comprehensive
pandemic Act and the existing Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897 is outdated. While Section 2
of the Act allows state governments to take appropriate measures to control the outbreak of a
disease, the Act is not advanced enough to tackle a pandemic in the modern age. As a result,
the pandemic is being managed under the ambit of the 2019 National Disaster Management
Plan of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The National Disaster Management Plan
mentions health emergencies but there are no specific provisions or policies in the Act to
handle a pandemic. Despite the regulatory gaps, three keys things with regards to data have
21 For details, see National Policy on Electronics 2019 available at
https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/eGazette_Notification_NPE%202019_dated%2025022019.pdf (last
accessed July 18, 2020) 22 For details,
seehttps://dgft.gov.in/sites/default/files/Notification%20No.%205%20dated%2007.05.2019%20English.pdf
(last accessed June 11, 2019)
13
happened in India since the onset of the pandemic – the launch of the “Aarogya Setu” mobile
application, India’s participation in various clinical trial databases and enhanced government-
private partnerships to address the pandemic (see Box 3.2). Thus, even though India earlier
supported rigid policies of data localisation, the country is now actively sharing sensitive
health data with global partners and collaborating with the private sector to address the
pandemic.
Box 3.2: Key Practices during COVID-19 in India
Aarogya Setu Mobile Application - The government launched the Aarogya Setu mobile
application on April 2, 2020. This application facilitates contact tracing of persons affected
with COVID-19, informs persons at-risk of precautions to be taken, and allows health
departments to take effective actions to mitigate the spread of the pandemic and enhance their
preparedness. As of date, the application has been successful in identifying COVID-19 hotspots
and has been downloaded by close to a million people in India. The data generated by this
application is collected and processed in real time to alert patients and policy makers to take
necessary precautions and allocate necessary resources accordingly. Since this application
collects confidential personal data on health and location, some experts have rasied concerns
about consumer protection, privacy and security in the absence of a framework to protect such
data, and about the accuracy of the technology itself (see, O’Neil, 2020). In response to such
concerns and to promote security, the source code of the application was made public.
Global Clinical Trials - India is participating with the WHO’s SOLIDARITY trial and, as of
July 2020, close to 26 trials from India have been listed on various global trial platforms such
as clinical trials. As a result of this participation, India is able to (a) share data on potential
COVID-19 therapies emerging from India and (b) gain access to similar data from trials being
conducted in other countries. This entire trial and its success depends on the successful
exchange of sensitive patient data.
Enhanced Government, Academic and Private Partnerships - Several partnerships are
developing decision support systems (DSS) and other applications (apps) to supplement data
from contact tracing apps; academics and researchers are regularly processing COVID-19 data
to either study the effect of COVID-related policies or COVID-19 itself. Researchers are also
using data from open-source software such as github to build predictive models to predict the
future spread of the disease and its effect on the economy.
Source: Compiled from https://www.mygov.in/aarogya-setu-app/;
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f54419a1-4823-404c-92f3-
c5e4f193b733; https://health.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/pharma/india-to-soon-
participate-in-who-solidarity-trial-for-developing-potential-covid-19-drugs-
govt/74855919 (last accessed October 1, 2020)
The public health crisis caused by COVID-19 has led India to engage in data sharing and
other such collaborations for the purposes of research and development. However, the
altercations at the Sino-Indian border, led the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) to
14
restrict imports from China. The MoCI, on June 23, 2020, has imposed a requirement23 for
sellers on the Government e-Marketplace (GeM) to declare the country of origin while
registering all new products. Sellers, who had already uploaded their products before the
introduction of this new policy, are being reminded regularly to update the country of origin,
with a warning that their products would be removed from GeM if they fail to update.24
While this has been imposed strictly for products selling on GeM, private e-commerce
companies such as Flipkart Internet Private Limited and Amazon.com Inc. have also been
informed of the requirement. In addition to this, the Prime Minister has also called for India
to become “atma-nirbhar” or “self-reliant”. Thus, capitalising on the goals identified in the
Draft National E-Commerce Policy and the NPE 2019, this goal of “self-reliance” has called
upon India to become a manufacturing and export hub for the production of ESDM and other
digital goods.25
4. Manufacturing, Trade and Investment
This section presents trends and developments in manufacturing digital products in India,
India’s trade in digital goods and services, its export competitiveness and its integration in
global value chains.
4.1 Manufacturing of ESDM Products and/or Digital Goods
There has been an increase in the production of electronic goods in India, although there is no
official data source to show the projected growth and/or targets. According to one study, the
industry is expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.2 per cent and
reach a production value of US$104 billion by the end of 2020 [India Brand Equity
Foundation (IBEF), 2015] from a value of US$32.7 billion in 2013. The Indian
semiconductor industry is expected to grow at a CAGR of around 10 per cent to reach a
market value of US$32.25 billion in 2025.26 Since 100 per cent foreign direct investment
(FDI) is allowed, most forecasts expect improvements in domestic manufacturing
capabilities. Recently, the computer hardware and software sector attracted the second
highest FDI inflow. The sector attracted approved FDI inflows worth US$7.67billion in the
financial year (FY) 2019-20, which is an increase from US$6.41 billion in the FY 2018-19.27
In addition, global brands such as Apple Inc. and Samsung have also announced their
intention to make significant investments in India.
23 For details, see https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1633511 (last accessed August 22, 2020) 24 Source: https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/pn3_2020.pdf (last accessed October 5, 2020) 25 Source: https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2020/08/view-from-india-electronics-sector-seizes-crisis-
opportunity-for-economic-growth/ (last accessed September 22, 2020) 26 Source: https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/huge-growth-of-usd-32-35-bn-by-2025-for-
indian-semiconductor-market-report-118022801265_1.html (last accessed August 23, 2020) 27 For details, see Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) April 2000 to March 2020, available at
https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_Factsheet_March20_28May_2020.pdf (last accessed August 23,
2020)
15
4.2 Trade in Goods and Services
In 2019, global trade in goods and services were US$18.89 trillion and US$6.03 trillion
respectively. India’s share in global exports and imports of goods was 1.7 per cent and 2.5
per cent, with the rank of 18 and 10, respectively (WTO, 2020). The exports of products
covered under ITA-1 increased from US$549 billion in 1996 to US$1653 billion in 2015. In
the same year, India ranked 19th in exports of ITA-1 products globally, with a share of 0.1 per
cent. In imports of ITA-1 products, India ranked 10th with share of 2 per cent of global
imports (WTO, 2017). Thus, after signing ITA-1, India’s negative trade balance seems to
have increased, raising concerns that India has not been able to develop its domestic
manufacturing capacity or be a part of global value chains. The recent increase in tariffs on
certain electronic products has been an attempt to promote domestic manufacturing in line
with the “Make in India” initiative.
One key beneficiary of zero duty imports was the Indian computer services industry; the
industry has been experiencing a boom since 1996 as costs of computing and
telecommunications equipment fell. Today, India has a positive trade balance in services,
with the trade balance increasing from US$12.6 trillion in 2009 to US$35.6 trillion in 2019.
In commercial services, India’s global share in exports and imports was 3.5 per cent and 3.1
per cent, with the rank of 8 and 10, respectively in 2019 (WTO, 2020). According to the
WTO, a major part of India’s positive trade balance in services can be attributed to the high
net exports in the sub-sector “telecommunications, computer and information services”,
where India ranked 2nd in 2019 after the EU. Among the top 10 exporters, India had an
overall share of 42.8 per cent in 2019, with an annual increase in exports from 2018 by 12 per
cent. Within telecommunication services exports, India ranked 5th globally and, within
computer and information services, India ranked 2nd in 2019. This was ahead of China, which
ranked 8th in telecommunication services and 3rd in computer and information services
respectively.28 India is also among the top exporters of financial and business services. In
2019, India ranked 9th and 5th respectively in global exports of financial and business
services.
Focusing on India’s strength in services, the country holds the first rank in A.T. Kearney’s
Global Services Location Index29 (GSLI) every year, since the inception of the GSLI in 2004
(Kearney, 2019). The GSLI ranks 50 countries based on their potential and fit to deliver
business services to global companies.30 India is the world’s largest provider of information
technology-business process management (IT-BPM) services, with the IT-BPM sector being
valued at US$177 billion in the financial year 2019 (NASSCOM, 2020). While IT services
have been approaching the US$100 billion mark (growing at a rate of 6.7 per cent), BPM has
28 Source: Compiled from World Trade Statistics Review 2019, WTO, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2019_e/wts2019_e.pdf (last accessed July 13, 2020) 29 The GSLI identifies locations that can best provide information technology (IT), business process
outsourcing (BPO), and voice services based on countries' financial attractiveness, people skills,
availability, and business environment. 30 Source: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/at-kearneys-2019-global-services-location-index-gsli-
resonates-with-digital-change-300867002.html (last accessed September 28, 2020)
16
been growing at a rate of over 8 per cent between 2019 and 2020. The report also highlights
that India is expected to rapidly adopt, and grow in nine digital technology areas including
three foundational technologies; Big data and analytics, cloud computing, and cybersecurity
and six advanced technologies - artificial intelligence, internet of things, 3D printing,
robotics, blockchain and immersive media.
With the outbreak of COVID-19, exports of certain services such as travel and tourism, and
goods-related services such as freight, transport and manufacturing services have been
adversely impacted. However, India is a major importer of these services. For example, in
2019, India ranked 13th among the top global importers of goods-related services with a share
of 0.8 per cent. On the other hand, trade in services such as telecommunications, computer
and information services have seen an increasing trend owing to demand for off-shoring,
online and online delivery of services. This is an area of India’s strength, which needs policy
attention as the country focuses on reviving growth and exports. As more and more services
are delivered online globally, data will play a key role in international trade.
In fact, trade in goods has declined due to sudden lockdowns, protectionism, etc. With
COVID-19, on April 8, 2020, the WTO projected a reduction in world trade by 13-32 per
cent in 2020 due to disruptions in supply chains. On June 22, 2020, WTO pointed out that the
volume of merchandise trade shrank by 3 per cent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2020.
Initial estimates for the second quarter indicated a year-on-year drop of around 18.5 per
cent.31 Thus, there will be a reduction in exports of goods. Travel bans and visa restrictions
are likely to adversely affect the mobility of high-skilled labour, but data flows are likely to
increase due to fast adoption of 4IR by all countries. India, with its strength in IT/ITeS
services, can not only enhance its exports but become a global data analytics and processing
hub.
In the past few months, India faced a decline in exports and imports, both due to the COVID-
19 related lockdown and due to geo-political tensions with China. Compared to March-June
2019, exports from India and imports to India have declined considerably between March and
June 2020 (see Figure 4.1). Between March 2020 and June 2020, imports of goods from the
world to India fell by 51.70 per cent and exports of goods during the same period fell by
33.04 per cent. As a result of this sharp decline in imports, India’s trade deficit which stood at
US$11,001.30 million at the beginning of the pandemic (March 2020) ended up going to a
surplus of US$793.17 million in June 2020. Disaggregated data by product categories are not
available in the public domain for the year 2020, which makes it difficult to understand how
the digital sector has been affected by the pandemic.
31 Source: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr858_e.pdf (last accessed August 23, 2020)
17
Figure 4.1: India’s Trade in Goods: March-June 2019 versus March-June 2020
(In US$ million)
Source: Compiled from the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry
of Commerce and Industry. Available at http://dgciskol.gov.in/QuickEstimeArchive.aspx
(last accessed July 13, 2020)
Since many government policies focus on local manufacturing of digital goods and on-soil
data localisation through the creation of data centre servers and cloud infrastructure, etc., the
next section tries to examine India’s trade in the equipment required to build, run and
maintain data centres.
4.3 Trade in Select Equipment Required for Data Centres
Using a sample of 45 ITA-1 products at the Harmonised System (HS) 6-digit level, it can be
seen that India has a large negative trade balance in equipment for data centres (see Figure
4.2), and the gap seems to increase over time. While exports of select equipment have
increased from US$1.70 billion in 2010 to US$3.23 billion in 2019, imports during the same
period have increased from US$10.73 billion to US$34.41 billion. In other words, while
exports have grown at a CAGR of 7.39 per cent, imports during the same period have grown
at a CAGR of 13.82 per cent.
Figure 4.2: India’s Trade in Select Equipment Required for Data Centres (2010-2019)
(In US$ billion)
Source: UNComtrade Statistics, available at https://comtrade.un.org/data/ (last accessed June 27,
2020)
-20000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
2019 2020 2019 2020 2019 2020 2019 2020
March April May June
Exports
Imports
Total Trade
Trade Balance
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Export Import
18
4.3.1 India’s Trade in Select Equipment Required for Data Centres: By Country
In 2017, the top 5 and top 10 export partners had a share of 63.63 per cent and 78.10 per cent
respectively in India’s exports of select equipment required for data centres (see Table 4.1
(a)). This share has fallen to 50.52 per cent and 71.02 per cent in 2019. It is worth noting that
the share of exports to China and Hong Kong has increased.
Table 4.1 (a): Top 10 Export Markets for India in Select Equipment for Data Centres
(2017 and 2019)
2017 2019
Rank Country Export Share (%) Rank Country Export Share (%)
1 United Arab Emirates 31.23 1 United States 16.59
2 United States 10.61 2 China 13.04
3 China 10.11 3 Netherlands 7.10
4 Russian Federation 6.98 4 United Arab Emirates 6.90
5 Netherlands 4.70 5 Hong Kong 6.89
6 Hong Kong 3.89 6 Singapore 5.12
7 Germany 3.23 7 France 4.86
8 South Africa 2.97 8 Germany 4.24
9 Turkey 2.36 9 Vietnam 3.60
10 Singapore 2.02 10 Indonesia 2.65
Top 5 Share 63.63 Top 5 Share 50.52
Top 10 Share 78.10 Top 10 Share 71.02
Source: UNComtrade Statistics, available at https://comtrade.un.org/data/ (last accessed July 18,
2020)
In terms of countries from which India imports, in 2017, the top 5 and top 10 import partners
had a share of 82.08 per cent and 91.94 per cent, respectively (see Table 4.1 (b)). This share
has since increased to 83.46 per cent and 93.50 per cent in 2019. The share of imports from
China has decreased from 63.64 per cent in 2017 to 40.47 per cent in 2019 but the share of
imports from Hong Kong has shown a significant increase.
Table 4.1 (b): Top 10 Countries from which India Imports Select Equipment for Data
Centres (2017 and 2019)
2017 2019
Rank Country Import Share (%) Rank Country Import Share (%)
1 China 63.64 1 China 40.47
2 Korea, Republic of 7.46 2 Hong Kong 22.02
3 Singapore 5.16 3 Singapore 9.08
4 Hong Kong 3.02 4 Viet Nam 6.27
5 United States 2.80 5 Korea, Republic of 5.62
6 Vietnam 2.74 6 USA 3.62
7 Malaysia 2.38 7 Taiwan 2.09
8 Mexico 1.76 8 Malaysia 1.89
9 Taiwan 1.58 9 Mexico 1.24
10 Japan 1.41 10 Japan 1.20
Top 5 Share 82.08 Top 5 Share 83.46
Top 10 Share 91.94 Top 10 Share 93.50
Source: UNComtrade Statistics, available at https://comtrade.un.org/data/ (last accessed July 18,
2020)
19
Overall, India is still heavily dependent on China for trade in digital products for data centres
and digital infrastructure creation. While disaggregated data is not available, overall trade
data shows that trade between India and China has declined drastically since the outbreak of
COVID-19 (see Figure 4.3) due to disruptions in supply chains and geo-political tensions.
Between January 2020 and March 2020,32 exports of goods from India to China have
declined by 29.24 per cent and imports from China during the same time period have
declined by 16.90 per cent. In addition, China’s share in total exports from India fell from
5.83 per cent in January 2020 to 4.96 per cent in March 2020, while its share in Indian
imports fell from 14.64 per cent to 9.25 per cent. As a result, India’s trade deficit with China
decreased from US$4517.48 million to US$1816.04 million during the same period.
Disaggregated data by market and product is needed to do further analysis on whether trade is
routed through a third country.
Figure 4.3: India-China Trade in Goods: January-March 2019 versus
January-March 2020
(In US$ million)
Source: Extracted from Export Import Bank Monthly, DGFT. Available at https://commerce-
app.gov.in/meidb/default.asp (last accessed July 13, 2020).
4.3.2 India’s Trade in Equipment Required for Data Centres: By Products
Out of the 45 products, Table A2 and Table A3 in Appendix present the top 10 products
exported and imported by India respectively in 2017 and 2019. In 2019, the top three
products exported by India include ‘telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless
network’ (HS-851712), ‘static converters’ (HS-850440) and ‘machines for the reception,
conversion & transmission/regeneration of voice’ (HS-851762). The top three products
imported during the same period include ‘parts of telephone sets, including telephones for
cellular networks/for other wireless networks’ (HS-851770), ‘electronic integrated circuits,
32 While we use data for March-May 2020 in Section 4.2, we use data for January-March 2020 in this section.
This is because while India went into a lockdown in March 2020, China went into a lockdown in January.
-6,000.00
-4,000.00
-2,000.00
0.00
2,000.00
4,000.00
6,000.00
8,000.00
10,000.00
2019 2020 2019 2020 2019 2020
January February March
Month-Year
India’s Total Export to China
India’s Total Import from China
Total Trade with China
Trade Balance with China
20
processors & controllers’ (HS-854231) and ‘portable automatic data processing machines,
weighing not more than 10 kg, consisting of a least a central processing unit, a keyboard & a
display’ (HS-847130). India’s trade is fairly concentrated in both exports and imports with
the share of the top 10 items of exports being 93.15 per cent and that of the top 10 imported
items being 84.03 per cent in 2019. If the government wants to reduce import dependence, it
is important to focus on the domestic manufacturing of these items.
4.3.3 India’s Export Competitiveness in Goods required for Data Centres
The RCAs based on the 45 product lines (see Table 4.2) show that in 2010, 2017 and 2019,
India enjoyed comparative advantage in 3 of the exported products out of the 45 product
categories considered. In all the years, India enjoyed export competitiveness in ‘electrical
capacitors, fixed, designed for use in 50/60Hz circuits & having a reactive power handling
capacity of not <0.5 kvar (power capacitors)’ (HS-853210), and ‘fixed electrical capacitors,
other than those of 8532.10, dielectric of paper/plastics’ (HS-853225).
Comparing the export competitiveness of the 45 selected items (see Table 4.2) with India’s
top 10 exported items for building data centres (as shown in Table A2 in Appendix), it can be
seen that India has a significant comparative advantage in the export of ‘electrical capacitors,
fixed, designed for use in 50/60Hz circuits & having a reactive power handling capacity of
not <0.5 kvar (power capacitors)’ (HS-853210), for both 2010 and 2019. However, this
product is not among the top 10 products exported from India in either of the years. Thus,
there is potential for the Indian government to support an increase in the manufacture of
products in which the country has a comparative advantage. In addition, there is need for
more primary survey-based studies to understand the reasons for low competitiveness of the
products listed in Table 4.2 and how domestic competitiveness can be enhanced. This will
help government to come up with the right polices to support the sector.
21
Table 4.2: Revealed Comparative Advantage33 of India’s Select Exports of Equipment for Data Centres (2010, 2017 and 2019)
HS-
Code
Product Name RCAs
2010 2017 2019
847130 Portable automatic data processing machines, weighing not more than 10 kg, consisting of a least a central processing unit, a keyboard
& a display
0.02 0.02 0.03
847141 Other automatic data processing machines: Comprising in the same housing at least a central processing unit & an input & output unit,
whether/not combined
0.11 0.08 0.05
847149 Other automatic data processing machines, presented in the form of systems. 0.02 0.01 0.02
847150 Processing units other than those of sub-heading 8471.41/8471.49, whether/not containing in the same housing one/two of the following
types of unit: storage units, input units, output units
0.06 0.02 0.03
847160 Input/output units, whether/not containing storage units in the same housing 0.34 0.05 0.09
847170 Storage units 0.12 0.02 0.03
847180 Other units of automatic data processing machines, excluding 8471.50, 8471.60, and 8471.70. 0.07 0.01 0.01
847190 Magnetic/optical readers, machines for transcribing data onto data media in coded form & machines for processing such data, n.e.s. 0.33 0.04 0.05
847321 Parts & accessories (excl. covers, carrying cases & the like) suit. for use solely/principally with the electronic calculating machines of
8470.10/8470.21/8470.29
0.00 0.01 0.10
847329 Parts & accessories (excl. covers, carrying cases & the like) suit. for use solely/principally with the machines of 84.70 other than for
those headings incl. in 8473.21
0.42 0.06 0.06
847330 Parts & accessories of the machines of heading 84.71 0.07 0.05 0.04
847350 Parts & accessories equally suitable for use with machines of two/more of the headings 84.69 to 84.72 0.32 0.03 0.44
850440 Static converters 0.55 0.57 0.69
850450 Inductors, n.e.s. (excl. for cathode ray tubes) 0.14 0.08 0.09
851711 Line telephone sets with cordless handsets 2.15 0.17 0.20
851712 Telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless networks, other than line telephone sets with cordless handsets 0.79 0.04 0.21
851718 Other telephone sets, incl. telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless networks, other than 8517.11 & 8517.12 0.29 0.16 0.13
851761 Base stations for transmission/reception of voice, images/other data, incl. apparatus for communication in a wired/wireless network
(such as a local/wide area network)
0.00 0.10 0.06
851762 Machines for the reception, conversion & transmission/regeneration of voice, images/other data, incl. switching & routing apparatus 0.03 0.19 0.23
851769 Communication Apparatus (excluding telephone sets or base stations); machines for the transmission or reception of voice, images or
other data (including wired/wireless networks), n.e.c. in item no. 8517.6
0.70 0.64 0.50
33 Revealed Comparative Advantage is calculated as of country I for product j is often measured by the product’s share in the country’s exports in relation to its share in
world trade: RCAij = (xij/Xit) / (xwj/Xwt) where xij and xwj are the values of country i’s exports of product j and world exports of product j and where Xit and Xwt refer to
the country’s total exports and world total exports. A value of less than unity implies that the country has a revealed comparative disadvantage in the product. Similarly,
if the index exceeds unity, the country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in the product.
22
HS-
Code
Product Name RCAs
2010 2017 2019
851770 Parts of telephone sets, incl. telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless networks; other apparatus for the transmission/reception
of voice, images/other data, incl. apparatus for communication in a wired/wireless network
0.14 0.10 0.10
853210 Electrical capacitors, fixed, designed for use in 50/60Hz circuits & having a reactive power handling capacity of not <0.5 kvar (power
capacitors) 2.95 2.90 2.86
853221 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, tantalum 0.00 0.00 0.00
853222 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, aluminium electrolytic 0.00 0.00 0.01
853223 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, ceramic dielectric, single layer 0.03 0.03 0.06
853224 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, ceramic dielectric, multilayer 0.00 0.00 0.01
853225 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, dielectric of paper/plastics 1.39 2.31 2.22
853229 Fixed electrical capacitors, n.e.s. in 85.32 0.23 0.14 0.25
853230 Variable/adjustable (pre-set) electrical capacitors 0.90 0.23 0.28
853290 Parts of the electrical capacitors of 85.32 0.34 0.34 0.53
853310 Fixed carbon electrical resistors, composition/film types 0.62 1.31 1.07
853321 Fixed electrical resistors (excl. fixed carbon resistors, composition/film types), for a power handling capacity not >20W 0.12 0.06 0.06
853329 Fixed electrical resistors (excl. fixed carbon resistors, composition/film types), n.e.s. in 85.33 0.19 0.15 0.11
853331 Wire wound variable electrical resistors, incl. rheostats & potentiometers (excl. heating resistors), for a power handling capacity not
>20W
0.33 0.24 0.18
853339 Wire wound variable electrical resistors, incl. rheostats & potentiometers (excl. heating resistors), n.e.s. in 85.33 0.21 0.33 0.46
853340 Electrical resistors (excl. heating resistors, light dependent resistors), n.e.s. in 85.33 0.27 0.22 0.23
853390 Parts of the electrical resistors of 85.33 0.10 0.06 0.11
853650 Switches other than isolating switches & make-&-break switches, for a voltage not >1000V 0.26 0.27 0.27
853669 Plugs & sockets for a voltage not >1000V 0.12 0.13 0.13
853690 Electrical apparatus for switching/protecting electrical circuits/for making connections to/in electrical circuits, n.e.s. in 85.36, for a
voltage not >1000V
0.37 0.32 0.36
854231 Electronic integrated circuits, processors & controllers, whether/not combined with memories, converters, logic circuits, amplifiers,
clock & timing circuits/other circuits
0.01 0.00 0.01
854232 Electronic integrated circuits, memories 0.01 0.00 0.00
854233 Electronic integrated circuits, amplifiers 0.00 0.00 0.00
854239 Other electronic integrated circuits, other than Amplifiers/memories/processors & controllers 0.00 0.01 0.04
854290 Parts of electronic integrated circuits 0.03 0.01 0.01
Source: Calculated using data from WITS
Note: The sub-categories in which India enjoys comparative advantage have been highlighted.
23
4.4 India’s Value-Added in Trade of Select Equipment Required for Data Centres
The domestic and foreign value-added content of gross exports and gross imports have been
calculated for the computers, electronic and electrical equipment industry (based on industrial
classification ISIC Revision 4), which includes products that are required for data centres.
The data has been calculated for the latest year available, i.e., 2015, and is presented in Table
4.3. The three indicators are defined as follows:
Domestic Value-Added Content of Gross-Exports: It shows the amount of domestic
value-addition that has gone into the production supply chain of a certain product
category for a certain exporting country (a forward linkage).
Domestic Value-Added Content of Gross-Imports: It shows the amount of domestic
value-addition that has been incorporated while importing a certain product category for a
certain importing country.
Foreign Value-Added Content of Gross-Exports: It shows the amount of foreign value-
addition that has gone into the production supply chain of a certain product category for a
certain exporting country (a backward linkage).
Table 4.3: Value-Added in Trade of Select Equipment Required for Data Centres -
2015
(In US$ million)
Indicators Value Gross Exports
/Imports
Share
(%)
Domestic Value-Added Content of Gross-Exports 3168.9 12347.4 25.66
Domestic Value-Added Content of Gross-Imports 152.7 37353.2 0.41
Foreign Value-Added Content of Gross-Exports 4474.9 12347.4 36.24
Source: Extracted from OECD TiVA Database
Table 4.3 shows that in 2015, in India, the domestic value-addition is lower as compared to
foreign value-addition in gross exports for the computer, electronic and electrical equipment
industry. This shows that India has lower domestic production capabilities in these products
and most of the items required for producing export items are imported. The share of
domestic value-addition in gross-imports is very low (0.41 per cent), indicating that India’s
exports of intermediate products in this category are low. Some of the reasons for this are
presented in Section 6 as challenges.
The next section focuses on the primary survey.
5. Findings from the Primary Survey
The aim of the primary survey was to (a) understand the overall changes in perception on
data localisation across stakeholders (b) see how different types of companies and sectors are
24
affected and/or are likely to be affected due to data localisation measures and (c) identify
issues and barriers arising due to data localisation (Section 6). While the survey was
conducted in three phases, the views and perceptions of the stakeholders towards data
localisation in a pre-COVID-19 scenario and during COVID-19 remain largely unchanged.
5.1 Perception and Impact of Data Localisation and Data Localisation Policies
Most stakeholders agree on the need for data governance for national security and consumer
privacy, but 96 per cent (see Figure 5.1) are against rigid on-soil data localisation measures.
Such measures are not only difficult to implement in a situation such as the one that exists
now due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but are also likely to negatively affect software services
exports and restrict innovation. Firms from Japan, the EU and the US pointed out that they
prefer countries that allow data sharing with some form of data security. In fact, many
countries are seeking regulatory transparency, clarity and predictability in data sharing and
data security through trade agreements to ensure that their firms have a stable operating
environment in foreign markets. Easier cross-border data flows have been a key Indian
demand in its trade negotiations in the past. Stakeholders feel that rigid data localisation
regulations may act as a threat to future investments in sectors like financial services or
healthcare technologies.
Figure 5.1: Overall Stance on On-Soil Data Localisation
Source: Primary Survey
Figure 5.2 presents the viewpoints of the survey participants on individual data
protection/localisation policies of Indian government entities.
Figure 5.2: Stakeholder Perceptions about different Data Localisation Policies
Source: Primary Survey
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
For
Against
70
5
2
92
30
95
98
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Personal Data Protection Bill 2019
Draft National E-Commerce Policy 2019
RBI Payment Directives of 2018
Draft Personal Data Protection Bill 2018
For Against
25
As shown in Figure 5.2, many stakeholders support the Draft Personal Data Protection Bill,
2018. However, some have raised concerns over the new provisions in the 2019 Personal
Data Protection Bill, which restricts cross-border transfer and processing of both sensitive
personal data and critical personal data. Stakeholders also raised concerns about the fact that
under the new provisions in the bill, the government is empowered to compel organisations to
produce data for policy-making purposes. Stakeholders pointed out that many Indian
companies are global and have made investments in technology, inducing monetisation of
data. Companies have worked hard to grow, and policies should not be anti-growth or
adversely affect business models and operations.
While most survey participants favour an overarching regulation, only 10 per cent want
sector-specific data localisation requirements/regulations. Their view is that sector-specific
regulations may have to be relaxed as has happened in the case of patient data during the
pandemic. Hence, India should first have a strong overarching regulation, which allows the
sharing of data with trust.
In terms of the RBI directive (DPSS.CO.OD No. 2785/06.08.005/2017-2018) on “Storage of
Payment System Data”, stakeholders agreed that RBI, being the central bank of the country,
should have “unfettered access to payment data”, and in this regard, companies are willing to
share data; however, they would like to have data mirroring and were unhappy with the
restriction that the data has to be stored “only in India”. Cross-border data sharing is needed
for many purposes, for example, companies need financial data on global firms for off-
shoring services and data sharing is needed for detection of cross-border financial frauds with
minimum delay.
Different types of companies seem to be affected differently by data localisation
requirements. For example, a company with a data storage facility in India and serving only
the Indian market (for example, some Indian e-commerce companies or foreign companies
that have invested in data storage infrastructure in India) will gain. However, Indian IT/ITeS
companies, which provide off-shore services in sensitive sectors like financial services to
global banks and financial institutions, will be adversely affected as their clients are now
worried about outsourcing such services to India. The survey participants pointed out that in
the off-shore business model of IT, a company off-shoring its work to India has its primary
business outside India. Forcing localisation requirements on such companies to store data
only in India would simply cause such businesses to outsource their operations to another
country with less stringent data localisation requirements.
Most survey participants are of the view that home grown e-commerce, health-tech and edu-
tech firms will not benefit from data localisation requirements if they want to expand globally
or cater to the international market. Sometimes, their venture capitalists/funders may impose
requirements of global expansion for funding and they will then face difficulties.
Interestingly, a number of global multinational technology companies have their data storage
facilities in India. They will not have major issues in adhering to data localisation
requirements. Further, they often offer value-added/better services and, therefore, may gain
from it due to consumer preference and loyalty. Further, in recent years, there have been a
26
series of partnerships between Indian firms and firms from countries such as the US. The
localisation policy will strengthen global partners while Indian firms will face difficulties in
expanding globally. One, therefore, needs to examine the costs and benefits of the policy
against India’s aim to be self-reliant.
Financial companies and data analytics firms expressed discontent with data localisation in
India, especially with respect to the RBI directive on payment storage. They specifically
objected to not being allowed data mirroring. According to them, it may cause delays in
ensuring global safety in data flows and will affect their existing business models. Due to this
directive, they now have to invest in duplicating physical infrastructure and compromise in
other areas like development of new financial products, which could have led to digital
financial inclusion of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Some Indian startups are happy with a data localisation policy. They need to apply analytics
to customer, product, transactional, account, service, and social data; and need to access data
to create better insights but have been facing issues in getting access. They opined that if the
government gives them access to data, they could improve their business as data can be
monetised. For example, one startup working with a state government on driving licences
shared the data of the drivers with a marketplace-based mobility company that was trying to
enrol drivers on the payment of a fee. Given that there is no data protection regulation, this is
an example of how government data can also be monetised by private companies. However,
startups who want to expand globally and go into deep research, technologies, and patents,
said that the policy is restrictive. In India, startups have greatly benefited from the cross-
border flow of data. For example, Myntra Designs Private Limited and RedBus (Ibibo Group
Private Limited) have hosted their data servers with global providers such as Amazon Web
Services (AWS) that allowed them to innovate and deliver enhanced analytics. Fortis
Healthcare Limited, in a bid to save costs, relocated their data centre abroad (Microsoft
Azure) while Flipkart Internet Private Limited (recently acquired by Wal-Mart Stores Inc.),
during its early days, relied on Canadian servers for operations. Another home-grown
ecommerce giant, Snapdeal Private Limited, leveraged AWS for its infrastructure in its
earlier days and later moved to setting up their own data centre.
Companies in sectors such as express delivery services and healthcare (i.e., hospital chains)
that do not have IT as a core part of their business operations said that they will be at a direct
disadvantage due to rigid policies. Express delivery services companies pointed out that
commitments to deliver within a certain date and/or time cannot be made to customers unless
e-commerce companies and/or the express delivery companies in their network have control
over inventory globally. Indian express delivery companies pointed out that being a part of
the network of global e-commerce companies has led to a 40 per cent increase in their
business-to-consumer (B2C) sales and a 20 per cent increase in their business-to-business
(B2B) sales. Given that logistics costs in India are high, duplicating infrastructure will add to
their costs.
Companies from countries such as Japan, Taiwan, EU member states and the Republic of
Korea, in sectors like electronics, pointed out that they wanted to set up manufacturing
27
facilities in India. However, since manufacturing is now automated and data-driven, global
firms would like to have the freedom to share cross-border data for business development,
efficiency improvement and product design. They also think that a rigid data localisation
policy would affect the abilities of firms, for example Indian and Japanese firms, to jointly
explore third country markets like Africa. India generates a lot of data through government
initiatives like Aadhaar, which can be used for direct benefit transfer and governance. These
can be a learning experience for developing countries in regions like Africa. However, such
cross-country initiatives will require cross-border data flows. The most recent example of
such an initiative is data sharing for COVID-19 vaccines and clinical trials. Without data
security, such data can be misused while rigid data localisation will prevent data sharing.
There can be different types of data – sensitive and non-sensitive. While the Draft E-
Commerce Policy of 2019 seems to try to control non-sensitive data, healthcare service
providers pointed out that there is a need to protect and safeguard patient data. At the same
time, in a pandemic situation, no country can forcefully implement on-soil data localisation.
In a normal situation, decisions on where to store data is an internal matter of the healthcare
service providers, and in fact, most hospitals in India, based on budget and management
decisions, store their data in their own data centres or on clouds of companies such as AWS
and Microsoft Azure. Since health data is critical, none of the hospitals interviewed stored
their data abroad. However, poor data infrastructure at hospitals make secure storage of data
a challenge. In India, there is a huge issue in generating patient health history and some
technology companies have recently entered into partnerships with hospitals to generate and
store that history.
Future demand for data processing and analysis will be both from export markets and within
India. For example, the survey found that as the Indian government is focusing on
technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, huge amounts of data will
be generated in India, which would in turn allow for more in-depth data analytics. However,
there is need for partnerships among academic and research organisations, government, and
private sector for robust data analytics. Access to data is meaningless unless it is analysed
properly. There is need for more analysis of government data for evidence-based
policymaking and such data should be made available as a public good. Around 50 per cent
of stakeholders opined that policies should be based on the goals of digitally inclusive
growth, good governance, national security, consumer protection and making India self-
reliant. In an age of globalisation, one cannot be self-reliant without exports and without
leveraging export competitiveness. Import restrictions may not lead to production efficiency
and enhanced export competitiveness; it can instead lead to inefficiencies and higher costs of
doing business. In such a scenario, even Indian multinationals will invest in technology
abroad rather than in India. The slowdown in economic growth and consumer demand has
taken away the attractiveness of India as a high growth market. In this scenario, companies
need policy support to make India an attractive off-shoring destination.
28
5.2 Financial Viability of Data Localisation and Role of Government
Data centres are capital intensive. To run a data centre, a company has to bear significant
costs, and, therefore, companies should ideally have the budget to run and maintain such data
centres effectively and efficiently. Apart from the initial cost of infrastructure, which includes
cost of land and equipment purchase, there is maintenance cost along with cost of power,
building permits and taxes, network connection, etc. The survey found that it costs close to
INR 3.5 crore to create a data centre for a company with close to 100 employees. For a larger
company, a self-built data centre could cost somewhere between US$10-25 million per year.
To reduce this cost, many SMEs store their data in a cloud or third-party run data centre.
Multiplicity of infrastructure is an unviable business proposition, especially in a country like
India, where a majority of the businesses are SMEs.
Data centres need uninterrupted power supply. Since this is not available, there is need for
additional investment in power back-up infrastructure. The cost of power in India is much
higher than in countries like China; so, the overall cost for businesses increases. Data centres
have to have resources to regularly maintain their hardware, replace obsolete equipment, etc.,
which many SMEs find difficult unless there are targeted schemes to reduce input costs.
Government in countries like China that have stringent data localisation rules spend a lot on
digital initiatives and input costs are low. If India wants to have similar policies, there has to
be at least a five-fold increase in government spending on digital infrastructure.
5.3 Impact on Trade Balance
Around 90 per cent of the survey participants pointed out that since India is not a hardware
manufacturer and most of the equipment for data centres are covered under India’s zero duty
commitments in ITA-I, stringent on-soil data localisation will lead to a rise in the already
large negative trade balance (see Figure 4.2), at least in the first five years. Given that most
imports are from China, on-soil data localisation measures without an increase in India’s
domestic manufacturing capabilities may lead to a surge in imports of these products from
China, either directly or re-routed through Hong Kong or other countries (for example,
Vietnam), which will increase the costs of business operations. The secondary analysis
presented in Section 4 confirmed that India seems to have four key issues – huge dependence
on China for digital products trade, lack of competitiveness in a wide range of products for
data centres, a failure to export the products in which the country can be competitive, and
lower domestic value-addition as compared to foreign value-addition in gross exports for
products that are needed to create a data centre/data processing hub. Overall, India is yet to
become a part of the global production network. Further, due to the recent geo-political
tensions with China, supply chains have been disrupted, and imports are restricted.
Relocating supply chains to India may take some time. Companies from countries/markets
such as Japan, the US and EU member states pointed out that while they want to diversify
their supply chain and reduce dependence on China post-COVID-19, they are worried about
investing in a country that does not allow data sharing with trust or is not willing to sign trade
agreements on data flows.
29
5.4 Future Relationship with China
India’s trade with China has deteriorated sharply between April 2020 and September 2020,
primarily due to geo-political tensions. The future is uncertain as the geo-political tensions
continue. In the electronics sector, India is heavily dependent on Chinese suppliers for raw
materials, intermediate goods and final products. Electronic goods account for 32 per cent of
India’s overall imports from China, which meets 40 per cent of India’s total imports of
electronic goods, including consumer electronics, industrial electronics, computer and IT
hardware, mobile phones, etc. Between April 2019 and February 2020, total imports of
electronic goods stood at INR 3.59 trillion. Of this, imports from China stood at INR 1.42
trillion or 40 per cent of the total imports of such goods.34 Specifically, India imported 98 per
cent of parts used in electronic integrated circuits and micro assemblies from China.35 While
some experts believe that India will receive investment from global companies moving out of
China,36 others fear that delay in the supply of components and other setbacks could see a
production impact worth INR 6,000 crore during March and April 2020 due to the disruption
in the supply chain [also see Federation of Indian Chamber Commerce and Industry (FICCI),
2020].
5.5 Impact on Job Creation
The Draft National E-Commerce Policy states that:
“Many aspects of business activity will get automated and there will be
increased use of artificial intelligence. It is hence vital that we retain control
of data to ensure job creation within India. Cloud computing should become
an economic activity in India and data analytics in the era of industry 4.0
should become a major job creator.”
Data centres require highly skilled and specialised professionals. The survey participants
pointed out that for running data centres, only a couple of employees may need to be present
for round-the-clock monitoring. Some low to mid-skilled jobs may be created during the
construction of the data centre but after that, only a handful of high-skilled and quality jobs
will be created. Therefore, a data centre cannot create huge employment. Manufacturing of
equipment for data centres and of electronics goods will require a high-skilled workforce that
can be supported through the right policy incentives like special economic zones (SEZs)
polices or technology park policies rather than restrictive policies. This can create
employment, but manufacturing is becoming increasingly automated. Therefore, the bulk of
employment will be created in off-shoring data analytics, product development, and data
34 Source : https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-can-source-electronic-goods-
from-markets-other-than-china-wtc-120062201614_1.html (last accessed July 13, 2020) 35 Source : https://globalprimenews.com/2020/06/22/india-can-enhance-electronic-goods-imports-from-
singapore-usa-malaysia-taiwan/ (last accessed July 13, 2020) 36 Source: https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/esc-reviewing-ict-export-forecast-of-usd-155-
bn-for-2020-21-amid-covid-19-pandemic/75796881 (last accessed July 13, 2020)
30
processing. India has the potential to become a global technology hub/off-shoring centre,
which in turn will lead to quality job creation as has been the case in the IT/ITeS sector. In
IT/ITeS sector, India is a supplier of skilled workforce globally.
5.6 Infrastructure Readiness
The survey participants pointed out that, while discussing the costs and benefits of data
localisation, it is also relevant to keep in mind the reality of India’s current data centre
capabilities. In the absence of external pressures, an entity’s decision on its location could be
based on several factors such as proximity to consumers, climate, availability of the required
infrastructure, cost of electricity, tax structure, links with core backbone networks and
political risks (also see Azmeh and Foster, 2016). Firms locate infrastructure across countries
to reduce risk related to pandemics and other disasters. For instance, during the recent
COVID-19, countries like India went for a sudden lockdown, without keeping
IT/ITeS/technology as part of the essential services.
Ninety per cent of survey participants pointed out that as of June 2020, India did not have the
regulatory framework, investment by government and the ability to create its own
infrastructure at globally competitive costs to become a data centre hub. Low internet
connectivity, slow broadband speeds and unpredictability in the availability of power supply
make it a rather unattractive destination to set up a physical data centre. Thus, instead of
forcing companies towards on-soil data localisation requirements, 96 per cent of the survey
participants opined that India should engage in data sharing partnerships with countries and
invest in the skills needed to implement 4IR technologies.
The Draft National E-Commerce Policy 2019 has allowed a period of three years to adjust to
data storage requirements and this is also the timeline in place to build the requisite
infrastructure for data centres. Around 95 per cent of the survey participants strongly disagree
with this time frame. They feel that three years with the current Digital India budget is not
enough to build state-of-the-art data centres. Building data centres requires manufacturing
capabilities, requisite physical infrastructure and, even with the promised availability of
easier credit and finance, it is simply not possible to build such a large-scale data centre
infrastructure in a period of just three years. If such policies are implemented, the
government should increase its spending manifold and policies should have clearly defined
targets, a plan to achieve the targets and a robust monitoring process.
The next section presents the issues with regards to data localisation in India.
6. Challenges for India
The discussions in the previous section highlights the fact that India is yet to be a part of the
global value chains for data centres; cost of data infrastructure is high and data security and
privacy regulations are evolving. Globally, rigid data localisation conditions are being
relaxed in the context of the pandemic, which has thrown up the need for data sharing with
31
trust. This section focuses on the barriers that have hampered or are likely to hamper India’s
ability to harness its potential as a data processing and innovation hub.
Increasing Geo-political Tensions – Since the onset of the pandemic, several
countries have experienced tensions with China. While some countries have just
blamed China’s handling of the COVID-19 virus which emerged in Wuhan, others
have commissioned detailed studies and put a monetary value on the adverse impact
of China’s role in failing to contain the virus. The India-China border tensions led a
series of reactions from the Indian government including a ban on Chinese mobile
applications and mandating the declaration of the origin of products being sold on e-
commerce platforms. India imposed restrictions on foreign investment from China.
India is heavily dependent on China for imports of ESDM products and some of these
restrictions have been a concern for businesses as it takes time to relocate supply
chains. Geo-political tensions between India and China has led to the disruption of
supply chains, which is in addition to the disruption due to the pandemic. With the a
majority of the board of directors of many firms/investors from Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) being Chinese, the survey found that restrictions on
FDI inflows from China may also adversely impact their ability to bring in investment
into India. Indian startups are worried that they may not be able to get funding from
China.
Monopolisation of Data – Many global experts and governments are of the view that
data is monopolised by certain large technology companies – Google Inc, Amazon
Inc, Facebook Inc and Apple Inc (popularly known as GAFA). GAFA’s control,
ownership and power over data are questioned from the angles of taxation, anti-
competitive practices, etc. Monopolisation of data can (a) hinder innovation and (b)
prevent economies from engaging in global best practices such as evidence-based
policymaking and realising social gains to the economy from such policymaking (see
Jones and Tonetti, 2020).
Regulatory Gaps related to Data Protection –Some survey participants pointed out
that the lack of a comprehensive data protection policy is a major regulatory gap
while others considered it to be a challenge to the long-term ease of doing business. It
may be beneficial for some companies in the short run to not have a comprehensive
data protection and privacy policy but in the long run, all companies opined that there
is need for such a policy as lack of policy leads to non-transparency, accountability
issues and business uncertainties, which ultimately affect the ease of doing business.
Piecemeal Regulations and Policy Uncertainty–Since 2018, India has been trying
to develop a regulatory regime for data protection; however, they have so far failed to
put out a clear policy. A number of ad-hoc policies from different regulatory bodies
and ministries have emerged and, apart from creating confusion for businesses, they
have created a lot of uncertainty. The government has also tried to revise provisions in
existing bills as a result of which these bills have got delayed in the parliament. For
32
example, revisions in the Draft Data Protection Bill 2019, which grants the
government unrestricted access to non-personal or anonymised data held by data
fiduciaries, have led to concerns amongst stakeholders. Concerns have also been
raised about potential for abuse; reduced transparency and accountability and failure
to protect intellectual property (see USTR, 2020).
Apart from this, there have been several piecemeal attempts at regulation, which are
not always aligned with each other. Many companies pointed out that some of these
draft regulations do not consider India’s export advantages and strengths in off-
shoring. Ninety per cent of the survey participants said that the government should
not be the sole custodian of data generated in India. They argued that any policy that
proposes data cannot be stored, processed or shared with third parties even with the
consent of the customer should be re-examined. They also suggest that policies may
be aligned with global best practices such as the EU’s GDPR and Asia Pacific
Economic Co-operation (APEC) Privacy Principles or regulations imposed by
countries such as Japan. While many of these markets are importers of data, they have
carefully designed their regulations so that these are not unnecessary barriers to trade
and investment.
Limited Pre-Consultation and Stakeholders’ Engagement – In developed
countries, governments hold extensive consultations with stakeholders before
initiating policies. In India, there was no consultation on the RBI directive on storage
of payment data and even the Draft National E-Commerce policy 2019 was
formulated without active stakeholder engagement and clear understanding of
different viewpoints. By contrast, the Justice Srikrishna Committee on data protection
did go through an extensive consultation process, according to the survey participants.
Thus, there is no uniformity across government departments in their consultation
processes. The lack of consultations and discussions creates an uncertain investment
environment, reduces the ease of doing business and increases compliance costs. The
inability to implement the Draft National E-Commerce Policy 2019 and the feedback
it received from within the government ministries/departments and stakeholders show
that policies need to be cautiously designed, based on research and interactions. While
such policies are often shelved, they create concerns among investors and companies
off-shoring to or investing in India. A majority of the survey participants (70 per cent)
also mentioned that policies are mostly defensive in nature rather than being
offensive, without a comprehensive analysis of India’s competitiveness and export
interests.
Increased Focus on Promoting Manufacturing through WTO Non-Compliant
and Protectionist Measures – India is a key member of the WTO and has in the past
shown support for a multilateral rule-based trading system. However, of late, India
seems to have taken measures that are not compliant with WTO rules or its own
commitments. For example, in November 2019, India lost the case (DS-541) against
the US with respect to a number of export-linked subsidies provided through the
33
Foreign Trade Policy and cluster-based policies like SEZs, which had been availed by
technology firms. The National Policy on Electronics 2019 aimed to “position India
as a global hub for Electronics System Design and Manufacturing (ESDM) by
encouraging and driving capabilities in the country for developing core components,
including chipsets, and creating an enabling environment for the industry to compete
globally.” The policy also refers to extending incentives to promote export-led growth
but fails to recognise that export-linked incentives are prohibited under the WTO’s
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). While the policy
aims to develop India as a manufacturing hub and some global companies are
relocating their manufacturing to India, survey participants pointed out that such
policies need to be strengthened by targets and supporting incentives to reduce
logistics costs and cost of services used in manufacturing. As the electronics and
technology sector is highly automated, subsidies in services will help reduce
production costs and such subsidies are WTO compliant. Unlike ASEAN and East
Asian countries, India is yet to design innovative and smart subsidies (Mukherjee and
Sarma, 2020).
High Cost of Creating Infrastructure – As has been underscored by the survey,
creating the infrastructure to run a data centre is costly; and doing it on a national
scale is going to be costlier. As of date, the Government of India has pledged a certain
amount of money in its annual budgets towards the Digital India and other affiliated
initiatives, but the spending has varied across years and is much lower than that of
countries like China and Germany. For example, in FY 2017-18, the government
allocated INR 16727.6 million (US$37227.3 million) for the Digital India programme,
of which only INR 14515.9 million (197.2 million) was actually spent.38 In 2018-19
and 2019-20, the allocations were increased to INR 33528.1 million (US$455.5
million) and INR 35617.6 million (US$484 million) respectively and MeitY spent
INR 30300 million (US$412.2 million) and INR 37506.0 million (US$ 509.6 million)
respectively. Yet, the quality of digital infrastructure in terms of connectivity, access,
etc., needs further improvement. China has announced that it intends to spend US$1.4
trillion on a digital infrastructure public spending program in 2020. Germany has
allocated more than US$176 billion in areas such as digital infrastructure and
transportation in 2020 upto 2023. 39. A more nuanced cross-country comparison
across G20 countries is limited by outdated data on investment infrastructure, the
latest cross-country available data is for the year 2015 (see OECD, 2017)
The survey confirmed that in India, there is a significant shortage of digital
infrastructure: the government needs to address multidimensional problems including
37 1dollar = 73.595 rupees is used as per RBI exchange rate for August, 2020 ( for more details, see
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/india/foreign-exchange-rate-reserve-bank-of-india, last accessed October 1,
2020) 38 For details see, Expenditure Budget available at
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/previous_union_budget.php (last accessed August 23, 2020) 39 Source: https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/germany-lifts-growth-outlook-pushes-
investment-to-keep-its-edge (last accessed August 23, 2020)
34
power supply, access, costs, and quality of infrastructure for on-soil data localisation
to be implemented. From a private sector perspective, infrastructure should be
carefully planned so that costs are low, and risks are mitigated. Huge investment in
fragmented infrastructure or duplication of infrastructure may pull out investment
from other areas.
Limited Government Data for Research – Ninety-five per cent of survey
participants pointed out that there is a dearth of official data in India for research and
innovation. For example, there is no data in the public domain that could help analyse
the utilisation of free trade agreements, FDI inflows into India by country and by
sectors/sub-sectors, trade in services by sub-sectors or data on exports of public sector
enterprises vis-à-vis private firms. Further, many hospitals, medical centres and
schools do not have access to basic computing facilities; hence, data cannot be
generated. There is no data on e-commerce trade or on utilisation of different
government schemes and programmes. In many states, the schemes are not monitored
or evaluated by using robust technology. Without data, informed policymaking is
difficult, if not impossible. India has an outdated data collection process, even for
government surveys on core issues like employment. There are no consumer surveys.
The data is often presented in PDF format and have to be manually extracted to excel
or other formats to do any analysis. With initiatives such as Aadhaar and the
Ayushman Bharat Yojana, a huge amount of data is generated by the government,
which can be used for research. However, it is also important to first use technology
to collect, collate, and share data while ensuring at the same time that such data is not
misused.
Defensive Position in Trade Agreements/International Forums – India has taken a
defensive position in trade agreements with respect to data flows, data sharing and
data localisation by not contributing to the debate and staying out of the discussions.
For example, it did not join the plurilateral group on e-commerce in the WTO, and did
not sign the “Osaka Track” under the Japan G20 Presidency. India has tried to align
itself with Saudi Arabia and Indonesia in most of these forums but with the signing of
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, the position
of Indonesia may change. With the on-going pandemic, the current Saudi Presidency
needs to take a leadership role in cross-border R&D for development of
vaccines/clinical trials, etc. Today, data flows are a key issue in all trade agreements
and international forums such as the G20, Indo-Pacific or East Asia Summit. With a
defensive position, it will not only be difficult for India to sign trade agreements with
the EU or the US, it will also be difficult for the country to drive agendas in forums
like the G20 and the Indo-Pacific. With current geo-political tensions with China,
India needs the support of countries such as the US, Japan and Australia and regions
such as the EU. Further, China is under pressure to open its market to global
technology firms.
35
The topic of data localisation has evolved in the G20 only in the last 5 years. While the Japan
Presidency focused on sharing data with trust and use of data for societal benefits, under the
current 2020 Saudi Arabia Presidency, the digital economy taskforce is discussing five broad
topic areas – measuring the digital economy, artificial intelligence, smart cities, security
issues in the digital economy and the flow of data with trust. While these are important
topics, there is very little focus as to how these issues pertain to or will help tackle the issue
of COVID-19 and its adverse impact on the global economy. Thus, globally, there is an
absence of a clear direction on global data sharing and collaboration, which is impeding both
inclusive growth and sustainable development. The next section details developments with
regards to data localisation in the G20.
7. Developments on Data Localisation in G20
While technology has been a topic of discussion in the G20 for a while, data protection has
gained visibility in recent years. Comprehensive discussions on data protection have taken
place only since the Hangzhou (China) Summit in 2016, where the first digital economy
document – the G20 Digital Economy Development and Cooperation Initiative – was
launched. The aim of this initiative was to address the digital divide, enhance flow of
information for economic growth, and ensure privacy and personal data protection amongst
other measures to spur the development of a digital economy. The latest development on this
front was when Japan launched the “Osaka Track”, a key theme discussed in the Ministerial
Meeting on Trade and Digital Economy, in order to standardise rules governing the global
movement of data.40
As mentioned earlier, the Osaka Track, given the concerns surrounding misuse and protection
of data, introduced the idea of “ free flow of data with trust”. While 14 G20 countries have
data localisation measures in place; which vary in the type of data, scope of applicability and
eventual enforcement as per their legislative frameworks (Kathuria et al., 2019), majority of
these countries were in favour of the rules introduced in the Osaka Track. G20 countries such
as India, South Africa and Indonesia opposed the Osaka Track resolution on the grounds that
it could undermine multilateral talks on e-commerce taking place under the WTO Work
Program on Electronic Commerce; and it is important to preserve the policy space of
developing countries with regards to data governance since policy is evolving.41 Specifically,
they pointed out that the Osaka Track
“undermines the multilateral principles of consensus-based decisions in
global trade negotiations and denies policy space for digital-industrialisation
in developing countries”42
40 Source:
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/g20_summit/osaka19/pdf/documents/en/Ministerial_Statement_on
_Trade_and_Digital_Economy.pdf (last accessed September 22, 2020) 41 Source: https://dig.watch/updates/g20-osaka-track-raises-controversy (last accessed September 9, 2020) 42 Source:https://gdpr.report/news/2019/07/02/japan-announces/ (last accessed May 11, 2020)
36
However, in light of the pandemic, all the three countries mentioned above have taken steps
that are in line with rules laid down in the Osaka Track. In fact, the forthcoming G20
Presidency of Saudi Arabia in November 2020 is also taking up this topic, and as a pre-cursor
to the summit and in the light of the on-going pandemic, the G20 Leaders’ Statement,43
published on March 27, 2020, made commitments to fight the pandemic by sharing timely
and transparent data in a sensitive sector like health. It is also worth noting that Saudi Arabia
was one of the 17 countries to sign the “Osaka Declaration on the Digital Economy”. Thus,
the digital economy taskforce (especially due to the pandemic) is expected to heavily
emphasise the need for data sharing and free flow of data with trust.
8. G20 Saudi Presidency, India’s Position and the Way Forward
The above discussions show that the COVID-19 pandemic has created a need for data sharing
with trust and Saudi Arabia, which is hosting the G20 Presidency, has aligned itself to the
broad objective of data sharing with trust along with other G20 members. In G20, countries
have to build consensus to take any agenda forward. There is a broad consensus across G20
members on data sharing with trust.
As India takes over the G20 Presidency in 2022, it will join the "troika" soon and will be a
part of it for the next three years. While India has kept itself away for any discussions on data
in international forums by not joining the WTO’s e-commerce plurilateral discussions or by
not signing the Osaka Track in G20, survey participants opined that India needs to have a
strategy on data in which it can build consensus.
The next Presidency in 2021 will be held in Italy and being an EU member country, Italy is
expected to push the idea of data sharing based on the EU’s GDPR. Thus, among the G20
members, EU, Italy and Germany will have the same views. The UK, despite its withdrawal
from the EU, is GDPR compliant. Japan, Australia and a number of other countries are in
favour of data sharing with trust. As discussed earlier, around 1 in 3 businesses across the
world which are exporting/plan to grow and export are GDPR compliant/want to be GDPR
compliant. Thus, a GDPR type of data protection framework may be acceptable to B20 and
G20. The US, given that it hosts the world’s largest technology firms, is in favour of free
flow of data. However, the US companies are GDPR compliant. China has a rigid data
localisation policy. India has somewhat aligned with China in the past through its different
domestic policy initiatives like the Draft National E-commerce Policy 2019. Due to geo-
political tensions between the two countries, India today cannot align itself with China’s
polices on data localisation. All these factors must be considered while discussing India’s
strategies and options.
As of now, 17 G20 members support the idea of data sharing with trust, apart from India,
Indonesia and South Africa. While South Africa’s position on the matter is unclear, Indonesia
43 For details see, G20 Leaders Statement available at
https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20_Extraordinary%20G20%20Leaders%E2%80%99%20Summit_St
atement_EN%20(3).pdf(last accessed September 23, 2020)
37
might sign the RCEP agreement as early as November 2020, which will have a chapter on e-
commerce and provision for data sharing. Thus, Indonesia may change its position with
regards to data localisation for its own Presidency in 2023. It is likely that Indonesia would
have undertaken commitments for data sharing under its trade agreements by 2023. Thus,
given the on-going pandemic and the likely positions to be taken by the other G20 countries
in the 2021 and 2023 Presidency, India must carefully evaluate its strengths, address its
weaknesses and subsequently develop a strategy for its own Presidency in 2022.
India’s should leverage on its strengths; India has a comparative advantage and export
surplus in trade in IT/ITeS services and is among the top countries in terms of application
development and number of startups. Many Indian companies are exploring global markets in
technology while a number of global firms are entering the Indian market. In addition, India
is one of the largest producers of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM)
graduates. Many technology companies, especially in English speaking countries, have
Indians in their senior management and workforce. A number of companies are planning to
relocate from China, and India can be an alternative destination. The Indian government has
focused on skill development and training to meet the manpower requirements of 4IR not
only in India but also globally. These strengths need to be showcased in G20 to get more
investment, which India needs for inclusive growth and to become a knowledge hub.
To develop India as a hub for data processing and innovation, and gain from participating in
international forums such as the G20, there is a need for a more holistic policy approach that
(a) links domestic policies and priorities across different government agencies, (b) is based
on extensive research and consultation, and (c) focuses on ensuring self-reliance through
inclusive growth, investment and job creation. India needs to focus on continued investment
in digital infrastructure and have comprehensive a data protection regulation in line with
global best practices such as GDPR, which allows sharing of data with trust. Concerns related
to monopolies can be addressed through anti-competitive regulations.
The COVID-19 pandemic has not only fast-tracked the adoption of 4IR technologies, but has
also showed the need for cross-border data sharing to manage the spread of the pandemic.
India can be a global off-shoring and data processing hub in these difficult times. However,
in order to do this seamlessly, India needs to address and resolve its infrastructure barriers
and develop a robust and comprehensive data protection policy. Thus, there is need for
domestic reforms to complement its positions in different international forums.
To recover from the current economic slowdown, India needs to embrace 4IR rapidly. It is
important to attract investment and capital in digital infrastructure for societal benefits and
inclusive growth. Partnerships between government, academia and the private sector will
play a key role in the adoption of 4IR. Since government funding is limited, it needs to play
the role of a facilitator as it had done earlier for the IT/ITeS sector, so that the private sector
is willing to invest and startups can get funding and grow. The government also needs to
streamline its process of data collection, collation and sharing so that there is access to data
for research. In some areas such as consumer profiling, there are data gaps. Instead of relying
on the private sector to share data that they can monetise, data can be generated through pan-
38
India surveys that can be made accessible to Indian startups. There are also data gaps in many
areas and policies appear to be based mostly on the perception of certain groups. For
example, there is no data on domestic and international trade in e-commerce. It is important
for the government to either set up an institutional mechanism for data collection through
authorities like DGCI&S or add some modules in existing industry surveys that provide
estimates of adoption of 4IR by industry, especially SMEs, and the gaps and issues. With an
increasing number of services being online and industry being automated, the government
can provide the right kind of support and incentives to technology industries by incentivising
services that are inputs into those industries. It can work with academic institutes, think tanks,
international organisations, and industry to collect and collate data, which can be used for
research and policy-making; it can collaborate with global technology companies and
encourage them to invest in India and align domestic policies with the country’s strengths
and export competitiveness.
As has been seen in Section 4, India’s export competitiveness and value addition are low for
goods and equipment required to create data centres. There is a need for in-depth survey-
based study to explore the reasons for low competitiveness and value addition and how this
can be improved. This is integral to India’s dream of becoming “aatma-nirbhar” or self-
reliant. The idea of self-reliance is rooted in boosting manufacturing; and if India wants to be
a part of the global value chain, value addition in the country should increase. This will
require targeted interventions based on needs and requirements of domestic firms and higher
tariffs and/or import restrictions on intermediate goods or parts may not be the right
intervention.
Our survey showed that companies may be willing to relocate their value chains to reduce
risks, especially after the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in China, but the process takes
around five years. The survey also confirmed that the decision of global firms to relocate to
India is contingent upon a number of factors, which range from ease of doing business in the
country, a transparent and predictable policy regime to the depth of the liberalisation and
commitments under trade agreements. They pointed out that a transparent policy regime and
low regulatory compliance burden are some of the key reasons for the successful relocation
and subsequent setting up of a business supply chain. However, given the weakening of the
WTO and the surrounding uncertainty of the global order, businesses, in addition to policy
transparency, are also interested in the commitment countries are willing to undertake under
bilateral and regional trade agreements. Business want secure investments; therefore, of late,
the decision to relocate is also becoming contingent upon trade agreements and tariff
commitments.
Along with domestic policies, given the current geo-political situation and the COVID-19
pandemic, there is a need for collaboration and co-operation among countries, and G20 offers
an excellent platform for such collaboration. It is important for India to develop a domestic
consensus and have a flexible position on issues of importance to the country in forums such
as the G20 as it prepares for its Presidency in 2022. The survey found that there are a number
of areas where India and other G20 countries can work together. These are given below:
39
Collaborations on Data Sharing – There is a need to do joint research and share
information to address the pandemic and, in this context, data sharing with trust is
important. India may build consensus with like-minded countries like the UK, the US,
Japan, Australia and the EU with whom it may have, or may sign trade agreements in
the near future. There is scope for cross-border collaborations in data generation and
analysis. India can partner with countries like Japan to explore developing country
markets in Africa. Since data will be a core part of future trade agreements, it is
important to strategically use the G20 as a platform to build consensus on issues that
affect developing countries like India as well as explore how there can be more
collaborations with developed countries for more balanced trade in data flows where
emerging data generating countries like India can enhance exports as it did in the
IT/ITeS sector.
Joint Approach towards Data Protection – While data sharing is important, G20
countries have to work together to have a model framework that prevents data misuse or
breach of national security and consumer privacy. In the past, India had struggled to
sign ‘Safe Harbor Privacy Principles’ with the EU but, if there is a model framework
that can be incorporated into domestic regulations, it may be easier for India to enter
into agreements with regions such as the EU. Most survey participants believe that a
GDPR kind of framework should be proposed in G20 as a model framework and a
similar framework for data privacy and security may be implemented in India. This is
mainly because since the implementation of the GDPR in 2018, all Indian companies
operating or looking to operate in the EU markets have taken steps to become GDPR
compliant. As mentioned earlier many global firms are GDPR compliant. Therefore, to
ease/reduce regulatory compliance burden for the industry and ensure actual ease of
doing business, instead of a completely new regulation, India may align its data
protection requirements to that of the EU’s GDPR. However, at the same time, some
flexibility may be given to countries like India to customise the framework according to
their own domestic priorities. Similarly, with the strong economic and strategic
partnership with Japan, India may agree to Japan’s proposal of sharing data with trust.
According to survey participants, India may participate actively in the G20 discussions
and try to bring forth its concerns in a constructive way.
Focus on Priorities of Developing Countries – The issue of data flows in G20 is
largely driven by a developed country agenda and hence, it ignores some of the
requirements and concerns of developing countries. Developing countries in G20 such
as Indonesia, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil along with India suffer from a digital
divide and face regulatory and infrastructural barriers. Startups from these countries
need financing and this can be an area for collaboration. India may play an active role
in bringing forward the concerns of developing countries and suggest ways and means
to address them. India may propose joint startup hubs and support startup visas. Issues
such as data monopoly and the need for greater investment in developing countries in
digital infrastructure, and a robust framework for information and data sharing with
developing countries can be part of the discussions. Hence, India can try to build
40
consensus on these issues and develop a collaborative framework, enable information
sharing and enhance government, academic and private partnerships across countries.
Aligning its Position in Different International Forums – India needs to align its
position in G20 with other trade forums. To have a more proactive approach, there
should be a comprehensive domestic regulation on data protection, which should be
aligned with global best practices and India’s export interests. This regulation should
allow India to access third country data and promote data sharing with trust. India needs
to have more detailed studies and discussion on how it can contribute to the Digital
Economy Taskforce and other digital initiatives of G20.
In conclusion, the COVID-19 pandemic has emphasised the importance of data and it has
also established that data-related services such as e-commerce, edu-tech, health-tech, etc., are
gradually becoming the new normal. Globally, all countries have aligned their policies to this
new normal and are actively engaging in best practices and adopting regulatory frameworks.
Large amount of data is being generated due to the adoption of technology and will continue
to be generated in the future. Data in itself is not valuable unless it can be processed and
analysed in a structured format. Cross-border data and information sharing is sometimes
needed as has been illustrated by COVID-19. India, too, must align itself to the new normal,
frame its domestic regulations accordingly and take a proactive stand in international forums.
By doing so, India can realise the benefits of digital trade and accomplish its vision of
becoming a data processing hub and knowledge-based economy.
41
References
Azmeh, S and Foster, C. (2016). The TPP and the Digital Trade Agenda: Digital Industrial
Policy and Silicon Valley’s Influence on New Trade Agreements. LSE Working
Paper Series no. 16-175. Available at https://www.southcentre.int/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Ev_170925_SC-Workshop-on-E-Commerce-and-Domestic-
Regulation_Presentation-The-TPP-and-the-Digital-Trade-Agenda-Shamel-
Azmeh_EN.pdf (last accessed August 23, 2020)
Bailey, R. and Parsheera, S. (2018). Data localisation in India: Questioning the Means and
Ends. NIPFP Working Paper 242. Available at
https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2018/10/WP_2018_242.pdf (last
accessed August 23, 2020)
Bain and Company. (2020). Covid-19 Accelerates the Adoption of Telemedicine in Asia-
Pacific Countries. Available at https://www.bain.com/insights/covid-19-accelerates-
the-adoption-of-telemedicine-in-asia-pacific-countries/ (last accessed September 29,
2020)
Capgemini Research Institute. (2019). Championing Data Protection and Privacy – a
Source of Competitive Advantage in the Digital Century. Available at
https://www.capgemini.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Infographic-%E2%80%93-
GDPR.pdf (last accessed September 29, 2020)
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). (2020). Impact of
COVID-19 on Indian Economy. Available at
http://ficci.in/spdocument/23195/Impact-of-COVID-19-on-Indian-Economy-FICCI-
2003.pdf (last accessed August 23, 2020)
India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF). (2015). Electronics. Available at
https://www.ibef.org/download/Electronics-March-2015.pdf (last accessed August 23,
2020)
International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2020). World Economic Outlook. Available at
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO (last accessed August 23, 2020)
Jones, C.I. and Tonetti, C. (2020). Non-rivalry and the Economics of Data. American
Economic Review Volume 111. Available at
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20191330&&from=f (last accessed
August 23, 2020)
Kantar IMRB. (2019). Digital Adoption and Usage Trends. Available at
https://imrbint.com/images/common/ICUBE%E2%84%A2_2019_Highlights.pdf
(last accessed August 23, 2020)
42
Kearney, A.T. (2019). Global Services Location Index. Available at
https://www.kearney.com/documents/20152/4977724/Digital+resonance+the+new+fa
ctor+influencing+location+attractiveness.pdf/7a39643a-dc22-87f5-936b-
5e734999f57d?t=1581025251793 (last accessed August 23, 2020)
Kathuria, R., Kedia, M., Varma, G., and Bagchi, K. (2019). Economic Implications of
Cross-Border Data Flows. ICRIER. Available at
http://icrier.org/pdf/Economic_Implications_of_Cross-Border_Data_Flows.pdf (last
accessed August 23, 2020)
Kathuria, R., Mathur, A., Kedia, M., Goyal, T.M., and Kukreja, P. (2020). Evolution of
the G20 Sherpa Track. ICRIER
Meltzer, J.P. and Lovelock, P. (2018). Regulating for a Digital Economy: Understanding
the Importance of Cross-Border Data Flows in Asia. Brookings Institution. Available
at https://www.brookings.edu/research/regulating-for-a-digital-economy-
understanding-the-importance-of-cross-border-data-flows-in-asia/ (last accessed
August 23, 2020)
Mukherjee, A., and Sarma, A.P. (2020). Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and the WTO:
The Case of India. Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) Special Issue, ISSN
1875-4120. Available at https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-
advance-publication-article.asp?key=1833#citation (last accessed September 10,
2020)
National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM). (2020).
Technology Sector in India: Techade- The New Decade/ Strategic Review. Available
at https://nasscom.in/knowledge-center/publications/technology-sector-in-india-2020-
techade-strategic-review (last accessed September 28, 2020)
National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM). (2019). Indian
Tech Start-up Ecosystem. Available at
http://10000startups.com/frontend/images/Indian-Tech-Start-up-Ecosystem-2019-
report.pdf (last accessed August 23, 2020)
O’Neil, P.H. (2020). India is Forcing People to Use its Covid App, Unlike Any Other
Democracy. Available at
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1001360/india-aarogya-setu-covid-
app-mandatory/ (last accessed October 1, 2020)
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2017). Key Issues
for Digital Transformation in the G20. Available at https://www.oecd.org/g20/key-
issues-for-digital-transformation-in-the-g20.pdf (last accessed October 1, 2020)
Park, S., Choi, G.J., and Ko, H. (2020). Information Technology-based Tracing Strategy in
Response to COVID-19 in South Korea – Privacy Controversies. JAMA. 2020;
43
323(21): 2129 – 2130. Available at https://www.doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.6602
(last accessed August 23, 2020)
United States Trade Representative (USTR). (2019). Fact Sheet on 2019 National Trade
Estimate: Key Barriers to Digital Trade. Available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2019/march/fact-sheet-2019-national-trade-estimate
(last accessed August 23, 2020)
United States Trade Representative (USTR). (2020). Fact Sheet on the 2020 National
Trade Estimate: Strong, Binding Rules to Advance Digital Trade. Available at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2020/march/fact-
sheet-2020-national-trade-estimate-strong-binding-rules-advance-digital-trade (last
accessed August 23, 2020)
World Trade Organization. (2017). 20 Years of the Information Technology Agreement.
Available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ita20years_2017_full_e.pdf
(last accessed August 23, 2020)
World Trade Organization. (2020). World Trade Statistical Review 2020. Available at
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2020_e/wts2020_e.pdf (last accessed
August 23, 2020)
44
Appendix A
Table A1: Select Equipment Required for Data Centres (at HS-6-digit level)
HS-
Code Product Name
847130 Portable automatic data processing machines, weighing not more than 10 kg, consisting of at least a central processing unit, a keyboard & a
display
847141 Other automatic data processing machines: Comprising in the same housing at least a central processing unit & an input & output unit,
whether/not combined
847149 Other automatic data processing machines, presented in the form of systems.
847150 Processing units other than those of sub-heading 8471.41/8471.49, whether/not containing in the same housing one/two of the following types of
units: storage units, input units, output units
847160 Input/output units, whether/not containing storage units in the same housing
847170 Storage units
847180 Other units of automatic data processing machines, excluded 8471.50, 8471.60, and 8471.70.
847190 Magnetic/optical readers, machines for transcribing data onto data media in coded form & machines for processing such data, n.e.s.
847321 Parts & accessories (excl. covers, carrying cases & the like) suit. for use solely/principally with the electronic calculating machines of
8470.10/8470.21/8470.29
847329 Parts & accessories (excl. covers, carrying cases & the like) suit. for use solely/principally with the machines of 84.70 other than for those
headings incl. in 8473.21
847330 Parts & accessories of the machines of heading 84.71
847350 Parts & accessories equally suitable for use with machines of two/more of the headings 84.69 to 84.72
850440 Static converters
850450 Inductors, n.e.s. (excl. for cathode ray tubes)
851711 Line telephone sets with cordless handsets
851712 Telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless networks, other than line telephone sets with cordless handsets
851718 Other telephone sets, incl. telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless networks, other than 8517.11 & 8517.12
851761 Base stations for transmission/reception of voice, images/other data, incl. apparatus for communication in a wired/wireless network (such as a
local/wide area network)
851762 Machines for the reception, conversion & transmission/regeneration of voice, images/other data, incl. switching & routing apparatus
851770 Parts of telephone sets, incl. telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless networks; other apparatus for the transmission/reception of voice,
images/other data, incl. apparatus for communication in a wired/wireless network
853210 Electrical capacitors, fixed, designed for use in 50/60Hz circuits & having a reactive power handling capacity of not <0.5 kvar (power capacitors)
45
HS-
Code Product Name
853221 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, tantalum
853222 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, aluminium electrolytic
853223 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, ceramic dielectric, single layer
853224 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, ceramic dielectric, multilayer
853225 Fixed electrical capacitors, other than those of 8532.10, dielectric of paper/plastics
853229 Fixed electrical capacitors, n.e.s. in 85.32
853230 Variable/adjustable (pre-set) electrical capacitors
853290 Parts of the electrical capacitors of 85.32
853310 Fixed carbon electrical resistors, composition/film types
853321 Fixed electrical resistors (excl. fixed carbon resistors, composition/film types), for a power handling capacity not >20W
853329 Fixed electrical resistors (excl. fixed carbon resistors, composition/film types), n.e.s. in 85.33
853331 Wire wound variable electrical resistors, incl. rheostats & potentiometers (excl. heating resistors), for a power handling capacity not >20W
853339 Wire wound variable electrical resistors, incl. rheostats & potentiometers (excl. heating resistors), n.e.s. in 85.33
853340 Electrical resistors (excl. heating resistors, light dependent resistors), n.e.s. in 85.33
853390 Parts of the electrical resistors of 85.33
853650 Switches other than isolating switches & make-&-break switches, for a voltage not >1000V
853669 Plugs & sockets for a voltage not >1000V
853690 Electrical apparatus for switching/protecting electrical circuits,/for making connections to/in electrical circuits, n.e.s. in 85.36, for a voltage not
>1000V
854231 Electronic integrated circuits, processors & controllers, whether/not combined with memories, converters, logic circuits, amplifiers, clock &
timing circuits,/other circuits
854232 Electronic integrated circuits, memories
854233 Electronic integrated circuits, amplifiers
854239 Other electronic integrated circuits, other than amplifiers/memories/processors & controllers
854290 Parts of electronic integrated circuits
851769 Communication Apparatus (excluding telephone sets or base stations); machines for the transmission or reception of voice, images or other data
(including wired/wireless networks), n.e.c. in item no. 8517.6
Source: WITS and UNComtrade Trade Statistics, available at
http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/RawTradeData/QueryDefinition.aspx?Page=RawTradeData and
https://comtrade.un.org/data/ (last accessed May 28, 2019)
46
Table A2: Top 10 Products Exported from India: 2017and 2019
2017 2019
Rank HS-Code Commodity Export Share (%) Rank HS-Code Commodity Export Share (%)
1 850440 Static Converters 22.29 1 851712
Telephones for Cellular Networks/for Other Wireless
Networks, Other than Line Telephone Sets with Cordless
Handsets
51.29
2 851762
Machines For The Reception, Conversion And
Transmission or Regeneration of Voice, Images
or Other Data, Including Switch
16.96 2 850440 Static Converters 17.86
3 851770 Parts of Cellular Phones and Radio Trunking
Terminals 14.92 3 851762
Machines for the Reception, Conversion &
Transmission/Regeneration of Voice, Images/Other Data, incl.
Switching & Routing Apparatus
7.77
4 853690 Other Apparatus Of Heading 8536 8.82 4 853690
Electrical Apparatus for Switching/Protecting Electrical
Circuits,/for Making Connections to/in Electrical Circuits,
n.e.s. in 85.36, for a voltage not >1000V
4.46
5 851712 Telephones for Cellular Networks or for Other
Wireless Networks 5.54 5 851770
Parts of Telephone Sets, incl. TELEPHONES for Cellular
Networks/for Other Wireless Networks; Other Apparatus for
the Transmission/Reception of Voice, Images/Other Data, incl.
Apparatus for Communication in a Wired/Wireless Network
4.42
6 847330 Parts And Accessors of Machines of Heading
No.8471 4.97 6 854239
Other Electronic Integrated Circuits, other than
Amplifiers/Memories/Processors & controllers 2.04
7 853650 Other Switches 4.01 7 847330 Parts & Accessories of the Machines of Heading 84.71 1.62
8 851769
Other: Apparatus for Transmission or Reception
of Voice, Images or other Data, including
Apparatus for Communication in a Wired or
Wireless Network
3.32 8 853650 Other Switches 1.49
9 853225 Other Fixed Capacitors Dielectric of
Paper/Plastics 2.73 9 854231
Electronic Integrated Circuits, Processors & Controllers,
whether/not Combined with Memories, Converters, Logic
Circuits, Amplifiers, Clock & Timing Circuits,/Other Circuits
1.39
10 847130
Portable Digital Automatic Data Processing
Machines, Weighing <10kg Consisting a Central
Processing Unit, A Keyboard And A Display
2.11 10 853225 Fixed Electrical Capacitors, other than those of 8532.10,
Dielectric of Paper/Plastics 0.82
Top 5
Share 68.54
Top 5
Share 85.80
Top 10
Share 85.68
Top 10
Share 93.15
Source: WITS and UNComtrade Trade Statistics, available at
http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/RawTradeData/QueryDefinition.aspx?Page=RawTradeData and
https://comtrade.un.org/data/ (last accessed August 28, 2020)
47
Table A3: Top 10 Products Imported by India: 2017and 2019
2017 2019
Rank HS-Code Commodity Import
Share (%) Rank HS-Code Commodity
Import Share
(%)
1 851770
Parts of telephone sets, incl. telephones for cellular
networks/for other wireless networks; other apparatus
for the transmission/reception of voice, images/other
data, incl. apparatus for communication in a
wired/wireless network
34.98 1 851770
Parts of telephone sets, incl. telephones for cellular
networks/for other wireless networks; other apparatus for
the transmission/reception of voice, images/other data, incl.
apparatus for communication in a wired/wireless network
23.15
2 851762
Machines for the reception, conversion &
transmission/regeneration of voice, images/other data,
incl. switching & routing apparatus
11.04 2 854231
Electronic integrated circuits, processors & controllers,
whether/not combined with memories, converters, logic
circuits, amplifiers, clock & timing circuits,/other circuits
15.06
3 851712
Telephones for cellular networks/for other wireless
networks, other than line telephone sets with cordless
handsets
10.56 3 847130
Machines for portable automatic data processing machines,
weighing not more than 10 kg, consisting of a least a
central processing unit, a keyboard & a display
10.17
4 847130
Portable automatic data processing machines, weighing
not more than 10 kg, consisting of a least a central
processing unit, a keyboard & a display
8.69 4 851762
Machines for the reception, conversion &
transmission/regeneration of voice, images/other data, incl.
switching & routing apparatus
9.82
5 847150
Processing units other than those of sub-heading
8471.41/8471.49, whether/not containing in the same
housing one/two of the following types of unit : storage
units, input units, output units
4.36 5 854239 Other electronic integrated circuits, other than
amplifiers/memories/processors & controllers 6.84
6 851769
Communication apparatus (excluding telephone sets or
base stations); machines for the transmission or
reception of voice, images or other data (including
wired/wireless networks), n.e.c. in item no. 8517.6
4.24 6 847150
Processing units other than those of sub-heading
8471.41/8471.49, whether/not containing in the same
housing one/two of the following types of unit : storage
units, input units, output units
5.17
7 847330 Parts & accessories of the machines of heading 84.71 3.83 7 854232 Electronic integrated circuits, memories 4.14
8 850440 Static converters 3.56 8 847330 Parts & accessories of the machines of heading 84.71 3.79
9 854239 Other electronic integrated circuits, other than
amplifiers/memories/processors &controllers 3.19 9 850440 Static converters 3.15
10 854231
Electronic integrated circuits, processors & controllers,
whether/not combined with memories, converters, logic
circuits, amplifiers, clock & timing circuits/other
circuits
2.91 10 851769
Communication apparatus (excluding telephone sets or
base stations); machines for the transmission or reception
of voice, images or other data (including wired/wireless
networks), n.e.c. in item no. 8517.6
2.72
Top 5 Share 69.63 Top 5 Share 65.05
Top 10 Share
87.36 Top 10 Share 84.03
Source: WITS and UNComtrade Trade Statistics, available at
http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/RawTradeData/QueryDefinition.aspx?Page=RawTradeData and
https://comtrade.un.org/data/ (last accessed August 28, 2020)
LATEST ICRIER’S WORKING PAPERS
NO. TITLE AUTHOR YEAR
397 SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL
AND SKILLS IN INDIAN
MANUFACTURING:
OBSERVED WAGE AND
TENURE RELATIONSHIPS
FROM A WORKER SURVEY
JAIVIR SINGH
DEB KUSUM DAS
KUMAR ABHISHEK
OCTOBER
2020
396 LIBERALISATION OF THE
INSURANCE SECTOR: AN
ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND
BRICS
SAON RAY
KUNTALA BANDYOPADHYAY
VASUNDHARA THAKUR
SEPTEMBER
2020
395 FAULT LINES IN THE
SECONDARY EDUCATION
SYSTEM IN TWO INDIAN
STATES
RASHMI SHARMA SEPTEMBER
2020
394 INDIA’S INSURANCE SECTOR:
CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
SAON RAY
VASUNDHARA THAKUR
KUNTALA BANDYOPADHYAY
JULY 2020
393 A MINIMUM INCOME
GUARANTEE AMIDST
JOBLESSNESS &
VULNERABILITY: A DESIGN
FOR INCOME TRANSFERS POST-
COVID 19 AND BEYOND
SANTOSH MEHROTRA
ANJANA RAJAGOPALAN
RAKESH RANJAN KUMAR
JUNE 2020
392 VALUE ADDITION, JOBS AND
SKILLS: A STUDY OF INDIA’S
EXPORTS
DEB KUSUM DAS
PRATEEK KUKREJA
JUNE 2020
391 THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES ON FDI
INFLOWS INTO INDIA: SOME
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
JAIVIR SINGH
VATSALA SHREETI
PARNIL URDHWARESHE
JUNE 2020
390 RETHINKING EXPORT
INCENTIVES IN INDIA
ANWARUL HODA MAY 2020
389 THE NATIONAL SKILLS
QUALIFICATION FRAMEWORK
IN INDIA: THE PROMISE AND
THE REALITY
SANTOSH MEHROTRA MAY 2020
388 PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES
IN INDIA: ENHANCING GEO-
STRATEGIC REACH AND
EXPORTS
ARPITA MUKHERJEE
ANGANA PARASHAR SARMA
ANKITA BARAH
ARUSH MOHAN
APRIL 2020
387 AFRICAN GREENFIELD
INVESTMENT AND THE LIKELY
EFFECT OF THE AFRICAN
CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE
AREA
ANIRUDH SHINGAL
MAXIMILIANO MENDEZ-
PARRA
MARCH 2020
About ICRIER
Established in August 1981, ICRIER is an autonomous, policy-oriented, not-for-profit,
economic policy think tank. ICRIER’s main focus is to enhance the knowledge content of
policy making by undertaking analytical research that is targeted at informing India’s policy
makers and also at improving the interface with the global economy.
ICRIER has two office locations in Delhi; in the institutional complex of India Habitat Centre
and a new office at the Institutional Area, Sector 6, Pushp Vihar, New Delhi.
ICRIER’s Board of Governors include leading academicians, policymakers, and
representatives from the private sector. Mr. Pramod Bhasin is ICRIER’s Chairperson.
Dr. Rajat Kathuria is Director and Chief Executive.
ICRIER conducts thematic research in the following eight thrust areas:
1. Macroeconomic Management, Financial Liberalisation and Regulation
2. Global Competitiveness of the Indian Economy – Agriculture, Manufacturing and Services
3. Multilateral Trade Negotiations and FTAs
4. Challenges and Opportunities of Urbanisation
5. Climate Change and Sustainable Development
6. Physical and Social Infrastructure including Telecom, Transport, Energy and Health
7. Asian Economic Integration with focus on South Asia
8. Skill Development, Entrepreneurship and Jobs
To effectively disseminate research findings, ICRIER organises workshops, seminars and
conferences to bring together academicians, policymakers, representatives from industry and
media to create a more informed understanding on issues of major policy interest. ICRIER
routinely invites distinguished scholars and policymakers from around the world to deliver
public lectures and give seminars on economic themes of interest to contemporary India.