OCTOBER 27, 2018

The National Heraldwww.thenationalherald.com

TH

E NATIONAL HERA

LD

As one by one the nationsof Europe fell under theheel of Axis oppression,

no one expected Greece, a rela-tively small nation, to stand upand derail the enemy forces.

On October 28, 1940 at 3AM, the Greek Prime Ministerfaced the demand for Greece’ssurrender and gave the one-word answer, Oxi, and in a mat-ter of hours, the Axis forces de-scended on Greece.

Expecting an easy victory,they underestimated the Greeksand were pushed back.

News of Greece’s victoryagainst the fascist Italian forcesin the mountains of northernGreece and Albania spreadquickly via radio and soon cov-ered the front pages of newspa-pers around the globe. The vic-tory was not just for the peopleof the Hellenic Republic but alsofor Hellenes of the diaspora, es-

pecially those in the UnitedStates, and for the entire world.

Greece gave hope to all thenations that had fallen underAxis oppression, forcing Hitlerto change his plans, delaying theinvasion of Russia (then-SovietUnion), and essentially turningthe tide of the war.

The valiant effort by theGreeks inspired the now famousquote from Winston Churchill,“Hence, we will not say thatGreeks fight like heroes, but thatheroes fight like Greeks.”

Greek-American childrengrow up learning about themeaning of Oxi in Greek schoolwith the annual celebration, thesongs and the plays, and espe-cially the poems we memorizedand practiced over and overagain.

The story was a profoundone and made us proud of ourheritage, but the fact that morepeople, outside of the Greekcommunity, do not know aboutOxi Day is a shame. Thankfully,there are individuals and orga-nizations trying to solve thisproblem.

The Washington Oxi DayFoundation hosts a series ofevents each year to honor theGreatest Generation and com-memorate Oxi Day and all thosewho fight for freedom and jus-tice around the world. As notedon the foundation’s website,“Today’s heroes around theworld who – in the spirit of OxiDay – courageously battle Go-liaths for freedom and democ-racy are nominated by America’spolicymakers and opinion lead-ers to be honored before inter-national and national leadersconvening in Washington, DCeach October for the AnnualWashington Oxi Day Celebra-tion.”

The Washington Oxi DayFoundation is dedicated to in-forming American policymakersand the public about the pro-found role Greece played inbringing about the outcome ofWorld War II and celebratingmodern day heroes who exhibitthe same courage as the Greeksdid in continuing to fight to pre-serve and promote freedom anddemocracy around the world.

AHEPA’s Oxi Day Commem-oration takes place on October27 at Ellis Island. Lectures byAnna Koulouris, the communi-cations advisor and journalistfor the Patriarchate of Jerusalemwho will speak about ReligiousPersecution in the Holy Land,and Vassilios Chrissochos,AHEPA District 6 Director ofHellenism, on the Historical Sig-nificance of Oxi Day. A screeningof The 11th Day, the story of themen, women, and children ofthe Cretan civilian Resistancemovement and the relentlessbattle against Nazi occupationforces from 1941 to 1945 willalso be held. More informationis available at oxiday.com.

In this special issue, we com-memorate that historic day andhope to continue to honor thememory of those who sacrificedall for freedom.

Oxi Day Special2 THE NATIONAL HERALD, OCTOBER 27, 2018

The Washington Oxi Day

Foundation

celebrates the profound role

Greece played in bringing about

the outcome of World War II

and honors today those whose

David vs. Goliath courage,

like the Greeks in WWII,

can alter history and

preserve freedom and democracy.

Andy Manatos, PresidentMike Manatos, Executive Director

OXI DAYOCTOBER 28, 1940

www.OxiDayFoundation.org

Commemorating Oxi Day, When Greece Gave the World Hope

TOP LEFT: The Federation ofHellenic Societies of GreaterNew York Oxi Day Paradelast year in Astoria.

TOP RIGHT: Holy Trinity-St.Nicholas Greek SchoolPrincipal Anastasia Mantaswith students with thestudents, left to right:Stamatis Mallas, GeorgiosPerakis, Maria Bacalexis,Alexandra Doyle, ManolisVlastakis, and ChristosGrigoriou at the Oxi Daycelebration on Staten Island.

CENTER: St. DemetriosGreek Afternoon School inAstoria Oxi Day celebration.

BOTTOM LEFT: The Oxi Daycelebration at the StathakionCenter in Astoria.

BOTTOM RIGHT: Thestudents of the WilliamSpyropoulos School of St.Nicholas in Flushing duringthe Oxi Day celebration inSarantakos Hall.

PHOTOS: TNH/KOSTAS BEJ& TNH/MICHALIS KAKIAS

By Eleni Sakellis

The commemoration of Oxi Day is as significant today

as it was during World War II, and perhaps even more

so now, when we see the continuing oppression and

persecution of people around the world.

Oxi Day SpecialTHE NATIONAL HERALD, OCTOBER 27, 2018 3

JOHN CATSIMATIDIS, Jr.

We proudly celebrate "OXI DAY"ΖΗΤΩ Η 28η ΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΟΥ 1940

Oxi Day Special4 THE NATIONAL HERALD, OCTOBER 27, 2018

The village elders advisedall inhabitants to stay in-doors, except for a com-

mittee of volunteers that wouldassemble in the town squareand pretend life was normal.There was nothing normalabout it. Hordes of Albanian andItalian fascists were marchingthrough the village heading fordeployment on a battle frontthat stretched from the Mour-gana Mountains to the town ofKonispoli. Dark clouds of waragainst Greece were gatheringand fear marked the lives ofNorthern Epirotans.

Though adults made valiantefforts to keep children free offear, fear was walking in frontof my house, dressed in the na-tional colors of Albanian war-riors, leading Mussolini’s armyto the Greek borders. I could notfathom then the significance ofGheghs marching againstGreece. A lifelong study onBalkan affairs would eventuallyclarify matters: the smartlydressed Albanians were ele-ments of the infamous TomoriDivision, a military outfit thathad asked the Italian High Com-mand for the honor to cross theGreek borders first.

On the night of October 27,a ferocious battle commencedin the Mourgana-Filiates frontthat became my introduction towar at age five. The tenaciousresistance by the Greek forcesagainst the Albano- Italian in-vasion, kept us awake at nightand hopeful for the day of ourfreedom. There were nightswhen small groups of men, myfather included, would crossover the Spara ridge intoTsamanda to provide informa-tion to Greek commandersabout troop movements of theinvaders; and there were othernights when we had to abandonour homes and hide in the forestto escape the pillage by Chamsand Albanian irregulars whohad formed special units, withthe sole purpose of pillaging andterrorizing the Greek minority.Irregular units were part andparcel of the Tirana govern-ment’s designs for a Greater Al-bania. Documents captured by

Greek forces in Korytsa (e.g.Document No. 122, June 29,1939) reveal the purpose ofthese units: they were designedto operate outside the parame-ters of the laws of war, carry outintimidation forays against theNorthern Epirotans, cause de-population of Greek villages andultimately change the demogra-phy of Epirus.

The Chams were a centralcomponent in Mussolini’sgrandiose Balkan schemes aswell. In anticipation of the Ital-ian invasion, and in close coor-dination with the Tirana gov-ernment of Shefqet Verlaci, theyhad formed a brigade of theirown that operated as a Trojanhorse behind Greek lines. Com-mander of the Brigade was TahirDemi from Filiates with hiscousin Petrit as his deputy. Thissame unit would play havocwith the lives of Epirotans whenit later offered its services toNazi General Huber Lanz.

In early December the Italo-Albanian forces collapsed, theChams drifted back into thecivilian life and tucked awaytheir guns for another day ofcollaboration. The Greek armypoured into my village and a tallofficer, Major Karalis, made theupper floor of our home his bat-talion headquarters. His stento-rian voice never left me: Nicola,

bring firewood upstairs, hewould intone. It turns out, heknew about my father’s serviceas a draftee in the Greek armyin 1914-16 and a friendship wasestablished between the twomen. Though stern and profes-sional, he would always taketime to run his hand over myhair and thank me for the fire-wood.

When I ended up in Ioanninaas a refugee to escape EnverHoxha’s gulag, I wrote a shortstory for a class assignment ti-tled My First Greek Hero. Thephilology professor of ZosimeaGymnasium, GrigoriosTzomakas, thought the essaywas worthwhile to be sharedwith the class and instructed meto read it. But I am not good forsuch occasions. I broke down insobs after the first sentence andcould not read a story about ahero who was killed in actionand did not keep his promise tomy father and come back forEaster. Another student read myessay to the class and a fewmore students cried.

For over 50 years I have kepthis name etched in my memoryand often thought of tracing hisrelatives. But I did not knowwhere to start and knew noth-ing more than his last name andrank. Those who would addresshim would call him Kyrie Tag-

matarcha and he would addressmy father as Barba Thanasi.

Fifty-nine years later, I acci-dentally discovered the major’sname and picture and memoriesof a heroic age came alive.While on a visit to Greece in1999 to give a lecture on theNew World Order and theBalkans at the invitation of theMayor of Papagos, AdmiralVasilios Xydis, a booklet listingfallen Greek officers in WorldWar II (and a silver plaque) waspresented to me by the host.And there it was: the full nameand a faded picture of my hero.What an irony! It was the timewhen the United States and itsNATO allies were bombardingthe Serbs ostensibly to defendAlbanian victims in Kosovo. Partof the lecture reflected a deepdisappointment for the West’slack of gratitude for the sacri-fices of the Greek and Serbiannations in World War II. At thesame time modern philistineswere bombarding the Serbs indefense of the offspring of Koso-var Nazi collaborators.

My hero had the same firstname as my father, Athanasios.He hailed from the village ofNikita, Halkidiki, and was com-mander of the 3rd Battalion ofthe 12th Infantry Regiment, theunit that liberated my villageand became a legend. A cousinof mine, Dimitrios Stavrou, hadcomposed a song about himwith terribly prophetic title …And if by Chance I Fall in Battle.(Parenthetically, Dimitrios andmy great uncle and sake, Niko-laos Stavrou, were burned aliveby Albanian Chams during ajoint Nazi- Ball Kombetar onEaster week 1944).

Official records show thatMajor Karalis died on December19, 1940 in the village of Borshi(outside Himara) during an as-sault by the Italian Air Force andwas posthumously promoted toLt. Colonel for bravery. I do notknow whether that is accurateor not.

My father had asked everysoldier returning from the frontabout his friend and was toldby several of them that he was

killed by an Albanian sniper inthe village of Nivitsa; and thatwas part of my 1953 essay.However, it makes no differencewhich version of his heroicdeath is correct. Major Karaliswas a hero.

I do not know whether astatue or monument honors hismemory anywhere. I only knowthat my family cherishes thehonor of having being his host,albeit so briefly, and never for-got Major Athanasios Karalis,son of Dimitrios, born in 1896,and died defending Greekideals.

Nikolaos A. Stavrou, a U.S. im-migrant from Greece, wasemeritus professor of interna-tional affairs and politicaltheory at Howard University,where he taught for over 35years, Dr. Stavrou was founderand editor of the academic jour-nal Mediterranean Quarterly.He passed away in 2011. Thispiece was originally publishedin The National Herald on Octo-ber 29, 2004.

Remembering Oxi Day and a World at WarBy Nikolaos A. Stavrou

Dramatic events disturbed

the bucolic life of

Griazdani, my birthplace

in Northern Epirus,

on a sunny October day

of 1940

The Washington Oxi Day Foundation Celebrating HeroesNominated by America’s policymakers and opinion leaders, these heroes from around the world who demonstrate the spirit of Oxi Day are recognized in Washington, DC at the AnnualWashington Oxi Day Celebration. Top left: Oxi Courage Award recipient Vice President Joe Biden was honored along with his late son, Beau, in 2016. Top center: Human rights activist Ji Seong-Ho in 2017. Top right: John Foley and Diane Foley received the Oxi Day Award in 2014 on behalf of their late son, James, a journalist who was the first U.S. hostage killed by ISIS. Middle right:Dr. Fouzia Saeed, at right, was honored in 2012. Middle center: U.S. Rep. Nancy Pelosi and Andy Manatos presented Dinara Yunus with the 2015 Oxi Courage Battle of Crete Award on behalfof her mother Leyla Yunus, a human rights activist in Azerbaijan. Middle right: Khalil al-Dakhi accepting the 2015 Oxi Courage Award from Andy Manatos. Above left to right: RuslanaLyzhychko in 2014; John Githongo and Berta Soler were honored in 2013; Chen Guancheng in 2012; and Nadia Murad, nominated by Amal Clooney, was honored in 2016 and received the 2018Nobel Peace Prize.

WASHINGTON OXI DAY FOUNDATION/PAUL MORSE

Oxi Day SpecialTHE NATIONAL HERALD, OCTOBER 27, 2018 5

a b

AHEPA Headquarters 1909 Q St., NW, Suite 500

Washington, DC 20009 • Phone: 202.232.6300 • Fax 202.232.2140

American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association,

preserving Hellenism since 1922.

Often duplicated, Never imitated, Join today ahepa.org!

The Order of AHEPA,

Supreme President George E. Loucas,

the Supreme Lodge, and all elected officers,

remember the heroes of October 28, 1940

Oxi Day Special6 THE NATIONAL HERALD, OCTOBER 27, 2018

By Dr. Alexandros K. Kyrou

The first aggression in 20thcentury history perpetrated by afascist state was carried out

against Greece, 12 years beforethe Italian conquest of Ethiopia,and 16 years before the Germaninvasion of Poland. In August1923, ten months after comingto power in Rome, Mussoliniused the pretext of an Italian-manufactured Greek-Albanianborder incident to bombard andoccupy the island of Corfu. Afterkilling at least 15 Greek civilians– the world’s first victims of fas-cist war making – the Italianforces withdrew from Corfu amonth after the start of their oc-cupation. Although world opin-ion and Greek diplomatic mag-nanimity forced the Italianwithdrawal and prevented Mus-solini from annexing Corfu, theItalian leader’s actions revealedfascism’s menacing character, anominous threat to internationalstability and peace that wouldbe ignored by the Western pow-ers until the outbreak of the Sec-ond World War.

Much as the Corfu Crisis of1923 has been largely over-looked in most histories of fascistaggression, the first defeat suf-fered by fascist forces in Europehas been one of the most ig-

nored, but important, events ofthe Second World War. Ironi-cally, the first defeat of fascism,like the first fascist aggression,involved Greece. Nineteen

months before the Axis setbackat El Alamein, North Africa and26 months before the Germandisaster at Stalingrad, Greece in-flicted an astonishing defeatagainst Mussolini’s fascist em-pire, a humiliation from whichthe world’s first fascist leaderand first fascist state wouldnever recover.

The Greco-Italian War of1940-1941, known to mostGreeks as simply the AlbanianWar, would have significantstrategic implications for thecourse of the wider, gargantuanconflict throughout Europe andthe Mediterranean. Yet, the routof Italy’s army by the Greeks inlate 1940 marked more than thefirst Allied military victory of thewar in continental Europe. Forthe Allied war effort, the out-come of the Greek campaignconstituted an important moraltriumph which would have enor-mous ideological consequencesfor the global battle of ideas be-tween democracy on the onehand, and the anti-democraticforces of fascism and totalitari-anism on the other.

DISTORTING GREECE’S ROLEIN THE WAR

Despite the significant conse-quences arising from Greece’sparticipation in the war, Greece’srole as an Allied power is typi-cally either ignored or trivializedby most historians. The English-language writing on the war,dominated largely by British au-thors and uncritically repro-duced by American scholars, hasled to a popular, distorted viewof the Second World War. Inas-much as most such works havetended to elevate Britain’s rolein the conflict by marginalizingthe importance of other actors,the contributions of smaller Al-lied co-belligerents have beenlargely ignored. In this sense, thehistorical importance of no otherAllied country has been perhaps

as willfully ignored as Greece.British national pride cher-

ishes the myth that “Britainstood alone” defiantly and hero-ically against fascism from thefall of France in June, 1940 tothe Axis invasion of the SovietUnion a year later. This fallacyis compounded by the fictionthat the British army’s victoriesin 1941 in Ethiopia and NorthAfrica represented the first Alliedvictories against the Axis.

Moreover, to the extent thatthe major extant literature ac-knowledges Greece’s role in thewar, the relevance of Greece’srole is largely reduced to draw-ing Britain’s involvement in theBalkans, dispersing Common-wealth forces to Greece, andthus supposedly underminingthe British from securing a deci-sive, early victory against theItalians in North Africa. In short,most histories of the SecondWorld War address Greece asmerely a peripheral theatre ofoperations for a failed, minorBritish campaign, culminating inan interesting, but tangential,German airborne assault againstCrete. In short, the substanceand analysis of Greece’s partici-pation in the war is largely ig-nored and the importance of theGreek victory against fascist Italyis either omitted or trivialized inmost such works.

These widely recycled rendi-tions of events are, however, en-tirely inconsistent with the ac-tual historical record. First, therhetoric of “Britain standingalone” against fascism ignoresthe many Commonwealth na-tions, as well as Czechs, FreeFrench, Poles, and others whofought alongside the British afterthe fall of France. This approachalso omits Greece – whosearmed forces resisted aggressionlonger than any other Alliedcountry eventually conquered bythe Axis – a country whichfought tenaciously during sevenof the twelve months that Britainsupposedly stood alone.

Furthermore, the Greekarmy’s daring reversal of the Ital-ian invasion proved to be notonly the first Allied victory of thewar, well ahead of Britain’s firstcautious counteroffensivesagainst the Italians in Ethiopiaand North Africa, but colossal inits symbolic and ideological im-portance.

Finally, rather than coming toterms with and analyzing the in-competence of British militaryleadership, which produced anuninterrupted string of Allieddisasters during the first twoyears of the war, most historianshave been content to repeat thehollow apologia of the Britishcommand in the Middle East,which deflected its failures inNorth Africa by attributing themto the dispatch of resources toGreece. This well-entrenchedAnglo-centric perspective hasimpeded the development of amore thorough understanding ofGreece’s participation in the warand the seminal strategic conse-quences and meaning ofGreece’s victory against Italy inthe early stages of the war.

THE ITALIAN INVASION ANDFAILURE

Greece was forced to enterWorld War II on October 28,1940, when an Italian armylaunched a cross-border invasionfrom positions in Albania – Mus-solini chose the date to com-memorate the 18th anniversaryof his ascendancy to power asItaly’s prime minister. Threehours before the invasion began,Greece’s head of state, IoannisMetaxas, was given an ultima-tum by Italy’s ambassador inAthens to surrender Greece toItalian occupation. Metaxas’ im-mediate and resolute rejection

of Mussolini’s ultimatum in-spired the Greek people, whowere already outraged bymonths of Italian provocations,to popularly express their will toresist in one word: Oxi! (No!).The Metaxas government’s im-mediate order for military mo-bilization was met by an instan-taneous wave of patriotic fervorand unprecedented nationalunity, as Greeks, regardless ofpast opposition to or support forthe Metaxas regime, rushed for-ward to defend their countryagainst fascist aggression.

The Italian invasion of Greecewas motivated by strategic, po-litical, and ideological objectives.Conquest of Greece was crucialto Mussolini’s goal of establish-ing Italian hegemony in theMediterranean and the building

of a fascist, revived Roman Em-pire. Furthermore, irritated byBerlin’s lack of consultation withRome before precipitating waragainst Poland in 1939 and in-vading France in 1940, as wellharboring envy of the Germans’astonishing military successes,Mussolini sought to match Hitlerthrough a victorious, unilateralcampaign against Greece. More-over, the anticipated defeat andsubjugation of the Greeks wasintended to demonstrate to theworld the primacy of Italian fas-cism and the superiority of theItalian nation.

The Italian invasion plan en-visioned a decisive defeat of theGreek army to be completedwithin two to three weeks.Greece would be invaded andoccupied in three stages, orphases. The first phase of oper-ations would eliminate Greekborder defenses and secure theseizure of Epirus and the IonianIslands. The second phase, fu-eled by the arrival of a largewave of reinforcements fromItaly, would produce the destruc-tion of the remaining Greek fieldforces in a thrust across westernMacedonia, culminating in thecapture of Thessaloniki. The fi-nal phase of the invasion wouldinvolve the rapid, effortless oc-cupation of the rest of Greece,to be crowned by a triumphalmarch of Italian troops intoAthens.

Placed under the commandof General Sebastiano ViscontiPrasca, the more than 100,000-man Italian invasion force con-sisted of one armored, onealpine, and four infantry divi-sions, plus ancillary armored, ar-tillery, blackshirt, cavalry, and in-fantry units, as well as sixAlbanian battalions, all of whichwere supported by roughly 500artillery pieces, 460 planes, andalmost 200 tanks. In order toquickly reinforce and nearlydouble the initial invasion force,six additional divisions were ear-marked for rapid deploymentfrom Italy within two weeks ofthe commencement of hostili-ties.

Facing this formidable con-centration of men and material,the Greek forces positioned inthe first line of defense along thefrontier with Albania, amountedto only 10,000 troops, a figurewhich would increase to barely35,000 troops during the firstweek of fighting. The Greekarmy lacked any tanks, and theentire air force counted fewerthan 80 planes.

Given the enormous disparityof forces in Italy’s favor, as wellas the factor of a surprise attack,the Italian High Command waspredictably optimistic about theoutcome of their forthcomingcampaign. Mussolini had everyreason to expect success. He wasnot alone. In fact, once news ofthe Italian invasion broke, theinternational media and theworld community universallyanticipated a quick defeat andoccupation of Greece by fascistItaly, a large, powerful countrywith a significant industrial ar-senal, a colonial empire, and apopulation seven times largerthan its prey.

World opinion had been jus-tified in expecting that Greecewould be quickly vanquishedand occupied. The poorly armedand antiquated Greek army wasgreatly outnumbered. Con-versely, the modern and well-equipped Italian military en-joyed comparatively limitlessreserves of manpower and ma-terial, as well as total air superi-ority and the initiative of the of-fensive. Yet, the Greeks wouldovercome these staggering dis-advantages by effective concen-tration of force, tactical deftness,and the intangible of extraordi-

nary will – in short, with stub-born determination, the Greeksoutmaneuvered and outfoughtthe Italians.

During the first few days ofthe attack, the massed Italianforces in Epirus moved forwardbut were slowed by the Greeks’screening units. On November1, the Italians collided into theGreeks’ main line of defense,running from Igoumenitsa alongthe Ionian coast, to the bordertowns of Kalpaki and Konitsa inthe center, north through thePindus Mountains, and descend-ing west of Kastoria and Florina.Backed by intensive bombingsorties, the primary thrust of theItalian offensive was directed to-ward the city of Ioanninathrough the vital crossroads nearKalpaki.

In support of the main pushtowards Ioannina, a deep flank-ing maneuver to the north andeast of the Kalpaki sector wasspearhead by the elite alpine Ju-lia Division. The powerful, well-equipped Julia Division wastasked with securing control ofthe Pindus Range and capturingthe strategic town of Metsovo,thereby isolating Greek forces inEpirus from those in Macedoniaand Thessaly, cutting off theirsupply and retreat route, and en-circling them for annihilation.

GREEK COUNTEROFFENSIVEAND VICTORY

To Mussolini’s horror, and theworld’s astonishment, the Italianinvasion was halted and beatenback by the Greeks. After almosta week of repeated, frenzied Ital-ian attempts to break throughthe Greek lines, the Greeks haddefeated the Italians in severalnear-border engagements, in-cluding the critical Battle ofKalpaki, the first Allied land vic-tory in Europe, in which two un-der-strength Greek regimentsbadly mauled and defeated twoItalian divisions and a large ar-mored formation. At the sametime, the Julia Division was dec-imated. The Julia Division’s ad-vance across the Pindus Rangewas harassed by constant, dar-ing attacks from Greek cavalry,which outmaneuvered the Ital-ian unit, forced it to fall back to-wards Albania, and crushed it ina series of bold actions.

The defeat of the Italian in-vasion force and the steady ar-rival of Greek reserves enabledthe Greek army’s commander-in-chief, General Alexandros Pa-pagos, to launch a counteroffen-sive along the entire front onNovember 14. The main push ofthe Greek assault came from fivedivisions, which Papagos hadconcentrated near Kastoria inwestern Macedonia, along a sec-tor of the front where the Ital-ians, waiting for the first phaseof the anticipated victory inEpirus before starting theplanned second phase of the in-vasion, had remained largely in-active.

Breaking through the Italians’forward defenses, and after alarge scale, week-long battleagainst eight Italian divisions,on November 21 the Greeks cap-tured Koritsa, Albania’s thenlargest city. Koritsa thus becamethe first Axis-occupied city to beliberated by Allied forces duringthe Second World War, an eventthat, much to Mussolini’s humil-iation, drew extensive interna-tional media attention.

The Greek victory at the Bat-tle of Koritsa, which nearly rup-tured the Italian front, had theeffect of forcing the Italians tobegin a headlong retreat deepinto Albania. By November 22,the last Italian troops had beenswept from Greek territory. Dur-ing the next six weeks the Greekcounteroffensive pressedsteadily deeper into Albania,producing an uninterruptedstream of victories as one Italiandefense line after another, andas one town after another, fellto the advancing Greek army.

By the close of 1940, virtuallyall of southern Albania, includ-ing predominantly Greek-popu-lated Northern Epirus, had beenliberated. Although the Greekscontinued to make local gainsby capturing strategic pointsalong the newly establishedfront in January and February1941, the onset of extremelyharsh winter conditions and lo-gistical limitations forced Gen-eral Papagos to halt the generaladvance at the close of Decem-ber 1940. In desperation, Mus-solini had by that time changedhis commanding generals in Al-bania twice and had poured

enormous numbers of troopsinto the country, all with no ef-fect. The front may have stabi-lized, but the Italians could notreverse their staggering defeat.

In response to the Italian dis-aster, Hitler ordered the GermanGeneral Staff to prepare for aninvasion of Greece. AlthoughHitler did not want to go to waragainst Greece, he saw nomeans of avoiding such action.Larger strategic interests de-manded that Greece be neutral-ized. Hitler concluded that thesuccess of his impending inva-sion of the Soviet Union wouldbe complicated if the Axis Pow-ers’ southern flank in theBalkans was not secure, a viewcemented by the arrival inGreece of a token British expe-ditionary force in March 1941.

Thus in April 1941, the Germansinvaded and overran Greece, be-ginning the country’s horrific or-deal of occupation and resis-tance.

Even in the midst of defeatand conquest by the Germans,the Greek victory against theItalians continued to resonateamong both Allied and Axiscamps. Mussolini attempted onelast time to salvage Italian fascistpride by launching a “Spring Of-fensive” aimed at defeating theGreek army in Albania ahead ofthe impending German invasionof Greece. After months of re-building and reinforcing the Ital-ian forces in Albania, ultimatelyamassing a vast army of almost600,000 troops (the largest sin-gle field army the Italians woulddeploy on any front during theSecond World War), on March 9Mussolini launched a carefullyprepared offensive against theGreek forces, which numberedfewer than 300,000 troops. Withthe support of massive aerialbombing and sustained artillerybarrages, tremendous waves ofground assaults were thrownagainst the Greek lines.

Despite suffering enormouscasualties, the Italian attackersdid not gain an inch of territoryand the vaunted “Spring Offen-sive” ended in total failure byMarch 25, fittingly, the Greeks’Independence Day. Mussolini,who had arrived in Albania toobserve in person the openingof the offensive, left Albania indisgust. Adding to Mussolini’shumiliation, following the Ger-mans’ invasion of Greece, Greekforces surrendered to the Ger-mans but refused to capitulateto the Italians. In fact, impressedby the Greeks’ show of braveryand tenaciousness in combatagainst German forces, Hitler,half-sympathizing with theGreeks, momentarily gave con-sideration to concluding a sepa-rate peace with Athens and toleaving the Italian forces in Al-bania to fight the Greeks alone.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONSOF GREEK VICTORY

The Greek victory over Italyhad significant consequences forthe course of the Second WorldWar, but in ways rarely under-stood by most historians. In-deed, the standard narratives onGreece have tended to promotemore misunderstanding than ac-curate awareness of the coun-try’s role in the larger conflict.For example, according to a nar-rative intended to mitigate thefailure of their Greek campaign,several British apologists positedthat London’s decision to deploy60,000 British and Common-wealth troops in Greece inMarch 1941 was determinant inproducing the postponement ofthe Axis invasion of the SovietUnion by six weeks, a delay thatproved fatal for the Germans be-cause it stopped them fromreaching Moscow before the ar-rival of the dreaded Russian win-ter. This argument was happilyrepeated by several German gen-erals who found in the Britishnarrative a convenient means toabsolve themselves of responsi-bility for their own military fail-ures in Russia and to deny theSoviets any credit for their ownrespective successes.

Interestingly, the British mas-ter narrative was eventuallyadopted and modified by Greekwriters, who presented Greece’sadmirable victory as a case of asmall state exercising an asym-metrical effect on Great Powergeopolitics and military actionsin the international system.Greece’s victory against Italy in1940 was thus explained as thecatalyst that set into motion thesequence of events that pro-duced the Axis failure against

The Strategic Implications of the Greek Oxi

Oxi Day SpecialTHE NATIONAL HERALD, OCTOBER 27, 2018 7

the Soviet Union, and hencemade possible the Allied victoryin Europe, a view widely popu-larized in Greece and the Greekdiaspora.

Despite its appeal to Greekpride, the proposition that theGreek army’s victory againstItaly in the mountains of Epirusand southern Albania deter-mined the outcome of the gar-gantuan struggle between NaziGermany and the Soviet Unionis without substance. Moreover,this entire interpretation ispremised upon the uncritical as-sumption that were it not formerely poor timing and badweather the Germans wouldhave crushed the Soviet colossusin a single, swift campaign – aconjecture that is as fatuous asit is simplistic. Rather, the Ger-mans lost their war against theSoviet Union for the same rea-sons the Italians lost their waragainst Greece – the fascistracism of the Germans and Ital-ians caused them to underesti-mate the ability of their enemies,and this outlook led them toplan unrealistically and inade-quately for the determined re-sistance they believed a suppos-edly inferior people, such as theSlavs and Greeks, were inca-pable of mounting. In this sense,the Greco-Italian War was im-portant not because it deter-mined the outcome of the Ger-man-Soviet conflict – it did not– but because it was the fore-runner, one with remarkableparallels to the latter, larger con-flict.

The conventional narrativehas obfuscated historians’ under-standing of the significance ofthe Greco-Italian War in two re-spects: the strategic conse-quences of the Greeks’ successfor the Mediterranean theatre ofwar; and the ideological conse-quences associated with the tri-umph of democratic ideas overthe supposed superiority of fas-cism. The preoccupation withlinking Germany’s defeat in theSoviet Union to the Greek vic-tory in Albania has been coun-

terproductive to a rigorous un-derstanding of the real impactof the Greco-Italian War on thestrategic contours of the largerwar.

To be precise, although theGreek victory in Albania was notimportant to the ultimate mili-tary outcome of the German-So-viet conflict, it was crucial to thesurvival of the British war effortin the Mediterranean. In short,the Greek victory against Italycontributed decisively to the fail-ure of the Axis to vanquishBritain, not the Soviet Union.

In this sense, the Greeks’ vic-tory in Albania was of particularimportance because it divertedcrucial Italian land, air, and seaforces at a time when they weredesperately needed in NorthAfrica to defeat the British forcesin Egypt. From October to May1941, the Italians dispatchedfive times as many troops andsupplies to Albania as they didto North Africa. Albania had thefirst call on armor, artillery, air-craft, motor vehicles, and muni-tions. As a result of the Greekcrisis, the Albanian front monop-olized the attention of the ItalianHigh Command and remainedRome’s all-consuming concernat the expense of other opera-tions, especially those in NorthAfrica.

Had Rome defeated and oc-cupied Greece, and not been tieddown fighting a desperate de-fensive war in Albania, the Ital-ians would have been able toconcentrate an enormous, mo-bile, and far more lethal forcein Libya with which the Axismight well have taken ElAlamein and successfully ad-vanced to the Suez in 1941,rather than failing to do so in1942. In short, the Greeks’ vic-tory against the Italians in 1940probably saved the not-yet-firmly organized, poorly led, andstill underperforming Britishforces in Egypt from defeat, adevelopment which would havehad disastrous consequences forBritain’s position in the EasternMediterranean.

Furthermore, it is clear thatItaly’s failure in Greece per-suaded Spain’s fascist leader,Francisco Franco, to remain neu-tral in the European conflict.Conversely, had the Italians de-feated the Greeks, Spain wouldhave likely entered the war onthe side of Hitler and Mussolini,Franco’s ideological partners.With Spain as a member of theAxis camp, Gibraltar would havebeen easily overrun and theBritish presence in the WesternMediterranean would have beenwiped out. Such simultaneousstrategic losses for the British atthe opposite ends of the Mediter-ranean – Gibraltar and Suez –would have been catastrophicfor Britain and its ability to con-tinue the war against the Axis.

IDEOLOGICALIMPLICATIONS OF GREEK

TRIUMPHFascist thinking led the Ital-

ians to assume that the Greeks

would be easily defeated. Oncethe Greek army devastated thefascist invasion force it producednot only military panic withinthe Italian High Command, butan existential crisis within Italianstate and society writ large. Mus-solini was stunned and bewil-dered by the seemingly incom-prehensible developments inGreece and Albania. He hadcarefully and deliberately sin-gled out Greece as a muchweaker country, and he believedthe Greeks to be racially inferiorto the Italians and therefore in-capable of resistance. Indeed,shortly before the outbreak ofhostilities, Mussolini was so con-fident of an effortless victorythat he remarked, "If anyonemakes any difficulties aboutbeating the Greeks I shall resignfrom being an Italian."

In the whole of almost twentyyears, nothing did more harminside and outside Italy to Mus-solini’s reputation and the ide-

ology of fascism than the Greekvictory in Albania. Militarymorale and Italian public confi-dence in Mussolini’s regime hitbottom, and the debacle inGreece disoriented and demor-alized the fascist party. In fact,it was the defeat at the hands ofthe Greeks that effectively lostfascism the overwhelming pop-ular support it had enjoyedamong Italians before October1940. Furthermore, Mussolini’sinternational prestige and cloutwere destroyed. Ultimately, Mus-solini's position even within theAxis camp was marred and be-littled as a result of the Italiandefeat in Greece. Mussolini, inshort, could no longer cling tohis early conviction that he wasthe greatest of the fascist dicta-tors, the leader of the more dy-namic movement with a right toequal consultation, if not actualleadership of the Axis. Instead,from the Greek debacle on-wards, Mussolini was forced tobecome more and more depen-dent on Germany, while Germanregard for Italian interests de-clined correspondingly. Indeed,whereas Mussolini's recognitionand importance as a majorworld leader were never indoubt before 1940, the Greek fi-asco transformed Mussolini andfascist Italy into an internationallaughing stock.

In retrospect, the most im-portant consequences of theGreek victory against Italy ex-tended beyond the militarysphere to the arena of ideas.Greece’s victory ended the mythof Axis invincibility and, evenmore importantly, it revealed thefalsehood and futility of fascism.Any illusion that fascism her-alded a New Order, a greater civ-ilization based on an entirelynew hierarchical idea of man,society, and nation was shatteredby the Greeks’ success in battleagainst the larger fascist, sup-posedly racially superior, invader– the triumph of a veritableDavid against a modern-day Go-liath. Consequently, the Greeks’military victory was also seen asa moral and ideological victoryfor the Allies and democracy be-cause it affirmed the noble prin-ciple that all nations which abideby the rule of law, no matterhow small or lacking they maybe in might, have a right to existand to be free to determine their

own destinies in peace.Greece’s defeat of fascist Italy

was a defeat of the brutal ideathat only powerful nations havea right to a future and that thefuture should be determined byforce. Many historians empha-size that the lack of sufficientpreparedness doomed the Italianinvasion of Greece to failure.Such historians miss the point –they do not grasp the fact thatthe cause of a lack of sufficientpreparedness in Rome for warwas fascism itself, which, asmuch as the Italian army, wasdemolished by the Greeks on thebattlefields of Epiros. Rome’s fas-cists had been confident thatItalian genius and energy werebound to bring success againstthe inferior Greeks, and thiswould be true even if the Greekswere a hundred times more nu-merous and well-armed. Italianscould rest assured that theywould be victorious becausethey were more intelligent, cul-tured, robust, and braver thanother nations. Therefore, true tothe logic of its racist nationalism,Italy welcomed the war againstGreece and judgment by battleas an entirely proper test bywhich the superior quality of theItalian nation and fascism couldbe demonstrated. Both Italy andfascism failed this test.

In this sense, Greece’s tri-umph against fascism was, likeso many other Greek achieve-ments before it, a victory and amoral lesson for the world – onethat is strikingly prescient forboth Greece and the world inour times.

Alexandros K. Kyrou, PhD, isProfessor of History andDirector, Program in East Euro-pean and Russian Studies atSalem State University in Salem,MA. This piece was originallypublished in The NationalHerald on October 25, 2014.

Apropos of the Oxi that wasdeclared not only by Greek Pre-mier Ioannis Metaxas that fatefulOctober 28 but by the entireGreek nation that rose in unityto fight for its freedom andagainst the Axis powers, threeAHEPA chapters in the Athensarea united to send a holidaymessage to their brothers and sis-ters in the Ahepa family in theUnited States, and to all Greek-Americans.

The message begins: “28th ofOctober 1940 isn't only the firstday of Hellenic Glory with re-spect to the Hellenic role inWWII. It is something more.

“Greeks through the ages havedemonstrated that some eventsin history generate legends thatreverberate in time and alsoshape the future. In the Greeklanguage we call it Athlos. Hellasspread such legends on numer-ous occasions and today they areechoes from its ancient history.

“Greece repeated the defiantMolon Lave, once hurled at thePersians at the Italian demandthat it open its borders to Italiantroops. It was the 28th day of Oc-tober of 1940.

“Being Free means that we areready to pay the greatest price toprotect liberty from tyranny, civ-ilization from barbarism, democ-racy from chaos, the light fromdarkness.

A legend has always its ac-companying virtues. The story ofthe 28th of October constitutes ahymn for Unity because ‘Unitedwe stand.’

“Unity is a substantial princi-ple for AHEPA family. Today,AHEPA Solon HJ-04, AHEPAAlexander the Great HJ-03 &AHEPA Argonauts Magnesia HJ-13 (D-25 AHEPA HELLAS) arecelebrating with our brothers andsisters in the USA who raise theGreek flag in a country that hostsour Greek values with love andrespect. Many happy returns toour brothers and sisters and toall Greek- Americans.”

TNH Staff

GJIROKASTER, ALBANIA –The remains of 573 Greek sol-diers and officers who fought inthe Greco-Italian War of 1940-1941 and died in Albania werereburied at the military ceme-tery of Dragoti on October 12.

The burial is part of a bilat-eral agreement calling for ex-humation, identification, andre-interment at Albanian ceme-teries of Greeks killed in thecountry.

The 573 were among nearly700 who had been buriedhastily during the Italian retreatafter a battle at the straits ofKelcyre (Kleisoura, in Greek). Asearch for the remains beganThere in January, 2017, and thefirst 100 found were reburied atBularat (Vouliarates) in July ofthis year.

At Dragoti cemetery, where

cenotaphs commemorate thedead, the soldiers and officerswere reburied with a religiousceremony led by MetropolitanDemetrios of Gjirokaster (Argy-rokastro).

It was attended by GreekAmbassador to Tirana EleniSourani and other officials.

A joint Greek-Albanian spe-cialists committee will continueits searches and exhumations inother areas as well, the GreekForeign Ministry said.

Material from the ANA-MPAwas used in this report.

Athens AhepaChapters OfferOXI Day Messageto Gr.-Americans

Fallen Greek Soldiers of WWII Reinterred in Albanian Military Cemetery

A cemetery in Vouliarati,Albania, near the Greek

border where Greek soldiersare buried.

Oxi Day Special8 THE NATIONAL HERALD, OCTOBER 27, 2018

Drs. Spiro & Amalia Spireasand

Sigmapharm LaboratoriesΣτην υπηρεσία της υγείας με όραμα, συνέπεια και αφοσίωση

Innovative Pharmaceutical Formulations, Maximizing Drug Therapy

Sigmapharm Laboratories, LLC3375 Progress Drive, Bensalem - PA 19020

Tel.: (215) 352-6655 - Fax: (215) 352-6644 • www.sigmapharm.com

On the 28th of October 1940 Greece was given a deadline of three hours to decide on war or peace

but even if a three day or three week or three year were given,

the response would have been the same.

The Greeks taught dignity throughout the centuries.

When the entire world had lost all hope,

the Greek people dared to question the invincibility

of the German monster raising against it the proud spirit of freedom.

Franklin D Roosevelt, US President 1933 - 1945