ny times v. sullivan
TRANSCRIPT
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
376 U.S. 254
Facts:
Respondent, an elected official in Montgomery, Alabama, brought suit in a state
court alleging that he had been libeled by an advertisement in corporate
petitioner's newspaper, the text of which appeared over the names of the four
individual petitioners and many others. The advertisement included statements,
some of which were false, about police action allegedly directed against students
who participated in a civil rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil
rights movement; respondent claimed the statements referred to him because his
duties included supervision of the police department. The trial judge instructed
the jury that such statements were "libelous per se," legal injury being implied
without proof of actual damages, and that, for the purpose of compensatory
damages, malice was presumed, so that such damages could be awarded against
petitioners if the statements were found to have been published by them and to
have related to respondent. As to punitive damages, the judge instructed that
mere negligence was not evidence of actual malice, and would not justify an
award of punitive damages; he refused to instruct that actual intent to harm or
recklessness had to be found before punitive damages could be awarded, or that
a verdict for respondent should differentiate between compensatory and punitivedamages. The jury found for respondent, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.
Issue:
Can a public figure receive damages in a civil libel action, if malice is not proven?
Ruling:
A State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a
public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves "actual malice" -- that the statement was made with knowledge of itsfalsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.
a) Application by state courts of a rule of law, whether statutory or not, to
award a judgment in a civil action, is "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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b) Expression does not lose constitutional protection to which it would
otherwise be entitled because it appears in the form of a paid
advertisement.
c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are
insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless"actual malice" -- knowledge that statements are false or in reckless
disregard of the truth -- is alleged and proved
d) State court judgment entered upon a general verdict which does not
differentiate between punitive damages, as to which, under state law,
actual malice must be proved, and general damages, as to which it is
"presumed," precludes any determination as to the basis of the verdict, and
requires reversal, where presumption of malice is inconsistent with federal
constitutional requirements.
e) The evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment forrespondent, since it failed to support a finding that the statements were
made with actual malice or that they related to respondent.
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
376 U.S. 254
Philippinized Ruling
Ruling:
A public figure may receive damages in a civil libel action, even if malice is not
proven in accordance with Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Thus:
“Article 33. In cases of defamation fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminalaction, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.”
In the case under consideration New York Times has a responsibility not only
to the public but also to the public officer, Mr. L.B. Sullivan of the Montgomery
Publi Safety as its Commissioner, when it advertised “Heed Their Rising Voices”, It
was directed to the Montgomery Public Safety Police Force for their actionsagaints the civil rights protestas, in which Mr. Sullivan was the head of the police
force Montgomery. By its very nature, libel causes dishonor, disrepute and
discredit where Mr. Sullivan’s reputation was injured as a consequence of the
advertisement made by New York Times. Said article is libelous per se as the law
implies damages and the complainant in libel case is not required to introduce
evidence of actual damages, at least when the amount of the award is more or
less nominal as in the case at bar. (Phee vs La Vanguardia 45 Phil 211)
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If a plaintiff in a defamation case is a public official or a public figure (see Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967)), a plaintiff must show that the defendant published the alleged defamatory statement with
actual malice, which the court defines as knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard as
to whether it was false or not.
Defamation
Any intentional false communication, either written or spoken, that harms a
person's reputation; decreases the respect, regard, or confidence in which a person is held; or induces disparaging, hostile, or disagreeable opinions or
feelings against a person.
Defamation may be a criminal or civil charge. It encompasses both written
statements, known as libel, and spoken statements, called slander.
The probability that a plaintiff will recover damages in a defamation suitdepends largely on whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure in the
eyes of the law. The public figure law of defamation was first delineatedin new york times v. sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686
(1964). In Sullivan, the plaintiff, a police official, claimed that falseallegations about him appeared in the New York Times, and sued the
newspaper for libel. The Supreme Court balanced the plaintiff's interest inpreserving his reputation against the public's interest in freedom of
expression in the area of political debate. It held that a public official alleging
libel must prove actual malice in order to recover damages. The Courtdeclared that the First Amendment protects open and robust debate onpublic issues even when such debate includes "vehement, caustic,
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." A publicofficial or other plaintiff who has voluntarily assumed a position in the public
eye must prove that defamatory statements were made with knowledge that
they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false.
Where the plaintiff in a defamation action is a private citizen who is not inthe public eye, the law extends a lesser degree of constitutional protection to
defamatory statements. Public figures voluntarily place themselves in aposition that invites close scrutiny, whereas private citizens who have not
entered public life do not relinquish their interest in protecting theirreputation. In addition, public figures have greater access to the means to
publicly counteract false statements about them. For these reasons, aprivate citizen's reputation and privacy interests tend to outweigh free
speech considerations and deserve greater protection
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http://lawbrain.com/wiki/Defamation
One of the more difficult issues in a defamation case focuses on whether the defendant is at
fault for publishing defamatory comments. Common law rules created strict liability on the part
of the defendant, meaning that a defendant could be liable for defamation merely for
publishing a false statement, even if the defendant was not aware that the statement was false.Cases involving an interpretation of the First Amendment later modified the common law rules,
especially in cases involving public officials, public figures, or matters of public concern.
Common Law Rules
At common law, once a plaintiff proved that a statement was defamatory, the court presumed
that the statement was false. The rules did not require that the defendant know that the
statement was false or defamatory in nature. The only requirement was that the defendant must
have intentionally or negligently published the information.
Public Officials and Public Figures
In New York Times v. Sullivan , the Supreme Court recognized that the strict liability rules in
defamation cases would lead to undesirable results when members of the press report on the
activities of public officials. Under the strict liability rules of common law, a public official would
not have to prove that a reporter was aware that a particular statement about the official was
false in order to recover from the reporter. This could have the effect of deterring members of
the press from commenting on the activities of a public official.
Under the rules set forth in Sullivan , a public official cannot recover from a person who
publishes a communication about a public official's conduct or fitness unless the defendant
knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of the statement's truth or
falsity. This standard is referred to as "actual malice," although malice in this sense does not
mean ill-will. Instead, the actual malice standard refers to the defendant's knowledge of the
truth or falsity of the statement. Public officials generally include employees of the government
who have responsibility over affairs of the government. In order for the First Amendment rule to
apply to the public official, the communication must concern a matter related directly to the
office.
Later cases expanded the rule to apply to public figures. A public figure is someone who has
gained a significant degree of fame or notoriety in general or in the context of a particular issue
or controversy. Even though these figures have no official role in government affairs, they often
hold considerable influence over decisions made by the government or by the public. Examples
of public figures are numerous and could include, for instance, celebrities, prominent athletes,
or advocates who involve themselves in a public debate.
Private Persons
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Where speech is directed at a person who is neither a public official nor a public figure, the case
of Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc. (1974) and subsequent decisions have set forth different
standards. The Court in Gertz determined that the actual malice standard established in New
York Times v. Sullivan should not apply where speech concerns a private person. However, the
Court also determined that the common law strict liability rules impermissibly burden
publishers and broadcasters.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a defendant who publishes a false and defamatory
communication about a private individual is liable to the individual only if the defendant acts
with actual malice (applying the standard under New York Times v. Sullivan) or acts negligently
in failing to ascertain whether a statement was false or defamatory.
http://injury.findlaw.com/defamation-libel-slander/requirement-of-fault.html
The law of defamation protects a person's reputation and good name against communications
that are false and derogatory. Defamation consists of two torts: libel and slander. Libel consistsof any defamation that can be seen, most typically in writing. Slander consists of an oral
defamatory communications. The elements of libel and slander are nearly identical to one
another.
Historically, the law governing slander focused on oral statements that were demeaning to
others. By the 1500s, English courts treated slander actions as those for damages. Libel
developed differently, however. English printers were required to be licensed by and give a
bond to the government because the printed word was believed to be a threat to political
stability. Libel included any criticism of the English government, and a person who committed
libel committed a crime. This history carried over in part to the United States, where Congress
under the presidency of John Adams passed the Sedition Act, which made it a crime to criticize
the government. Congress and the courts eventually abandoned this approach to libel, and the
law of libel is now focused on recovery of damages in civil cases.
Beginning with the landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that the law of defamation has a constitutional dimension. Under this
case and subsequent cases, the Court has balanced individual interests in reputation with the
interests of free speech among society. This approach has altered the rules governing libel and
slander, especially where a communication is about a public official or figure, or where the
communication is about a matter of public concern.
http://injury.findlaw.com/defamation-libel-slander/defamation-libel-slander-background.html
http://lawbrain.com/wiki/First_Amendment - first amendment
http://lawbrain.com/wiki/Fourteenth_Amendment -fourteenth amendment