c.. n \J:'IQ.To whom was that report addressed, and did you ever see it at any time? A. No, I didn't. You cannot gather from the document to whom the report was addressed, as the heading shows it was a tabula tion of partisan activities during the period of time from 1-15 June 1942. . Q. Is it possible that report went to the army group? .A. It is possible that it is a statistical compilation about in cidents connected with the partisans and about anti-partisan warfare which may also have been sent to the army group. I cannot remember, however, that this report was submitted or orally reported to me at any time. The evaluation of such a com pilation was the duty of the Ie.Q. Is it revealed from that report that those gypsies were shot arbitrarily or for ideological or political reasons? A. No. It is expressly stated here that the compilation deals with partisan activities. It is stated here, under the date of 7 June, that the gypsies were shot after investigations had been made.

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Q. Now, that will bring us to Document NOKW-2072, Prosecu tion Exhibit 682,2 What is revealed by that report?~Roques, who was known to me as a very reliable and conscientious

A. As is shown by this report, General von Roques, Franz von

officer, has thoroughly investigated this incident, apparently on his own initiative. It still deals with the same incident concerning 128 gypsies.Q. Did you know this last report?

A. No. The division sent it to the army group, rear area and it therefore could not have reached me at any time.1

Document reproduced above in this section. 'Ibid.

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Q. I believe that brings us to the end of this particular in cident.

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Q. This brings me to Document NOKW-2268, Prosecution Exhibit 678. * In submitting this document the prosecution, as is revealed by the indictment, wants to prove your complicity in the extermination of 240 mentally defective, syphilitic, and epileptic women from the insane asylum in Markarevskaja-Pustinj in the area of the XXVIII Corps, which was subordinate to you. Of how many parts does that document consist? A. The document consists of four parts. Q. What parts are they? A. It is a report from the SD Commander Hubig addressed to the chief of the Einsatzgruppe and an excerpt of the activity report of the XXVIII Corps Ic to the 18th Army Ic, of 20 Decem ber 1941 and the report of the XXVIII Corps Ic to the 18th Army Ic, of 3 January. Q. Was that document or one of its parts known to you before you saw it in Nuernberg? A. No. Before I arrived here and before I was shown these documents, I did not know anyone of the four parts of this document. Q. To what agency was the report of the Security Service, dated 2 December, sent? A. That report went to the superior agency of the Security Service to Berlin. I would think so. Q. Was that agency subordinate to you? A. No. Of course not. It was not subordinate to me. Q. How about the activity report? A. The activity report of the Ic of the XXVIII Corps was an internal affair of the XXVIII Corps and belonged to the war diary of the XXVIII Corps. Q. Were such war diaries submitted to you at any time?

A. No. The war diaries of the corps, the divisions, or of sub ordinate troop units were not submitted to me.Q. Did you see the report of the Ic of the XXVIII Corps, ad dressed to the 18th Army, Ic of 20 December 1941? Document reproduced above in this section.

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A. No. I saw the photostatic copy, but I did not receive the report. If I had, I am sure I would have initialed it.Q. Does the same apply to the reports of the Ic of the XXVIII Corps to the 18th Army Ic of 3 January 1941?

A. Yes. It applies to that also.Q. Was the whole incident, or the whole matter, ever reported to you orally?

A. No. It was not at any time reported to me orally. Q. If it had been, who would have reported to you? A. That would have been the chief of staff of the army or the Ic of the army.Q. Who was the chief of staff?

A. During that period of time it was Colonel Hasse, who has been mentioned earlier and who in 1945, died in Breslau as a consequence of a sickness he had contracted in the war.Q. And the Ic?

A. That was Colonel Richter, and, as far as I remember, he is a Russian prisoner of war.Q. Who else could have informed you about that incident?

A. Probably the commanding general of the XXVIII Corps or his chief of staff or the commanding general of the I Corps, or his chief of staff.Q. Why the commanding general of the I Corps?

A. Markarevskaja-Pustinj was situated in the area of the XXVIII Corps, but close to the borderline of the area of that corps and for certain periods of time it must also have been part of the area of the I Corps.Q. During the period of time at issue, that is, in December 1941, were you during your trips to the front ever in areas of the I or XXVIII Corps?

A. Frequently during that period of time I visited the XXVIII Corps as well as the I Corps, along the whole front line, that is, the front which goes from Leningrad via Schluesselburg to the North. This [witness pointing out on map] is where the XXVIII Corps was committed, and the I Corps was here, and this is where the heavy battles were raging in December; during that time I was almost daily with the XXVIII Corps or with the I Corps.

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Q. Did one of the commanding generals of either the XXVIII Corps or I Corps or one of their chiefs of staff inform you orally concerning the incident at issue? A. No. I said that neither the commanding generals of the XXVIII or the I Corps nor their chiefs of staff informed me.

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Q. Now, did the chief of Einsatzgruppe A, SS Brigadier Gen eral Stahlecker, inform you?

A. No. I did not see SS Brigadier General Stahlecker and he did not inform me, nor was he subordinate to me.Q. Field Marshal, how do you explain, then, the entry in the war diary of the report of the Ie of the XXVIII Corps, dated 25 and 28 December 1941, which states that the commander in chief gave his consent?

A. I cannot explain that entry at all. I can only suppose, I can only hazard a guess, that my official designation of com mander in chief [Army Group] was mixed up with the designa tion of the commander of the army [AOK]. Such errors unfor tunately occurred. The entries were made by young officers, some of them were reserve officers, and as I said, heavy battles were raging all over the place and the period of time was a very difficult one. The people were overburdened and under a strain, and thus it is possible that an error might have occurred in the entry.Q. You said, Field Marshal, that the incident was reported to you neither by the officers concerned of the army staff nor by one of the commanding generals of the corps or their chiefs of staff, nor did you hear anything about it from SS Brigadier General Stahlecker. In that event could you give your consent at all?

A. No. Since I was not informed at all of the incident, since I knew nothing about it, it was not possible for me to give my consent. The chief of staff, Colonel Hasse, and the Ie who would have been the people to inform me, were most reliable and con scientious. I held both of them in high esteem. I can only suppose that owing to the fact that officers were over-burdened during that time-it was a very severe winter and the most heavy battles were being waged-all of us were physically worn out and under strain and I can only suppose that because of this they failed to inform me.Q. One possibility remains, Field Marshal. Was the Ie of the XXVIII Corps known to you, and wasn't it possible that he informed you or your chief of staff, Hasse?

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A. I did not know the Ie of the XXVIII Corps. Even today I don't know his name, but it would have been unusual, actually it would have been impossible for the Ie of a corps to telephone the commander of an army without the permission of his commanding general or, not even without permission, without the express order, of the commanding general-and the commanding general knew nothing about it. Q. In view of your knowledge of the situation today, did any measure at all need to be taken against the inmates of that insane asylum? A. Yes, certainly. As I heard just now for the first time, Markarevskaja-Pustinj was not located directly behind the front, but actually in the fighting zone. The inmates who were women with terrible illnesses, presented a danger to the troops and of course they couldn't remain there. It was necessary, therefore, somehow to transport them west. If I had heard about the whole matter, I would most certainly have found a way out or a solution to transport these 240 inmates somewhere into the army rear area. JUDGE HALE: You know of no justification for the execution of these women? DEFENDANT V. KUECHLER: No. DR. BEHLING: You don't know the whole incident? A. No. I don't know the whole incident. When I heard this charge for the first time, it moved me considerably. It is one which is outside the normal events of war. It touches my feeling of humanity. Even after I heard about the incident here in Nuernberg, I had plenty of opportunity, days and nights, to search my memory. I found no indication in my recollection of even a trace of a knowledge of that incident at the time.

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EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS FRANZ HALDER*

CROSS-EXAMINATION

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MR. McHANEY: Witness, I will now restrict myself to Army Group North. Do you know about the execution of inmates of mental institutions in the army group under the command of Field Marshal Leeb? Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript. 12-16 April 1948; pp. 1817-64, 1867-2166.

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WITNESS HALDER: I do not know that they were shot, but I do know that the problem of the evacuation of insane asylums was discussed, because Wagner reported this to me. Q. Yes, he did. Let me put your diary to you so we will be very clear about this. Witness, will you find the entry in your diary of 21 September 1941 ? A. 21 September. Yes. I have got that. It says here that as a topic for report the evacuation of insane asylums in occupied territories-. Q. Doesn't the entry read, "General Wagner (Generalquartier meister)", paragraph d: "What to do with inmates of mental institutions in occupied territory"? A. That is the substance of that notation.

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Q. Now, Witness, what is the sense of this entry of 26 Septem ber 1941? A. The substance is the following: The Generalquartiermeister, who was General Wagner, once more pointed out to me a question which had been touched upon earlier on, namely, the question of the mental institutions in the northern area of the eastern front. He had received information to the effect that the Security Service had certain intentions in connection with the mental institutions, and thereupon he asked me what my attitude was concerning this problem. Then he made the following statement, "The Russians regard the mentally insane as sacred persons". In spite of this, in the circles of the Security Service it is deemed necessary to eliminate these mentally insane. Thereupon I told him at that time, "That is a matter which at no time will have any support from the High Command of the Army or any official agency of the High Command of the Army, and which will never be advocated by the High Command of the Army or any of its agencies." That is the substance of the note. Later on he reported to me, in answer to a question of mine, that the mentally insane had been evacuated from the institutions and in order to make the buildings available for military purposes. That is all I know about the matter.

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Q. Oh, I see. Now, this entry, just to clarify it a little more, doesn't mention the Security Service. You explained that killing them is necessary, nevertheless, you explain that, by saying that really is what the Security Service said to Wagner?

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A. That is how Wagner reported it to me. Q. Well, why had the Security Service consulted Wagner about this, do you know? A. I don't know through what channel Wagner received that information. His department military administration dealt with questions of executive power and received its information from all sorts of sources. Q. And you don't know, as a matter of fact, that insane per sons were executed in the operational area? A. No. I never heard anything about it, and I repeat that when I asked sometime later, perhaps there is an entry to that effect also in my diary-when I asked, I was told that these people had been accommodated outside of the institute in which they had been quartered so far. Q. You told Wagner that it was no concern of the High Com mand of the Army what the Security Service did in the opera tional area, is that right? A. No. I didn't say that. Q. I thought that that was what you said a few moments ago. Well, what did you say to Wagner when he reported this to you? A. I told Wagner that no agency of the army would lend a hand to such actions. Q. Did you know that insane people in Germany were executed during the war pursuant to a euthanasia decree? A. I didn't hear anything to that effect during the war, but before the war I heard about it, and I was in personal contact with the clerical circles who opposed and fought this decree.

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4. MEASURES AGAINST JEWSPARTIAL 'rRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-1531 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 587 EXTRACT OF LETTER FROM COMMANDER OF ARMY REAR AREA 550, 20 AUGUST 1940, INCORPORATING COpy OF LETTER FROM COM MANDER IN CHIEF OF 18TH ARMY, 22 JULY 1940, CONTAINING DIRECTIVES CONCERNING ETHNIC STRUGGLE IN THE EAST

[Handwritten] War Diary Commander of Army Rear Area 550 [Stamp] Secret

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G.J. No. 734/40 secret The Commander in Chief of the 18th Army (Ie No. 2489/40 secret)

Staff Quarters, 20 August 1940 Copy

Army Headquarters, 22 July 1940

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2. I also stress the necessity of ensuring that every soldier of the army, particularly every officer, refrains from criticizing the ethnic struggle being carried out in the Government General, for instance the treatment of the Polish minorities, of the Jews, and of church matters. The final ethnic solution of the ethnic struggle, which has been raging on the eastern border for centuries, calls for unique harsh measures. Certain units of the Party and the State have been charged with the carrying out of this ethnic struggle in the East. The soldiers must, therefore, keep aloof from these concerns of other units. This implies that they must not interfere with those concerns by criticism either. It is particularly urgent to initiate immediately the instruction concerning these problems to those soldiers who have been re cently transferred from the West to the East; otherwise, they might become acquainted with rumors and false information con cerning the meaning and the purpose of that struggle. Signed: VON KUECHLER Certified true copy: Signed signature Captain, GSC

25 July 1940

oberquartiermeisterI request the superior.officers to instruct the officers and officials of their departments immediately upon their arrival in the East concerning the contents of the order of the commander in chief. Signed: SCHLIEPER Certified: Signed signature Major Certified true copy: [Illegible signature] Captain

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-2523 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 853 COPY OF LETTER, 22 JULY 1941, FROM 11TH ARMY, SIGNED IN DRAFT BY DEFENDANT WOEHLER, CONCERNING PHOTOGRAPHS AND REPORTS OF EXECUTIONS

Copy 11th Army Command Sec. Ie/Counterintelligence Office Army Headquarters, 22 July 1941 [Handwritten] 74 In view of a certain special case it seems advisable to call express attention to the following: In view of the concept of the value of human life prevailing in eastern Europe, German soldiers might become witnesses of incidents (mass executions, killings of civilian prisoners, Jews and others) which at the moment they are unable to prevent, which, however, are offensive to the innermost German sense of honor. It goes without saying for any normal human being, that no photographs will be made of such abominable excesses, and no report of them will be given in letters home. The production and the distribution of such photographs and reports on such in cidents are looked upon as undermining the decency and discipline in the armed forces and will be severely punished. All existing photographs and reports on such excesses are to be confiscated together with the negatives and are to be sent to the Ie/counter intelligence officer of the army giving the name of the producer or distributor. It is beneath the dignity of a German soldier to watch such incidents out of curiosity. FOR THE ARMY COMMAND. The Chief of the General Staff Signed in draft: WOEHLER 22d Division Sec. Ie. Division Command Post, 27 July 1941 The above copy is being sent for your information and con sideration. FOR THE DIVISION COMMAND. First General Staff Officer [Illegible signature] Distribution B and subordinate units89101&-61-79

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-3292 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1556* COVERING LETTER FROM 18TH ARMY, 28 SEPTEMBER 1941, TRANS MITTING KEITEL ORDER, 12 SEPTEMBER 1941, CONCERNING JEWS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

[Handwritten] Enclosure 5 XXVI Army Corps, Ie No. 862/41 Secret Qu. No. 717/41 Secret [Stamp] Secret 18th Army Command Ie/Counter Intelligence Officer No. 1229/41 Secret Army Headquarters, 28 September 1941 Secret The enclosed instructions from the OKW are hereby forwarded for your information and observation.FOR THE ARMY COMMAND

The Chief of Staff By ORDER: [Signed] Richter Distribution: Down to the regiments, independent battalions, and Supply Troops 2 enclosures [Handwritten] Announced at roll call [Illegible initial] [Handwritten] Only Enclosure 1 Enclosure 2 to be shown to the two chaplains [kriegspfarrer] and to be acknowledged in writing [Illegible initial] Copy Fuehrer Headquarters, 12 September 1941 Armed Forces High Command Armed Forces Operations Staff/Dept. National Defense (IV/Qu.) No. 02041/41 Secret This document was introduced during the cross-examination of defendant von Kuechler. See von Kuechler's testimony below in this section.

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Subject: Jews in the Occupied Eastern Territories Individual occurrences give cause to refer to the directives issued for the behavior of the troops in Russia (OKW Armed Forces Operations Staff/Dept. National Defense (IV/Qu.) No. 44560/41, Top Secret, Matter for Chiefs, 19 May 1941).1 The struggle against bolshevism demands ruthless and ener getic measures, above all also against the Jews, who are the main bearers of bolshevism. Therefore, there will be no collaboration between the armed forces and the Jewish population, whose attitude is openly or secretly anti-German, and no employment of individual Jews to render preferential' auxiliary services for the armed forces. Papers which confirm to the Jews that they are employed for armed forces purposes, will not be issued by military headquar ters under any circumstances. Excepted from this is solely the employment of Jews in spe cially set up labor columns which are only to be assigned under German supervision. It is requested to disseminate this order to the troops. The Chief of the OKW Signed: KEITELTRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-34 I I PROSECUTION REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 142 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL AND, "REICHENAU ORDER",s OF 10 OCTOBER 1941, DISTRIBUTED BY XXVIII ARMY CORPS OF THE 18TH ARMY, COMMANDED BY DEFENDANT VON KUECHLER

[Handwritten] Activity Report IV, Appendix 17 Ic [Stamp] Secret Corps Hq. XXVIII Army Corps Section Ic No. 706/41 Secret Corps Command Post, Lissino, 6 November 1941 Corps Hq. XXVIII Army Corps Section Ia No. 1552/41 Secret As enclosure an order- by an army command is forwarded; this order has been approved by the Fuehrer and deals with the con1 This directive (a, pa,rt of Dotmment NOGW-9J,85. Prosecution Rehutta.l Exhibit 9) is reproduced in section VI D 3 b. Photographic reproduction of this document appears in Section VIII, Case 12, vol. XI. This order, originally composed and issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau. Commander in Chief of the 6th Army, was disseminated widely within the German military forces in the East. "The prosecution introduced this copy into evidence as a rebuttal document in connection with the testimony of the defendant von Kuechler that the "Reichenau Order" was not distributed within the l"8th Army. (See von Kuechler's testimony below in this section.)

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duet of the troops in the Eastern Territories. In the corps area, too, the conditions in general are such that the soldiers must be educated to show more harshness. The following factors are reemphasized: 1. Every piece of bread given to the civilian population, will be missed at home. 2. Every civilian, even woman or child, trying to cross our encirclement around Leningrad, is to be fired on. The less mouths to feed at Leningrad, the longer will be its resistance there, and each refugee is inclined toward espionage and the partisans; all these things cost the lives of German soldiers. 3. German trucks and vehicles are not here to serve as trans portation for the Russian population. As Deputy [Signed] KRATZERT Maj or General Distribution: Down to battalions.

Army Command [AOK]

Copy of copy Army Hq., 10 October 1941 Secret

Subject: Conduct of the troops in the Eastern Territories In many places there still exist vague ideas regarding the con duct of the troops towards the Bolshevist system. The most important objective of the war against the Jewish Bolshevist system is the complete destruction of its means of power and the elimination of the Asiatic influence within the sphere of European civilization. In this connection, tasks arise for the troops, which exceed the traditional one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern Territories is not only a fighter according to the rules of the art of war, but also the bearer of a ruthless national ideology and the avenger of all the bestialities which have been inflicted on the German and racially related nations. This is the reason why the soldier must have full understanding of the necessity of a severe but just retribution upon the Jewish subhuman elements. Its second purpose is to nip in the bud revolts in the rear of the armed forces, which, as experience shows, are always fomented by Jews. The struggle against the enemy behind the front is still not being taken seriously enough. Malicious,

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cruel partisans, and degenerate females are still being made prisoners of war; and snipers and vagrants dressed partly in uniforms or in civilian clothes, are being treated like decent soldiers and turned over toPW camps. Indeed, the captured Russian officers report sneeringly that the Soviet agents roam the streets unmolested and frequently eat meals at German field kitchens. Such conduct on the part of the troops can be explained only as complete thoughtlessness. In this case, however, the time has come for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle. The feeding at army kitchens of the native population and prisoners of war who are not in the service of the armed forces, is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving away of cigarettes and bread. The items given up at home under the greatest sacrifices, and transported to the front by the com mand authorities under the greatest of difficulties, must not be given away by the soldier to the enemy, even if they come from booty stores. They are an essential part of our supplies. The Soviets frequently set fire to buildings while retreating. The troops should be interested in fire fighting only as far as necessary troop billets must be preserved. In all other cases, the disappearance of the symbols of the former Bolshevist regime, even if represented by buildings, belongs into the framework of the war of annihilation. In this respect, neither historical nor artistic considerations play a part in the eastern region. The command authorities will give the necessary orders for the preservation of the raw materials and production plants essential for war economy. The total disarming of the population in the rear of the fighting troops is especially urgent in view of the long and vulnerable supply lines. Captured arms and ammunition are to be salvaged and guarded wherever possible. If the combat situation does not permit this, arms and ammunition are to be rendered useless. If individual partisans are found to be using firearms in the rear of the army, this has to be suppressed by drastic measures. These measures must also be extended to those persons of male population who were in a position to prevent or report sabotage operations. The indifference of numerous alleged ly anti-Soviet elements, which derives from a "wait and see" attitude, must give way to a clear decision to cooperate actively against bolshevism. Otherwise no one can complain about being considered and treated as an adherent of the Soviet system. The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than the threat from the wandering Bolshevist remnants. Apart from all political considerations of the future, the soldier must fulfill two demands.1213

1. The total annihilation of the false bolshevist doctrine of the Soviet state and its armed forces. 2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty, and by the same token, the protection of the lives of the members of the German Armed Forces in Russia. Only in this manner shall we fulfill our historical mission to free the German people from the Asiatic-Jewish danger once and for aU. Signed signature Certified true copy: [Signed] VON KATZELL 1st Lt.PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-663 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 018 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL FROM ARMY HIGH COMMAND (OKH) TO MAJOR SUBORDINATE UNITS IN THE EAST, 28 OCTOBER 1941, REQUESTING IMPLEMENTATION OF "REICHENAU ORDER"

Copy High Command of the Army General Staff of the Army/Generalquartiermeister Dept. War Administration (QuA/B) II 7498/41 Secret Headquarters, High Command of the Army, 28 October 1941 [Stamp] Secret Subject: Conduct of troops in Eastern Territories By order of the Commander in Chief of the Army [von Brauchitsch], the copy of an order concerning the conduct of the troops in the Eastern Territories by the Commander in Chief of the Sixth Army, designated as excellent by the Fuehrer, is here with transmitted with the request to issue---if not already done-- orders to the same effect. * ByORDER:

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Signature Distribution: To all: Army Groups Armies . th e E as t III Panzer Groups Commanders of Army Group Rear Area

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The order transmitted was signed "Commander in Chief, von Reichenau, Field Marshal", A translation of the text of this order Is contained In Document NOKW-S411, Prosecution Rebuttal Exhihit 14, immediately preceding.

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Certified True Copy: [Illegible signature] Captain

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-650 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 738 REPORT FROM XXX ARMY CORPS TO 11TH ARMY, 2 AUGUST 1941, CONCERNING OPERATIONS AGAINST JEWS IN KODYMA

Corps Hq XXX Army Corps Section Ie Corps Hq., 2 August 1941 [Stamp] 11th Army Section Ie Counterintelligence Officer 6 August 1941 To 11th Army Section Ie/Counterintelligence Officer Subject: Operations against Jews and Komsomol in Kodyma on 1 August 1941. I. A Ukrainian woman was brought to Corps Headquarters Section Ie by Captain Kraemer, interpreter with the 198th Divi sion on 1 August 1941, about noon. The woman stated as follows: She listened in on a discussion of Jews and Bolsheviks on 31 July 1941, about 1900 hours. During this discussion a decision was reached to sabotage the German request to start work again in the fields, to spy on the German military offices in Kodyma and, after being joined by persons of the same mind from other villages, to attack the German offices and troop units of the German Army stationed in Kodyma. For interrogation of the Ukrainian woman see Enclosure 1. II. On the basis of this report the SS Einsatzkommando lOa, stationed in Olshanka was informed immediately. The Einsatz kommando was requested to dispatch a detachment to Kodyma immediately in order to prevent the execution of the intentions of the Jews and Bolsheviks on the same afternoon by an exten sive operation in the Jewish quarter. The operation was executed under the command of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Prast, and 300 members of various troop units were also employed to block off the part of the town involved. The operation started at 1515 hours and was finished at approximately 1900 hours. III. Results-Altogether 400 male persons were arrested, most ly Jews. They were subjected to an interrogation in the market place of Kodyma. It was remarkable that many of these Jews were from Baltic, Soroki, Yampol, and other localities formerly

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occupied by German troops, in particular former leading Com munists. Ninety-eight of these 400 persons were proved active members of the Communist Party (functionaries and the like) and/or urgently suspect of participation in the intended plot. The rest of the persons consisted to a great part of asocial elements of the Jewish race. The first mentioned 98 persons were shot to death outside the village pursuant to the directive of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Prast, after they were briefly screened and interrogated once more. Of those remaining 170 were de tained as hostages of which 120 to 130 (old men and children) were again released in the morning of 2 August 1941, while the remaining 40 persons were detained as hostages. On the same evening, by means of loud-speaker vans, and the next morning by means of poster and the distribution of the enclosed proc lamation, the population was informed of the reason for the measures taken on 1 August 1941, and given instructions for their future conduct. IV. The night from 1-2 August 1941, in Kodyma was perfectly quiet. There were no signs whatever that any actions by Jews and Communists against the armed forces would take place.FOR THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

The Chief of the General Staff [Illegible signature J Colonel

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-586 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 741 PROCLAMATION BY DEFENDANT VON SALMUTH* TO THE INHABI TANTS OF KODYMA, ISSUED ON 1 AUGUST 1941, AND EXTRACT OF REPORT FROM SS SONDERKOMMANDO lOa TO EINSATZGRUPPE D, 3 AUGUST 1941, CONCERNING KODYMA AFFAIR

To the population of Kodyma 1. A number of persons were shot today because it had become known to the German Command that preparations were being made for secret attacks against the troops of the German Armed Forces in the town. 2. In addition, a further number of persons were taken hostage and brought to the prison camp. They will not be harmed if the See testimony of defendant von Salmuth reproduced below in this section, for more cOMplete information concerning this incident.

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population of the town shows a quiet and loyal attitude towards the troop detachments in the town and towards German soldiers. 3. However, should any troop detachments or individual Ger man members of the armed forces or any installations of the German Armed Forces in the town or in the vicinity of Kodyma be attacked, the German Command will be obliged to order more executions. Only a quiet loyal attitude of the entire population guarantees the lives of these hostages. 4. It is hereby ordered that until further notice the population of Kodyma has to provide for the provisioning of these hostages. The major is arranging details with the local commander and the commander of the prison camp. 5. Starting immediately the civilian population is forbidden to leave their homes between 2030 and 0400 hours. Anyone found in the streets during this time will be shot. Kodyma, 1 August 1941 The German Command Local Headquarters, 3 August 1941 Sonderkommando lOa To Einsatzgruppe D

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2. On account of riots and preparations for attacks on the German Armed Forces, a raid of the Jewish quarter of Kodyma was organized by the Teilkommando, for which the XXX Army Corps put 400 soldiers at the disposal of the Teilkommando. For this the use of arms was necessary. In agreement with the com manding general, 99 of the persons arrested were shot, among them 97 Jews, approximately 175 were taken as hostages, the rest released. Executions were carried out by 24 men of the armed forces and 12 of the Security Police. Details are given in the special report, enclosed herewith.

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(Signed) SEETZEN SS ObersturmbannfuehrerTRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-579 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 740 REPORT BY SONDERKOMMANDO lOa, 2 AUGUST 1941, CONCERNING OPERATION AGAINST JEWS IN KODYMA

Local Headquarters, 2 August 1941

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Sonderkommando lOa (Petchanka) Report Subject: Meetings of Jews in Kodyma. On the strength of information given by a Ukrainian woman, according to which a secret meeting of about 50 Jewish persons was held in Kodyma at which the possibility of a surprise attack on individual German units quartered in Kodyma was discussed, the Sonderkommando lOa was notified through the XXX Army Corps. From the Sonderkommando lOa a squad consisting of 2 NCO's and 14 men was detailed to investigate the matter. The information given by the Ukrainian woman was largely con firmed by the statements of several Ukrainian inhabitants of the town. In addition, several reports had been received from German soldiers stating that Jews staying in Kodyma, the majority of whom were Jews who had fled there from the districts Belzy, Soroki, etc., had shown a very hostile attitude towards German military personnel. Among other things, the Jewish manager of a soda water factory had forbidden drinks to be served to the troops, and under threat he had prevented soldiers from entering. Other Jews had gathered in groups of 10-12 and had also adopted a very hostile attitude. After the Ic of the XXX Army Corps had detailed about 400 men for the purpose of carrying out an operation, it was possible wholly to surround and comb out the inner circle of the town the inhabitants of which were almost 100 percent Jewish. A decree was then issued that all males over 15 years of age were to be arrested. Any attempt at flight or resistance would be ruthlessly countered by force of arms. Since the Jews even then persisted in their hostile behavior and some of them attempted to escape or barricaded themselves in their houses, firearms had repeatedly to be used. One Jew was shot and another wounded. In addition, warning shots had to be fired repeatedly at the rest of the population as they tried to free those arrested or to intervene in some other way. After the operation was over, about 400 male Jews were arrested. The majority of them had fled from districts occupied by the advance troops and had taken refuge in Kodyma. By interrogation of and confrontation with Ukrainian inhabi tants of the town, 98 persons were identified who had taken part in the meetings or who had behaved in an insubordinate manner to the German military, or who had belonged to the Jewish in telligentsia. About 100 persons who were Ukrainians or Russians or were very old were released after appropriate fines had been 1218

imposed. With regard to the remainder, about 175 in number who were all Jews, it could not be proved that they were im plicated. They were therefore handed over to the German military prison camp as hostages, while the aforementioned 98 persons were liquidated after their particulars had been taken. During the interrogation it was ascertained that even after the arrival of the staff of the XXX Army Corps, a Jew had given refuge to a Russian officer, who had only left the town a few days before, leaving his uniform behind. The Jew who had given him refuge was also arrested. The armed forces took part in the execution with a detachment of 24 men, while the execution detachment of Security Police taking part consisted of 12 men. An attempt at flight which took place during the execution was prevented by the use of firearms. While preparations were being made for the execution and also during the actual execution, order had to be restored in the town by force of arms. At 2030 hours order was finally restored after the population also had been notified of the proclamation issued by the local commander stating that no one was to leave his house after 2030 hours on pain of death. The detachment of the Security Police remained on the spot during the following night and yesterday. Up to the present no incidents have been reported. During the following night the population was informed of the measures adopted by the German authorities by means of loud speaker vans and posters (see enclosure) in German, Russian, and Ukrainian. SS HauptsturmfuehrerPARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-2963 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1303 DIRECTIVE FROM COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE XXX CORPS, DEFENDANT VON SALMUTH, 2 AUGUST 1941, CONCERNING PARTICIPATION OF SOLDIERS IN OPERA"I"IONS AGAINST JEWS AND COMMUNISTS

Headquarters XXX Army Corps Section Ie No. 628/41 secret Corps Headquarters, 2 August 1941 Secret Counterintelligence Directive No.4 [Handwritten] 22d Division Ic 552/41, secret 20 August 1941 Distribution A, 20 August 1941 [Illegible initial]

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2. Participation of soldiers in operations against Jews and Communists-The fanatical intent of the members of the Com munist Party and of the Jews to delay the German Armed Forces at all costs must be broken under all circumstances. In the interest of the security of the army rear area it is therefore necessary to take severe measures. Sonderkommandos have been charged with this mission. At one place, however, members of the armed forces participated in such an operation in an unpleasant manner. For the future I order-Only those soldiers will participate in such operations who are expressly ordered to do so. I also forbid all members of the unit subordinate to me to participate as spectators. If members of the units are ordered to participate in such operations, they must be under the command of officers. These officers are responsible for ensuring that no unpleasant excesses are committed by the troops.Distribution: Down to companies. THE COMMANDING GENERAL [Signed] SALMUTH

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-3146 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 943 EXTRACTS FROM OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT U.S.S.R. NO. 94, 25 SEPTEMBER 1941, CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN

The Chief of the Security Police and Security Service (SD) IVA 1/Journal No. 1/B41, Top Secret Berlin, 25 September 1941 48 copies-36th copy

Operational Situation Report U.S.S.R., No. 94 Top Secret I. Political survey

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II. Reports from the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos Einsatzgruppe A. Location Kikerino I. Partisans

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Within the area of the civil administration, Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3 found at various places an intensified propaganda activity

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of the Jewish population for the Bolshevist cause. Wherever suchpropaganda activity appears the most severe measures are being taken and the places entirely purged of Jews as far as possible. This Jewish propaganda activity having been particularly in tensive in Lithuania, the number of persons liquidated within the area of Einsatzkommando 3 has increased to approximately 75,000. For specific tasks special Kommandos had repeatedly to be sent into the rural districts and were assigned to certain places for several days. Thus, for example, one Kommando had to be sent to Pljussa, since reports about large-scale looting had been re ceived from there. Forty-seven persons were arrested and ques tioned. Seven persons were shot for looting, two more were publicly escorted through the streets of the place, while the in habitants were told that these persons had been looting food to the detriment of the population. Another Sonderkommando had to be sent to Mugotova where 87 insane persons had armed them selves and roamed the countryside looting. It could be ascertained that these insane had been incited by 11 Communists, part of whom presumably belonged to a partisan group. The 11 agitators, among them 6 Jews, and the insane were liquidated. In the vicinity of the headquarters of group staff Pesje, Ikerine and Neshne, the whole male population was regularly screened immediately on arrival of the units, resulting repeatedly in the arrest of partisans, Jewish and Communist agitators, looters, etc. Since the locations of the Einsatzgruppe are always near the headquarters of the 4th Armored Group, appreciation for this systematic and successful screening of the neighborhood area was repeatedly voiced by the 4th Armored Group.II. The Jewish problem in the Eastland Territory [Gebiet Ostland]

The first actions against the Jews in the Reich Commissariat Eastland, also in the field of the administrative police, were under taken by the Security Police. After the civil administration had taken over, the Einsatzkommandos transferred all anti-Jewish actions in the administrative police field whether completed or only initiated, to the civil administration agencies. The establish ment of ghettos had already been prepared everywhere and is being continued by the civil administration. Only at Wilno [Vylna] which was taken over by Einsatzgruppe A at a later date, preparations for the confinement in a ghetto of the 60,000 Jews living there had not yet been made. Einsatzkommando 3 has now suggested the establishment of a ghetto and will at the1221

same time initiate the necessary pacification actions against the political activity of the Jews. At Riga, the so-called Moscow quarter of the town had been provided as a ghetto, even before the civil administration took over and a council of Jewish elders had been nominated. The removal of the Jews into the ghetto is being continued. The Jews in the cities are being employed by all German agen cies as unpaid manpower. Difficulties with such employing agencies are everyday occurrences, if and when the Security Police must take steps against working Jews. Economic agencies have repeatedly even filed applications for exempting Jews from the obligation to wear the Star of David and for authorizing them to patronize public inns. This concerns mostly Jews who are designated as key personnel for certain economic enterprises. Such efforts are of course suppressed by the agencies of the Security Police. In the old Soviet Russian territory, Jews were found only sporadically, even in the cities. Most of the Jews who had been living there had fled. At present, and since old Soviet Russian territories have been occupied, the Wehrmacht itself usually issues orders for the marking of the Jews. Thus, the commander in chief of the 18th Army has ordered, for example, that Jews must be distinguished by white brassards to be worn on both arms and showing the Star of David.

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IV. Situation in occupied area of Old Soviet Russia

No reports from Einsatzgruppe B. Einsatzgruppe C. Location Smolensk.

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II. Measures taken and observations made by the Security Police During the preparation period for the military offensive now under way, the operations of the Einsatzkommandos could be continued intensively and on a broad basis. In the southern region of the operational area, because of the sparseness of the Jewish population, the main effort had to be directed toward individual investigations and search actions, while particularly in the region of Zhitomir and Berdichev there was an opportunity for actions on a larger scale. This explains also the difference in the number of executions reported by the individual Kommandos.1222

Sonderkommando 4a has now surpassed the number of 15,000 executions. Einsatzkommando 5, for the period between 31 August and 6 September 1941, reports the liquidation of 90 political officials, 72 saboteurs and looters, and 161 Jews. Sonder kommando 4b, in the period between 6-12 September 1941, shot 13 political officials and 290 Jews, primarily of the intelligentsia, whereas Einsatzkommando 6, in the period between 1-13 Sep tember 1941, executed 60 persons. Group staff was able to liqui late during the last days four political officials and informers of ;he NKVD, six asocial elements (gypsies) and 55 Jews. The LInits of the Higher SS and Police Leader during the month of August shot a total of 44,125 persons, mostly Jews.

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As already mentioned, the procedure against the Jews is neces sarily different in the individual sectors, according to the density of their settlement. Especially in the northern sector of Einsatz gruppe C, a great many Jewish refugees have returned to the villages and, present now a heavy burden in regard to the food situation. The population neither houses nor feeds them. They live partly in caverns, partly in overcrowded old huts. The danger of epidemics has thus increased considerably, so that for that reason alone a thorough cleanup of the respective places became necessary. The insolence of the Jews has not yet diminished even now. Apart from the fact that, on the occasion of raids, they like to pass themselves off for Russians, Ukrainians, even ethnic Ger mans, they often are in the possession of passports which, though showing their names correctly, give a false nationality. Conceal ment of their Jewish descent has been made easier for them by the Russianization of the names which has taken place to an ever-increasing degree during the last years. At Kirovograd it became known that Jews tried to obtain all the register's office identity papers with a false nationality. Several Jews, on the basis of forged papers, even succeeded in obtaining various posts with the administration where they per formed such acts of "re-baptism" in a system of patronage as practiced already previously. The Ukrainian population, for fear of revenge by the Jews, often does not dare to report this situation to the authorities. The most severe measures are taken here in dealing with such cases. Difficulties have arisen insofar as Jews are often the only skilled workers in certain trades. Thus, the only harness-makers and the only good tailors at Novo-Ukrainia are Jews. At other places also only Jews can be employed for carpentry and lock1223

smith work. The cause of this shortage of skilled workers is to a large extent to be found in the unlimited compulsory evacuation of skilled Ukrainians by the Soviets. In order not to endanger reconstruction and the repair work also for the benefit of tran sient troop units, it has become necessary to exclude provisionally especially the older Jewish skilled workers from the executions.

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No reports from Einsatzgruppe D.

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT VON KUECHLER

DIRECT EXAMINATION

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DR. BEHLING (counsel for defendant von Kuechler) : Now, Field Marshal, the prosecution has raised two questions here, reports or war diary extracts where it is reported that Jews were shot. I ask you now, were these Jews shot because they were Jews or, if not, how do you explain these reports? DEFENDANT VON KUECHLER: No. These Jews were certainly not shot because they were Jews or because of their religion. They were shot because they were connected in some way with the partisans, and because they were convicted of having helped the partisans or having participated in partisan warfare.Q. Why then was there a separate listing in your reports with respect to the partisans, partisan suspects, and partisan helpers, Jews, persons without identification, etc.? Parachutists were also listed separately.

A. Actually they are all the same; there is just a separate list ing due to the individual who wrote the war diary, and I really cannot explain why it happened.

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CROSS-EXAMINATIONMR. NIEDERMANN: You stated you received the Reichenau Order while you were in the East. DEFENDANT VON KUECHLER: Yes. Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 27-{!9 April 1948, pp. 2787 3002.

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Q. It is Document NOKW-663, Prosecution Exhibit 618. * Did you distribute that order to your subordinates?

A. When did the Reichenau Order arrive? Oh, yes. I was with the 18th Army then. I must have been with the 18th Army. No. I did not pass on the order.Q. Do you recall the order well enough to describe it or to discuss it, or shall I show it to you?

A. Well, I cannot remember it butQ. Can you give me your opinion of that order? A. Well, yes. I know the substance of the order and I have read it again now. I reject the order and think that it is not consistent with the conduct of war. Q. Did you issue any orders similar to that in your sphere of command? A. No. I also thought about whether I gave an order on the basis of the Reichenau Order, and I don't think I did, no. Q. Did you order any discriminatory measures against Jews? A. No. Q. You were shown a document this morning or yesterday, NO-3146, Exhibit 943. You will recall perhaps that that was a report by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in whichA. The commander in chief agrees to the Jewish star.Q. That is right. You said, didn't you, that you had no kno_wl edge of the fact that you are mentioned there as having ordered the marking by arm band of Jews?

A. No. I can't remember that. No. I can't remember that Stahlecker came to visit me about that either. I can't remember.Q. Did you or did you not issue such an order? It must be easy for you to answer that question. You categorically deny that you issued it? A. Well, I am sitting here under oath, and I really can't-I can only state according to my best knowledge and belief. If I s,ay no, then you will just produce a document with an order showing the opposite! Q. Would you have issued such an order?

A. No.Q. If you had issued such an order you would have.:: Document reproduced in part, above. in this section. A complete translation of the text

of the Reichenau Order also appears in NOKW-3411, Prosecution Rebuttal Exhibit 14, in this section.891018-51-80

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A. Because it absolutely contradicted my opinion. 1 really can not imagine that 1 issued an order of that kind.Q. You, of course, realize that if you had issued such an order for marking of Jews in those times and in that place you would have in reality been marking them for execution, would you not?

A. No. Why? 1 don't know. 1 didn't know anything at all about this secret order of Hitler's, and 1 didn't know anything at all about the extermination of the Jews or gypsies. 1 didn't know anything about it at all. Q. Certainly you now realize that if you had done that, that is what would have resulted? A. Yes. When 1 look back on it now, then 1 must answer in the affirmative.Q. Let me show you another Document, NOKW-1686, Prosecu tion Exhibit 612.* This is an order-do you have it in front of you? A. Yes. 1 have got it.Q. This is an order by the commanding general of the rear area of the Army Group North on Jews in the newly Occupied Eastern Territories.

A. Yes. Q. What do you think of that order? A. This is an order from the OKW to the commander of the rear area of Army Group North which probably contains the intentions of Hitler in the struggle against Bolshevism.Q. What do you think of the order; what is your opinion? Would you have issued such an order?

A. No. I would never have issued such an order.Q. But, as a matter of fact, Witness, you did issue such an order, did you not?

A. Did I? No. When?Q. Then 1 must show it to you, NOKW-3292, Prosecution Ex hibit 1556. That is the identical order. It is the same order, is it not? A. Yes.Q. And it is distributed by your 18th Army, is it not?

A. Yes. This exhibit is the same in content as Document NOKW-3292. Prosecution Exhibit 1666, reproduced above in this section. Note following testimony of the defendant von Kuechler affirming fact that the documents are identical.

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Q. And signed by the [18th] Army General Staff?

A. But it is not signed by me nor by my chief of staff. It went through the Ic channel, even through the Ic counterintelligence channel, and it was distributed without my approval and without my knowledge.Q. Did the chief of staff have authority to issue such an order without your approval?

A. The chief of staff didn't issue it. The Ic, Richter, received this order from the OKW, and then he simply passed it on. Q. Now you say the Ic issued the order and passed it on without your knowledge. Will you read the signature? A. Yes. It is signed Richter.Q. And who is his superior officer?

A. Richter's direct superior is the chief of staff. In disciplinary matters. Q. You have previously testified that all the Jews shown as killed in numerous reports, that we have presented here in evi dence, were all partisans, have you not? A. I can't think otherwise than that. Jews were not shot be cause they were Jews but because they had cooperated somehow with the partisans. I can't think anything else. Q. Don't you really think that the main reason for the killing of these Jews is that expressed here in your order of the 18th Army, or at least the order of the 18th Army, the battle against bolshevism? A. That certainly isn't an order of the 18th Army, but an order from the High Command of the Army or the OKW. It is not an order from the 18th Army.

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Q. You have also testified concerning the killing of Jews, that

they were listed separately for some reason incomprehensible to you, have you not? A. Yes. Q. Do you understand why they were even asked if they were Jewish in order to be listed? A. No.1 can't think of any reason. Q. Isn't perhaps this order before you one of the reasons? A. I would like to read it through again. Well, it is difficult to say. I really can't say today. I don't ~now.

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EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT HANS VON SALMUTHl

DIRECT EXAMINATION

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DR. GOLLNICK (counsel for defendant von Salmuth) : I will now come to the count of the indictment, ill-treatment and murder of the civilian population, and put to you Document NOKW-650, Exhibit 738,2 which deals with the events in Kodyma. Can you first of all, in order to facilitate the comprehension of the Tri bunal, describe the military situation in Kodyma as it existed at the time? DEFENDANT VON SALMUTH: After the crossing of the Dnestr, two of my German divisions had driven towards the enemy very fast. They had advanced very rapidly. They were far in advance when they were attacked by superior enemy forces which had been hurled at them. The combat post of the corps at that time had been moved very far to the front, very close to those two divisions, whereas two other divisions were at the rear to the right and rather far away. There were most unpleasant crises. In Kodyma itself one of these crises happened which we might have fallen victims to, if by chance I myself-as a matter of fact, this is not a particular accomplishment of mine, I don't want to put myself in a good light in this connection-elf I] had not observed a Russian attack close to Kodyma itself. I succeeded in halting this attack, yet the position remained extremely critical. On the first of August, on the day when this event occurred, I returned from a Rumanian division. That was at noon, and I wanted to inform the chief of staff, but he had not yet returned from a flight to another division. Thus, I left immediately to see another division, and it was only in the evening, at about 1900 hours, that I returned. Q. Now, what had happened in Kodyma in your absence, and what did you hear about it upon your return? A. The chief of staff, who had meanwhile returned, reported to me as follows-A German officer had brought a Ukrainian woman along who had testified as follows. On the evening before she had listened in to a meeting of a number of persons, and in this assembly the following had been agreed on; (a) a raid on the German staff headquarters; (b) sabotage of the harvest, burning of the harvest stocks in Kodyma, and the killing of the Ukrainian population who sympathized with the German troops.1 Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 12-14 May 1948. pp. 3899- 4177. 2 Document rep !'oduced above in this section.

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Q. Was that a particularly dangerous position, in view of the military position as described by you?

A. Yes. Because in the night before, owing to an enemy break through about 2 kilometers from Kodyma we had lost two bat teries.Q. Now, what happened afterwards?

A. It was reported to me that in my absence and the absence of the chief of staff, a Security Service detachment, which hap pened to be near, had been called upon to investigate this incident. This Security Service detachment had arrived, and after a short examination they had asked for a military detachment in order to seal off a certain quarter of the city. The corps headquarters, from the mixture of units which were stationed in Kodyma there were no fighting troops stationed in Kodyma-had got about 300 people together in order to use them for cordoning-off purposes. This Security Service detachment had searched certain roads, certain quarters, and had arrested a number of people in the course of this investigation. Now, in the period until the afternoon, the following had happened. The chief of staff, who had by then returned, had been requested by the Security Service detachment to supply an execution squad of German soldiers in order to execute those 400 persons who had been arrested. The chief of staff had refused. Soon after I arrived on the scene and everything I have described was reported to me. I took the follow ing steps: (a) Communication to the leader of the Security Serv ice detachment, "Shooting of those people out of the question. I demand a proper investigation in order that due process of law will take place and no arbitrary actions occur." For that purpose I made the Judge Advocate available. This Judge Advocate re ceived the order from the corps at the place he was in-he was further to the rear-to come immediately in order to look after the matter. On the same night I learned that the Security Service detachment had not waited for the arrival of the Judge Advocate but that approximately 100 people were shot by them; thereupon, the Judge Advocate reported to me that, unfortunately, he had been too late; that he had ascertained that there altogether 400 persons had been arrested and 100 shot, so that 300 remained; I no longer know how many, but I think 100 or 175 were re leased; the remainder, approximately 200-no, I must correct myself-there were less than 200 taken from the Security Service and sent to the prisoner of war collecting center.Q. And what happened to these people that were sent to the

prisoner of war coliecting center?1229

A. On the next day, of these people there were less than 200, all of them were released except 30 or 40, and these remaining 30 or 40 were released a few days later when the corps advanced. On the same night when this had happened I issued an order, a proclamation in the town of Kodyma in which it was announced that the German Command had unfortunately been compelled, on account of this intended insurrection, to shoot a number of per sons, and that a number of persons had been retained as hostages..

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Q. Now how about the participation of the German Armed

Forces in the execution, did German soldiers participate? A. As I stated before, the chief of staff of the XXX Corps had refused a participation of the armed forces or of the XXX Corps in any execution. Unfortunately, however, a few soldiers not upon the orders of their superior officers, but on their own initiative-voluntarily participated in this execution. I cannot deny that because that is what happened and unfortunately a man from .my own corps staff was among them. He was accordingly punished by his superior, the chief of staff, with the strictest arrest possible for disobedience.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION MR. NIEDERMAN: I would like now to discuss with you the Kodyma incident. You recall that incident, of course. Kodyma, K-O-D-Y-M-A. Do you recall that incident? DEFENDANT VON SALMUTH : Very well indeed.

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What was the first information you received concerning this event? A. As I testified yesterday, the incident was reported to me as it is recorded in the document.

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Q. Who told you? Who reported that to you?

A. I assume it was my chief of staff. Q. Were you advised at that time that the execution of these 98 Jews had already taken place? A. No. I don't think so. I learned about it two days later, be cause subsequent to this conversation, I issued an order that it was completely out of the question.

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Q. But didn't your proclamation, issued on 1 August

A. Yes. Q. I will find it in just a minute. Didn't your proclamation on 1 August, say a number of persons were shot today? A. Yes. Q. Then you must have been informed of the fact on 1 August, must you not? A. I did not contest that. Q. Then on 1 August on your return you were already advised that persons had been shot. A. No. I have told you, that as far as I recall (a) it had been reported to me that this had happened; (b) I heard about the arrest, and also that this Security Service detachment wanted to shoot those 400 Jews. Now, the steps I took were to dispatch somebody immediately to the leader of this Security Service detachment to tell him to stop, and that I would not allow this to happen; then I requested my Judge Advocate to come to the spot immediately so these things could be stopped and proper legal proceedings could be instituted. Q. I am afraid I am still confused. How could you on 1 August issue a proclamation to the population of Kodyma that a number of persons were shot today if you didn't know that they had been shot? A. I beg your pardon. I previously stated that I had heard of what had happened though not immediately. I think I made myself quite clear on this point. Q. Well, then, on 1 August you already knew that persons had been shot in Kodyma? A. Yes, during the evening I knew.

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Q. Now, when you were informed of this execution that had taken place, were you informed that 300 members of troop units of yours had blocked off the city? A. Yes. I was informed of this. Q. Who was in command of those troop units?

A. I can't say today.Q. Didn't your investigation deal with that phase of the matter?

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A. I testified yesterday-I must refer you once again to my testimony-and I stand by this testimony of yesterday, that the local commanding officer, had been ordered to make troops avail able for the blocking off that took place in connection with this investigation. Q. Yes, and who ordered the local commander to make those troops available? A. The corps headquarters. Q. The corps headquarters? And who in the corps headquarters had issued that order? A. I don't know and so I can't say. Q. Didn't you investigate to determine who that was? A. No. Q. Were you also advised that the execution squad consisted principally of army troops? A. No. Q. You have read the Security Service report in here whrch stated that the execution squad consisted of 24 soldiers and 12 Security Service members, have you not? A. I have read it here. I have seen the documents here on the witness stand, but I cannot imagine that I read them at an earlier date.Q. Did your investigation disclose that 24 members of your troops had participated in the execution?

A. Once again I must refer to my testimony of yesterday when I stated that a~cording to the report by my chief of staff, a num ber of soldiers of my corps unfortunately had taken part in this execution. I furthermore stated that the Security Service detach ment had requested my chief of staff to make soldiers available for this execution. This request to supply people for the execution was brusquely refused by the chief of staff, but-and I stated that yesterday-a few soldiers unfortunately participated in this execution. I also stated that the chief of staff had punished a member of my corps headquarters staff who had taken part in the executions, and that he had imposed a disciplinary punish ment.Q. What do you mean by "disciplinary punishment"?

A. He punished him by arrest.Q. And what subsequently happened to this member of the execution squad?

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A. I stated this man was punished by arrest. In other words, he was locked up.Q. For how long a period was he locked up?

A. I don't know. I can't tell you. Perhaps for-I think the maximum penalty was 20 days. Q. And you thought, of course, that that punishment was severe enough for a man who had participated in the execution of 98 Jews? A. This man could only be punished for disobedience, failure to obey an order, and, according to the regulations, you could not raise any other charges against him. Q. Why couldn't you punish him for murder? A. I couldn't punish him, only his superior in disciplinary mat ters, the chief of staff, could punish him. Now, as for, murder, the man wasn't even conscious of committing a murder, because I am convinced that no soldier who participated in this execution realized clearly that he committed a murder, because he had to assume that all this prosecution of the perpetrators had all taken place according to due processes of law, and they had no idea of the circumstances leading to it.Q. Then you mean, he wasn't punished, because he had par ticipated in this event by order? A. He was punished because he had disobeyed the order which had been issued to him. Q. What order are you talking about?

A. The chief of staff had issued the order that nobody was to participate in this execution. Q. Then the chief of staff knew that these people were to be executed? A. Mr. Prosecutor, I have told you twice before now that the Security Service detachment requested my chief of staff to make troops available for the execution, and that the chief of staff refused to supply these troops; so he was bound to know that something of this kind was possibly going to happen. Q. Now, what happened to the 23 other members of the armed forces that participated in this event? A. I can't tell you. I don't know. There were all men of detach ments which happened to be in Kodyma on that particular day, and they left Kodyma after a few hours and went to some other place the next day, and I don't know where they went.

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Q. Now, at what time of the day did you receive the first report from your chief of staff concerning this event?

A. I cannot tell you however much I try. It was in the evening when I returned. Q. Did the chief of staff tell you when he reported that he was present at the execution. A. Will you please repeat the question. Q. Was your chief of staff present during the execution? A. My chief of staff? Q. Yes. A. Not in any way. Q. If he knew that this execution was to take place, why didn't. he stop it? A. He didn't know, nor did I know when this was reported to me, that the Security Service detachment suddenly wanted to carry out the shootings this very night; for that reason I had called upon the judge advocate to come, because I had to assume that according to what I had told the Security Service detach ment, everything had come to a stop for the time being. Q. But you testified that the chief of staff had been requested by the SD for an execution squad? A. Yes. Q. He knew there was to be an execution, didn't he? Why didn't he stop it? A. I had given the order that the execution was not to take place, that no troops were to be made available. Q. Now, you issued the order then that they were not to make the troops available for the execution? A. Yes, and also I issued the order that the execution was not to take place at all. These are two different matters. Q. And on 1 August, you knew that the execution had taken place by your poster. Prior to that time, you must have issued the order then that the execution should not have taken place? A. Just a minute. I think that was an error of yours. Q. I would like to show you-you have it in the document book before you-your poster just to settle the difficulties on the dates. The poster is NOKW-586, it is in document book 9-1, if Your Honor please, on page 11. You will see in the first line the state ment that a number of persons were shot today, dated 1 August 1941, the German Command; therefore, when you issued this1234

poster, you already knew on 1 August, that these persons had been shot; therefore, when you issued your order that they should not be shot, it was before they were shot on 1 August, was it not? A. Did I really express myself in such a manner that I am absolutely misunderstood? Am I really so unclear? Things were like this. I left in the morning. During my absence the following occurred. Perhaps I need not repeat all of it. The report of this Ukrainian woman, so forth and so forth, apprehension of four hundred Jews. Now, the request put to the chief of staff in the afternoon for the execution squads which he sharply rejected. Now, I returned. The incident is immediately reported to me. I intervene. Communication to the SD Leader, "Stop, do nothing, I will send my Judge Advocate to you who will settle the matter." Then again an interval. Then the same night I learned that the SD leader nevertheless had shot those 98 people. Thereupon this order issued by me, rather it was not an order, but a proclamation to the population of Kodyma.Q. That is exactly as I understood you, you issued the order that they should not shoot them, but in spite of this, they went ahead and killed them? A. Yes. Q. Fine. Now, then, prior to the execution you had returned to Kodyma, had you not? A. I cannot tell you. I don't know when it actually took place. I don't know at what point of time. I don't know. Q. It must have been before the execution, because you ordered the Security Service not to execute those people, therefore, it must have been prior to the excution, must it not? A. But I don't know what had happened. If the chief of staff reported to me that this and this has happened, then I don't know .what, in the meanwhile could have occurred at a different spot. Q. I submit to you, Defendant, that not only were you present prior to the execution, but that in fact, by agreement with you, these people were executed, and I show you a document, Docu ment NOKW-586, Exhibit No. 741.* You will note in the second paragraph of this document, which is a report by the Sonder kommando lOa. "In agreement with the commanding general, 99 of the persons arrested were shot, among them 97 Jews." You were the commanding general, weren't you? A. Yes. Q. Then it was in agreement with you that these persons were shot, was it not? Document reproduced above in this section.

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A. I can only tell you that these people were not shot with my agreement, and this report is just as false as the other report of the Security Service which says that this execution sguad was in fact supplied by us. Because then there would have been no need for me to send my Judge Advocate there if I wanted to have these people shot; in that case I would not have issued this order to the population, and then this order on the next day, i.e., on 2 August, in which I expressed my indignation that German sol-, diers had participated in this matter, and that I strictly forbade that.

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