nuclear reactors, materials, and waste cikr sector: case study of the nuclear accident at three...

Running Head: NUCLEAR CIKR & TMI-2 LOCA

Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector: Case Study of the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island

Lindsey Landolfi

Towson University

Critical National Infrastructures, IHSM 611-001

Professor William J. Lahneman, PhD

November 2011

NUCLEAR CIKR & TMI-2 LOCA 2

It is necessary to protect the Nuclear Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR)

from manmade and natural disasters in order to preserve the American lifestyle. A major nuclear

meltdown or detonation would severely compromise CIKR in the area surrounding the accident.

The immediate damage resulting from the impact would obliterate CIKR at the incident

hypocenter; the destruction radius will be proportionate to the yield of the explosion. It is also

important to consider the secondary effects of a nuclear accident on CIKR. For example, the

negative affects of intense electromagnetic pulse (EMP) on electronic communication devices.

EMP can interrupt satellite based communication systems or potentially damage the electrical

power grid. Lack of communications will drastically hinder incident planning and response,

confusion due to miscommunication can prove dangerous to the handling of an emergency

management situation. Thermal radiation could spark fires; if uncontrolled a firestorm can

destroy CIKR such as gasoline lines and fuel tanks. Other CIKR sectors would also be afflicted

by a nuclear disaster for example, structural damage to buildings, roads, and concrete. The Latent

radiation or fall-out will cause further detriment such as the short and long term effects of

radioactive pollution on public health safety. The radiological release on the environment may

cause terrain irregularities such as the destruction of agricultural land, livestock, aquatic life and

the contamination of flora and fauna. The environmental damage will hinder the associated aqua

and agriculture economy.

The risk of radiation leakage is a part of the nature of nuclear power plant facilities. “The

primary danger from nuclear power stations is the potential for the release of is the release of

radioactive materials produced in the reactor core as a result of fission.” (U.S. President's

Commission, 1979, p.88) In Pennsylvania USA, 1979 a nuclear partial core meltdown occurred

at Metropolitan Edison’s and General Public Utilities’ Three Mile Island commercial nuclear

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power plant. The core reactor of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) overheated as a result of a

series of mechanical or electrical failure caused by the combination of equipment malfunctions

and operator confusion and error. The TMI accident spanned across five days and resulted in low

levels of radiological release. The accident “was the most serious in U.S. commercial nuclear

power plant operating history.” (U.S. NRC, 2011) The Three Mile Island accident ranked at level

five in the seven levels International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) for prompt communication of

safety significance. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) INES provides a general

scale for accident and incident description, facilitating standardized communications and

corresponding incident interpretations. A level five accident signifies an accident with off-site

risk for wider consequences. The TMI accident after-math included heath and environmental

repercussions, enhancements to U.S. nuclear policy and emergency preparedness, and increased

coordination efforts within the nuclear sector.

TMI nuclear facilities used a pressurized water reactor (PWR) type to generate

electricity. All commercial U.S. PWRs use uranium based fission process to produce heat; this

heat is then converted into electric power using steam. “At TMI-2, the reactor core holds some

100 tons of uranium.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.87) Failures within the coolant

system can cause overheating; excessive water evaporation may expose the reactor core. An

exposed core is highly dangerous as it may overheat and damage the fuel rods and pellets

causing the release of radioactive materials. Nuclear plants are designed with three main safety

protection features to prevent radiation leakage. First is the fuel rod core assembly; the fuel rods

absorb radioactive materials produced from the uranium fuel pellets. Second feature is the

reactor vessel constructed of steal which creates a hermetic seal around the reactor core.

Contained within the reactor vessel are the closed reactor coolant system loop and the control

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rods. The third basic safety barrier is the containment building; according to the Final Safety

Analysis Report for TMI-2 the containment building was “a 193-foot high, reinforced-concrete

structure with walls 4 feet thick.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p. 90) Nuclear facilities

have a variety of safety systems and back-up systems designed to protect against general system

failure. “The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) automatically uses existing plant

equipment to ensure that cooling water covers the core.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979,

p.93)

TMI-2 suffered a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) resulting in major damages to the

reactor and fuel. Water supply pumps for the steam generator in TMI-2’s rector malfunctioned

resulting in loss of vital cooling water. The excessive heat caused the pressurizer level to rise

triggering the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) to open. According to a reading in the control

room electric power to the PORV was shut off, operators assumed that the PORV had properly

re-closed and the core was being cooled. “But the PORV was stuck open, and would remain

open for 2 hours and 22 minutes, draining needed coolant water -- a LOCA was in progress”

(U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.95), the reactor core was overheating. A design error

involving an inverse response from the pressurizer level indicator lead the control room

operators to believe that PRW volume was too high. In response, operators reduced the flow

coolant to a minimum by shutting down the emergency High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps of

TMI-2’s ECCS. This precautionary measure, in fact, further reduced cooling lowering water

levels and possibly exposing the core. The reactor core and internal vessel temperatures

continued to escalate causing an automatically scram. A reactor scram or trip is a term used by

the nuclear industry to describe the emergency shutdown of a nuclear reactor. Scram is produced

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by the immediate release of all control rods into the reactor core which stops the chain reaction

fission process.

Summarized in the paragraphs below is the chronology of the LOCA in accordance to the

NRC report and Governor R. Thornburgh reflections of the TMI accident. The TMI crisis began

early morning Wednesday, March 28, 1979 when control systems alerts indicated

malfunctioning. Control room operators performed designated procedures in response to the

systems warning signals. Workers reported the unusual system activities and took precautionary

measures in attempt to resume normal reactor functionality; situational confusion persisted

throughout the emergency response procedures. When it became clear to TMI employees that a

general emergency had occurred at the site the TMI Director of Emergency Management

reported to the accident to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) who

informed local and state government. “The NRC’s regional office in King of Prussia, Pa., was

notified at 7:45 a.m. on March 28.” (U.S. NRC, 2011) NRC headquarters were alerted of the

scram and by approximately 8:00 am NRC Operations Center was activated. Information on the

accident was first relayed to the public via a local radio report. Upon official release of the TMI

accident the Associated Press filed a national news story on the catastrophe.

Approved emergency radiation exposure rate calculations indicated contamination

leakage at the site. However, on Thursday Met. Ed. and G.P. Utilities were assuring the public

that the incident was well managed and that public was safe. Skepticism of the utilities

credibility and the potential danger involved with nuclear accidents lead to official intervention.

The TMI crisis became the responsibility of the local governance. Governor R. Thornburgh

created an ad-hoc bureaucracy to address the accident. Official authorities instructed the local

residential areas to remain indoors and turn off ventilation systems. Meanwhile in Washington

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DC, congressional committees consulted with the NRC about the accident. That night Met. Ed.

and G.P. Utilities held their first official public press conference on the accident.

Early morning day three, children attended school as usual, there still no mandatory

public precautionary safety measures in place. At the TMI-2 facility controls indicated a pressure

build-up; in response shift operators opened the release value to vent steam and the contained

radioactive materials into the atmosphere. The PORV release was conducted with no prior

authorization and employees did not report venting activities until after the fact. The lack of

communication would facilitate information misinterpretation and negatively effect vital

decisions dependent on that information. Radiation readings reported from a helicopter over TMI

that morning “indicated a very high radiation exposure rate – 1200 millirems per hour – a rate

certainly high enough to warrant an evacuation.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.4) The radiation

measurements were reported to the NRC management team who then issued a five mile general

evacuation recommendation to Pennsylvania’s Emergency Management Director. This

information was relayed to the local civil defense director and then to the public via local radio.

Additionally, at 9:30 A.M. an emergency siren at TMI was mysterious tripped. Prompted by

NRC recommendations, sensationalized media reports, and the fear of radiation exposure

voluntary evacuations coupled by public hysteria ensued in the residential areas near the TMI

facility. In response state authorities sought federal expertise and assistance. NRC radiation

experts further investigated the situation and announced that the evacuation warning was

mistakenly issued, the public was immediately alerted. Mr. H. Denton, the NRC’s director of

nuclear reactor regulation, and approximately twelve other NRC experts were sent by President

J. Carter to join the official staff in Pennsylvania. After deliberation with NRC Chairman Mr. J.

Hendrie, around noon day three Governor R. Thornburgh advised all “pregnant women and

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preschoolers leave the area within five miles of the plant until further notice, and that all schools

within that zone be closed as well.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.4) A press conference was conducted

that evening with H. Denton providing a credible and trustworthy source to publics in order to

gain a better understanding of the actual technical situation at TMI.

The weekend starting on Saturday March 31st, was associated with the hydrogen bubble

scare. During the TMI-2 LOCA hydrogen gases were released by chemical reactions between the

exposed reactor core and the remaining coolant water causing pressure to build with in the

reactor vessel. NRC officials feared that the pressure may rupture or explode the reactor vessel.

These fears manifested in the media reports and public actions. It was later investigated and

reported by Mr. H. Denton that there was no imminent source of explosive danger. Immediate

press releases were issued to the media stating that there was no cause for alarm. The public was

also informed of President J. Cater plans visit TMI with Governor R. Thornburgh; the actions of

these two prominent officials would pacify public fears. His visit assured public of the safety

security at TMI and that the situation was being well managed.

The immediate crisis had been resolved, by the fifth day the public was assured by

officials that the TMI-2 accident was managed and their safety secured. A full meltdown was

averted; the majority of the radiation was contained within the plant. The detectable

contamination released into the external atmosphere caused only negligible amounts of harm to

public heath and the environment, there were no direct fatalities. Ten days following the initial

LOCA reports all official precautionary evacuation measures were withdrawn. However, there

was still much to consider in respects to the TMI-2 cleanup operations and the proper disposal of

waste materials from the nuclear plant. Governor R. Thornburgh initiated the development of a

national cost-sharing financial plan to fund the approximated billion-dollar cleanup efforts.

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Funding came from TMI owners Metropolitan Edison and General Public Utilities, the nuclear

industry, state and federal governments. Public issues with decontamination legality and safety

lead to safety demonstrations and public hearings. In response, Governor R. Thornburgh

contracted the Union of Concerned Scientists to study and develop a safe venting radioactive gas

plan. “When that organization concluded that it posed no physical threat to public health and

safety, the venting proceeded peacefully.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.7) TMI-2 has been permanently

decommissioned since the LOCA due to the damage incurred, approximately 12 years later TMI-

2 clean-up processes were completed and the reactor was officially shutdown and defueled in

1993. “NRC issued a possession-only license” (U.S. NRC, 2011) which authorizes the facility to

possess specific nuclear materials and prohibits the operation of TMI-2.

Immediately after the disaster, President J. Carter ordered the creation of a special

commission to investigate the TMI accident. The results from this commission were used as

evidence in the TMI legal trials. The commission, also known as the Kemeny Report, determined

that the accident was a result of human and organization error and not due to failure of the large-

scale technical systems. The NRC conducted its own study of the TMI-2 LOCA which yielded

results similar to the Kemeny Report. Complicated organizational structure of the utility and

ambiguous TMI-2 control room design fostered employee confusion. For instance, engineers

misread equipment in respects to the PORV operations and assumed that emergency processes

were active and that the reactor core was being properly cooled, in fact, it was not. Human

misinterpretation of the reactor control system's user interface contributed to the severity of the

LOCA. Additional contributing factor to human operational misjudgments in the TMI-2 control

room was the combination of misleading instrument information and a lack of emergency worker

training. An example was that the TMI-2 pressurizer level indicator design used volume and not

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mass as a measure for pressure levels, therefore excessive heat caused by the LOCA created

steam-pockets at the bottom of the reactor and falsely raised the PRW volume.“The operators

had been taught to keep the system from "going solid" -- a condition that would make controlling

the pressure within the reactor coolant system more difficult and that might damage the system.”

(U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.98) TMI-2 control room operators followed the approved

safety regulations and protocols to prevent the system from overheating or going solid. However,

employee training was not sufficient enough to enable them to quickly recognize system errors

and remedy malfunctions in order to prevent general operational failure. A lack of

comprehensive and user-friendly safety regulations and protocols also hampered employees’

ability to respond to the confusion regarding the system warning signs.

A major contributing factor to the TMI LOCA and public crisis was poor communication

and coordination. A number of private and public agencies at the local, state and federal were

involved in incident response planning; delayed, ambiguous, and inconsistent interagency

communications between involved parties negatively reflected on emergency response. The

Kemeny Report indicated that prior to the TMI-2 LOCA similar PORV incidents had been

reported in facilities with PWR type reactors using the same brand of equipment as TMI. If this

information was shared by the NRC, the utilities, or the equipment manufacture repair

maintenance could have been performed and the accident prevented. In respects to emergency

operations, the rapid dissemination of information is vital to response efficiency and

effectiveness. Information on the TMI-2 LOCA was not delivered in a timely manner, “the local

NRC office was not manned, and telephone calls were answered by answering machines until

8:00 A.M.” (Osif, Baratta, & Contling, 2004, p.26), approximately four hours after the LOCA

occurred. The potential assistance from NRC experts during this timeframe may have resulted in

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a more timely resolution of the LOCA in turn reducing the resulting negative consequences. A

lack of communication coordination between the government and the utility was also evident in

NRC’s accidental issuance of a general evacuation. NRC’s evacuation recommendation was

issued prior to consulting Pennsylvania’s radiation protection director. Further investigation into

the radiation measurements would have indicated that the reading was faulty due to additional

external influences such as the location of the reading and operational activities at the TMI-2

reactor. Media coverage and public perception of the accident were influenced by the official

handling of the LOCA. Comprehensive communications could have prevented unnecessary mass

public panic and confusion.

The delay in the dissemination of information regarding the incident from the plant

operator fostered negative speculation and increased public fear. Additionally, the utility

concealed pertinent information from the public for example, technicians at Met. Ed. and G.P.

Utilities were aware that radioactivity levels in areas surrounding the factory were elevated about

normal measurements yet this data was not disclosed in their public statements. Another example

of information deliverance aversion was when Met. Ed. employees vented radioactive steam into

the atmosphere without authorization or alerting the public until after the fact. By down-playing

the magnitude of the incident to the public the utility diminished their credibility with the public

and government. “The utility, its regulators and other groups and institutions appeared to be

contradicting each other, or telling the public either less than they knew or more than they

knew.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.2) Residents experienced situational confusion as a result of the

contradictions between the reassuring official news reports and sensationalized national media.

With the lack of credible sources and general information confusion such as the NRC errored

evacuation issuance, it was difficult for the public to evaluate and select which information to

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consume. When people believe that they have been deceived there is a higher probability for

negative speculation.

The TMI accident generated massive media coverage. There was high news value of

publicizing and sensationalizing the TMI-2 LOCA. Media dramatization of the situation

exaggerated public fear and rumors of an imminent “China Syndrome” situation. “The China

Syndrome” was released in theaters twelve days prior to the TMI accident. “The China

Syndrome” dramatized the dangers of nuclear power; the script even described how a nuclear

meltdown could contaminate an area “the size of the state of Pennsylvania.” (Thornburgh, 1999,

p.3) The film’s title was developed from the concept that a molten nuclear reactor core could

melt the earth penetrating through to the opposite side. In actuality a major nuclear plant

meltdown involves excessive overheating of the reactor core that breaches the physical safety

barriers; when uncontained the radioactive materials would be externally released into the

environment. Chernobyl, Ukraine 1986 nuclear meltdown, described as a level seven accident

according to the INES, is an ideal example of the potential dangers and safety significance of a

worst-case scenario nuclear accident. However, at the time the majority of the public was

unaware of the potential dangers involving a nuclear accident. Many people assumed that

mushroom cloud style nuclear explosion would ensue. As explained in the Kemeny report; “an

accident we [the public] cannot see or taste or smell . . .is an accident that is invisible. I think the

fact that it is invisible creates a sense of uncertainty and fright that may well go beyond the

reality of the accident itself.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.85)

The TMI accident created an ideal environment for nuclear opposition to express the

growing pubic dissent against the use of nuclear power. The TMI-2 accident resulted in

increased and vocalized anti-nuclear sentiments. Anti-Nuclear Power Campaigns peaked

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following the TMI accident; mass demonstrations conveyed the public’s health safety and

environmental concerns. Negative public perception of nuclear generated energy hindered

expansion of the nuclear power industry. “New construction was stopped dead in its tracks and

no new plants have been undertaken since 1979.” (Thornburgh, 1999, p.7) The TMI accident

resulted in severe image and monetary ramifications for the nuclear industry as a whole. Major

federal and commercial contributions from the nuclear industry supported the TMI-2 cleanup

operation. “The cleanup cost nearly a billion dollars, one third of which was passed on to rate

payers, making nuclear power more expensive than other energy options.” (Thornburgh, 1999,

p.1) The nuclear industry incurred additional monetary costs in order to be in compliance with

new safety standards established in response to TMI accident. The resolution of the TMI-2

accident resulted in large initial investments and long-term monetary consequences for the

nuclear industry active after the TMI accident. The TMI-2 LOCA and public relations crisis

damaged the nuclear industry’s core advertising campaign message of nuclear power as the most

financially and environmentally friendly energy option.

The radioactive material release at TMI-2 promoted investigations regarding the risk of

threat of latent radioactivity on public health safety and the surrounding environment. The EPA

was responsible for the initial official nuclear post-monitoring program to document the health

and environmental effects of the radiation released as a result of the TMI-2 LOCA. Met. Ed. and

G.P. Utilities in cooperation with the Pennsylvania Department of Health continue to monitor the

vicinity for rates radiation disease. Government officials confirmed that statistical evidence of

radiological measurement indicated minimal possibility for negative health consequences

correlated to the TMI accident. The Kemeny Report concluded “On the basis of present scientific

knowledge, the radiation doses received by the general population as a result of exposure to the

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radioactivity released during the accident were so small that there will be no detectable

additional cases of cancer, developmental abnormalities, or genetic ill-health as a consequence of

the accident at TMI.” (U.S. President's Commission, 1979, p.39) Epidemiological studies have

produced conflicting results. Numerous commercially sponsored scientific studies have revealed

a positive correlation between the contamination leakage and radiation-related diseases. Reports

indicated increases of numerous forms of cancer, respiratory illness, and stress related disorders

resulting from the long-term psychological effects of the disaster such as heart disease. For

example, “an annual volume issued by the National Center for Health Statistics, showed that the

1978–1979 rate increase in Pennsylvania exceeded the national increase in three crucial

categories: infant deaths, births under 3.3 pounds, and percent of newborns with low Apgar

scores.” (Mangano, 2004, p.3) The TMI catastrophe affected more than the local human

population, multiple sources of anecdotal evidence reported disease among the area’s wildlife

and livestock. The local environment was negatively impacted by soil and ground water

radioactive contamination. Negative biological effects resulted from the external and internal

exposure to the radioactive pollution produced from the TMI-2 LOCA.

To date there has TMI residential publics have not been able to file a class action lawsuit

to address the concerns of Pennsylvania residents in respect to the TMI accident and personal

health effects. Met. Ed. and G.P. Utilities settled quietly out of court paying out over a million

dollars worth of damages for personal injury and loss claims. “In 1981, citizens' groups won a

class-action suit against the Three Mile Island facility, an out-of court settlement of $25 million.”

(Greene, 2001, p.178) A portion of this settlement was allocated towards the creation of the TMI

Public Health Fund which is responsible for overseeing research linking negative health

consequences to the radiation exposure absorbed by publics in the TMI area. In 1983, Met. Ed.

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was indicted by a federal grand jury of criminal charges of falsifying system test results prior to

the TMI-2 LOCA. “The indictment charges the company with five counts of violating provisions

of its license to operate a nuclear power plant, five counts of violating NRC regulations and one

count of violating a federal statue against false statements.” (AP, 1983, p.6) It was determined

that Met. Ed. and G.P. Utilities did not intentionally withhold or distort public or private

information. However, Met. Ed.’s faced additional financial ramifications and their competency

as a nuclear facility operator was challenged; the accused violations could have increased the

severity of the TMI accident.

As a result of the TMI-2 LOCA and NRC sponsored research of the safety failures at

TMI, the NRC enacted a post-TMI action plan designed to enhance industry regulations and the

operational safety and security of U.S. nuclear facilities. The NRC reorganized and enhanced the

management of nuclear power facilities. Tactics such as more facility safety upgrade

requirements, increased authoritative control, and stricter regulations were the foundation for

substantial safety performance improvements in U.S. nuclear power plants. The NRC also raised

standards of operator training and qualification requirements and added the requirement for all

U.S. nuclear plants to have a developed emergency operational plan intact. The NRC and

commercial nuclear industry adapted recommendations from the commission becoming

increasingly proactive in respect to nuclear safety standards.

Major US CIKR accidents such as the Three Mile Island Nuclear Meltdown have assisted

the United States government in recognizing the importance of preparedness in respect to the

security of US CIKR. In response to the federal challenges with incident response at TMI

President J. Carter enacted Executive Order (EO) 12127, in 1979 establishing the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a part of the National Homeland Security strategy.

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FEMA was designed to centralize and integrate the numerous federal agencies with emergency

response responsibilities. EO 12148 authorized FEMA to provide the guidelines for response

policy, specifically organization and operational coordination of incident management. Having a

standardized structure created unity between these multiple entities. While at the same time the

flexibility of FEMA’s comprehensive guidance documents for emergency preparedness response

allows for modifications to best suit each situation. FEMA’s all-hazard approach for complex

incident response situations can be easily adapted to scenarios such as a nuclear meltdown.

FEMA plays a major role in Nuclear CIKR FEMA emergency planning and response

management specifically the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program. FEMA

assumed responsibility for the coordination of off-site activities, specifically government

emergency planning and response while NRC maintained responsibility of the regulation of on-

site emergency planning and response activities.

Federal emergency response frameworks provide the most robust and comprehensive

recommendations based off of existing experience, knowledge, and resources and are adaptable

to operational capabilities. National guides in response planning support coordinated and

comprehensive incident response efforts are consistent with National Response Framework

(NRF) standardization, National Incident Management System (NIMS) terminology, and the

Incident Command System (ICS) structure. The NRF predefines the organizational structure for

large scale domestic incident response from local, state, federal, to headquarters such as DHS’s

National Operations Center (NOC). The NRF replaced the Federal Radiological Emergency

Response Plan which was developed in response to the government’s experience with the TMI

accident. Scenario specific planning documents such as NRF’s national planning scenarios or

National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (NIPP) Sector Specific Plans (SSP) are useful in the

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development of strategic and operational emergency planning for CIKR protection and

resilience.

Federal involvement in CIKR is delegated by the DHS to Sector-Specific Agencies

(SSAs). The Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector is one of the National Infrastructure

Protection Plan’s (NIPP) eighteen designated SSAs responsible for the collaboration of the

public and private protective activities for a specific critical infrastructure sector. The Nuclear

SSA is located within the Sector-Specific Agency Executive Management Office (SSA EMO)

under the DHS, Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP). The Nuclear SSA is one of the primary

CIKR sectors involved in emergency support functions for oil and hazardous materials, and

energy response. The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) provides the

legal frame work for the Nuclear Government Coordinating Council (NGCC) and Nuclear Sector

Coordinating Council (NSCC) to work in collaboration towards the protection of Nuclear CIKR

as identified and prioritized in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7) as well as

supporting the implementation of the NIPP. The all-hazards Nuclear SSA approach is dependent

on the collaboration of multiple partnerships. The capabilities of numerous appropriately selected

responding agencies are aligned via the NRF, National Operations Center (NOC), National

Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and National Infrastructure Coordinating Center

(NICC). The Nuclear SSP delegates CIKR protection responsibilities for the Federal, State, and

local governments, the private sector, non-government organizations, and international

participants for the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector.

The Nuclear SSP supports the implementation of NIPP through risk assessment,

mitigation actions, operational planning, cooperation efforts, and response and recovery

strategies. The Nuclear SSP outlines an array of strategies and tactics to ensure the protection

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and resilience of the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector. The Nuclear SSP has an

established framework delegating responsibilities to the agencies accountable for the protection

of Nuclear CIKR via capabilities-based planning and performance standards. The Nuclear SSA

collaborates with the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC)

National Infrastructure Risk Analysis Program (NIRAP) through participation in the Strategic

Homeland Infrastructure Risk Analysis (SHIRA) process. SHIRA is a DHS standardized CIKR

risk assessment and analysis program. Nuclear SSP supports a risk-informed approach in the

development of protective measures.

The Nuclear Sector goals explained in the Nuclear SSP highlight the importance of five

major factors awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Interagency awareness

is developed through appropriate information sharing with relevant security partners such as the

NRC, DOE, DOD, and private sector. Awareness involves international cooperation and sharing

technical knowledge on nuclear safety. Clear, open, and consistent, proactive and reactive

communications between the different organizations involved improves the coordination of

responsibilities and operational activities. Pre-emptive emergency educational materials with

preventative action recommendations such as self decontamination, physical protective

measures, ideal sheltering locations, water advisories, ad-hoc protection, and hazard and areas

should be distributed to the publics of a vulnerable area. Public awareness and engagement is

beneficial to good radiation exposure management since it would help to minimize the negative

immediate and long-term consequences. Information sharing with government and public is

necessary to best achieve recovery goals.

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Successful emergency management efforts require prioritizing actions in planning and

response operations. Development and coordination of evacuation plans are dependent on

planning zones. The three planning areas as specified in the Nuclear SSP are the Exclusion Area

Boundar (EAB), the plume exposure pathway (10 mile EPZ), and the Ingestion Exposure

Pathway (50-mile EPZ). In 1979, TMI lacked a conceptual model to use in evacuation planning

and response to an unexpected nuclear accident. While it is now required for all U.S. Nuclear

Sites to have an evacuation plan, the issuance of an evacuation should be handled with carful

deliberation. Evacuations require significant preparation and resources and should be issued on

situational bases in respects to an analysis cost to benefit ratio. Certain incidents may not require

the complications of evacuation. When issued an evacuation should be limited to those most at

risk in order to prevent unnecessary hysteria. Emergency response arrangements should be

developed by identifying CIKR and prioritizing related protection and restoration activities.

Proposed zone delineation for nuclear explosion response planning according to the 2009

Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation included low-damage (LD), moderate-

damage (MD) and No-Go (NG) zones recognized by the degree of observable damage. The

dangerous fall-out (DF) zone is identified by radiation levels. Incident recovery efforts are

maximized by the enhanced resources of cooperative interagency coordination. To be effective

emergency response plans must be comprehensive and efforts coordinated at all levels.

Communication and coordination are the primary focus in emergency response. Interoperable

communications promote situational awareness at all government levels and private sector to

manage resources and share incident specific information from the first responders to higher

level responders and so forth to headquarters.

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In the event of a major nuclear accident, the regional city management, emergency

managers, and first responders would be the first to respond to the disaster and its consequences.

Once situational awareness is established by conducting initial damage assessments, the need for

additional assistance can be determined. If necessary, the local government should issue a

national presidential alert of disaster to the public using FEMA’s Emergency Alert System

(EAS). Disaster declaration and requests are first handled by an established Joint Field Office

(JFO) who primarily serves to organize and coordinate the overall incident management efforts.

Emergency response shelter and evacuation strategies should be implemented immediately and

facilitating infrastructures such as medical support, properly managed. Coordination between

jurisdictions and state assets via mutual aid or assistance agreements help to supply necessary

resources and support. Federal government response efforts will greatly enhance technical and

financial resources. The use of national communication systems such as ICS and Joint

Information Center (JIC) enable rapid information dissemination and response between involved

authorities. Government regulatory authorities collaborate with the private sector to further

enhance incident response. Private sector involvement includes private sector CIKR operators

and owners, industry partners, and NGOs such as the Red Cross. Interagency coordination and

collaboration must be established between involved response parties to achieve successful

incident preparation and response.

In coordination with FEMA’s All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning framework,

state and local authorities are responsible for the offsite nuclear facility management, emergency

planning and response. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the major federal

coordinating agency for radiological regulation and incident response, collaborates with the

DHS, the Nuclear SSA, and the Department of Energy (DOE) to ensure the protection of

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commercial and non-power nuclear reactors through implementing protective programs and

enforcing industry regulations. The DHS is one of the lead coordinating and management

agencies in CIKR response efforts. In the event of an oil, hazardous material, or energy disaster

responsibility will primarily rest in the Office of Infrastructure Protection: Nuclear Reactors,

Materials, and Waste SSA. The interrelated CIKR structure may call for involvement from

multiple SSAs and associated agencies for example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) in

coordination with the DOE would be responsible for hazardous material disposal. The DOE also

contributes to the development of new nuclear technologies. The Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) contributes to environmental radiation standards. The Clean Air Act (CAA), 1990

required that the EPA and other authoritative sources to establish and enforce national emissions

standards for hazardous air pollutants. EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT)

is specifically responsible for emergency radiological incident response. Emergency response

efforts may require involvement from the Emergency Services SSA, the Public Health and

Healthcare Sector SSA, and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). Possible additional

federal involvement may include assistance from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and

U.S. military aid in response efforts, or FBI and DOJ involvement to investigate the possibility

terrorist threat and attacks on Nuclear CIKR. The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

Support Annex establishes the delineation of roles and responsibilities relative to NRF structure

and NIMS guidance in establishing operational activities for CIKR security planning and

response.

Lessons learned from the TMI accident provoked safety and security adjustments for new

generation of power plants in order to prevent future accidents. Nuclear industry reform post-

TMI enhanced technical, operational, and managerial safety and performance. Modern plant

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designs and equipment feature improvements in the physical structure of the reactor and more

competent and user-friendly control designs for example, a clear and constant display of all

equipment statuses in a centralized local. A culture of nuclear safety and emergency

preparedness was developed in the industry reformation. Information dissemination of new

technological and safety developments and feedback communications on the functional of new

developments was more openly share within the U.S. nuclear industry and international partners.

Constant enforcement of safety analysis procedures such as radiological assessments and

inspection reports have aided in the prevention of design based accidents and over all quality

control.

Performance and safety enhancements of nuclear facilities lead up to a recent revival of

the nuclear industry. Government and private nuclear partners have increased their vocalizations

of nuclear power as a sustainable and environmentally friendly energy solution. Industry

expansion has been facilitated by the U.S. government through the allocation of federal loans to

support the development of new U.S. nuclear facilities. The DOE Loan Guarantee Program was

established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The $18.5 billion allocated to the DOE is intended

to “reduce the economic risk of deploying the first two or three "first-of-a kind" units of

innovative reactor designs new to the American market.” (Energy Hearing on Nuclear Energy

Development, 2009, p.3) The functionality of the active commercial nuclear industry was

secured through the issuance NRC extensions of current operating licenses. In 2008, the new

TMI facilities owner post-TMI-2 LOCA, the Exelon Corporation, applied for license renewal of

TMI-1 in 2008. According to the U.S. NRC operating reactor licensing, the TMI Unit-1 license

was renewed in 2009 extending approved nuclear operations until 2034. With the license

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extension the Exelon Byron Nuclear Generating Station at TMI-1 is currently running at

capacity.

The TMI-1 Nuclear Generating Station, “like all U.S. nuclear energy facilities, is based

on a ‘defense-in-depth’ design, which means there are redundant layers of safety.” (Exelon

Corporation, 2011)The defense-in-depth system supports nuclear safety thorough multiple layers

or independently functioning safety control measures designed to avert human or system failure

at a nuclear facility. Nuclear facilities designed with multiple, diverse data sensors and redundant

warning systems are more likely to prevent and withstand major accidents. The safety enhanced

facility design is supported through highly trained operators and experience management. In

addition, emergency planning and preparedness activities promote a company culture of safety

awareness, provides substantial guidance for emergency response and responders, and exhibits

Exelon’s commitment to occupation and public health and safety.

Exelon has a sophisticated emergency plan in place designed to protect the public health

and safety in event of a nuclear emergency. The current TMI Emergency Plan is approved by

the NRC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The TMI Emergency Plan explains the public

alert system that would be implemented and details instructions for individuals unable to use the

traditional systems. Situational information such as directions to shelter indoors or evacuation

locations would be disseminated via warning sirens and through the FEMA’s Emergency Alert

System (EAS). The plan outlines the emergency procedures to be followed by local publics

specifically those located within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), a ten mile radius from a

nuclear facility. Emergency instructions are broken-down by county and township detailing risk

and host schools, reception center addresses and driving directions, as well as transportation

assistance numbers. The TMI evacuation plan was developed with consideration of traffic flow

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patterns and alternative housing locations; the evacuation map illustrates the evacuation routes,

reception centers, and township divisions. The Exelon emergency plan also uses the NRF

classification system used at TMI in order to foster media consistency and public clarity in

respects to reporting unusual activities or crisis situations. The classification system uses four

levels as follows; unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency. The use of

Exelon emergency procedures, sector specific planning, and federal general emergency planning

frameworks provide the guidance necessary for successful emergency response planning.

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References

Associated Press. (1983, November 8). Three Mile Island operator falsified tests: jury. Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from http://news.google.com/ newspapers?id=Cq8yAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Ne8FAAAAIBAJ&dq=three%20mile%20island%20leak%20rates&pg=4415%2C4871603

Energy Hearing on Nuclear Energy Development, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Dr. T. Cochran - Senior Scientist, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council) (U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources ).

Exelon Corporation. (2011). Committed to Safety. In Three Mile Island. Retrieved from http://www.exeloncorp.com/powerplants/threemileisland/Pages/profile.aspx

Greene, G. (2001). The woman who knew too much: Alice Stewart and the secrets of radiation. Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan Press. Retrieved from http://lnk.nu/books.google.com/1usn

Mangano, J. (2004, September/October). Three Mile Island: health study meltdown. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 60(5), 31-35. Retrieved from EBSCOhost.

Osif, B., Baratta, A., & Contling, T. (2004). TMI 25 years later: The Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident and its impact. University Park, PA: The Pennslyvania State University Press. Retrieved from http://lnk.nu/books.google.com/1usm

Thornburgh, R., Former P.A. Gov. (1999, September). Some reflections on Three Mile Island . Retrieved from The Clarke Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Contemporary Issues, Dickinson College website: http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads/309.pdf

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2011). Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident. Retrieved from http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html

United States President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (1979). The need for change: The legacy of TMI, Report of the President's commission on the accident at Three Mile Island. Retrieved from http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads/188.pdf

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Bibliography

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2011, July 8). History of radiological emergency response at EPA. Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/rert/history.html#70s

U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. (2010). Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector-specific plan. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-nuclear-2010.pdf

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2004, August). Strategic plan for fiscal years 2004 to 2009. (Vol. No.3). Retrieved from http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1614/v3/sr1614v3.pdf

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