nuclear power in japan: fukushima and after

Nuclear power in Japan: Fukushima and after

Richard TanterNautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

[email protected]

http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications

This PPT at

http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/talks

University of Melbourne

19 October 2011

2

Fukushima I NPP, 2004

Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011

3

Outline

• What happened at Fukushima?• What is the situation at Fukushima now?• What will happen from now on?• What have been the health and environmental consequences?• Why did these events occur?• What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?• What are the implications beyond Japan?

4

Preface• Nuclear power plants:

– as a machine– as a socio-technical system

• Endemic unsolved issues relevant to all NPPs:– High-level radioactive waste treatment and storage– Operational safety– Nuclear weapon proliferation potential

• Post-Fukushima: exposure of workers to resolve loss of coolant accidents

• Otherwise, issues specific to particular NPPs and historically specific risk management and operational regimes

5

1. What happened at Fukushima?

•

6

A swarm of earthquakes (as of 15 March 2011)

Source: United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), “Japan: Earthquakes Swarm (15 Mar 2011),” Relief Web,

7

Nuclear power plants in Japan

8

Characteristics of Fukushima No. 1 NPP Units 1 - 6

Source: Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011, Table IV-1-2.

Note: Unit 3 fuel was mixed uranium oxide-plutonium oxide.

9

Boiling Water reactor System

10

Unit 4 reactor schematic

11

Fukushima BWR basic design

Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Figure 21 (from GE and METI)

12

GE BWR reactor vessel

13

Unit 1 schematic and inundation level

Source: Report of Japanese Governmentto the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's FukushimaNuclear Power Stations, June 2011; Figure III-2-4 (a).

14

RPV water levels and coolant injection times

Source: John H. Large, Update On The Nuclear And Radiological Situation At Fukushima Dai-Ichi, Large & Associates Consulting Engineers, Nr. R3196-AR2, Greenpeace Germany, May 2011; Data source: TEPCO

15

Unit 1; modelled status of fuel assemblies, melted and

slumped

Source: Report of Japanese Governmentto the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's FukushimaNuclear Power Stations, June 2011; Attachment IV-!, Reactor Core Conditions of Units 1 to 3 of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Figure 3.1.9.

16

Spent fuel at Fukushima I NPP

Source: Masa Takubo, cited by David Wright, More on Spent Fuel Pools at Fukushima, All Things Nuclear, March 21, 2010

17

The proximate source: reactor after-heat following insertion of control rods without cooling = meltdown

Source: Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, “Containment of a Reactor Meltdown,” Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982

18

BWR nuclear fuel structure

19

Unit 4 spent fuel pond - apparently not significantly damaged

Source: “No significant damage to fuel at unit 4”, World Nuclear News, 30 April

2011

20

Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP: 11 March

Pre-quake: – Units 1,2,3 operating; – Units 5 and 6 offline in cold shutdown; – Unit 4 offline; defueled November 2010

14.46 Magnitude 9 earthquake 135 km offshore– Automatic shutdown of Units 1,2, and 3.– Offsite power is lost. – Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) provide coolant power

15.46 14 metre-tsunami breaches plant seawalls and inundates most of the plant– Emergency generators flooded and short-circuited– Battery powered pumping system starts; fails by March 12.

19.30 Fuel assemblies in Unit 1 completely exposed

21

Station blackout accident: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System failed with loss off-site and emergency AC power and DC battery power

• Off-site power lost in earthquake due to damage to a transformer 10 kms from NPP

• 13 emergency diesel generators each “the size of a locomotive”, each 6 MWhr capacity– 8 in the basement of the main turbine hall, two at ground level

behind Unit 4– 12/13 disabled by the tsunami

• Batteries supplying DC power exhausted after 9-12 hours

22

Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP: 12 - 15 March

• Oxidation of zirconium cladding by steam → hydrogen– Zr + 2 H2O → ZrO2 + 2 H2

• March 12: – 15.36 Unit 1 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure

exposing fuel pond; 4 workers injured• March 14

– 11.01 Unit 3 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure exposing fuel pond; 6 workers injured

• March 15 – Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond– Hydrogen explosion in Unit 2; suspected damage to wet-well

in primary containment.– Explosion at Unit 4 spent fuel pond: origin possibly Unit 3

RPV

23

Decay curves of short-lived and long-lived isotopes

Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Fig. 26.

24

Long half-life fission isotopes

Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011.

25

Japanese government report to IAEA: Fukushima “worse than meltdown?”

Source: “'Melt-through' at Fukushima? / Govt report to IAEA suggests situation worse than meltdown”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 June 2011.

26

Fukushima I NPP, 2004

Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011

27

March 14

28

Seawater pump - March 17

Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome.org

29

Flooded electric equipment room, Unit 6, March 17

Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome.org

30

2. What is the situation at Fukushima now?

31

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of 14 October:a. reactors and spent fuel

Source: Status of countermeasures for restoring from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 through 4. As of October 14th, 2011. (Estimated by JAIF)

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

Core and fuel integrity

Damaged (core melt

Damaged (core melt*

Damaged (core melt

No fuels loaded

RPV structural integrity

Partially damaged and leaking

Unknown Unknown No damage

PCV structural integrity

Damage and leaking suspected



No damage

Spent fuels in the SFP

292 587 514 1331

Fuel integrity in SFP

Unknown Most spent fuels not damaged

Unknown Most spent fuels not damaged

SFP cooling Function recovered

Function recovered

Function recovered

Function recovered

32

Source: Asahi Shimbun 10 August 2011

33

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of 14 October:b. contaminated water leakage and water storage

• Contamination of huge volumes of sea-water and freshwater injected and sprayed into containment buildings and spent fuel ponds– Some released to sea– Most stored onsite in turbine building basement, etc.– Some stored on floating barges

• Highly radioactive leakages from damaged reactor pressure vessels and containment vessels– into sea and into groundwater

34Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.

State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:c. Site debris and contamination

35

Key current site operations

• Heat exchange of cooling water to CPV/RPV • Decontamination of radioactive water in containment vessel, in

flooded areas, and in storage– As of 9 August, 42,000 tonnes processed, but 120,000 tonnes

remained on site; expected end-year goal of 200,000 tonnes now unlikely

• Reducing/eliminating onsite radioactive hotspots• Covering all four units with steel and plastic to reduce air-borne

contamination

36

Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule

Source: Fukushima Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule, NikkeiNet, 17 August 2011

37

3. What will happen from now on?• Units 1-4 to be decommissioned; Units 5-6 unclear• New TEPCO “roadmap” presented to JAEC 31 August

– Plastic covering for Units 1-4 to contain airborne radiation matter

– Cold shut down by January 2012 ….?– By end-2011 will start building ground shield between Units 1-

4 and sea• 800 metres long and 20 metres deep• possible extension around whole of Units 1-4

• Removal of fuel from spent fuel ponds 1-4• Removal of spent fuel from reactors 1-4• Removal of corium from Units 1,2 and 3 - from RPV and/or CPV

– 10-50 years before attempt at reactor/corium removal possible• Decontamination, dismantling and clean-up …. Sometime in the

future …

38

The TEPCO roadmap (as of 17 August 2011)

• Basic objective: reactors and nuclear fuel ponds to a stable condition and mitigating release of radioactive materials.

• Step 2:– Control of release of radioactive materials – Accelerate processing of water to reduce required

volume– then increase rate of water injection by continuous

and reinforced circulating injection cooling towards cold shutdown.

Source: Summary of Progress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daichi NPP TEPCO, National Nuclear Response Headquarters, 17 August 2011.

39

TEPCO: roadmap implementation “issues”

1. Reactors: confirm functional securiting of water injection system

2. SFP: more stable cooling

3. Accelerate water treatment

4. Groundwater: design shield

5. Atmosphere/soil - steel/plastic covering

6. Measurement of radiation and disclosure

7. Tsunami reinforcement for Unit 4 SNP

8. Living/working environment

9. Radiation control/medical care

10. Staff training

Source: Summary of Progress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daichi NPP TEPCO, National Nuclear Response Headquarters, 17 August 2011.

40

Model of plastic

coverage for Unit 1

Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release

41

Unit 1 plastic cover: before and after

Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of the reactor building covering plan of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Press Release

42

Seaward-side water shield plan

Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6.

43

Seaward-side water shield - schematic cross-section(piles: 1 metre diameter, 14-22 mm. thick, 22-23 metres deep)


44

Fukushima No.1 NPP hydrology (pre-quake data)


45

Cross-section of hydrology model (pre-quake data)


46

Underground water trajectory modelling schematic


47

Anticipated underground water levels with seaside-ward water shield in place


48

The corium issue

• Corium = the liquid or solid slag within or below the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) resulting from a melting of fuel rods, cladding, steel structures, and subsequent chemical reactions and physical events

• If the corium melts through the steel RPV to the concrete base-mat of the primary containment vessel (PC or PCV), corium-concrete chemical reactions may include gases including CO, CO2, H2

• There is a further possibility of corium passing through the base-mat if the PCV is ruptured (e.g. by H2 explosion) or if melted by the corium

49

Debris bed from core melting at Three Mile Island NPP

Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Figure 43.

50

Fukushima BWR basic design

Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011, Figure 21 (from GE and METI)

51

The corium issue: corium lava flow at Chernobyl

Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html

52

The corium issue: corium “elephant’s foot uranium fuel flow in Chernobyl NPP basement

Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html

53

The corium issue:Three Mile Island NPP Core End-

State Configuration

Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/cor

ium.html

54

4. What have been the health and environmental consequences?

• Immediate injuries and deaths• Longterm radiation illness and mortality• Temporary social disruption from accident

consequences– social, economic, psychological

• Longterm social consequences– How many former residents can never go back?

55

Schematic of 31 August accident at cesium

decontamination equipment: two workers drenched

Source: TEPCO, 1 September 2011

56

Ionising radiation maximum permissible dose limits (courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)

• NB: Average background radiation: 2-3 mSv/y; half due to radon gas• General population: 1 mSv

– Japan: women regulated at 5 mSv over 3 mo– 1 mSv/y ~ 0.11 microSv/h

• Radiation workers:– 100 mSv over 5 y with no more than 50 mSv in any year

• ICRP recommendations accidents/emergencies: – In lower part of 1-20 mSv range for public – Workers – 100 mSv, ICRP up to 500 for volunteers in emergency

rescue operations– Post-Fukushima Japan:

• 250 mSv/y workers• 20 mSv for public including children

57Source:AREVA

Fukushima radiation releases, 11-20 March 2011

(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)

58Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.

59

US Fukushima radiation monitoring, to April 29

60

Zoning criteria Belarus 1991

kBq/m2 Individual dose (mSv)

Zone

>1480 >5 Priority resettlement

555-1480 <5 Secondary resettlement

185-555 >1 Resettlement rights

37-185 <1 Periodic radiation monitoring

Source: ICRP 111, 2009

61

Applying Chernobyl evacuation criteria to Fukushima

• Red and most yellow is > Chernobyl relocation zone (>1480 kBq/m2)

• Rest of yellow, green, light blue and some dark blue is > Chernobyl dose reduction zone

• Cs 137 T1/2 =30 years

(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)

62

Protective measures

• Evacuation for est ext >50 mSv– 20 vs 80 km;

• Sheltering – for ext est >10mSv, esp 20-30 km zone • Acceptance increased exposures• Stable iodine – appears not used?

– initial evacuation completed by time instruction issued VII-9 GOJ IAEA subm 6.11)

• Food and water monitoring and restrictions• Local monitoring• Remediation – including local initiative eg schools• Long-term health assessment planned – details

sparse

63

Killing them softly: radiation exposure limits for workers and children

• International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendation for workers:– maximum permissible annual dose of 20 mSv averaged over five

years– no more than 50 mSv in any one year.

• Japanese worker exposure standard:– Pre-crisis: 100 mSv p.a– Post-crisis “emergency” exposure limits: 250 mSv p.a.

• Resignation of Kosako Toshiso, Tokyo University, – Appointed Special Advisor to Cabinet, March 16; resigned 29 April – Reported METI now discussing 500 mSv emergency exposure limit for

workers– Refused to approve promulgation of children’s exposure level at “3.8

µSv per hour” on the basis of “20 mSv per year”

• See Tilman Ruff, “Children of Fukushima need our protection”, The Age, 27 April 2011

64

MEXT data on Cesium-137 soil contamination, 29-30 August

Sources: “34 spots top Chernobyl evacuation standard”, Daily Yomiuri Online, 31 August 2011; original data: MEXT: http://radioactivity.mext.go.jp/

“According to a soil contamination map submitted at a study meeting of the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry, six municipalities recorded more than 1.48 million becquerels of cesium 137 per square meter--the standard used for forced resettlement after the 1986 Chernobyl accident.”

65

Social effects

• Short- and medium-term evacuation • Loss of livelihood• Damage to deep cultural roots• No return zones• Compensation

– TEPCO compensation costs for coming year alone expected to reach 3.6 trillion yen

66

Nuclear labour - the return of the nuclear gypsies

• Pre-crisis Fukushima NPP 1 labour force– Regular employees (seisha’in 正社員 )= 1,1,08– Contract employees (hiseisha’in 非正社員 ) = 9,195 [“day labourers”]

• 2009 worker radiation exposure at Fukushima No. 1 NPP– “of those who received a dose between 5 and 10 millisieverts (mSv), there were

671 contract laborers against 36 regular employees. – “Those who received between 10 and 15 mSv were comprised of 220 contract

laborers and 2 regular workers, while 35 contract workers and no regular workers were exposed to a dose between 15 and 20 mSv”

• Post-crisis nuclear gypsy recruitment– More than 2,000 workers now onsite; – TEPCO planning to raise to 3,000– Recruited by construction company:

- jobs advertised for “10,000 yen for three hours work per day”

• Source: Paul Jobin, “Dying for TEPCO? Fukushima’s Nuclear Contract Workers”, Japan Focus, 2011

67

6. Why did this happen?

• Levels of cause• immediate/proximate causes :

– Earthquake plus tsunami – loss of coolant accompanied by after-heat = fuel element

meltdown– Remediation efforts generating new problems (e.g.

contaminated water)• Immediate failures in risk assessment and management

– E.g. sea-wall height known to be inadequate since 2008– E.g. subsequent discovery of five active fault lines

immediately offshore

68

The nuclear alliance, utilities nuclear manufacturers and the bureaucracy• TEPCO will be bankrupt before the clean-up is complete

• Nationalisation as risk displacement onto tax-payers

• The clean-up bonus for anyone by TEPCO

• Power companies as fiefdoms;

• power grids as islands

• Industry restructuring:– Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Hitachi nuclear division merger– MHI and other nuclear companies also reviewin non-nuclear divisions– Rapid expansion of solar industries.

69

Inculcating “a false sense of TEPCO’s competence”

“It is not clear why TEPCO chose not to release the key instrumentation records of RPV and fuel core conditions during and immediately following the tsunami strike until 15 May. Certainly, TEPCO would have had access to these records at the time…

The role and judgment of NISA in presenting the daily updates of reactor conditions is also questionable, particularly in that it must have been aware that Unit 1, at least, had undergone a full melt within 16 hours or shorter of the earthquake but then, even in this certain knowledge, why it continued to publish its daily but unrelated readings of the RPV shell temperatures is baffling. At best, what must be construed as mismanagement of information has frustrated observers and analysts following progression of the Fukushima Dai-ichi incident. At worst, the information withheld most likely resulted in ill-informed and incorrect decision-making and management both on and off the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear site.

Source: John H. Large, Update On The Nuclear And Radiological Situation At Fukushima Dai-Ichi, Large & Associates Consulting Engineers, Nr. R3196-AR2, Greenpeace Germany, May 2011.

70

Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear state-corporate-scientific complex

• GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1 BWRs Mk I and II

– Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence– Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import– Japan?

• TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented incidents• March 1, 2011 - TEPCO admitted falsification and suppression of faults data t

NISA• 1997, and 2009 repression of minority reports on seismology warnings

– Huge Jogan earthquake hit Tohoku coastline 869• Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy, regulators and

industry• Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior LDP politicians• The Kan government as a break?

– ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among government and utility officials.’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011)

– Kan: ”Fukushima was a man-made disaster”

71

Distant/ultimate causes

• Gradations of strength/salience• Inadequacies of Japanese nuclear industrial regulation and safety

regimes• TEPCO as a repeat offender/rogue company• Weakness of Japanese political structures• Japanese pursuit of energy security via a plutonium economy built around

future breeder reactors and reprocessing• Japan’s “construction state” and ongoing loss of state system steering

capacity– >>> national herd of white elephants– Rokkasho reprocessing plant and Monju breeder reactor as the whitest of

white elephants

• Global acceptance of “nuclear sovereignty”• Weakness of global nuclear governance • Fantasies of nuclear sustainability

72

7. What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?

73

The forgotten side of Japan as a nuclear power: as many planned NPP as succeeded were abandoned due to widespread and long-lasting local opposition.

Source: courtesy Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo

74

Nuclear facilities: actual Nuclear projects abandoned

Source: CNIC, 原子力市民年鑑 2008 年

75

Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum

6 months after Fukushima three-quarters of Japan’s nuclear power plants offline or shut-down

76

Nuclear Power Plants in operation, as of 4 September, 2011

Hokkaido Electric Tomari-3

Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO)

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1



Kansai Electric Power

Mihama-2

Takahama-2

Takahama-3

Ohi-2

Chugoku Electric Power Shimane-2

Shikoku Electric Power Ikata-2

Kyushu Electric PowerGenkai-1

Genkai-4

Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum

77

What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?

• Expansion of output from remaining thermal and hydro- power plants.

• Note only 13 NPP online as at early September

• Great success of energy conservation and efficiency measures in Tokyo and Tohoku

– E.g. TEPCO capacity fell from 64,000 MW to 56,400 MW; but peak summer demand has been 49,000MW

• Spotlight on utility regional monopolies and regional “islands”

• Alternative energy pathways:– Energy efficiency– Renewable energy– Distributed generation

• Note: all three require construction of smart grids

78

The utilities as islands

79

Japan effects: nuclear power mortally wounded

• Release of previously suppressed information– Safety– Costs– spent fuel cul de sac

• Politicians will never again trust the nuclear alliance to keep them safe

• Public trust– likelihood of corruption revelations over Fukushima NPP I

• design and construction and operation• the failure of the plutonium project: Rokkasho reprocessing facility

and the fast breeder reactors• >> support for “once-through” NPP process as first step.• Non-nuclear energy producers

80

Regulatory changes

• Dismissal of senior METI and NISA personnel• Replacement of NISA• Cabinet ratification of reduction of role of nuclear

energy in national energy policy• Cabinet regulation requiring revision of costing

procedures in comparative evaluations of energy sources to include accident compensation, clean-up, and full decommissioning costs.

• Much now depends on fights over implementation under new Noda administration

81

Public opinion: April-August 2011, Mainichi Shimbun

Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August 2011

82

Available from:


Real world energy alternatives for Japan:

Energy efficiency Renewable energy

Distributed generation

Real world energy alternatives

• Energy efficiency

• Renewable energy

• Distributed generation

83

Key questions for Japan

• Will serious liberalisation of nuclear energy production help?• Are the utilities locked into nuclear trajectory? • Are the nuclear manufacturers (Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba)

locked into nuclear power? – Export future (cf NPP deals with Vietnam and and Jordan)

• Can an elected government gain control of nuclear policy?• Can an elected government force the abandonment of the

plutonium economy?• Can a Japanese government breakthrough politically to direct

new energy policy?

84

Collective international regulation for nuclear safety• Notice international responses from China, Korea and United States

– Very slow release of US data and imagery

• IAEA: Why so silent?

– Mission statement: conflict of interest:

• Promoting nuclear power

• Regulating nuclear power

– Capture by major nuclear states and public-private nuclear alliance

• IAEA lack of effective powers

• Liability regime limitations– The farce of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

85

Convention on Nuclear Safety• Need for fundamental challenge to nuclear sovereignty embedded in

Convention on Nuclear Safety– CNS parties last week deferred Fukushima review meeting till

August 2012

• IAEA on the Convention:• “The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure

fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the Parties to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism is the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention.”

– http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.asp

86

Global civil society response ?

• Energy and climate change interconnection central:– Need for parallel and inter-linked responses

• No energy regime is without costs• Global public right to information and transparency

– Intelligence information access.• Rebuilding of transnational networks

87

Available from:


Nautilus Institute early response reports on on Fukushima

88

• EnerWebWatch's Special Nuclear Situation in Japan– http://www.enerwebwatch.eu/webwatch?page=EarthQuake&id=update17

• The Fukushima Project: SimplyInfo– http://www.simplyinfo.org/

• Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 5 2011: (see Von Hippel, Suzuki, Takubo, and Lyman)

• After the Deluge: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, Special Report, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, March 17, 2011

– http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

• The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on Japan’s Electricity System, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, April 11, 2011

– http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

• TEPCO Country after Fukushima, Arena Magazine, June 2011 [footnoted version]– http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications

89

Richard TanterNautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

[email protected]

[email protected]


This PPT at

http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/talks

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