nuclear posture 2009-2010
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
1/48Progressive ideas for a strong, just, and free america www.americanProgres
Orienting the 2009Nuclear Posture Review
A RoadmapAndrew Grotto Cene f Ameican Pgess
Joe Cirincione Plugsaes Fund
November 2008
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
2/48
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
3/48
Orienting the 2009Nuclear Posture ReviewA Roadmap
Andrew Grotto Cene f Ameican Pgess
Joe Cirincione Plugsaes Fund
November 2008
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
4/48
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
5/48
Cnens 1 Executive summary3 An emerging bipartisan consensus or
a new nuclear posture
3 ChArt: Glbal nuclea sckpiles, 19552008
4 21st century nuclear threats4 Nuclea eism and gue saes
5 te nuclea black make
6 Nuclea enegy and nuclea eapns plifeain
8 The imperative o U.S. leadership8 russias key le
10 ChArt: te NPtS gand bagain
11 Needed: a new U.S. nuclear weapons posture12 Structuring the 2009 NPR
16 Sequencing the 2009 NPR16 Duing e ansiin
16 te fis 100 days
17 te fis yea
18 A progressive nuclear posture: key policy issues18 Deeence and dcine
18 ChArt: U.S. nuclea fces by e numbes (acive sckpile)
19 Fce sucue and e nuclea eapns cmplex
19 ChArt: Key nuclea eapns-elaed faciliies
20 Nnplifeain and ams cnl
21 ChArt: U.S. nuclea fces and e nuclea iad
21 Appendix I: Revised Nuclear Posture Review
(1070 FY 2008 National Deense Authorization Act)
23 Appendix II: Past as prelude: the politics and process
o nuclear posture reviews
28 Appendix III: A brie history o strategic arms control,
19692008
32 Selected reerences
35 Endnotes
36 About the authors
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
6/48
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
7/48
exuv summay | www.amanpgss
Execuive summay
ere is an emerging biparisan consensus ha Americas curren nuclear weapons posure
imposes an unnecessary burden on .. eors o preven nuclear errorism and curail
he spread o nuclear weapons, maerials, and echnology o addiional naion-saes.
holds ha he nied aes mus reain a nuclear arsenal as a sraegic deerren, bu
should embrace he vision laid ou by senior saesmen eorge hulz, enry Kissinger,
illiam erry, and am unn o a world ree o nuclear weapons in order o srenghen
Americas abiliy o exercise global leadership in counering 21s cenury nuclear hreas.
e bama adminisraion should use he congressionally mandaed 20092010 uclear
osure eview, or , o realign nuclear policy, orces, and posure wih hese hreas.
is sudy makes he case or why a successul should be among he bama adminis-
raions op prioriies and provides a roadmap on how o srucure and manage he review
so ha i achieves key policy objecives. is no a sudy on nuclear weapons docrine.
e 20092010 will be he hird ormal review o .. nuclear sraegy conduced
since he end o he old ar. e preceding reviews were conduced early in each o he
linon and Bush adminisraions rs erms. e linon adminisraions review essen-
ially raied he old ar saus quo, despie an urgen need o recalibrae in ligh o he
ovie nions collapse and he need o work wih oscow o preven he urher spread
o nuclear weapons, maerials, and echnology. e aional ecuriy ouncil was largelydisengaged rom he process, as he hie ouse was jus emerging rom a series o biter
dispues wih he armed orces over such issues as omalia and gays in he miliary. e
adminisraion was also batling boh he miliary and an increasingly hosile ongress
over deense spending prioriies. e Deparmen o Deense underwen a leadership
change in he middle o he review, and oher issues, such as dealing wih orh Koreas
nuclear program and he muliple prolieraion concerns presened by he collapse o he
ovie nion, compeed or senior appoinees nie ime and resources.
he second ormal ook place in 2001 under vasly dieren poliical and
policy circumsances. was driven by presidenial prerogaives, which guaraneed
ha senior oicials would inves ime and energy in he process. he reviewyielded he adminisraions preerred policy oucomes, bu i also u ndermined
Americas n onprolieraion credenials.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
8/48
2 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
e goals o he 20092010 should be o recalibrae Americas nuclear deerren
in ligh o exising and emerging hreas, srenghen Americas hand in negoiaions on
improvemens o he global nuclear nonprolieraion regime, and send a clear signal o he
world ha he nied aes is charing a new, mulilaeral course. uccess in achieving hese
goals hinges on developmen o a coheren, realisic sraegy or conducing he review ha
ensures senior appoinees devoe susained atenion even as hey conron oher naional
securiy challenges. e sraegy should be organized according o hese principles:
Do no poliicize nuclear weapons docrine.
onduc he review as a sraegy-driven exercise guided by a vision or nuclear weapons
policy elaboraed by he presiden.
onsul and engage he Join hies o a.
onsul and engage ongress.
Appoin experienced proessionals o carry ou he vision.
nsure ha he review is ineragency.
onsul and engage key allies and parners.
Develop a communicaions plan.
is sudy idenies he key nuclear policy issues ha demand senior-level atenion,
which we ideniy as alling ino hree caegories: Deerrence and Docrine, orce
rucure and he uclear eapons omplex, and onprolieraion and Arms onrol.
also provides a noional imeline or sequencing he review.
ese recommendaions and ndings are based on a review and comparison o how he
srucure o he linon and Bush adminisraion s, conduced in 19931994 and
2001, shaped he nal review produc in each case. e sudy was also inormed by nearly
wo dozen inerviews and inormal discussions wih expers, congressional sa, and
ormer senior ocials wih experience in nuclear policy rom boh sides o he poliicalspecrum. e auhors ake sole responsibiliy or he conen o his repor.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
9/48
An mgng bpasan nsnsus f a nw nula psu | www.amanpgss
An emeging bipaisan cnsensusf a ne nuclea psue
ere is an emerging biparisan consensus ha Americas curren nuclear weapons
posurehe policies governing he role, mission, and size o he .. nuclear weapons
arsenalimposes an unnecessary burden on .. eors o preven nuclear errorism and
curail he spread o nuclear weapons, maerials, and echnology o addiional naion-saes.
is consensus, which includes more han wo-hirds o living ormer naional securiy
advisors and secrearies o sae or deense, acknowledges he ongoing role o .. nuclear
weapons as a sraegic deerren or he nied aes and is allies. Bu he consensus also
embraces he vision o a world ree o nuclear weapons ariculaed by ormer ecrearies
o ae eorge hulz and enry Kissinger, ormer ecreary o Deense illiam erry,
and ormer enaor am unn (D-A) in a pair oWall Street Journal op-eds.1
e emerging consensus ress on wo proposiions. irs, i holds ha he curren posure
is based on oudaed old ar assumpions abou nuclear argeing ha emphasize he
need o deer large-scale, preempive nuclear srikes by ussia, our ormer old ar
adversary. old ar hosiliies ended more han 15 years ago wih he collapse o he
ovie nion and he arsaw ac. Alhough he nied aes and ussia have serious
dierences over a range o inernaional securiy issues and reain large nuclear arsenals,
he wo naions no longer consider each oher as irreconcilable ideological adversaries.
hina has an esimaed wo dozen ballisic missiles capable o delivering a nuclear payloado he coninenal nied aes and is slowly modernizing is nuclear orces. aiwan
remains a poenial ashpoin in ..-hina relaions, bu as long as all paries respec
he principles laid ou in he hree ..-hina Join ommuniqus and he one hina
policy, armed conic is a remoe possibiliy and nuclear conic even more so. Alhough
he nied aes will reain a nuclear arsenal or as long as oher counries possess hem,
hese developmens have brough he world a sep closer o achieving residen onald
eagans dream ha one day nuclear weapons will be banished rom he ace o he earh.
Rest o the World
Russia
United States
Global nuclear stockp
19552008
10
200
3,057
351
6,129
31,982
723
19,055
27,826
1,085
39,197
24,237
1,200
27,000
12,144
1955
1975
1995
2 0
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1965
1985
Source: NRDC (2006); Norris (2007); Norris
(2008a); (2008b); (2008c); (2008d); (2007).
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
10/48
4 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
21s cenuy nuclea eas
e second proposiion underlying he biparisan consensus is ha many counries
consider .. compliance wih is nuclear disarmamen obligaions under Aricle
o he on-rolieraion reay, or , a precondiion beore supporing addiional
.. nonprolieraion iniiaives ha are vial o counering 21s cenury nuclear hreas.
ese hreas are characerized by he diusion o nuclear maerials, know-how, and
echnologymuch o i wih a civilian dimensiono sae and non-sae acors enabled
by globalizaion and economic developmen. n he words o secrearies hulz, Kissinger,
erry, and en. unn, ihou he vision o moving oward zero [nuclear weapons], we
will no nd he essenial cooperaion required o sop our downward spiral.2
e nied aes canno couner hese hreas alone. e success o American non-
prolieraion sraegy is now ied in signican par o he willingness and capaciy o
oher counries o make cosly invesmens o ime, money, and sovereigny in a hos o
domesic and inernaional insiuions designed o regulae he ranser o sensiive mae-
rials and echnology, build condence in global supplies o nuclear uel so ha domesic
enrichmen projecs are unnecessary, penalize violaions o nonprolieraion norms, and
deer uure ransgressions. e nied aes could acquire much greaer leverage o
persuade oher counries o ake [hese seps] by addressing concerns abou Aricle
compliance, according o a nonprolieraion policy ask orce chaired by ex-ecreary oae adeleine Albrigh and ormer ecreary erry.3
Nuclea eism and gue saes
ere is no single greaer hrea o he .. homeland han erroris use o a nuclear device
agains an American ciy. Alhough he chances o his happening are small, he conse-
quences o a nuclear atack would be devasaing, likely killing hundreds o housands o
people, causing rillions o dollars in lasing damage, and orever changing our way o lie.
oenially vulnerable sockpiles o weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium, or
wha a erroris would need o build a crude nuclear deviceexis a civilian research acil-iies in dozens o counries around he world. By securing or eliminaing hese sockpiles,
he nied aes could pracically guaranee agains an ac o nuclear errorism. Ye he
pace o eors o address his key naional securiy vulnerabiliy by securing sockpiles and,
preerably, phasing ou he civilian use o alogeher lags behind he severiy o he
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
11/48
21s nuy nula has | www.amanpgss
hrea. As o 2007, an esimaed our ou o ve research reacors lacked adequae securiy
o proec agains sophisicaed hieves, while only around one-hird o -ueled
research reacors have had all heir monioring removed.4
ogue sae acquisiion o nuclear weapons presens a dieren, more complex challenge.
raises he chances o nuclear war hrough miscalculaion or acciden while providing an
incenive or oher counries o seek heir own nuclear deerren, poenially leading oregional arms races. ran coninues o press orward wih is nuclear program in violaion
o successive .. ecuriy ouncil resoluions demanding a suspension. orh Korea has
agreed in principle o eliminae is nuclear program as o his wriing, bu i is by no means
cerain wheher ongoing negoiaions will produce ha oucome. her saes, such as
yria, may also have secre programs underway. Alhough concerns abou .. compli-
ance wih Aricle are unlikely o exer a direc inuence on rogue saes nuclear
ambiions, such concerns may inuence he willingness o oher counries o join an
inernaional eor o conain hose ambiions using sancions, diplomaic pressures, and
oher means. inally, over he long run, an insisence by he worlds sronges convenional
miliary power, he nied aes, ha i canno mee is securiy needs wihou nuclear
weapons can only make nuclear weapons more atracive or weaker powers.
te nuclea black make
e lieline or hese illici eors is a nuclear black marke comprised o skilled manuac-
urers, engineers and scieniss, middle-men, and ransporaion and logisics channels.
is serviced by hree broad ypes o prolieraors ha vary in heir willingness and abiliy
o comba prolieraion: willul prolieraors, such as he inamous A.. Khan, aher
o akisans cenriuge enrichmen program; willully blind prolieraors ha should
reasonably know heir skills and wares will be used o advance a bomb program bu ail operorm due diligence; and ignoran prolieraors ha genuinely do no undersand he
prolieraion consequences o heir acions. fen, he acor in quesion is a privae-secor
eniy operaing in a counry wih uneven or largely non-exisen governmenal oversigh
over ows o poenially sensiive maerials and echnology. ach o hese prolieraors
presens a unique challenge, bu hey all have his in common: ey reec undamenal
weaknesses in domesic and inernaional governance o global commerce.
n he indusrialized es, here have been major improvemens in expor conrols and
relaed measures o clamp down on illici nuclear rade during he pas 15 years. ese
advances were spurred in large par by shocking revelaions in he afermah o he 1991
ul ar concerning he size and scale o addam usseins nuclear procuremens duringhe 1980s. raq during his period, along wih ndia, akisan, and ohers, exploied weak-
nesses in he expor conrol regimes o he advanced indusrial democracies, paricularly
in selec uropean counries whose indusries possessed high echnologies. e exposure
o A.. Khans nework in 2003 moivaed anoher round o improvemens in many coun-
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
12/48
6 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
ries. xpor conrols remain a work in progress, despie decades o experience regulaing
nuclear expors. onsan vigilance is demanded o say ahead o he prolieraion curve.
oreover, he orces o economic developmen, indusrializaion, and globalizaion are
esablishing new ceners o high echnology in he developing world ha can serve as
alernaive suppliers or sensiive, precision echnologies. A.. Khan, or example, se up
a cenriuge componen manuacuring aciliy in alaysia, a counry wih litle priorexperience policing illici ransers o prolieraion-sensiive echnologies. is develop-
men presens a grave and growing new challenge o he nonprolieraion regime, or many
o hese counrieswhich are concenraed in he on-Aligned ovemen, or A, an
inernaional bloc o mosly developing counrieslack he domesic capabiliy o ade-
quaely regulae sensiive echnology ows and/or he poliical will o beter regulae he
ow o echnology expors, which are ofen seen as essenial o economic developmen or
counries ha have made expor-led growh he cornersone o heir naional economic
policy. A nied aions nsiue or Disarmamen esearch sudy repors, or example,
ha many developing counries regard expor conrols wih suspicion, viewing hem as
barriers o economic developmen a bes, and a wors as par o a deliberae sraegy o
echnology denial on he par o he developed world.5
.. ecuriy ouncil esoluion 1540 highlighs he diculies associaed wih moiva-
ing counries o spend scarce resources on nonprolieraion eors. is, in essence, an
ununded mandae requiring ha counries adop and enorce appropriae eecive laws
prevening non-sae acors rom prolieraing D. aes mus criminalize prolieraion,
adop and enorce expor and border conrols, and insiue eecive physical proecion
measures. or many counries, paricularly developing ones, his is a very all order requir-
ing poenially signican invesmens in a range o specialized regulaory capaciy
invesmens hey migh preer o spend on educaion, inrasrucure, or public healh. Bu
-1540 does no dene wha appropriae eecive means, leaving he inerprea-ion o individual counries discreion. As a resul o hese acors, implemenaion among
developing counries, according o he D sudy, is weak.
Nuclea enegy and nuclea eapns plifeain
uure prolierans need no pursue he clandesineand hence unambiguously ille-
galroue ha ibya, raq, ran, orh Korea, and possibly yria have aken. nsead, a
governmen could announce a grandiose nuclear energy developmen program ha
includes a domesic nuclear uel-making capabiliy, osensibly o guaranee a supply o
nuclear uel or is anicipaed reacor ee. e does no expressly prohibi saesrom pursuing his echnology, provided i is or avowedly peaceul purposes and he hos
governmen subjecs i o AA inspecionseven hough i can produce uel or bombs
as well as reacors. ran, or example, had disclosed he exisence o is nuclear uel-
making program rom he beginning insead o hiding i in violaion o is AA saeguards
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
13/48
21s nuy nula has | www.amanpgss
agreemen, he prevailing view among mos inernaional legal expers is ha he program
would be permissible under he . AA inspecions can veriy ha a declared aciliy
is peaceul in naure, bu hey canno preven a counry rom kicking inspecors ou and
using he aciliy o produce uel or bombs. Alernaively, a sae can diver he experience
and knowledge gained rom operaing a declared peaceul aciliy o a secre, undeclared
aciliy dedicaed o making bombs. a is why rans nuclear uel-making programs pose
such a grave prolieraion risk.
ese scenarios are ar rom hypoheical. ran already jusies is enrichmen program
on energy securiy grounds, and many developing counries are relucan o srongly con-
demn rans program or ear ha urher resricions on nuclear uel-making could jeop-
ardize heir energy securiy should hey develop nuclear reacors or producing elecriciy.
her counries may well ollow he more above-board roue available o hem under he
and pursue a weapons program under he guise o a civilian energy program.
is risk could grow precipiously in he coming decades i demand grows or nuclear
energy as an alernaive o burning ossil uels or elecriciy producion. A presen, more
han 90 percen o exising nuclear reacor capaciy is concenraed in developed and
ransiion economies. os o he ne growh in worldwide capaciy, however, is projeced
o occur in developing counries, paricularly in hose associaed wih he on-Aligned
ovemen. n jus he pas wo years, or example, many such counriesincluding sev-
eral .. parners in he iddle ashave announced ambiious nuclear energy develop-
men plans, ciing concern over global warming and rapid demand growh or energy.
nly a ew non-aligned counries, such as Brazil and ouh Arica, currenly possess
domesic enrichmen echnology or have plans o pursue i; he risk ha several or more
may decide o do so in he uure, however, is signican. op nonprolieraion priori-
ies or he bama adminisraion will include reducing he incenive or indigenousuel making by promoing credible, economically atracive alernaives o domesic uel
producion, improving ransparency o civilian nuclear energy programs by srenghen-
ing he nernaional Aomic nergy Agencys abiliy o conduc nuclear inspecions, and
srenghening expor and border conrol regimes o curb he ow o illici nuclear com-
merce. e challenge or nonprolieraion diplomacy is ha counries are under no general
legal obligaion o accep or suppor hese measures. ome counries recognize he direc
benes hey would derive rom acceping hese obligaions and already suppor hem.
her counries, however, do no and mus be lobbied or cajoled ino supporing hem.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
14/48
8 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
te impeaive f U.S. leadesip
.. leadership is essenial o mobilizing inernaional acion o reduce hese risks. As ormer
ecrearies hulz, erry, and Kissinger and en. unn wroe in heir 2007 Wall Street Journal
op-ed, i is required o ake he world o he nex sageo a solid consensus or reversing
reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vial conribuion o prevening heir prolieraion
ino poenially dangerous hands, and ulimaely ending hem as a hrea o he world.
Bu many developing counries have rejeced .. leadership. A recen D sudy
repors, or example, a widespread belie in ouh-as Asia and elsewhere ha an exag-
geraed non-sae D hrea is being used by he nuclear weapons saes o disrac
atenion rom heir ailure o comply wih heir disarmamen commimens.6 ese
counries accuse he nied aes o ailing o uphold is commimen o nuclear disar-
mamen as required by he , ciing he Bush adminisraions repudiaion o a polii-
cal undersanding reached a he 2000 eview onerence on a series o 13 specic
measures or acions ha would serve as benchmarks or evaluaing progress as well as
he oucome o he 2001 ha, as explained in Appendix , is widely inerpreed
as expanding he role o nuclear weapons in .. deense sraegy. e 13 benchmarks
include enry ino orce o he omprehensive es Ban reay and a issile aerial
u- reay wih vericaion provisions, susaining he Ani-Ballisic issile reay,
and oher arms conrol measures. ncreasingly, developing counries are he main argeso nonprolieraion diplomacy, ye hey have indicaed hey will no enerain he pos-
sibiliy o assuming new nonprolieraion obligaions unless he exising nuclear powers
ake urher seps o reduce heir arsenals. is issue will dominae he spring 2010
eview onerence, which many expers regard as a make-or-break momen or he
nonprolieraion regime. e success o he conerenceand he abiliy o he nied
aes o advocae or necessary improvemens o he nonprolieraion regimewill urn
in par on he nuclear weapons policies o he nied aes.
russias key le
ussian suppor is indispensable o any durable eor o consrain prolieraion. is
already a major miliary and diplomaic power and a leading energy supplier due o is
large reserves o oil and naural gas. also has an advanced nuclear energy indusry. ese
asses endow ussia wih remendous inuence over prolieran saes such as ranand
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
15/48
th mpav f U.S. ladshp | www.amanpgss
he prospecs or more durable improvemens o he nonprolieraion regime, such as
iniiaives o consrain he spread o nuclear uel-making aciliies.
By he same oken, he nied aes canno revialize inernaional eors o reduce
nuclear weapon dangers wih ussia, hina, and oher counries wihou a clear sense
o how nuclear weapons ino broader .. deense sraegy. n December 2009, he
cornersone arms conrol agreemen beween he nied aes and ussia, he Areay, will expire. is agreemen species he essenial procedures and mechanisms
or veriying muual compliance wih agreemens ha reduce and eliminae nuclear
arsenals, including he oscow reay (also known as ) signed in 2002.
her key iems on he arms conrol and nonprolieraion agendas include he disposiion
o he omprehensive es Ban reay, ongoing negoiaions over a issile aerial u-
reay, convincing developing counries o renounce naional uranium enrichmen
in avor o mulilaeral alernaives, and srenghening he AAs auhoriy and abiliy o
conduc nuclear inspecions. Achievemen o hese objecives is likely o hinge in par on
he saus o .. nuclear weapons policy.
norunaely, he ..-ussia relaionship, which had achieved unprecedened coop-
eraion on nuclear nonprolieraion maters in he 1990s, is broken. e Bush admin-
israions wihdrawal rom he Ani-Ballisic issile reay in 2001 se he sage or
an increasingly acrimonious and a imes hosile relaionship beween he wo ormer
miliary adversaries. ussias leadership, paricularly ormer residen and curren
rime iniser ladimir uin, deserves he lions share o he blame or he downurn.
oscow has clamped down on reedoms a home and exploied is newound clou in
global energy markes o bully neighbors. n addiion, is miliary conic wih eorgia
in Augus 2008 has raised grave quesions abou ussias sraegic direcion. Bu Bush
adminisraion policies ranging rom he 2003 invasion o raq o is curren eorso esablish a missile deense beachhead in asern urope have ed he impression in
ussia ha he nied aes is no an enlighened superpower, bu an expansionis one
ha seeks power and inuence a ussias expense. ..-ussian relaions have reached a
nadir no seen since he old ar ended nearly 20 years ago.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
16/48
10 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
Regarded as the cornerstone o the nuclear nonprolieration regime, the
NPT divides the world into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon
states. The treaty considers China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States nuclear-weapon states. Every other country in the worldis considered a de jure non-nuclear weapon state, even i they de acto
possess nuclear weapons. Thus, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are
considered non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Those our countries
are also the only countries that arent party to the treaty.
Nuclear-weapon states:
Wont prolierate to non-nuclear weapon states (Art I)
Facilitate the use o peaceul nuclear technology (Art IV)
Negotiate in good aith toward nuclear disarmament (Art VI)
Non-nuclear weapon states party:
Foreswear nuclear weapons (Art II)
Accept IAEA saeguards over peaceul nuclear activities (Art III)
The NPTS grand bargain
United States
United Kingdom
France
Russia
China North Korea
India
Israel
Pakistan
Nuclear-weapons states
De facto nuclear states
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
17/48
Ndd: a nw U.S. nula wapns psu | www.amanpgss.
Needed: a ne U.S. nucleaeapns psue
e bama adminisraion mus break his logjamboh wih he developing world
and wih ussiain order o eecively comba he nuclear hreas o he 21s cenury.
A renewed commimen on he par o he nied aes o reducing is nuclear arsenal,
along wih a reinvigoraed sraegic dialogue wih ussia, would bolser Americas nonpro-
lieraion bona des and enable i o reassume is radiional leadership role in eors o
srenghen he global nuclear nonprolieraion regime.
Accordingly, he bama adminisraion should use he congressionally mandaed
20092010 nuclear posure review [see Appendix ] o realign nuclear policy, orces, and
posure wih 21s cenury nuclear hreas. e goals o he review should be o recalibrae
he nuclear deerren in ligh o exising and emerging hreas, srenghen Americas hand
in negoiaions over improvemens o he global nuclear nonprolieraion regime, and
send a clear signal o he world ha he nied aes is charing a new course.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
18/48
12 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
Sucuing e 2009 NPr
uccess in achieving hese goals hinges on developmen o a coheren, realisic sra-
egy or conducing he review ha ensures senior appoinees rom he deparmens o
deense, sae, and energy, along wih he aional ecuriy ouncil, devoe susained
atenion even as hey conron oher naional securiy challenges. e 2009 will
occur in a vasly more complex policy environmen han eiher o he preceding wo
reviews, which occurred a he sar o each o he linon and Bush adminisraions rs
erms. e bama adminisraion will inheri a saggering array o major oreign policy
challenges ha will compee or he atenion o senior appoinees, including wars in raq
and Aghanisan, errorism, orh Koreas nuclear weapons program, rans nuclear ambi-
ions and growing regional clou, a broken ..-ussia relaionship, energy insecuriy,
climae change, and a nonprolieraion regime in urgen need o repair. will also likely
have o make a number o dicul choices abou deense spending prioriies.
olicy choices in one area may consrain or enable policy opions in oher areas. or
example, some analyss have proposed eliminaing he Kings Bay aval ubmarine
Base in eorgia, which serves as he Alanic seapor or Americas B ee. rom an
operaional sandpoin, his would eecively eliminae he abiliy o he nied aes o
conduc nuclear parols in he Alanic, which has implicaions or .. alliance relaions
in A and broader .. policy oward ussia as well. Adminisraion policy owardnuclear esingincluding he Bwill aec he abiliy o he nied aes o
achieve diplomaic objecives a he 2010 eview onerence. And a deermina-
ion o press orward wih missile deense insallaions in asern urope will aec he
prospecs or bilaeral arms conrol wih ussia. Abandoning hese insallaions, however,
could have alliance repercussions. ese are jus a ew illusraions o why i is essenial o
have a coheren sraegy or carrying ou he .
aionalism in ussia is a an apex, as is disrus o ashingon. ese dynamics reinorce
he need or he bama adminisraion o seek a sraegic dialogue wih ussia, bu hey
also raise quesions abou wheher ussias leadership is ready o engage he nied aes
in a serious way, paricularly wih respec o sraegic issues such as nuclear weapons, mis-sile deense, and A expansion. e bama adminisraion mus seek his dialogue,
bu have realisic expecaions abou wha i is capable o producing in he near erm.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
19/48
Suung h 2009 NPr | www.amanpgss.
inally, he emerging biparisan consensus on nuclear policy does no ye exend o such
key quesions as he appropriae nuclear weapons manuacuring complex o suppor he
arsenal, he role and uure o ballisic missile deense sysems, and he miliary use o
space. n addiion, some conservaive legislaors and pundis urher o he righ on he
poliical specrum remain commited o a old ar posure and have indicaed srong
suppor or a nuclear weapons complex capable o supporing a much larger arsenal han
may be warraned by a realisic hrea assessmen. e bama adminisraion shouldexpec hese conservaives o challenge a progressive nuclear posure and seek o racure
he emerging biparisan consensus.
n order o maximize he s eeciveness and ensure is subsequen implemenaion,
i should be srucured according o he ollowing lis o core principles. ese principles
are derived rom a series o wide-ranging inerviews wih expers and ormer senior
ocials wih experience in nuclear policy rom boh sides o he poliical specrum, and
a review and comparison o how he srucure o he linon and Bush adminisraion
s shaped he nal review produc in each case (see Appendix , as as relude: e
oliics and rocess o uclear osure eviews).
Conduct the NPR as a strategy-driven exercise guided by a vision for nuclear
weapons policy elaborated by the president in a Presidential Decision Directive or
other appropriate means.A review process conduced wihou a sense or he ulimae
desinaion is unlikely o produce any meaningul changes in he posure. is vision
is essenial or dening he parameers o ineragency debae (whas setled and whas
up or grabs), ocusing he review process, and arming he presidens appoinees wih
poliical auhoriy or driving he presidens agenda orward. e presiden himsel
should deermine he goal o he review, which could be as general as insrucions o his
senior appoinees ha hey achieve deep cus in nuclear orces consisen wih susain-
ing deerrence and revialize inernaional arms conrol. is senior appoinees shouldhen lead he review, as opposed o delegaing he review o mid-level appoinees and
career civil servans. is is essenial in order o ideniy, weigh, and deniively setle
radeos across radiionally sovepiped policy areas.
Consult and engage the Joint Chiefs. eir advice and suppor is essenial o conduc-
ing a posure review and eecively communicaing he resuls o he American people
and ongress. e J are in all likelihood prepared o accep poenially signican
changes in .. nuclear weapons policy, bu heir suppor should no be aken or graned.
is essenial ha hey be acively consuled and brough ino he review process.
Consult and engage with Congress. e bama adminisraion could coun on hesuppor o a progressive ongress, provided key members o ongress are consuled
a he onse o he review and given an inerim repor. onservaive legislaors may
atemp o challenge he bama adminisraions nuclear weapons policies, bu hey
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
20/48
14 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
can be rebued i here is consisen, close communicaion beween he hie ouse
and he ongress, accompanied by a concered eor o reach ou o moderae con-
servaive legislaors.
Do not politicize nuclear weapons doctrine. e presiden mus speak o he American
people abou he sraegic hreas o he naion, paricularly nuclear errorism and he
risk o nuclear weapons use. is adminisraions nuclear policy, however, may be anatracive arge or conservaives in ongress and elsewhere, paricularly i hey sense
ha he presiden is personally commited o he issue. ere is litle value in elevaing
he poliical prole o nuclear weapons docrine beyond he broad parameers o he
biparisan consensus in avor o urher reducing he size and sraegic prole o nuclear
weapons in .. sraegy. is consensus is embodied in he join wriings o senior
saesmen hulz, Kissinger, erry, and unn. inally, he adminisraion should be par-
icularly careul no o make public commimens in advance o he review on specic
numbers or he weapons sockpile.
Appoint experienced professionals to carry out the vision. A successul mus
engage a diverse specrum o nuclear weapons policy consiuencies, some o which
may resis an eor o sreamline .. nuclear orces. e process will go much more
smoohly i he presiden aps experienced proessionals who undersand he inner
workings o he nuclear weapons bureaucracy, have producive working relaionships
wih he uniormed miliary and wih each oher, and enjoy he respec o civilian and
uniormed career proessionals alike. ese individuals mus also be able o coun on
he presidens ull suppor. e adminisraion can gain addiional insighs and suppor
or is policies rom independen exper groups, including he congressionally mandaed
ommission on he raegic osure o he nied aes and he ommission on he
revenion o eapons o ass Desrucion rolieraion and errorism.
Ensure that the review is interagency. All relevan agencies should have a sea a he
able, hough i is imporan o recognize ha he personal relaionships among he
senior appoinees and heir commimen o he process will exer a ar greaer impac on
he process han ormal lines o consulaion and communicaion.
Consult and engage key allies and partners. Americas allies are weary o oreign policy
surprises and increasingly jitery abou Americas securiy commimen o hem. e
unease could grow among allies in he iddle as in ligh o rans nuclear ambi-
ions and as he nied aes begins o redeploy rom raq, in asern urope due o
ussias armed conic wih eorgia, and in as A sia because o orh Koreas nuclear
program. is unease could corrode Americas relaionships and inuence, and leadsome counries o seek a nuclear weapons capabiliy. is essenial ha he con-
sider he eec ha changes in he size and sraegic prole o .. nuclear orces may
have on Americas alliances.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
21/48
Suung h 2009 NPr | www.amanpgss.
Develop a communications plan. is will ensure ha he nied aes reaps he
maximum possible inernaional diplomaic bene rom is new posure a he 2010
eview onerence, where A counries are likely o link heir suppor or
new nonprolieraion obligaions o progress on nuclear disarmamen by he nied
aes and oher nuclear powers. e nied aes should seek o be as ransparen as
possibleconsisen wih susaining deerrenceabou he reviews resuls in order o
couner mispercepions and concreely illusrae how he nied aes is ullling isnuclear disarmamen commimens under Aricle . n addiion, conservaives
mus no be allowed o rame he debae over he resuls o he . eir criique is
likely o employ hese ve rheorical sraegies and argumens: atemp o inaccuraely
rame he sakes o he as a choice beween heir vision o nuclear weapons policy
and unilaeral nuclear disarmamen; ridicule he noion ha nuclear reducions by he
nied aes would have any impac on counries like ran and orh Korea when he
main diplomaic objecive is o inuence non-aligned counries willingness o suppor
Americas nonprolieraion agenda; alsely sugges ha oher counries are modernizing
heir sraegic arsenals while America is no; selecively inerpre echnical daa on war-
head reliabiliy o jusiy large nuclear weapons producion aciliies; and oer unduly
opimisic projecions abou he cos o hese new aciliies.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
22/48
16 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
Sequencing e 2009 NPr
e sequencing and pace o he review will depend largely on he degree o which he
presiden and his senior appoinees make i a prioriy, along wih he broader poliical and
policy climae in 2009. ill, i is useul o lay ou a noional imeline in order o provide an
iniial ramework or organizing he process.
Duing e ansiin
Signal presidential commitment to a progressive nuclear posture. e presiden-elec
and/or his senior appoinees should inorm he J during ransiion briengs ha
he presiden-elec wans o ake bold seps in he direcion o a world ree o nuclear
weapons while preserving Americas nuclear deerren. e ransiion eam should begin
o ouline he main parameers o a new residenial Decision Direcive on nuclear
weapons policy.
te fis 100 days
Hold a meeting of the principals of the National Security Council, along with the
commander of STRATCOM, to formally launch the review.e goals o he meeing
are o demonsrae presidenial commimen o nuclear policy, ideniy which aspecs
o nuclear policy are setled and which are up or grabs, and esablish a preceden or a
robus ineragency process. e presiden should reques ha he resuls o he review
be given o him in he orm o a memo o opions ha all paricipans in he review
regard as legiimae, even i hey preer one over anoher. e advanage o his approach
is ha i doesn require he presiden o explicily overrule he viewpoin o any paricu-
lar consiuency when he chooses his preerred opion.
Develop a process ensuring sustained senior-level commitment to implementing the
presidents vision. e success o he review will hinge in signican par on he parici-paion o senior-level poliical appoinees capable o mobilizing heir respecive bureau-
cracies behind he presidens vision, resolving ineragency dispues, and engaging
he J. is may require a careul examinaion o wheher he ce o he Assisan
ecreary o Deense or pecial peraions/ow-nensiy onic & nerdependen
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
23/48
Squnng h 2009 NPr | www.amanpgss.
apabiliies, or /&, which currenly has responsibiliy or nuclear weapons
policy a DD, has he resources o eecively lead he review, given is oher policy
responsibiliies. ne opion is o creae a separae ce o raegic apabiliies
headed by is own assisan secreary. A second and perhaps preerred opion, in ligh o
he challenges associaed wih a signican reorganizaion o DD, would be o appoin
a srong assisan o he secreary o deense or nuclear, chemical and biological deense
programs, or AD(B), and make i a direc repor o he secreary o deense. isposiion already exiss on paper and requires enae conrmaion.
Host a meeting with congressional leaders on the presidents vision. ongressional
inviees should include he enae ajoriy eader, he peaker o he ouse, and he
hair and anking embers o he ouse and enae oreign relaions and armed
orces commitees and relevan subcommitees.
Launch outreach process to key U.S. allies and parners. e nied aes should
launch consulaions wih A allies, in connecion wih As eor o draf is
new raegic oncep, on he role o nuclear weapons in he alliance and he disposi-
ion o he esimaed 350 acical nuclear weapons orward-deployed by he nied
aes in urope. e nied aes should also iniiae discussions on nuclear policy
wih he governmens o Ausralia, Japan, and he epublic o Korea. should also
explore avenues o deepen a dialogue over sraegic orces wih hina. inally, he
nied aes should seek a sraegic dialogue wih ussia on he role o nuclear weap-
ons and he uure o arms conrol in ligh o he December 2009 expiraion o A .
te fis yea
Present Congress with an interim briefing.
e goal o he brieng is o give ongressan opporuniy o weigh in on he process and o launch a process o resolve any dis-
agreemens well in advance o he ebruary 2010 due dae.
Provide the president with the options memo on nuclear weapons policy. e
resuls should be delivered o he presiden by he secrearies o deense, energy, and
sae, along wih he chairman o he J.
Launch a bipartisan process to address and resolve issues relevant to Senate ratifica-
tion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. e main issues are vericaion o he
reay and he reays implicaions or sockpile reliabiliy.
Develop a communications plan on nuclear policy. is should be considered a core
par o he review, no an aferhough. n addiion o raming he new posure o build
domesic poliical suppor, he communicaions plan should also eaure a vigorous sra-
egy or maximizing .. diplomaic gains a he spring 2010 eview onerence.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
24/48
18 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
A pgessive nuclea psue:key plicy issues
e demands made on he presiden and his senior appoinees are grea even in peace-
ime. Bu he bama adminisraion will inheri wo wars and a hos o oher pressing
naional securiy problems ha will compee or senior policymakers limied pool o
ime and atenion. is hereore essenial o ideniy in advance he key nuclear policy
issues ha are likely o demand senior-level decisions and guidance. ese issues all ino
hree caegories: Deerrence and Docrine; orce rucure and he uclear eapons
omplex; and onprolieraion and Arms onrol.
Deeence and dcine
The mission(s) and role(s) for nuclear weapons. hould he employmen o nuclear
weapons be limied o deerring and i necessary responding o nuclear atacks? r are
here oher legiimae missions or nuclear weapons, e.g. o preemp or realiae agains
he use o chemical or biological weapons atacks? ould he nied aes ever use
nuclear weapons rs? ha role, i any, exiss or acical nuclear weapons? Does uncer-
ainy over he sraegic direcion o hina or ussia maerially aec hese quesions?
Nuclear weapons targeting plans.
hould he nied aes coninue o rely on preseargeing plans agains ussia, hina, and oher possible adversaries, or abandon hem
in avor o exible argeing procedures ha ailor a response o unique coningencies
as hey emerge?
Deployment practices, including alert rates. hould he nied aes reain rapid
launch opions or nuclear weapons, such as launch on warning or launch under
atack? ha are he operaional implicaions?
Declaratory policy. hould he nied aes publicly renounce and/or rearm (as he
case may be) is policies regarding securiy assurances?
The role, if any, of nuclear weapons in sustaining key security alliances. ow impor-
an is Americas nuclear umbrella o he A alliance and .. relaions wih Japan?
hould A remain a nuclear alliance? ha abou exending he umbrella o ohers,
e.g. allies in he iddle as?
U.S. nuclear orces by the
numbers (active stockpile)
Warheads
Delivery vehicles/platorms
2,000
Sea Land Air Non-
strategic
1,500
1,000
500
0
ource: Norris and Kristensen (2008d).
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
25/48
A pgssv nula psu: ky ply ssus | www.amanpgss.
The relationship between nuclear forces, conventional long-range strike, and bal-
listic missile defense systems.
Fce sucue and e nuclea eapns cmplex
The sum total of the arsenal, including deployed and reserve nuclear weapons.
hould he oal be a poliical decision dicaed ex ante by he presiden (e.g., presiden
issues insrucions a he onse capping he oal arsenal a 1,000 warheads)?
Key nuclear weapons-related acilities
Bangor Naval Submarine Base, WATrident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles.
Houses an estimated 2,364 warheads.
Barksdale AFB, LA B-52H bombers. Houses 940 warheads.
Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, MOManuactures and procures non-nuclear components or nuclear
weapons. Employs ~2,900 personnel.
Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base, GATrident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles.
Houses an estimated 1,364 warheads.
Kirtland AFB, NMHome o the Air Force Materiel Commands Nuclear Weapons Center
(NWC). Houses an estimated 1,914 warheads.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, CA
Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and reurbishment.
Employs ~5,100 personnel.
Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Los Alamos, NM
Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and reurbishment.
Employs ~5,900 personnel.
Malmstrom AFB, MT Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 535 warheads.
Minot AFB, ND
B-52H bombers, Minuteman III ICBMS, and nuclear-capable
advanced cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles.Houses an estimated 1,250 warheads.
Nellis AFB, NV Houses an estimated 902 warheads.
Nevada Test Site, Las Vegas, NVSupports stockpile stewardship and sustains U.S. readiness to resume
underground nuclear testing. Employs ~2,200 personnel.
Ofutt AFB, NE Home to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TXRange o warhead surety and saety services, along with pit storage
and warhead assembly and disassembly. Employs ~3,200 personnel.
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,
NM; Livermore, CA; Kauai, HI; Tonopah, NV
Responsible or non-nuclear components and systems engineering.
Employs ~5,100 personnel.
Savannah River Site, Aiken, SCProduces and manages tritium or use in nuclear weapons. Employs
~1,700 personnel.
Warren AFB, CO, NE, WY Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 170 warheads.
Whiteman AFB, MO B-2 bombers. Houses an estimated 136 warheads.
Y-12 National Security Complex,
Oak Ridge, TN
Fabricates warhead parts and components rom special nuclear
materials. Employs ~4,000.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
26/48
20 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
The configuration of the triad, including whether all three legs are required. hould
he nied aes eliminae one or more o he legs? ha are he sraegic, budge-
ary, and poliical implicaions o eliminaing, or example, he bomber ee and/or he
inerconinenal ballisic missile orce?
The appropriate nuclear weapons surety and manufacturing base to guarantee the
safety and reliability of the arsenal. ow can he nied aes susain is nuclearweapons design experise? Does he nied aes need o design and build new war-
heads? Does i need new nuclear weapons producion aciliies, e.g. o produce pluo-
nium pis? ha are he sraegic, budgeary, and poliical implicaions?
Nuclear testing, including disposition of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. an
he ockpile ewardship rogram guaranee he saey and reliabiliy o he arsenal,
paricularly in he even o deep reducions ha would reduce he number o weapons
held in reserve or inacive saus?
Nnplifeain and ams cnl
The role of arms control. hould he nied aes negoiae legally binding accords
wih ussia on nuclear reducions or pursue hem unilaerally? negoiaed, o wha
exen should issues such as missile deense and A expansion be par o he discus-
sions? pursued unilaerally, wha i ussia does no reciprocae? here does hina
in? And where do allied (rance and rea Briain) arsenals in?
The relationship between Americas nuclear posture and its ability to advocate on
behalf of nuclear nonproliferation.ha can he nied aes do o address concerns
expressed by many counries ha i is no living up o is nuclear disarmamen obliga-ions under Aricle o he onprolieraion reay?
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
27/48
A pgssv nula psu: ky ply ssus | www.amanpgss.
The United States currently has an estimated 10,000 nuclear warheads in
its total stockpile o which approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads are in the
active stockpile: 4,075 operational weapons and another 1,260 warheads
kept in reserve. The operational stockpile consists o around 3,575 stra-tegic nuclear orces and 500 nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear orces. The
remainder o the weapons is in storage awaiting dismantlement.
Strategic nuclear forces. A nuclear warhead is generally considered
strategic i it is delivered using a long-range strategic delivery platorm
as part o a deterrence mission. These platorms include:
IntercontInental BallIstIc MIssIles, or IcBMs. America has an
estimated 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, but plans reductions to 450.
The ICBMs are located at three U. S. Air Force bases in ve states:
Minot AFB (ND), Malmstrom AFB (MT), and Warren AFB (which over-
laps corners o CO, NE, and WY). These ICBMs carry an estimated
764 nuclear warheads, most o which are 20 times more powerul
than the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
BallIstIc MIssIle suBMarInes, or
ssBns. The United States has 14 SSBNs,
two o which are currently in overhaul. These are based out o Bangor
Naval Submarine Base (WA) or Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base (GA). The
SSBN eet can carry 288 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles. Each missile, in
turn, can carry six nuclear warheads or a total o 1,728 operationallydeployed strategic warheads on the SSBN eetnearly 40 percent o the
operationally deployed arsenal. The explosive power o these warheads
ranges rom eight times to 30 times more powerul than the Hirosh
device, depending on the warhead model. More than 60 percent o
patrols now occur in the Pacic, compared to just 15 percent in the
The targets or these patrols are likely China, North Korea, and Russ
long-range heavy BoMBers. Two bombers, the B-2 Spir
B-52 Stratoortress, are dual-hatted or nuclear a
conventional missions. America
B-2s and 56 B-52s on operatio
status, and another our B-2s and 38 B-52Hs are used or training, t
and backup missions. The B-52s are stationed at Barksdale AFB (LA
Minot AFB (ND), and the B-2s at Whiteman AFB (MO). The bombers
carry several diferent types o nuclear weapons, including some w
so-called dial-a-yield capability that enables the user to choose r
range o explosive yields. The explosive power o the air-delivered
tegic arsenal ranges rom less than the explosive yield o the Hiros
bomb to 80 times as powerul. More than 1,000 strategic warhead
operationally deployed to the bomber orce.
Non-strategic tactical nuclear forces. These are nuclear we
intended or tactical use on a military battleeld. There are no bind
international legal constraints on them. America has an estimated
non-strategic weapons, o which 500 are considered operational
ready or deployment. The remaining 790 are considered inactive
timated 350 warheads rom the active stockpile are orward deplothe territory o several NATO allies. The non-strategic arsenal consi
sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and air-launched gravity b
U.S. nuclear orces and the nuclear triad
Source: Norris & Kristensen (2008d).
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
28/48
22 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
Appendix I
revised Nuclea Psue revie (1070 FY 2008 Nainal DefenseAuizain Ac)
(a) EQUIEMEN FO COMPEHENSIVE EVIEW.n order o clariy .. nuclear deer-
rence policy and sraegy or he near erm, he secreary o deense shall conduc a
comprehensive review o he nuclear posure o he nied aes or he nex 5 o
10 years. e secreary shall conduc he review in consulaion wih he secreary o
energy and he secreary o sae.
(b) ELEMENS OF EVIEW. e nuclear posure review shall include he ollowing elemens:
(1) e role o nuclear orces in .. miliary sraegy, planning, and programming.
(2) e policy requiremens and objecives or he nied aes o mainain a sae,
reliable, and credible nuclear deerrence posure.
(3) e relaionship among .. nuclear deerrence policy, argeing sraegy, and arms
conrol objecives.
(4) e role ha missile deense capabiliies and convenional srike orces play in
deermining he role and size o nuclear orces.
(5) e levels and composiion o he nuclear delivery sysems ha will be required
or implemening he nied aes naional and miliary sraegy, including any
plans or replacing or modiying exising sysems.(6) e nuclear weapons complex ha will be required or implemening he nied
aes naional and miliary sraegy, including any plans o modernize or modiy
he complex.
(7) e acive and inacive nuclear weapons sockpile ha will be required or imple-
mening he nied aes naional and miliary sraegy, including any plans or
replacing or modiying warheads.
(c) EPO O CONGESS.e secreary o deense shall submi o ongress, in unclas-
sied and classied orms as necessary, a repor on he resuls o he nuclear posure
review conduced under his secion. e repor shall be submited concurrenly wih
he quadrennial deense review required o be submited under secion 118 o ile 10,
nied aes ode, in 2009.(d) SENSE OF CONGESS. is he sense o ongress ha he nuclear posure review con-
duced under his secion should be used as a basis or esablishing uure .. arms
conrol objecives and negoiaing posiions.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
29/48
Appndx ii | www.amanpgss.
Appendix II
Pas as pelude: e pliics and pcess f nuclea psue evies
e bama adminisraions nuclear posure review will be he hird ormal review o
.. nuclear sraegy conduced since he end o he old ar. e preceding reviews
conduced early in each o he linon and Bush adminisraions rs ermsoccurred
under dieren policy and poliical conexs ha maerially aeced he conduc o he
review and is impac on .. policy. omparing he wo provides crucial lessons on how
o srucure he 2009 o achieve a desired resul.
te 19931994 NPr
e rs occurred in 19931994, during he rs erm o he linon adminisraion.
As a candidae in 1992, linon had made change a cenerpiece o his campaign. is rs
secreary o deense, es Aspin, brough ha heme o he enagon, where he launched a
major deense policy review o craf a .. deense policy or he pos-old ar era. e
so-called Botom-p eview was compleed in epember 1993 and se he sage or he
adminisraions , which was launched shorly hereafer.
e original goal o he was o ocus on he role o nuclear deerrence in .. secu-
riy sraegy in he new pos-old ar environmen. e main nuclear hrea was consid-
ered by linon appoinees o be he accidenal or unauhorized launch o a weapon by
ussia or he acquisiion o nuclear weapons by a rogue sae such as raq or orh Korea,
and no an inenional nuclear srike by he legiimae ussian leadership. e nuclear
posure needed o complemen Americas broader eors o address hese hreas. e
risk o accidenal or unauhorized launch could be reduced i boh sides were o aban-
don nuclear war plans driven by he old ar need o deer a surprise atackwhich
demanded large numbers o weapons on hair-rigger alerin avor o a smaller, surviv-
able orce. e nied aes also sough o promoe he nuclear nonprolieraion norms
capured in he 1968 on-rolieraion reay, paricularly in advance o he spring1995 eview and xension onerence ha would decide wheher o indeniely
exend ha reay or allow is expiraion laer ha year. e prospecs or indenie exen-
sion o he could be maximized i he nied aes was seen as reducing he role o
nuclear weapons in is own deense sraegy.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
30/48
24 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
n he end, however, he review generaed a posure ha more or less raied he old ar
sraegy o deploying housands o nuclear weapons on hair-rigger aler. e sory or
why he review urned ou his way is complex, bu several hemes sand ou. Alhough
he old ar was over, here were some uncerainies over wheher and when ussia,
which remained a ormidable sraegic weapons power wih ens o housands o nuclear
weapons, would evolve ino a ull-edged democracy. easonable people could disagree
on his undamenal dimension o he overall hrea assessmen, bu opponens o changeused his residual uncerainy, and in some cases exaggeraed i, o suppor a hawkish posi-
ion on ussia. ere was no susained ineragency eor o resolve his divergence, which
inherenly avored he saus quo policy o planning nuclear requiremens and operaions
primarily on he basis o he poenial hrea posed by oscow.
imilarly, here was a major gap beween he uniormed miliary and he mid-level DD
poliical appoinees ha managed he on wha role nuclear weapons played in ..
deense policy. R was commited o susaining and even expanding he saus
quo role o nuclear weapons. e poliical appoinees, by conras, judged ha precision
convenional weaponry had already begun o replace nuclear weapons in acual war gh-
ing, and ha his rend would only accelerae. e remaining mission or nuclear weapons
was deerrence by he hrea o overwhelming realiaionand ha mission, in heir v iew,
could be ullled solely by ballisic missile submarines.
e suggesion ha he oher wo legs o he nuclear riadinerconinenal ballisic mis-
siles and heavy bomberswere obsolee and could be on he chopping block promped a
vigorous campaign on he par o R o preemp he ormal process wih
is own inernal policy review and vigorous advocacy on he ill. e uniormed miliary
and he civilian nuclear weapons bureaucracy closed ranks around Rs per-
specive, and proceedings were leaked o seleced members o ongress, who hen
waged parisan atacks agains he adminisraion.
ere was no concered eor by senior poliical appoinees o broker or setle hese dis-
pues over undamenal issues o .. grand sraegy. e hie ouse was jus emerging
rom a series o biter dispues wih he armed orces over such issues as omalia and gays
in he miliary, and was batling boh he miliary and an increasingly hosile ongress
over deense spending prioriies. e was largely disengaged rom he process, and
DD underwen a leadership change in he middle o he review and was preoccupied
wih oher issues, such as dealing wih orh Koreas nuclear program and he muliple
prolieraion concerns presened by he collapse o he ovie nion. n he end, he 1994
essenially raied he conclusions o Rs own inernal policy review:
keep he riad, pursue no urher reducions beyond hose agreed o in A , andsick wih curren operaional docrine.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
31/48
Appndx ii | www.amanpgss.
te 2001 NPr
e second ormal ook place in 2001 under vasly dieren poliical and policy
circumsances, and was srucured in such a way as o produce he adminisraions
desired oucome. n a ay 2000 presidenial campaign speech, candidae eorge .
Bush linked reducions in .. nuclear orces o he aggressive pursui o naional mis-
sile deense, wih he later being a core ideological objecive or conservaives. ponaking oce, residen Bush old his senior advisors ha he waned he o resul in
signican nuclear reducions. is insrucion was likely moivaed by a desire o recas
..-ussian relaions in he pos-old ar era, a key objecive o ondoleezza ice, his
naional securiy advisor, and ephen adley, ices depuy. ome senior ocials in his
adminisraion also viewed he process as an opporuniy o consolidae suppor or
wihdrawing rom he AB reay, which was preordained, and pursuing naional mis-
sile deense. ese acors helped ensure ha he would be ideological and driven
by wo presidenial prerogaives, which guaraneed ha senior ocials would inves
ime and energy in he process. Bu i also produced a posure ha undermined
Americas nonprolieraion credenials.
e main parameers o he review were deermined by a relaively small group o senior
ocials rom he aional ecuriy ouncil and Deparmen o Deense. e was
conduced primarily during he iniial nine monhs o he new adminisraion, a period
o relaive calm wih ew major inernaional crises. ndeed, he main oreign policy batle
he adminisraion was gearing up or was over he AB reay and missile deense.
e adminisraion atemped o ake a page rom onald eagans raegic Deense
niiaive, or D, playbook and link nuclear reducions o missile deense. By developing
and deploying such a sysem, he nied aes could render rogue nuclear arsenals, in
eagans words, impoen and obsolee and hereby ree up he nied aes o make
cus in is own arsenal. e Bush adminisraion also had he luxury o a less hosileongress and, a leas in 20012002, enjoyed a repuaion or compeency in deense
policy due o he considerable experience o Bushs cabine and senior advisors.
n maters o nuclear docrine, he appoinees had a head sar in he review process: mos
o hem were involved in a ask orce sudy on nuclear weapons policy convened in 2000 by
he aional nsiue or ublic olicy, a conservaive hink ank. According o some par-
icipans, his sudy served as a reresher on he relevance o nuclear weapons policy o ..
naional securiy and helped ge senior appoinees on he same page rom day one.
verall, he Bush did no cu ha hard agains he grain o esablished nuclear
orhodoxy wihin he enagon or generae any clear budgeary losers in he bureaucracyor ongress. is lef he Bush adminisraions criics wih ew consiuencies o link up
wih and limied channels o wage a campaign agains he resuls. (ndeed, he mos
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
32/48
26 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
poen early criic o he adminisraions nuclear weapons policy urned ou o be he
epublican chairman o a ouse Appropriaions subcommitee, David obson (),
who challenged elemens o he adminisraions nuclear weapons budge proposal and
no he review s core conclusionsper se.)
e setled on 1,7002,200 operaionally deployed warheads, which marked a reduc-
ion o around wo-hirds in he operaionally deployed orce. a gure was codied ina ay 2002 agreemen wih ussia called he raegic ensive educions reay, or
. (ome senior ocials, such as hen-Depuy aional ecuriy Advisor adley,
reporedly suppored even deeper reducions, perhaps by several hundred, bu were
deerred by he prospec o a batle wih hen-ecreary o Deense Donald umseld).
enior paricipans in he 2001 genuinely believed hey reduced he role o nuclear
weapons in .. naional securiy sraegy. n his oreword o he repor submi-
ed o ongress, or example, ecreary umseld announced ha he .. will be less
dependen han i has been in he pas on nuclear orces o provide is oensive deerren
capabiliy. Bu many counries, ranging rom ussia o members o he A, judged
he precise opposie when porions o he were leaked o he press in early 2002.
e called or greaer exibiliy in he planning, developmen, and use o nuclear
weapons, including he developmen and possible use o acical nuclear weapons agains
rogue saes such as ran and orh Korea. also singled ou hina and ussia as pos-
sible arges or nuclear operaions. inally, he divided .. sraegic capabiliies
ino hree rheorical caegories described as he new riad: nuclear and convenional
oenses, deenses such as missile deense, and a responsive nuclear weapons manuac-
uring and surey inrasrucure. e inended goals o his ormulaion were o signal
a reducion in he salience o nuclear weapons o .. sraegic policy and o boos he
prole o missile deense.
Aside rom he emphasis on missile deense, hese developmens did no mark a sig-
nican change in nuclear weapons docrine rom he linon adminisraions posure.
e nied aes already considered he lised counries as possible arges or nuclear
operaions, or example, even i i hadn said so publicly. Bu he Bush adminisraions
aggressive unilaeralismparicularly is wihdrawal rom he AB reay and is new
docrine o prevenive warcreaed an inerpreaive conex or he s clumsily blun
language ha led hina, ussia, and many A counries o inerpre he posure in
he wors possible ligh. e new riad ormulaion, or example, was widely criicized
as blurring he disincion beween convenional and nuclear orces. And he adminis-
raions ill-advised proposals or developing new acical nuclear weapons such as he
so-called bunker buser, which senior paricipans viewed as enhancing deerrence(as opposed o supplemening convenional miliary operaions), dramaically reinorced
his inerpreaion.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
33/48
Appndx ii | www.amanpgss.
n he end, he 2001 did grea damage o Americas nonprolieraion credenials.
e deense deparmen, which had responsibiliy or he public relaions componen o
he , had negleced o inves any ime or energy ino how he resuls migh be
received by he adminisraions many criics. hen he criicisms began o moun, he
adminisraion made no concered eor o couner hem. is neglec is a reecion in
par o he adminisraions unilaeralismmany senior ocials simply didn care how
oreign audiences would reac. Bu he deense deparmen was also disraced by he warin Aghanisan and early planning or he 2003 invasion o raq. aricipans in he 2001
believe ha a more eecive communicaions plan migh have bluned some o he
criicism, alhough he hosiliy ha he Bush adminisraions broader unilaeralism was
generaing around he world would have made his inherenly dicul.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
34/48
28 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
Appendix III
A bief isy f saegic ams cnl, 19692008
te Nixn/Fd yeas (19691977)
raegic Arms imiaion alks, or A (19691972). is process led o he rs rea-
ies and agreemens beween he nied aes and he ovie nion ha would impose
consrains on sraegic weapons. e AB reay was one produc o his process. e
oher main produc was he nerim Agreemen, in which he nied aes and ussia
agreed o sop building new B silos, exercise resrain in expanding he size o exising
ones, and cap he number o submarine-launched ballisic missi les and Bs. a agree-
men expired in 1977.
Ani-Ballisic issile reay, or AB (1972). e AB reay banned deploymen o a
missile deense sysem inended o guard he enire naion agains ballisic missiles, and
prohibied a range o research and developmen aciviy ha could lead o such a sysem.
e nied aes wihdrew rom he reay on June 13, 2002.
reshold es Ban reay, or TB (1974). oncluded by he ixon adminisraion, his
early atemp a arms conrol prohibied nuclear ess ha exceeded 150 k (10 imes hesize o he iroshima bomb) and esablished a number o ransparency and vericaion
measures. imiing he permissible yield or nuclear esing would consrain developmen
o new, more powerul weapons ha could be used in a nuclear rs srike. Boh paries
announced in 1976 heir inenion o observe he reays yield limi pending raicaion.
oncerns over vericaion held up raicaion, however, unil 1987 when he wo sides
agreed on addiional vericaion measures. e reay nally enered ino orce in 1990.
e reay duraion is rolling ve-year erms, which are auomaically renewed unless
eiher pary noies he oher o is inen o erminae.
te Cae yeas (19771981)
A (19721979). e A process began monhs afer he A process
ended. produced a reay in 1979 ha would limi boh sides o a oal o 2,400 delivery
vehicles, where each B silo, submarine missile-launch ube, or bomber was consid-
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
35/48
Appndx iii | www.amanpgss.
ered a single delivery vehicle. hen he ovie nion invaded Aghanisan laer ha year,
however, residen Jimmy arer asked he enae o pu advice and consen or he reay
on hold. Boh counries iniially pledged o abide by is erms pending raicaion, bu in
ay 1986 residen eagan renounced his pledge, saying he nied aes mus base
decisions regarding is sraegic orce srucure on he naure and magniude o he hrea
posed by ovie sraegic orces and no on sandards conained in he A srucure.
Alhough he reay was never raied, ongress laer ha year enaced a nonbindingmeasure indicaing he sense o he ongress ha i is in he naional securiy ineress o
he nied aes o coninue volunary compliance wih he cenral numerical sub-limis
o he A reay as long as he ovie nion complies wih such sub-limis.
te reagan/Bus yeas (19811993)
nermediae-ange uclear orces reay, or (1987). n his reay, he nied aes
and ussia agreed or he rs ime o eliminae an enire caegory o nuclear weapon:
ground-launched ballisic missiles and cruise missiles wih ranges beween 5005,500
kilomeers. e reay also eaured provisions mandaing on-sie inspecions o veriy
compliance and esablished a pecial ericaion ommission o aciliae reay imple-
menaion. e reay enered ino orce in June 1988. reay membership expanded in
1991 o include Belarus, Kazakhsan, and kraine, which along wih ussia had inheried
nuclear weapons when he ovie nion dissolved. e provisions or on-sie inspecions
expired on ay 31, 2001, so vericaion is now conduced using surveillance saellies.
e reay is oherwise o unlimied duraion.
raegic Arms educion reay, or A (1991). nder A, he nied aes
and ussia agreed o reduce heir deployed sraegic arsenals o 1,600 delivery vehicles
and 6,000 warheads. e reay eaures elaborae couning rules or deermining heselimis. e paries agreed o desroy excess delivery vehicles and accep inrusive inspec-
ions o veriy compliance. ey also se a deadline o December 5, 2001 o comply wih
he reay. All paries me ha deadline.
e collapse o he ovie nion in December 1991 delayed he reays enry ino orce
because i produced our saes wih nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhsan, ussia, and
kraine. n ay 1992, he paries signed he isbon roocol, in which all our counries
(along wih he nied aes) agreed o sign A . Belarus, Kazakhsan, and kraine
pledged o join he as non-nuclear weapon saes. A enered ino orce in
December 1994.
e reay will expire on December 5, 2009 unless he paries agree o a ve-year exension.
An exension or oher ime periods would consiue an amendmen o he reay and
hereore require re-raicaion by boh paries.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
36/48
30 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
e residenial uclear niiaives, or s (19911992). e is he rs and only
concree eor by he nied aes and ussia o joinly reduce heir acical nuclear
weapons arsenals. n epember 27, 1991, residen eorge .. Bush announced
ha he nied aes would unilaerally end overseas deploymen o ground-launched
shor-range nuclear weapons and desroy all weapons in his caegory. e also pledged o
end deploymens o acical nuclear weapons on several naval plaorms during normal
circumsances, i.e. unless hosiliies broke ou.
Bush made hese pledges in order o signal o he ovie nion ha he nied aes
would no exploi ovie weakness as he ovie sae disinegraed and o promp ovie
presiden ikhail orbachev o ake reciprocal acion. Bush worried ha he command
and conrol o he ovie nions acical nuclear orces, which i deployed in large num-
bers hroughou he arsaw ac, could be compromised. orbachev reciprocaed wih
pledges o eliminae and/or consolidae several caegories o acical nuclear weapons.
e s resuled in he eliminaion o housands o nuclear weapons, including 3,000
American weapons. simaes o he curren size o he ussian acical arsenal vary widely,
bu he range is likely o be 3,000 o 6,000, down rom beween 12,000 o 21,700 in 1991.
Bu here are no mechanisms in place o veriy compliance wih he pledge, and periodic
eors o negoiae ransparency measures, such as accouning exchanges on invenories,
have ye o succeed. ussia has condiioned urher negoiaions on he wihdrawal o he
remaining .. acical nuclear orces rom urope, where hey are deployed per A
policy. A decision o remove hem would require he consen o all 26 A counries.
te Clinn yeas (19932001)
A (1993) and A . e core obligaion in A is o urher reducedeployed sraegic nuclear warheads o beween 3,000 and 3,500. Anoher imporan ea-
ure o he reay is ha i would have banned muliple warheads on Bs. e nied
aes raied he reay in January 1996 and ussia in ay 2000, bu ussia reused
o exchange insrumens o raicaion unless he nied aes ongress approved a
1997 proocol ha would exend he A s implemenaion deadline and a series
o concurrenly negoiaed agreemens ha claried and srenghened he AB reay.
ongress never approved hese measures so A has no enered ino orce.
A was inended o serve as a ollow-on agreemen o A . envisioned
urher reducions and new ransparency measures, bu i was eecively superseded by
he 2002 agreemen.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
37/48
Appndx iii | www.amanpgss.
te Bus yeas (20012009)
raegic ensive educions reay, or (2002). igned by ussia and he nied
aes in ay 2002, i commis he paries o limiing heir respecive arsenals o opera-
ionally deployed sraegic warheads o 1,700 o 2,000 by December 31, 2012, on which
dae expires.
suers rom several shorcomings. e reay incorporaes he vericaion
measures o he raegic Arms educion reay, bu ha agreemen is se o expire in
December 2009, and here is no replacemen or i ye. does no speciy a imeable
or benchmarks o guide he implemenaion o he reay, which makes i dicul o objec-
ively assess reay implemenaion. n addiion, does no esablish any ceilings or
he number o sraegic warheads kep in reserve or require ha excess sraegic warheads
be dismanled or desroyed, so when he reay expires in 2012, eiher pary could launch
a rapid nuclear build-up using sockpiled weapons and delivery vehicles.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
38/48
32 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
Seleced efeences
Allison, raham. 2004.Nuclear errorism: Te Ultimate Prevent-able Catastrophe. ew York: imes Books.
Arms onrol Associaion. 2006. ..-ovie/ussian uclearArms onrol Agreemens a a lance. (www.armsconrol.org/acshees/aclejune07).
Arms onrol Associaion. 2002. ummary o .. mplemen-
aion o he 13 racical eps on onprolieraion andDisarmamen Agreed o a he 2000 eview onerence.(www.armsconrol.org/sysem/les/np13seps.pd).
Braun, haim, and hrisopher hyba. 2004. rolieraionings: ew hallenges o he uclear onprolieraionegime.International Security 29 (2).
Bunn, eorge and hrisopher hyba, eds. 2006. U.S. NuclearWeapons Policy: Cononting odays Treats. Balimore: Brook-ings nsiuion ress.
Bunn, athew. 2007. ecuring he Bomb 2007. arvardniversiy/uclear rea niiaive (www.ni.org/secur-inghebomb).
ampbell, Kur ., ober J. inhorn, and ichell B. eiss, eds.2004. Te Nuclear ipping Point: Why States Reconsider Teir Nuclear Choices.ashingon: Brookings nsiuion ress.
irincione, Joseph, e. al., 2005.Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biologi-cal, and Chemical Treats.ashingon: arnegie ndowmenor nernaional eace.
irincione, Joseph, and Andrew roto. 2007. onain andngage: A ew raegy or esolving he uclear risis wihran.ashingon: ener or American rogress.
orera, ordon. 2006. Shopping or Bombs: Nuclear Prolieration,Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall o the A.Q. Khan Network.xord: xord niversiy ress.
Deuch, John, e. al.. 2004. aking he orld ae or uclearnergy. Survival 46 (4): 6580.
Deuch, John, and rnes oniz, eds. 2003. Te Future o Nuclear
Power. ambridge: assachusets nsiue o echnology.
Drell, idney D., and James . oodby. 2003. Te Gravest Danger:Nuclear Weapons. alo Alo: oover nsiuion ress.
Dunn, ewis, e. al. 2006. oreign erspecives on .. uclearolicy and osure: nsighs, ssues and mplicaions. orBelvoir, A: Deense rea educion Agency.
inlay, Brian D., and lizabeh urpen. 2007. weny-ive epso reven uclear error: A uide or olicymakers. ash-ingon: enry . imson ener.
izparick, ark, ed. 2008. uclear rogrammes in he iddleas: n he hadow o ran. ondon: nernaional nsiue
or raegic udies.
izparick, ark, ed. 2007. uclear Black arkes: akisan,A.. Khan and he ise o rolieraion eworks. ondon:nernaional nsiue or raegic udies.
addis, John ewis. 1997. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold WarHistory. xord: xord niversiy ress.
enry . imson ener. e ex ne undred rojec:onsrucing a lobal oolki o uppor aes-a-isk andrenghen he nernaional onprolieraion egime. (www.simson.org/cnp/?=200608111059).
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
39/48
Sld fns | www.amanpgss.
aional ecuriy Advisory roup. 2007. educing uclearreas and revening uclear errorism. ashingon.
aural esources Deense ouncil. 2006. lobal uclear ock-piles, 19452006. Te Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists 62 (4).
olan, Janne . 1999.Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons andAmerican Security afer the Cold War. ashingon: e Brook-
ings nsiuion.
olan, Janne . 1989. Guardians o the Arsenal: Te Politics oNuclear Strategy . ew York: Basic Books.
olan, Janne ., and James . olmes. 2008. e Bureaucracyo Deerrence. Te Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists 64 (1).
orris, ober . 2007. akisans nuclear orces, 2007. Te Bul-letin o the Atomic Scientists 63 (3).
orris, ober . and ans . Krisensen. 2008a. renchnuclear orces, 2008. Te Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists 64 (4).
orris, ober . and ans . Krisensen. 2008b. hinese
nuclear orces, 2008. Te Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists 64 (3).
orris, ober . and ans . Krisensen. 2008c. ussiannuclear orces, 2008. Te Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists 64 (2).
orris, ober . and ans . Krisensen. 2008d. .. nuclearorces, 2008. Te Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists 64 (1).
orris, ober . and ans . Krisensen. 2007. ndias nuclearorces, 2007. Te Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists 63 (4).
elrich, van. 2005. issions or uclear eapons Afer heold ar. ederaion o American cieniss ccasionalaper o.3.
gilvie-hie, anya. 2008. aciliaing mplemenaion o
esoluion 1540 in ouh-as Asia and he ouh acic. nawrence cheinman, ed.,Implementing Resolution 1540: TeRole o Regional Organizations. ew York: nied aionsnsiue or Disarmamen esearch.
ayne, Keih B. 2001. Te Fallacies o Cold War Deterrence and aNew Direction. exingon: niversiy o Kenucky ress.
erkovich, eorge, e. al. 2005. Universal Compliance: A Strategyor Nuclear Security. ashingon: arnegie ndowmen ornernaional eace.
cheinman, awrence, ed. 2008.Implementing R esolution 1540:Te Role o Regional Organizations. ew York: nied aionsnsiue or Disarmamen esearch.
hulz, eorge ., e. al. 2008. oward a uclear-ree orld.Wall Street Journal, January 15.
hulz, eorge ., e. al. 2007. A orld ree o uclear eapons.Te Wall Street Journal, January 4.
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k4q43h2104032426/?p=5ebe01b1e3d24822b411e16c46374626&pi=2http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k01h5q0wg50353k5/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=5http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k01h5q0wg50353k5/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=5http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=2http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=2http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t2j78437407v3qv1/?p=445edce806f1460b94516b52b4080a2f&pi=14http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t2j78437407v3qv1/?p=445edce806f1460b94516b52b4080a2f&pi=14http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/hm378jxpm12u4342/?p=5ebe01b1e3d24822b411e16c46374626&pi=0http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/hm378jxpm12u4342/?p=5ebe01b1e3d24822b411e16c46374626&pi=0http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/hm378jxpm12u4342/?p=5ebe01b1e3d24822b411e16c46374626&pi=0http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/hm378jxpm12u4342/?p=5ebe01b1e3d24822b411e16c46374626&pi=0http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t2j78437407v3qv1/?p=445edce806f1460b94516b52b4080a2f&pi=14http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t2j78437407v3qv1/?p=445edce806f1460b94516b52b4080a2f&pi=14http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=2http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=2http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k01h5q0wg50353k5/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=5http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k01h5q0wg50353k5/?p=6540e04cdbda43c9b0abe53b604dfb57&pi=5http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Hans+M.+Kristensenhttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/?Author=Robert+S.+Norrishttp://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k4q43h2104032426/?p=5ebe01b1e3d24822b411e16c46374626&pi=2 -
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
40/48
34 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
41/48
endns | www.amanpgss.
Endnes
1 George P. Shultz et. al., A World Free o Nuclear Weapons. The Wall
Street Journal, January 4, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB116787515251566636.html ; George P. Shultz et. al., Toward a Nuclear-Free
World,The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries .
2 Shultz et. al., Toward a Nuclear-Free World.
3 National Security Advisory Group, Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism (2007).
4 Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007 (Cambridge: Harvard University/Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007), available at www.nti.org/securingthebomb.
5 Tanya Ogilvie-White, Facilitating Implementation o Resolution 1540 in South-
East Asia and the South Pacic. In Lawrence Scheinman, ed., ImplementingResolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations (New York: United
Nations Institute or Disarmament Research, 2008).
6 Ibid.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://www.nti.org/securingthebombhttp://www.nti.org/securingthebombhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentarieshttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html -
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
42/48
36 cn f Aman Pgss | onng h 2009 Nula Psu rvw: A radmap
Abu e aus
ANDrEw J. Grotto
Andrew J. roto is a enior aional ecuriy Analys a he ener or American
rogress, where he specializes in .. nuclear weapons sraegy, nuclear nonprolieraion
policy, and nuclear energy.
is work has appeared in a variey o scholarly and popular publicaions, and he is a
requen gues lecurer on nuclear nonprolieraion a he oreign ervice nsiue, he
.. ae Deparmens pos-graduae school. e is also a regular gues commenaor on
nonprolieraion and .. naional securiy sraegy or major inernaional and naional
media oules, including BB, , B, Al Jazeera, ox, ky hannel, aional
ublic adio, and Air America. n addiion o his wriings on deense policy, roto has
also published scholarly works on inernaional rade and inellecual propery.
roto received his J.D. rom he niversiy o aliornia a Berkeley, where he served as
an edior o heBerkeley Journal o International Law. e received his masers degree rom
arvard niversiys John . Kennedy chool o overnmen and his bachelors degree
rom he niversiy o Kenucky, where he was a aines ellow.
-
8/14/2019 Nuclear Posture 2009-2010
43/48
Abu h auhs | www.amanpgss.
Abu e aus
JoSEPh CIrINCIoNE
Joseph irincione joined loughshares und as presiden in arch 2008. e is auhor
oBomb Scare: Te History and Future o Nuclear Weapons and served previously as senior
vice presiden or naional securiy and inernaional policy a he ener or American
rogress and as direcor or nonprolieraion a he arnegie ndowmen or nernaionaleace or eigh years. e worked or nine years in he .. ouse o epresenaives as a
proessional sa member o he ommitee on Armed ervices and he ommitee on
overnmen peraions, and served as sa direcor o he biparisan iliary eorm
aucus. e eaches a he eorgeown niversiy raduae chool o oreign ervice and
is a member o he ouncil on oreign elaio