Form Appirtro"REPORT. DOCUMENTATION PAGE 0M8 No. 070,.01"

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j?'ocon1 46&#o.. or 46e Basee Force of' ML9.

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12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

The monograph analyzes the background and significance of reconstitution and its

relationship to the emerging national military strategy for the 1990s. It reviews the doctrineI-and policies which have been developed to implement the concept in the military scrviccs.

It further examines the merits of linking incremental reconstitution options to theGraduated Mobilization Response (GMR) system as a way to initiate measures to form

new units early in a crisis. Finally one of the means of reconstitution, the Army's cadre; dhi/n. isin looked at to deterrnine• ipotential as a method of reconstituting fighting units.

This monograph concludes there Is muc.h worK wiucn, neeas to Dc onef, on nc,

: underpinnings of a strategy of reconstitution. This includcs clearly defining the concept,

providing unity of command and effort to the strategy, writing appropriate doctrine,

educating the various leaders who must execute the policies, and developing sound plans

"for implementing reconstitution within all the military services. Should the Department of

'• Defense continue to declare reconstitution an economy of resources and low priority

strategy, it may be in the best interests of the nation to relegate flus concept to a supporting

and not a foundation principle of the national military strategy. This study further

concludes that reconstitution in its present form is actually a placebo, pronusing newt _units which it can not deliver in a national crisis.

14. SUBJECT TERMS ot..- " .. " " q I . `15. NUMBER OF PAGES

(L .A D,,,l w A W)rQL6Y.(. ,,&'b 1- .16PRI'CCGDE

rAI ,4i f r(jiur+ ___________

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

OF REPORT OF THIS PAGý OF AIISTRICTl/ ItV •J ( .c,', (j F.i U\ . ,. _V -,', t j,. V~i.-,.NSN 7540-O1-210-S500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

Fue gfribed OV ANSI Sid. L39-I1L!|* *4*

RMseconstiuton of the BaeForceof 1995: Plan or Placebo?

A Monographby

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Lutz

Field Artillery

93-31499

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenwtrth, Kansas

9$ 12 2805•

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Td9s fM 0Momga* flacaW=i.ii f theEsForCeof 1995: Pla rPlAcebO?

Appovd By:

C~j(-/ZWDUA jDireor, School of Advanced

* ____ ______ _Dbic cW, Graduate Dcpw PimnPhilip J. BroOkA*, Ph.D.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5 For-

NTIS GRA& f 4TDTIC TAB 0Unannou~nced 0

Accep~i ~ day f 1993 JustificationL-...

Distributilon/

Availability Codes

Dist Speia~il

by LTC Slohm DL LAz, USA. 6Opwp&

in do "i and - m m inmod. U S. Aime Foome for 60 1990s ad boycm&d TIm tau*wE be ft Bs Fame of 1995- a Total Fame pudmi* ImAi of actw and nomuscupotn o mmd at &o ndm acceptabb bv* bogvt mlu uawogb to =aodaomu~c mmd global cw .i The nfiky mtbe cqmbbof miqppwrhg U.NaidoMal ) y Sk mgmd kforkey dnw of StMWW Dasmvm and Defomse,Fonwwd Pi m nce, - do Raqiana, and R p -m lk on. Skmc U. fm=c wE be amnAflgm Woay, it i himpwaw guit a dinuly uwb~nm p m..e be in phac to dlow fina to

mqpa put of =~ NatioAl Socuhy Straeg byr praimig a capabftl to caoMtiut emlirdwfan=s fi dim a pow"ja adwumy om gaS a -,-dils offwo cmbihty ID

TI.mmngg ummpb nay. do beckarcud and skoficam of fp , m*Wa and kmswhIooftID &od 1nugi nlamulW =~U" Wa ford. 199t ft mvmsw th dftotvmmd polici whih ha bam duwlope to knlmmuft d.corept hin fti =Tmy meavice

.Ikfhh e z~ .numLhhghcuiu eolbta opim to U.Gnu~mod ?oEm m 7z oupe. (GUvR) syama m a *Wy to uiiiat memos to fom

wwm eady in a cm.. Fiual ow of d. me of 11an nmutiuco, *a ArMy' cadm&Yiatsis ba ookd at V dennim km poloMia n a anduid of 11 P, hmd -lmw-u- figtbft tuha.

Thb mamoWajh concid. 6ime u much work whic mko to be &ar on toudpmuuhp of a WvM ofre nsouwion. Thh kicud cloub dcflhhg Ow coamept,

mru iu t wy of conmmad and effoit to &o *&w, wu ppu ajopnem docuimedumealiu d. mmo hadmi who muma escus ft pVe, and dvekmlphg uaud p1..far rikmntgum. utm mwi ai d. mfftiy =vimss Slmau d. Daputnuu ofD~so ca ýo~ to dm n rc damm acomomy of uourma and low piodty

pfsf, it my be hind. baa hi- - of Ld. t~o ruelepI dub cmomp to a inuppaiduugand ant a foumdadma prinipl Lid.nonal nu~amy ategy. 1~s oft* flh~bculdsdarcawbnikpmum,--ianhi kmpfmanform uacualy a plcabo, paunug

nuray Y~ wicht cm anm debwi in a nadanal cakk.

TABLE OF CO TENT

L.. fIMMODUCTIN... . .1

M. BACKGROUND AND SIONVICANICE.. .. 4

DlL DOCTRDMNANDPOL1CY.. ..

IV. frMcEMENTAL RECONSlTrIUMON. .. .14

V. TBE CADRE DIVCISNS. . 22

VL CONCLUSIONS AND RECO&DMNDAflONS. . 38

APPENDIX A.: RECONSITniUTN IDEFDUMONS. . . 41

APPENDIX B: CADRE DIVISON STUJDY OP1CIN. . 43

EN~DNO1'ES. .. .- . .. .46

wM2MPH,5

Out -rop wR pmd agw a mqor revuaml ar Soviet. -- . by krnc-x hiD out jdamio Uw cmof ---. oflmr cor humc-. By Urn .ini90s, Use dms itweaddtsUrn Sovi to - tlo Unkwh of cnfroaio -did1, midUw d. 1 . afofUs Cold War wM be m~dma toAm as o ruk tisol nwft fu -bt to gmorawh* am lI.. ml -a - &-t o rebuild - masdo aMpdin ourdolhmepoliy - wSbe an udm tauinourAf~tlo de maweino.

P-Reiet GecrgsBushAupMs Coorado 2 Augus 1990

Wi da e'swik Pwada Buuh ushered irn s new polic of 1 ,r-comdttib~on destined t6bomum am of Urn four lixmidiW of Udo United States Natina Nffatq Strafteg

R cmudiui Wm is. ft 6 1 , . ai i and flolling of now figbeiug hncu fomi a nucdes. of

baud pemm N.its dealpued to senda dsigd of national rosohm to door a polandda advernmy

hum comimineig gosh co.way t r hmaoft Um c wU*@td State. ShoilUsadedmmwef#Ado f m mcnmdtgtia p'wu Mowm for dosexpanion of Udo forc strsctux from a reginaly od~ibde

"-Bu Fome," to & gobal waffgtirns capaby As U&o powelwd wetid &srubt to die Unitd

Stam declas aid Us.odm h im focsoodumeu to draw down, a ndatina stat of f pco aiuim is

h~kd and; h 'du

Dodlguf neooudbtn as a natiWia oaftat requires hiualig Us. fissruniata of nationapower (polic al, canoic, mitaa) to at frnwmt of a~k ways and =='s. The "cad.' we

ddbod by Uwstood nall.! secuity objectives of juuunihig a doletenace whfie reaining Us.

abltytomo~lzeUs.naio ad at agloalwus~ cpailty. lu"ncun" of a ubteg

Of wGOI e Us. mftiy awnyowm pooL hiduskial base pvodctim, cadre mits

- i~oc&qi. and win uusus, resumo and tecwirnlgy, an ~sd mftiy loadumii.

The amb and wM be liked wih UOw "way. of only wmsg nafgac systemm, *wmly

and positiv dechiorn by Urn natlesu level ladershi in reactin to Usrea waiigs Us. GraduatedMOb~om Rapgom (GMR) qgyg, and &g. doobis. and polices of U&D niitarn deputnnnts 3

As Amoca dowmni..n its mitaty forme to aduethUe changin would, it mudt prsan w U way.

and mu require to rebuld ow globa warhghting capability.

1

urn nikay aiwwin am cona* atakm deps to buld a r cmbation strategy though

Ink*1 Adolw plms, and pcws. The mie of disk success wil be jxuuatii a gndfc~apol lo dew ow ummies wle d~ MW M Ovedale mom ggamd our

'-wIauwe hav She anaonalvI wE wW=biz at &oe ubonat of powc and build m cm eade

sergf. Ik defitus -rcmdhtio" mmd ems bwftrouumd epce, md &Mihd kWyolmIa. Ann analyzed include ftn dctimo and Vruzuoa couudc off & tre ,

mbuiaLm, ̂md ftUrn t (Irad I Moblizatiwi Rampa me utWo Due to the linkd scoAc of fthpmmi of l m c* m of the wioume reoain mm, Urn U.S. Amils cadra divdon cimcep, isevahuatod. The study locks at noatina amltay poicy for fecobitulion -. withem the

D -F mahuet of Ddeim (Dci)) and lrn Mokt ahimf of Stif (JCS). Whmr required to cuine apwbutiow inillmy smeic., dom juper uses Ow U.S. Ammy wAits l do m mmd phims ailo w -i U

To wo ccmiull of dehuaimin and objectivit of th malyja. tdosstudy astabliuesseveail cdtuia, to weg te research fiadimus Thes mkmia hkw been daived fim die Defaensphbuiq Guidace (DpFG), 4 ' tieJoat Stategl CWpaillm plan (jSCp).S mmd tom U.S. ArmyJFjj Yew IM9 (TY 93) Poomr StatwmoL 6 The Sw cr11.1 me:

Eflm* otig lieAfityto pro"vieidsmcefir die mud xecutionof an effecive rcui uIo process, Moldes policy smuatanmh, regulatons, foeld manuak

A As em od indrnt JSCP, pluos ii& hmaw sbiy to deWlop aVml~ftcwonofgIto es. Those ane shla~r to *an Flemzf Dehanra

Leaders mu cowpowa whm ftey ar clew ai th* vimc of thefiaur and Aity develope in profe~amalo achock and o;peraional se.gunmts.

.- Mw Aft ib iMnwb~zaiam or*ina crhh Umerb~y acifaopaom oir ompus ato*& Thi widsow the US. to soak a iralomud or mor* conifict

kmW TMe Afty cfia reca utihanim s&$ to plac iaabmewsof in pwrmaime,haft. mmd ramsmues cvrt. wtho Unontionl and of i. de Ied Cod-cfihcthnmsunmere sin pals achiened rathe than mimmaI anouhl of fimoy spent.

2

Blud an ft hc~n.sht'fr recuuihic containod in to National Security

Sftft -nd ftn National Miltay Stralegy, Along with dio avaluation of die key element bted

ft itiay conchides that recns*Wmisio a wa-accepted coweet, but certainly not a plan. The

M~dad It" of prmkga stron U.S. defrmce uvl creating a global warfigbiing

* capabihyam chmly amadenood by doe civilan, and umisay badaL What a Ickin andi

effecw colamw plon for amphoyfhln of di. wasu and mean to achieve the goals of

f e camdtbi~ As a nou* doctrine and plans are not xvailbl to guidt ervice members an

varou aspecta of &ae ateg. No -ramisn charp of do. ,ecretiution effort whMc cow am=e

nmeru comtowd and staff funactional low A mpr* dechisio wvilbi dio Depaimenat of

Defaene was to oriedt rocamiuoi~n solely on bu1ft a globa walobtku capability. This

caroWpetl dush d die opposlmiy to =mb dp&*el plmed optim to react to v~aou

ccan~ es abort of *Wba Wafe Falrly, Noi has been dom to eitbrkh doeqsii

&idimu for do. museud to achieve di. enib of a strateg offPr ncmtizlm TIs is evident by

to. lack at progre to dat.i na eitabhkg dio Amnr~s two cadw divisiom.

VAN&k do. mitmby services toay dier is a vey low piarity for a Veomild ng pr n-m

kve w-- Iv be made fr di. asForcse~s puma, Itr hlw anmd eclsuilogy poor to bei

canmmoed to ails not yet An, .zhtawoL Tis, dais econhomy of resources *2raegy will receV lip

sevcbut "n action. RP co nstittio wil neve become a viable, p11w of di. Nationa ?Eiftay

S=Naeg undl Oue Co~qeun and nillay reall belleve daoy wMR hay, to reconaso forces. At d&m

tie dwr di. utry is din %"to hadw c~auay for kadnskgpolicies which commt people

ha imand resouru. apparat for doe nmn seva earal is to cmontnu to cutIdefens speadig and forc m Itxe diereby mcum - -CconaP ----a widin 9w. tufitary for lImited

resoum ~s.incemrcwuhia bnbased on Miore I atMia radw d=a its puwaut capabilities, di.

-rss wigl in*l rcIv am lm prioity and knvensto over di. comnmg decades,

Ca_-u* die f Anmeican. salegy of recmuftudon ib actualy a placebo - what we would lIke

* ~to have verus what we need to accomplish Thw national level laderfhi and do. Depastment of

Defamse need to reduink d6e, ae of recmndtuta

3

A chuninhg I I en virommit and megug m world order as caun a M~OM ulO

in do min and skcm of U. US. umied fmcou for U. 1990s and beyond. 11m rmo for to

nx.*uy wR be U. Bus Farce of 1995 - a Toald Farme prod=*tl tabed of acive and ramom

campaom mad at lbo aummu acceptAbl level., but robust enough to nuet daodesc and

glbl- TI. swces m"g be cqapkie of ,updn U. fw ow foundations of the

Natkual MIdMy Sftat. Slrasmg Damemeo and De1ame, Faivwad Pro@=@c, Crmi Respowme

and R -I - " * Im Samce U. eud fhrce wA be maile dim toay, it a imperati tha a

mvm 22, procebe in plawto ofaiw nm to be mamod or cy p -- UpI .lewisve of tinsion or

amuffict escaola Rocabian Om. play a nq*a us an ou natmiol ddsue by providing a

capablty to ca..dbe anft*l now farce faste tdan a potental advmmay can gnerate a credile

T"e Clancept of 1 mc nbuo of fomrces anot now. Throumabout histaty, aminss from many

nastana hmave n pa le o uwat U. oeqi* of war. FRa a ca&C system pwo

to World War If desipWe to exped its force upo= mobaildan by dividig each extngdvbsin

h*w Un new ones. The resuhing chaos in orguiadon and lmac of mit level -ak from ths

&ou.w pm-battl chageov cabuted dkvc* to ft kfýu debae* of ft Frm&c miliary

in May 1940. 10 A -morem~ exmnpl has bee U. 1 Pcent Arab-Imei was in whfich barad

d. d U ,-I ab@ t Wo add 400,00 somal to its umtan amy of 164,000 w~ithi twenty-

four homr Cnkasy I to U Fran.h cadre expercc iee U. ki Defesu Farce (lI)F)

doenomd its porminad and equipmen readimm vay admira*l an U. IMidde East

The utinuate American exl, per-enc in reosim ution occumfd dufin U. pezid of the

Second Would War. In 1939 U. U.S. Amty was woehuiy --dent 't (about 200,000 each in

U.o Reguar Army and U. Nathma Guard) and poorly equipped widi World War One-na

4

aepain, iniuiel, and docuiv& Gawd Georgin C. Marahal became the Army Cbial of Staff

ant yew ad Viadaroi* a k~manlc r couedtua effort. Usk majo talk was to ovaci~r aamMunch

oppoodon, by the Anwricm people and doe Congps. to knrased mllitay expmnditus and force

Icbs NPr. By dto end of11941 Mdm" had mob. geat prop..= and dae Anmy was in sipfcandy

* botw d"& Ovw 1.4 nMwu a~ar me servimg in 36 combst tlviiain end 64 Air Groiup,

layiig don fmlndta for a Siobal wuk capabfy dwe would identify Axmuicaa mdi

'uami of dmacy' 1 2 Lm. d=m fmw yeau late, the Army pew from 1.6 nubo soldiers to

m .yias v~n frc acsig .2n lmnsnadwoen13

het a a natias cm crane IKg. fores, it can also raod* dmnobizem and Mbend dm at

don md ofia cemfict The historical Anericmn expmece has been. to "fice.-M due amond forces

to mnacel-pýýtaly low kwh mmupows~ equpmentprodctiamad fWiud ana post-warpedod,

grii a fly preictabb unwld' of Anserim miltary wWu------------ between wars. The

neglect of dft amed forces d=m became obvious a few years ate in de firt bald. of the nart

war. Places, and nuam much as, First Bull Run., Sm Jumn HID C~nmtgy, Kassamde Pus, and Taik

Forme Snuid =i mute tuames of due Mal. to iniin M&Wfj cVApabiiie duing p=GW. in 1 4

Wit t denmd of &v. Cold War Amnaca is again .tig a period in Mich it will downsize its

tufay far=&

Mos Amedicans accept doe fact die nation face a new Walratc landscape, with no

slgaflicent dareatIulaich reqkre mabntainig a lm!B utanli ~~ flxme Durnlug doe forty yew

of due Cold Ww a bipoAr wori eahad whsich necessitaed. me Amicmb glba pmrinene m

kwlvhmuin in nameom reuiuald caufais, iucludluag Kareal Vin Nan, Un W&dl EaiK and due

Cuibeam bada. The 1980s wae a period of WVp dedene inveheow u n der Presidents Reagan

and Buuh thin proved to be a significant factor in breakig die maid' of badlian oal iltay

ui-epradareuh wiih 6s, bk*al soccuassM perfoanence of American iroops in Oparatiom Just

Can. and Deset SbISM Sum

But mee as dke, mtiiny was achieving lqutk, dechsive victory in doe Persian Gult die

bipola world of America and Soviet milfitary superpowers was comuing apart. The Warsaw Pact

5

and Communit Enkm Ewupe ware de fiet to go wih dw fiE of die Iron Curtan and die

peaceN remficalion of Gemmy. u cy all d frmer was of ide Soviet Uni were

embracing democracy and capalin as a new way of fe. Nith de umuico-afl coup of August

1991 camd tho coflse of Ie. Soviet Union n both a naian and a miltay superpower. Forty-

"flw years of U.S. - Soviet conunatio appeared to be oa' and mnst Aumecam looked forward

to a new world order of peace and baquity. A isa of dt changing times wa doe 1992

IN 1 eletio defeat of Ge Bsh, a raepctod world leader, by Bill CInton, a state

gemar who focused on domestic imues rather ta fori poficy acwhie"naft. Mw people of

Ihe United States appeared to be aending a message for a "peac &vcmd" to support domestic

sacI, Ip W, bmply at die ceme of floe defemee budgets.

1hw nfl Problem Amca fhces in di new world order isinu to detarmine what dhe

et to its nadonal security i It, -1 .a explained by oer defame briefir, "-M good news

for Armric i d Communs gne; die bad news is dig it has not been replaced yet"' 5

Expctaiomfor world Peone prosperity, and stabiliy have cartuiny not been realized to date.

Quite do opposiK there numous regional dinrat- which may prov ewe more volatile do n

ie fomr superpower stand.off. Sippedof it Cold War protei layer, d6o world , much

-or unstable dues to ethnic, violance, religious fnaetls6economic migrtion border

dorIIetI, nuclea proliferation, conifiting poliical ideologies, drug trafficking, and social

eu e. Coequ , many rgional, ares could eupt into counfict or open warfre,

inehmhn di former Soviet Union and Yuolaa Ira, Jra, Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and namy

oudi AM=m WI. 16

WMile to world may be very unmable, dm is no diect nmmy data against die United

St maince no nan capabl of po ojectin has Popressed hosdt, intent toward Amer& ori OL.17 The U Od wil oeed to coantinu osem di chging world Mvonment

mid be ensitw to dio aenm e of a fetrs American adverary. Key in the identification of

pontiul and emegdthatswillbedieabayafdie itedSes nt easnmettoprovide

eonly direat warnings mad indicatora With sopbhicated usstlells, i, sea, and ground-based

6

himfpme mysti~m, k is poidoddigt thatde Unted State wil have =ple warnig time to dtc

umr ' ' g militay buildup by a hostile nation which may jeopardize vital U.S. interests. Most

offidA palnmmat sources indicate two year m the avablble warning time, however some open

-nc docmia pred ct keg - five to eht years advance nodce may be po AL8e

* ~ ~ nWhae die actual warnin time, toe effct upon a ateW of reosiuinam sleaiftcant

TL Ing ed drase to reset to ,n1ngi numitay th -m egats e doe laportamnce of oarly and rapi

fom ro nunsitution. If 6ah Unitd Stat has two or mo years to prepare for ww, there should

be ew rquanftfor Ahmtemo=mm-" reouIto invsmenats such - modern equipment,

stockpile wi war reserves, cadre units ad miltay n~manpwr Thus more money can be spent

athe present capabfiiie of forces-4in-being rather than die future potential of new

figbhtg fomrm T success of dis entimre ; m- howve, r•u•t on two ky events. Fist, te

, -IN I- sste main hav die abiliy to idauf* enapag ng mliamy thrats. Secondly, and even

mor importAn, is dle need for positive decisiom and responses by the national kevl lesads to

dis eardy wann. A filme to use Ie infrmation provided will throw Amerca back into die

traditinal pater of entering a confflict woefully unpreared in die indastrial and military

nmm s of national power.

1Ui national level leadership reaim, die Cold Ws paradigm no longe applie and miliazy

force reductions are unaveidable While begi m in die pmoees to slah the Defense Department,

m- y In Anmrc m u•fn to ensure the na•on avoids repeoat di mnstake of t pans by

rtini-g a crdible capabit to recons t miliTary units in the fuarore. This u a difficult balance

to waccompish becaus of die hnaied resources availble and die, uncertain dftW die country faces

into' die 21st Centy. As a rosl evan the Base Forc of 1995 is a very dynmic concep*,

coniam alyajuufti to thdo i raS pidly changin realities, Only die pasag of time wal

d if America has been ab to ham fnm Ihe ps•t by t g die abiy to bing back

quikly its deobiizod nu~tay unis

7

Recolitiaswas fast public~ arnonomed by P~reidant Bush dmftn a speech in MsPGn

Cdktado in Au IM 19. As' a unk of this praddndal hukitim w, concept and ftnuin~oIO

-n pxmpdbd ho saermw poricy and disciumma.. The Joint Staff ;-s (Plum) been v m ma t -

to doewlop Owe idea and in Much 1991 fannd a group to study dwi. sm. This wodfhag WOU

tuPrmIed adl die mrvicas fte Joint *4ff and dw Emwgmqec Prepmaremu Office of die

Smdm~y of Defme (Sac Dq4) They waited togethe on die concept for four mondis,

au mg gnerton of now units, producumo of miltiy major and *mam and threat intdgeac

warning times. The group concluded its work by developing JSCP definitions for fie concepts of

f ac antfution aid y..imadon. 19

Ift is -InupI In to undastand how these two concepIX apply to the Base Farce. Forexaii~h dke Amnj of 1995 will be much smaller than at due and of di. Cold War pod wilrepresent: fte m anm force neceassy to maintain acceptable ris, below which folther

redoctaue would anot be wme. Thi Total Ann force of Activ (AC) and Resrv (RC)

cauomtsis camposed of forces-in-bein and hamuhzoifocs (See F~xu 1)R~gmurto rfica s tod heeIdin forcesý,umualy RCwhchdie services mantain pewactime atbvvsh I=s thai full ulSO anl d readinis Duri ng mol~ifzaion, dumes farces mu "regenerated to

A~zedLfvel of Orgairtmi -1 (ALO-1) with pasmmAe aid equimn for tihgmud

R-comdtudon refers to die formation of new units which dor netdxt in tbe peacetmeforce mctmma Wlhenc= f is imehnt and Congress declaus Tota Mobilization, di.

new unit wil be h. cm&e 4v~mauk which us pid*ul fonnd units containin only aelected

-i officer and -officer (NCOs). These cadre uit wil serV0 - due MOPag

between 6ve foresinben and entirel new units formed a peusomie aid equipmen avenhuafy

become avaial 20

xxx x iSTATESTOTAL

EASEDW cW=ENA SNATE S MODERJATIONRAWLXY DELOYABLE REWORCEMENT

SAC 95% 40% 30% 5%

F-3Aod~nlt M Remm~r Ca**UnftUftht IMi

mencde Total AMW units engage In periodic deIomet.

miduf OW uita n a~ssstance, cominedV exercMWis, etc.

FIGURE 1: THE ARMY BASE FORCE OF 1995 21

mmN modia diffcl~ty in forming now units wil be obtaining th onrssoadpp o nsatm required to inc'Rease mulftay end skuigth. The Army Bags Force of 19953a

cu wbo shduled to comhd of 536,000 active duty uokdiun32 This 10, United State Code(USC) sufltzhs flu u gehi of flu actve Army component to be 837,000?2 but doe two yearDatumn qpprqxiti1 Act of 1992 will flud o* 536,00 of ftho spaes For the Army to

expad to 837,000 sbklmu onl appronpriaon authoity is needed. For a force above 837,000both an appropriation and chang to 711le 10, USC would be necsmay. The curent T791e 10Imits for flu oths ArWmycmponcfts mu 600,000 for th Natiwia Guard and 980,000 for dkuArmy Roamve (USAR)?'

I , "a- ngnmuutary approprati amd chagn force ubuctwe m significant political ac&sWhena mu m aions directl ftreabd or attacked, e th sachim wil occu rapidly aid wightaunudous politial swppoit. In 1940, jus prior to Amedic enterin World War II, "stas~ng

appopiaton provided sufficient autority and funds to equ ipte mniltary and increase ddefes

9

Woh*Wa baa prodincti 25 In tdays Ammeican, pelitcal envitonnt boweve, wveridng dar

Vend from decreasig to uac-m-tg miltaty apopisioom wMl be a ma*o affoL To inkinatIM0w M o- early, dft militaty would need to convince Cwaehhod-al ludadu dud external

security fvwe otwweighd the douneado, .in. plrbayed in8w 19M Presidinia election,

CUDPSULWVA due United IStatestuedjig alone aste woddrs muilithy .ipearower, da would be

so ammm tat. A mabd In, nuwaior anvi is world '1 1 ts hkewd wiih a fraewwat to

hacunuibvbegiagn reoutihuienffixt over lim wig be nw~eesay to arvoid Amoricalm taditionalNO~f Rm p for wa.

The rabew of 1precn omtib iin ca diy embedded in key national documma, inclhudig dueNational Security and Mdftmy Strategiem Daefme Plaing Guidance, and due Joit Sftategi

Capabiltne Pan. Since comepts and guidance nonamfy flow down to t6w muiby services,f p m M ioniub inhosi be evident and detailed a due dockle plum, and policies of doe sermies.

Ezoep for due dimly defind end oate of presenting at delenng. and preserving 8w caspAbit tomy e, - a M A obal wardghtig capAilty, fte services have not Ibly incoporated i Wttmi

An initial reama for dais absnc is die ambiguity of the term itaelf Romiuisni not anw militaay term and umial ceuwsup e image of recreating samedaing whichprvmy

exited, such .s doe 89 U&S Amny divii..s of Would War KI Ptesident Buksh kitent was, to

describe doe process of frignew fightng units to comuter anezwn ni~aay deafts to the

United States Am g die various services, howeve, it t=ake n a diffi Pat contcz Air Force

muinile rewnein associate reoaIV udo wilh actions at the miss& dio after launchng a

WeapOIn 2 flue Army coemdd= due term to be toe actiom take to red=e a unit to comba

effecivumemsafterheavy oussain batde 27 The ifon - ntio - JCS rW I..' -, -oM woesing groupcomieredindcting another word to munnaiz confbdmi among fte mvices,inldg

191-1io ",1 - recnontitation and force n ideatudi Thesewa ventaly dsegar~de

-ic doe word - -mduto had come into widepmpad =@ at due nationual lavvL2 While manay

milimy Wuas have multpl meanAp (Le., campaign, radtion retire) it wil take so=n time to

.ihucate service members to unuderstand duo national straegi meaning of 1recfnmatiutic..

This kanerervice conuhsion. isoaomue by due lack of a coordinsatd and aiccepted

definion of the word.- recom R'uRon win doe Depautment of Deme. Plamimr in the Joint Staff

(JA 1-U) die Air Stxf HQDA (DCSOPS, Force Comamand (FORSCOM), and the Federal

10

EinapacyMmiqW&i Agmy (FEMA) acknowief th hekI& of a commn definition Staff.,

k va1m~m mn to der"&thirnrnuufg ftrccstuakin -i-cludi Presdent Bushs AspenSpeeck frn MS NMA DPM md fte J"C.29 Tius minrusM E so= anare wodkig on a

caocq w iMAK a standard d&fiikldn of the goal they am layin to awhimv. M&i makes it difficul

to shed.cf andg 0" fte milft~yforceain ft eld. (See Appnwn& A for ddnlimu from. variom

71jiw~u ca-An be rualved by publiing a deflinitio of ---cmWuduw in m 3aW

Pubsutiaon 1-02 Thanuaul is he sowure document for the

mommug of Al Un wed in D6D and will prvide lhe ao nuat of reference required to

amid e d o us r rming Joint Pubk~icn, 1-02 has not been revised ohmci 1M3 and durnforn

dons not contain UOw word ecoustitutionY---3 Withan. updde at Urn joint W4nwi Urniniitay swr~es

can implement Urn necessay guidance. The P amspoe to an abqumy to Urn ORMEmpo1 &dion at

tdo Joint Staff J-5 in~dicte am awareness of drig Ihdomu bowvrm, it wil be at lowamt yewbeoeJoint pub 1_02 wa be rsvin&d31

If don Army is ruppementative in UOne dev --pm-n of iuoniuinplceit is apparentthat veay Wite progeses has been maide. Anuy Regulaton (AR.) 310-25, Dictionary of A&W

I=& was hes revised in 1986 and theunfor dons not inclu&de Ur p-innt national leveomo32 Lime Joint Pub 1-02 it mreds reivnan

Fuld~~ pubbrI 10-9 nd January 199 and is an

Cezeont hlayown of ton dockirnr and theoy of fte Arm~s tradidorna de&Milon of rncoui wtutron

(restorig toe unity, coheson, leaderhip and equipment of combat heffectin units). FM 100-9dons ad minion. te natmdIona ,,l sat ramosig of recomw ati g cai*norly w vnits, dzus fikrd

* cldouftdin r already murk issue of whotr pcmnilution nme. in ftn AnW toda.3

lbe Army Mobilizsion and Operations Planning Systnm (AMOPS) provides mobilization

and operainal pisauin gidmec to tde service. Yet zaowhbwo in ifo&w vhlumes does it mention

Ruatin 500-3-8.1.,, PORSCOM MnLztm and booymn hni. ytm=MD EPS)~ also do nad discuss fte subject of recoenbdn These ft vwhimos owo

pudbhed sequiatialy in late 1991 as- Urn aeg of recnaituion was being developed. Voluirn

VII of Urn FORMDEPS deask wholly with Total Mobblzatio, Urn vary foundation of building a*Wba warfightin capabillity. It as remabkble that during the coordination mid research to rewmie

11

the Anr/s monad on Total Moblnrost thiB Ving joint cmexp was not dcowred. if it

had, a decmidn could haew beca. mae& to inclde; an early and evlvdMg concept of frecoumibut-ian or

delay publication of Volue.. V11 util moreP definift plums evolvid. Now the Amiy iB Mef wit akhsyione documcat on glba wuare with no. dacusia. of die ovwrudkq savuW of

re~~itbud06. 35

Soni pszbficatdo demnstrate the AMW a oqubl of teprhgreomium nonw docaine 11 FY 93 Army Posuem Staloenu provides a general o~va-w an diicm=w of

all the foundations of doe Natiwia MUtmy Sxtqaeg. FM 100-17, Mr"%iiumi, is mduou~xbr doytAinaft bedt effot at Inking toe cadre proc,.e. lopedw and prmI hig to concept to A maldl..Pubhe In October 1992 thi document provide a hkag of uaobfizewa, 6he GradhuifdMobilizaton. Respmon, federal agencies, ad reo~um.ThiB is certalhml a good stsK but

- must be doam in the fI , especially duce Eu entire dbncuian. of r -c o~miudot isi less thaow half pqp a Isno 36md More decidled iefommbn on mmplig r M on liiafi aotivwiwould boettr serve hindes at flu major conmmand and unit leWLa

Analo4 gUing problem, far achieving a colierent and unifedecmiuiodn Frog.l is the

lack of an individualto agency responafti far plumning and executing fth stratg within tienep; bmt of Daefme. Since reconetitutionct acub wosmurfanctiondal mu (policy,pumP -souN- , oVer-tIf, -- an logintics), tereis no do& DoDk JCS, or nm~fy service ourpaidon.

wih the overallawrinspiblty far& a coartinatedpolic. 37 Ti..Officeof teUJndemearntay of

Defame for PolIcy has 1u miomo to prepare dwEu Mtin pordon, of the DefamePuinGuidance which provdes nhcmeaq guidance to the Joint and service staffs Ebwe~w, widdin JCSand dw u infty deparuma, there urs peonomel puM, poEWcy operations and lowtics staffpuzoanme all wo pig se APat piecesof ayrcnnflag-o policy. There hrae beeigne attempts toad~ds tihormpewuitilbl't problem, much u foaing a meeaing g'i withn the Office of theSearty of Defame (OWD) but notinbg sbtanti ham inatuinzd to date.

A concept tugleunly int1he profeional development ofn=Tdy laders iB a met of'Principles of War. Theme key. to soccems an E umfTdazy battlefield include 'Uniy ofComnmad,' which advocates te use of one commander who poseme the requite audworty tocirec All forest emploaved in flu pursuit of a unified ~purpo.39 1he sane principle applietsto thesstaegy of I PcF -mtiludow it can*nl be succesdul if a ehuon or agenc plu m d coordinatsmflu &evcied, pro0rM. Since Ireco MtiuM o involvecs the four miliary services flu Joaw StaXff~th

12

Deuln w ItaDduins and mmy of d fedeal Wzii' anuui~md agazwk, a O"Uiy

ot Effart is Ao uyqokd. TbmI~ 1wri deak & wAt coardinstin and coopafm~o amo al

farce IDWuI a commo objcfnve man thoqg al okm may " be pmt of &ie urm0030Mi k M 1 lm Thig coopeaTAMve afthi tdafmft~ bmed on cnm - m i- sW an

mmomal c t=Wo Uumyof Comimd dciom~blo eytgoo r -.ece C(GWdAiL4

Rac -m icboth wam o~of resurcsmid aa 1el mnip'sua% Therefor

It mq1 s dlone mmtuiof to mem prope devklauvWantd krncm ;rar hio fit =dTmy

.ate of 1995 and beym&WA fth U. cdW conamud domovodo of =U"a inib tnder

ft . Ptafealmia ftrn~ . Uansed to hmv a my-lsg oqasbfy to reconsmdb farce

bm ýwa m m -, uqmtcaut M& so* mcm i, daM Uft SOW Staf revw U&a lhdbity

of bfctn offices foralRco'mntiu& prtowmiat the bit aidhvidia1uevim Wvh Thus

soodom wuld be 1,p lme&', to juuiid ftn mkiy of coamurnd w tirn indi knE khal e biis

midcoufrte loto U vudfedera Io ~ ,nt ,-em ofdeffOft fbrfm -ec-*io - o,-- ;A' ly0"wA Urs*8 unrtdr of d& meftod wil U. Unitd Stmm gau~mut develp *li gw&=nc

and acobmut tsgy for averecodi -1-prce.Oven% docarm and regadaliw coacamag nea~ton "e ntAvbl with &ae

Dquumnut nofDefane Thrememany~ a reuie to die suatg in broad huh doctmts

pubtlibd at don joit and mvice Iswk but peciffic gaiurns w fo.d irqn ad n d

cmunio of an effectiv reweoitiudan rywina doesno amL A imys Mp of "pdafti U. jotn

and saevic dcinrnuies wfth a comun d~kon would uamh6 a boolo of coneon zfnrice.Ce~iaglbt8 al ecII n e--- ffac m at 66JO aontmd servIce lWi w~oWl provi&de &edon mdebirnaute inach hn datio ieffofts EmmntualISly quxexatsdockbo ad guidamce woul now&kl

down' ito wii* &UMWand d tead*l xvdab publicaiirn In to interim swrvce mnumbr

wE bac die accumy anfaomaion and xmwi- on cafe wrih* mukowow and eq.mant ums

inbid bessane, md odmerfiuictim enuu to Theme - soilirsav uiolom*rnol, aid madaml wE be required to led and W&b ILP Bas Porc of 1995 din aose@me of

dlew and fism cketow

13

TIU Unb~d Scow is a n~o.o which ounly uurffnjis its force for war; aid U. procemsis

nori* wed to meat aciw dly foeas without resoafthn to tho ,acouiduon of ani*il nw

fif miue. To uelctk blyhd to a giobal warflsbthi capsabity, Urn fodaral gr~rnewo b

"hummerd hrw levl of many 1,bi 20 rs91 o (Pzuigdut Seiscw Rmruw Cd-UpjPaid, FeE, ami Tatel Io~a Ti. NM dins type dad tzi* wilh hrnitus aid uile

i Un tocuruil avbdmad noaty flbrc ilcbrn, Totd Mobffa,1 . however, bnmwve

.zpo.oa ofi to forcaes by guI Ih Said acivaf amb berywd lhe csft approved

Vpbsý Mw~ emp com tdo mobiriema of Al adjiwad aone =qukred krnchdq civimprdecma facai., to woond oot ad unsi Urn forces 41

TMw Depinanai of Dofinn hiss oddl 'at ph= for -ao~ tow boUn a-W O iii~j a oqbft42 7bb tmumn &g ofpaimuity toa, MeW um al-

ueqmuui.IyM -mria ra 10.t a cris, waftingislud =9i a *wai*cue uco'd develps

aid TOWa Mobuzadan bacon.. ii. sole gei. opoiLm Delsyha acion to caam asw forces

wd toe find Awa of amobirado Wausa Uto Afty of Ur nodaon to accomprbh the mison. Theuu e bcosws a inrp effot which is iidall rnefficid aid imbls to most Udo short uem

zwrnb M Im i 'Ink~i afhOug prdOtcina oupu oV ''. aE .=wutAM* Mea or =xcad

ry umaL A injor &advausp of Mb method is thud it off=, few redl Chaime ad placesuvundly ifficukl polical decido. befou, nxdoama leadmrs Wh dab *al or in~ig ryokn

cmriauly in piace, lwumrnnma oploins awno ra wabbl to imltvuuydelop detmmc aid-mf wm 1gliug forme. Saw. Auaia c zto delay omignew tuksa to counteran

amruswoeld Uuas DoDhud= prep.. other opin - forceuly prsatioui ad a crhe to smunicK9==ad mitmybladwLs A -rec-,nsdnmethdiss.~octoftgseecdw or hcrnn,

f Pfl Ribudwa peckaps for =sm inu~ dwdowsort of tota war. This would confo= to the

UraduMld MabiwaR.pan ORM), Urn ofma =ciabizsion now mecd iUn UuieWodSwes UIft da Con cept of rwcousbiuao W&t Urn eshlag fAvnewowk of a 11- - AnW hepto ma only wbv r nwoamy ~olia deeisam to fom m w uinl. Tin boudai with GM WE&o me raccman -'- tranvidoci frm mu!el being a *good idWa bo arn ecutable pWla.

WVlsb mobfilvaton sam to be synonymous with recomsdtuiourn, it acaualy servs ma aIMndtin R~co-tIkon rMks on the moblizjoz proem. to prom&de theeutad maipower,

14

acdW razurowes fof inamo cy k~gon, mod ceavunmix of das civim ecammy to awby-kmdiiri bome Mobaif lho madam involves dahiffi do use of smemx national zusmrcm

ftxom -* to pm~numcta me Tbis auxiuius capabilly and potentia can help uignificuavdy Inlha cram on anew mibls,

-IL - - coom lop bed imagoois & madi dg of many Awodms. Thi is largely dos

10 pxuvlm U.S. ww azpuimc in which an ou~p opud am aam had to idus cras V -,m to

V a and oqop die ammed forces U.S. sobihane been analog. to tufing on

a 1,000 wo V& bulb itimde a closed Eb'uealsd oman At ih flick of di "On* switch, die

mAna waf tam ralmiv dooe inactiviy to an ezuuuhg war effos Upon coafic

lomu. d^a toe swich was qickl neset ID the 0f poaium I beimo m isWe demo- .ad

and evanumal -retn to doefame utagastou Aum=c needs to mph=ac ihe 'On-Off" switch wia& aa~mseet ~ I=& coaiknb ol wR Aom die gmomu to mdinamhnn pruiilmsod and

garihmd kwhal of -cei ra mmoe am dine TI.., imbd of gomag iazuneisatey fmm addm dod to mainua effIt due nationacm upuum for Sibul war graduay in rempameo to early

driam warmup. Such a inobIzam. 1 l - moake good urn for Amerima.

Ile Graduated Mobffizatio Rempome System in a Bazbbs decision makin jucam whichad~v@@os Americn nbizm-kc m rqiuus OMa a Pttem- to urse die poitcaL ecmoumc andsmamyo bwm mae. of powtv to "W, I q II * -P I zomeWs to I 'potaIa; - ---- 'me band on

du aed- of waming hicato. and actuovalt WA MM ?~f, natonal leaden am pnmidedtdared -wapom e dhon a icu. -tal sloes to ma-c-r- 1 die natimal securk enmgpacy

V Pp m Pdinrn psumu. These calcuated actions m usualy rovau*I to allow die guvurmn= to

a~ due spectu of mbfnwbradm reanud wslboe comuaftdg to IotW war.45 Skucftud in amelindA. famwon GMI is secifically demigoed to 'mahance demtw4,ie mitigate d&e impea

of an event or cirn and reckae oipificanllyd lead tim associated wit a mobilization ahoul

Graduated Mobffzaind Rompoms cm ue. is o.tu to My 197 when Proiadw auCtwss

Ezecua"v Order 12148 mat ed dxi Federal Emnspagcy Maagement Agenc (FEMA. Thm

purpose, of dla arpuidind is to coumaldate cii defomu and anquacy inanavenma fluctim

aft o- federal agency. Over am*, FEMA has developed dxi ways and momn to cmoorinte

feero al, s ans md local Vmnnumen ph=x wit indatay to aichiev natonal preparedwuas.

Add"=na*, ther deveoped dxi meed to Fvoiid ON poltcaeonomic, and mfiitay alleniatmve to a

SaW nwbin of die United States for a Smal w 'i Euope. Fromn f 199k duough do19 6 All mal m y P re Pd phl ming hbad centned on Iba wa•i cm uscAw. of a suruunmcer attack on fh United Stans oir a mbot wmaring Soviet attack co Wauun Europe .11an dciA- amea&i pimuing and did not take into ommt odmi scenarios, such am reional coffirctor protracted wr pmcdod by sufficient eaty wa•ir,4"7 Fam , iy 1si9 both the Proes

Nmd Securiy SUan umui mad Eecutiv Orda' 12656 a symme for at

fed1a1 deprm~mma mad specisa to reapoad to national securky um-ucs forsau and

1. 3Modfift dios actio to bo hplemented early o in a potential nationalnow*uy e marecy whih could nus or a ficsiy redhuce &o ead tm. associated wth atotal nadwd ampacy moinim

2. Drvvhoing a system to be used in a natonal •c y m ngency which pmvidwboom asmu•vik and a proce, to comide at vriou lees of tfu uferncay.'S

A, Execouiw Order 12656 dnutified FEMA as fl go imniet gamcy

remonahiefor idendfiiniu and coordinating national security emnergency inwasres with an other

Moral dsft d •qn .49 TiU prant sup gave f proponent n rpo t for

n to a do&ag•i•-y. As prviouly m%4d to achie a FcAernrt natns[ nwobMimo

policy an=&a fle federal sUate and local goanainateb, it is iroperativet didt one orgainition, be in

From 1988 to 1990 GMR deoped from a conept to a msa by the joint cooperative

•Wt of FEMA a flu Depinnat of Defense. As a resut of donlu ecivil and iunitary

nu G,, MR ho fy evolved as policy for de Departimt of Defens conept of

nuoiztiawith Ibe posify of loftu it wit the e ugi concept of fec-iutitution The

Naloma dbm Sft" tey of Jauary 199 preclihme

Akeydautin raqwonftto Ihischai cratin~gnew mlitaryUnksJ iB Gradhuatd Mobilizatia Rempoom. IN@ national processntegrats aci"-ou to• ioae our anirency; p puhden. post=im revmm to warning of Mam. Th. acdsom andaigd to miaisto I of a cmis and to reduc mnific•uly the lead time anocimd

16

widk rupcmtb to a full scals nationa smawiy enmegency.'

Gramdd Mabizmion lta"pom is W~W A km natIona strUeW, adressing aII the

hmrmaofunatioal power. It provimodesth ntin l lwiadenhip vum incmntal optim

toyo m ime to a.muy sibuatim in owuwt main and cbrnut skrategi M ev Ronwt TIU

M&is duipud to be WMv, process mid *uuuwod to awbibnz tba natio far bod&

ding musmdeaffiLS1 QiM has ffwap, or kmel off Veqow- which u's:

almi"Ca o aeusld~ow~~A b~mupmt oriuimt ane lready begu to &delop.

ft=± Natimsel Secmit Em~wpo/ Wjw5

MI IIIurn, GM& looks at ok thctonal smu ft'm which it buie mespomes &a*

plimiug or a cgs m Th. me nohS nwbizam of kuhukial econxuuc, kufru- ucI a, hunma

gmeamm. SOVU~mTMOK d" clv p ApnmRnu aoftS3 iM. M iwallyproviesa mvtod to

apsim te -wno of uamrnqIy pmiek-, prior to actull swtatn dou engie. Thi capabilty

i*o. -* admu e fth Aflty of the Udwhd Maw to respod with mmufmn Siblty and

malws to nGAsnd mai ,breakifg ow kxn-tndrgta~an of n~ibizeitio

ft is wft thus cqaeblitie toat GR and frec ktto overlap and disply common

chfactmclBotha mu eigned to kiniftia provid for a mans of de~tern a potential eneV

Arm coatinub* acd=. caosy to U.S. vkda intmwests. Bodh wil achimv a mob~iizd nando= and

apaudsd watofta capabiity as Uni endosta Their differce occur by he ways andmo

* aup~byed to amve at thuw stated goals GM4 provides icreasing levels of reversile steps to

work -ao towed total i bat This offirs poft~al and miltaz eadni vaziou

*.emadvas for pug nq epoome and %Wadakrg deterrepnMce.d Rc msi mio on the other h=nd ig

dedped to be forglobalww andtotaW obfimzaion only. Aas ecfifcalyplmed bythe

Depubuin-t of D mofo , midswed in th National utiny St~teW, recoati-ulio1 is notdesired

oir plumed for atb a Leves dm ta total win. DoDsftonglyoppossmay ue of recousikutioefforts

17

in, coqjimkcli wilh fstbiqi Majo Ragoimi Confiqancies (MRC), Imqel due; to the amowA of

diea rup=W Io btuM new fmcces. By die time teconsomod forces would reach ft. baukWied the

tegional conflict should allready be terminated.5 xtndn die MRC beyond ueveral yams would

asob it a protracled ww, aid hzinvll decisiou. on ceratiug a globa wauflghting capablhty abi. to

WMelW decsive -W.

Thai a not moch out di tatnwly fioamd unit would not be teadil owal" to

partciaso a a Major Regional Coningncy. At best thme new forces would be availlable to

replace combat uits which had been paI-Ipat "in n an MRC for an extended period of time, as

1hey totated out of the theate. This would ocow about two years after diercwito

requirement was ',ated, IIsice it takes at 1earn tat long to organize, foam, twina amd deploy an

aIthl new unit5 The experiene from Desert Stoan inhwed tha already forme RC combat

mite require about one yew to train befor being committed to combat.57 Thw HQDA standard,

for combat readinces amid depIloymeunt of a cadre division is Mesian months58 a vey optimistic

expectaion, fix dihen partay fo=me mite to be ready. Therefoxre, die time period. to create and

trainU an ath now fihdmuit would haw to be no les, iatwo years,

A couacera wAn die: Department of Defense is thot politiciauns will bellievfe rcom. isuio

a vihiemum o eeI, new mits rapidly for meian a Maor Regionall Contingecy. Based ondtha

perceptioun, many Pentagon Mtfe haw concerns that Conupes wil use, recoI "u"i uIo as a basis

to soek addItIona cuts Inua di uityplaned base force Some leglislators beiew dohat denation.

could miraaain a mmml. pecim forc structwe and quckly twemntituffe lary forces to

addres each ckki as &a needs mw Mwe ability to rapidly form new wilts clearly doe notcat

andisnoanknaitofastraegof 5 Suchapolicywouldbeamistakefordie

nallmall hwvu leadership to pUma..

There =%, however, cauai scmatza no which an inicremenWta recontituon effort would

be bolh wine amid adil agos The possiblity of a long period. of strategic and tactical warning

foloweid by a protracted war woulld be such a cam. During die warning period, &ie United States

would be able, to take stps to identi sources of manpower, enact standby emergency legisation,

18

activate cAke divisions, and take Wnustrial prepmoedn nwsuires such as *warmkne sami cuMca

"cokl" defuw production. mdLe As the actual conflict drew closer, die United States would be

b mom prepre to continue toward global war, yet contnuing to mond signal cleady intended to

dater the advomuy ftm 0ia hostile acm or ktlous At dig stagp anl niebiriion &ctiw

t*m would be romdW~be aowing a Vacefta mid faco..vig way out fo politcal leaders on bodi

sides. Nt dooerruac eventualy Mod mud global war v x uhadsteps to uped doe force mud mraft

new unks would Alredy be well tudor way. Amueica, would thus overcome its biasoy of being

tuprepaced for wa, mud could now use die rheoswa mothd of pirepration ra rd=r dhie -On-

Of swkc

Thcre in no parutee diat the United States leadership of the 21st Centuy wigl do any

bette reacting to eady warning mud moblizaton plea. dhan thickieecs Howo~, daun iB

reason to hops di. naton will be able to recomtinmebte and faster dhn m athe pas. Foet, duner

hane been many efforts to carefuly document mud correct mobilindon. mistakes from recent

confficts, mah as a landmark 1955 study which developed commao. lessons learned from sewn

wamin Aniercan bluty.60 Thene eoI== have been used to redautak the U.S. mobalzation

exmn sonio corrections of which wase sen during Operations Desert SMudd mud Desert Sorm.

It may be pousible that America is willing to loamn hn doe mistake of die past Secondly, thea

United State has leaders today who we more 'glbal oriented daun in the past. The

-tmrevolution and em of world ifave have made diewould manaerby naldng

* pomibls isntmneous mitry mud political deciidos., as wd as rapidnmovomse of people mud

caw. Additionall, the intexoching world econondes have made it difficult for nations not to be

involve in the indUWral md financial activtie which cut am=u many sovereign bouniduries.

Since doe United States is mew the walls only miltary superpower, it wil be hard not to beconte

involvd as a global policanan. America has already conmmitted to Somailia mud daere we my

who, would involve the nation in Yugosavia. The end reook a the Unbid State can mu longer

relistically advocate a policy of isolationism, but must be ready to perfornt on the world stage.

Finally, America now has a systemic approach, GMR, which forces goenetlagencies mud die

19

=~yTON 10pam seletiv mobakdin optio to national leaders though the Natoaml Securit

Cominc (NSC) Ma force adaptiv plmrijg and ea*l thikin through various rmpomes to

addma mmwpncypmpd problems. Deterece is initiated ealy on, and readfines for war

is Weatly - F eI . The Unotd Staes not o*l has a bettrsa ta 21 place, it 1s realStIO,

wmkad*e and fth comaec poky.

Recw~knti s neato be mereMy -inasd -inoto Cw radl td Mo0bilhiaon RzspoMe

proc. MWha needs to chag is &a reluctnce to infitit new unift at levels short of tota

bIoN - ?M~any leaders soul prep..e respome packages intended for earl oe inorder to

be&a solvn ft tough imus of -r-cowlmtiui Some of dwse spedfic action wil requre public

debas and legilaiv approaL It isbest to begin thm fina and surface the isme. eauy, woddog

tow reard d aU&bOU nmuy areas An addiional benefi wil be havig our adweruari monitorin

dds pubic procen, dearly suvai as a nmum of U.S. detuzuce by dbplaying national resolv.

The end reult could be no conffct and the opportunity to rode do U.S. national emergency

pr-epm Pdnmn reosta knob to 1w off positon.

Specific ecmtuanaction which could be considered for inchaujo into the adapive

pimuing pro. a( w Graduated Mobbilzaton Response fri~nnewm include:

1. Requestng legslaiv approal from Congress for apr3 iain to expand theadutoized end sramgth of 1w variou militay deparunonts based on 1w pecie rq IreeLsTlm could include just cough to cover ft twvo Army cadre divisione, or a robust request to

b Itfoad epmad each of 1w -Fd services. Adaptiv plumnbg at ft ime of 1w requesatw Mul div1w siz of dw reqimnat

2. Activafti cadre dkivison to foll strngth and begining diir depoynmen ftaiin

3. lIend~tfin am peumonel to fil cadre postons requird for 1w newly fonnug ArmyEvhiam above ad beyond 1w cadre divmao

4. Activatin the maw and ship of to Innvativ Nava Raserve a thtty-two sft &aeeof niodballed frigats

S. Transpouling stored militay equipmntd and supplies from war reserve stocks or depotsto newly fo ig unkit obfiliaton statons

20

6. Procuring civilian. equipment and teclinology in 'off the shelf condition for use by-ot fo6 n imfts until production lane can be tooled up to produce itms. to militaryFpe'f ications. (For examicplging to a commercial bource such as Radio Shack for telephone,

radjo, and global positoning equipment to use n lieu of standard msue military equiipment )

7. Iniatng persounne and manpower procuraemmt: action to help staff the needs of tieserices. This could range from recalling retbre to acuve duty, to requesting IIntai ofdie Selective Service (comcWtio) rstem.

These are but a few of the umay optione avoilable to moilitary planners ther adaptiv

planning options for recaonsitution in the Graduated Mobilization Response process. By initiatn

thee well thought out options, early in a crisi response stags, die Defense Department and die

nation would be better Prepared with, newly forming umits when actual conflict on die battlefield

begiz. A rethinking of the *globa warfare oWl strategy for reconstuittion, couild result in

ninwm option which could be set on the shelf for appropriate revision, and '-as

required in a crisis. Additionall, darin the peacetime planning procam, these variou planning

optons should not be classified; rather, they should be weal known and published in open sourcee

dociuments. This would seave the purpose of makingt our potential adversarie aware of the range

of option the United Stdats could excute to defeat: threato to uts vital interests. In this mamae, die

primary goal of recon-ti -u-on (deterence) would be fixdw advanced. When a crisi developed,

die United State would then be able to keep classified, which specific actions it selected to execute,

th:111 Protectig operational. securitY.

Incotporating- smduated responses into the polIcies of x recnsttuton would also require dhe

definition of the strategy to be rewriften. This study propose the folloing definitio of

reconstuion be accepted bythe Departmeantof Defense:

A!EOXMU7ZX*A national security strategy invofvng die forming, traininand fielding of new military units in order to dete a potential adversary from competing miltailwft the United States. Should deterrence, fal a credible warfighiting capability, from selectivetforc pockages to globa war, wil be prvided from a gaduated, mobilizatio .epos Ofmanpower, cadre uni% stockpiled and war reserve military moats research and techniologyuwsbnen triiined and experienced leadership and expanded industrial base operations.

21

This dament povides a complete overarching definion applicable to an military

depslunen-s i UN Departmaen of NDfnse. It addresses m ncorporai adaptiv planning into th

com IuMn pOC in order to tailor rmpnes at execution. It also provdes guidance to

planners an do mum duiy need to consider in the overall policy of reconstimutio- . This study

*00m8, recommmen tha the JCS comnider using the above definition in Joint Publication 1-02,

. . and stmada!ding Un meaning of ro u thmughout die Depanent of

Defaise.

By adopting a gadualed proem, of reconstituto Deparment of Defense can help

ensure that die fourth foundation of as national iitazy strateg wilM bbecome a viable plan instead

of mer a stated concept

THE CAMR DIVSIONS

The new world shategic aevironment is creating a situation which does not adow die

coafident prediction of future polifical trands and militazy alliancem. Therefore th United States

must design its form for th unknown threats which wil enmge tem to twenty years from now.

To hedp mnee thd need, thU Deparment of Defene's FY 94-99 Defense Planni Guidance

document direct Uie Army to consider organizing two reserve coomponent cadre divisions.6 1

Accordingly, Uie Army has sructured two of des units in its Base Force of 1995 to provide the

likag betwee exisng force and th new forces qued.

A cAd is defined as, "a nucles of trained pmoune around which a laW organization

can be built ad kijngj 62 With this type ganization, dtie Amy is attepting o put in place a

process to make two addional divisions avaible quickly while dU long process of creating

emiry new units is begun. Abhougb dr are numerous refernces to cadre divisinm in DoD,

JCS, and Arny p"cations, it is dMic to find spocifi on the orgamizaton, personnel,

quipm and training of thes orgaizas. This is especially perpleing since nations havc

historicaly used cadres in thir national armies

22

Mw mes of cadres to form and expand amin is not now, the need for thean began when

the ftradinal mucawy annic begn to give way to d the - naional force of Napoleoni

France. 11k fit larg scale planned urse can probably be traced to Prussian General Gedwdd

van Scharuhoust adw his nations disatrus; ddefe at the Baodo of Jena-An.astdt in U06. To

- meom the do =fore stuictue restricdti b kupoined by France on Runkd in the peace treaty

of that war, SchAuhbaum implemented a fiwloqia sysom to trime active duty soldin into a

reserv nMilb Anaualy, each active boo company itceived twenty new recruds, who replaced die

twenty oldest nienibers of tho mtu These Adhplce soldiers were then assigned to Ohe Lmnwdeh,

an inactive teserve militia. By 1815 this process had created a Landwehr of 260,000 on-cdM

moldier, administered by a 300 -mb-erI- cadre which maved on active duty. At miobilization this

cadre element would organize the units and minsre trining wus completed for dqploymenL63

Afte Prussiai's decisive vxc~my over France in the 1871 Franco-Prussian Wa, the other militay

power, of the would, eceqpt the United StaIMtesecognized the success and adopted the Prussian

reev and cadre sysem modek,6

Europeaus used cadres sisnnl duning World WEr Ito expand thei arnwLe TU Somie

ogPeratonal artis V. Talendafikv noted, w[vjmry few tuliefht th dese operations (the initial

successes achieved on the Western Front) could have been conducted with such intensity and with

such art of m~aneuver thanks onl to those significant cadre. the Germs.., and French had and who

k=W edite high qualities. of the moblizd auny."65 France and Gannany also planned to nake

cosve use of cadres during the period, between the world wars. The French devised a plan

which made each of its =uA active divisions the nucleus, of traies, which split apart and fanned

thre new divins. upon mobfizxtio This .. retededd cadre capablifties with uwrealisic

FIXpectatins, contributing significantly to their nMliary diuaster of May 1940.66 On dhe other

hand, the Germani Army considered its 100,000 -io arm of the 1920a to be the nucleus of the

forc it would expad to eventuly rule Europe. 1I@ resulting Gommn Webnnacht proved highly

succesulbl agal itsi European neigbor during theopng yearn of Woul War ]L67

23

Thmrugout d. intistic patid of the lat IS0 and ealy 193(k, die cak concept was

lag* gimad by di United Sates. Le•d m uch a Emory Upton in &ie 18t and ESh Root

ia iii eady 190s tied wiho uccess to establish a strog mw/cade system A mjor

reealock to such a force cam vay lly be tre to previously cited radition of

die Amarica pubki% awhmion to muatakft a Iap stmfa may. Famly, General Payton C.

March was able to achieve so=n woo..in do 1920s with doi mreat of a nazry troeeve and

cae sysm Ameria's for Woid WE I ws sufficiet to have

legislaion ametd i an mpt to rsolv mobilitn problmu. 6

In 1920, die pinap of de Natonal Defense Act established a total Anny force composed

of dire compones - do. Rgu Amy (RA), die National Guard (NG), and the Organazd

Reme Corps (ORC). A maiflnt pardon of die ORC was a cakre ryd= of officom and

NCOs with do wwpamibify upon mobifdion to or n umits and tam fr, Mading

r ecrult The ORC was to be a fomre of tweny-seven ifmay and six cavaky divisions which

could round out ie Rcgua Any and National Guard. Unfoumamely, the ORC did not move

frAm concep to actual potental until die late 193OL69

When wa" cmi. to Euope a 1939, Premidnt Rooevek declared a nadona emwraecy i

ft. Unted Stats. Geneal Geoqr C. Marshal became the Amny Chief of Staff about the sme

tm and, within two yeas, was able to ovecome major roadbloc, significantly pamndg die

Army and mjuwag its eqxnent and doctm.70 Congres mdatd mm mobilizaon steps,

but did not actvate any uits of de Orgmized R•s•w Corps. This fafire to permit dw ORC to

oqame and tmin some of dthir ddlh ree diiiom undouWbty cotomfibted to America's poor

state of readiness upon enterin e conflict ia Decmber, 1941.

1n 1942, Ge Marhma appved. a cake plan did was used roughout die war to

mate tingul (te bpid•) infinty divisions. Under tids sydem units won ornized with

aroxmately twee percenm ofheir amhmrized officrs and NCO. s experiemed cadre (216 of

452 oflicers 1,460 of 13,425 autoried enlied sldiem). When the organizaton received

24

ufficient film to reach funll drngth, de cadre conducted an ienve Oiteen week combat

tr pen psgian which pa~pasm Ow~ unit for overea dsplayhicawt 7l

Th1 cadre system used in Wodd War HI was an overall succs since mor don My new

drv• were created for sm ,e in th combat thaemn72 Howevr, severa problems we

aino.em •,in mpafu tained leadcrfs cadre. F'r many soklie nv anied at their

cadre amagms amc tho Anry dnafed tuhm to act as fJk, or casualty rm in

Regular Army and National Guard unit. Thefoe, mas of the prcviu trained cadre

maqpower pool nova had tdo opporsuity to amploy thdo pracdtod in poeac ftrng A

second difficulty occurred when mobilization plans failed to assemble and train many cadre

personnel befor they i tunu had to train their own umi. This was paroculody notceable in the

Natonal Guard where many ic pVleml prepared cadre were gmiag basic traing to new

recnrts. A final problem happened freqmendy whm qualified, cadres tha did train nw unt won

not alowed to deloy and f&ht v ther uni Due to the grat need for taining cadres and the

lack of avalfb and qualified pesonnel, many soldie became permanent cadre membem Since

the Amican war effort needed new fore rapidly, dhe pemanent trI i-es wm required to

keep recycling to additional new units. 16 Ufrtunatly, the depa-tig and newly trained divisions

left CONUS ,mnus masy of th•ir nograwd key lesdad This had, th negaim Impact of

dieruptng the cohesion and unity of many mew battalion and brigades in the earl stages of the

Second WoMd War.73

The post-WoMd War l era saw another masuw Amercan denibilizatio which resulted

in the amous "hollow Army" of tho Korean, conflic AB a rult, th Army conidnd various

mtods to expand.with cadre un• s dudr th% ly = 195t In March 1951, Army Field Forces at

Fort loumo% V'u&a developed a "Cadre Ilan for th AMy Mobilizaon Pl" which prvie a

Mictme to idntf ad &=b the nucle of nw umns the AM would cmat upon dmand.

On mobili;zvd, th plan eNvoned a peiod of I1 days to organiz, train, and p"osition &e

cadre. An a tonal, twenty-eh to thirty-six wees of ftrann (48 how we&) were, te

necesary to cert and d the new organizaon into conba7 4 1he Army General Staff in

25

Wadbtai, D.C. folowedin the -m y with a Cadre Plan for thme Expamio of the Gf nral

Rampa' Thi• documentVted qpe fic RC uits •th Amy planned to create and Wd ffed which

cdut umit would provide die cadr, a wel as where the now umila would organize and ami75

Thi plan and ohs -e tIme 19IM hw been discused, but neve n•plmansted an do U.S.

AmW.

Today, fth American nmiTkary serwics are looking at various ways of closing the time gap

to M by increasing the ram s in foamg now uedts The Navy has two such

uWategie. the kit being the Ianavativi Naval Reserv (INR) This plan earmaris eight Knox class

fiptm in ft non-doplaying reserves (Iýpe H Resem -aiing ship) a -raining platform for the

identifiod craws of thiry-two motbled fI gaes in the inactive Reserves (1hp M Resemv). A

cadre of trainrs will provide the quality control to propem the futire craws to man these ships

witoutsimive train-Wp U~pon nmailizatiaum, these thirty-two trained, Type M Reserve craws

wil be capale of adcat their assigned vessels within 190 dayL 76 This complies with the

proposed definition of .ecoutiution presented by this study - providing a graduated mobdiation

tuposn of military manpower and war resem assets in the formigtrnig and fielding of new

The second option is a joint Navy - Maritime A i n (MARAD) effort known as

ho Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). Estabbibhed in 1976, tho RRF is a set of ninety-sx "•gh•

Sship purchased from U.S. kndmy and locaed at various ports aound the natio

Designed to address maritine frlsrato shortfals, the RRF seeks to provide additional cargo

cannym capabil'y to the military fi• to ten days ar activaon. In early 1991, as part of

Operation Desert ShKld, the RRF te .4 ift o*nl activaim to dab. The RRF achived some

successes during the Persian Gulf War, b: mous difficultes were encountd, including:

1. Eigh of the sixty-five ships activated were non-seaworthy.

2. Very few of the ship met thei target saing daum

26

3. Spare pubt were Moltcu to obtain since most ships wvim purchased from industry atdo end of thd u@Afi sea ih and possesed antiquated semu~mtdil~

4. fw fm w iu to asenmble tWrnd ma cmw because of the continuing dcline of theU.S. Marchant Mari force. Numerous suars on board the v &h wer in ecess of sixty year

S. hme costs to bsig ships up to usabl cmmon iwu were almost twice he amouno t planned

(S1.5 MMI eac4)77

Due to Aniamabt to mod mauy hexpcabdue hDe Na, and MARAD wE need to crfly

wlw thm IRR conwcpt and dsr ne t mfaidt fr homr raoko

h U.S. Air Foc* in nt cu * woig on a c4ace concept due to theunu

tscla~Problems of maintaining sophisticated airciraft and ftrinng amw PIoteL One option, the

Civfiia Rasmw Air Flect (CRAF), prAidw a mobiliatin masst for n~allty planners to comsider

re Ongrng civfiia airhime for militay tranpost. Ti~s backup ta otafion- pool proved viny

vidavl and successflU during Operationa Daunt Shield and Deset Stoan 7 S

The Army is davoloping two cadr~e disonsw based an' studies conducted by the

Headqua•r•e •oD, epoa n dom Army (HQDA the Training and Doc.ine Command

(rRADOC), and do Combined Asm. Command (CA . These ra- deIgned models 00

provide two cost-effective mechanized infantuy division which could meet fte requd.-I Ien of

aciceptable ris and the capabli of deplyig witki &%=ee months, of *Moblizto&79 SevaId

varaln were coeiA~rO kwbxfiW

I. A Ishadow divismon concept which would locate the calre division at doe same.

bhbtallai as an eadstig AC or RC division.

2. An xi tin USAR training divsion as dom base for a cadre division.

3. A mix of active and resmai forces, to -a the division.80

Evantual six moddle wer defined. and analy-ad aainst One evaluation criteria ofcot

haderuh tra soulf-mufficiuicy M4s and deplya~bft. The models had -r sonnengd

rangng from 3,500 to 8,700 aoldieru and training dines vazyiog from 57 to 77 weeks.81 (See

Appendix B for specific details).

27

11e HQDA study did not mccamnan establiig a cadre diviskaa, but if one was

ascommy, k f~~ A im 2 t- be nmaned by 3,500 sakdiu from die Activ Cornpownm (AC).8

11w TRADOC comumamir rcamaded an option whkh ai VT x imnaliy 6,000 soldier from &he

AC 1p6,fena Oie 83i.. Dada ,eouue -m- Act Coapnamt beca kt would be

df we mal c1w coumpoen fr a cadre divmkIna, huiw doe haow umm of nik, and be ft

mawe my *aJ 10 casiver

laftdw A flt to iatemleadersfrom "oo unkpo@dm to cadre asi mm san

-qads dmswu in to vialW of du cadre &vWmic Officu and NMO need to profeusionsAly

dswlop byusevingina poside parkto conducdfat g a macare Sinceft mcr mv

ce~emr*do not hav a readly ava~be framewock. to prow-ide due necessay rotatin, many

had=s fluqueniy view doe activ comnponent am an ideal choice for die locaton of d&Me tyPe

for~lu.110 ni*a hd~tg associated wih doe AC mi die hig cost dia coma Ms dwit

dedicated fklu dm permonnel. Thes casts an not only measured in dogaMi but also personnel

Mpacin &a defoce. skotsucm

CA&e am~mens, would ane a Ip hame of 68 a~ein~ mandated Army and

eludu aiitxized ba mauau afpopr"owx~a and tale 10 of die U.S. Code. Since due cadre waits

consist prismatly of seunar officer and NCO leadership, dime wai are dspropostonal h die

u~uuntof pwmnmae by rank structume Therelure, kt cosma die Army many peorsonl spaces

wbMc an in high deumad ia oduer soldier accoumm By amseiplu die required nmber of soldimr

to cadre uniKs die Army must decbiden which other muea to accept degadation (Le., TOE units or

TDA accomuft) The Army could also appoach die problu by askung Congress to adjus die

adigerized level of ciffice per 1ft legal hts cauind in rde 10, ft Uuited Sttsw COde.5

1& provhkm specifies die saftrimd ugdu for ac"iv duty rank of M*w, Llutm ant

CdOlel CdlO4d and Geneall Officrs Shmc cawmkeuts Comm in peacetim of only die nucleu

of key kmader* fte rmulhag grade imbala=ncemaul be addressed to gain lega zulie for a wtop-

heav rank suclw. A succeumfia reques would have die advantag of allwing die service to

keep TOE and MDA anpm ents fulal while structumig positions in cakre vails 11e abilty to sel

28

Cmqieu an incz Pa- -d offices and NCO& woiul deped an U.e aime of U.e kkcrease requested, U.

, , *Iso 'dima ldtcostan u dw pclkkcaachnse at ft d= of Ukerequeat. Iff. .insd formc

casdoue to abuin and recommkudon becoms -- Ifhdas a national sUatey, the dining

may be 0Lt

TI. U. S. Army ReswA (USAR) and Udo Nadnal Gumd (N) have vmw oi um

about v , di, , U. cadre 201*m1*0. T1w WSAR has a tra~Iia of peafoaziog cadre-type roles

-Winn vision) but would reqiur asiadvw force Mucturcx changes and Mfltmy Occupadnaf

Specially (MOS) convuardus to haw U. ~Amity to mna fill combat drusdn. cadme TI. samix

Isaduv*l of to. WAR activey seeks to have cadre divhidom located in Udw component,

aqeol* in V&a of its present onataioned toward combat v.port and combat saviuce support

uuib.6 Howetw,, do@ to *a raquiumozt fot mqgor fot=estructnur and MOS chanss fte USAR

isnot a good choice for U. cadre of a snochunid bafuy &Wgmn

The National Guard lISfhs greedy from di. WAR in its enthusiasm toward the cadre

dwidons Speaking for mnyW numbox of U. National Guarid, dw Nadioal Guard Association of

U. United Stass sootd my skonst at Its May 1990 sy~omosa dwkt 'Cadre units Wak suffmidest

1 1m 1u and equknmut to pIoa U. 6 -dnion of an ouganized- uki TI. Guard and Resene

lsac a roational based pasomae rystmm as found an U. acumv componnt. The ead. ecqwq

Am -m qp&e&u to ~A Na..d (dasd dRwea .87

TIk MWS and force scrucam availble in U. National Guard combat dkvivon and

bI Iades fwavrabl mpgr U. O cadre concept. Additonal it would be ter expemuve in dolt..

and psuomie cost to -a a cadre =9 n ft U National Guard tha in U. activ component The

lnac of a roaional syvtm to pruoay deveop U. cadre nmeabers howawe, is a major

&=*a*Ia to foctigU caidre unils in U. Natkual Guard.

Ag~aht Mak backib of dstded shiiin and anaosd At mdef

doc~adn to held two cadre dvvaa. and locate d=amn hin a U. National Guard. Desinated as

U.M&t bfanky Divhio (Mvfosta) and U. 4M h Jnfa" Divion (California), Uue

n~cuizd lv~oe wM be on he by U. and of FY 95. HQD.A, FORSCOM branch schools

29

and N& a mlsd Guard Ewe..ms of ft soaw knekid ar sE dwkqdmg do Tables of

Q~guimk ui and (l*mOU) fir U... to dviukmms3 At ft peuft ftA. 60

aoft od SOm of each, dv~am wS be -;Iprh 11,500 scums, roughl tw" *k& of a

me~mdinfmy &dvon's fog MuOL 89gl *a~ml 34dm and 40M Jafaify Drummr we

Ihamsin-I -L Wand wE and lto rduce fm=e Wucftv ID ac~ms adjd cadre I~t gl kin.

T U. 6 two cadre divisons A*l in U. Ngia Guard -amm ID de* AN looc

concerning dims. type ones, TiU Natonal Guard does not provide a viabl r~omn symtm for

I I I % dewdopm.. mind *arn* tojecia *a cadre dvkm idea. AddM=*sy U. pVim cab fir

&ms two lvdak a to be amsmxced at alemea ftum Gnu a camke divioms auuabmizd trmagtb a

.saum~mt ezpuuw mind moceumay qippoach. As a remi6s, U.concqa being dawloped kia a

plm in aelactu* aca~oke vijmm~a., but -~ WOmua mg nchmizd infinwy bion. Tm

~imbt ID raf a -,cm -- 11, 9m a 2V hm chaty been vidimid; U...e umuw appea to own a

I pip m ru ker W, 1o-Amrigina deWLu. Tb p ecmep dnis do &ma U.tWo unii am not being

fanned ma cadte umii but rdm- -. m semum for U. Nafmmd Guard lo reeaim puuumui positic. and

two &slv~n &ap in Ub ft=e sbuchue.9

Hivngtw M ivid.u at ebty-" pacent aiimobl my sot be a bad polcy. Theme puftlaly

mre e &vW=r wE be abl to ceamplte - immIn and daplay hiaow tha *aklvn units. What is

wMI wim 6s, plman isha t kdoes not cem*pl with &v infent of U. Nationl NO"laa Strae and

fth D~et Planning Guidance docuuanmL An Ammy cafe &Ivhon is supposed to be a unit

tmourced. im puRaca mit-e wi W ats no equipmnd and about tumty parcen" of Ow require

I Im-1.91 Each TOE ocmut prfoduced byv HQDA provides a iAgt of U. number of

affim and NM~ req*mvd to WONabb a cadre force. A nmcbmized Wnmay divmon wM&

qaprointy17,600 saki.r at hadl I ugdm would hav a. peacfibme cadre force of about 3,500

- mm ad wo.Timers is Nidse ed Io qpuad tIme dmivloping cadve divhimn Tables of

Oguiriu and Eqmuk=Mt (TOE) since, as dhown in Table 1 belo, U. wead has, Already been

done. RAthe, 6a Amy doul spend bm. addneuhag odunr cadre issues such as whethe to

proide equipment to U.on cadre mmii., or where to locate U. units im U. 34tihfIfamy Divinian,

30

dositom Urn jumicm of nmwA moom Natoinia Guud Ewv... Thus md odw conuuin

=chi*l N hv-, mdassd b gta t-'o die daum. semda of Urn ftwue dim unp -- A ftirsU

du oat&caft kuvko.

TABLE 1: SAAMPIZ CADREC UNIT TOR MTENGTH 92

FULL AUTHORIZED CADRETOR/ ALTY1HORU CADRE PERCENT

TYPE UMi DamG~ S1IENCTH OF FILL

01-385L.100/ (AIX HMM. EN) 265 77 21%

05-145L00(Y (ENG EN) 903 163 13%

06-36S1A00/ (155MM3XI SP FA EN) 743 91 13%

07-245L00( (MECHDlJFN)M113 313 120 15%

17-375L"0 (AR EN) MI 550 151 27%

19-333LA00 (MP CO) 153 34 22%

TOTrAL ........................ 3427............ 643 .......... 19%

M wombpt to crat ca ca dividai whic reqaimu zugeuaton w an

&vhdm r'lwr dim i e awdhudn a nevly foamed ivbion mnkb a very dlew signa to die

-afw, Urn Coupreu, and Urn Anawim people Ile reat may be 6da de Anmy does Mo

iumddu'tuad wh a u Wzm hqnuimu unUrn Natina Secuily mad WMib"~ Stategies of dio Urgted Staft.

The wodd dietw h hred bmd ipd pfimaudy mad Amxia no kowW ftce Un dAnr of die mauve

nulcla skmii or wesate Eurapu Muvanion flue. Urn "evi Sovit Empkue * The faifite of die

Anuy to chang floe Urn Cold Wa' paraIgn to dieview wodd reslMes may have a negtiv

31

do ur Am for a long lime toIcoraL Akeady tine we questiom and crfficin abou the

iaz, inpine aud Wont of lb fwmbi cadre divionL The Total Aty bsdadm*is resapommble

for dldI dIeion md aould ac qdcl to get cadre dh4ldo back am tack, or ddstd from ft

fm= u . 7hb 6, andesd lt r m be ha Congre. wl ad to resolve what it

paesim a a Amyi y e 6 to hMiow r W gd .

fflb Am - Ob 3t4h and 40Mh Jbfa Divom at fl Weag of II,500 ad

ach do on* redm, eas im ho, nd be corm dred ce divire twiwo, bfu rathr

iuaduatIuaslhg&machm d kaf &W ow in am wlb a fmor uctwes. At uity-five puct

*a**0gth &lb. IvWom dhuld be a to achisvereadýing aTi above dbe C-5 level an lb

UA. Statuas Report in accordaice with AR 220-1.93 Inded of focusing onm nobfflzinm mn g

for Bier personnel in baic and advanced unit Wecbiques, lhue diviti ihould develop Madain

Easmatal, Took Luft (METL) for combat UAL. To mAke mauý use of th foace strcture to

acaive combat readinoss, ewach &oo•m t hon'ild be foaned as a dvih oieth two full strnt

ma.ver bdgaeamad appropriate suppoit uoi This would not degrade overal Amy readinm

damce v ,is= require reg atiralk imbi to acbievem hw umgt p to completing

imdtucdotifcalin, and de loyma Tbe ru-Pha ed Fomre Deploymeat list (TWDL) will

nake aifficiint ti-n'g dime avalable to te *am -tn d dvid= a ate deploying unim

Tbm reakt of lb cunr.n Americms polifical, climate will probably not ;erit lb 34th and

40tih Jnun~y Divhioms to rnnain as robust cadre dlvhiamn. The sze of to as e Force of 1995 b

already quemtioned as being too lsA, tha lb services bmed it an lbo Soviet dhea from lb Cold

VWk. Tb@ Cairmnm of lb Joint Chiehi of Staf4 Omairal Coin Powdfi fpt~sd arguet

dkining Pentag plnI anticipated lb fall of lb USSR and structured lbe Base Force

acodin.94. Wlicbvewr guument is accepled, threm e aeswg indicatiome lb U.S. Army wil

relhoce below lb twenty Pdivson biewi. Pipeelinat Bill Clinton wn elected an a pltatfo of

redkuced defamcuskm and a force ize reduction Aom 1.6 milIon to 1.4 wman service

manbeui The Army. dhun of fth 200,000 pers-on reduction is prese untlmknaown, but die cuts

wM' undoubtedy affit s of lb dihiom frme structue." Seetay of Defats Lsa Asn

32

has "adoed rednetans in tha med. foces, his plan be baed an "'ra or Desert Stom

eqdvaiel. wit no me than m aive Army divioms96 TIe ilent is car; dew, fm ddP l

wE dbbh mad Totel Army sio win bav to decreas oar time to kept pace with the Amod

R•eauss afhow the ca atk &ivimn tom as, thdu may be a need for a ce ati cocpt in

Sfitm of tih Total Army. Wih coninedprojec•n for a mmmiaa nftmy forme, aemmr Army

leadeuhip may be wie to rrmme thid optioin The fibew below an igheen &vWion forc the

Army goes, the more imperativ tk becomes to moutute a wel-dened mand viable fame

9 AoM usdion poliy. Fihting two Majo RegIonal Cwainagemcies (URC) wE aevarey tax the

capabMas of o Bae Force, mad ma even maA Army wll be Ims c of addresing dw

Puq Mt.97 S thS e ie of anm Army dvinon will be a long proce. (two yum or

mo)r the nad to form nw uits eady wKll be parmioum.

11e most inportant clemenet m, creating now uits as obbainng the cadre parsonnaL

Wthout .s trined officers and NCOsin place, fghtihg fors cam not take shape. It taka years

of toni cres . die nues of commander. st4 and NCO bada p 'Grow-ng•"m Army

better=o conumande or Conmmand S.aemat Maor requfis about e ighteen years of schooling mad

job eczmdce. 11 docti mad prooedures to procure the cma•d•e ma emential podia. of may

mccesiful recom ton o without which the Army is doomed to rpeat Franme's

eipueagco In Wmd WarD.

Prior to the Second World War, the French had a "Nation i Arm"t docein whkh

maintained activo w primarly to sere s cadre for new dWioas to be formed upon

Imbtion for war. Due to the lack of quafied cadre, a group of low pioty ("B" genes)

French disions wer comprhoed Almot owclh* of the oldest mad lowt trined resziss. In,

the 551h Infuaty Divimi this muda that Ion im four perc•n (20 out of 450 officers) were a

properly raned mnd prepared cadre. Coummeded by geeras canled out of rerem•nmt mad made&

up moody of mm or forty sairicafy cAed U " Aj," dvee of U.m gosly unapnired

33

4vim (53rd, 55ft 71d) •inuddup mannng do e cridoal defae at Sedan i May 1940. Ti

pmllo be d rab m for Pro mad a niay wit dafor dwGermn Any.9

An avahiaedon of doe U.S. Anmys cadre cauuept ahws duim litte defaitiw progress has

beeanme in andf* poImI- sonlere of cadre to creMae sew fightng u Thi smudy found

a*onoy muclawifleid docuen whch aulupg' to deS.e winoMre fte Amy wN Ab I the cadre

pIm d Jncommy to c am n sw . FORSCOM Rapdadon 500-3-7, FORMDEPS Vohume

VBL descrbmes de sowe of du cadre, "Aruy Rmsww Commmand (ARCOM0

Mmmiw Anea Commads (MACI mid Mm vwe Traiuig Commands G(rC oud,, whm al

edi" owatnd rieonaem camplesed, be prepared to provide le cadre for elctod fame

units. 99

Such a policy i not onun it i wreafdc. Paiulady gli ais. ,uatint

"be p are to provide, due c~a,•" "r d dimly i mpteseim.mfor ýditobe prmmy,

autxc of noew unit cadre. As prevuhly noted, d USAR doce not pause. dou fome struuctar or

MOS daitis to cadre combat un. Thewe •or y wil not be toabe provide doi n•myd of

seior leaders requird to form combat batafaions of a (ivomL Adionaly, Amica not wait

umai du ARCOs MAC, mnd rCs cmplete A od v sthad missio pns orto btoituuiug fu

IVoMMbiuda of Amy fomes. These unks al have mismion rquiuanl ain du vaining base,

tr- Alhiztion sites, and CONUS defm wMich tab d= to conflict termination.100 I a dffult

io bdevw dwu FORSCOM uow i to begin forming w unit at such a lat date in tue

M~b~OSDay (M-Day) sequmms

A second docusrnut addressing sources of cadre n doe Any/s budget request, dou Anny

PmRo u Object I hi (POM) for FY 94-99. Vohuzue M Rg k 10 1 of fth

POM is clumifled Scd and avaniae on to a limiwd audme priuanly saor kaders i thu

P, lagou- Ibis documat look at vriou aspects of an Amay wrcomdilai state, two of

which provide important u"clusifld guidm=eamon cadre pmrocuzt. Th firs is •tat fl Anmy

Wenads to hII nw units without degradad=iona any mner to doe eitin unite2 flis a

important because it demonstrates dust die Army does not plan to 'raW any of fle urn

34

divison to 8*z out do leadoship n~euuuy to cadre any of dom MW&A .N Tbls is certainly a

Id I'm option, as thi study has already noted some of *0 cobeai. n unitmy I-athmu thi

caused i Wodd War M. The Anrnrs future problem wil be to find m adequae o=c of ftmd

ad aperuced cadre eadert outide TOE umi. As *i mse condomn to draw down mad

mum mdT y mmpow pool dawk over tnm, do wS becoimn kacm* dificulL

The send a Army POMpeina m ue'sat s *0 amd tat, " eui"d

oacm and NCO leadmW in TDA poitin wi be reaigned as needed to mar new units as

d"y evdw into do fonre1 03 This i undoubtedly a more realhdc source of ocu•a•m for

cades dm *O ARCOMs, MACs, and MrCs mentiond in f FORSCOM FORNIDEPS

Volume VIL The "Tables of Diskibdon and Ailowuaces (TDA) AnryN cmmieft of po ti on

vatioau sotaf and propVuon (ROTC, recruiting) located prumarily outside dke combat dividon force

knmwm. With detailed rsmarch aid adaptim powiung TDA poition cm be idented for

udh acivation a cadre a a now unit upon bfiliL This low cos planing optio

couldg crea ec*0 ucsiof, bin for *e initiall units to be foanned. While *0 actal nutube of

diisions .quiruag rec nmidon wilM not be known unll a cri devlops, having a pool of cadre

avilab for now AC or RC dhviios will greatly facilitale ognaiiian ad training. Thus when a

needis identified Amy planners would not have to start at thde lovs •W (iWdedt cadrej but

instead could focus on acivating condngecy plans and ausembling cadres at propez mobffition

The Amny ualso, approach cadre procwurmnt with die realization that fth TDA Artay

s a necesay face of due owal combat effort whch does not go away in nationalme

Comdaing About twenty-fem patent of *0 active comnponmc104 program such as ROTC,

Recruiq& *0 Mbay Acadawy, Basic and Advanced bInvidual Trami gad RC advisors wi

not fpqe -in acriisin orderto prvide Allflir soldiersfor ý,1 -to coubat troop

units While thiere wil be room for Kme wr-dais reductions in ft TDA u=its, other

zeq~i ASOu (reenratonof edstig units, casuaty VqIc At) il abo impac on &a

numbers of personel xvaabe to cadre new units. Vt•h a requiremen for about 3,500 soldiers

35

pamr hAnized Winfanty dion, the Amy will not be able to ue tis method ma sole source for

cad,

The succes of this plnin option as conainget upon die Army having one oftie

reinil frmoiorn and coordinating all recuuiuta ufosm As amlray no04d

rea m, adtatio cut acomw mauw lInes of functional rposbilty, -usmdn policy, pcsConm -k

blo~ics, niobilintion, and faiding. Unity of cmunamd and uffort is mandatory to plan, revise,

and ex a • statyofre oAm•tion. Onby sting p ty for the pro n a single

apaq wR Wx be M* tohappen

The concluion of this study is that the Army can soM e cadre problem only by using an

adap planning approa•h across a broad bm of available opions The pnmy somure for the

cadre hould be DA positions fim both the active and reserve componaft Vobimteem retirees

and am trained nutasy manpower (rlead drough reductio in force [Rfn or veluntary

servic b ) shoud be m ained in data bae d&ug peaccuim for aiabt drg

enirgaics.Additionally, some cadre should come from units such as the ARCOWe MACa,

and MTfCs Finally, the Army shoul prepmr to extract a amall percentage of leaders from fth

foceWWbig oron ot h cde euiaens This woudW be the least desired option and

only Idanne for im oata~io as a last resort. Unf-, with fewer peondel resources

avaible in the yea ahead, this p may be necesmy eady in a crim.

In auomay, ft cadre division is an hnersting cocpt which affords uniqu oppotunities

to accomplish muanstitution tasks ea*. Hkwever, with tday's curen force structure of twelve

acamv and eight reserve component dimisi (includin toe 341 and 4Mt Mal) thi study

iremmends the Army net purme a cadre concept at this time. All referc to the 34th and 40th

Jafh ay Dv mns as cadre units need to be temad rather, dhm units hould be refered to as

m ut h m izd inflantry &vim. requiring rgeneration, as delnn of the CONUS-

based reinforcementd forces-in-beng

Widh th exzt significant direcd personnel cut, the Army needs to inameatey deactivat

dw 341h and 40th Divisiou.. This will sve approximatey 25,000 spaces by eliminating the two

36

me aipsdabl =iui ain do iv farce ofutu*=. Comzinxoaft wih unit redaciimw die

Tota AMu awe c-reme1 its awaruiss of, ad comomI a aedible vtW (if

remudluittiom. A comcaoie effort must be mkade to cratede *aeostat-ype- frameworkc of

adsp"i pl'innin opdim wid oadualy increainng mobiR~dmf on mm g in Fleible Dietmiat

Opium (FDO). Thin would include, such stups ar staid-b coabbig k~latio (Vp~iopiati

requests farce M%=ure es oxpumn), cadre proctieeinit plus, unit equipamot stoage, aid nw

Smhoudfac structuve slip below levels deaned by die Army leadership to be acceptable

rin (perhaps Iems dma nine activ and 6 zusuw comnponent dvivsions),d dies . crea"x of a cadre

unit may become a viable optim. Thui study recoammil die Army consider farming a cadre

unecumiz d ifatry bdgdade The assined brigade personnl would come from an eve mix of

AC aid RC soldiers in die two mechanized mnfuy, am amr, ame frct support fild ardleay,

an am forwad support battalons Roundig out the unit witha a cadre brigade -hed .ates "and

some imited support assefts die total requiinmt could be Iess don. 300 soldim,. Cadre

-W~mts would not exced eightea mondis in duration aid would be limited to one tUm only.

"Shadow*ng" auipamests with TDA positons would be aafthrized, and each slirwould be

awarded a cadre Addiioal SAMl Ideniffie (ASI) upon succesuib completion of theu mw A

- .I 11. OU5madt dv & ý it et f ouonntwould be stored at the inits home station to

supor die 0 -aIng aid mobdiriion equianem of fie unit

Locating such a unit at Fort Hood, Texa would take advantage of die pexouomi availble

in two active divisions, a corps headqut aid vauious non-dvisiona umita. Many of die cadre

A'obl- associated with doe rotatio of leaders through critical positions for profesional

dewog -aet could be addreued by thin collocation. AdFto aclot Hood faciltates, die

shadow concept by having acces. to quakfed pehlomme at nearby Fort Bliss, SE, Sam Houston,

and Polk for cadre assgnment aid -traing. Finally, ther is potentally adequate space aid

mainemcesupport at Fort Hlood to rapport a complete set of stored brigad equmipet.

37

11. mon difareu betwee doi brigde cadre concept and thiorn proposed mim past

would be doi=:. Tradiootoay die Army pew~vd cads, unis as ei Iing to be die actual nuk

which would form and deployr to Wila 11e realy today is that die Anny cannot afford to have

&o puuumid mmd CqiiPm.,t for uWraI &VIMIOO wOP for d. alat Of a glWa War. Thin M

cads.e hqpdo would cue not to ezpind into a fighting force, but rdw to bust owr Umm a pool

Of .zums md dedicatd leaders todvnin i procelmes required to form new uumits

When a national ergency develops, theme traied caft. identified by in AAI would be brought

wee~die fim doe AC and RC to form die ne butallmos, brigades, and &divinm of the

detmiminod f mcmogindn, nuods. In efMiP -, die U.S. AmWy would be repeatiog doe ezpeiemc of

dhe Pzuuia L~dWeh Of d110 early 1800. Follwing Geneal Shammhor~s exaunpie, by the yewr

2000, the Anny could im*mad drwlop a eoftaioedleadars, ezpedonced inadre

teduique and ready to form 3gw fightig forces. Succh an end sabM an both logic al md prudeM

for an Amny dauaty of reco mlton

Mme United States of America finds itsefftoday in die dilemma of celebrating a victory in

ft. Cold War, yet facing inbown military thraft in die fu1ure. T1m only certain defense policy is

that the miltary force stucture wil be significandy reduced ftern the previou levels of the long

confront ation M&d doe Soviiet Union. How far doese reducti. in personnel and equpommn should

go is what America nmu~ determine.

The National Security and Mihiany Sftrtgie of 1992 and 1993 have been dhe Obt effort

to deubs the desired mutiny end sota. Since dims are Bumb-era documents, dfe Clinton

-io uccuthely Iz d~i P 08 poAlic and deseanine d diredhction Anxica wil take

over die not few years. As indicated by Secretary of Defeme Ampio, reductios loom ahead but

dw e mu imultaneous pledges to moahntin U.S. nuffitary superiority wiAt a welltrined and

balanced force.

38

Rea~~nii.w be ft subject oif much debdat in U. howu Anivicm mihitagy samo.

As naled in dds monaorapku die caonept of riadlds awall accepted and audadeood by U.

cbi m ad mfftiy Iade= of U. national govunmnut Te issue, is whether or not die United

Sow cm affixd U. cos ausoiod wM& maintahing U. capablty to quickl rebuild it mtinay

Emk p~a~ps to those klm U. heights of die Cold War. Tina would ivolv soaigicant

kw~ ma mainpowar, -4uc md tecimolopy, prodaction, .todkpies, and indaeuial. base

infrve. Addi2onlly 1U11 mitazy must &dvlop doctzin to guidde eachi saeries plans and

fouindai. of Amad=u defame policy. VA&l tic is U.e stated case, Uw .2ý. S0-Of

z Pcomdftudonarec actually hollow and weask Mlw doctrin to provide adequate guidance for U.

and ezcuolm of such a Irrn hag---b yet to be wrte.Therefore U. Dapscunet

of Defame and U. vaioush miltazy deparlanents have been uniable or uinwlling to develop U.e

plans and dedicte U. toressu to malke ire-comtitudio a readty. DoD doomed thim concept enty

by de~ignting it as n. 'eAComWm of reuources" show in U. Defame lnigGuidace. As U.e

lowest prioit for funding and. resurnces, ArVUcou -` 1 ', wS nee raein much more d=a lip

servce or minor invastmnats in equipmeant, peanom4nd, infrut10 WNuctL Thin ha U. spin-off

effect of not developing competent leadeo.- thos who, an clear ia dirk visi. ofU faure and

fuffly prepared to recoinutute entirel new fighting forces Mwha U. need wbe..

In addition. to ift low priority, r cot,- mo has been locked out of U. adapive planning

p==e kwadvctd by U. Depialmuat of Defamse. By Unitafing U. concept itrc*l to g&ba

wafrDoD has again am r ldw U. hMu of f cPhhibutim Gradually '--creasang selecive

response oplioms ohmu of total war aon vita ID provide vursaftiy to our national leader..

M~io~aly fleible oplion promot defternce while building a global. warfitbng capabity to

meet pow"sibleed dipomacy. bntgratod My ino, a U Graduated Mobilizetio Response

ProCe~se, J~~f -*rcutn Flexble Detennce Options (FDM) would, mom timely mobilization.

of all kmtnoentu of natonal power. Currently, U. systm onl craats new fihigforces at U.e

39

and of tim nmloilzon epecdn. This Anmsic UutMo of pIpu too late for thm next war is

a cbduig. tdo counaky must overcoum as it looks ahead to thm fot1 e

In oider to firmly estabish frecomdtudonti as a pfliar ofU.S. national policy, American,

hindesan mW vedst .aut redouces in a cpapuhiy to bidnow flgl~ug foirces This woud be

- .xuwwproposiuiwa ndvn h e dedicationofakufifcug rmuvc War jumwnmatuedl

and asu would need to be pcbued and moaed at peak level in depol. Research and

'Mehna fhr soplintiatd weapoms and equipment would be requked to contnue. An

additi naleed would be es- 16 1ng dome coordbudn with civilua ihadny to mainasin key

production faciliie for numobizion surgen on ihad ndc.. Finaly, military manpower and unk

cades would requm trinig and nmnitxing inpaunmae data base for eventual activation and

fonmation of 1mw unios.

Via prjoected longer wanming lima for dtcigand reactin toeDnerpq niay threat

to die United States such a ireconituton srafteya is nmceuary. There is no majr military

power in dom wrld whuch cmn conupew with the United State today or in tim near futu reWithout

drastic foirce reductions America can nmaz its national, security and react to M4jor Regional

Cotigem.(MRC) witimut rec stomd

Tms prenut Amerian skraegy of reconstitution is a hollow program which reads well but

pronines a lot mo m.ta it can delive. It is in the bee hintees of tie Depaitmnent of Defense to

ddi ---sreoudludonas- a Opiier oi th nations nujlbam strateg. Ma wil ens. sufint

inveItmuata can he made by dom iodividual fdmitay imijicas to presa timpresent combat

readines of thseir fightin auil Then the hiumi potential of reosiuin can be a laid-up asset

in the foaM Of weldvlpddoctijm and plans. Inking ftim pla ns it the Graduated

Mdbinuton Respxe sysem, will also, tie tim stateg to early wanig qesytn and eamaz

Ammics in neva again unprepae for war. With din utouc- fing Amidca- cin replace the

placebo of ou cnen Imilitary strategyof reconstduio wihacs-fetv, epniesrtg

duat will Pus = u readiness for di nam conflict

40

Tie following defiom of die militay tamn RECOMSTIT7= ON v provided.They him been collected ftom the vanou doemnems noed and point out di wide rangeo4nmauwp for do, iziteg cancep

1. wAfl blty to geas. wholly new foam beyond the Vi mm - capabtm.prvddby samti and resaw fomces, and tagm~es curefi autntio to do viAl douom& of

ow -~tm -omod tOn bmk bame, scimae and technology, and maipower.(NA7TIONA L SEMCUR 1TT73MTE G] rOF THE UNITE D .S7TE.7'= Augusa 19 91, pagep 2 9.)

2. Forming, rining, and Suing tnow fighting units flim cadres; umoblizingpreviousl trained. or new mianpower,; and activating the industia base on a larg scale.Recmmonsiuto also huwiw mebai. tehnoogy, doctitrin, I -g experiecednu~ary pezonnl and innovation nacessy to retai due comnpetiw edge indecisve areaof poketal muTiny coumpeilo.L (NATINAL SECURITY S7R47TAUT OF THE UNITEDSTAI= Janusy 1993, pope 15.)

3. nolvesm fbannng training. and fielding new ints huchiding initall drawing oncadre-tM~ unt lad uip mlIftay ami^ =mobilzn manpowcc, and actiating de industkabase on a larg sale. (NATIONAL MILTARY SZRATEGY OF TIE UNITED STATES,Januy 1992 page 74-.)

4. IU1 capabilty to generte wholly umw forcs to hedge aganst renewed woMl&tLras (DEFESE PLANNING GUIANCE, May 1992, page 5.)

I. The capailiy to ezpad =nllT~y power by establishing and training now waits.Actionskbx I ncde biLizaton of Iset (up to TOWal MoIaiN) and fthexaio of fteindustrial base, wilh the reestablismenta of a gl"a warfigfti capabiit. (JOINT~STRATEGIC CAABILITIE PLA, Calendar Yomu 1993-1995, Augus 1992, pagpGL.17.)

6. T10 AbiMY to continousl mantain, in suffmicn snuesae, capabfiime to cetaddijona &M~e and capabiliies beyond those in the acum and reserve units retained anthe base Amme (Dr. Dodde Goure, m briefig to Mr. Lewi Libby, Pricipal DeputyUndeusecetauy of Defense, Strategy and Resoumce, Januay 1992.)

7. A natioal security smWeg to insur de capailty to expad due exitig formepostur by maintaiin and investing in die necemay long lead denents." The capablityto recmutdelm ontae fthrug policies, plans, and unveshnetm is intended, to reduce

41

tho d of a dlobd threat and b ini w mf N ood, by d m ig 13 kizot ancapaba $'1 1uo to chumps in 13 hier.uad moeumU (Ar. Michad Aiumw,

*=&I a d&, Mffic of Unde Secrdwy of Dcfin for Poky, 6 Jiu3, 1991.)

L. 1. Pb maIwaleo1ib of Ow Amniyu n nkwtw soon, a table of or7Atinonand emitwnt =it which has previouudy been hudiiwdd. fl@ can be dcam onl by 13Sear1a od.w Amay. 2. Raaarsi waft to dW*V*vdfode.AW 3. To Adx or romahin,mobk n , r - 111 1 a weruu. 4. The proemn of raviteaI* n.ik ameanblag duvo*~13 replecouzi of oaiiind dePle. k -I hbmbhuiml of now bun', and repsckagoq of

co --- whare qiproliis (ArmuyfRguklkm 310-25, Dicono~.yoArmuy Term,, 21May 191&

9. E aahyactindm~ cmfe plan and. inipement to seoft unf to aduckd lw of comabat uffibctiviu COMasO~ with aMimao Secmui-ans d

avaiable rGDOam nami~oay ~hicde - rMOMM tde uit fioni canbatkm sk lwrn aurnud Mo aakbin 13A h chain of comimemi, the ag13uu for

fat=x opru s~bliling unit cohesiam (U.1 Army Fleld M~wuml 1(KJ-9.Recomitula,, Januuy 1992.)

10. Rtoakmig as.. to a Iw coadito... (Webster's Dieftaiy~, 1986.)

RECOXE7VT1TON- A nationa warcily drateU iwolving die forming, riigand Bligof nw nilitmy ait in haorder to dier a poftmuda advermy frm compeftngad~Imly wida the Uiibd, Ste. Shed deturec 64 a czdile wmaffbg capub~iiy,flim uibmtw fohce pckW to woal Wvw, vii be provided from a garabdot nwilztim--u-- -e of nmapower, cadre usf, uockwpil id. ww eerv - ailiy mva, ruesearh and

ftchuda x~iop aw t anidmd upurienced kadmWl and oupandod. inubtrid bas

42

Tiw Mow* six Cadre Diviimi opd win cammdosd, i n de dcimio processfor -1 to vindb =aim* being Iune in dwNmi Guard Thein hforant was

tn AW, C~shimd Ar Cindm@ Fart Lwadh, mm I pEX-%, EX-..

QlJg,: VT* s I ly 7,000 p1oul Opdor 1 has am ofi inu 1 81 Prsone.yun it was dedmd io conduct aseiscied bmi comeuving maidrn advanced

hIlvidd- , ,be -6 1 m~ui, aid to ban kbuod canmi lid no mue capabily.The&M d vi on haew a v atm leader cadre and wig rapi Paomad. in eWrades sgiffgt do, mig cmptab anmiWthin upndwW p~ummel nminbf Aquis.d, 10 conduact ik .qmipru MMbNidprepae forca crn ti oa.mu 6n

a .00*caf. O&W ,R -Id. kkvi -1 1~ I1g - nh1 yinntb aidMME (If..nim Eussa EiPOIS far TsdWW a*. to uukai leader and

. - P pDGAy0 hr in &dv R nimbspa mIE dn 10mamI. Les iak is * F II-s ing* commemie -ov s.edfing Aob after mobilza M1W &vimn wilLard its" leaders in q~mt~iy to be Iuw pIquo& Dqblynutd tm ains

dehnupon th cc -pq -1 69 weeks ac11w;77 weeks mm~ If ft initial oquipmmatma ilnmar is sliamd~inm do &6m, regard. o(caaposent, can dploy in 64

week.. Option 1 consainsd second higinut cost for active, as wel a rserven

QggL.; WMt apr.in~ 6,000 pasunaL Opeler 2 was deigund to conduct aeholed.Advaned indIividuual inukg be ulf-suffcioK and have a limisd comand lied mimcapbilty -(Alho* u thle i Opeonl 1).11wividrn hassufficimut pasmeinu~ rad.mftvu;Auxoughcapt 6 AsOpsia , Opdniiscoilyuusoinhishpuamvd

ana emrpked to conduct advaiced idvidua trumaid prepa far combatoperiam~Cdi faco. - in aut ~a in dvaied .d~dal a n~ad

MmE re unu-ts to nmkitai leader aid trinr ificiumey for do divialarn post-zmobilzatim subm A trade-off wilh reaped to i -r-aseI mombeus ofI Ps aým- is is hfact tha less persanad M mrequrapbed afte snoaal~izatin. Therelr% 6s Uis a blow ftfacto, dowing So commmunud.r - bilulty in tFm M pa fub.mw arvkam~ Iledivisi wEl afford ift junir Isads= in oppammmity to be I~ , ulfleV& Deployme"an for as davwiser a6 week% regard.. ~ofamuomat ragin d eqa,"uu tbesama is. almkaedin f~vt&idcarn cmy dioni 57 meekm

Qpml* A W IR I lohuuy 3,M0 ;,auwI Option 3 could 1uiu 6 elected advancedadidd baibut it is not N ul-aufiiu aid has no fold takig exm capabity.

1he dividm has nuninum perumlin aSgrd.s segant thOughm~ captain aid vay limbtedcadre WE Compered lo, Options 1 aid 2, Option 3 ais loutM coody, with fewer--u- - -- havn only Shome pemoumel aecommay to plan far aid conduct mann utaff

43

&waf fo pas mi~ A tad.ff wid rupec tord Iowa nmumb ofIea is ftn fe *ai me p fib m requird afte mmobii7oa. Tlwdxuf

dm s k u z* ammch"a wft ftn youm, Iss fil=* lif

- t Irndl olp a huit for tr pdflcs"n fwor uuw loodom Doploymofor Un &%Wim in 57 1e-ka,1 8 "m of ccmopoo If USo di& is Om inmnd- ta~Sud arie. kwiooddd ii sdvhion 57 weekls p dqiay 01h of

~4: f SWi I&"-ehaas 6t , Apum~ Op"h .4 was domigrnd to pruo4do for-umo boohqunk 4ootiom cp'r imadus ehcdhc aiuo

a~ined i~kad ~ig mild be cmdic"& This opima in um-infl and has aI~d, cmomo Sld umucls, and &M amucke cqrnbft. The &vW=a bas a

r~ ajacak ad w rmks iirnmpuu~m -- igrad. upowhmoa captak1POI 6a m Wik wo UIIs I~ "Okarn toi. zuiu omdoct iod" M-sin mad prep.. 0fr co"ui opo~mrn, 6 UrnM lvis acaiy. O&W facom drinikg tiamcog areUn ft q- b~dgu at ALA) 3ua wel as Udo amcheed dkimin Ame A tado-off b ID obibr imake otlp-mma w rnt fmAc Uo I=;. pumrl 0 fib eq~e antp fter

a~bAka.Thmdxe% Urm is Ime. Mr whM Mo dowsr camone -s fltieaft moFm. TIn~vim wEl Mee lion'* officumlb woppadrtnuiy lbebrouch

~pd~d. Diq~n dolme for Urn Ivkidm vmue dopidipg on coa~ 77 weeks forUrn acliv compomim mad 77 weeks for dorous mf ft Urn *Widi erunI tiuin=m isi dhka4 ebmed, Urn mki, regaric. of cinyommt cm deploy anS7 weeks.

Ouam 4 cooftim Uft U*d high cost for bodt actiw and reserv coaom

~I: Vx& qwInkud 1,0 pua1 Optio 5 wa deiwrnd to opliz Urpuaxud m Urn gad.uurgsut U oug ptakL Opto " skm aftl ii o .chA lips af

Opti" 1 wft - add~oo 1,730 pommunI. Depoyuac lb for ton divn mi ,Op"io 1: 77 1 vecs for actiw cmonoma mad 77 weeks for Uarn mw compomner mad57 weeks an requied w-Moot fts kfida equpment takning nmuhmn Opdio s contains &ce-oo cabt for bo&r actfw mad iummw cmornonaf

Qpkm&: With -iso ni-dy 7,000 pu~mami Opti" 6 is a wiatisfn ofOption 1, Urn uqio dieMW e being dwsurce of do of Urn pr..moM Wzton pasouonLIn Optio 1, Urn cadre pernamd us asmgprd to Urn &vkio mad hran asa &vbiem. ImOptim 6, lbs cadre pesumaui mu ha1.ultd km Urn TRADOC TDA t iming buss'Thusl pm -peg-ft a thir daiTRA CIDMA poekidw. On an aui=4 iiMNam* or qoatu*y bo*h U.. poumme mobliz mad umasn Uft cadre otff for a cadre

qvkon * rnM depo~ynmu doe fw Urn dviskon b 77 weeks for Urn aso" cmnponent IfUrn kida e irnat~l taking melon in daiciusd, Urn ivkiaa, regarhou of compomnad,cm dpo~y irn 57 we&&s

SA VW qflim 3,200 psumon, Oplim 6A ig a waialiaci Opfim 3,11O. mq*x diframic bein to moo of lho p , ma 0 d puumuw Inopm3 wcdepsm ma@Wt d Wmadai sa&d & vUobffmWL In Option 6A .dwoakk pauumd wev duaI~hibd kmu Ow TRADOC 7DA. .. bus. Thus porncai prhmn ia Uw diy TRADOC MDA posilim. Onmanind, ur&-uudor qiu~bty smoj baib Im.puou mad tausion cadreso&Z T1~d~Iuynwnt tnfor U. bkimB 77 weusfor U.aciwcm~aiyo. If U.iome6yiq rpa amvau *. *I. a~4 dcofwaingcmdepoyinykS7 woub

45

lftajjgg Gempodg i6m Speechbd deor b Aspen J~uis Aspen, Ceokxado, 2 Aupu 1990.

m ad= ~Gam Corn L Powdk Chmm, Jint7a" atSbEA hinuy 1992:74.

Sambff f le l~ &O MMWaibelc, The Wbif House, AMMu1991:29-3 A L2 2

*Ufý - uimm isal esrm 99-mgam(Secret) Wauhigmon, Offce of flSecrtay of Defms, 22 May 1992'.

Sim aw 993199 U=Wambhgeon,loin aish afts -4 25ARN192

6twm Zgn,%MML~d aw 993W ..bta, 1991.

7 M~ (1992)6 35.

kIS& (1992), 6&7;, M (1991),14-15.

l0oba2t. A. Doughty, Teedsfna (Chdbea. Scarborough House, 1985)121-24.

11a W.Sp@uer, Plv(WauhIgtmL!Cqumu uruy m.19 171-172.

12joj.n T. Nab=. I go=r C. MMAnhL SbmqcLadaI idd.Cialmi ofB~~k4AM,939,1 (Ca~e Ewacks Stralagi S~mrle Jhm&ht 1993),1-3.

13WA Kruidberg and Minion G. Henry, ffgwi MaifuinIk1wB~A=17m;I- - (Wahia Depubmut of lbs Am~y, 1955), 5D7,623.

14O~ E.Hcl an Wilan . SoM L~wrmwc: Univerit~y ofKamess Press 1984

46

15NATO Hmed ýqu -mtm Briefing to Advamiced Opmrdwial Sbxrs Fufowsbip (AOSF), Bnuokh

Bc~n 1 M"rc 1.993.

16 A~od Force Sauig (APsounh) Caumonaud Briefing to AOSF, Naph.k Ital, 10 Mamh 1993.

1714ATOhaqutu Briefin to AOSF, Bromokh BdoW., 1 Mh~m 1993.

DQC C qp - i mm-d Ruoswh Service, 1992),25-2&.

19LTC Nihohl. Motowyta USAF, Telephoni interview, 6 Janusy 1993.

2()RhacLomdbzd Tran A CniA Mar 1E of &ce Now NMamA So=*it ShmUty,-&mwk 19 (FARI1991):11-12.

21U.S. Army, U&WA r9Y 19209Uga(Washington, DC: Departmentoddu Army, 19911,:.

22 M~ (1992, pae40.

23Md 10, Unitd Staes Cm*e Chapter 331, sectio 3201, pare 54.

MMii 10, U.S.C, aaq*W 331, Sectiom 3222,3225, pa.W 71-72.

2hu-U&M*WkgM~ 581.

26MM Stew Culmi, USAF, JCS J-5, Telehmic intrview, 30 Deember 1992.

27U.S.Amy, FM100-.Bm (Wnbhingon Depsneat of 2w Army, 13 luiuuy

28motwyAk, intridew, 6 Januuy 1.993.

29CuhIga, Mao~wytak inwiewg Mai 3. Guubak MoIffllzma Pokcy and Ph=. Dmvsin,FDAA, TelPhesic interview, 31 Decanber 1992; LTC Gleorg Wilmkov USAF, JCS 3-5,Tdopbaooi inerview, 31 Dmeod 1992; Ms. M* Wamo4 State& War plh= Diviion,DCSOP% HQDA9 Telephocic inteaiew 13 Jamaay 1993.

47

31SW abi& at Staff (j-5) hiduig 10 th Advwod Opwsmtim Skaft Febwmhil theP~iaumWaubik~m, D.C. 5 Febuazy 1993.

32U.S. Army, 33125 kM ofUieShmAVm (Wulhigton:Dspwl tnamztoflsAmy, 1916, 34.

33achapter 1.

34US.S AMW, -405 MQM

Q&M=E (Wuhimgte DPUUDI oft th Army, 1916 Fm wilmm.35FCICU CONW A 2-UDUSCMAgbgzIm

1991).; Vaime VII of FORMDEPS: Fmcei Cumnmmwd,0--7

36LT.S. Army,(Wuhingt ~oEDphrbMW of the Army, 1992),A 1-016.

"3 Wamw intsrviw, 13 smuarj 15993.; Gcodi*h 5

39L1.S. AyME IlU. :aWQgih1m.~., Di utmmt of the An"y

1993) 2-9.

40lbkL, 2-9.

41 S ArMW, pi

(Fart 1L hMu, FORSCOM, 1991),4.

4 2MA~ (1992M 7.; adGokjf&j M R-, . Wf bri,,3Decunbu 1992.

4jlmS Puutay and Leamad Suiivan, Jr., 'Prusying Stwg U.S. MoIbffziond Capabilt,'~~ 75 MA~ch 1991),19-21.

4 4MLM-K IoaeltmD* _maf M(Wa'hiqtm Off=c of Strateg* Coqipetiineus,Prinia Deo"t Umder Seutarwy of Ddeime for Strateg and Ecuomoam, undated) 10.

4 -5Feduu Eamvgmi Mmagnmut Agency,

aMM (Wuhiiton Guowniit Printing Offce-, 1992),2-1.

4%W-i, 2-1.

47pauI E. TW rkla nI& b= oA - to iWDm~

EEZ(19921,1-2.; Pruidbit RomM Rasap Execdwonw a 265 MTw WhileHouse, 18 Noanbv 1988) Scdum 201(4)

51LT COL Wigbm 3. Evu.9&d QWUMU M'AN m M , M(Wa hh~t.L huhubiul Cob-eg of di. Armed Foce., 19911,1.

5 2E~a. (1992), Chate 3.

53Ibid, B-1.

54ZkL, 2-1.

"k55 (1992),7.; Gold& 2-25

5 arBura Stw, "RswvuW TAM & YeW tO Train," Jan. Defin Weky1(14 Mar&h 1992),* 421.

* SUnaito Stat. Army Combined Am. Commnd (CAC), AumlYb~(Fort Lmavmiwrm.& Guvumnat Printing Offmice 1992) -1.

59GONA dchalW 21-25. WilE.. intview, 31 Deceber 1992.

* ~61M 1992, 37.

49

da~o~zNow(SprugfielI& G & C Mcciatk-Webuter, 1977),966.

(Cadhi Barrack:SatgcSuishdie,12)3-.

,65'VL Tduadsfilov, Nam f R.g fM od=Aumi (oscow- Lwhiaad: StalePuhbhimdglHouse, 1929),32.

67Matdiw Cooper, LIHA (Chehca.- Scarborough Home, 1978),117-119.

68COL Charles E. Heller, 'A Cadre System for the U.S. AnnyW ,' w7 (c~1991),14-16.

W9bL 617.

"7Joh T. Nelsent ,geo=g C. Mmbsal Statgic Leadersh and th hlegsOf~~1394 (Carlisle Barraks: Sraegc& StUdies Institut, 1993),1-3.

71i,19.

3Hcbeer, 'A Cadre System,' 19.

74U.S. Army, ormkk..A=.Mkiili lJ3= (Fort Mconro: Army For~csCommand, 1951),1-2; 11-14.

'75U.S. Army, Car(lnfro eCmlR W asff hingt nonTh General514x 1951).

76Joh S. Ptuggy, and Leonard Sullivan, Jr, 'Presrvng a Stron U.S. Mobiliztio Capablit,'75 (Mrh1991),21.

77LCDR Him J. Vanoekel, &g==Mizt of the &Wa Rmmrv Force - A NecMOi~ tobaJM & JC Ca~wtd MM(Newport: Naval War Cb~ege 1991).

so

78LTGi Freduki J. Brwnm, Mw U.S. ArM in Traniuia 11 (WaihkigOL Bruuec'/ hr, 1993),76.

79 CACq ~ Y aY EX-1.

SOUbiL, EX-1Z 13.

8IbiL, EX*12; WMM Wwieviw, W. Robort Wafr, CGSC, (DJCO), Foat Luvonworth,Kansa, pesonala ktitervw, 4 January 1993, (Mr. Walz was nmnber of Strategic War PimaDhdiuam, DCSOPS, during tie Cadre Division. Study.)

83CA, Qat~h m~wb~aEX-1Z,13.

4MEX-12.

85 M~l 10, Unitd State Code, h re Section 523.

WCAC, C~uA uae~ EX-lO.

Guard Auociatian of fte United States 1990). S.

88CPT Daniel MMMe~nUSA, NatiWa Owd~ Buu=a (NGB-ARF-I- Divison Forc Integration),teepbanic -nevke October 1997-

8%&id; Greg Seije "Laze Ca&=e Puzzle Expeam," AzmVXim (23 January 19931,28.

90Sei*& wLuer Cadre," 23.

92HQDA, IabjujwaEggn 15- isna 1992 except TOE 01-385LI00(Attack Helicpter Battalod) whsich is1 October 1939.

93U.S. Amy, &WA gg=201 Unit Statbus zL (Wubhgtma Department: of the*A=V. 19XX).

"~Pavwt d lh Bmaow 1,3. COL Reid K. Beveridge, "Bas Force v. Zero Base,"N~a~u~d46 (April 1992),22-24.

9F'rh or Cat B*-t -r 53 (2 November 1992) 19.

"-6 The Futow of fth Guud and the Rusty," amLud (April1992) 37-38; MortonKomdrack -Mh AM*i Papen,- o ob 206 (27 April1992) 11-12.

97Gc&* 4-5

"9Alist Home, TOIA= na BM& amdondan. Paigin Bools, 1%919),2-224.

99FORSCOM, FORSOMR &NWM 00,44 4.

(Wuhhgmgta Depariment of the Army, 1992)

10 21hL3, 17.

104BG Richard A. Chl.oat USA, briefig to Advanced Operatonal Shidwe Fellwshi (AOSF),Wuhnbgtm, D.C., 5 Februay 1993.

52

Brww., LTG Frederc 3. Ila U.S. A= in Trmition U Wubinton Brasey's (US), 1993.

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Homos, Abtai. To lme sk %ft Landon Penguin Books, 1969.

Kennedy, Paul Mýi :h 'ie~Fl of die Great m Now York: Rmadom House, 1917.

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* ~We~icy, Russell F. LIM= of - United SWILAM New Yock Mlacmilan Conaany, 1967.

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Depuenat of Dcfinue Ranxtof the Sazrew ofDefeme to no rsdetaddi opWahngton, DC iumamy 1991.

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53

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Hiu, Charles E. Econghwv of Force A Total &rMy T~he sre Det&wu Fomc MM&e StraegiSftudiebsMImtus U.S. Army War Coleus, Cariii. Bairac, Pa., 15 March 1992.

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54

Nehmo, Jahn T, IL Gemzda Gern e C. MushalL SrtgclamhpadteCalne oftheAmy.1939641, Sftat Sta~ium ub~s, U.S. Army War C~olleg Carlcl

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60