nrc exam appendix d scenario outline form es-d-1event 4 sop-6, event 5 sop-34 11 2 2 100% event 4....

NRC EXAM

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

I I

\--

Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: Simulator IC-20

1. 96% Power Rod Line >loo% (103%) Turnover:

1. Raise Suppression Pool water level to 200 feet using CSH Pump per N2-OP-33

Scenario No.: NRC-01 Op-Test No.: NRC-01

Event No.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Malf. No.

RR08B

FW03A RR31 RR30

FW35

Switch P628-B22C- S4A-A

TU02 9% and

MCOI 15%, Ramp Time 3 minutes

Event

N2-SOP-34 Stuck Open SRV

M (ALL) Condenser air in-leakage results in a slight drop in vacuum. Because of the rising turbine vibration, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram and trip the main turbine. N2-A RP-0 1 N2-SOP-9 N2-EOP-RPV

of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal

Final Submittal Thursday, April 21, 2005

NRC EXAM Loss of main condenser vacuum. The degrading vibration causes a main condenser vacuum leak that degrades rapidly once the reactor is scrammed and results in automatic closure of MSIVs. The loss of the main condenser as a heat sink requires manual operation of SRVs for pressure control and contributes to challenging the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit. Rising Suppression Pool temperature requires entry into N2-EOP-PC. N2-EOP-PC

TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO: SEE SECTION D.5.d)

9

ACTUAL ATTRIBUTES

10

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) Events 9,lO 3. Abnormal events (2-4) Event 4 SOP-6, Event 5 SOP-34

11

2

2

100% event

4. Major transients (1 -2) Event 6 (and 7 only counted once)

Event 6 and 7 EOP-RPV. EOP-PC 5. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive actions (1-2)

FWOIB FWOIC 1

2

Incomplete Scram. When the crew scrams the reactor control rods fail to insert due to hydraulic lock. Reactor power will lower to about 18% to 23% by APRM indication. The crew will be able to manually insert control rods using RMCS. Additional manual scrams will be successful in inserting control rods.

N2-EOP-6 Attachment 14

The crew will be required to respond to a failure of RRCS to initiate and WCS to isolate when SLC is manually initiated.

N2-EOP-C5

7. Critical tasks (2-3) CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

capability after terminate and prevent injection is performed. The crew will be required to perform RPV Blowdown when RPV water level cannot be maintained above MSCWL. The use of Alternate Injection systems such as low pressure ECCS systems is then required to maintain adequate core cooling. EOP-C2

Emeraencv 2.2.2

4

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) Events 2.3.4.5.8.9

6

1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) Event 8 EOP-C5. Event 10 EOP-CZ

CT-1.0 Close ADS valve prior to SPT reaching 110°F CT-2.0 Avoid exceeding HCTL CT-3.0 Restore and maintain RPV water level above

CT-4.0 Fully insert control rods MSCRWL (-39 inches)

of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal

Final Submittal Thursday, April 21,2005

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO

NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 48

RECIRC FLOW UNIT FAILURE/FEEDPUMP TRIP WITH PARTIAL RUNBACWTURBINE HIGH VIBRATION/FAILURE TO SCRAM

PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05

VALIDATED R. Lanae, B. Moore, M. Smith DATE 2/16/05

MANAGER 6 NA Exam Securitv

GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING

OPE RAT1 ONS

DATE Y / L I / Q ~

DATE

CON FIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Securitv DATE

SCENARIO SUMMARY

Length: 2 hours

Initial Power Level: 96%, above the 100% Rod Line

The scenario begins at 96% reactor power. The crew will add water to the Suppression Pool using the High Pressure Core Spray System (CSH) per normal operating procedure N2-0P-33, High Pressure Core Spray. While water is being added to the Suppression Pool, Recirc Flow Unit input to APRM/RBM fails downscale resulting in APRM high power scram signals inputted into the Power Range Monitoring System logic modules. The crew will bypass the affected instrument per normal operating procedure and annunciator response procedures.

The crew experiences a Reactor Feedwater pump trip and partial automatic Recirc Flow Control Valve (FCV) Runback. The partial runback occurs due to a trip RCS FCV hydraulic power units. The result is slowly lowering reactor water level due to failure of reactor power to be automatically reduced to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump. Reactor water level will slowly approach the automatic scram low water level of 159 inches. The crew will manually insert CRAM rods to reduce power approximately 10% to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump (65%). This action will return reactor water level to the normal band of 178 to 187 inches.

After the plant is stable, the total Steam flow signal to Feedwater Level Control operates erratically resulting in water level transient. The crew will take manual contol of Feedwater to stabilize level. Manual level control will be required for the remainder of the scenario.

An inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV valve occurs. The crew will take actions required by procedures to close the valve before a manual scram is required at Suppression Pool water temperature of 1 10°F.

NRC Scenario 1 -1- March 2005

When the ADS/SRV is closed, Main Turbine vibration begins to rise. The crew will manually scram the reactor and trip the Main Turbine when procedure limits of 12 mils are exceeded, since there are no automatic turbine trips associated with turbine vibration. When the reactor is scrammed all control rods will fail to fully insert resulting in reactor power level of approximately 18% to 23% by APRM indication. When MSlVs close on low vacuum, heat will be added to the containment during SRVs operation for pressure control. The transient is complicated by loss of the remaining operating Feedwater pump and the inability to maintain water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches). The crew will perform an RPV Blowdown to lower RPV pressure which allows the use of RHS via Shutdown Cooling line. This is the last remaining preferred injection system. If, in the SRO’s judgment, additional injection sources are required to restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL, Alternate Injection systems can now be lined up to restore and maintain level above -39 inches. The crew will execute Alternate Control Rod Insertion procedures to fully insert the stuck control rods, such that the reactor will remain shutdown.

Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C5, C2. SOP-6, 29,101 D, 21 and 9.

EOP-6 Attachment 14

EAL Classification: SAE 2.2.2 Any RPS scram setpoint has been exceeded AND automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown conditions without boron AND EITHER Power >4% OR Suppression Pool temperature > I 10°F

Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is restored and maintained in normal level band 160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully inserted.


I. SIMULATOR SET UP

A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent. Reduce power to 96% with RCS flow.

B. Presets/Function Key Assignments .-

I . Malfunctions:

a. RD17

b. RP12A

c. RP12B

d. CU08

e. RR08B

f. FW03A

g. RR31

h. RR30

i. FW35

j. TU02

k. MCOI

I. MCOl

m. FWOIA

n. FWOIB

0. FWOIC

p. RP14A

q. RP14B

r. RP02

LOAD COMPOSITE 003 RD17 at 23% power QUEUED

RRCS Failure (Div I) QUEUED

RRCS Failure (Div 11) QUEUED

Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail, TRUE QUEUED

RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B F3

Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE F4

HPU B PMP Number 2 Failure, TRUE F4

TUA 2 seconds

HPU B PMP Number 1 Failure, TRUE

TUA 2 seconds; TRA 10 seconds

Steam Flow Input Fails to FW Control, TRUE

RELATIVES USED TO CAUSE ERRATIC OPERATION

Main Turbine Vibration High F6

Value 9; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes

Main Condenser Air lnleakage F6


Main Condenser Air lnleakage ET02


Condensate Pump Trip PIA, TRUE

TUA 8:OO minutes for all 3 FWOls

Condensate Pump Trip P I B, TRUE

F4

F5

ET02

ET02

UE ET02

, TRUE F8

Condensate Pump Trip PIC, TI

RRCS ARI Failure/Defeated Div

TUA 1 :30 minutes

RRCS ARI Failure/Defeated Div

TUA 1 :30 minutes

I, TRUE F8

RPS Failure to Scram Automatic, TRUE

TUA 1 :30 minutes

F9


s. RC02

t. RH08

2. Remotes:

a. RH55

b. MSOGA

c. MSOGB

d. MSO6C

e. MSO6D

RCIC Failure Isolation of RCIC, TRUE

TUA 1 :00 minute

Group 5 Isolation Failure SDC MOVs, TRUE

TUA 2:00 minutes

LOAD COMPOSITE 001 RHS SDC A and B

PIPES FULL

Defeat Level I MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED

TUA 1 :30 minutes

Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED

TUA 1 :30 minutes


TUA 1 :30 minutes


TUA 1 :30 minutes

ET03

F10

QUEUED

F7

F7

F7

F7

3. Overrides:

a. None

4. Annunciators:

a. None

C. Equipment Out of Service

1. None

D. Support Documentation

1. Working copy of N2-OP-33, H.3.0 for use by crew OR plastic sleeve

procedure sections to facilitate placekeeping. An already place-kept copy of

F . l .O is to be made and provided with turnover sheet, since the scenario

assumes this section has already been completed.

E. Miscellaneous

1. Red rod line sign posted

2. Reduce power to 96% with RCS flow.

3. At APRM #2 Voter Module ensure Memory reset. At APRM Module, select

Trip Status and Reset Memory, to ensure no pre-existing trip lights are in on

both the voter module and the APRM.


.-- 4. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES

a. ET02 Mode Switch in Shutdown (Event Trigger 8) Initiates increase in

MCOl magnitude to 100% AND all three Condensate Pump trip FWOI

malfunctions with Ramp Time of 8:OO minutes after Mode Switch is placed

in SHUTDOWN for reactor scram.

b. ET03 RClC Turbine Speed >72% in auto (Event Trigger 49) Initiates

malfunction RC02 RClC Isolation following RClC start after 1 :30 minutes.

c. Malfunction Composite 003 RD17 @ 23%. Establishes RD17A at 04,

RD17B at 06. The remaining RD17 are at 46 and 48. This results in post

ATWS APRM indication of 23% and minimal mismatch with actual thermal

power, which can be caused by APRM Gain Adjustments.

d. Remote Composite 001 RHS SDC A and B Pipes Full. Sets RH55A and

RH55B to 100% from default value of 0%. This minimizes observed drop

in RPV water level when injecting with SDC lines through RHS*MOV40A

and B. Level drop occurs partially because of modeling within RHS piping

that assumes SDC pipes are not full.


II.

TITLE SRO

ATC RO BOP RO

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

NAME TITLE NAME

.- - OFF GOING SHIFT: I N C D DATE:

PART I : shift.

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 96% 0 Loadline = >loo% 0 None

PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:

Raise Suppression Pool Water level to 200 feet using CSH pump per N2-OP-33. Establish CSH pump flow rate of 5500 to 6000 gpm. N2-OP-33 F . l .O Standby Condition Status Checks are comdete.

0 Holding power at 96% while Reactor Engineering verifies process computer Thermal power calculation

PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)


Scenario ID#

NSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?


Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1 .O

CT-2.0

CT-3.0

CT-4.0

Given the plant at power and inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV

valve, the crew will close the SRV to preclude a manual scram if

Suppression Pool temperature reaches 1 1 O°F, per N2-SOP-34

Given a failure of the reactor to scram and RPV Blowdown

required, the crew will avoid exceeding HCTL by a combination of

terminating and preventing injection, injecting boron and operating

Suppression Pool Cooling per N2-EOP-C5.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram and the RPV has been

blown down per EOP-C2, the crew will resume injection when RPV

pressure lowers below the MSCP, to restore and maintain RPV

water level between the MSCWL and 202.3 inches.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram the crew will fully insert all

control rods using alternate methods per N2-EOP-6 Attachment 14

B. Performance Objectives:

PO-1 .o

PO-2.0

PO-3.0

Given the plant with direction to raise Suppression Pool water level,

the crew will lineup High pressure Core Spray and raise level to

200 feet per N2-OP-33.

Given downscale failure of a Recirc Flow Unit, the crew will bypass

APRM 2 per applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and N2-

OP-92.

Given the reactor plant operating at full power when a Feedwater

pump trip and failure of RCS to completely runback, the crew will

perform a Rapid Power Reduction, insert cram rods to lower power


PO-4.0

PO-5.0

PO-6.0

PO-7.0

PO-8.0

PO-9.0

PO-I 0.0

and stabilize the plant before a low level scram occurs per N2- SOP-6, SOP-29 and SOP-I01 D

Given the plant operating at power and misoperation of FWLC

system due to failed steam flow input signal, the crew will take

manual control of FWLC and stabilize level per N2-SOP-6

Given the plant operating at power with an inadvertent opening of

an ADSlSRV the crew will close the valve before Suppression Pool

temperature reaches 110°F to preclude a manual scram

requirement, per N2-SOP-34.

Given the plant operating at power with high Main Turbine

Vibration, the crew will initiate a manual scram and manual turbine

trip when vibration exceed 12 mils per applicable Annunciator

Response Procedures and N2-SOP-21.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram, the crew will establish

control rod insertion in accordance with EOP-6, Attachment 14.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power 4% or above and

reactor water level 100 inches or above, the crew will terminate and

prevent injection with the exception of SLS, CRD and RCIC.

Given a failure of WCS to isolate when SLS is injected, the crew

will manually close WCS containment isolation valves from P602.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram with loss of Feedwater the

crew will perform an RPV Blowdown and inject with alternate

ATWS injection systems to restore and maintain RPV water level

above MSCRWL per EOPs.


INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 ON S

.

EVENT 1

Suppression Pool Fill Utilizing CSH Pump

PO-I .o

3 e w

0 Crew conducts a pre-brief,

walks down the panels, and

tests annunciators.

SRO

Directs Suppression Pool fill per

N2-OP-33, H.3.0

Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 (as

directed from N2-OP-33) Condition

B and initates Required Actions

B. l Verify by administrative means

RClC System is OPERABLE

when RClC is required to be

0 PE RAB L E. (Completion

Time is Immediately)

AND

B.2 Restore HPCS System to

OPERABLE status.

(Completion Time is 14 days)

BOP RO

Verify Subsection F . l .O, Standby

Condition Status Checks is

complete. (Actual performance is

NOT required because completion

was provided in Shift Turnover

in formation .)


INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS

-_ .

Verify SM has declared CSH

System inoperable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CAUTIONS

DO NOT ALLOW THE CSH PUMP TO

OPERATE IN A RUNOUT FLOW

CONDITION OF > 7175 GPM OR PUMP

DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.

MINIMIZE AMOUNT OF TIME CSH IS OPERATING ON MINIMUM FLOW OR PUMP

DAMAGE MAY OCCUR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

After the CSH pump is started, Suppression

Pool Level (SPL) will rise from initial level of

199.8 feet. It will take about 3 minutes to raise

SPL to 200 feet.

Start CSH*PI, HPCS PUMP I .

Verify open CSH*MOV105,

MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

Monitor CST AND Suppression

Pool Levels.

Raise rate of transferring water

from CST to Suppression Pool

(5500 to 6000 gpm) by performing

the following:

Throttle open

CSH*MOVI 11, TEST

RETURN TO

SUPPRESSION POOL.

WHEN CSH System Flow is

> 634 gpm, verify closed

CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM

FLOW BYPASS VLV.

NRC Scenario 1 -1 1- March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 ON S

EVENT 2

Recirc Flow Unit B Failed Downscale

PO-2.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR

When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate

malfunction by depressing F3 key:

RR08B, RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B

F 3 )

2/4 MDL 1-4 have received one of the two

WHEN desired Suppression Pool

Level is reached, close

CSH*MOVI 11, TEST RETURN

TO SUPPRESSION POOL.

WHEN HPCS SYSTEM FLOW is

less than 634 GPM, verify open

CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW

BYPASS VLV.

Stop CSH*PI, HPCS PUMP 1.

Verify closed CSH*MOV105,

MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

Notify SM that 2CSH*MOV111 is

closed AND operability concern

per DER 2-98-0557 no longer

exist.

Restore CST Level, as required,

per N2-OP-4.

ATC RO

Identifies and reports annunciators

to SRO

Implements ARP actions

(Significant ARP 603202 60321 7)



-.

required trips. An additional trip from any

unbypassed A PRM will cause a reactor

SCRAM.

Rod withdrawal block.

The following annunciators alarm:

603202 APRM TRIP SYSTEM

UPSCA LWINOPERA B L E

603208 APRM TRIP SYSTEM UPSCALE

603217 FLOW REFERENCE OFF NORMAL

6032 18 OPRM TRIP ENABLED

603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK

At P603 Rod Select Matrix Right Side

APRM 2 Amber UPSC ALARM lit

APRM 2 Red UPSC TRIP OR INOP lit

OPRM 2 White TRIP ENABLED lit

FL 0 W White CA MPA R lit

Process Computer points alarm consistent with

conditions. RDSBCl2, NMPUC08,

NMPBC47, NMPBC33, NMPBC22, NMPBCI 7,

NMP2C121, NMP2C108

At P608 backpanel, A PRM 2 Display includes

FL 0 W 0.0% (pre-failure value is 95.5% flow)

2/4 MOL 2 Module (and 1,3,4 modules)

indicate APRM 2 HIGH/INOP TRIP red LED lit

NRC Scenario 1 -13

These are 603202 actions 3 Determine by Red UPSC/INOP

light on 2CEC*PNL603 which

APRM Channel has alarmed.

(APRM 2 is the affected

instrument)

IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN

enter N2-SOP-101 C, Reactor

Scram. (No scram occurs)

IF NO SCRAM has occurred,

THEN perform the following:

Check the other APRM

channels to verify that NO

SCRAM should have

occurred.

IF a SCRAM should have

occurred, THEN enter the

Em erg en cy 0 pera t i ng

Procedures. (Scram

should not have occurred)

IF NO SCRAM should

have occurred, THEN

perform the following:

IF required, THEN lower

Reactor Power per N2-

OP-I 01 D or N2-SOP-

101 D. (Not required

because instrument

failure is the cause)

March 2005


Other FLOW indicafions on APRM 1,3,4

chassis reads about 95.5%.

Role Play:

If asked report all other Voter Module

indications are consistent with Voter module 2

indications.

Note

ARP actions for 603202 and 603217 will likely

be performed concurrently or 60321 7 actions

may be performed before 603202 actions.

Refer to Technical

Specifications for

actions. (Inform SRO to

perform)

Bypass the affected

APRM per N2-OP-92.

(See later Scenario

steps for bypassing the

APRM)

Reset the memory on

the following per N2-

OP-92, Section F.8.0:

2/4 MDL 1

2/4 MDL 2

2/4 MDL 3

2/4 MDL 4

Troubleshoot and

correct the cause of the

alarm.

ATC RO/BOP RO

These are 603217 actions

Determine which channel is in

alarm and whether UPSC or

COMPAR amber light(s) are

illuminated on 2CEC*PNL603.

COMPAR (generated by RBM)

At 2CEC*PNL608 determine


I N STRU CTO R ACT1 ON S/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS

which flow channel is high/low

by comparison of flow

i nd ica t io n s .

Failed Flow Unit is bypassed by bypassing

APRM 2

After A PRM 2 is bypassed all annunciators

and P603 indications return to pre-transient

conditions.

IF desired, THEN bypass the

affected APRM per N2-OP-92.

ATC RO/BOP RO

Bypass APRM 2with Bypassing

Joystick per N2-OP-92 H.2.

APRM channel bypass can be

performed by placing the APRM

BYPASS joystick to the APRM

channel to be bypassed. This action

will also bypass the associated

Recirculation Flow circuitry and

OPRM. Only 1 APRM

channel may be bypassed.

The actions in this section are

performed at 2CEC*PNL603 unless

otherwise noted.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CAUTION

Bypass joysticks can become

electrically misaligned after numerous

bending motions due to "Metal

Creep". Any bypass function should



EVENT 2 SRO Actions

be verified by channel BYPASS lights

to ensure that only the intended

channel is bypassed. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Verify NO other APRM in bypass

for the instrument to be bypassed.

Place the APRM BYPASS joystick

to the bypass position 2.

IF APRM 2 was bypassed, THEN

verify the following:

APRM 2 BYPASS light is lit on

2CEC*PNL603.

BYP is displayed in inverse

video in the header for APRM 2

(2 - 4) Chassis at H13-P608.

Blue BYPASSED LED is lit for

APRM 1 (2 - 4) on EACH 2/4

MDL at HI3-P608.

Report APRM 2 bypassed to SRO

SRO

Directs APRM 2 bypassed

Notifies Operations and Plant

Management

Contacts WEC SRO for assistance

and work planning

Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1 . I RPS

Function 2 APRMs. No action is

required since only 1 APRM



EVENT 3

Feedwater Pump A trip with partial RCS

FCV runback PO-3.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR


malfunction by depressing F4key:

FW03A Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE

RR31 HPU B PMP Number 2 Failure, TRUE

TUA 2 seconds

RR30 HPU B PMP Number I Failure, TRUE

TUA 2 seconds; TRA I O seconds

channel is inoperable.

Refer to TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod

Block Instrumentation Function 4.

0 2 channels are required for the

“function”, which is to initiate a

rod block. With 1 channel

inoperable, 3 channels are still

operable. No other action is

required.

Conducts post event brief

SRO

Directs entry into:

N2-SOP-6 Feedwater Failures

N2-SOP-29 Sudden Reduction

In Core Flow

N2-SOPIOID Rapid Power

Reduction

Directs Cram Rod insertion

(SOP-29 and SOP-101 D

action)




851509 REACTOR FEED PUMPlA/lB/IC AUTO TRIP

851519 REAC FEED PMP IA/ IB / IC MOTOR ELEC

FAULT

602210 FCV A PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP

602222 FCV B PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP

602102 RECIRC FCV B HYDRAULICS INOPERABLE

602104 RECIRC FCV B BACK UP HYDR INOPERABLE

602106 RECIRC FCV B MOTION INHIBIT

603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGHILOW

At P603

RPV water level slowly lowers and reaches its’lowest

values of about I70 inches after about 4 minutes (Low

Level scram setpoint is 159.3 inches). The operating

Feedwater pump flow is pegged high. Power reduction

is necessary to restore Feedwater pump flow to

acceptable value.

APRM power lowers to about 75% and Total Core

Flow is reduced to about 74 Mlbm/hr. A successful

runback would result in power level of about 65%,

which is within the capacity of one Feedwater pump.

FWS-LVIOB goes to 100% open

NRC Scenario 1 -18-

0 When conditions stabilize, enters

Tech Spec 3.4.1 Condition B

Required Action to “Declare the

recirculation loop with lower flow to

be “not in operation.” With

Completion time of 2 hours. With

both recirculation loops operating

but the flows not matched, the

flows must be matched within 2

hours. If matched flows are not

restored, the recirculation loop with

lower flow must be declared “not in

operation,” as required by

Required Action B.1. This

Required Action does not require

tripping the recirculation pump in

the lowest flow loop when the

mismatch between total jet pump

flows of the two loops is greater

than the required limits. Now the

one loop part of the LCO

statement applies. Those action

(single loop) are required to be

completed within 4 hours.

March 2005


At P851

Feedwater Pump B amps rise to about 530 (max)

and flow rises to top scale 24,000 gpm

At P602

RCS FCV A goes to minimum (correct response)

RCS FCV B goes to about 70% (incorrect

response due to HPU trips)

Loop Flow A about 20 Mlbm/hr

Loop Flow B about 55 Mlbm/hr (Flow Mismatch

Tech Spec entry is required)

When control rods are inserted, reactor power

will lower. Inserting the first 4 cram rods

results in lowering power from 75% to about

63%. As power is lowered to single Feedwater

pump capacity, RPV water level will rise and

return to within the normal level band of I78

inches to 187 inches and Feedwater Pump B . F WS-L V I OB throttles closed to flow return

pump flow and amps to normal values.

Note

Crew initiates N2-SOP-29 flowchart decision

blocks by answering “YES/NO” questions.

ATC RO

Reports Feedwater Pump A trip

and RPV water level low alarms

Monitors reactor power, pressure

and water level

Enters N2-SOP-6

Places LVIOA in MAN and full

closes

When directed, inserts Cram Rods

using Continuous Insert button for

rapid Power reduction

SRO/BOP RO/ATC RO

0 Enter and implement the flowchart

actions per N2-SOP-29

Is a Recirc pump in service?

YES

Is core flow to left of natural circ

line? NO

Core flow AND Power within



.--

Note

CRAM rod insertion will likely be directed from

N2-SOP-101 D, Rapid Power Reduction. Also,

with operation above the 100% rod line, the

crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that

the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods

to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS

INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity

Manipulation for ATC RO)

Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be

reduced below 100% rod line

CONSOLE OPERATOR

If directed to remove Condensate

Demineralizers from service due to the power

reduction, manually enter REMOTES, as

required to establish the directed number of in-

service de m i n e ra I ize rs:

FWO 1 A-H , CON DEN SATE DEMl N ERALIZER,

OFF

Plant should now be stabilized at about 60-

65% power. The crew will make notifications

and Plant Management will be consulted to

establish coordination and overall direction as

0

0

0

0

0

SRO

Scram Region? NO

Core flow AND power within

Exit Region? NO

Reduce rodline below 100% by

inserting CRAM rods. (Also

being inserted to lower

power for SOP-IOID actions

by A TC RO)

> 3 OPRMs operable? YES

Plant in Heightened Awareness

Zone? NO

Recover per Attachment 2. Note

that actual recovery action to

reset the motion inhibit cannot be

performed until repairs are

completed on HPUs)



INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

to how recovery will be implemented.

SRO should address

RCS Flow Mismatch

RCS FCV motion inhibit requires repairs

of HPUs

0 Electric Fault trip of Feedwater Pump A

0 Bypassed APRM 2 due to failed Flow

Unit

EVENT 4

Steam Flow Signal Failure P O 4 0

CONSOLE OPERATOR


malfunction and relatives by depressing F5

key:

FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW, TRUE

Steam flow signal operation becomes erratic.

Feedwater flow and RPV water level becomes

unstable.

603139 RPV WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW

603307 RWM ROD BLOCK

CONSOLE OPERATOR

After FWLC is placed in MANUAL, manually

activate malfunction:

FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW, TRUE

This will keep the failed signal inputted into

FWLC.

ATC RO

Identifies and reports misoperation

of FWLC to SRO

Enters N2-SOP-6

Places FWS-HICIOIOB (LVIOB)

controller OR Master FWLC

controller to MANUAL

Stabilizes RPV water level

between 160 to 200 inches (1 78 to

187 inches normal band)

SRO

Directs entry into N2-SOP-6 for

misoperation of FWLC



Management



INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT1 0 N S

EVENT 5

Inadvertent opening of ADS/SRV PSVl21

PO-5.0

This event should proceed while the crew

is discussing placing FWLC to single

element in response to the previous event.

CONSOLE OPERATOR

When directed by Lead Evaluator, manually

enter over rid e:

P628 SWITCH Page 2 of 3 P628-B22C-S4A-

A; P628 ADS Valve PSV121, OPEN

The following annunciators alarm: 601537 ADS VALVESlSAFETY VALVES LEAKING

601 548 SAFETYIRELIEF VALVE OPEN

601553 ADS ACC TANK 32/33/34 PRESSURE LOW

851506 CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUMP 1NlB AUTO START

851507 CNST XFER PMP DISCH HEADER

PRESSURE LOW

At P601 MSS"PSVl21 red light lit and DIV I

MSS*PSVl21 OPEN white postage stamp lit

indicating valve is open.

and work planning

SRO

Directs entry into N2-SOP-34

Declares PSV121 ADS valve

inoperable.

Refers to Tech Specs 3.5.1. With

one ADS valve inoperable no

actions is required. Currently the

minimum number of REQUIRED

ADS valves is still met with one

valve inoperable.

Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.1.7.2 and

recognizes requirement to perform

N2-OSP-ISC-M@002 within 12

hours.

May direct one loop of RHS placed

in Suppression Pool Cooling.

IF RHS is placed in

Suppression Pool Cooling,



--

At P603, MWe drop is observed as turbine

control valve closes slightly.

Suppression Pool temperature rises and

approaches 90 “F.

EVENT 5 BOP RO Actions

declares RHS inoperable for

LPCl mode and enters Tech

Spec 3.5.1 CONDITION A

REQUIRED ACTION A.l with 7

day COMPLETION TIME.

IF Suppression Pool Temperature

exceeds 90°F, enters EOP-PC.


Management.


and work planning.

Conducts post event brief.

BOP RO

Reports annunciators

Enters and executes N2-SOP-34

Identify which SRV is open. (PSV121)

Place the keylock switch for PSV21 to

the OFF position.

Did the SRV close? NO (Detail 1)

Use one or more of following

indications to verify SRV status:

SPDS Computer

ERF Computer Points

MSSZCI 11 ; MSSZCl28



PSV121 remains open after pulling F79 and

F80. At P601 position indicating (red and

green) lights for PSV121 are now deenergized.

PSV 121 closes when F9A and FlOA are

p ulled.

Reactor Power Change

Generator Output Change

Steam FlowIFeed Flow Mismatch

Accoustic Monitor

Reduce power to approximately 85%

per N2-SOP-101 D. (NIA, currently

below 85% power)

IF Average Suppression Pool

temperature is approaching 1 10°F.. . . . .

THEN Scram the reactor per N2-SOP-

101C and continue here.

Proceeds to back panel P628 with

fuse pullers and protective safety

equipment (PPE). Using Detail 2,

remove the fuses for the affected SRV

in the following order until the SRV

closes:

1. C Solenoid fuse

2. A Solenoid fuse (CT-1 .O)

0 For 2MSS*PSV121 C Solenoid

P628 Strip K F79 and F80

pulled

0 For 2MSS*PSV121 A Solenoid

P628 Strip F9A and FlOA

(CT-1 . O )

Did SRV close? NO for C

solenoid but YES when A

solenoid fuses are pulled.



- Generator MWe rises and ERF Computer

Points indicate SRV is closed.

EVENT 5 ATC RO Actions

EVENT 6

Rising Main Turbine Vibration with minor

Main Condenser Air In-leakage PO-6.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR


malfunction by depressing F6 key: c

Detail 1

Use one or more of following

indications to verify SRV status:

SPDS Computer

ERF Computer Points

MSSZCI 1 1 ; MSSZCl28

Reactor Power Change

Generator Output Change

0 Steam FlowlFeed Flow Mismatch

Accoustic Monitor

Exits SOP-34 and informs SRO SRV is

closed.

If directed starts RHS in Suppression Pool

Cooling.

ATC RO

Monitors parameters to assist in

determining SRV position.

Monitors and control RPV water

level in directed band in manual.



TU02 Main Turbine Vibration High


MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage (F6)


(F6)

Main Turbine vibration and Offgas Train flow

rise.

After about 1:30 minutes Turbine vibration

reaches 7 mils and the following annunciators

alarm:

851 140 TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION

HIGH

851306 OFFGAS SYSTEM TROUBLE

SRO

May direct further power reduction

by Cram rod insertion

When vibration or vacuum limits

are exceeded, directs reactor

scram and turbine trip.


Management


and work planning


BOP RO

Reports and implements

annunciator 851 129 actions by

monitoring for condition that

require further actions:

May initiate Process Computer

Group Point 14 to monitor turbine

vibration on CRT display.

IF any Bearing Vibration is 10

mils for 15 minutes. Trip OR

verify Main Turbine Tripped in



After about 3 minutes Turbine vibration

reaches 12 mils requiring a manual reactor

scram and turbine trip. The following

annunciators alarm:

851 129 TURBINE GENERATOR VlSRATlON

HIGH- HI G H

0

accordance with N2-SOP-21,

Turbine Trip.

IF any Bearing Vibration is 12

mils, verify Main Turbine Trip in

accordance with N2-SOP-21.

Refer to N2-0P-21 Section

H.l.O, Operation With High

Vibration in Alarm or High

Vibration Trip Disabled.

IF any Bearing Vibration is >9

mils with >3 mils/minute rate of

change THEN trip OR verify

Main Turbine Tripped in

accordance with N2-SOP-21,

Turbine Trip.

IF Bearing Vibration is

projected to exceed 30 mils

following a Turbine Trip THEN

break condenser vacuum in

accordance with N2-OP-21,

Subsection H.1.4.

WHEN any vibration limit is

exceeded or when directed, enters

N2-SOP-21 and implements

flowchart actions

0 Has Tubine tripped? NO

0 Power >25%? YES

SCRAM the reactor per N2-



EVENT 6 ATC RO actions

NRC Scenario I -28-

0

0

0

0

ATC RO

SOP-101C. (ATC RO to

perform action).

Manually trip Turbine using

TRIP pushbuttons. (BOP RO

to perform action).

Did the Turbine trip using

TRIP pushbuttons? YES

Verify MSV/ CV/ ClVs closed

AND TBVs open to control

pressure.

Verify the following:

House loads transfer

Megawatts are - 0

R230, R925 open

41 M, 41 E open

MDS1/233N open

Monitors reactor power, level and

pressure

If directed, implements N2-SOP-9

actions for lowering condenser

vacuum

If directed, lowers power per

N2-SOP-101 D to stabilize

vacuum. (Since already

operating at reduced power, a

further power reduction is not

likely to be directed).

March 2005


Tthe crew is directed to manually scram and

trip the turbine on either of two parameters

during this event. The crew must take these

actions based on high turbine vibration

(> 12mils) or lo wering condenser vacuum (prior

to 22. I inch Hg, automatic turbine trip

setpoint.

EVENT 7 and 8

Manual Reactor Scram and ATWS

PO-7.0 and 8.0

The following preset malfunction become

active:

RDI 7 COMPOSITE 003 QUEUED

RPIZA RRCS Failure (Div I) QUEUED

RPIZB RRCS Failure (Div II) QUEUED

Reactor is manually scrammed by placing the

Mode Switch in Shutdown. RPS trips but

Some Control rods insert only to position 04

and 06 due to “hydraulic lock”. Reactor power

will stabilized at about l8%to 23% on APRMs.

Actual thermal power production may be

Verify proper operation of:

SJAE per N2-OP-9

Off-gas per N2-OP-42

Circ Water per N2-OP-1OA

Reactor Power >25’/0? YES

IF Condenser vacuum is

approaching 22.1 inches Hg .....

THEN ....

0 Scram the reactor per

N2-SOP-101 C

Trip the turbine per N2-

SOP21

SRO

Directs Mode Switch placed in

Shutdown

Repeats back scram report

Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV

water level (<I 59 inches) AND

Reactor power above 4% when a

scram is required.

When determines the reactor will

not stay shutdown without boron

based on current rod positions,

EXITS EOP-RPV and ENTER

EOP-C5



---

slightly higher due to APRM GAFs being

different than at full power. RPV water level

will lower and EOP entry conditions are met.

Turbine bypass valves open as pressure rises

SRVs are not expected to cycle.

The following also occur (become active and

start timing) when the Mode Switch is placed in

Shutdown, Event Trigger ET02:

MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage

Value 100; Ramp Time 5 0 0 minutes

TUA 8:OO minutes for all 3 FWOIA, B and C

FWOIA Condensate Pump Trip P I A

FWOI B Condensate Pump Trip P I B

FWOIC Condensate Pump Trip P I C

-

NOTE: SRO will direct EOP-C5

LEVEL, PRESSURE and POWER

actions concurrently

Directs from EOP-C5 Level Actions

Inhibit ADS

Prevent HPCS injection by

placing HPCS pump in PTL

May direct EOP-6 Attachment 2

to prevent Main Turbine trip

from RClC injection. (If manual

turbine trip is delayed because

of the ATWS, this action may

be directed).

May direct EOP-6 Attachment

10 to prevent low level MSlV

closure. (Since condenser

vacuum is lowering, this action

may not be directed. MSlVs

will automatically close on low

vacuum even if low level

jumpers are installed).

With power >4% and level

above 100 inches directs

terminating and prevent

injection at P603 except boron,

CRD and RClC to standard


I N STR U CTO R ACT1 ONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1 0 N S

When SPT reaches 1 IO F terminate and

prevent injection a second time is required.

NOTE

When using Fuel Zone Instruments, the value

of -14 inches (TAF) and -39 inches (MSCRWL)

is corrected for RPV pressure using Fig. Z

curves. Typically at 800 -1000 psig, -14 inches

= -55 inches AND -39 inches = -70 inches.

Therefore a level band between -14 and -39 is

directed as -55 to -70 inches when corrected

using Fig. Z

As the SRO directs initial EOP-C5 actions and

the ROs perform those actions, the following

conditions should be achieved, before

conditions further degrade (loss of Condensate

Booster Pumps occurs eight minutes after the

Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown:

0

0

level band of 50 to 80 inches

with Feedwater system.

Directs terminating and

preventing injection at P601.

Per override L-5, IF power is

>4% AND level > -14 inches

(TAF) AND an SRV is open

AND SPT >11 O°F, directs

injection terminated and

prevents again UNlTlL either

17 APRM are dnsc OR

RPV Level reaches TAF

(about -55 inches corrected per

Fig Z)

0 Records Fuel Zone Level

Directs injection using only

Detail G systems to restore

and maintain level above

MSCRWL

Directs from EOP-C5 PRESSURE

Actions

RPV pressure stabilized below

1052 psig with EHC (Bypass

Valves) and SRVs. Standard

pressure band 800 to 1000 psig



-.

Level stabilized and controlled 50 to 80 inches

with F W and RCIC. Other injection sources

have been "terminated and prevented" from

injecting except boron, CRD and RCIC.

Pressure stabilized and controlled 800 to 1000

psig with BPVs and SRVs. SRVs only after

MSlV closure.

Both loops of SLS are injecting at 86 gpm. As

Suppression Pool water temperature rises,

RHS is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling

lin eup.

When MSlV close, standard

pressure band 800 to 1000 psig

with SRVs

Restore pneumatics to the

Drywell

WAIT until Cold Shutdown

boron weight is injected (SLS

tank level below 1450 gallons).

Directs from EOP-C5 POWER

Actions

Mode switch in Shutdown

Initiate RRCS (EOP-6 Att 13)

Reduce Recirc to minimum

With power >4%, trip the RCS

Pumps When pressure and level are

under control, directs control

rod insertion per EOP-6

Attachment 14

BEFORE SPT reaches 1 IOOF,

directs SLS boron injection

WAIT until boron injection is no

longer required before

terminating SLS injection.



EVENT and

directed.

ATC RO Actions as

PO-8.0

EVENT 7 and 8 BOP RO Actions as

directed.

7 WHEN SPT reaches 90°F enters

EOP-PC

Directs both loops of RHS

placed in Suppression Pool

Cooling

ATC RO

7

0

0

0

0

Places Mode Switch in Shutdown

Provides scram report, including

APRMs are not downcale and all

rods are not fully inserted

Initiates RRCS by arming and

depressing manual initiation

pushbuttons per EOP-6 Att 13

Terminates and prevents P603

injection by placing FW control in

manual and fully closing LVlOs

When level drops below 100

inches, establishes RPV injection

by reopening LVlOs to maintain

level in directed band (50 to 80

inches).

BOP RO

Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock

switches

Places HPCS pump control switch

in PTL

If directed, bypasses MSIV low

level isolations per EOP-6



MSOGA Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation,

DEFEATED, TUA 1 :30 minutes

MSOGB Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation,


MSOGC Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation,


MSOGD Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation,


_-

CONSOLE OPERATOR

IF requested to bypass MSlV low level

isolations per EOP-6 Attachment 10,

immediatelv activate remote timer by

depressing F7 key THEN WAIT until the 1 :30

minute TUA timer times out and report the

jumpers are installed

I

1 :00 minute after RClC starts, ET03 actives

malfunction RC02 RClC FAILURE - ISOLATION OF RCIC, TRUE

Attachment 10

Manually operates SRV to maintain

pressure in directed band (800 to

1000 psig)

Restores pneumatics (at P851) to

Drywell by using keylocks to

override and reopen IAS*SOVI 66

and 184.

Restores pneumatics (at P601) to

Drywell by using keylocks to

override and reopen IAS*SOVI 64

and 165.

Terminates and prevents Div I

ECCS injection at P601 by

performing:

Arm and depress Div I ECCS

manual initiation pushbutton.

Override closed CSL Injection

MOV (amber light stays on).

Place CSL pump in PTL.

0 Override closed RHS A

Injection MOV (amber light

stays on).

Terminates and prevents Div II

ECCS injection at P601 by

perform i ng :



EVENT 9 WCS Isolation Failure PO-9.0

CU08 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail,

TRUE malfunction becomes effective

WCS*MOVl02 and 112 isolation valves fail to

close when SLS switches are placed in ON.

When P602 control switches are used, the

WCS isolation MOVs will close.

Arm and depress Div II ECCS

manual initiation pushbutton.

Override closed RHS C


stays on).

Place RHS C pump in PTL.

Override closed RHS B


stays on).

When RClC isolates, reports RClC

isolation to SRO

Injects SLS boron injection using

keylock switches

SLS*MOVl A and 1 B open

SLS*Pl A and 1 B start

Explosive Valves fire

Pump pressure and flow rise

SLS tank level begins to lower

Identifies failure of WCS isolation

Manually closes WCS isolation

valves MOVl02 and 112 at

P602


I N STRU CTO R ACT1 0 NS/ PLANT RESPONSE . OPERATOR ACTIONS

EVENT 10 Trip of all Condensate Pumps

PO-10.0

Eight minutes after the Mode Switch is placed

in Shutdown, ET02 automatically activates the

following malfunctions:

FWOIA Condensate Pump Trip P I A

FWOl B Condensate Pump Trip P I B

FWOlC Condensate Pump Trip P I C

All three Condensate Pumps trip. Feedwater

pump suction pressure drops. feedwater

pumps automatically trip on low suction

pressure.

RPV water level falls below MSCRWL and

cannot be restored until additional systems are

lined up for injection. As RPV water level

drops, core voiding results in lowering reactor

power and pressure.

ATC RO

Reports loss of all Condensate,

Booster and Feedwater Pumps

Reports lowering RPV water level

Closes FWS-LVIOs for tripped

Feedwater Pumps

Lineup systems as directed

Acknowledges loss of Feedwater

Directs RHS injection through

Shutdown Cooling per EOP-6

Attachment 30. (Requires

installation of jumpers to defeat

RHS Shutdown Cooling interlocks

AND RPV pressure reduced below

350 psig)

Per L-10 Conditional Step,

determines RPV water level cannot

be restored and maintained above

MSCRWL with Detail G Preferred



Systems AND EOP-C2 has not

been entered yet.. . . . . EXITS C5

Level and Pressure legs AND

ENTERS EOP-C2 to perform an

RPV Blowdown

Executes EOP-C2 as follows:

Determines reactor will NOT

stay shutdown without boron

(Step 2) Determines SPL is above 192

feet (Step 3)

Directs terminate and prevent

all RPV injection except boron,

CRD and RClC (Step 4)

Directs all 7 ADS valves open

(Step 5 ) When all 7 ADS valves are

reported open, continues in C2

to WAIT blocks (Step 16 then

17) AND ENTERS (RETURN

TO ) EOP-C5 at 10

RETURNS TO EOP-CS at 10

Determines 2 or more SRVs

are open (L-12)

WAITS until RPV pressure

drops below value in Table J

(below 165 psig with 7 SRVs

open; L-13)



Directs injection using only

Detail G systems slowly start

injecting to restore and

maintain level above MSCRWL

(RHS through Shutdown

Cooling per EOP-6 Attachment

30 should now be established;

L- I 4)

Determines capability of RHS

to restore and maintain level

above MSCRWL (L-15)

SRO may decide that RHS

alone will not restore water

level above MSCRWL and

direct Alternate ATWS System

Injection from Detail H systems

(L-16 and L- I 7)

Likely to direct injection with

HPCS, LPCS or RHS LPCl

Returns to EOP-C5 at 9, since

level was intentionally lowered

prior to entering EOP-C2

Restores and maintains water

level between MSCRWL and

level recorded in step L-9

number 4 using Detail G and

it’s OK to use Detail H systems



.._.-

EVENT I O BOP RO Actions, when directed

CONSOLE OPERATOR

When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to

“defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks for

2RHS*MOV40A or B” per EOP-6 Attachment

30, immediately activate remote timer by

depressing FIO key THEN WAIT until the 2:OO

minute TUA timer times out and report the

BOP RO

Performs RPV Injection Via

Shutdown Cooling Return per

EOP-6 Attachment 30 Injection via

RHS B (A)

Verify closed the following valves:

RHS*MOVI 5B (A), OUTLET

RHS*MOV8B (A), HEAT

TO DRYWELL SPRAY

EXCHANGER 1B (A) INLET

BYPASS VLV (WHEN possible)

RHS*MOV33B (A), OUTLET

TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY

RHS*FV38B (A), RETURN TO

SUPPR POOL COOLING

RHS*MOV24B (A), LPCl B (A)

INJECTION VLV

RHS*MOV40B (A), SDC B

RHS*MOV104, RHR B TO

REACTORHEADSPRAY

RETURN

Defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks

for 2RHS*MOV40B as follows

(Figure 30-2):

(2 CEC *PNL 622) (NO T actually

performed)

0 Lift AND tape the lead on

terminal point BB-62



\.-

jumpers are installed and leads are lifted.

RH08 Group 5 Isolation Failure SDC MOVs,

TRUE F10)

NOTE

Per EOP-C5 Step L-13 and L-14, injection is

NOT allowable until RPV pressure drops below

165 psig with 7 SRVs open. The crew SHALL

NOT establish injection when RPV pressure

drops below 350 psig. This would violate the

EOP step and Critical Task.

CONSOLE OPERATOR

When requested by BOP ROlATC RO to place

radiation monitor SWP*RE23B (A) in service (if

not already in service), manually activate

remotes, then report RE23B (A) is in service:

NOTE: USE REMOTES FOR RE 23A IF

APPROPRIATE :

Install EOP Jumper #9 on

terminal points BB-41 AND

BB-60

Verify RHS*Pl B (A), PMP 1 B

(A) is running.

0 Verify open SWP*MOV90B (A),

HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE

WTR INLET VLV.

WAIT UNTIL reactor pressure

has been reduced to less than

350

Throttle open RHS*MOV40B

(A), SDC B (A) RETURN to a

maximum of 7450 gpm on E12-

603B (A), RHR B (A) TOTAL

FLOW meter to control RPV

water level

Throttle open SWP*MOV33B

(A), HEAT EXCHANGER 1B

SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV

THROTTLE to establish

approximately 7400 gpm on

E12-R602B (A), SVCE WTR

TO RHR B (A) HX FLOW meter

0 Request Rad Monitor

SWP*RE23B (A) placed in

service



RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline,

ON

RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample

Pump, ON

CONTINGENCY: IF ALL (including Fuel

Zone) water level instruments are

downscale, the Crew will enter EOP-C4,

RPV Flooding temporarily. When RPV

water level starts to rise (level can now be

determined, EOP-C4 is exited (step 1

override) and EOP-C5 re-entered at 6 and

EOP-C2 re-entered at 25.

EOP-6 Attachment 30 is

corn p lete

Confirms P601 system injection to

RPV is terminated and prevented

Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming

and depressing ADS MANUAL

INITIATION pushbuttons on P601

Reports 7 ADS valves are open

Reports when RPV pressure drops

below Table J value of 165 psig

with 7 SRVs open

Injects with systems to restore

and maintain RPV water level in

directed band (CT-3.0)

RHS Via Shutdown Cooling

HPCS

0 LPCS

0 LPCl



Alternate Control Rod Insertion

Appropriate sections to be performed are

3.3 Additional Manual Scram Initiation

3.5 Manual Control Rod Insertion (Driving rods

with RDS). These sections are performed

concurrently.

CONSOLE OPERATOR

WHEN requested to reset ARI per EOP-6

Attachment 14, immediately activate remote

timer by depressing F8 key THEN WAIT until

the 1 :30 minute TUA timer times out and

report the fuses are pulled L

RP14A RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div I,

TRUE TUA I :30 minutes

RPI 4B RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div II,

TRUE TUA 1 :30 minutes

CONSOLE OPERATOR

WHEN requested to defeat RPS per EOP-6

Attachment 14, immediately activate remote

- timer by depressing F9 key THEN WAIT until

the 1 :30 minute TUA timer times out and

report the jumpers are installed

RP02 RPS Failure to Scram Automatic,

TRUE

ATC RO

Using EOP-6 Attachment 14

Flowchart determines appropriate

sections (3.3 and 3.5) to be

performed.

Performs section 3.3

Reset ARI by directing fuses pulled

per 3.3.1

Defeat RPS interlocks by

directing/installing RPS jumpers

0 Reset RPS by momentarily placing

the following switches to RESET:

(2C€C*PNL603)

REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A

REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C

REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC B



TUA 1 :30 minutes

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONSOLE OPERATOR

WHEN RPS is reset, manually delete all

RD17 malfunctions to ensure rods fully insert

when additional scram signal is inserted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NOTE:

After RPS is reset and while waiting for

indication that the SDV is drained, ATC RO

should proceed to section 3.5 to implement

action to manually insert rods by driving in

using RDS. It takes about 10 minutes for the

SDV annunciators to clear, indicating that the

SDV is drained

-

NOTE:

At the examiners discretion, time compression

may be used to shorten the time while waiting

for the SDV to drain. This is accomplished by

directing the CONSOLE OPERATOR to

REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC D

0

0

0

0

Ensure the eight white PILOT

SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS

lights are lit.

Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME

VENT VLVS RDS*AOVI 24/132

indicate open.

Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME

DRAIN VLVS RDS*AOV123/130

indicate open.

Using one OR more of the

following, ensure the Scram

Discharge Volume (SDV) is

drained :

0 Annunciator 6031 09, RPS A

DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL

TRIP, clear

0 Annunciator 603409, RPS B

DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL

TRIP, clear

Annunciator 6031 30, SDV

LEVEL HIGH, clear

ATC RO

While waiting for SDV to drain

performs section 3.5



override OFF SDV annunciator 603109 or

603409, to simulate SDV is drained.

Verify the following pumps are

running (starts 2fld RDS pump

using control switch):

RDS-PIA, CRD PUMP 1A

RDS-PIB, CRD PUMP 1B

Place controller 2RDS-FC107,

CRD FLOW CONTROL, in

MANUAL

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CAUTION

To prevent pump motor damage or

tripping the supply breaker, motor

current shall not exceed 40 amps for

RDS-PIA or RDS-PI B. k * * * * * * * * * * * X * * * * * * * *

2 Depress the OPEN pushbutton on

2RDS-FC107 UNTIL the controller

output meter shows 100% OR

RDS pump motor current

approaches 40 amps

7 Check that RDS System flow rises

on C12-R606, CRD SYSTEM

FLOW.

NOTE: In the following step it is

2xpected that RDS System Flow will

Jrop.

3 Close 2RDS-PV101, DRIVE WTR



When the SDV alarms clear the ATC RO will

initiate another scram by tripping RPS using

manual scram pushbuttons. All rods will fully

insert.

PRESS CONTROL MOV, to

maximize Drive Water AP.

Ensure RDS Drive Water AP rises

on C12-R602, DRIVE WTR DlFF

PRESSURE

Using an SHH 5366 key, bypass

the RWM by taking the RWM

Operator Console

BYPASS/OPE RATE/TEST switch

to the BYPASS position

Using Figures 14-2 AND 14-3,

track the status of the control rods,

as the rods are inserted.

Starting with a control rod at OR

near the center, select a control

rod to be driven in on the Rod

Select Matrix

ATC RO

Return to Section 3.3

WHEN the SDV is drained,

initiate a manual scram

Arm and depress manual

scram pushbutton (CT-4.0)

Check for control rod motion AND



T E RM IN AT ION C RITE RI A

RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is

restored and maintained in normal level band

160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully

inserted.

EVENT 11 SRO Admin JPM 5-1

control rod positions

Confirm all rods fully inserted

Report control rod status to

SRO

SRO

Classify the event as SAE 2.2.2

Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM

for emergency classification.


V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE

-. A. NA, NRC Exam

VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS

A. Reference Events

None

B. Commitments

1. None

VII. LESSONS LEARNED


. _- I .

2.

EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST

Additional Information about these checks:

For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.

For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.

Q u a I it at ive Attributes

X I Realism/Credibility

I x Event Sequencing

I x Simulator Modeling

Evaluating Crew Competencies I I I

3. Quantitative Attributes

tb

Total Malfunctions

Malfunctions after EOP Entry

Abnormal Events

Major Transients

EOPs Used

EOP Contingency Procedures Used

Simulator Run Time

EOP Run Time

Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)

4. Developmental Checks:

Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?

Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?

Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?

Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?

NRC EXAM Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-02 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: Simulator IC-20

Op-Test No.: NRC-01

1. Division I Low Pressure ECCS systems CSL and RHS are inoperable for maintenance. 2. 100% Power Rod Line >loo% (106%)

Turnover: 1.

Event No.

'lace RDS-PI E Malf. No.

RR16A @.25 1 min ramp RR16A @ .75 1 min

ramp

RD18 RD063419 RD062227

ED02A DG04A CS03

RR20 @I .5% RR20@1Oo/o 10 min ramp after scram

1 service Event Type*

N (SRO)

C, R, TS (SRO)

R (ATC)

C, TS (SRO)

TS (SRO)

M (ALL)

Event Description

Swap Control Rod Drive Pumps to RDS-PI B in-service. N2-OP-30

Recirc Pump (RCS) A outer seal degradation and leakage. The leakage requires removal from service and isolation of RCS Pump A to stop the leak. (TS 3.4.1) Cram Rod insertion is required to reduce rod line below 100%. With inoperable OPRMs additional actions are required to monitor for power oscillations while in the Heightened Awareness Zone. N2-SOP-29. I , Reactor Recirc Pump Seal Failure N2-SOP-29, Sudden Reduction In Core Flow Tech SPec 3.4.1

Control Rod Drive PumD RDS-PI B trim due to cloaaed suction strainer with 2 HCU Acbumulator Troible Alarms. The crew will trip Reactor Water Cleanup pumps if warranted and restart an RDS pump after dispatching operators to changeover pump suction filters N2-SOP-30, Control Rod Drive Failures Tech SDec 3.1.5 -.--- - - ._

Loss of line 5 and Division I and Ill Diesel Generators (DG) fails to . .

start on bus undervoltage. Division I DG manual start is performed to avoid the requirement to initiate a manual scram. Crew will restore Service Water system to allow continued plant operation per SOP 3. SRO enters Tech Specs and with both High and Low Pressure Core Spray systems inoperable, enters LCO 3.0.3 which requires plant shutdown. High Pressure Core Spray is also unavailable as an injection source later in scenario. N2-SOP-3, Loss of AC Power Tech Specs 3.5.1 LCO 3.0.3 3.7.1, 3.8.1, 3.8.8 PRA Tasks

Reactor coolant leak. Rising Drywell Pressure will require a manual scram. RPV Water level lowers but can be restored and maintained above TAF by manually starting failed ECCS systems. Containment Spray is required. N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-PC

Page 3 of 8 NUREG-I 021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal


NRC EXAM

1 TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)

9 1

ACTUAL ATTRIBUTES

I Perform RPV Blowdown to allow Low Pressure ECCS injection. N2-E OPC2

\

I

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 5 Events 2,3.4,5,7 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Events 73 ' 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3 Event 2 SOP-29.1 and SOP-29, Event 3 SOP-30 Event 4 SOP-3

I Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-02 Op-Test No.: NRC-01

5. Event 5 EOP-RPV, EOP-PC 6. Event 9 EOP-C2

EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1 -2)

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)

2

1 ~ -~

7. Critical tasks (2-3) CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

4. Major transients (1-2) Event 5

2

I 1

CT-1.0: Restart CRD pump within 20 minutes with

CT-2.0: Restore and maintain RPV water level above inoperable control rod accumulators.

TAF with LP ECCS systems

Event 8* Not counted in Total Malfunctions but counted as Malfunction After EOP entry per Appendix D C.2.c page 9. System out of service influences the mitigation strategy by reducing the number of available injection and containment spray systems to one. Crew must now prioritize use of remaining system to inject to restore water level before using RHR B for containment spray.

Page 4 of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal




RDS PUMP SWAP/RCS SEAL LEAK/LOSS OF LINE 5 WITH EDG FAILURES/RCS LEAK WITH DEGRADED ECCS REQUIRES RPV BLOWDOWN

PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/1/05

VAL I DATED 6. Weaver, 6. Moore, P. Brennan DATE 3/7/05

DATE qbI/d GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING -

OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE

CONFIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Securitv DATE

SCENARIO SUMMARY

-._

Length: 2 hours

Initial Power Level: loo%, above the 100% Rod Line

The scenario begins at 100% reactor power. The crew will swap Control Rod Drive Pumps to return RDS-P1 B to service and remove RDS-P1A from service. After the normal evolution is complete, an outer seal leak develops on Recirc Pump (RCS) A. N2-SOP-29.1 is entered RCS pumps is removed from service and isolated. The crew will also enter N2-SOP-29 due to reduced core flow and insert Cram Rods to lower rod line below 100%. The crew will stabilize the plant in single loop and the SRO will implement the required single loop Tech Spec actions.

With the plant now stable, Control Rod Drive suction filter clogging results in the trip of the operating RDS pump and several accumulator trouble alarms. The crew will enter N2-SOP-30, trip Reactor Water Cleanup due to loss of pump seal cooling, swap RDS pump suction filters and restart an RDS pump.

A loss of one offsite 115 KV power Line 5 will occur. The Division I and Division Ill EDGs will fail to start. Manual operator action will be required to start the Division I EDG and preclude a manual scram. The Division Ill High Pressure Core Spray EDG cannot be started. The crew will implement the actions required by N2-SOP-3 to restore Service Water System flow to the Turbine and Reactor Building non safety related headers which have isolated due to the off site power loss.

. -

_ _ A small reactor coolant leak develops inside the Drywell. This results in rising drywell temperatures and pressure. The crew will take manual action and scram the reactor. N2-EOP- RPV, PC are entered. The event is complicated by degraded ECCS response and loss of


electrical power. An RPV Blowdown is required to establish injection with the only remaining Low Pressure ECCS systems RHR B and C. Suppression Chamber Spray and Drywell Spray should be established to control primary containment pressure and temperature, as the LOCA becomes more severe. Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays will be complicated by loss of electrical power and degraded ECCS systems. The only remaining system that can be used for sprays, will also be required for RPV injection.

--

Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C-2. SOP-29.1, 29,30 and 3

EAL Classification: ALERT 3.1.1 Primary containment pressure cannot be maintained <1.68 psig due to coolant leakage.

Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF. Drywell Spray is initiated.


I. SIMULATOR SET UP

-- A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent.

6. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. DG04A DG 1 UV LOCA Fail to Start, TRUE

b. RH14B ECCS Fails to Initiate (Divll), TRUE

c. CS03 HPCS Diesel Engine Failure, TRUE

d. EGI 56 No Transfer to Reserve SWG003, TRUE

e. RR16A RR Pump Upper Seal Failure (PIA),

Value 0.25; Ramp Time 1 :00 minute

f. RR16A RR Pump Upper Seal Failure (PIA),

Value 0.75; Ramp Time 1 :00 minute

g. RD18 CRD Suction Filter Clogged, TRUE

h. RD063419 34-19 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE

TUA 2:OO minutes

i. RD062227 22-27 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE

TUA 2:20 minutes

j. ED02A Loss of Off-Site 11 5KV Line 5, TRUE

k. RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA

Value 1.5

I. RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA

Value 10; Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes

2. Remotes:

a. RH33 2RHS*MOV24A 600V BKR STATUS, OPEN

b. CS17 2CSL*MOV104 600V BKR STATUS, OPEN

c. RH48 2RHS*MOV15B EOP Jumper, TRUE

d. RH50 2RHS*MOV25B EOP Jumper, TRUE

3. Overrides:

a. P601 LAMP RHS A /LPCS RTN TO SUPP POOL

MOV30A GREEN,OFF (PAGE 42)

QUEUED

QUEUED

QUEUED

QUEUED

F3

F4

F5

F5

F5 -_

F6

F7

ET0 I

QUEUED

QUEUED

F8

F8

QUEUED


4. Annunciators:

a. None


1. Division I Low Pressure ECCS

a. CSL with Red Clearance applied to components

i. CSL*Pl Pump in PTL

ii. CSL*MOV104 Injection Valve Breaker open

b. RHS Div I with Red Clearance applied to components

i. RHS*PIA Pump Red Clearance PTL

ii. RHS*MOV24A Injection Valve Breaker open

iii. RHS*MOV30A closed using keylock switch

c. RDS-PI B caution yellow tag applied to control switch


None

E. Miscellaneous

1. Red rod line sign posted

2. EVENT TRIGGERS

a. ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown (Event Trigger 8) Initiates increase in

RR20 magnitude to 10% with Ramp Time of 1O:OO minutes after Mode

Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN for reactor scram.


11. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

TITLE SRO

OFF GOING SHIFT: I N 7 D DATE: --

NAME TITLE NAME BOP RO

PART I: shift.

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)



Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)


0 Reactor Power = 100% 0 Loadline = >loo% Division I Low Pressure ECCS systems are INOPERABLE (pre-planned)

Corrective Maintenance on broken motor operator for RHS*MOV30A Return to Suppression Pool. Scheduled return to service is late on the next shift.

TS 3.5.1 Reauired Action C. l was entered 12 hours aao. Reauired Action C . l Action to restore one subsystem with 72 hour Completion Time. TS 3.6.1.6 Drywell Spray Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time

TS 3.6.2.3 Suppression Pool Cooling Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time

TS 3.6.2.4 Suppression Pool Spray Required Action A. l with 7 day Completion Time

-.

0 Corrective Maintenance has been completed on RDS-PIB and it is to be placed in

service for Post Maintenance Testing. When the pump is running contact the WEC to dispatch the assembled PMT crew to the pump to obtain all required data.

PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions: Place RDS-PI B in service for Post Maintenance Testing.


0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)


Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What we did? Why? (Goals) I Other Options?


Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1 .O Given the plant at power with RPV pressure >900 psig and two

inoperable scram accumulators, the crew will restore charging

water pressure >940 psig within 20 minutes of meeting

conditions for entering TS 3.1.5 Condition B, by restarting an

RDS pump and avoiding the requirement to immediately scram

the reactor per N2-SOP-30 and Tech Spec 3.1.5.

CT Justification: Failure to restore Charging Header Pressure by

restarting RDS pump results in “direct adverse consequences and

a challenge to plant safety” by requiring a manual scram transient

to be initiated. Per Tech Spec Basis 3.1.5 “With two or more control

rod scram accumulators inoperable and reactor steam dome

pressure >900 psig, adequate pressure must be supplied to the

charging water header. With inadequate charging water pressure,

all of the accumulators could become inoperable, resulting in a

potentially severe degradation of the scram performance.

Therefore, within 20 minutes from discovery of charging water

header pressure < 940 psig concurrent with Condition B, adequate

charging water header pressure must be restored. The allowed

Completion Time of 20 minutes is considered a reasonable time to

place a CRD pump into service to restore the charging header

pressure, if required. This Completion Time also recognizes the

ability of the reactor pressure alone to fully insert all control rods.”

CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources, the crew will establish

RPV injection using available Preferred Injection Systems

listed in Table E l of EOP-RPV to RESTORE AND MAINTAIN

RPV water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches Fig Z) to preclude

executing EOP-C3 or Flooding the Drywell by entering SAPS,

per N2-EOP-RPV.


CT Justification: Failure to restore and maintain RPV water level

above -39 inches by implementing actions per EOP-RPV will result

in “adverse consequences” to the plant by abandoning the EOP

injection strategy and implementing Drywell Flooding (from EOP-

RPV Step L-16) used in the SAPs. It is expected that proper

implementation of EOP-RRV will result in performing an RPV

Blowdown by opening 7 ADS valves to reduce RPV pressure and

manual injecting RHS Pump B and RHS Pump C (either both or

any one pump) which are capable of recovering level above -39

inches and ultimately above -14 inches (TAF). Water level is

expected to drop below -39 inches for several minutes while

executing the steps to blowdown and establish injection. There is

no specific time constraints attached to this CT. As long as the

crew recovers level without entering EOP-C3, Steam Cooling or the

SAPs, this would demonstrate satisfactory completion of the CT.


PO-I .o

PO-2.0

PO-3.0

PO-4.0

Given the plant with direction to swap Control Rod Drive pumps,

the crew will start RDS-PI B and secure RDS-PI A per N2-OP-30

Given the plant with an RCS pump seal leak, the crew will remove

the pump from service per N2-SOP-29.1 and N2-SOP-29, then

continue to operate the plant in single loop per with N2-OP-29.

Given the plant operating at power and a Control Rod Drive pump

trip with accumulator trouble alarms, the crew will restart an RDS

pump within 20 minutes per N2-SOP-30

Given the reactor plant operating at power when a loss of offsite

line 5 with EDG failures occurs, the crew will take action to start the


failed EDG and stabilize service water in accordance with N2-SOP-

03. (Operator actions with PRA significance)

PO-5.0 Given a reactor plant operating at power with a LOCA in progress,

the crew will manually scram the reactor plant prior to reaching

1.68 psig in the Containment.

PO-6.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection the crew will restore and

maintain RPV water level above TAF after performing an RPV

Blowdown per N2-EOP-RPV and N2-EOP-C2. (Operator actions

with PRA significance)

PO-7.0 Given a failure of Low Pressure ECCS pumps to start on high

drywell pressure signal, the crew will manually start the Low

Pressure ECCS pumps per EOP Bases and Operations Manual

PO-8.0 Given the plant with a LOCA and conditions met for containment

spray, the crew will initiate Containment Spray per N2-EOP-PC and

EOP-6 Attachment 22.



EVENT 1

RDS Pump Swap PO-1 .o

Role Play

When dispatched as additional operators to

support the pump swap with activities such as

performing prestart verifications and

monitoring, respond as required. There will be

no unusual conditions or readings to be

reported for this evolution.

Crew

0 Crew conducts a pre-brief,


tests annunciators.

SRO

Directs RDS-PIB started and

RDS-PIA placed in standby per

N2-OP-30, F.2.0

0 After RDS-PI B is placed in

service, contacts WEC to dispatch

team to perform Post Maintenance

Testing requirements.

BOP RO

Dispatches A 0 to perform prestart

lineup

IF RDS is supplying WCS pump

seal cooling, THEN station

personnel at locations to

simultaneously monitor WCS

pump seal parameters during RDS

pump changeover.

Start the standby CRD pump


---- _--- - .- INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE JP'tKA I OK AC I IONS

2RDS-PI B CRD PUMP 1 B by

placing its control switch to

START, THEN release to Normal-

Afte r-START.

Stop the CRD pump to be

shutdown 2RDS-P1A, CRD PUMP

1A by taking its control switch to

STOP AND releasing to Normal-

After-STOP.

Directs local monitoring of

operating WCS pump(s) seal cavity

temperatures

IF WCS pump seal cooling is being

supplied from RDS, THEN directs

verification of seal cooling flow

between 1-4 gpm as indicated

locally.

As required, directs adjusting RPV

Level I n st ru menta tion Ba c kf i I I

Reports RDS-PI B in service and

RDS-PIA in standby.



--

EVENT 2

RCS Pump A outer seal leakage PO-2.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR



RRIGA, 0.25, Ramp Time 1:00 Min (F3)

RRPIA upper seal cavity press lowers to

about 220 psis

Annunciator 602109 Recirc Pump ?A Outer SL

Leak High alarms after about I minute.

BOP RO

Identifies and reports annunciator

602109 to SRO

Implements ARP 6021 09 actions

Monitor DW Equipment Drain

Tank leak rate. Refer to ITS

3.4.5 RCS Operational

Leakage.

Monitor upper and lower seal

cavity pressures using P602

pressure indicators.

Monitor upper and lower seal

cavity temperatures using P614

recorder points 8 and 9 and

Process Computer points

RCSTAl5 and RCSTAl7.

Enter N2-SOP-29.1 and

performs concurrently with ARP

actions.



CONSOLE OPERATOR

After the crew enters N2-SOP-29.1 and is

monitoring parameters activate malfunction by

depressing F4 key:

RRI 6A, 0.75, Ramp Time I :00 Min (F4)

Upper Seal pressure drops below 100 psig

which requires the RCS pump to be tripped

SROlBOP RO

Implements SOP-29.1 Actions

while monitoring Seal Action leg

conditions that may require pump

trip

Establish periodic monitoring of

pump conditions.

If applicable, monitor DEWDFR

leakage for indication of

degradation (TS 3.4.5).

If conditions warrant, shutdown

the affected pump per N2-OP-29,

G.2.0.

Refer to N2-OP-29, H.4.0, if both

seal injection and cooling water

are lost.

BOP RO

Implements SOP-29.1 Seal

Actions

IF ANY of THESE OCCUR

Upper seal cavity pressure

< 100 psig

Upper seal cavity pressure >

920 psig

Lower seal cavity pressure >

1200 psig

Outer seal leakage > 1.2

gpm



Annunciator 6021 15, Recirc Pmp 1A seal

staging flow high/low

RCS Pump A is manually tripped and isolated

by closing RCS*MOVIOA and 18A with the

following alarms

602207 RECIRC PMP ?A LOW SPEED AUTO

TRANSFER NOTAVAILABLE

603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL

HIG H/L 0 W

603218 OPRM TRIP ENABLED

Reactor Water Cleanup is manually realigned

for single loop by lowering system flow and

closing WCS*MOVl05. When WCS flow is

lowered, the in-service filter demineralizer

HOLD Pumps start with the following P602

alarms

602317 RWCU FILTER DEMlN I TROUBLE

602318 RWCU FILTER DEMlN I TROUBLE

Note


blocks by answering "YESINO" questions.

NRC Scenario 2 -14

Seal staging flow > 1.8 gpm

DFR > 1 gpm rise

..THEN CONTINUE AT A (when

seal pressure drops below

100 psig)

Trip the affected pump

AND enter N2-SOP-29.

Recirculation pump should

be tripped by opening

RECIRC PMP IA(1B)

MOTOR BRKR 5A by

placing control switch to

STOP or PTL.

Lower WCS flow to < 450

gpm (by throttling MOV200)

Close WCS*MOVI 05.

Close RCS*MOVI OA

Close RCS*MOVI 8A

When time permits, perform

N2-OP-29, H. (Single Loop

Operations

SRO/BOP RO/ATC RO

Enter and implement the flowchart

actions per N2-SOP-29 when

directed from SOP-29.1

Is a Recirc pump in service?

YES

March 2005


Note

With operation above the 100% rod line, the

crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that

the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods

to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS

INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity

Manipulation for ATC RO)

Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be

reduced below 100% rod line

0

0

0

0

Is core flow to left of natural circ

line? NO

Core flow AND Power in Scram

Region? NO

Core flow AND Power in Exit

Region? NO

Reduce rodline below 100% by

inserting CRAM rods. (EVENT

2 Reactivity Manipulation for

ATC RO)

> 3 OPRMs operable? YES

Plant in Heightened Awareness

Zone? YES

Recover per Attachment 2

SOP-29 Attachment 2 actions

IF one Recirc. Pump tripped AND

NOT in Natural Circulation, perform

the following:

Verify Recirc Flow Controller in

LOOP MANUAL for BOTH

loops

Close Flow Control valve for

the tripped pump

Reduce flow rate of operating

loop to less than 41,800 gpm



EVENT 2 SRO ACTIONS

0

0

0

0

SRO

Direct trip of RCS Pump A and

ensure actions of SOP-29,

Attachment 2 and OP-29, G.2.0

are taken to place in shutdown

cond i tion.

as indicated by flow recorder at

2CEC*PNL602

Notify I&C to perform APRM

Scram AND Rod Block AND

rod block monitor setpoint

change

Reduce thermal power to less

than 70% of rated

IF pump speed does NOT

indicate 0 rpm one minute

AFTER pump trip, close

2RCS*MOV18A OR

2RCS*MOV1 OA

IF NOT able to start the tripped

pump, perform N2-OP-29,

Subsection H.6.0, Single

Recirculation Loop Operation

AND exit this attachment.



J Enters N2-SOP-29.

J Directs cram rods inserted.

J Refer to ITS 3.4.5 for RCS leakage

requirements.

3 Refer to ITS 3.4.1 for single loop

operation. Condition C LCO

requirements are currently not met

until actions are complete to adjust

APLHGR, MCPR, RPS APRM

Scram and Rod Block settings for

single loop operation. The

Completion Time is 4 hours

o Notify I&C to reduce APRM scram

and rod block monitor trip

setpoints. May be done by

contacting WEC SRO.

o Notifies Operations and Plant

Management


and wok planning.



EVENT 3 PO-3.0

Operating Control Rod Drive Pump trip

CONSOLE OPERATOR



RD18

RD063419 34-19 Rod Failure Accum

Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:OO minutes

RD062227 22-27 Rod Failure Accum

Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:20 minutes

CRD Suction Filter Clogged, TRUE

(F5)

RDS P I A trips

RDS flow and charging pressure drop to 0


603318 CRD Pmp Suction Fltr Diff Press

High (first alarm)

After the RDS pump trips then:

603308 CRD Pmp IA / IB Auto Trip

603309 CRD Pmp ?A Suct Press Low

60331 I CRD Charging Wtr Press Low

603315 CRD PMP 18 Suct Press Low

603446 CRD Pmp Disch Hdr Press Low

ATC RO

Acknowledge and report

Enter N2-SOP-30

Monitor for override conditions and

performs actions if required

IF THESE OCCUR ....

RPV pressure is >900 psig

AND

Two or more accumulators

for withdrawn control rods are

inoperable AND

Charging water header

pressure <940 psig for 20

minutes

THEN

SCRAM the reactor per N2-

SOP-1 01 c .



After 2:OO minutes, 603441 Rod Drive

Accumulator Trouble alarms

Rod and Detector Display Amber Trouble light

is lit for the affected accumulators

Accumulator 34-19 after 2:OO minute delay

Accumulator 22-27 after 2:20 minute delay

Note

While executing actions to restart an RDS

pump the crew will monitor the “flowchart

override” conditions and initiate a manual

scram, if required. It is NOT expected to meet

any of the required manual scram conditions.

ROLE PLAY

Report as operator dispatched that both

accumulator 34-19 and 22-27 pressure read

900 psig.

Annunciator 602324, RWCU PUMP CLG WTR

TEMP HIGH, is expected to be received after

several minutes with no operating RDS pump.

Dispatches operator to report

accumulator pressure for 34-1 9 and

22-27

Implements pump recovery actions

IsRDSpump

operating? NO

IF Annunciator 602324, RWCU

PUMP CLG WTR TEMP HIGH,

is received. THEN ..... Remove

WCS from service as follows:

Throttle WCS*MOV200 until

in service filters on hold.

Trip WCS pumps.



NOTE

RDS pump restoration is expected to be

completed in less than 15 minutes.

CONSOLE OPERATOR

WHEN dispatched to swap RDS suction filter

DELETE malfunction RD18 WAIT 3 minutes

and report to control room that suction filters

are swapped.

AFTER RDS pump is operating delete

malfunction RD06 to clear accumulator

trouble condition.

Following RDS pump restart and flow control

valve operation, system flow and pressure are

restored to normal. Associated alarms will

clear.

IF An RDS pump can NOT be

restored to service within 15

minutes OR indications of

system breech exist.

THEN.. . . . .Isolate RDS backfill

by closing 2RDS-V20

(preferred) OR 2RDS-V2058.

Shift 2RDS-FC107 (RDS flow

controller) to Manual.

Close FCV to minimum

position.

Determines trip is caused by

low suction pressure

Dispatches operator to swap

RDS suction filters per N2-OP-

30, Section F. l .O.

Start a RDS pump (within 20

minutes of 2"d inoperable

accumulator with Charging

header pressure 940 psig.

(CT-1 .O)

WHEN a RDS pump is running,

perform the following:

Adjust RDS flow using

2RDS-FC107 to

approximately 63 gpm.

Place 2RDS-FC107 in Auto.

IF WCS OR RPV backfill



EVENT 3 SRO Actions

NRC Scenario 2 -21

was removed from service,

THEN restore per SM/CRS.

Verify WCS/RCS seal flows

and backfill flows per N2-

OP-30, Sections F.2.5

through F.2.9

WHEN charging water

header pressure has been

restored above 940 psig,

exit this procedure (N2-

SOP-30).

Report RDS pump is restarted

- SRO

Directs entry into SOP-30

Declares two accumulators

inoperable with their pressure

below 940 psig and enters Tech

Spec 3.1.5 Condition B and

implements the REQUIRED

ACTIONS

B. Two or more control rod scram

accumulators inoperable with

reactor steam dome pressure ~ 9 0 0

psig.

B. 1 Restore charging water header

pressure to >940 psig. Completion

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S

Time is 20 minutes from discovery

of Condition B concurrent with

charging water header pressure <

940 psig

AND

B.2.1 Declare the associated

control rod scram time "slow."

Completion Time is 1 hour.

OR

B.2.2 Declare the associated

control rod inoperable.

Completion Time is 1 hour.

EVENT 4 P O 4 0

Loss of Line 5 with EDG Failures

CONSOLE OPERATOR



EDOZA, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 5,

TRUE

DG04A, DG 1 UV LOCA Start Failure is now

in effect

Multiple 86 devices and annunciators actuate

on P852. Div I and Div 111 EDG fail to start on

undervoltage. 4 160 VAC Emergency

Switchgear ENS*SWGIOI and 102

deenergize. HPCS is now unavailable due to

BOP RO

II Recognize and report Loss of Line

5 and Division I and Division Ill

EDGs failed to start.

II Enters and executes N2-SOP-3

Determines that both Divisions

(I and II) have not lost power

Determines Division I EDG did

not energize the bus

Starts Division I EDG from

P852 and reports EDG started



S WG 102 loss and is not recoverable.

SWP Non Essential MOVs close, isolating

SWP flow to CCS and CCP heat exchangers.

The Div I EDG will start when manually started

fro P852.

Verifies output breaker 101-1

closes and observes

ENS*SWG101 is energized

At P601, verifies Div II SWP

Non-Essential MOVs close

After EDG energizes

ENS*SWGI 01, verifies:

Div I SWP Non-Essential

MOVs close

One Div I SWP pump

restarts

WHEN SWP Pump restarts

u Open ALL SWP Non-

Essential MOVs

Throttle SWP Pump

Discharge MOV74’s to

maintain pump flow below

10,000 gpm

o Start a 3rd Div I1 SWP Pump

and reopen MOV74’s

Verify proper operation of EDG

Voltage 4160 VAC

Frequency 60 Hz

SWP flow > 780 gpm

Restore pneumatics to Drywell

At P851 open IAS*SOV166

At P601 open IAS*SOV164

Refer to Attachment 1 for

subsequent actions and fault



_ -

Role Play: If dispatched to perform switchyard

to electrical power distribution panel

wal kdowns, wait approximately 5 minutes then

report back that all indications are good and

only targets found were Div I under voltage

trips.

CONSOLE OPERATOR

WHEN requested to start CMSIO sample pumps, manually activate remotes as requested

RM03 for CMS*REI OA, ON

identification

ATC RO

Subsequent Actions (N2-SOP-3

Attachment 1 )

Reports GTS running on the

Reactor Building

Restores drywell cooling by

restarting unit coolers on P873.

0 Secures CWS blowdown if

required.

Restores CMS.

0

0

0

0

0

0

SRO

Open 2CMS*SOV62B

Open 2CMS*SOV6OA

Open 2CMS*SOV62A

Open 2CMS*SOVGOB

Restart or verify in standby the

Div I H2102 Monitor in

accordance with N2-OP-82

(May not be performed)

Notify Rad Protection to start

2CMS*RE1 OA AND verify the

monitor is on line and working

properly

Notify Rad Protection to start

2CMS*REI OB AND verify the

monitor is on line and working

properly



Line 5 loss with CSH EDG failing to starf

results in loss of power to HPCS. HPCS is

now inoperable and with LPCS already

inoperable for maintenance, Tech Spec 3.5.1

Condition H is entered. This is the most

restrictive LCO.


Directs subsequent and fault

identification actions

Declares HPCS inoperable AND

with LPCS already inoperable

enter Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition H

Condition H not met for HPCS and

Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

Systems inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION H. l Enter LCO

3.0.3

COMPLETION TIME Immediately

0 Enters Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3

LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met

and the associated ACTIONS are not

met, an associated ACTION is not

provided, or if directed by the

associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be

placed in a MODE or other specified

condition in which the LCO is not

applicable. Action shall be initiated

within 1 hour to place the unit, as

applicable, in:

a.

b.

C.

Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition B

MODE 2 within 7 hours;

MODE 3 within 13 hours; and

MODE 4 within 37 hours.


I N STRU CTO R ACT1 0 NS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS

TS 3.8.1 Condition D is most restrictive after

LCO 3.0.3 considerations, with 12 hour

completion time for line or EDG restoration.

Then 72 hours for the other component.

for HPCS inoperable

High Pressure Core Spray

(HPCS) System inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTIONS

B. 1 Verify by administrative

means RClC System is

OPERABLE when RClC is

required to be OPERABLE.

Completion Time is

Immediately

AND

B.2 Restore HPCS System

to OPERABLE status.

Completion Time is 14 days

Enters Tech. Spec. 3.8.1 and

Condition A

Condition A not met for Line 5

REQUIRED ACTION A. l

directs N2-OSP-LOG WOO1

performed within 1 hour and

every 8 hours thereafter.

AND A.2 is not applicable

under current conditions

AND A.3 Restore required

offsite circuit to OPERABLE

status. Completion Time 72

hours



0

0

0

Condition B not met for Div Ill

EDG

Condition D not met Line 5

AND Div Ill EDG

One required offsite circuit

inoperable.

AND

One required DG inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION

D.1 Restore required offsite

circuit to OPERABLE status.

Completion Time 12 hours

OR

D.2 Restore required DG to

OPERABLE status. Completion

Time 12 hours

Conducts crew briefing


Management


and wok planning.



EVENT 5 RCS Coolant Leakage into the

Drywell PO-5.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR



RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA

Value 1.5

RCS coolant leakage into DW is initiated. IF

CMS*RElOs have been returned to service

following power loss, annunciator 851 254

PROCESS AIRBORNE RAD MONITOR

A C TI VA TED alarms.

DRMS computer indicates CMS*REl Os

a la rming .

Drywell floor drain leak rate rising.

Drywell pressure begins to rise.

DWP slowly rises and 603140 DRYWELL

PRESSURE HIGH/LO W alarms at about 0.78

Psis

A manual scram should be directed prior to the

automatic high drywell pressure RPS trip

setpoint of 1.68 psis

BOP RO

Reports alarm 851254 and

implements actions

Determine the source(s) of the

alarm by reviewing the status of

the DRMS monitors using the

STATUS GRID function of the

DRMS console. Color-coded

identification is used for status

of normal (green), alert alarm

(yellow), high radiation (red),

suspect data (white), and

equipment failure (blue). For

applicable alarm response refer

to Table 851254. For alert

response refer to step e.

If there has been an increase in

containment activity as

evidenced by an alert or High

Rad alarm on the gaseous or

particulate channel of


INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S

’ EVENT 5 and 6 SRO Actions

PO-5.0 and 6.0

SRO

CONSOLE OPERATOR

WHEN Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown, verify change in status of malfunction RR20

RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA Value

I O ; Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes ET0 1

ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown.

IF ET01 fails to trigger RR20 ...... MANUALLY enter RR20, 1 O%, Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes

CMS*RElOA or B:

0

Notify the SM.

Notify the Rad. Prot.

Department.

Attempt to identify the cause

of the increase, notify

Chemistry to sample

contain ment .

Verify Reactor Coolant

leakage is within Tech.

Spec. limits (see Tech.

Spec. 3.4.3.2). {ITS 3.4.5)

Updates crew and identifies the

threshold DWP value that the

reactor will be scrammed at when

reached.

When DWP threshold is reached,

directs manual scram

Receive and repeat back scram

report

Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV

water level at 159 inches

Directs initial level restored and

maintained 160 inches to 200

inches with Feedwater, CRD, RClC

(L-3)



--

Detail E l Preferred Injection Systems

0 Condensate/Feedwater (tripped)

0 RClC (available)

HPCS (power loss)

0 LPCS (not available)

0

0

LPCl (B and C only available)

RHS through Shutdown Cooling (RHS B

after depressurizing)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Directs RPV pressure band 800 to

1000 psig with EHC in automatic

using BPV (P-5)

Enters EOP-PC on high Drywell

pressure when DWP reaches 1.68

Psig 0 May direct Suppression

Chamber and Drwyell spray

initiation. If this is directed, the

SRO will have to redirect RHS

for injection, when level drops

below TAF -14 inches.

When loss of high pressure feed

systems occurs determines RPV

water level cannot be maintained

above -14 inches (TAF)

May direct SLS injected from

Boron Tank

Transition to EOP-RPV at

Directs ADS inhibited (L-5)

Directs level restored and

maintained above -14 inches (Fig

Z) with Preferred Injection Systems

from Detail E l (L-6)

Are 2 or more Subsystems Detail F

lineup? (L-7) YES; LPCl B and

LPCl c WAIT until level drops to -14

inches (Fig Z) (L-9)



Detail F Injection Subsystems

0 Condensate/Feedwater (NO)

HPCS(N0)

0 LPClA(N0)

LPCl B (YES)

LPCl C(YES)

LPCS(N0)

After applying Fuel Zone Correcfion using Fig

Z, TAF -14 inches is about -52 inches AND

MSCRWL -39 inches is about -72 inches at

800 psig.

Is any Subsystems Detail F lineup

with a pump running? (L-IO) YES;

LPCl B and LPCl C

Is any injection source lineup with

a pump running? (L-12) YES; LPCl

B and LPCl C

BEFORE water level drops to -39

inches (Fig Z) . . ..... ENTER EOP-

C2 RPV Blowdown while

continuing here (EOP-RPV step L-

16) Executes EOP-C2 as follows:

Determines reactor WILL stay shutdown without boron (Step 2)

Drywell Pressure? Above 1.68 psig (Step 9)

Prevent LPCS and LPCl injection not needed for core cooling. (Step I O ) Current conditions require injection, so NO system injection is to be prevented.

Determines SPL is above 192 feet (Step 11)

Directs all 7 ADS valves open (Step 12)

When all 7 ADS valves are

reported open, continues in C2 to

WAIT blocks (Step 16 then 17)



When RPV injection is established with RHS B

and C systems, RPV water level will turn and

be restored above -39 inches. Afler level is

restored, SRO should direct RHR system A

lined up for Containment Spray

SRO Actions directed from EOP-PC

NRC Scenario 2

Continues EOP-RPV actions at

step L-16 and directs RPV water

level restored and mainatained

above -39 inches (Fig Z) with

Preferred Injection Systems from

Detail E l

RHS B and RHS C (LPCI) are

to be injected (CT-2.0)

Determines RPV water level can

be restored and maintained above

-14 inches (Fig Z) per Step L-4 override and returns to EOP-RPV

at 0 Directs RPV water level is restored

and maintained 160 to 200 inches

using RHS C and RHS B

WHEN water level is restored

above -14 inches, directs RHS B

lined up for Containment Spray

These actions are directed from EOP-

PC

Directs RHR Loop B placed in

Suppression Chamber Spray but

only if pump is not needed fore

core cooling.

WAIT until Suppression Chamber

Pressure is above 10 psig

-32- March 2005


Defeating Drywell Spray interlocks is

necessary due to Div I1 ECCS initiation logic

failure (malfunction RHl4B).

EVENT 5 and 6 ATC RO/BOP RO as

v directed

PO-5.0 and PO-6.0

Verify DW parameters are inside

Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (EOP-

PC Fig K)

Directs tripping RCS Pumps

(Should already be tripped)

Directs Drywell Unit Coolers

tripped (Should already be tripped)

Directs RHS B lined up for Drywell

Spray per EOP-6 Attachment 22

0 Defeating Drywell Spray

interlocks is necessary

ATC RO

WHEN DWP reaches pre-

determined value and when

directed by the SRO, places Mode

Switch in Shutdown

Provides scram report to SRO

Performs Scram Actions per N2-

SOP-101c

17 Verify automatic responses:

All rods full in

Rx power lowering

Turbine trippedlTSVs &

TCVs shut

Generator tripped and

house loads transferred

SDV Vents &Drain valves

closed


--

INSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS

0 RCS pumps downshift

RPV pressure on TBVs OR

SRVs

FWLC controlling level >

159.3 inches

IF all Feedwater pumps have

tripped THEN place all FWS-

LVlO and 55 controllers in

manual and verify valves are

full closed

IF scram cannot be reset, if

directed by SRO closes RDS-

V28 Charging Header Is01 by

dispatching operator.

Perform the following as time

permits:

0 Fully insert IRMs AND

SRMs.

Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07

(2N HS-MCC008-2E).

0 If required, secure makeup

to the Cooling Tower.

At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown

HWC.

IF WCS is in one pump three

filter lineup.. ... THEN throttle

close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if

required, throttle open 2WCS-

MOVI I O ) to obtain

approximately 225 gpm WCS


I N STRU CTO R ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS

BOP RO Actions performed as directed

When RPV water level drops to 108.8 inches

RClC starts and water Level 2 containment

isolation occurs. Standby Gas Treatment

systems and Control Building Special Filter

Trains start.

EVENT 7 Division II Low Pressure ECCS

Systems fail to start PO-7.0

After RPV Blowdown, RHS Injection MOVs

flow.

Maintains RPV water level in

directed band

Reports NPS-SWG003 de-

energized and resulting loss of

Feedwater system

BOP RO

When RPV level drops to I 0 8

inches report RClC start

Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock

switches

When DWP reaches 1.68 psig

Inform SRO of EOP entry

cond it ion

Verify Div II ECCS systems

start

Report failure to start

Manually start RHS C

Pump (CT-2.0)

Manually start RHS B

Pump (CT-2.0)

Report pumps started

Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming

and depressing ADS MANUAL

INITIATION pushbuttons on P601

Reports 7 ADS valves are open

Injects with systems to restore


.-


._ -

must be opened from P601 to establish

injection. When level begins to rise and

transitions from Fuel Zone to Wide Range

instruments, action should be taken to

close RHS LPCl injection MOVs to prevent

overfilling the RPV (control level below 202

inches). This will also allow RHS B loop to

be diverted to Containment Spray.

Contai n ment Spray

PO-8.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR

WHEN requested to defeat Drywell Spray valve interlocks per EOP-6 Attachment 22, WAIT 2 minutes then activate remote by depressing F8 key. Report the jumpers are installed

RH48 2RHS*MOV15B EOP Jumper, TRUE

F8

RH50 2RHS*MOV25B EOP Jumper, TRUE

F8

0

NRC Scenario 2 -36-

and maintain RPV water level in

directed band (CT-2.0)

0 RHS Via Shutdown Cooling

LPCl B (RHS), opens MOV24B

LPCl C (RHS), opens MOV24C

When directed initiates Drywell

Spray using RHS B per EOP-6

Attachment 22 step 3.2.2

(2CEC*PNLGO I ).

IF Drywell spray valve interlocks

are not met, defeat the

RHS*MOVI 5B/25B interlock by

performing the following:

NOTE: Dispatches another operator

to install jumpers

0 At 2CEC*PNL704A, install

EOP Jumper #33 from

terminal strip TCI 10, TB2

terminal 7 to terminal strip

TCI 12, TB2 terminal 19.

(Figure 22-2)

At 2CEC*PNL704A, install

EOP Jumper #34 from

March 2005


NRC Scenario 2 -37-

terminal strip TCI 08, TB1

terminal 2 to terminal strip

TC108, TBI terminal 4.

(Figure 22-3)

NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOB open

may be delayed until after sprays

are in service.

0

0

0

0

0

0

Verify open SWP*MOV90B,

HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE

WTR INLET VLV

Verify closed AND IF possible

overridden, RHS*MOV24B,

LPCl B INJECTION VLV

Verify running RHS*Pl B, PMP

1B

IF Suppression Chamber

Sprays are required

concurrently with Drywell

Sprays, perform the following:

Open RHS*MOV33B,

OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL

SPRAY

o Verify approximately 450

gpm on SUPPR SPRAY

HEADER FLOW

(2RHS *f 1643)

Verify closed, RHS*FV38B,

RETURN TO SUPPR POOL

COOLING

Verify open, RHS*MOV4B,

March 2005


CONSOLE OPERATOR

When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to place radiation monitor SWP*RE23B in service (if not already in service), manually activate remotes, then report RE23B is in service:

RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline, ON

RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample Pump, ON

NRC Scenario 2 -3E

PMP I B MINIMUM FLOW VLV

Open RHS*MOV25B, OUTLET

TO DRYWELL SPRAY

Open RHS*MOVI 5B, OUTLET

TO DRYWELL SPRAY

Verify closed, RHS*MOV4B,

PMP 1B MINIMUM FLOW VLV

Verify approximately 7450 gpm

on DRYWELL SPRAY

HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/63B)

Verify open SWP*MOV90B,

HEAT EXCHANGER 1 B SVCE

WTR INLET VLV

Throttle open SWP*MOV33B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1 B SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1 B of approximately 7400 gpm (€12- R602B)

WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B INLET BYPASS VLV

Request Rad Monitor SWP*RE23B placed in service.

March 2005


-

T E R M I NATION C RITE RIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF. Drywell Spray is initiated.

EVENT 8 SRO Admin JPM 5-2 SRO

Classify the event as ALERT 3.1 .I


for erne rge n cy cI ass if icat io n .



A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative

critique on:

1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?

2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?

3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?

4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?

Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.

PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should

be addressed.

Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.

At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for

improvement. Review video tape if appropriate.

Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to

allow later retrieval and follow-up.



- A. Reference Events

None

B. Commitments

1. 1 OCFR55.45

2. 1 OCFR55.59


None


Appendix D Scenario 0 utline NRC EXAM

Form ES-D-1

Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: Simulator IC-IO with additional rods withdrawn to raise power to about 4.5%. Reactor startup in progress per N2-OP-101 A. Turnover: Continue power ascension; N2-OP-IOI A; Section E.3.0, Step 3.3. Continue the startup, transfer the reactor mode switch to run after APRM downscale condition is cleared (above 4%). EHC Pump B is out of service for motor repairs.

Scenario No.: NRC-03 Op-Test No.: NRC-01

Event Malf. No. No. 1

I

4 RD05 34-27

5

6 FW30A FW16A

Event Type*

R (SRO)

I (SRO)

TS (SRO)

C (ATC) C (SRO)

I (SRO)

Event Description

Withdraw control rods raise reactor power to above 5%. Several control rods must be withdrawn to raise power to clear the APRM downscale condition. N2-OP-101 A

IRM A Failure - hop Trip. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip. (TS determination for SRO).

placed in service. With less than 4 operating pumps, an additional pumps must be started with 72 hour COMPLETION TIME.

Tech Spec 3.7.1 N2-OP-11

Control Rod 34-27 Drift Out. N2-SOP-8 will be executed to fully insert and isolate the control rod. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod.

Tech Spec 3.1.5 N2-SOP-8

Transfer Reactor Mode Switch in RUN. N2-OP-101A

Feedwater Pump A minimum flow valve fails open with RPV Narrow Range level input to FWLC failed as-is. RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective function then transfer to redundant Narrow Range transmitter before returning FWLC to automatic control. N2-SOP-6 NP-nP-R ._- -. - (SRO) MCC 302 Feeder Breaker to ICS'MOV128 RClC Steam Line Containment Isolation Valve trips open. Prevents isolation valve from closing on subsequent steam leak. Tech Spec 3.6.1.3


Final Submittal Wednesday, April 20,2005

8

1. Total malfunctions (5-8)

9

10

6

RC12 I M(ALL) 25% 10

min ramp RC11

TC15A TCI 5B

4. Major transients (1-2)

5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) Event 8

Event 8 EOP-RPV, EOP-SC 6. Event 10 EOP-C2 7. Critical tasks (2-3)

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)

NRC EXAM RClC Steam Leak into Reactor Building with Failure to isolate. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the RClC steam line will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-SC is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed. EHC Pump trip results in loss of Bypass Valve capability, if used to anticipate RPV Blowdown. N2-EOP-RPV N2-EOP-SC

1

2

1

3

radiation level. Requires action to close Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers and manually start Standby Gas Treatment systems to terminate a potential ground level release pathway. N2-OP-52

When Reactor Building temperatures exceed 212°F an RPV Blowdown is required. ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during RPV Blowdown due to Loss of N2 supply. Requires operator action to open an additional SRV to obtain the number directed by EOP- c 2 N2-EOP-C2

* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-03 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES I ACTUALATTRIBUTES I

Events 2.3.6.7.9.10 I I 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) Events 8.10

2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) Event 4 SOP-8 Event 6 SOP-6

2


Final Submittal Wednesday, April 20,2005



TRANSFER MODE SWITCH TO RUNKONTROL ROD DRIFT/UNISOLABLE RClC STEAM LEAK WITH RPV BLOWDOWN

PREPARE R G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05

VALIDATED R. Lange, B. Moore, M. Smith DATE 2/16/05

GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE v b \ / a 0 PE RAT1 ONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE

I f

CON FIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE

SCENARIO SUMMARY

Length: 2.5 hours

Initial Power Level:

The scenario begins at about 4.5% reactor power, during plant startup. The crew will continue the startup by withdrawing control rods to raise power above 5% with subsequent Mode Switch transfer to RUN. IRM A failure due to an inop trip occurs resulting in a trip if RPS trip system A. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip.

4.5% with Mode Switch in STARTUP

Service Water Pump A trips occurs requiring a standby pump to be placed in service. With less than four operating Service Water pumps, Tech Spec entry is required. Control Rod 34-27 will drift out. N2- SOP-8 will be executed to fully insert and isolate the control rod. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod. The startup now continues and the crew completes steps until the Mode Switch is transferred to RUN. The scenario can continue regardless of whether the crew actually places the Mode Switch to RUN.

Feedwater Pump A minimum flow valve fails open with a concurrent failure of RPV Narrow Range level input to Feedwater Level Control System (FWLC). With the level transmitter failed as-is, an RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective trip function per N2-SOP-6. When level is stabilized the crew will then transfer to redundant Narrow Range transmitter per normal operating procedures and subsequently return FW LC to automatic control.

The major transient begins when a RClC Steam Leak into Reactor Building occurs. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the RClC steam line will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-SC is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed. Reactor Building Ventilation System fails to isolate on high radiation level. This requires action to close Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers and manually start Standby Gas Treatment systems to terminate a potential ground level release pathway. When Reactor Building temperatures exceed 212°F in more than one area, an RPV Blowdown is required.


EHC Pump A trips to disable the Bypass Valves as a means of rapidly reducing RPV pressure to mitigate the steam leak. ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during RPV Blowdown due to Loss of N2 supply, requiring operator action to open an additional SRV to obtain the number directed by EOP-C2.

Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, SC, C-2. N2-SOP-6 and N2-SOP-8

E AL Classification : SAE 3.4.1 Main Steam Line, RClC steam line or Reactor Water Cleanup isolation failure AND release pathway, outside normal process system flowpaths from unisolable system exists outside primary containment

SAE 4.1 .I Primary system is discharging into RB resulting in RB area temperatures >212"F in more than one area, N2-EOP-SC

Termination Criteria:RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF.


I. SIMULATOR SET UP

A. IC Number: IC-10 or equivalent. (IC-48)

RWMStep29

Pull rods to raise power to about 4.5%. Initial IC power level is 2.5%. Start of

RWM step 31 will result in the proper initial scenario power level.

Reset CSH HI WTR LEVEL SEAL IN

Place EHC Pump B (TME-PIB) in P-T-L and hang red clearance tag on control

switch.

B. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED

b. RCI 1, RClC Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED

c. AD08C, ADS Valve N 2 Supply Severed (MSS*PSV126), TRUE QUEUED

d. NMOSA, IRM Channel Failure INOP (A), TRUE F3

e. CWOIA Service Water Pump Trip A, TRUE F4

f. RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out, TRUE F5

g. FW30A, Reactor NR Level Transmitter Failure As Is (4A), TRUE F7

h. FWIGA, FW Pump Recirc Valve Failure Open (FV2A), TRUE F7

TUA 3 seconds

RC12, RCIC Steam Leak in RB 215’ Elevation

25% Ramp Time 10 minutes

RC12, RClC Steam Leak in RB 215’ Elevation

60% F10

k. TC15A, EHC Pump A Trip, TRUE ET02

I. TC15B, EHC Pump B Trip, TRUE ET02

i.

F9

j.

2. Remotes:

a. MS03 Cond Low Vac Bypass OFF QUEUED

b. RD08 34-27 HCU Isolation, CLOSED F6

3. Overrides:

a. MOV 121, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard), OPEN QUEUED

b. MOV 128, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard), OPEN QUEUED

c. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Inboard Isolation INOP Amber, ON F8

d. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, OFF F8 NRC Scenario 3 -3- March 2005

e. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Red, OFF F8

f. MOV 121, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, ON ET01

g. MOV 121, Light Not Fully OPEN, Amber, ON ET0 1

4. Annunciators:

a. AN601305, RClC System Inoperable, ON F8

b. AN601 31 9, RClC Valves Motor Overload, ON F8


a. TMB-PIB EHC Pump B in P-T-L with red clearance on control switch


a. N2-OP-IOIA, Plant Startup complete through E.3.3

E. Miscellaneous

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

a. ET01 ANN 601 157 RB GEN TEMP HIGH IN ALARM (Event Trigger 68) When

alarm actuates this results in indications of cause of the isolation failure.

b. ET02 650 psig PAM A (Event Trigger 001). Trips EHC pump resulting in loss of

Turbine Bypass Valves.


II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

TITLE SRO

---

NAME TITLE NAME

OFF GOING SHIFT: I N E D DATE:

4 ATC RO BOP RO

PART I: shift.


0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)


Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA)

0 Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)


Reactor Power = 4.5% approx RWM Step31 0 RPV Pressure 925 psig 0 Bypass Valve # I is full open and #2 is partially open

Reactor Power = 4.5% approx RWM Step31 0 RPV Pressure 925 psig 0 Bvpass Valve # I is full open and #2 is Dartiallv oDen 0 Feedwater Pump A in service with FWS-LV55A in AUTO (HICI 37)

EHC Pump B is out of service for motor repair. Red clearance issued. Scheduled return to service date is Mav 20.

PART 111: RemarkdPlanned Evolutions: Continue plant startup to place the reactor mode switch to RUN per N2-OP-IOIA. Currently at step E.3.3


0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS) 0


Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other 0 pt io n s?


PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1 .O Given a condition requiring automatic isolation of Secondary

Containment and a failure of Ventilation isolation, the crew will

manually isolate the reactor building by closing Secondary

Containment isolation dampers and start GTS.

CT-2.0 Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment

temperature approaching maximum safe values in one area, the

crew will enter EOP-RPV and initiate a manual reactor scram

before performing an RPV Blowdown.

CT-3.0 Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment

temperature above maximum safe values in more than one area,

the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2.


PO-I .o

PO-2.0

PO-3.0

PO-4.0

Given the plant during startup and an IRM INOP trip, the crew will

bypass the failed IRM and reset RPS trip systems per N2-0P-92

and N2-OP-97.

Given a Service Water Pump trip the crew will start a standby

pump to restore the plant to 4 operating pumps per N2-OP-11.

Given the reactor plant during startup and a control rod drifting out,

the crew will fully insert and disarm the control rod per N2-SOP-8.

Given a failed open Feedwater pump minimum flow valve with RPV

level instrument failure resulting in lowering RPV water level, the

crew will manually control level to avoid a reactor scram per N2-

SOP-6 and N2-OP-3.


PO-5.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures approaching 212OF,

the crew will manually scram per N2-EOP-SC and EOP-RPV.

PO-6.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures in two areas exceeding

212"F, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2.



\.-

EVENT I Continue Startup

The crew continues the startup per N2-OP- 101A E.3.3

EVENT 2

IRM A Failure h o p Trip PO-I .o

CONSOLE OPERATOR

When power is above 5% or when directed by

Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by

depressing F3 key:

NMOSA, IRM CHANNEL FAILURE-INOP (A)

TRUE, (F3)

3 e w

Crew conducts a pre-brief,


tests annunciators.

jR0

3 Directs plant startup continued

4TC RO

Continue to withdraw control rods

UNTIL APRM downscale lights

have cleared.

Verify APRMs reading greater than

5% by placing IRM/APRM recorder

select switch to APRM.

In EACH Reactor Protection

Division leave one I RM/APRM

recorder select switch placed in the

APRM position.

SRO

Acknowledges report of IRM A

INOP trip and RPS A half scram

Directs IRM A bypassed

Directs RPS trip system A reset


Management


-

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE

IRM A channel fails upscale resulting in RPS

trips system A trip. On left side of P603, the 4

white RPS scram lights are o f . For IRMA the

RED UPSC TR OR INOP light is on, indicating

the effected channel. Rod withdrawal block.


603102 RPS A NMS TRIP

6031 10 RPS A AUTO TRIP

603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALEANOPERABLE


NRC Scenario 3 -10-

-. _. ~ ~

OPERATOR ACTIONS


and work planning

Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1 .I RPS

Function 1 IRMs. No action is

required since only 1 IRM channel

is inoperable. (NOTE Also see

TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod Block

Instrumentation Function 2)


May place startup activities on hold

to resolve IRM failure

ATC RO

Identifies and reports annunciators

to SRO

Implements ARP 603102 actions.

6031 10 actions are similar.


IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN

enter N2-SOP-101 C, Reactor

Scram. (Scram should NOT have

occurred)

IF NO SCRAM has occurred,

THEN perform the following:

Check the other IRM channels

to verify that NO SCRAM

should have occurred.

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS

IF a SCRAM should have

occurred, THEN enter the

Emergency Operating Procedures.

(Scram should NOT have

occurred)

IF NO SCRAM should have

occurred, THEN perform the

following:

Troubleshoot AND correct the

cause of the alarm.

Refer to Technical

Specifications for actions.

IF desired, THEN bypass the

applicable IRM per N2-OP-92.

WHEN the initiating signal is

cleared OR bypassed, THEN reset

the half SCRAM per N2-OP-97.

ATC RO


At P603 determine by red

UPSCLANOP light which IRM

channel is tripped. (Determines

IRM A is INOP)

Verify associated range switch

setting is correct.

Consult with S.S.S. and bypass

faulty channel.


INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE ATC RO Bypass IRM A

When IRM is bypassed the following

annunciators cle a r:

603102 RPS A NMS TRIP

603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALE/INOPERABLE


ATC RO Reset of Tripped Protective System

Channel (RESET HALF SCRAM)

...

3PERATOR ACTIONS ATC RO

These actions are taken to bypass

IRM A, when directed k * * * * * * * * X * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CAUTION

Bypass joysticks can become

electrically misaligned after numerous

bending motions due to "Metal

Creep". Any bypass function should

be verified by channel BYPASS lights

to ensure that only the intended

channel is bypassed. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Verify NO other IRM in bypass for

the instrument to be bypassed.

Place the IRM BYPASS joystick to

the bypass position.

IF IRM A was bypassed, THEN

verify the IRM A BYPASS light is lit

on 2CEC*PNL603 OR H I 3-P606

ATC RO

These actions are taken to reset the

RPS trip, when directed

Determine which protective

channel is tripped by verifying

which SCRAM solenoid lights on

2CEC*PNL603 are de-energized.

At 2CEC*PNL603, reset SCRAM

signals by momentarily placing the



When RPS A trip system is reset the following

PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white

lights A, C, E AND G light and 6031 10 RPS A

AUTO TRIP clears..

EVENT 3

Service Water Pump A Trip PO-2.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR

When power directed by Lead Evaluator,

activate malfunction by depressing F4 key:

CWOIA, Service Water Pump Trip (PIA),

TRUE, F4 )

Service Water (SWP) Pump A trips. Flows rise

on the remaining operating S WP pumps.


601 113 Service Water Pump lA / IC / lE PUMP

AUTO TRIP/FAIL TO START

601 114 Service Water Pump IA/ IC/ IE Motor/

Feeder Electrical Fault.

NRC Scenario 3 -13-

OPERATOR ACTIONS applicable switches to RESET as

follows:

For RPS A:

REACTOR SCRAM RESET

LOGIC A

REACTOR SCRAM RESET

LOGIC C

Verify PILOT SCRAM VALVE

SOLENOID white lights A, C, E

AND G are lit.

SRO

Refers to Tech Spec

3.7.1 Service Water (SW) System

and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.1 Division 1 and 2 SW

subsystems and UHS shall be

OPERABLE.

AND

Four OPERABLE SW pumps

shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,

and 3

CONDITION E. One required SW

pump not in operation.

March 2005


Role Play

IF dispatched to perform prestart checks when

starting pump per N2-OP-11 E.2.0, WAIT

about 2 minutes and report ready to start the

standby pump.

Role Plav: As the AO, wait three minutes and

report that Service Water Pump PIA, 86-

lockout relay is tripped. 1

3PERATOR ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION E . l Restore

required SW pump to operation.

COMPLETION TIME 72 hours


Management


and work planning


BOP RO

C Recognizes and reports condition

of the SWP*PIA tripped to the

SRO.

3 Performs actions required by N2-

ARP-01 ,601 11 3 (or 601 114

actions are the same):

IF required, throttle

2SW P*MOV74A( B ,C,D, E ,F) to

maintain running SWP Pump

flow 10,000 gpm. (Pumps B, C

and D will require throttling) Start additional Service Water

Pumps, as required, at P601 as

follows:

IF time permits per N2-OP-

11 Section E.2.0, OR

Place associated pump

control switch to START

Place the tripped Service Water

Pump control switch in "PULL-

TO-LOCK", at P601.



EVENT 4

Control Rod 34-27 Drift

PO-3.0

CONSOLE OPERATOR



RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out,

TRUE F5

Control Rod 34-27 slowly drifts outward and

power slowly rises. RWM Display indicates

34-27 is drifting out.

The following annunciators alarm

603307 RWM ROD BLOCK

603443 CONTROL ROD DRIFT

OPERATOR ACTIONS Notifies SRO to refer to

Technical Specifications.

Dispatches A 0 to investigate

the cause of P I A trip.

Reopen any MOV74’s

previously throttled

SRO


Provides reactivity oversight

Refer to TS 3.1.3, Control Rod

Operability.

Refer to TS 3.1 5, Control Rod

Scram Accumulator Operability.


Management


and work planning


May place startup continuation on

hold to resolve current equipment

deficiencies.



Note


blocks by answering “YES/NO” questions.

NRC Scenario 3 -16-

OPERATOR ACTIONS ATC RO

Reports alarms and implements

Annunciator 603443 actions

Determine whether alarm is

valid by checking the Full Core

Display AND Four Rod Display.

IF alarm is valid, enter N2-

SOP-08, Unplanned Power

Changes, AND execute

concurrently with this ARP.

Refer to N2-OP-95A, F.3.0,

Rod Drift Indication, to reset

Drift alarm.

Enters N2-SOP-8

IF More than one control rod

has scrammed OR drifted,

THEN SCRAM the reactor per

N2-SOP-101 C. Scram not

required, only 1 rod is drifting

Power change due to Recirc

FCV motion? NO

Power on APRMs rising OR

expected to rise? YES

Reduce Reactor power to

approximately 85% per N2-

SOP-IOID. NA, Power is

below 5%

Monitor Offgas AND Main

Steam Line Radiation Monitors

March 2005


Rod will insert to full in after bypassing RWM

and using INSERT pushbutton.

After releasing the insert pushbutton, the rod

will drift out again.

CONSOLE OPERATOR

When dispatched to isolate HCU 34-27,

activate REMOTE by depressing F6 key :

RD08 34-27, HCU Isolation for Inserted Rod

F6

Wait one minute, then report HCU 34-27

NRC Scenario 3 -17-

OPERATOR ACTIONS for evidence of Fuel Element

Fa i I u re.

IF Cause due to Control Rod

Drift .... THEN Continue at A (of

SOP-8)

ATC RO

These are “A’ actions

Identify which control rod is

drifting and in what direction

CR IN / OUT

Using INSERT pushbutton, fully

insert drifted control rod.

Bypass the RWM if necessary.

Uses keylock switch and

bypasses RWM.

Can control rod be fully

inserted? YES

Release the insert pushbutton.

Did the control rod remain fully

inserted? NO

Depress and hold INSERT

pushbutton to maintain control

rod fully inserted.

When control rod is fully

inserted, close the following

valves at the HCU for the

drifting control rod.

2RDS*V103

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE isolated.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CAUTION FOR CONSOLE OPERATOR

IF Instructor Station locks up with REMOTE

RD08 core grid displayed THEN select rod 31-

18 on the map. This should release the grid

and allow continued console operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

After isolating the HCU, and the INSERT

pushbutton is released, 34-27 no longer drifts

out. With rod fully inserted, A PRM power is

lower. Annunciator 603215 APRM TRIP

SYSTEM DOWNSCALE may alarm

intermittently (at 4%).

EVENT 6 Feedwater Pump A Minimum Flow

Valve fails open with RPV Narrow Range A

level transmitter failed as is. P O 4 0

CONSOLE OPERATOR



NRC Scenario 3 -18-

2RDS*V105

Release INSERT pushbutton

Is the control rod drifting out?

NO

IF required, disarm the control

rod per N2-OP-30.


Operability.

WHEN directed by the SM, exit

this procedure.


Scram Accumulator Operability.

Contact Maintenance for

troubleshoothepair plan as

required.

ATC RO

Reports alarms

Monitors RPV water level and

identifies difference between RX

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE FW16A, FW PUMP RECIRC VALVE

FAILURE - OPEN (FVZA), TRUE

FW30A, REACTOR NR LEVEL

F7 -_-

TRANSMITTER FAILURE - AS IS (C33-

N004A), TRUE F7

RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A indicator is

now failed at current value of about 183

inches. Feedwater Pump A minimum flow

valve opens diverting feedflow from the RPV.

RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE B and RX

LEVEL NARROW RANGE C indicators slowly

lower. With A failed, FWLC does not

compensate for the transient. -

The following annunciator alarm: 851456 CNST SYSTEM TROUBLE/ NO BACKUP PMP

A VA IL AB L E

851457 CNST BSTR PMP SYS TROUBLUNO BACKUP

PMP AVAILABLE

851546 CNST PUMP DISCH HEADER FLOW LOW

NOTE:

May have to prompt SRO to use N2-OP-3

steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO

NRC Scenario 3 -19-

\

indicator and B and C indicators

Determines FW R-FV2A is ramped

to 100% open

Enter SOP-6 due to lowering water

level

Places FWS-LIK1055A (LV55A) to

manual

Restores water level as directed.

(1 78 to 187 inches)

Determines RX LEVEL NARROW

RANGE A indicator is

malfunctioning. Recommends

changeover to RX LEVEL

NARROW RANGE B

If directed, inserts control rods to

lower power

Per N2-0P-3 F.8.5, change

Narrow Range Level Instruments

as follows:

IF “B” Level Instrument is

required, place LEVEL A/B

CONTROL switch REACTOR

WTRLEVEL C33A-SI in

LEVEL B position

As directed, place FWLC in auto

(N2-OP-3 E.3.27 - E.3.30)

OPERATOR ACTIONS LEVEL NARROW RANGE A

March 2005

..

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A.

OPE RATOR ACT IONS Adjust adjust 2CNM-HICI 37,

NRC Scenario 3 -20-

0

0

SRO

FEEDWATER LO FLOW

CONTROLLER, tape setpoint

to obtain equal signals as read

in the input (vertical) AND

output (horizontal) signal on

2 F W S-LV55A( B ) control le r.

Verify 2CNM-HICI 37 indicator

is in the green band.

Depress Auto (A) pushbutton

on 2FWS-LV55A(B) controller.

Verify that Reactor water level

is being maintained at the

desired setpoint.

0 Directs entry into SOP-6 due to

malfunctioning FWLC

Determines RX LEVEL NARROW

RANGE A instrument is inoperable

Refers toTech Spec 3.3.2.2 for

Feedwater System and Main

Turbine High Water Level Trip

Instrumentation

LCO 3.3.2.2 Three channels of

feedwater system and main turbine

high water level trip nstrumentation

shall be OPERABLE.

APPL I CAB I L ITY: THERMAL

POWER 2 25% RTP.

March 2005


NOTE:

May have to prompt SRO to use N2-OP-3

steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO

with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A.

EVENT 7 SRO Tech Spec

21CS*MOV128 Breaker Trip, Containment

Isolation Valve Failed Open

CONSOLE OPERATOR:

When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert

the following overrides for ICS*MOVI 28

breaker trip, by depressing F8 key:

MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation

(Inboard) Green “OFF”

MOV*I 28, Steam Supply Line Isolation

(Inboard) Red “OFF”

OPE RATOR ACT1 0 N S No action is required since power

is below 25%.

May direct control rods inserted to

lower power

Directs FWLC system placed on

RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A

instrument and FWLC returned to

automatic control per N2-OP-3


Management


and work planning


BOP RO

Recognizes and reports RClC

Inboard Isolation Valve failure.


At 2CEC*PNLGOI, determine IF

any INOP Status Lights are

energized.

IF any INOP Status Lights are


~ -

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE MOV*128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation - INOP Amber “ON”

AN601 305, RClC System Inoperable “ON”

AN601319, RClC Valve Motor Overload

“ON”

All on F8

MOV*128 Steam Supply Line Isolation

(Inboard) - “OPEN” Queued

NRC Scenario 3 -22-

OPERATOR ACTIONS energized, refer to their applicable

Alarm Response Procedure.

Determines INOP status light lit for

TURB STM SPLY INBD ISOL VLV

ICS*MOV128

These are MOV128 lnop Status light

actions

Using the energized red OR green

indicating lights, confirm power

available to ICS*MOV128,

TURBINE STM SUPPLY

INBOARD ISOL VLV.

IF power is NOT available,

dispatch an operator to

2EHS*MCC302.

Confirm 2EHS*MCC302 Bkr. 14A,

21CS*MOVI 28 Power Supply, is

ON.

- SRO

Acknowledges BOP RO report.

Refers to T.S. 3.6.1.3, Primary

Containment I solation fa ilu re.

From Bases B.3.6.1.3

The power operated, automatic

isolation valves are required to have

isolation times within limits and

actuate on an automatic isolation

signal. The valves covered by this

LCO are listed with their associated

stroke times in Ref. 1. (TRM)

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE IPERATOR ACTIONS

2ONDITION A One or more

ienetration flow paths with one PClV

noperable except due to leakage not

Nithin limit.

3EQUIRED ACTION

4.1 Isolate the affected penetration

'low path by use of at least one closed

and de-activated automatic valve,

:losed manual valve, blind flange, or

:heck valve with flow through the

ialve secured.

COMPLETION TIME (for A . l ) 4

hours except for main steam line.

(Determines penetration must be

isolated within 4 hours.)

AND

REQUIRED ACTION

A.2 Verify the affected penetration

flow path is isolated.

COMPLETION TIME (for A.2) Once

per 31 days for isolation devices

outside p ri ma ry containment

Refer to TRM If necessary

TRM 3.6.1 Primary Containment

Isolation Valves

The Primary Containment Isolation

Role Play: When dispatched by the BOP RO,

ask for panel and breaker numbers.

Wait two (2) minutes and report breaker in the

tripped condition. “No cause is apparent.”

EVENT 8 and 9 Unisolable RClC Steam

Reactor Building Ventilation Fails to isolate

CONSOLE OPERATOR:

After Tech Specs are reviewed by the SRO for

MOV*128 failure or when directed by Lead

Evaluator, insert the following malfunction by

depressing F9 key:

RC12, RClC Steam Leak in Reactor

Building, 25% over 10 minute ramp F9

--

The following annunciator alarms:

NRC Scenario 3 -24-

OPERATOR ACTIONS Valves and, if applicable, valve

groups, isolation signals, and

isolation times are listed in Table

T3.6.1-2.

May enter Tech. Spec. 3.5.3 for

RCI C inoperable.


Management


and work planning


BOP RO

Check DRMS CRT Display to

determine RB HVR*RE32A/B

alarming.

These are 851 254 Corrective

Actions

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE 851254 Process Airborne Rad Monitor

Activated

Malfunction PC06 becomes active

PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation

Failure, TRUE

Reactor Building Ventilation fails to isolate

Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-SC

actions.

3PERATOR ACTIONS 3n High Radiation Level

Verify Automatic Response has

occurred, as applicable.

Gaseous Rad Level High initiates

the following (CT-1.0, also

redirected from EOP-SC):

RX Bldg Vent Emergency

*UC413A(B) starts. Suction Test

DMPR*AOD34A(B) wil l be open

after manual start.

Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Supp

Air Is01 DMPR *AODIAIB.

Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Exh

Air Is01 DMPR *AODSAIB.

Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation

Refuel Area Exh Air lsol DMPR

*AODl ONB.

Initiates Standby Gas

Treatment Filter Train A or B

Start Signal.

Identify Area affected, and

verify level reading.

Refer to Emergency Plan

Procedure EPIP-EPP-21.

Evacuates Reactor Building ,

when directed.

Refer to N2-EOP-SC (SRO).

SRO

Enters and directs actions per

EOP-SC when HVR Exhaust

radiation is above an isolation



setpoint (HVR*RE32A/B exceed

Areas Temperature High is received and RClC

Steam Line should isolate as temperature rises

above 135OF. WCS system isolates. WHEN

601 157, Reactor Building General Areas

Temperature High is received, Event Trigger

ET01 activates:

MOV”121, Steam Supply Line Isolation

(Outboard) - Green - “ON”

MOV*121, Not Fully Open - Amber - “ON”

ET01

MOV*121 Steam Supply Line Isolation

(Outboard) - “OPEN” Queued

(Prevents valve from closing)

MOV*128 has no power and MOV*121

appears to be closing.

However, RClC steam line pressure stay up

and temperatures in the area are still rising.

Thus, no isolation of the RClC Steam Line has

occurred. Fire panel 8491 07 FIRE DETECTED

PAIL103 SE QUAD 215 alarms as a result of -

NRC Scenario 3 -26-

DRMS Red setpoint)

IF HVR Exhaust radiation

exceeds an isolation setpoint

THEN verify (Override SC-1) (CT-

I .O)

HVR isolates

HVR*UC413A or B starts

GTSstarts

HVR Unit Coolers start

IF any area temperature is above

the isolation setpoint THEN GO to

28 (Step SC-2)

Isolate all discharges into affected

areas except systems needed for

fire fighting or other EOP actions

(Step SC-4)

Directs BOP RO to

manually isolate RClC

Steam Line.

IF “primary system” is discharging

into the Reactor Building (YES

RCIC, Conditional Step SC-

4) .... THEN GO to 29

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE steam discharging into the area.

Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-RPV

actions. PO-5.0

EOP-RPV Detail E l Systems

o CondensatelFeedwater

CRD

RClC

HPCS

0 LPCS

0 LPCl

RHS through Shutdown Cooling

EOP-RPV Detail E2 Systems

RHS Service Water Crosstie

Fire Systems

ECCS Keep-Full

SLS, test tank

SLS, boron tank

Condensate Transfer

IPERATOR ACTIONS

3 BEFORE any area temperature

reaches Maximum Safe Value

(Detail S; 212°F) (Step SC-7 and

SC-8) .... ENTER RPV Control,

while continuing in EOP-SC (CT-

2.0)

rhese actions are directed by the

SRO from EOP-RPV

3 ENTERSCRAMPROCEDURE

N2-SOP-101 C, while continuing in

EOP-RPV (Step 3)

3 Executes LEVEL and PRESSURE

legs concurrently

LEVEL ACTIONS DIRECTED BY

SRO

Restore and maintain RPV water

level between 159.3 inches and

202.3 inches using one or more

Preferred Injection Systems (Detail

E l ) Step L-3. SRO should direct

control between 159 to 200 inches.

IF level cannot be restored and

maintained above 159.3

inches.. ..THEN maintain level

above -14 inches (Fig Z)

OK to augment with Alternate

Injection systems if needed

(Detail E2) (Use of these is

NOT expected)


I N STR U CTO R ACT1 ONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS

PRESSURE ACTIONS DIRECTED

BY SRO

IF RPV Blowdown (EOP-C2) is

anticipated.. ... THEN Rapidly

depressurize the RPV using the

Main Turbine Bypass Valves. OK

to exceed 1 OO°F/hr cooldown.

(Step P-I Override). (This is an

expected action because EOP-C2

will be necessary due to rising

Reactor Building temperatures).

Is any SRV Cycling? NO (Step P-2)

Stabilize RPV Pressure below

1052 psig using Main Turbine

Bypass Valves. (Step P-4). SRO

should direct control between 800

to 1OOOpsig with BPVs.

Use Alternate Pressure Control

Systems, if needed.

Restore pneumatics to drywell,

if necessary.

WAIT until shutdown cooling

pressure interlock clears 128 psig

(Step P-7) BEFORE proceeding to

Step P-8. While in Step P-7 or

sooner, the SRO will likely return to

EOP-SC actions and may be

waiting for 2 areas to reach 212°F


INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE SRO enters and directs EOP-SC actions.

.-

Event 8 BOP RO Actions

At back panel LDS Temperature Monitoring

Panels P632 and P642 the first area in alarm

and to reach 212 OF

E31-N619A and N620A

E31-N619B and N620B

... I f "anticipating" RPV Blowdown, all 5 BPVs are

NRC Scenario 3 -29-

OPERATOR ACTIONS These actions are directed by SRO

when returning to EOP-SC

WAIT until 2 or more areas are

above Maximum Safe Value for

the same parameter (Step SC-9

and I O ) , THEN proceed to SC-10

to enter EOP-C2.

BOP RO

Recognize and reports increasing

area temperatures and in the

Reactor Building.

Uses EOP-6 Attachment 28 to

monitor and report temperature

cond it ions .

Confirms WCS and RHR isolation.

Reports failure of RClC to

automatically isolate.

Attempts to manually isolate the

RClC Steam Line by closing

MOV*I 21 using keylock switch.

Monitors back panels for trending

area temperatures and radiation

levels.

Reports levels and trends to the

SRO.

IF directed to rapidly depressurize

the RPV using the Main Turbine

Bypass Valves, opens all 5 BPVs

using the BYPASS JACK

INCREASE pushbutton. OK to

exceed 100"Flhr cooldown. (Step

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE opened. RPV pressure lowers. RPV pressure

drops to about 650 psig, the following

malfunction activate from ET02:

TC15A, EHC Pump A Trip, TRUE

TC15B, EHC Pump B Trip, TRUE

-_

EHC Pump A trips and as EHC pressure

lowers, the BPVs will close to to loss of fluid

pressure.

Event 8 ATC RO Scram Actions

NRC Scenario 3 -30-

OPERATOR ACTIONS

0

P-1 Override). (This is an expected

action because EOP-C2 will be

necessary due to rising Reactor

Building temperatures).

Reports trip of EHC pumps and

loss of BPVs, if used for rapid

depressurization.

ATC RO

These are N2-SOP-101 C Scram

Actions

IF Automatic Scram is anticipated

AND time permits.. . . . .THEN

Reduce Recirc Flow to 55 mlbm/hr

per N2-SOP-IO1 D. (NA, at 4%

power)

IF Mode switch is NOT in

REFUEL position ..... THEN Place

MODE Switch to SHUTDOWN

posit ion . (CT-2 .O)

Provides Scram report to SRO

IF RPS is NOT tripped ...... THEN

Arm AND depress BOTH Manual

Scram pushbuttons on either side

of 2CEC*PNL603. (NA, RPS trips)

March 2005

NRC Scenario 3 -31-

3PE RAT0 R ACT1 ON S 0

o

0

0

0

Verify automatic responses.

All rods full in

Rx power lowering

Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs

shut

Generator tripped and house

loads transferred

SDV V&D valves closed

RCS pumps downshift

RPV pressure on TBVs OR

SRVs

FWLC controlling level > 159.3"

IF All feedwater pumps have

tripped.. .THEN Place ALL 2FWS-

LVIO and LV55 controllers to

"manual" and verify the valves are

full closed.

IF the Reactor scram can be

promptly reset (and remain

reset) .... THEN Reset the scram.

IF the Reactor scram CANNOT be

reset.. ..THEN Close 2RDS-V28 if

directed by the SM/CRS.

Performs LEVEL control actions as

directed by SRO from EOPs

Performs PRESSURE control

actions as directed by SRO from

EOPs

WHILE continuing, perform the

following as time permits:

March 2005

__ _ _ ~~ ~. ~


IF Feedwater Pumps trip on high level (above

202.3 inches), an FWS Pump Restart can be

performed per N2-SOP-101 C, Level Control

Actions Detail 1. Since RPV pressure will drop

below 500 psig during the scenario (RPV

Blowdown), Condensate Booster Pump

injection can be used instead of Feedpump

restart.

NRC Scenario 3 -32-

Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.

Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07

(2NHS-MCC008-2E).

If required, secure makeup to

the Cooling Tower.

At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown

HWC.

IF WCS is in one pump three

filter lineup.. ..THEN Throttle

close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if

required, throttle open 2WCS-

MOVI 10) to obtain

approximately 225 gpm WCS

flow.

These actions are used to restart a

tripped Fedwater pump, if directed

Is at least 1 condensate pump

running? YES

Verify the following:

Out of service condensate,

booster and feedpumps in PTL.

2 condensate pumps running.

2 booster pumps running.

2FWR-FV2s closed.

The following controllers in

manual with 0% output:

0 2FWS-HIC55s

0 2FWS-HICI 010s

0 2FWS-HIC1600

IF required, reset Level 8

push buttons.

March 2005


Event 10 Second Area Temperature reaches

21 2°F PO-6.0

Second area temperature reaches 2 12 F (E3 1-

N601 E and N601F). RPV Blowdown is

required.

Event 10 BOP RO actions

NRC Scenario 3 -33-

OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 Start feedwater pump as follows:

Confirm suction pressure > 500

psi.

Verify aux oil pump running.

Place pump switch to red flag.

WHEN 2FWS-FV2A/B/C 15%

open, confirm pump start.

Confirm flow - 8000 gpm.

Inject with 2FWS-LV55A/B

(open 2FWS-V103A/B if

required)

OR verify open 2FWS- MOV47

A/B/C AND inject with 2FWS-

LV1 OA/B/C as required.

IF required, reset setpoint

setdown per N2-OP-3, H. l .O.

For automatic control, refer to

N2-OP-3, H.9.12 OR H.9.13.

Verify aux oil pump stops.

BOP RO

Report second area temperature

reaching 212°F.

3 If required restore pneumatics to

drywell

March 2005


Event 70 SRO enters and directs EOP-C2

actions.

EVENT 10 ADS Valve fails to open

When ADS Valves are opened AD08C, ADS

Valve N2 supply severed becomes active.

-\ PSV 126 does not indicate open at P601, even

OPERATOR ACTIONS ~

At P851 IAS*SOV166 and 184

At P601 IAS *SOV164 and 165

When directed, open seven (7)

ADS / SRVs by using keylock

switch for EACH ADS valve at

control room back panel P631

and P628. (CT-3.0)

Recognizes and reports failed ADS

/ SRV to the SRO.

Open additional non-ADS SRV

from P601 control switch to

achieve 7 open valves.

These actions are directed by the

SRO from EOP-C2

Will the reactor stay shutdown

without boron? YES all rods are

fully inserted (Step 2)

Drywell Pressure? Below 1.68

psig (Step 9, then bypass step IO)

Suppression Pool Level?

Above El 192 ft (Step 11)

Open all 7 ADS Valves (Step 12)

(CT-3.0)

OK to exceed 100°F/hr

Restore pneumatics to drywell

if necessary

Per Ops Manual, with no RHS


INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS though back panel indication is that the valve

opened (ADS solenoid is energized).

T E R M I NATION CRITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is

maintained above TAF.

EVENT 11 SRO Admin JPM 5-3

pumps running, opening the 7

ADS valves is performed by

placing individual keylock

switch for EACH ADS valve to

open at control room back

panel P631 and P628.

Can all 7 ADS Valves be opened?

NO (Step 13)

Open other SRVs until a total of 7

are open (Step 14)

WAIT until shutdown cooling

pressure interlock clears 128 psig

(Step 16) BEFORE proceeding to

Step 17.

SRO

Classify the event as SAE 3.4.1 (SAE

4.4.1 with RB area temperatures

>212"F in more than one area)


For emergency classification.



A. NA. NRC Exam


A. Reference Events

None

6. Commitments

1. None



nrc exam appendix d scenario outline form es-d-1event 4 sop-6, event 5 sop-34 11 2 2 100% event 4....

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