notice of ruling against sojka & becerra

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Simi Valley City Councilmen Steve Sojka and Glen Becerra tried to trample on the First Amendment Rights of citizens of Simi Valley by suing Patrick Furey and threatening him to release the names of people who spoke negatively about Sojka in a robocall. The court ruled that Freedom of Speech is still a Constitutionally protected right. The court granted Furey's Anti-SLAPP motion which, effectively, dismissed the case against ALL defendants including Patrick Furey.

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    1 LAW OFFICE OF STEWART J. NEUVILLEStewart 1. Neuville SBN 135492M. Hope Aguilar SBN 123444

    11845 w. OLYMPIC BOULEVARDSUITE 1000

    LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90064Telephone: (310) 312-8100Facsimile: (310) 312-8621

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    6 Attorneys for Defendants, LIBERTY CAMPAIGN SOLUTIONS, LLC; PATRICK FUREY;JUSTICE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (Defunct)

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    [Assigned to the Hon. Kent Kellegrew, Dept. 43]Action Filed: June 5, 2014

    Trial Date: None Set

    I CASE NO.: 56-2014-00453855-CU-AT-VTA

    Defendal1ts

    Plaintiffs,

    SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

    FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTURA

    YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT on September 18,2014, in the above entitled

    TO EACH PARTY AND TO THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY:

    STEVEN SOJKA; JEFFREY NEWBY;12 CAROLINE ST. PETER; TIMOTHY13 SHANNON; GLEN BECERRA; MICHAEL NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANTS

    MCCAFFREY; MIKE NOLAN; individually and LIBERTY CAMPAIGN SOLUTIONS, LLC AND14 on behalf of all others similarly situated PATRICK FUREY'S SPECIAL MOTION TO

    STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.1615

    16 vs.

    17 JUSTICE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE;18 TINA MCKINNOR; LIBERTY CAMPAIGN

    SOLUTIONS, LLC; PATRICK FUREY;19 COALITION OF $99 OR LESS DONORS; and

    DOES 1 to 100

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    26 Iaction, this Court entered an order granting Defendant Liberty Campaign Solutions, LLC's Special27 Motion to Strike pursuant to C.C.P. 425.1628 A copy of the Minute Order is attached, and incorporated into this Notice by this

    1Notice of Ruling re Sojka v, Liberty Campaign Solutions, LLC; P. Furey

  • 1 reference.

    2 Dated: September 24,2014

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    . Neuvillefor Defendants

    L TY CAMPAIGN SOLUTIONS, LLC;PATRICK FUREY; mSTICE POLITICAL ACTIONCOMMITTEE (Defunct)

    2Notice of Ruling re Sojka v. Liberty Campaign Solutions, LLC; P. Furey

  • DEPT: 43

    SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,COUNTY OF VENTURA

    VENTURA

    MINUTE ORDER

    DATE: 09/18/2014 TIME: 10:44:00 AMJUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Kent KellegrewCLERK: Hellmi McintyreREPORTER/ERM:

    CASE NO: 56-2014-00453855-CU-AT-VTACASE TITLE: Sojka VS Justice Political ActionCASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Antitrust/Trade Regulation

    EVENT TYPE: Ruling on Submitted Matter loef.'S Note: Opinion Issued on 09/18/14, at approx. 6:06 p.m. I

    APPEARANCES

    The Court, having previously taken the Liberty Campaign Solutions, LLC and Patrick Furey's anti-SLAPPiviotions to Strike under submission, now ruies as foiiows:

    The Court GRANTS the special motions to strike. This action arises out of protected activity as theallegedly defamatory robocall constitutes an oral statement to the public in connection with an issue ofpublic interest or other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech inconnection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Plaintiffs have not conclusively establishedthat the robocall was illegal and therefore not subject to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute.As such, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. To meetthis burden the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported bya sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment. Defendants have made a ratherpersuasive argument that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a private cause of action under 47 U.S.C. 227.Plaintiffs cannot avoid this argument or meet their burden of demonstrating a legally sufficient complaintsimply by claiming, without any authority, that such an argument should be brought by way of demurrerand not in an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. In addition, plaintiffs' sole evidence, a one and a half pagedeclaration from counsel, falls well short of establishing a prima facie showing of facts to sustain afavorable judgment.Background: On June 5, 2014, plaintiffs filed a class action complaint for statutory damages forviolations of 47 U.S.C. 227, "the Telephone Consumer Protection Act." A first amended complaint \vasfiled on 6/18/14 and asserts causes of action for: 1) negligent violation of 47 U.S.C. 227; 2) knowingviolation of 47 U.S.C. 227; 3) injunctive relief to bar future TCPA violations; and 4) injunctive relief topreserve evidence. Plaintiffs claim that defendants sent out a robocall that violated the TCPA to some18,000 housed in Simi Valley on October 22, 2012.

    DATE: 09/18/2014DEPT: 43

    MINUTE ORDER Page 1

  • CASE TITLE: Sojka VS Justice Political Action CASE NO: 56-2014-00453855-CU-AT-VTA

    A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's rightof petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a publicissue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff hasestablished that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. CCP 425.16(b)(1).The court must engage in a two-step process when ruling on a defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strikea complaint: first, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that thechallenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity; if the court finds that such a showinghas been made, it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailingon the claim. Eguilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause. Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67. In making itsdetermination, this court is obligated to consider the pleadings as well as the admissible evidencesubmitted by the parties. CCP 425. 16(b)(2).The complaint alleges that this "case involves an pre-recorded automated telephone politicaladvertisement sometimes known as a 'robocall,' which occurred in the City of Simi Valley, California onor about October 22, 2012. The robocall was sent to 18,000 homes in Simi Valley..." FAC p.2:8-10.The robocall involves the alleged positions, actions and investigation of a candidate for the Simi ValleyCity Council. FAC p.2:13-22.

    Does the complaint arise out of protected activity? The parties dispute whether the robocall statementswere Constitutionally protected speech.

    For purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, an "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or freespeech under the United States Oi California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: (1)any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, orany other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made inconnection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, orany other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in aplace open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any otherconduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right offree speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." CCP 425.16(e).Defendants argue that the robocall statements were oral statements made in public in connection withan issue of public interest or "other conduct" in connection with an issue of public interest. CCP 425.13(e)(3) and (4). Plaintiffs really do not dispute this. The statement itself involved a matter of publicinterest: the use of public money by a candidate for public office. It would therefore seem to be entitledto anti-SLAPP protection.

    However, plaintiffs go on to argue that "illegal conduct" is not protected speech and that defendants'conduct was illegal. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that any illegal exception applies. As such, thecomplaint arises out of protected activity and the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate a probability ofprevailing on the claim.

    Has plaintiff demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim?

    "In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPPmotion must 'state [ ] and substantiate[ ] a legally sufficient claim.' Put another way, the plaintiff 'mustdemonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie

    DATE: 09/18/2014DEPT: 43

    MINUTE ORDER Page 2

  • CASE TITLE: Sojka VS Justice Political Action CASE NO: 56-2014-00453855-CU-AT-VTA

    showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. Indeciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiarysubmissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant; though the court does not weigh the credibility orcomparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law,the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiffs attempt to establish evidentiarysupport for the claim." Premier Medical Management Systems. Inc. v California Ins. Guarantee Assn.(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476-477 (citations omitted).Defendants argue that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a private cause of action under 47 U.S.C.227. Plaintiffs seem to concede this point and claim that it only means the FAC is subject to demurrerand not a motion to strike. See Opposition p.2:11-15. Plaintiffs provide no legal authority for thisargument

    Even if plaintiffs could amend their complaint to state a viable cause of action, it would still be subject toan anti-slapp motion to strike. Since defendants have demonstrated that the case involves protectedspeech, plaintiffs would still have the burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing. Plaintiffssimply have not done that. The one and a half page declaration submitted by attorney Green falls wellshort of showing that some new cause of action would survive demurrer and that plaintiffs have aprobability of prevailing on said claim

    DATE: 09/18/2014DEPT: 43

    MINUTE ORDER Page 3

  • PROOF OF SERVICE

    STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES1

    2I, the undersigned, declare I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action or

    3 proceeding. My business address is 11845 W. Olympic Boulevard, Suite 1000, Los Angeles, California, 90064.

    4 On , I served the within

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    on interested parties to this action by:

    facsimile at the listed numbers; and/or by ~ e-mail at the addresses listed, and/or by;overnight courier and/or by D personal delivery and/or by D regular mail by placingthe oritnaf; ~ true copy(ies), thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes ~ addressed asfollows: as addressed in the attached mailing list:

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    Mr. Mitchell E. GreenLaw Offices of Mitchell E. GreenP.O. Box 630550Simi Valley, CA 93063Facsimile: (805) 823-0916

    e-mail: [email protected]

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    D BY MAIL [C.C.P. 1013(a); (+5 days)] I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collectionand processing correspondence for mailing with the V.S. Postal Service.Under that practice it would be deposited on that same day with postage fully prepaid in Los Angeles,California in the ordinary course of business. The envelope was sealed and placed for collection andmailing on the date of execution set forth below following ordinary business practices.BY FACSIMILE [C.C.P. 1013(e); C.R.C. Rule 2.306; (+2 days)] The parties have agreed in writingto accept and receive service by facsimile.~ BY EMAIL [C.C.P. 1010.6; C.R.C. Rule 2.251; (+2 days)] The parties have stipulated in writing to

    accept and receive service by email.The document was transmitted by facsimile or email and the transmission was reported as complete andwithout error by the transmitting device.

    D BY EXPRESS MAIL; FEDERAL EXPRESS; V.P.S. [C.C.P. 1013(c); (+2 days)] I am readilyfamiliar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing with U.S.Postal Service Express Mail, Federal Express or United Postal Service.

    D BY PERSONAL DELIVERY [C.C.P. 1011(a), attorney; 1011(b), party] I personally delivered suchenvelope(s) by hand to the offices of the addressee(s).

    I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on ,at Los Angeles, California.

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    M. Hope Aguilar[Print Name ofPerson Executing Proof] [Signature]

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