norwegian centre for human rights

Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo

REPORT VISIT CAIRO

January 16-25, 2013

Nelly van Doorn-Harder and Kari Vogt

COPTIC COMMUNITY in transition:

post-revolution (January 25, 2011) and post-Shenouda III (1971-2012).

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Van Doorn-‐Harder and Vogt: Coptic Community in Transition

“I’ll say one more thing, though: if anything was proven in all of this, it’s that political analysis for

anything more than three days ahead in Egypt is an exercise in futility.” Bassem Sabry (The Arabist Blog)

INTRODUCTION The primary aim of this visit was to research the condition and the main themes of debates, in particular legal themes, as brought up by Egypt’s religious minorities, especially the Coptic Christian communities that are around ten percent of the entire population of around 85 million. Our special focus was the largest denomination, the Coptic Orthodox Church (or Coptic Church), which is headed by a pope who traditionally represents his community in official interactions with the government. Furthermore we spoke with representatives of the Coptic Protestant churches.1 Relying on our research network that we have entertained since the 1980s, we interviewed several high ranking leaders of the Coptic Church, including the Pope, as well as several leading Christian and Muslim politicians. While the entire country is going through dramatic changes after the revolution of January 25th, 2011 that brought down President Mubarak, the Coptic Orthodox community had to deal with the death of Pope Shenouda III on March 17, 2012. The challenges awaiting his successor, Pope Tawadros II (elected November 4th), are daunting as he faces manifold internal and external struggles. Inside the Church, debates rage about the position of laity and personal rights matters such as the strict rules concerning divorce and the ever-growing Coptic community that now lives in Diaspora. As for the external challenges, economic and political upheaval affects the Copts as it does the rest of society. On top of these problems, Copts face a society that is increasingly

1 Three denominations are called “Coptic:” the Coptic Orthodox Church that is the indigenous and largest

church in Egypt (with a membership that is estimated to be around ten percent of the population; between seven and nine million), the Coptic Catholic Church (around 160,000 members) and the Coptic Protestant Church (around 200,000 members).

Often we see the title of Pope as well as that of Patriarch being used for the prime leader of the Orthodox Copts. His official title is dual: Pope of Alexandria and Patriarch of all Africa on the Holy See of St. Mark the Apostle. The Coptic popes have used this title since the time of Pope Dyonisios (247-264 BCE) which was fifty years before the same title was assigned to the Bishop of Rome. Stephen Davis, The Early Coptic Papacy. The Egyptian Church and Its Leadership in Late Antiquity (Cairo, New York, AUC Press, 2005), p. 27.

Most of the materials in this article concern the Coptic Orthodox Church, also called the Coptic Church.

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controlled by Islamist agendas, a newly designed Islamist-inspired Constitution with several articles that holds numerous potentials for infringements on their rights as equal citizens, and ongoing incidents of sectarian violence against Coptic lives and property. “The vision for the future is not so clear,” Anba Pachomius, Metropolitan of Bohaira, Matrouh, and North Africa, (and formerly the interim pope) said expressing the reality that Copts cannot predict what Islamist groups will do that will affect the Copts; “Changing and more strained relations with Muslims have been imposed on us. The working vision of the Islamic movement today is not clear” (Interview January 22, 2013). “Every day we see steps being taken backwards,” observed Anba Thomas, Bishop of El-Qusiyeh and Deputy Secretary of the Holy Synod; “A theocratic regime allows little space for those who are different. However, we are not into politics but in the business of defending people's rights.” (Interview, January 17, 2013) Egyptian society is in transition. After sixty years of autocratic rule the change to democracy is complicated. Especially, as Dr. Shahira Mehrez pointed out, because the state educational system is not only dismal (a recent report ranked Egypt number 139 on a list of 144 countries), but has fed several generations narrow-minded materials with a focus on rote learning. In spite of the dismal state of education, the younger generation that represents more than fifty percent of the population will not accept a return to the Mubarak era and desires to be free and speak up (Interview January 20, 2013). Using Bishop Pachomius’ words: “The desire for democracy is real; after the Revolution you can’t tell anybody what to do” (January 22, 2013). This reality is present inside the Church where it influences the relationships between Church authorities and lay members, as well as outside where it colors the relations between the Egyptian people and the political establishment. Yet, the current government that is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood apparently falls back on the same methods of repression and suppression that led to the downfall of Mubarak.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS The general condition of Egypt is deteriorating; the economy has not recovered since the Revolution, while civil unrest continues.2 Copts, being part of the fabric of society, equally suffer from the dismal economic situation. Although there are several ultra-rich Coptic tycoons such as the Sawiris and the Bassili families, many Copts belong to the lower strata of society. Some of the

2 Another problem that has led to much upheaval was connected to the so-called soccer riots. Thousands of

young soccer fans ran amok in Port Said and Cairo after court verdicts against fans embroiled in the February 1, 2012 stadium riots that left 74 dead. The death sentences of 21 soccer fans were considered a great injustice since most of the police officers contributing to the killings have gone free or received lighter sentences. See: Hamza Hendawi & Aya Batrawy, “Egypt Soccer Riots: Death Sentence Confirmed as Fans Take to Cairo Streets,” March 9, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/09/egypt-soccer-riot-death-sentence_n_2844087.html

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poor such as the zabbaleen or garbage collectors who used pigs to recycle and process garbage, saw their source of income wiped out when in 2009 the Egyptian government killed all the pigs based on an unfounded fear of the “swine flu.” In the midst of the current chaos, religious ultra conservatives, the Salafis, keep insisting that only the strictest form of Islamic law can save Egypt. They claim that this strict set of laws will uphold “the purest ethics and ideologies” as symbolized by a ban on alcohol, the segregation of the sexes and the imposition of Islamic dress. The level of state and police violence has increased and demonstrators are reported to have died due to torture. Political scientist Dina al-Khawaga indicates as reason for the violence a strong alliance between the Brotherhood, the police and the army who each calculate that this troika can ensure their survival. This loose alliance that in her opinion “rules without governing,” tries to justify repression and intimidation by turning protesters against each other and infiltrate protests to raise the level of violence.3 A recent report by Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies confirms the observations that the new government is relying on excessive use of force and alleged torture and abuse to control those opposing it. Throughout the country, President Morsi’s approval rate has dropped from 78% in September of 2012 to less than 50% in early 2013.4 The President as well as the Muslim Brotherhood are becoming increasingly unpopular as they have failed to produce a clear policy that can lift the country out of the current economic and societal crisis. A telltale sign that the Brotherhood’s popularity is waning came during the first week of March when their candidates suffered unprecedented losses in the elections of Egypt’s university student unions. While in the past they gained great sympathy for being suppressed; now they failed to present a coherent program. The opposition, the National Salvation Front (NSF) is not only unpopular but largely unknown; around 35% of the population has never heard of it.5 The goodwill it gained in the Revolution has faded and the different parties are accused of having a policy that “acts now and decides later,” which the youth leader Ahmed Maher, frustrated with the inactivity of the older generation, has compared to “eating soup with a fork.” Opposition leaders have been unable to come up with a clear agenda that counters the current failures of the Morsi government, and they fail to take on a strong role as it is unclear what they stand for.6 According to opposition leader Samir Morqos, it is vital that they explain their plans to the Egyptian public.7

3 Dina el-Khawaga, “Who Rules Egypt Now?” Al Masri Al Youm, February 21, 2013.

4 The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research “Baseera,” according to its periodic poll to track the President’s approval ratings. See: www.baseera.com.eg.

5 The Arabist, “Morsi's popularity dips (just) below 50%”, posted February 26, 2013.

6 The Arabist Blog, “On the Egyptian Opposition”, February 27, 2013.

7 Al-Gamal, Samar, “Egypte: Le boycott, et après ...”, Al Ahram Hebdo, March 6, 2013.

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The opposition refused to participate in the parliamentary elections that were planned for the end of April. Due to a flaw in the procedure of ratifying amendments that were made in the Islamist-dominated Shura Council, the body that is currently governing Egypt, a court decision forced President Morsi to postpone them. 8 The Citizenship Committee of the Coptic Orthodox Church had also decided to boycott the elections based on the recent redrawing of electoral districts and tampering with neighborhood boundaries that would result in splitting the Coptic vote to ensure the victory of leading Brotherhood figures.9 However, voices warn against fully withdrawing from the elections as this might give an undeserved win to the Brotherhood, which almost happened during the student union elections where non-Brotherhood groups decided to join at the last minute and won big. The politicians we spoke with all represented some form of opposition. Dr. Shahira Mehrez, a founding member of the Popular Alliance Socialist Party (Hizb al-Tahaluf al-Sha'abi al-Ishtiraki), and Professor of Art at Cairo University, Mr. Muhammad abdel 'Alim Daud, was a member of the Deputy People's Assembly, while Dr. Ehab el-Kharrat, was the co-founder of the Egyptian Socialist Democratic Party (Al-Hizb al-Masri Demoqrati el-Ijtima`i, founded July 4, 2011) and one of the three Christians elected to the Shura Council. Of the 180 members, the Council has 15 Christians, 12 of whom are appointed. Furthermore Dr. El-Kharrat served as the president of the human rights organization called Justice and Freedom that was launched in 2003. According to Dr. El-Kharrat, the Brotherhood was losing popular support and would fail in future elections unless economic conditions improved. While during the time of the Nasser revolution in the 1950s-1960s, “the people were prepared to give up freedom for bread, food and anti-colonialism. This is no longer the case.” Moreover, the Brotherhood lacks charismatic figures that could run for the Presidency in case Morsi fails. He did agree that in Salafi circles there are inspiring figures such as erstwhile presidential candidate Sheikh Hazim Salah Abu Ismail; however, lacking political experience they were not viable alternatives. (Interview January 24, 2013) Muhammad Abdel `Alim Daud also feared that rising prices could destabilize the country quickly. In his view, one of the good things the President had done was to end military rule. However, he now had replaced that rule with himself. He thought that the chance for Egypt to become a truly democratic state was fifty-fifty and saw as one of the necessities that the opposition does not leave the democratic process. Dr. Shahira Mehrez was of the same opinion; only when all those who are in opposition unite and refuse to be intimidated by forces that envision an Islamist society, will their voices be heard. She especially urged the Christian community in Egypt not to allow itself to be intimidated and be marginalized. As example she gave the voting on the Constitution where

8 Bassem Sabry, March 10, 2013, AlMonitor, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/morsi-muslim-brotherhood-postpone-elections-egypt.html

9 Adel, Michael, “Coptic boycott,” Al Ahram Weekly, March 6, 2013.

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Brotherhood groups outside the large cities bullied people to stay away from the voting booths. According to Professor Mehnez, the voting results on the Constitution would have turned out differently had the Copts cast their votes.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

On December 15 and 22, 2012, the state held a referendum on the draft of the Constitution that was controversial from the beginning. The document holds unclear articles and lacks protection of basic rights to freedom of religion. According to all those we interviewed, it does not allow for freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and ignores the rights of women, children, and religious minorities. Furthermore, it remained unclear how fair the voting process went since, especially in rural areas, groups related to the Brotherhood openly intimidated those who would vote against it to the point where many stayed away from the ballot box. Official Church representatives were part of the drafting committee, as well as Coptic politicians such as Samir Morqos who at that time held the position of Presidential Assistant with the portfolio of Democratic Transition. On behalf of the Coptic Church Interim Pope Anba Pachomius, Metropolitan of Bohaira, Matrouh, and North Africa, withdrew Bishop Paula from Tanta, who represented the Coptic hierarchy, from the drafting committee. The Catholic and Protestant churches, as well as the lay Coptic representatives followed suit. Especially articles 2 and 219 Copts consider to be problematic. The second article, that the “Principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation,” has created intense debates among Egyptians since it remains unclear whose interpretation of Sharia will be followed.10 Article 219 compounds the confusion by stating: “The principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the large community.”11 This article is premised on the fiction that there is a consensus on the principles of Sharia. According to several of the Coptic leaders we interviewed, when considering the logic consequences of this article, it could mean that, for example, Wahhabi sources could be applied or that anyone could be given the power to criminalize a certain act. In fact, the article conflates the judiciary, executive and legislative powers and leads to a dangerous breach of the separation of powers that in theory guarantee a citizen’s rights.

10 Article 2:Al-Islam din ad-dawla, wa al-lughat ul-Àrabiyya lughatuha al-resmiyya wa mabadi’ al-Shari’a al-Islamiyya al masdar al-ra’isi lil tashri: ا��د�ر �ا�� ا�� و��د�ئ �ا��٬، �� ا�� و�ا�� ا��د��و��٬، ��د��ن �ا��م�

��ي �ا�� 11 Article 219: Mabadi al-Sharià al-Islamiyya tashmalu adilataha al-kulliya wa qawaìdha al-usuliyya wa al-

fiqhiyya wa masadiruha al mu`tabira fi madhahib ahl as-Sunna wa al-Jamaà: مباددئئ االشريیعة ااإلسالميیة تشملددلتها االكليیة ووقوااعدها ااألصوليیة وواالفقهيیة وومصاددررها االمعتبرةة فى مذااهب أأهل االسنة وواالجماعةأأ .

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The Churches officially challenged the Constitution as it was found unclear and leaning towards an Islamic theocratic regime that assigned heavy-handed authority to the President. The main objections offered by Christians as well as Muslims, concerned that the articles indicate the application of Shari’a without further explanation and the fact that the document did not allow for full equality between men and women, and Muslims and non-Muslims. According to the Coptic leaders we interviewed there was no distinction between the Shari’a and the Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh). Furthermore they found that many principles were not based on social reality (waqi`a) but referred to certain religious ideologies. According to Professor Mina Khalil, the third article of the Constitution is warmly welcomed by conservative Copts. “The canon principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws, religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leader.” This article constitutionalizes the Church’s authority, allowing it prime authority in matters of personal status. Article four ascribes similar high powers to the Islamic Al-Azhar University and explicitly mentions the Sunni tradition. The articles also limit the religions acceptable to the Muslim rulers, leaving out, for example, Baha’is and Islamic minority groups such as the Shi’ites. Article three is considered problematic by Copts who do not want the Church to have the final word in their personal affairs among which especially the issue of divorce is very controversial. The ideas laid out in article three of the Constitution in fact create a division across religious lines within Egypt’s population. While bestowing much internal power on the Church, as Professor Khalil pointed out, “article 3 could become an overture to the reintroduction of the Dhimmi status that was abolished in 1856” (Interview January 16, 2013). While this status was abolished as a legal concept, it remains present in Egyptian society where the majority of Muslims do not consider Christians to be equal. As a result, article 33 that claims all citizens to be equal before the law is contradicted by other articles.12 Even if not discriminated against openly, Copts know that forms of inequality are unavoidable in Egyptian society. Yet, they don’t quite know how they could fit into a state ruled by Islamic law. They fear a return to the time of segregation where Christians and Jews living in the Muslim empires could enjoy freedom in their own quarters as long as they remained separate (the so-called millet system). Although no reference is made to article 219, a disturbing feature in the Al-Ahram newspaper of March 11, 2013 seems to indicate that it allows for unwarranted forms of justice affecting Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Sunday, March 10, 2013, the prosecutor-general issued a decision that allows “citizen’s arrests”: the right to arrest anyone suspected of breaking the law. According to Al-Ahram newspaper, “Only Islamist political powers, represented by the Freedom and Justice Party

12 Article 33: Al muwatinun lada al-Qanun siwa’ wa hum mutasawaun fi al-huquq wa al-wajibat al-`ama la

tamyiz bainahum fi dhalika: نن فى االحقوقق وواالوااجباتت االعامة، ال تميیيیز بيینهم فى ذذلكاالموااطنونن لدىى االقانونن سوااء، ووهم متساوووو .

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and Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, welcomed the decision as an attempt to curb the security deterioration in the country.”13 The measure created such a storm of criticism that it was withdrawn within days.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Copts as well as Muslims regularly mentioned that the many forms of injustice Copts experienced under the Mubarak regime have remained unchanged after the Revolution. If nothing else, they have increased. According to Ishak Ibrahim at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), it is a reality that even if the Constitution guarantees minorities basic rights, these rights are often being ignored. Apart from ongoing complaints about the restriction of the number of Copts in prominent public positions in the army, police force, and government, the Institute’s reports of Freedom of Religion and Belief in Egypt testify of recurring incidents of sectarian tension and violence. For example, from January 2008 to January 2010 there were 53 incidents of sectarian violence or tension in 17 of Egypt’s 29 governorates.14 Local vendettas, accusations of construction of churches without the required permits, and conversion can lead to intense violence. Having the required permits to build or repair a church by itself does not guarantee that the work can proceed since opposition often comes from the local communities. Now as well as during the Mubarak regime, Coptic victims are voiceless. With Islamists in power and Salafi Muslims feeling emboldened, the number of egregious cases continues to grow. Al-Ahram weekly regularly features reports of such incidents. For example, reporting from the area of Shubra Al-Kheima that has a high number of Coptic inhabitants we read: “Anxiety among the Coptic community has grown following an attack by Salafis earlier this week on Abu Makkar Church in Shubra Al-Kheima. The complex has been besieged after Salafi sheikhs objected to construction work and to the holding of prayers in the complex’s offices.”15 An unprecedented expression of these new forms of Islamist boldness happened on Sunday April 7th when the Coptic Cathedral was attacked. During a funeral of two Copts who had died during sectarian clashes on Friday April 5th in a place north of Cairo called El-Khosous, Coptic as well as Muslim mourners started to shout anti-government slogans. These expressions of resistance resulted in the procession being attacked and the violence spreading into the campus of the Cathedral.

13 Dalia Farouk, “Enactment of citizens arrest deals blow to Egyptian tourism,” March 11, 2013,

ahramonline: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/66612/Business/Economy/Enactment-of-citizens-arrest-deals-blow-to-Egyptia.aspx.

14 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, “Two Years of Violence: What have we learned? Where do we begin?” Cairo, April 2010, p. 6.

15 Adel Michael, “Coptic Boycott,” March 6, 2013.

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Conversion in the Egyptian context concerns cases where Christians convert to Islam or where a Muslim wishes to become a Christian. Reasons for conversion to Islam range from marriage to being able to obtain a divorce that the Church only grants based on strict rules. During the past years several high profile cases concerned Christian women whose intention to convert to Islam was said to be obstructed by the Coptic hierarchy, which has led to extremely violent inter-communal strife. Another feature in Al-Ahram Weekly concerning such a case in the south of Egypt, March 2013, reported: “In the meantime a baseless rumor that a Muslim teacher, Sahar Al-Tuni, was being held against her will in Mar Girgis Church in Kom Ombo triggered daily clashes between security forces and young Muslim rioters who attacked the church. Security presence was beefed up in the entire area out of fear of violence spreading.”16 When a Muslim-born individual wishes to convert it is officially a case of apostasy. Although Egypt does not apply capital punishment for this offense, the general opinion is that it is forbidden. On May 1, 2007, a memo by Interior Minister Habib el-Adly argued that Islam demanded the death of any Muslim man leaving the faith, while a female apostate “should be imprisoned and beaten every three days until she returns to Islam.”17 Many apostasy cases remain undetected as converts hide their identity and change of religion. Blasphemy cases, however, are publicized in the Press. EIPR, that also represents cases in court, counted thirty five cases of apostasy and blasphemy since the Revolution. The majority of these cases concern accusations against Copts. Copts are not only involved in sectarian incidents but also have been victims of state abuse that has especially been directed against anti-government demonstrators regardless of their religion. One of the most offensive incidents was during the so-called Maspero demonstrations when the army killed between 24 and 27 and wounded over 300 peaceful demonstrators, most of whom were Copts. On October 15, 2012, on the occasion of the 100th day of Mohamed Morsi’s presidency, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) issued a report entitled, “After President Mohamed Morsi’s first 100 days: Worrying indications for future of human rights, major crises remain unresolved.” The writers of the report warned that “human rights issues remained neglected and state authorities continued to violate human rights, even though the current president possesses more legislative and executive powers than any president before him. The absence of human rights issues from the president’s 100-day plan, as well as their absence from his practices and policies

16 Ibid.

17 Paul Marshall & Nina Shea, Silenced. How Apostasy & Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 66.

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over this period, has made it impossible to end the numerous violations and infringements of these rights.”18 Advocates for women’s rights sense that the situation is getting worse for women and that the influence of Salafis and Brotherhood members are moving the country into a more conservative and patriarchal direction. Not only have violent attacks on female demonstrators been tolerated, the Muslim Brotherhood’s views on the role and rights of women would cancel reforms that strengthen women’s rights introduced by Mubarak. For example, a Muslim woman would no longer be able to travel without her husband’s consent. The Brotherhood’s comments on a proposed United Nations document to condemn violence against women spilled their ideas on women into public view. Joining Russia, Iran, and the Vatican, the Brothers condemned the idea that a woman could decide on when to work or where to travel.19 Currently the agencies monitoring and challenging the various infractions on basic human rights find themselves threatened by the draft for a law that would curtail their freedom and activities, restricting their freedom to criticize the government. Mubarak considered agencies working on human rights issues as a threat and tried to curtail Non-Governmental Organizations that received foreign funding. Even after his fall, NGO offices were raided, equipment confiscated and employees investigated. Recently, a government minister and member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) has proposed a law with the same scope as that of the Mubarak era.20

COPTIC RESPONSES AND INTERNAL COMMUNAL MATTERS

Politics and Civil Society

All churches, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant have been firm in their stance against the government, for example, jointly critiquing the Constitution. They reject violence while urging their members to participate in the democratic process. Christians should express their opinions and air their grievances to the authorities and demand equal status with Muslims based on the reality that all are Egyptian nationals. The Church advises but Copts participate in the political and

18 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, interim report on the conditions of human rights during the

first 100 days of Morsi’s presidency: cihrs.org, http://www.cihrs.org/?p=5954&lang=en.

19 Dan Murphy, “The UN document on women that has terrified Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood,” Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 2013.

20 Kristen Chick, “Is the Muslim Brotherhood seeking to kill Egypt’s NGO’s?” The Christian Science Monitor, February 22, 2013, at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0222/Is-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-seeking-to-kill-Egypt-s-NGOs.

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civil process as individuals. When young people asked Bishop Musa, the Bishop for Youth, about participating in the Maspero demonstration, he echoed the advice given by most Church leaders: “As citizens you have the right to demonstrate. Go but don’t attack anybody, don’t use violence or offensive slogans, be peaceful and wise” (Interview, January 23, 2013). This attitude is one of several indications that the leadership has started to step away from Pope Shenouda’s (1971-2012) approach of wielding power inside the Church and in dealing with the State. On behalf of the Church, Shenouda asserted the rights to authority to represent the Copts and the Coptic Church in the media and in relation to the State. He preferred to speak on behalf of the community rather than the community members speaking for themselves. Towards the end of this reign this policy had become problematic as many Copts, in particular the youth, felt rendered voiceless. Shenouda’s successor, Tawadros, said that for his Church he prefers “modernization in a democratic way” (Interview, January 24, 2013). During our stay we heard several leaders confirm this desire. The new Pope was described as “a creative leader,” with “an eye for details, who knows how to delegate tasks,” and prefers to design a structure that is objective and does not rely on the goodwill of individuals only.21 A key issue of the authority in the Coptic Orthodox Church is the role of the Holy Synod, which during the time of Pope Shenouda had been moved to a position secondary to that of the pope. However, as Bishop Thomas explained: ”We have to leave the autocratic system. Now the church feels the need to activate and develop the concept of the Synod. The highest authority is the Synod, not the patriarch” (Interview, January 17, 2013). Pope Tawadros has also signaled that he is stepping away from Shenouda’s practice to solve incidents of communal violence in direct communication with the President. This approach viewed sectarian violence purely as a security issue and failed to address the underlying social and political issues involved.22 In this context we understand one of the main conclusions EIPR researchers made when investigating communal violence: “Imposing quiet is the goal of the Ministry of Interior in all incidents of sectarian violence, this is often done against the will of the parties involved in the clashes.”23 By organizing reconciliation meetings between religious leaders representing the communities involved, further investigations were aborted with the result of victims of the violence being deprived from opportunities to seek justice. According to EIPR, the State’s interventions were invariably “inadequate, violent, shortsighted and, in most cases, illegal. Its actions are always intended to impose calm by force: it is either reconciliation or quiet or arrest

21 Among others, Bishop Thomas summed up these characteristics during our interview on January 17, 2013.

22 Elizabeth Iskander, Sectarian Conflict in Egypt. Coptic media, identity and representation (London, New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 82.

23 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, “Two Years of Violence: What have we learned? Where do we begin?” Cairo, April 2010, p.19

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and at times the collective punishment of the victims themselves.”24 Often the police are unable or unwilling to intervene. It is in this context that we should read Pope Tawadros’ refusal to accept President Morsi’s invitation to join a series of national dialogues. Tawadros said he preferred actions over words and was not interested in ceremonial meetings that were mere window dressing and would not be in Egypt’s national interest.25 This stance also shows that unlike Shenouda whose unswerving support for Mubarak continued almost until the day he stepped down, Tawadros is prepared to express his objections to the President’s decisions. The vagueness of the Islamist’s agenda concerns the Coptic leadership. Bishop Musa, taking his cue from historic evidence, faith in God, and the fact that the majority of Muslims in Egypt preferred moderate interpretations of their religion, remained moderately optimistic. He advised the ruling Islamists to “Be patient, interact, you are the majority, we the minority but if you don’t interact with other groups you are bound to fail since we Christians are part of the Egyptian tapestry” (Interview, January 23, 2013). It is a decisive era for the Copts and their leaders agree that it is vital they should link up with other groups that oppose the government. In order to have a stronger voice, on February 18, history was made when the heads of Egypt’s five main denominations – Coptic Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Anglican - all mainstream churches in Egypt took the historic step to launch an Egyptian Council of Churches. Some groups were left out, however. The small Mormon Church in Egypt has neither been accepted by the Protestant churches, nor by the Coptic Orthodox Church, although it has officially been recognized by the President. Furthermore, the Coptic Orthodox church strongly opposes groups such as the Seventh Day Adventists and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Based on Pope Shenouda’s rejection of the last two denominations, they have not been officially recognized by the Egyptian government. The acute Coptic Orthodox reactions to such groups first and foremost stem from the desire to construct a structure of the believers’ solidarity with the Church and the strong efforts of Pope Shenouda to defend its Orthodox beliefs. In the past this stance has led to doctrinal feuds within the Church notably with Father Matta el-Meskin (1919-2006), the esteemed theologian and abbot of the Monastery of St. Macarius. Using the church magazine al-Kiraza as platform, Pope Shenouda continued his attacks on Father Matta’s teachings long after the former passed away in 2006.26 Another internal problem arose when a deacon from Tanta, Max Michel, managed to obtain ordination somewhere in the USA and returned to Egypt as Maximos, “Archbishop for the Holy Synod for the Orthodox Church in Egypt and the Middle East.” He created what amounted to a

24 Ibid., p. 18

25 Associated Press, “Coptic Pope Tawadros II criticizes Egypt's Islamist leadership, new constitution,” February 5, 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/64135.aspx

26 Guirguis & van Doorn-Harder, 186.

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shadow Orthodox Church that received disgruntled Coptic Orthodox believers and obtained official approval from the Egyptian government.27 Pope Shenouda considered these types of dissention as an outright threat to his authority as pope and to the integrity and strength of the Church. Alternative interpretations of the faith also come from the outside, especially from evangelical churches and mission groups from the West. Not being able to establish missionary activities among the Muslim population, Western groups will target Orthodox Copts, for example, with pamphlets and CD’s to “penetrate the Orthodox Coptic Church and peel away adherents.”28 As one of the Bishops who prefers to remain anonymous phrased it: “Christian missionaries coming from abroad are a problem to the Coptic Church. Why do they want to convert us? Why don’t they simply help and support us? They are weakening Christianity in Egypt by splitting up the Christian community. These missionaries are mainly coming from the US, but also from South Africa and some from The Netherlands. They are Presbyterians, Baptists and Pentecostals. We have no such problems with the Catholics or the Greek Orthodox Church.” During the annual conferences on faith affirmation, the issue was high on the Orthodox Church’s agenda. For example, in 2009 the conference discussed “the evangelical war,” and how to oppose these attacks that take place by infiltration from the inside.29 According to Reverend Safwat al-Bayadi, the Egyptian Protestant churches insist on cooperation and the creation of strong ecumenical relations (Interview, January 23, 2013). Thus the recent formation of the Egyptian Council of Churches can be considered an important step toward strengthening bonds of cooperation rather than competition. In the midst of the current chaos, the churches continue to provide their members as well as the rest of society with social, educational, and medical assistance. According to Metropolitan Pachomius, now more than ever the Coptic Orthodox Church wants to take its position in society by building more clinics, hospitals and schools to help improve Egypt’s deplorable education system. To stop the tide of unemployment, plans are in the making to open more vocational training centers that will strengthen the chances of young unemployed Copts to find jobs. The Coptic Orthodox Church has a long history of creating civil education projects that aim at keeping communication channels with the rest of society open. During the past twenty years, the Bishopric for Youth has been at the forefront of such activities. Bishop Musa explained that he “started the Youth Movement in order to create an interaction between Christians and Muslims – in schools, at the universities and in political parties. We still rely on this foundation. Now we need

27 Ibid, 187, 188.

28 EIPR Report, “Freedom of Religion,” 29. 29 Ibid, 29.

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new strategies for our work with young people, and pope Tawadros has given this work a priority” (Interview, January 23, 2013). Bishop Thomas explained that the goal of this type of effort was to create peace building efforts and an atmosphere of sharing responsibility for the good of the nation. Where Muslim and Christian leaders work closely together, it is easier to prevent or solve incidences of communal violence. To prepare leaders who can intervene, local Coptic parishes organize leadership trainings in conflict resolution. In the political arena, Christians and Muslims who oppose the current government work together in training leaders who can deal with issues of citizenship and human rights. Furthermore political activists travel in small groups to rural areas where they provide voters in the villages with information about the political parties, the Constitution and the like.30 Divorce and Apostasy During the time of Pope Shenouda the issue of divorce became a national debate played out in the media. On March 8, 2008, the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court ruled that Atef Kyrillos who had obtained a divorce through civil court should be allowed to remarry in Church.31 The ruling was based upon the constitutional stipulation that every Egyptian citizen has the right to marry and form a family. It was a direct attack on Pope Shenouda’s authority to speak and act on behalf of the Copts and raised questions about the boundaries of Coptic identity and national identity. In the Pope’s view, the state should not interfere with the Church’s laws on marriage and divorce, and most Copts agreed with him. In 2010, the Holy Synod that consists of the Pope and all the bishops officially rejected the court ruling appealing to the Church’s religious freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution. Marriage and divorce pertain to Coptic Personal Rights issues. A marriage contracted in the Church is considered a sacrament that cannot be dissolved without pressing reasons. Copts do have the option to seek a divorce via the Egyptian civil courts, but the Church will not recognize it and only allows remarrying in a church ceremony if the divorce is based on adultery or when one of the spouses converts to another religion. Opinions run along two lines: a majority of the Church hierarchy and many devout Copts believe that based on the Biblical injunctions (such as in Matthew 5:31-32 & 19:6) only adultery or conversion can be grounds for a divorce. Other Copts, however, including members of the clergy believe that the rules are too stringent and consider having access to the option of ending a dysfunctional or unhappy marriage a basic human right. Furthermore, according to several members of the clergy, a reconsideration of the strict rules based

30 Adel Michael, “Coptic boycott,” March 6, 2013.

31 Magdy Malak, “A ruling obliges the church to allow Copts to remarry,” Watani International, March 9, 2008. http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2008/week-10/26-church-obliged (Accessed March 15, 2013).

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on new theological and legal interpretations has become necessary since the current situation causes Copts to leave the Church.32 The divorce debate is complicated and goes back to 1938, when the Coptic Orthodox Communal Council (Majlis al-Milli) designed a personal status code that contained nine legitimate reasons for the dissolution of a marriage: adultery, conversion, unexplained five-year absence of one of the spouses, a minimum of seven years imprisonment, a husband’s impotence, mental illness, incorrigible behavior, incompatibility, and taking monastic vows.33 The Code that was based on medieval documents infuriated the Pope (John XIX) at the time and the popes after him who accepted adultery as the only reason for divorce. In 1962, Pope Kyrillos VI (1959-1971) added the second reason of conversion and instructed then-Bishop Shenouda to draft a new code based on the biblical teachings.34 Upon becoming pope in 1971, he issued a papal decree confirming that the Orthodox Church only granted a divorce in cases of adultery and conversion. To avoid the Coptic Orthodox personal status rules, some Orthodox Copts changed their denomination to Protestant or Greek Orthodox, which allowed them to file for a divorce in the civil court. However, Pope Shenouda convinced the other denominations in Egypt to unify the personal status affairs of all Christians, which in 1989 resulted in a Family Law which was presented to Parliament several times but has not yet been ratified. When the loophole of joining a different denomination closed, Copts converted to Islam to get their marriage dissolved. This solution has become problematic as many regret that step and cannot return to Christianity since that would force them to commit apostasy. In 1955, President Nasser abolished the religious communal courts. As a result, currently civil judges can choose which personal code rules to apply. For the Coptic Orthodox community, they can apply the 1938 rules that have officially been rejected by the Coptic Orthodox Church, the amended Church code that allows two reasons for divorce only, or the civil rules of the Egyptian state that are based on Islam. The issue of divorce brings out the reality that there are competing wings within the Coptic Orthodox Church. With the election of Pope Tawadros II, the more moderate groups have gained the upper end. But the debate about what to accept as valid reasons for a divorce is far from solved and features prominently on the Pope’s agenda. He has called it “a headache” (Interview, January 24, 2013). Currently Bishop Paula from Tanta is in charge of the divorce files. Much confusion is created by the lack of clarity about who is granted the right to remarry in Church and who is not. From the outside the system seems opaque with success depending on which cleric one knows

32 See for example, Emad Khalil, “120 Coptic Christians.”

33 The Coptic Encyclopedia, 1991, volume 6, “Personal Status Law, Marriage,” p. 1942-1943.

34 Magdi Guirguis and Nelly van Doorn-Harder, The Emergence of the Modern Coptic Papacy (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2011), p.113, 184 & 185.

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within the hierarchy. Local circumstances also play a role; EIPR found that in villages with few Copts, the Church is more inclined to grant a divorce since one of the spouses converting to Islam would upset the social balance within the Coptic community. All members of the clergy are acutely aware of the fact that there is not a clear cut solution. In the words of Bishop Thomas: “Many want change - I am hopeful, but cannot guarantee the result. We will have a series of meetings, and we are aware of the fact that every law has a political dimension” (Interview, January 17, 2013). Clarifying the rules and exceptions surrounding divorce is one of Pope Tawadros’ priorities and in line with his policy to create more transparent and accessible systems of governance for the entire Church. Currently, Bishop Paula from Tanta is in charge of the pending divorce cases, and the Church’s hierarchy hopes that researching and discussing the issue will help diminish the unsolved case load. On March 18-21, 2013, the Church held a meeting to study Coptic Canon Law and family matters. The meeting on divorce was one of several to address the five main points in Tawadros’ policy making plans. The other areas of concern were: monasticism, theological education, personal property and real estate (the awqaf), and issues concerning the clergy and general ecclesial projects. Furthermore he plans to focus on the pastoral care of children and youth by adding a Bishop for Youth who will be in charge of children to the age of fifteen so that Bishop Musa can focus on adolescents and young adults from fifteen to twenty-five-years-old. Furthermore he plans to ordain a bishop for family matters. Directly and indirectly related to the issue of family matters is the role and position of women in the Coptic Orthodox Church. Although many women are active in the Church as nuns, deaconesses, teachers, and members of lay councils, they have no official space in the hierarchy. This does not mean they are completely voiceless, but often their voices are being heard by invitation. Yet the leadership is aware of the importance of including women and all over Egypt the Church runs projects for the empowerment of women. With the new Pope, plans are underway to involve more women in the running of parishes and in creating advisory committees that include women members who provide the Holy Synod with advice. In the spirit of the Revolution, there is a sense that “Everybody should participate in the ongoing debate and discussions” (Bishop Thomas, January 17, 2013). Reflecting this democratic impulse is the new committee that Pope Tawadros appointed in order to suggest changes necessary to update the 1957 law concerning the election of a new pope. Among others, an urgent recommendation is that women become included in the Electoral College. Currently, the majority of the College’s members are selected by the presiding bishop and it is his choice to include women or not.35

35 See: Saad, Michael S. and Nardine Saad Riegels, “Traditions of Selecting Coptic Popes over Two Millennia,” forthcoming (2013), p. 7.

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Pope Tawadros is a pharmacist trained in Great Britain who before entering the monastery had managed a pharmaceutical company. After going through the monastic ranks, he had been assigned as auxiliary bishop to the well-respected Metropolitan Pachomius in the northern province of Damanhour, focusing on work with children and youth. Following a less autocratic style than his predecessor, he considers all Copts to be servants, and exploring this dimension of church membership, March 11-14, 2013, he organized a seminar called, “Service is leadership and custodianship.” Another sign of this more inclusive style is his invitation to those who were excommunicated or sidelined during the Shenouda era, wishing to reintegrate them into the Church. A significant step towards this policy of healing and reconciliation was healing the breaches with the monks of the St. Macarius Monastery whose former abbot Matta el-Meskin had been at odds with Pope Shenouda. Clearly the new Pope and his team seem to be in tune with the desire for more openness and democracy. In order to foster what some bishops have called “a culture of excellence,” all talents have to be included. This attitude is in line with the philosophies on church leadership of his mentor, Bishop Pachomius, who considers the ideal church leader as a shepherd who "must be in tune with his people; he must listen to them, accept their realities, and take them as they are and not as he wants."

CONCLUSION

Relying on the internal strength of their spiritual, social and economic institutions, Christians in Egypt are coping with and adapting to the rapidly changing political and economic conditions around them. Lacking the foreign networks Catholic, Protestant, Greek Orthodox and other denominations can rely on, the Coptic Orthodox Church mines its inner strength and institutions to stay focused on guiding the believers in times of internal and external change. The challenges are not only manifold but in many cases unclear as nobody can predict what the impact of some of the articles in the new Constitution will be on the position of the community as religious minority, how the new Council of Egyptian Churches will strengthen the ecumenical networks and lessen pressure from the outside caused by missionary groups who target the Orthodox Copts, and how the new Coptic Orthodox leadership will fare in promoting its agenda of change and more openness and cooperation between clergy and believers. In this context a high priority should be given to ongoing study of the various Islamic laws, their impact and the Christian reactions. Apart from short, focused studies, ongoing contact with the Churches and with political circles would help us to gain deeper understanding of the position of the Christians (and other minorities) in Egyptian society. Finally, there still is a paucity of materials about the various strategies used by the Christian communities in Egypt to empower their members in order to enable them to have fruitful discussions across religious lines and to remain active actors in civil society.

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INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED Pope Tawadros II (Jan. 24)

Anba Pachomius, Metropolitan of Bohaira, Matrouh, and North Africa, Interim Pope between March 17 and November 18 2012. (Jan. 22)

Anba Musa, General Bishop for Youth. (Jan. 23)

Anba Thomas, Bishop of El-Qusiyeh and Deputy Secretary of the Holy Synod and member of the special Committee for Youth. (Jan. 17)

Magda Kamel, Coptic Cultural Center; program assistant (Jan 16-24)

Mina el-Khalil, Assistant Professor Islamic Law at AUC. (Jan 16)

Dr. Albert Isteero, former Chair of the Middle East Council of Churches ( MECC) and Emeritus President of the Egyptian Evangelical Seminary. (Jan. 18)

Mauritius Wijffels (Jan. 18), Founder of Melba Foundation for Middle East legal and business consulting.

Dr. Rudolph de Jong, Director of the Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo. (Jan. 19)

Sister Rauth, Director educational development programs Coptic Orthodox Church. (Jan. 19)

Dr. Shahira Mehrez, member of the Popular Alliance Socialist Party (Hizb al-Tahaluf al-Sha'abi al-Ishtiraki), Professor of Art, Cairo University. (Jan. 20)

Mr. Muhammad abdel 'Alim Daud, Deputy People's Assembly & Ahmad Taha Ali, Chair Media Art Production. (Jan. 21)

Dr. Rev. Safwat el-Bayadi, President of the Protestant Churches Egypt. (Jan. 23)

Ishak Ibrahim, Officer Freedom of Religion and Belief, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. (Jan. 23)

Dr. Ehab elKharrat, president human rights organization Justice and Freedom & co-founder of the Egyptian Socialist Democratic Party & elected member of the Shura Council. (Jan. 24)

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SOURCES QUOTED Adel, Michael, “Coptic boycott”, Al Ahram Weekly (March 6, 2013).

Al-Gamal, Samar, “Egypte: Le boycott, et après ...”, Al Ahram Hebdo (March 6, 2013).

“Article Two of Egypt’s Constitution”, Staring at the View blog (March 5, 2011), http://staringattheview.blogspot.com/2011/03/article-two-of-egypts-constitution.html.

Associated Press, “Coptic Pope Tawadros II criticises Egypt's Islamist leadership, new constitution” (February 5, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/64135.aspx.

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, interim report on the conditions of human rights during the first 100 days of Morsi’s presidency: http://www.cihrs.org/?p=5954&lang=en.

Chick, Kristen, “Is the Muslim Brotherhood seeking to kill Egypt’s NGO’s?” The Christian Science Monitor (February 22, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0222/Is-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-seeking-to-kill-Egypt-s-NGOs.

Davis, Stephen, The Early Coptic Papacy, The Egyptian Church and its Leadership in Late Antiquity (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005).

Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), “Freedom of Religion and Belief in Egypt,” Quarterly Report , October-December 2009, (January 2010).

____________Report, “Two Years of Violence: What have we learned? Where do we begin?” (Cairo, April 2010).

Guirguis, Magdi and Nelly van Doorn-Harder, The Emergence of the Modern Coptic Papacy (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2011).

Hamza Hendawi & Aya Batrawy, “Egypt Soccer Riots: Death Sentence Confirmed as Fans Take to Cairo Streets” (March 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/09/egypt-soccer-riot-death-sentence_n_2844087.html.

Iskander, Elizabeth, Sectarian Conflict in Egypt. Coptic Media, identity and representation (London, New York: Routledge, 2012).

Khalil, Emad, “120 Coptic Christians leave Orthodox Church over divorce, remarriage laws,” Egypt Independent (September 18, 2011), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/120-coptic-christians-leave-orthodox-church-over-divorce-remarriage-laws.

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Magdy Malak, “A ruling obliges the church to allow Copts to remarry”, Watani International (March 9, 2008), http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2008/week-10/26-church-obliged (Accessed March 15, 2013).

Marshall, Paul & Nina Shea, Silenced. How Apostasy & Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Murphy, Dan, “The UN document on women that has terrified Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood,” Christian Science Monitor (March 15, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/un-document-women-terrified-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-190143567.html.

Saad, Michael S. and Nardine Saad Riegels, “Traditions of Selecting Coptic Popes over Two Millennia,” 2013, forthcoming.

Also see Nelly van Doorn-Harder’s op-ed on the new pope Tawadros II, http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/nelly-van-doorn-harder and the essay on the Popes of Egypt: http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/The-Popes-of-Egypt.php http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2013/week-3/17-interviewing-bishop-musa-constitutional-draft-be-subjected-referendum-december

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