Research Institute of Industrial Economics

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IFN Working Paper No. 836, 2010

North Korea: Fading Totalitarianism in the ”Hermit Kingdom” Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

North Korea: Fading Totalitarianism in the “Hermit Kingdom”

*

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

May 13, 2010

Abstract: North Korea is perceived by many as one of the most totalitarian societies of modern

time. But in the wake of the economic collapse of the 1990s, North Korean totalitarianism has

grappled with new conditions. This paper examines how the country‟s totalitarian character has

been upheld through the institutional changes instigated by the economic collapse and subsequent

famine in the country. It strives to answer whether today‟s North Korea should still be

characterized as a totalitarian society, and, if not, what system then governs the country.

JEL Codes: P20, P30, P36

Keywords: North Korea; Totalitarianism; Authoritarianism; Institutional Change; Planned Economy; Social

Control

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Box 55665

SE-102 15 Stockholm

Phone: +46-8-665 45 00

Fax: +46-8-665 45 99

e-mail: Benjamin.Katzeff@ifn.se

* I am grateful for useful comments and suggestions from Magnus Henrekson and Fredrik Sjöholm at the

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).

1

Introduction

North Korea is perceived by many as the most controlled and oppressed society in the

world today. It tops many of the global standardized ratings of political repression, and is in

fact considered by some to be the longest surviving totalitarian regime in the world. The

political control incorporated in the North Korean society apparatus is so strong that the North

Korean regime has remained unthreatened by political opposition for decades, despite the fact

that North Korea is, according to Nicholas Eberstadt, “[…] [T]he first urbanized literate

society in human history to suffer famine during peacetime.”1

Indeed, North Korean society was – at least when it functioned as intended – almost an

embodiment of the textbook definition of a totalitarian society. Pre-1990s North Korea even

stood out from other societies considered to be totalitarian, perhaps most notably in its total

lack of political dissidence. According to both scholars and refugees who have fled North

Korea, no political opposition or dissident movement has ever existed in the country (Hassig

and Oh 2000, ch. 6, various pages). The North Korea in the years before the 1990s was not

merely “any” totalitarian society – its level of totalitarianism was unprecedented in

contemporary history.

But a totalitarian society requires that its institutions actually function as intended in order

for totalitarianism to work. This was not a significant problem when North Korea was

economically stabile. But as the 1990s approached, the dire state of the country‟s economy

took an increasingly larger toll on the public agencies controlled by the regime. It has thus

become questionable whether the country that was long considered to be the most totalitarian

society of all times is still actually totalitarian. This paper aims to explore exactly that: did

North Korean totalitarianism survive the economic crisis of the 1990s?

1 Eberstadt 2009, p. xi.

2

If totalitarianism is fading in North Korea, the country may well be becoming what Andrei

Lankov calls more “normal”.2 A transformation in the social nature of the country would have

profound implications for the entire region. A non-totalitarian regime would, in the long run,

be forced to answer to the demands of the population in a different way than a totalitarian one.

North Koreans would probably not accept the economic mismanagement and isolationist

strategies of the totalitarian regime, forcing it to reform in order to stay in power.3 And a

reformed North Korea would be likely to become economically interdependent, and thus

probably more peaceful (Cargill 2009). Should the regime, however, choose not to change,

the chances of a collapse in the long run are significant. Whatever the fate of North Korean

totalitarianism may be, it will have far-reaching implications for many other countries beside

North Korea itself.

This issue is not unexplored. For example, Andrew Scobell has provided a thorough

overview of North Korean totalitarianism in a previous issue of the North Korean Review

(Scobell 2008). I do, however, hope to provide a different framework and focus of analysis

than previous researchers have, and that my perspective is able to enrich the discussion on

changes in North Korean society.

Theoretical Framework – What is Totalitarianism?

Totalitarianism is first and foremost a political system in which the ruling regime holds

political control over all of society by commanding vital political and social institutions. It

tolerates none or very few threats to its mandate to exist, and justifies oppressive measures

with the “ultimate end” of the system, the stage when the state‟s ideological goals will finally

be met. Political scientists differ on the exact definition of totalitarianism, but this can be said

to be the very core of the concept. It is the dynamic, “organic” cooperation between different

2 Lankov 2006a.

3 For more on this issue, see Park 2009.

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totalitarian segments that creates the cluster of totalitarianism. Without one of them, or with

only some of them, a society cannot be considered totalitarian (Linz 2000, p. 9). It is the

purpose of this essay is to explore whether this dynamic exists in the North Korean society.

What characteristics, then, define the totalitarian society? Juan Linz, one of the scholars

who has developed the concept further by building on the works of Zbigniew Brzezinski and

Carl J. Friedrich, Hanna Arendt and others, suggests three main features: a monistic center of

power; an ideology developed, justified and pursued by the leadership; and mass participation

in political and social goals encouraged and even demanded by that same leadership (Linz

2000, p. 70). This definition is more flexible than the one that Juan Linz has dubbed

“classical”, that posed by Brzezinski and Friedrich. But it is also vaguer than Brzezinski‟s and

Friedrich‟s definition, which establishes six “traits” creating the totalitarian “cluster”. Their

defining list deserves to be quoted in full:

1. “An official ideology …covering all vital aspects of man‟s existence to which

everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere … [the ideology] is

characteristically focused and projected toward a perfect final state of mankind …;

2. A single mass party led typically by one man …and consisting of a relatively small

percentage of the total population … a hard core of them passionately and

unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology …such a party being…typically either

superior to, or completely intertwined with the bureaucratic government organization;

3. A system of terroristic police control…characteristically directed not only against

demonstrable „enemies‟ of the regime, but against arbitrarily selected classes of the

population; the terror of the secret police systematically exploiting modern science,

and more especially scientific psychology;

4

4. A technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the

party and its subservient cadres, of all means of effective mass communication, such

as the press, radio, motion pictures;

5. A similarly technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control (in the

same hands) of all means of effective armed combat;

6. A central control and direction of the economy… typically including most other

associations and group activities.”4

The authors later revised and added further comments to their description. In doing so, they

emphasized the fact that the party intertwined with the government bureaucracy does not

necessarily have to be a political party as such. The vital point is that monopolistic control is

in the hands of society‟s ruling elite (Linz 2000, pp. 65–66).

Alternate Labels

Yet what political system rules North Korea if not totalitarianism? To answer this question,

a number of closely related but alternate labels can be contrasted with contemporary North

Korea.

1) Eroding totalitarianism essentially refers to a state where totalitarianism is the basic

political system, but where that system is breaking up in one or many aspects.

2) Post-totalitarianism suggests a state of structural totalitarianism, but with a weakened

central power that allows for other group interests, such as those relating to class, regions,

economical or other bureaucratic spheres to take root and affect politics. Thus, post-

totalitarianism involves a sort of pluralism that does not exist in the totalitarian society. In this

political system, ideology turns into a mere instrument for those in power, and is adapted to

other forces than purely the regime‟s political goals (Linz 2000, p. 115; Scobell 2006).

4 Brzezinski and Friedrich 1956, p. 9–11.

5

3) Authoritarianism is often confused with totalitarianism. Authoritarianism refers to a

lighter stage of political control, and theorists often refer to authoritarian regimes rather than

societies, as in the case of totalitarianism. This is because the distinction between regime and

society is not fully obliterated in the authoritarian society, just as the rulers intend. There

exists a limited form of pluralism that is not present in the totalitarian society, and the

functions of the institutions in the authoritarian regime may vary between countries and

regimes. Instead, what defines the authoritarian regime – which can of course take a great

number of different forms – is, according to Juan Linz, the existence of a leader and

occasionally a group that exercises power within informally defined but still “quite”

predictable limits. Political pluralism can exist, but it is devoid of real power. Political

mobilization may also exist at some points in the regime‟s history, but it is not the norm, as

seen in the totalitarian society (Linz 2000, pp. 159–161).

4) The failed (or failing) state implies a situation where one or many of the regime‟s

institutions exist, but have essentially ceased to function. The failed state is disorganized;

political authority disappears – fails – and the economy declines, control over citizens

weakens, and authority over large parts of territory is lost. The overall authority of the state is

in decline, which is illustrated by a variety of factors, including refugee flows (Foreign Policy

Magazine 2009).

I now turn to the actual analysis of today‟s North Korea to assess whether totalitarianism is

still the country‟s prevalent political system.

The Current Status of Totalitarianism in North Korea

The “Official Ideology”

In official terms, North Korea‟s ideology does not seem to have changed much since the

beginning of the economic crisis. The constitutional revision of 1998 did not significantly

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alter the nature of ideology‟s function and importance – Juche is still mentioned in the first

sentence. The introduction of new ideological concepts in politics, such as Songun (“military-

first-politics”) and Kangsong Taeguk (“Strong and Prosperous Nation” – a supposed leading

strategy in strengthening North Korea‟s economy and military) is probably best interpreted as

a new emphasis on the military-oriented segment of Juche, which has gained importance since

Kim Jong Il formally took power in North Korea through his position in the military (Lee et al

2009; Kim 2003, pp. 88–89, p. 66, pp. 91–92). Some have argued that the introduction of

Kangsong Taeguk implies an ideological move towards economic opening, but the concept

itself and the circumstances during which it was introduced rather points towards it standing

representing a hardening of Juche ideological rigor (GlobalSecurity.org 2009; Kim 2003, p.

66).

A revision of the Juche ideology would have been logical in the wake of North Korea‟s

economic collapse. Juche calls for complete economic independence, but the disintegration of

the North Korean economy has in fact made the country entirely economically dependent on

its worst political enemies. The regime appears to have chosen denial as the strategy for

continuing to justify the Juche ideology for its own population. According to a study

conducted in the fall of 2009, 43 percent of North Korean refugees had never even heard of

the international food aid to the country, which at one point fed more than one-third of the

population (Chang et al 2008). Of course, the state‟s very recognition of economic problems

could be interpreted as passive admittance of the failure of the Juche ideological doctrine, but

nothing of the sort seems to be visible in North Korean rhetoric.

Yet North Korea continues to employ the totalitarian ideology as described by the

totalitarian framework. The ideology not only exists, but is inscribed in the country‟s

constitution, and very little points to actual changes in ideological theory and rhetoric.

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The “Single Mass-party”

Has North Korea‟s power center – the single mass-party – managed to survive the

economic collapse and uphold its position? The power center‟s strength seems intact, but its

structure has been slightly altered. A significant power shift has occurred from the party to the

army, but the monolithic power center as such remains. Even though the North Korean

constitution states that the Worker‟s Party should provide leadership for “all activities” within

the republic, many consider North Korea to be ruled by the military rather than the party. This

order has supposedly been in place since the instigation of “Military First Politics”, Songun,

an explicit political strategy which states that the military should be given priority in politics

and resource allocation. The chairmanship of the National Defense Commission (held by Kim

Jong Il) is, according to Kim Yong Nam (the president of the North Korean parliament‟s

presidium) the “top post of the republic”,5 being made so through a number of intentional

constitutional reforms.

Many signs in recent years have suggested a power struggle between the allegedly more

conservative military apparatus, and the supposedly more progressive and reform-friendly

party. Although factual information is a rare luxury, the fact that the power shift has been

explicitly announced through judicial measures gives little reason to question the military‟s

increased power within the state apparatus. Likewise, anecdotal evidence from within the

institutions fuel the claim of a power struggle (see for example Oberdorfer 2001, p. 422).

But what does this mean for the political system? As noted, it is not an explicit criterion for

totalitarianism that society be ruled by a totalitarian political party. Rather, it is the existence

of a center of power that provides the totalitarian mechanism. In other words, whether the

party or the army acts as the totalitarian center of power is not important.

5 Kim 2003, p. 91.

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However, the very existence of a split between two separate power centers is interesting, as

it implies at least some degree of pluralism, which should not exist in a totalitarian society

because of the risk of splits and factionalism. These separate power centers could give rise to

an (admittedly very limited) pluralistic climate of opinion, which could in turn threaten the

totalitarian regime‟s unitary totalitarian power. When totalitarian power is divided, room

emerges for alliances between interests outside the control of the regime, which may in turn

threaten society‟s political unity. But then again, the implications of this should not be

overstated by any means. No matter which sector of the state apparatus enjoys main political

power, they are all part of the regime as such. Thus, the threat towards the regime‟s power is

probably fairly limited. This is emphasized by Juan Linz, who cites the example of the

struggles between the SS and the SA in Nazi Germany, a relationship that was likely tenser

than that between the army and the party in North Korea today (Linz 2000, pp. 68–69). That

does not mean that the structures of Nazi Germany were not totalitarian, or that North Korea

is not totalitarian in this respect; it simply implies the possibility of an opening towards post-

totalitarianism. But the North Korean power center is still far from that stage.

The System of Police Control

According to some of the most knowledgeable scholars, the economic crisis and

subsequent famine of the 1990s have in many respects drastically weakened the North Korean

system of police control. This is mainly due to the poor state of the North Korean economy

and the state‟s inability to pay its security functionaries, including security guards and the

heads of the inminban (“people‟s groups”).6 Much indicates that bribes have become more

and more common, and that they are making it increasingly easier to avoid punishment for

6 The term inminban roughly translates into ”people‟s groups”. Each North Korean citizen is allocated to an

inmiban depending on place of residence, and all group members are responsible for the surveillance of each

other. The head, the inminbanjang, stands in regular contact with the security authorities and is responsible for

reporting any criminal activity or other political disobedience to them (Lankov 2006b).

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“political crimes” such as possession of foreign (mostly South Korean) literature and similar

items. The inminbanjang (heads of the people‟s groups) used to be one of the political

police‟s most important social proxies within the population, and indeed they still are. But

their rigor has probably diminished due to the breakdown of the public distribution system

(PDS). One of the incentives for the inminbanjang used to be larger rations, as payment for

the assignment (Lankov 2007, pp. 173–177; Lankov 2006b). But today, the PDS barely

operates, resulting in less incentive for the inmibanjang to uphold social control. Like the

police, they are likely to be quite receptive to bribes as a way to increase their income after

the decrease in rations from the PDS. The system‟s function has thus been greatly weakened

in the aftermath of the economic crisis.

The harsh restriction of freedom of movement has also subsided due to the breakdown of

the official economy. Bribes have become an institutionalized tool for gaining travel permits

for both domestic and cross-border travel. At first, control of domestic travel foundered

because the state wasn‟t able to keep people from searching for food in other provinces than

their own. But later on, restrictions on travel have become fairly easy to evade by bribing

officials for permits (KINU 2008; Lankov 2007, pp. 180–184; Lee, Joo Il 2009). Travel to

China – has also become possible through the institutionalization of bribery, even though it is

still forbidden by law. The fact that police control has been so weakened that North Koreans

can leave the country without major complications is an indication of the severity of the

collapse. The breakdown of police control through bribery has effectively damaged the

function of the North Korean system of control as a whole; many of the tools the state had

used to ensure control have eroded.

It is interesting to note how the North Korean class system has been affected by the

increased inefficiency of the system of control. The groups in the lowest strata have,

according to some, been able to climb the social ladder, as they generally live close to the

10

Chinese border, the least hospitable areas of the country. Because they live so close to China,

they are able to make “unofficial” money through illegal cross-border trade. Their proximity

to China has thus granted them a comparative advantage in trade, with some saying that the

whole songbûn-system has been damaged by these geographic perks.

Other social aspects of police control have lost significance too. The Maoist-inspired “self-

criticism” sessions have reportedly diminished in importance and frequency since the 1990s.

These sessions exploited basic human psychology by creating animosity and suspicion

between people, who were forced to criticize each other‟s actions and behavior at the

workplace on a daily basis. But much indicates that the sessions are no longer practiced with

the same frequency as before (Lankov 2007, pp. 35–37).

However, it should be noted that even though police control in North Korea may have

diminished since the breakdown of the economy, coercion and police terror are still very

much present. Though the rate of arrests and police coercion – or “terror” – seems to vary

quite significantly over time, it remains clear that police control is still a reality.

Finally, is contemporary North Korea totalitarian with respect to the third criterion? Since

it is apparent that the system of police control is weakening, one could hold that the third

criterion of totalitarianism is eroding: the structures still exist, but the system is not

functioning as intended – it is gradually breaking up. This is indeed what seems to be

happening. The terror has decreased in rigor because of the regime‟s inability to finance the

system, with cracks developing as a result. As noted earlier, the system continues to be very

strong, but the fact that it has weakened considerably implies that the terror is no longer all-

pervasive. One could also consider the current status of the North Korean system of control as

approaching the post-totalitarian stage.

The abatement of control has given rise to a rather vague interest group consisting of the

traders along the Sino-Korean border and in the formerly outlawed black markets of the

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country. Their group interest was recently made apparent when large numbers of traders

engaged in rare displays of anger after a recent currency reform caused them to lose large

sums of money (Choi et al 2009; Yoo 2009). According to Juan Linz, real change can occur

in a totalitarian society when policymakers establish links with interest groups in society

(Linz 2000, p. 115). But in North Korea at present, the interest groups exist, yet the links

between them and policymakers seem not to, even though many of the traders are likely to be

party members of high standing. And, even though cracks in the system – such as cross-

border trade – have been institutionalized, they have not been formally recognized, and the

regime has in fact made some attempts to roll back the development. With respect to the

system of oppressive police control, North Korea is probably best described as an eroding

totalitarian society, with good future prospects of reaching post-totalitarianism. The pre-

requisites for post-totalitarianism exist, but they are not fully developed.

The Monopoly of Mass Communication

It is clear that the economic crisis and the regime‟s subsequent inability to fully finance its

institutions have greatly eroded the monopoly of mass communication. Weakened border

control has made the flow of foreign influences into North Korea possible, and not least South

Korean influences have found their way into the country (Hassig and Oh 2008). It is doubtful

that one can speak of an actual monopoly of mass communication in today‟s North Korea due

to the fact that an alternate flow of information exists.

The breakdown of border control towards China has propelled this process by enabling

South Korean culture to be smuggled into North Korea. There is reportedly an unofficial word

for South Korean music obtained from China, “Yanbian Music”. The word emanates from the

Chinese region Yanbian, near the border to North Korea, which is known for its extensive

population of ethnic Koreans and South Korean businessmen. Furthermore, a steady stream of

12

news reports has followed in the wake of popular culture. It needs to be emphasized that

South Korean, Chinese or any sort of cultural influx provides North Koreans with news

previously unknown to most. Supposed poverty and suffering in South Korea and in the

capitalist world in general has been a dominant theme in North Korean propaganda for

decades, which has claimed that the standard of life and human rights in the country is higher

than in most other parts of the world. Although smuggled movies and television shows rarely

present a true representation of reality, they still show living standards in other countries – in

South Korea in particular, in the North Korean case – by just having been filmed there. They

passively depict the relative affluence in the western world, showing the high density of cars

on the streets for example, or the standard of clothing worn by the general public. This

deprives the North Korean regime of a great deal of its legitimacy.

The habit of listening to foreign radio broadcasts is also an ever-growing trend in North

Korea. It is not possible to accurately measure the number of North Koreans who listen to

foreign radio broadcasts today, but survey studies conducted among refugees in China and

South Korea have indicated that as many as 87 percent had either listened illegally to radio

stations such as the South Korean public service station Korean Broadcast Service or knew of

its broadcasts in North Korea, prior to defecting. Forty percent listened to the KBS more than

twice a week, and another 40 percent claimed they had been listening on a daily basis (Hassig

and Oh 2009, p. 161). This population may very well be skewed – those who defect probably

often hold a less favorable view of the regime and are therefore more prone to disobey its

rules and laws. But the fact that such a high percentage of a non-explicit elite sample of

people has repeatedly listened to illegal radio broadcasts, whose news on the North Korean

regime tends to be anything but favorable, indicates that the monopoly on mass

communication has not only begun to erode, but has been heavily damaged. Some North

Korean defectors‟ groups in South Korea and China even claim to regularly speak to North

13

Koreans along the border to China with cell phones. If such a direct flow of information

actually exists, the long-term consequences could be dramatic. After being continuously

exposed to non-propagandistic news about the country, North Koreans may start to question

the propaganda that the regime is presenting to them. They might thus begin seriously

questioning the regime in the long run.

As Brzezinski and Friedrich note, the propaganda in a totalitarian society is used to

maintain the power of the ruling regime; it is clear that the North Korean state is beginning to

loose a strong weapon. In fact, some signs indicate that the regime is even starting to adapt to

this new order, thereby recognizing and even admitting to some validity in the implications

inherent in the flow of South Korean culture. One example is cited by Andrei Lankov, who

holds that the regime now tries to promote itself as the more purely Korean and nationalist

alternative instead of claiming to be economically superior to South Korea (Lankov 2008).

Thus, even though the regime still strives for totalitarian control by trying to subvert outside

influences and uphold its monopoly on mass communication, North Korea is in this respect

approaching a post-totalitarian system, where the strategies of the regime continuously adapt

to a changing reality.

But then again, it should be remembered that North Koreans showed very little signs of

open contempt towards the government even during the worst days of the famine, and no

substantial political opposition has ever been organized inside the country. Thus, despite that

North Korea may be moving towards post-totalitarianism, it remains doubtful whether the

transformation would have any real implications for the country. Its Confucian heritage

contributes to preventing all forms of organized political dissent for some time to come, even

in the absence of a state monopoly on mass communication. After all, the regime has

managed to muddle through the major economic crisis of the 1990s. If it can combat such an

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obvious challenge to its legitimacy, it may well be able to successfully manage the flow of

outside influences into the country.

Whatever the implications, it is clear that the regime‟s monopoly on mass communication

is eroding. Should the erosion continue, a post-totalitarian stage where the regime adapts itself

even more and accepts the flow of information from the outside world could follow. And, last

but not least, as the flow of information is maintained at the current level, or grows larger, the

population will continue to grow even more aware of a reality that is a challenge to the

regime, which continues to claim that its system is superior to all alternatives.

The Planned Economy and the Associations

It is widely recognized and acknowledged that the North Korean economy broke down

during the 1990s in virtually all respects. Thus, the totalitarian design of central control of the

economy and all other organizations is no longer valid for North Korea. Today‟s North Korea

is radically different from the design and model described above as intended by the regime. In

other words, North Korea is no longer economically totalitarian.

The breakdown of the state economy gave rise to another sector that had until then only

existed on a very small scale: the private, unofficial economy. Despite being modeled as a

centrally planned economy, North Korea has managed to survive without actually gaining

near-sufficient income. These circumstances can be explained in part by the massive flow of

foreign aid since 1995. But the private market system that has spontaneously developed in the

country has also played a major role.

The strict regulations on private trade were possible to uphold when the state actually

delivered something, and was able to feed its people. But upholding the central planning of

the economy and the laws against private ownership and business transactions became

impossible when all alternatives to private trade ceased to function. Thus, the centrally

15

planned economy became forcibly privatized due to the lack of other alternatives. In 1995, as

floods struck North Korea, a number of aid organizations began operations in the country,

which had until then denied that any severe, acute food shortages were occurring. The floods

became the starting point for an aid program that eventually grew into the World Food

Program‟s largest. Today, it is estimated that about one third or more of the North Korean

population is entirely dependent on external aid for their survival (Lintner 2005, p. 51; Chang

et al 2008).

Gradually, private markets came to take the PDS‟s place. At first, these marketplaces

operated under a largely illegal framework. But as the authorities themselves were forced to

recognize that the people had no alternatives – and that private trade simply could not be

completely suppressed – their existence became increasingly open and institutionalized, and

even semi-legalized. Today, private sources provide the larger part of all food for North

Koreans, according to recent surveys conducted in China (Lee 2008; Haggard and Noland

2009; Chang et al 2008). The judicial recognition of the loss of central command over the

economy is a signal of how far the process has progressed. A reform package introduced by

the regime in 2002 recognized both the micro-level managerial necessity of individual

decision making within the state enterprises, allowing the population a certain extent of

private ownership and private trading. Thus, the planned economy has not only been

spontaneously transformed by the unlawful changes in the population‟s economic behavioral

patterns; it has even been officially changed by popular pressure.

These institutional changes have had further implications for many other areas beyond the

economy. The central planning of the economy has been an important tool for the regime to

control the population and reward them politically. Not only occupation but also social

position, living standards, organizational belonging and many other aspects of citizens‟ lives

have been controlled by the state. The workplaces have been important as means of control

16

for the regime because they accord it the ability to influence the opinions of the population

through mandatory indoctrination sessions of various kinds. Even food rations have been

distributed through workplaces (Hassig and Oh 2009, p. 66). Yet with the informal sector‟s

predominance over the formal one, these mechanisms have in all likelihood diminished

greatly.

As previously noted, the state used the PDS and the planned economy to control and

provide incentives for political loyalty. Those considered politically loyal and well-connected

were allocated better rations through their more attractive professional assignments (KINU

2008). But because the PDS has virtually ceased operating, officially allocated jobs do not

matter as much, although they have not lost all significance. In any case, because the state is

no longer the main provider for the main segments of the North Korean population, general

loyalty towards the state has probably already decreased (Lee et al 2009).

It should be noted, however, that an official economy still exists in North Korea. The state

does own some industries, and its weapons technology and manufacturing sectors –

particularly its ballistic missile program – hold a relatively high standard, given the overall

state of the country‟s economy. Furthermore, the state has made attempts to revive the PDS

and to suppress the unofficial market. This indicates that the regime does in fact regard central

planning of the economy as a realistic goal. This dampens the significance of the 2002

economic reforms as truly groundbreaking, and puts them in a more temporarily pragmatic

light. However, because food is supplied by the private sector to such a large extent, few

scholars believe that the state will be able to reverse the process of private marketization even

if it wishes to do so. The PDS is simply too shattered, and the state is probably wary of trying

to suppress the market too harshly and risk public unrest and even uprisings against the

regime. The state may be reluctant to take such a risk, even to restore the central planning of

the economy.

17

However, non-economic organizational freedom is still virtually nonexistent, despite the

official organization‟s loss of significance. Mobilization of the population has recently proven

possible, for example with the “100 Day Battle” campaign for an increased harvest which

reportedly mobilized large segments of the population. Even though the state has been forced

to permit an unofficial economy, its institutions still matter. A recently conducted study shows

that the vast majority – as many as 80 percent – of refugees surveyed believe that becoming a

party or government official is the best way to get ahead in North Korea, while engaging in

business is only perceived by 10–20 percent as being the best option (Haggard and Noland

2009).

Still, it remains a fact that the state has lost the ability to centrally plan the economy, even

though it guides it harshly. The fact that the economy is strictly controlled but not actually

planned probably best brands North Korea in this respect as authoritarian, leaning towards

post-totalitarianism because of its reluctance to permit the private economic activity. There

exists a plurality of economic organizations – namely, private traders – outside the state‟s

control; in a strictly totalitarian country, there exists no economy beyond state control. This is

no longer the case for North Korea.

Summary and Conclusion

What conclusion, then, should be drawn from these findings? When analyzing a supposed

totalitarian “cluster” potentially formed by the six mentioned traits, it is important to bear

their organic character in mind. A country with a secret police but without a complete

monopoly on all means of mass communication is not totalitarian, neither is a society with a

tightly controlled centrally planned economy, but without a guiding, totalitarian ideology. It is

the cluster – the dynamics created by the interplay between the six traits – that is crucial, not

the separate traits themselves.

18

Therefore, the North Korea of today can hardly be considered fully totalitarian. The state

apparatus is still exceedingly harsh, and the coercive system of control is still very much in

operation. The totalitarian ideology still exists, as does the monolithic power center. But the

centrally planned economy does not exist as prescribed by the totalitarian framework. This is

especially relevant, because the breakdown of the economy has hit virtually all state

institutions. Although all totalitarian criteria are important, the central control of the economy

may well be the one that stands out. As bribing and private trade become part of daily life in

North Korea, the political incentive structure and system of control has begun to fade. The

state simply does not matter as much anymore as it did when North Korea was considered a

textbook definition of a totalitarian society. It has thus provided room for influences,

behaviors and thoughts other than those which the state endorses to take root.

It is hard to say what this really means, or what it bodes for the future. The totalitarian

fostering of loyalty and political correctness is a process that takes place over a long time. It

starts at a very early age, and proceeds through mechanisms tightly intertwined with state

institutions all through a citizen‟s life. The changes in North Korea‟s formerly totalitarian

nature may thus not be visible for years or even decades to come. If no drastic changes occur

in North Korea‟s economic behavior, the generation that is currently growing up in the

country will be the first one for many decades not to be dependent on the state for provisions,

and the first to live under the eroded totalitarian system of control. Only time will tell how

this new reality will affect the nature of North Korea.

However, the possibility of a rollback should not be dismissed. Even though the regime has

implemented some reforms, they have done so mostly out of necessity. Some measures

indicate that the regime still intends to regain totalitarian control. The public distribution

system has been restarted on a number of occasions, but has not managed to replace the

market. The recent currency denomination is the most recent example of the regime‟s

19

crackdown on the markets, indicating that the regime is nowhere near ready to fully recognize

the new market economy.

But the totalitarian institutions have eroded to such an extent that it is hard to believe that

the state will ever manage to return them to their previous efficiency of operation. They face a

dilemma: the totalitarian institutions require funding, but the North Korean economy was

reportedly growing in tiny numbers in relation to its total size as of 2008, not nearly enough to

make a significant difference in the totalitarian institutions (Moon 2009). And as the previous

strategy of self-reliance has failed, it would probably be necessary to gain outside capital.

This would be difficult to do without risking letting the foreign influences that the totalitarian

leadership wants to guard itself against into the country. Either way, the prospects for

totalitarianism have been compromised.

There are many more indications to support the argument that North Korean totalitarianism

is fading than this paper leaves room for. The economic reforms and birth of SEZ‟s – Special

Economic Zones – in North Korea can in their own right be seen as signs of fading

totalitarianism. When leaving room for foreign influences to enter, as is the case with the

SEZ‟s, the state gives up some of its power and makes itself increasingly dependent on

outside forces. The increased number of diplomatic relations that North Korea has developed

over the last ten years can also be seen as a sign of the Pyongyang regime moving in an

increasingly open direction, since they point to the country becoming more and more willing

to cooperate and receive impressions from the outside world (Park 2009). The broad, cultural

changes that the influx of foreign media and impressions has brought only serves to

emphasize the state‟s weakening power and the erosion of totalitarianism in North Korea

(Hassig and Oh 2008). This is one result of the regime‟s loss of total monopoly on the flow of

information that should not be underestimated. The increase of North Korea‟s external

20

economic dependency also drastically compromises the regime‟s power and ability to fully

conduct its own policies.

The North Korean society of today is thus significantly different from the one which

preceded the famine of the 1990s. It might not have reached the post-totalitarian stage – it is

in some aspects still firmly totalitarian – but it is clear that its control is eroding as a whole.

What some conclude to be the most closed and oppressed society in the world is

fundamentally changing. Not least North Korea‟s neighbors would do right to keep a close

eye on the process.

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