norms and rights: a non -recursive model of human...
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NORMS AND RIGHTS: A NON-RECURSIVE MODEL OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
Dr. Todd LandmanSenior Lecturer, Department of Government
Co-Director, Human Rights Centre
University of EssexWivenhoe Park
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQUnited Kingdom
Tel/Fax: +44-(0)1206-872129Email: [email protected]://www.essex.ac.uk
Paper prepared for the 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia 28-31 August 2003. Panel 46-6 Human Rights and Repression: The Quest for Understanding.
Norms and Rights: A Non-recursive model of human rights protection
Abstract
Drawing on theories from international relations, international law, and comparative politics, this paper tests the relationship between international human rights norms and human rights protection. Using a cross-national time series data set for 169 countries over the period 1976-2000, the paper explores the temporal and spatial patterns in the growth in the international human rights regime and the protection of human rights, and then models their mutual relationship using non-recursive estimation techniques, while controlling for the influences of democracy, wealth, international interdependence, warfare, population size, and regional differences. The results of the analysis show three things. First, the norms-rights relationship between the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the protection of civil and political rights is statistically significant and stronger than for the rights-norms relationship. Second, democracy, wealth, and international interdependence help explain both treaty ratification and greater protection of human rights. Third, the norms- rights relationship is less strong for Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Overall, the findings suggest that formal participation in the international regime of human rights complements patterns of development, democratisation, and global interdependence, all of which are related to a greater protection of human rights.
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Introduction
The turn of the new century offers an opportunity for reflection and critical
assessment of both the achievements and setbacks in the global human rights project.
The post-World War II era has seen the establishment and subsequent growth in the
international law of human rights, the turn away from authoritarianism with the global
spread of democratic forms of rule, and an increasing number of international
interventions carried out on behalf of human rights. The international law of human
rights includes major international and regional treaties, institutions, and
organisations. By the year 2000, between 95 and 191 countries have become
signatories to the main international legal instruments, which many have argued
comprise an international ‘regime’ for the promotion and protection of human rights
(Henkin 1979; Donnelly 1989; Hathaway 2002). This regime has grown both in
breadth and depth as new categories of human rights have been given express legal
protection, while an increasing number of countries have formally committed
themselves to the human rights norms and values originally found in the 1948 UN
Declaration. Similar such regimes have been established in Europe, the Americas, and
Africa.
Alongside this evolution in the international law of human rights, the world has seen a
dramatic turn away from authoritarian forms of rule to nascent forms of democracy.
Since the Portuguese transition to democracy in 1974, the global spread and pace of
democratisation has meant that over 60% of the world is now at least nominally
democratic (Diamond 1999). Global comparative studies on the tangible benefits of
democratic rule demonstrate a decrease in international violent conflict (see Russet
and O’Neal 2001), lower levels of violation in personal integrity rights (Poe and Tate
1994, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Zanger 2000), and levels of economic development
and performance that are no worse than those found under authoritarian regimes
(Ersson and Lane 1996; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000).
In addition to the development of human rights law and processes of democratisation,
the world has witnessed an increasing number of foreign interventions carried out
ostensibly on behalf of human rights or humanitarian grounds such as those in East
Timor and Kosovo. Moreover, the tradition of human rights tribunals first established
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in Nuremberg has been renewed with tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Variants of such tribunals have appeared at the domestic level with the
formation of numerous truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) in Latin
America, Africa, and Eastern Europe whose remit has been to collect information on
past crimes against humanity and to offer some form of reconciliation to deeply torn
societies (De Brito 1997; Roniger and Sznajder 1999; Hayner 1994, 2002). This
proliferation of tribunals has culminated in the establishment of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), a process that has been described as the international
‘institutionalisation of criminal liability’ (Falk 2000: 4).
Scholars and commentators have thus argued by the turn of this Century the world has
entered the ‘age of rights’ (Bobbio 1996), experienced a ‘juridical revolution’
(Ignatieff 2001); a process of international ‘legalization’ (Abbott et al. 2000) and
‘judicialization’ (Stone Sweet 1999) in which rights have established the normative
framework for ‘human conduct in the world of states’ (Jackson 2000). Taken
together, this development of international and regional human rights systems,
coupled with democratisation and ethically oriented foreign relations suggests that
nation states formally participating in the international legal mechanisms for human
rights protection are increasingly embedded into larger institutional structures that
seek to constrain and limit state behaviour in order to protect the sanctity of
individuals and certain collectivities.1 Even those states that have not signed or
ratified the various human rights instruments find themselves under increased
international pressure from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to
join these regimes and to change their practices to make them conform to the
normative global expectations that adhere to human rights values (see, e.g. Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Welch 2001).
These developments may lead to the sanguine conclusion that human rights have
finally triumphed and now provide the normative framework for the future of global
1 By certain collectivities, I refer to the various ways in which minority rights have become increasingly protected, for example, by the 1957 International Labour Organisation Convention No. 107 on the Protection of Indigenous and other Tribal and semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal peoples, and the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities (Philips 1997: viii-xiii). Such protection means that certain groups in society (typically non-dominant and numerically small) have special protections against majority incursions in areas such as education, health, employment, language, and religion.
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politics, echoing earlier claims about the ‘end of ideology’ (Bell 1960) and the ‘end of
history’ (Fukuyama 1992). In contrast to such a rosy assessment, others suggest that
the rights agenda is certainly on the table but that it has ‘yet to realize the rudiments of
its full political potential’ (Foweraker and Landman 1997: 243), and that we have
witnessed the ‘precarious triumph of human rights’ (Reiff 1999). It is a triumph since
even the most optimistic observers in 1948 could not have imagined the subsequent
growth and influence of human rights discourse and doctrine. But it is precarious
since these same achievements can easily be reversed, where politics and power have
shaped the different ways in which such gains have been achieved. Moreover, the
world is still a place in which 'there are more countries … where fundamental rights
and civil liberties are regularly violated than countries where they are effectively
protected' (Robertson and Merrills 1996: 2).
In 1990, Amnesty International noted that out of 179 UN member states, 104 states
had committed acts of torture against their citizens, while in their 2002 report, 111 out
of 194 member states continue such practices (Amnesty International 1990; Amnesty
International 2002). These numbers indicate only a one percent drop in the number of
states practicing torture (58 percent in 1990 and 57 percent in 2002) over the last
decade of the 20th Century. Additional data on human rights protection shows that in
1985, 35% of all countries score ‘6’ or higher on the Freedom House scale for civil
liberties (range of 1 to 7), 12-13% score a ‘4’ or higher on the ‘political terror scale’
(range of 1 to 5) for both Amnesty and State Department coding sources (Poe and
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), and 22% score a ‘4’ or higher on a scale of
torture (range 1 to 5) (Hathaway 2002). These scores on the various scales are all at
the high end, which depicts a consistent and regular violation of the rights measured
by each. By 1993, the percentage of countries with such scores increased dramatically
to 42% with a score of ‘6’ or higher on the Freedom House scale for civil liberties,
31% with a score of ‘4’ or higher on the political terror scale, and 39% with a score
of ‘4’ or higher on a scale of torture.
There is thus a significant and persistent gap between rights in principle (i.e. those
formally protected by international law) and rights in practice (i.e. those rights
actually protected by states and enjoyed by individuals and groups) (Foweraker and
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Landman 1997).2 This paper is concerned precisely with this significant and persistent
gap between principle and practice in human rights protection. Such a gap suggests
that there has thus far been an unfilled expectation that the growth and sophistication
in the international regime of human rights will lead to a greater protection of human
rights. The fact that rights protection continues to be precarious despite the increasing
participation of states in the various systems for their protection raises two
fundamental questions for empirical research: (1) what explains the growth of the
international law of human rights and (2) what is the nature of the relationship
between the international law of human rights and the actual protection of human
rights?
To begin addressing these questions, this paper is divided into four parts. First, it
examines a certain convergence in the theories of public international law,
international relations, and comparative politics around the general topic of regimes,
and makes specific reference to the human rights regime. It shows that legal-
proceduralism, neo-liberal institutionalism, liberal-republicanism, and new
institutionalism have similar concerns over how principles, legal norms, and
institutions both facilitate and constrain state behaviour. This convergence in thinking
raises expectations for the impact of international institutions on state behaviour in
areas such as trade, finance, and environmental protection, while human rights
scholars suggest that such expectations may equally apply to the international human
rights regime (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002).
Second, the paper uses the analytical categories and variables drawn from these three
areas of theory to specify a preliminary empirical model that depicts the complex
relationship between the international law of human rights and the protection of
human rights. The model includes treaty and rights variables and identifies
independent variables that may modulate the relationship in important and significant
ways, including democracy, wealth, interdependence, involvement in international
and domestic conflict, population size and regional differentiation. Third, it estimates
the model for one international human rights treaty and five separate measures of
human rights protection using two-staged least squares regression with instrumental
2 In the language of international lawyers, this gap exists between the de jure protection and de factorealisation of human rights.
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variables. Fourth, it discusses the findings in light of the substantive issues raised in
the first part of the paper. The results of the analysis show a statistically significant
relationship between norms and rights for three out of the five human rights measures,
which is stronger than for the relationship between rights and norms. The norms-
rights relationship, however, must be seen as a function of larger processes of
democratisation, economic wealth, and global interdependence.
Part I: A Nexus for Empirical Theories
Human rights provide an important nexus for empirical theories of law, politics and
international relations. Public international lawyers speak of the problems of
compliance and implementation (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Slaughter-Burley 1993;
Higgins 1994; Koh 1997; Hathaway 2002). International relations scholars speak of
problems of regime creation, effectiveness and enforcement (Keohane 1984;
Rittberger 1997; Young 1992; 1999). Comparativists focus on the ways in which
differences across domestic systems of governance have an impact on regime
participation and rights protection (Moravcsik 1997, 2000; Poe and Tate 1994; Keith
1999; Landman 2002, 2003; Donnelly 1986; 1999), as well as the linkages between
international politics, domestic politics and transnational non-state actors (Keck and
Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).
Traditionally, these three families of theory and research have had very little to do
with each other (Raustialia and Slaughter 2000). But since the 1980s there appears to
have been a convergence of work around the general topic of regimes to examine the
degree to which international law, norms, and principles shape state behaviour. The
consideration of human rights has increasingly been included in regime analysis, a
process that has brought international law and international relations closer together
(see Donnelly 1986; Keith 1999; Krasner 1997; 1999; Hathaway 2002; Schmitz and
Sikkink 2002). These concerns at the international level have also transcended the
study of domestic forms of state-citizen relations, the traditional domain of
comparative politics. Certain strands of international relations theory focus on
domestic actors, collective domestic preferences, and national institutional
arrangements influence international action (Henkin 1979: 60-68; Putnam 1993;
Moravcsik 1997; 2000; Slaughter Burley 1993: 227-228). Thus the ‘double
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convergence’ of theoretical concerns at the international and domestic levels of
analysis around the topic of human rights demonstrates a growing interest in the ways
in which the promotion and protection of human dignity can be analysed empirically.
International Law and International Relations
International law and international relations have long been concerned with the ways
in which states interact with one another, and both fields have traditionally built their
theories on the twin assumptions of state sovereignty and non-intervention, most
notably embodied in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Both the modern state system
and international law have developed dramatically since the end of the Thirty Years
War, where international law moved from 'natural' foundations to 'positive'
foundations (Slaughter-Burley 1993: 207-220; Koh 1997: 2603-2614) addressing an
ever-increasing variety of issue areas. Similarly, international relations theory evolved
from a dominance of ethical and normative perspectives on the conduct of states to
those that are increasingly empirical and positivist (Boucher 1998; Schmidt 2002).
For much of the post-World War II era there has been a natural tension between
international law represented by the legal positivists on the one hand and international
relations represented by the realists on the other.
Legal positivists focus on the ‘neutral’ function of international law as it is meant to
be applied to problem areas devoid of any considerations of the nature of power
differences between states or of the international system more generally (e.g. Austin
1975 [1954]; Kelsen 1949). This could be labelled the ‘law without power’
perspective. In contrast, realist theories of international relations, built on the
assumption of states as unitary rational actors, play down the importance of
international law and relegate it to something that is merely ‘epiphenomenal’. Realists
argue that the structure of power between and among states as they maximise their
preferences is the key determinant of political outcomes (e.g. Kennan 1951;
Morgenthau 1961; Waltz 1979; Schmitz and Sikkink 2000; Donnelly 2000). This
could be labelled the ‘power without law’ perspective.3
3 Kennan (1951: 95-99) argues that international law rests on 'the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints…[and that such a] legalistic approach to international relations is faulty in its assumptions concerning the possibility of sanctions against offenses and violations…' In similar fashion, Morgenthau (1958: 73) has an equal disdain for legalistic
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These two perspectives represent extreme ends of a broad continuum of scholarship
on international law and international relations produced during the 1960-1989 period,
which Slaughter-Burley (1993: 207) has deigned the ‘polarity of law and power’.
Along the continuum, the Yale and Columbia schools of international law offered
alternative perspectives that emphasised the importance of international community
and the formality of norms on the one hand, and sovereign autonomy and informality
of norms on the other (Kennedy 2000: 117-120). This legal scholarship gave way to
new forms of 'legal pragmatism' and 'legal proceduralism' during the 1990s, both of
which temper the neutral understanding of law by focusing on the 'interplay between
rules and social process in enunciating the law' (Koh 1997: 2618). Legal pragmatists
concede that power and ideology not only influence law, but that law itself is a
continuing process of authoritative decisions (Higgins 1968: 58-59 in Higgins 1994:
2, emphasis mine; see also Slaughter-Burley 1993: 209-214), where any conception of
law which ‘banishes power to the outer darkness’ is pure ‘fantasy’ and that ‘[t]he
authority which characterizes law exists not in a vacuum, but exactly where it
intersects with power’ (Higgins 1994: 4).
Within international relations, there has been a similar set of moves away from
extreme realism to include the consideration of how power interacts with law, norms,
principles and institutions more generally. Hegemonic stability theory concedes that
certain norms over time become important but that ultimately the enforcement of
international law depends on the existence, willingness, and capacity of powerful (or
hegemonic) states. In this view, ‘[r]egime creation and maintenance are a function of
the distribution of power and interests among states’ (Krasner 1997: 140). For
example, in comparing regimes on religious practices in the seventeenth century,
slavery in the nineteenth century, minority rights in Central Europe in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and individual rights in the late twentieth
century, Krasner (1997: 141) shows that the variance in regime success depends very
much on the ‘capabilities and commitment of those states that supported each of these
regimes.’ Indeed, he contends that the abolition of slavery would not have been
possible without the vigorous monitoring and enforcement of the regime by the major
approaches to international relations whose 'common denominator … is the substitution for the national interest of an assumed supranational standard of action…' (see Henkin 1979: 322-323; 330).
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European powers, especially Britain (Krasner 1997: 143-144; 152-155).4 This
perspective thus moves slightly away from ‘power without law’ to one of ‘law, but
only with dominant power(s) willing to enforce it’.
Neo-liberal institutionalists move further away from hegemonic stability theorists and
argue that ‘post-hegemonic’ forms of international cooperation are possible. Such a
perspective focuses on how institutions emerge from state interest and then attenuate
the power relations between and among states. In After Hegemony, Keohane (1984:8)
argues that rational states will cooperate out of self-interest, even though such
cooperation will not always prevail. But interests are malleable and the increased
interdependence of states creates incentives for cooperation. The mutual advantage
and reciprocity that emerge from international co-operation (e.g. lower transaction
costs, access to information, expectations of behaviour) explains why states would
enter into international agreements. And unlike hegemonic stability theory, stable co-
operation 'equilibria' are possible without the presence of a dominant enforcer. This
perspective comes very close to legal-proceduralism outlined above since it too
focuses on the ways in which mutual benefit and reciprocity provide the conditions
under which otherwise self-interested states would cooperate with each other.
This convergence around the relationship between law and power has been further
addressed by ‘constructivist’ approaches in international relations, which occupy a
partly middle and partly lateral position to realist and legal-positivist perspectives. In
contrast to accepting law or power as given, constructivists focus their attention on the
ways in which law and power as well as the agents or 'subjects' that articulate them
are socially constructed within international affairs. They thus look at the origins,
emergence and maintenance of ideas, norms, principles, and laws as constitutive
processes rather than some outcome of the strategic interaction of states (Wendt 1999;
Fearon and Wendt 2002: 56-58). Accentuating the difference between the
intentionality and holism of interstate state relations and behaviour, constructivist
approaches embed their arguments in the logic of 'appropriateness' (i.e. what the
4 In another example, Donnelly (1986: 625) argues that the hegemonic authority of the United States supported the creation of the Inter-American regional system for the protection of human rights with its relatively strong monitoring powers.
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international context expects of states)5 rather than the logic of 'consequences' (i.e. the
outcomes of state behaviour) (March and Olsen 1998). Such a constructivist
perspective dovetails with the legal-procedural and neo-institutional perspectives
outlined above. On the one hand, legal-proceduralists are precisely interested in the
construction of international law as an iterative political process. On the other hand,
Wendt (1999) shows convincingly that the social and political construction of
preferences and interests of states precedes any strategic interaction in which they
may engage. Thus, the construction of international cooperative regimes, law, or
institutions must be seen as a function of broader processes of normative transmission
and internalization (see also Henkin 1979: 60-62; Falk 2000: 60-66).
Legal proceduralism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism are all important
for the theory of regimes. For Young (1992), ‘[r]egimes are sets of rules, decision-
making procedures, and/or programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to
the participants in these practices, and govern their interactions’. In addition, a regime
is a ‘collection of rights and rules’ that ‘structure the opportunities of the actors
interested in a given activity’, has a significant procedural component for the
resolution of situations involving social or collective choices, and has the expectation
for compliance among its members (Young 1980: 333-342). Realist and neo-liberal
institutionalist theories demonstrate that regimes are created and are effective through
the application of cost-benefit analysis by states, while constructivist theories argue
that regime effectiveness is achieved through ‘internalized identities and norms of
appropriate behaviour’ (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 540). Like constructivism,
international law differs from realism and neo-liberal institutionalism in its view of
regimes. It turns its attention away from cost-benefit functions of regimes and
concentrates on their provision of rules. Such rules foster stable expectations for
actors and establish efficient baselines and standards, criteria for the justification of
action, processes of communication, opportunities for domestic and international
‘intermeshing’ of bureaucracies, and routinized habits of compliance (Slaughter-
Burley 1993: 220).
5 Henkin (1979: 93) goes as far as to say that '[m]uch of law, and the most successful part, is a codification of existing mores, of how people behave and they feel they ought to behave. To that extent law reflects rather than imposes, existing order. To say that nations act pursuant to law only as they would act anyhow may indicate not that law is irrelevant, but rather that it is sound and viable, reflecting the true interests and attitudes of nations, and that it is likely to be maintained.'
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But not all regimes are the same as Donnelly (1986) demonstrates. For him, regimes
vary according to their level of norms (fully international to entirely national) and
their types of decision-making activities (enforcement, implementation, or promotion)
(Donnelly 1986: 603-604). The combination of these two dimensions (norms and
decision making) creates a typology that ranges from ‘strong declaratory’ regimes to
‘weak promotional’ regimes, where the strength of any one regime is determined by
its normative and procedural scope, as well as by its overall acceptance and coherence
(Ibid., 604-605). While the notion of acceptance is straightforward, coherence
requires a match between the normative and procedural dimensions of the regime
(Ibid., 605), or what Keohane (2002: 135) calls a high degree of ‘precision’. This
difference in regime type and strength is important, as the discussion of the
international human rights regime below will demonstrate. But before bringing
together these different aspects of international law and international relations with
respect to human rights, it is first necessary to consider the contribution from
empirical theories in comparative politics.
Comparative Politics
The field of comparative politics has long been concerned with how and why the
relationship between citizens and the state varies across different national political
contexts. The substantive focus of the field has included patterns of stability and
instability in advanced industrial democracies; the emergence, maintenance, and
performance of liberal democracy; the origins and consequences of violent and non-
violent social mobilization; the emergence, duration and performance of authoritarian
regimes; patterns of democratic transition and consolidation; processes of
regionalization and globalization; and the political economy of development (see
Almond and Powell 1966; Macridis and Brown 1990; Rustow and Erickson 1991;
Chilcote 1994; Apter 1996; Mair 1996; Landman 2000, 2003). Theories in
comparative politics reflect similar concerns to those found in international relations:
rational actors, ideas, norms, institutions, and structures. Like international relations,
rationalist, culturalist, and structuralist theories in comparative politics help account
for and understand political outcomes and patterns that are observed across different
political contexts. These theories have similar tensions that are the product of both
their base assumptions and their analytical scope of human behaviour. Rationalist
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perspectives concentrate on the actions and behaviour of individuals who make
reasoned and intentional choices based upon sets of preferences, or interests. Those
who adhere to the rationalist perspective are 'concerned with the collective processes
and outcomes that follow from intentionality, or the social consequences of
individually rational action' (Lichbach 1997: 246; see also Munck 2001). Like realism
in international relations, rationalism in comparative politics concentrates on ‘means-
ends’ calculations and how they affect political outcomes. But realism engages in
‘methodological nationalism’ (Zürn 2002: 248) while rationalism as it is deployed in
comparative politics engages in ‘methodological individualism’ (Przeworski 1985).
In contrast to the rationalist perspective, culturalist perspectives in comparative
politics seek an understanding of political phenomena by focusing on the broader
holistic and shared aspects of collectivities. Single individual interests and actions are
not understood in isolation, but are placed in the context of the shared understandings,
inter-subjective relationships, and mutual orientations that make human communities
possible (Lichbach 1997: 246-247). These shared meanings and understandings form
broader cultures and communities grouped together and analysed as whole units. They
are held together by social rules that are emblematic of the identities of both the
individuals and the groups themselves (ibid.: 247). Identifying the boundaries of these
cultural units and separate identities remains problematic for systematic comparative
research; however, scholars have tried to examine the world views, rituals, and
symbols that provide 'systems of meaning and the structure and intensity of political
identity' across different geographical regions of the world (Ross 1997: 43-44).
Culturalist approaches are akin to their constructivist counterparts in international
relations, where the social construction and meaning of ideas and norms forms the
basis for analysis.
Structuralists focus on the holistic aspects of politics, but unlike culturalists, their
attention is drawn to interdependent relationships among individuals, collectivities,
institutions, and organizations. They are interested in the social, political, and
economic networks that form between and among individuals. Structures that have
become reified over time constrain or facilitate political activity such that individual
actors are not completely free agents capable of determining particular political
outcomes (Lichbach 1997: 247-248). Rather, individuals are embedded in relational
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structures that shape human identities, interests, and interaction. Relational structures
have evolved through large historical processes such as capitalist development,
market rationality, nation state building, political and scientific revolutions, and
technological progress (Katznelson 1997: 83), all of which provide possibilities and
limits for human action.
Like the polarity of law and power in the fields of international law and international
relations, rationalist and structuralist accounts of politics have created a polarity
between ‘structureless agents’ on the one hand (extreme rational choice) and
‘agentless structures’ on the other (extreme structuralists). This polarity between
agents and structures (see Hay 1995; 2002) has converged (or has sought to be
resolved) around the idea of ‘new-institutionalism’ (March and Olsen 1984), which
not only seeks to examine the constrained rationality of actors as they confront the
persistence of institutional forms, but also brings in culturalist concerns over symbolic
action, norms, and ideas (March and Olsen 1984:739, 744). Like the claim that
‘international law matters’ from public international lawyers, proponents of new
institutionalism equally make the claim that ‘institutions matter’ (Steinmo, Thelen,
and Longstreth 1992), and there is no surprise that proponents of new institutionalism
at the domestic level have turned their attention to the international level (compare
March and Olsen 1984 to March and Olsen 1998).
Cross-over: two-level games and liberal-republicanism
Examining these developments in international law, international relations and
comparative politics shows that the traditional polarities in international and
comparative research have been partly transcended and have produced similar
convergences around the idea of constrained action. Legal-proceduralism, neo-liberal
institutionalism, and new-institutionalism are all concerned with the ways in which
law, power, ideas, norms, and institutions intersect to both facilitate and limit choices
that are available to individuals and states. The insights from these seemingly
disparate perspectives contribute to our understanding of the ways in which states
make agreements and how such agreements affect their behaviour. Legal-
proceduralism shows how norms emerge through express consent of states, the
absence of opposition to such norms, or the failure of attempts to oppose them.
Obligations to abide by these norms arise through a perception that there is a
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reciprocal advantage in cautioning self-restraint (Higgins 1994: 16). Thus, both the
emergence of norms and adherence to them can be seen as a process that involves the
power of states to engage in activity that yields mutual benefit. Equally, for
proponents of neo-liberal institutionalism, individual and mutual state advantage can
be achieved through the formation of agreements. New-institutionalists see such
interactions between formal institutions and individual actions at the domestic level.
Robert Putnam’s (1993) work on ‘two-level’ games brings these convergent views in
international and comparative research together. He observes that ‘[t]he most
portentous development in the fields of comparative politics and international
relations in recent years is the dawning recognition among practitioners in each field
of the need to take into account entanglements between the two’ (Putnam 1993: 459).
Thus, any engagement of a state in international relations reflects the domestic array
of social and political forces, including key actors and institutions (Ibid., 435). The
politics of such a two-level game is neatly summarised as follows:
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and the politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments (Ibid., 436).
While there may be different ‘rational’ strategies available at either level of the game,
Putnam (1993: 473) argues that ‘there are powerful incentives for consistency
between the two games.’ What is absent from the formulation of the two-level game is
any consideration of the type of government that is in place, although it appears that
Putnam implies some form of representative government and most of his empirical
examples are of advanced industrial democracies.6 Indeed, liberal democratic states
are simply more open to and reflective of competing claims from domestic groups
than authoritarian states. Nevertheless, as the elite-centred work on democratic
transitions demonstrates (e.g. Przeworski 1991; Colomer 2000), authoritarian regimes
are susceptible to competing demands within the authoritarian coalition as well as
6 In drawing on the two-lebvel game, Ripsman (2002) shows that different degrees of executive autonomy in Britain, France,and the United States affect the ways in which they conducted foreign policy in the immediate post war period.
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from groups in civil society, however repressed it may be. Thus, it is possible to think
in broader terms on how the games played at the domestic level (whatever type of
government is in place) will be important for the types of interaction in which states
will engage at the international level.
Drawing on the insights of the two-level game and combining them with variants of
democratic peace theory, Moravcsik (1997, 2000) develops a theory of ‘liberal
republicanism’, which makes explicit reference to democratic forms of rule and how
such domestic systems will have an influence on countries’ propensity for making
international agreements. He argues that making international agreements can ‘lock
in’ and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and
stability in the long run against possible threats from non-democratic forces. In
echoing realist language, he argue that states will make such agreements when the
benefits of reducing future uncertainty outweigh the costs of membership in an
international regime (Moravcsik 2000: 220). He claims that this argument only really
applies to newly established democracies since they face more immediate uncertainty
which regime membership tempers, but other scholars suggest that regime
membership, particularly for human rights, is a function of democracy in general (see
Zacher 1992: 94; Vincent 1986).
The International Human Rights Regime
This ‘double convergence’ in international and comparative research combined with
concerns over the interaction of domestic and international politics provides a rich
theoretical basis that helps explain the growth and effectiveness of the international
human rights regime. The growth of the international human rights regime
demonstrates that human rights have now become enshrined in bodies of international
law represented most forcefully by the existence of international treaties to which
states become a party and, at least in formal terms, agree to abide by the obligations
found within them. From the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966) through to the Rome Statute on the establishment of the International Criminal
Court (2002), increasing types of human rights have found expression in international
law and an increasing number of states have signed and ratified the treaties. Table 1
summarises these instruments, lists the date when they became open for signature, and
shows the number of states parties to the instruments as of 2000. It is clear from the
15
table that the regime has become increasingly specialised beyond the main
International Bill of Human Rights (i.e. the Universal Declaration and the two
International Covenants) to include the rights of women and children, as well as
prohibition of specific acts such as torture and racial discrimination. It is also clear
that overall formal participation of states ranges from 22% to 98%.
Table 1. The international human rights regime: instruments, dates, and membershipName Date when open
for signatureStates parties 2000 N and %
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
1966 146(75.6)
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
1966 142(73.6)
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OPT1)
1976 95(49.2)
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OPT2)
1989 44(22.8)
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
1966 156(80.8)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
1979 164(85.0)
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
1984 122(63.2)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989 190(98.4)
Data source: OUNHCHR (Sept. 2000), Status of Ratification of the principal International Human Rights Treaties, www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf and International Service for Human Rights (January 2000), Info-Pack, pp. 46-50. See also Bayefsky (2001: 11).
Unlike other international regimes in areas such as environmental protection and trade
which involve the regulation of the interaction between states, human rights is a
special area since the international regime seeks to uphold state obligations and state
responsibility towards individuals and groups (Higgins 1994: 95; Moravcsik 2000:
217). Its growth appears counter-intuitive if one adopts a purely realist perspective,
which is captured effectively by the following question:
Why would any government, democratic or dictatorial, favour establishing an effective, independent international authority, the sole purpose of which is to constrain its domestic sovereignty in such an
16
unprecedentedly invasive and overtly non-majoritarian manner? (Moravcsik 2000: 219).
The inability for a purely interest-based theory of state action to explain the
proliferation of human rights norms suggests that neo-liberal institutionalism and
legal-proceduralism offer a more satisfactory account by focusing on the historically
iterative process of norm proliferation and the construction of state behaviour. The
fact that states have signed and ratified human rights treaties of the years has led to
certain optimism among international lawyers that increased state participation in the
international human rights regime ought to make a difference for human rights
protection. But analysis of regime effectiveness is incomplete if one merely focuses
on either the international law of human rights or on domestic political arrangements
and institutions. Legal-proceduralism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and new-
institutionalism help build a fuller picture of the ways in which both domestic and
international factors are important in considering the relationship between the
international human rights regime and human rights protection.
The preceding examination of the double convergence in theories from international
law, international relations, and comparative politics is summarised in Figure 1. The
top of the figure charts the transformation in international legal and international
relations scholarship, while the bottom of the figure charts the ways in which rational,
structural, and cultural approaches in comparative politics have converged on the
‘rediscovery’ of institutions. The two halves of the figure converge within the shaded
elliptical area, which represents the study of regimes, including the liberal-republican
perspective. Finally, the human rights regime lies at the centre of the figure as the
important nexus for these theories. From these theories and the figure, it is now
possible develop a preliminary empirical model from which it is possible to derive a
series of hypothesised relationships and testable propositions about the growth and
effectiveness of the international human rights regime.
17
Figure 1. Human rights as a nexus for theories of international law, international relations, and comparative politics
Part II: Building an Empirical Model
If the norms contained within the international human rights regime are important, as
legal-proceduralists, neo-liberal institutionalists, and liberal-republicans argue, then
there ought to be a positive relationship between the international law of human rights
(rights in principle) and the protection of human rights (rights in practice). Such an
expectation is often supported by Henkin's (1979: 47) claim that ‘it is probably the
case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time (emphasis in the original). In
response to this claim, Chayes and Chayes (1993: 176-177) argue that no such
empirical attempt has been made, that 'it would not be easy to devise a statistical
protocol that would generate such evidence', and that 'general compliance with
international agreements cannot be empirically verified.' In contrast, Koh (1997:
2599-2600) shows that initial empirical work on international trade, international
adjudication, US policy on human rights, and international environmental protection
'seems largely to have confirmed this hedged but optimistic description'. In addition, a
Legal positivismLaw without power
RealismPower without law
Hegemonic stabilityLaw with dominant power (s)
Legal pragmatismLaw as leverage
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Neo-liberal institutionalismLaw and power
Legal proceduralismLaw and power
HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
COMPARATIVE POLITICS
New institutionalismConstrained rationality
RationalistAgents without structure
StructuralistStructure without agents
Liberal republicanismTwo-level game
CulturalistNorms, ideas, and meaning
ConstructivismNorms, ideas, and meaning
18
recent study on the IMF demonstrates that countries comply with exchange rate
demands of the regime (Simmons 2000).
Outside these issue areas, two recent studies in the field of human rights test the
relationship between treaty ratification and human rights protection across a variety of
human rights measures and indicators. Keith (1999) examines the relationship
between ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the protection of personal integrity rights, while Hathaway (2002) tests
the relationship between a broader range of treaties and rights protection, including
torture, genocide, and women's rights. Both studies achieve mixed results where
simple bi-variate analysis (correlation and difference in means tests) shows a positive
association between treaty ratification and rights protection, which tends to drop away
in their multivariate analyses. They both use data sets that are pooled over time and
across space, which gives them a large number of observations, but masks the growth
of the regime, its time-dependent effects on rights protection, possible feedback
effects, and the importance of complementary social and political developments.
Replicating these analyses for selected years across the period 1976-2000 shows that
by 1993, ratification of the ICCPR has a positive relationship with the protection of
personal integrity rights, even with the presence of important control variables
(Landman 2001).
These extant studies testing compliance suggest that this is fruitful and necessary area
of research to enrich our understanding of global human rights protection. Indeed, it
seems paramount for political science theories and methods to provide meaningful
explanations as to why countries ratify human rights treaties in the first place and
whether such ratification makes a difference for human rights protection. Drawing on
the achievements of these extant studies and the theories outlined above, it is possible
to construct an empirical model that helps explain both the growth and effectiveness
of the international human rights regime. Figure 2 depicts the simple bi-variate
relationship between treaty ratification and human rights protection.
Figure 2. Simple bi-variate relationship between international human rights law and human rights protectionInternational
human rights lawHuman rights
protection(+)
19
The figure captures the simple relationship as expected from legal-proceduralism,
noe-institutionalism, and new-institutionalism, but fails to take into account a series of
other important factors. Since norms exhibit trends and human rights protection can
accumulate over time, it is necessary to add three different time-series feedback
processes to the model. First, there are feedback processes between previous
ratifications of human rights treaties and current ratifications, both of which operate
within the same state as well as among states. These are known as ‘social’ or
‘bandwagon’ effects.7 Second, there are feedback processes between previous and
current years of human rights protection, capturing the time-dependent performance
of a country with respect to human rights protection (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate,
and Keith 1999; Keith 1999). Third, there are feedback processes between human
rights protection and treaty participation itself, such that human rights protection in
one year may have an effect on a country's propensity to ratify in subsequent years
(Hathaway 2002: 2001). This third feedback process thus suggests that ratification
and protection are not necessarily mutually exclusive processes. Figure 3 depicts the
simple relationship with these additional feedback processes, showing that the first
two processes are expected to have positive relationships, while the third process
remains opaque. If a state improves its human rights practices before ratification, the
relationship should be positive, while if it improves its practices after ratification, the
relationship should be negative.
7 In her study of IMF compliance, Simmons (2000: 833) adds a regional norm variable, which captures contiguous participation in IMF article VIII of countries from the same region.
20
Figure 3. Feedback processes in human rights law and human rights protection
These relationships are complicated further by a series of important additional
independent variables that reflect the issues and concerns outlined in the various
theories in Part I of this paper as well as findings from extant studies in international
relations and comparative politics.8 First, studies within the neo-liberal institutional
and liberal republican traditions have repeatedly shown the benefits of democratic rule
both for the ratification of treaties and the protection of human rights. In testing the
liberal-republican model, Moravcsik (1997; 2000) shows that democratic states have a
greater propensity to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights, a finding that
is upheld at the global level (Landman 2002a). Empirical studies show that
democracies are less likely to violate personal integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994;
Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002) and even within the first year
of a democratic transition, such rights violations decrease significantly (Zanger 2000).
Second, extant studies in comparative politics have repeatedly shown the importance
of wealth for the emergence and maintenance of democracy, as well as the protection
of personal integrity rights. From Lipset's (1959) seminal study on the 'economic
correlates of democracy' to Przeworski et al's (2000) cross-national time-series
comparative study, overall levels of wealth are positively related to the level of
democracy (see Landman 2003, Chapter 4). These findings are also upheld by studies
8 Young (1992: 163) notes that in any analysis of regime effectiveness and compliance, ‘multivariate relationships will constitute the norm rather than the exception’.
Internationalhuman rights law
Human rights protection(+)
(+)(+)
(+/-)
21
on the violation of personal integrity rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith 1999; Zanger 2000; Hathaway 2002).
Fourth, international relations research on the 'Kantian tripod' demonstrates the
overall importance of international interdependence of countries in reducing their
propensity of international conflict (e.g. Russett, O'Neal, and Davis 1998; Russett and
O'Neal 2001). These findings are consistent with the work on the growth of 'world
culture', which maps the global evolution and proliferation of international
governmental (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (Boli and
Thomas 1999). The degree of 'embeddedness' of countries in global networks of IGOs
and INGOs, it is argued, increases their exposure to value transfers and demonstration
effects that ought to have a positive impact on regime participation and compliance.
Indeed, in The Power of Human Rights, eleven comparative case studies on the
protection of political and civil rights demonstrate that the existence of international
human rights norms coupled with increased activity from domestic and international
NGOs makes a positive contribution to state compliance (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
1999). Thus, democracy, wealth, and membership in IGOs and INGOs are seen to be
crucial independent variables that mediate the relationship between norms and rights.
Finally, three further control variables need to be specified for the model. Again, the
extant studies argue that any explanation of personal integrity rights protection must
take into account the degree of a country's involvement in international and national
conflict. One of the key findings of this research, not surprisingly, is that involvement
in civil war poses the largest threat to the protection of personal integrity rights (Poe
and Tate 1994: 866). But involvement in international and domestic conflict may also
have an impact on regime participation. On the one hand, states in conflict may need
external allies and see treaty ratification as an important way in which to garner
support. On the other hand, states in conflict may be so preoccupied with the
immediate nature of the conflict that they simply have no interest in treaty
negotiations. The final two variables control for the size of the population and for the
geographical differentiation across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.
Figure 4 depicts the fully specified model with expected signs for all the relationships,
including those for the feedback loops and control variables. The model clearly shows
22
that the simple bi-variate relationship between treaty ratification and rights protection
must take into account past state behaviour with respect to treaties and rights, levels of
democracy, wealth, international interdependence, involvement in conflict, size of the
population, and regional differentiation.
Figure 4. The fully specified model for human rights protection
Part III: Estimating the Model
Estimation of this model requires the construction of a global data set with regime
variables, rights variables, and control variables. While the full methodological
discussion and operationalisation of these variables is beyond the scope of this paper,
it is possible to list the ways in which the variables have been created and discuss how
the model can be estimated. The data set that has been constructed is for all the
countries in the world from 1976 to 2000. It has ratification variables for the main
international human rights treaties and the regional systems of Europe, the Americas,
and Africa. Following the UNDP, Keith (1999) and Hathaway (2002), the ratification
variables award a country for signing (coded 1) and ratifying (coded 2) the treaties.
For this paper, only the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is used. This choice is based on a similar logic found in The Power of
Internationalhuman rights law
Human rights protection(+)
(+)(+)
Instruments:
(+) Democracy (+)
(+) Wealth (+)
(+) Interdependence (+)
Control variables:
(+/-) Internal/External Conflict (-)
(+) Population (-)
(+/-) Region (+/-)
(+/-)
23
Human Rights, in which the authors concentrate on that set of rights on which there is
greatest global consensus. The choice also has a methodological basis since there
currently exist several measures of the protection of various types of civil and political
rights. These measures are not without their problems and controversies but as a first
cut, they provide a reasonable baseline for testing the hypothesised relationships
between treaty ratification and rights protection. The human rights variables include
the Freedom House indices for political and civil rights (www.freedomhouse.org), the
five-point scale for personal integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994), and the five-point
scale for torture (Hathaway 2002). Comparable indicators for the protection of
economic, social, and cultural rights have not yet been made available on a global
basis, but work is progressing on violations approaches to the measurement of such
rights (shr.aaas.org), while others have advocated using aggregate development
indicators as proxy measures for these rights (Green 2001).9
Democracy is measured using the Polity IV combined indicator for democracy, which
subtracts the ten-point autocracy score from the ten-point democracy score (Jaggers
and Gurr 1995). Wealth is measured using per capita gross domestic product.
International interdependence has separate variables for the number of international
governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations
(INGOs) with registered offices in each country collated by the Union of International
Associations (see also Russett and O’Neal 2001). The international and national
conflict variables are drawn from the ‘correlates of war’ project (see Poe and Tate
1994). Population figures were obtained from the World Bank world development
indicators database. Finally, there are separate dummy variables for Latin America,
Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.
Table 2 is bi-variate correlation matrix of first order relationships between the treaty,
rights, and other variables. Consistent with Keith (1999), the table shows that
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is significantly
correlated with the greater human rights protection across all the human rights
measures except Hathaway's (2002) measure of torture.10 Ratification of the treaty is
9 In similar fashion to the personal integrity rights measure of human rights, David Cingranelli has coded the US State Department and Amnesty International country reports for certain categories of worker's rights, but the data have not yet been available (see Cingranelli and Tsai 2002).10 The signs are negative since all the measures give higher scores to countries for violating rights.
24
also significantly correlated with higher levels of democracy and wealth, as well as
larger membership figures for IGOs and NGOs. The table also shows that democracy,
wealth, and IGO and NGO membership are significantly correlated with all five
measures of human rights. These correlations provide preliminary support for the
expectations of the model. But without multivariate and non-recursive estimation of
the model, support remains suggestive at best.
25
Table 2. Correlation co-efficients for all variables
ICCPR (1966)
ICCPR growtha
Amnesty PIR
State Dept. PIR
Freedom House Civil Rights
Freedom House Political Rights
Torture Scale
Polity IV Dem Score
Per capita GDP 1995 USD WB (logged)
IGO Membership LN INGOS
Civil War (COW)
Internat.War (COW)
LN populat.
ICCPR (1966) - -.08 -.07 -.21 -.22 -.03 .37 .15 .29 .48 -.09 .04 .27Amnesty PIR - .85 .51 .45 .67 -.39 -.44 -.9 -.04* .16 0.00 .36State Department PIR - .57 .51 .71 -.43 -.49 -.18 -.09 .14 -.02 .32Freedom House Civil Rights - .92 .50 -.85 -.62 -.16 -.36 .04* .06 .17Freedom House Political Rights - .42 -.91 -.58 -.14 -.37 .03 .06 .11Torture Scale (Hathaway) - -.34 -.42 -.15 -.15 .13 -.02 .36Polity IV Democracy Score - .54 .24 .60 -.03 -.04* .09Per capita GDP 1995 USD WB (logged) - .30 .53 -.07 .02 -.08IGO Membership (Linear Interpolation) - .51 -.06 .01 .42LN Ingos (Linear Interpolation) - -.05* -.03 .59Civil War (COW) - -.02 .02International War (COW) - .05Natural log of population -Pearson’s correlation co-efficients, all are significant at p < .01; *p < .05; non-significant correlations are in shaded cells.ICCPR growth is a variable that measures the time since ratification of the ICCPR.
26
It is not surprising that the democracy, wealth, and the interdependence measures
correlate with both treaty ratification and rights protection. The data suggest that there
is perhaps a global 'club' of states and a complementary set of social and political
processes that have are associated both with treaty ratification and rights protection.
Such relationships may be thought of in instrumental terms for estimating the model,
since it appears that both treaty ratification and rights protection are a function of
democracy, wealth, and interdependence. One method of capturing these
complementary developments is to use two-staged least squares regression (2SLS),
which provides a way to resolve systems of two equations. To estimate the full model,
two systems of two equations have been specified. One system is for the norms-rights
relationship (Equations 1.1-1.3) and one is for the rights-norms relationship
(Equations 2.1-2.3), while both systems give special emphasis to the importance of
democracy, wealth, and interdependence.
For the norms-rights relationship, Equation 1.1 shows that human rights protection is
a function of past rights protection, ratification of the ICCPR, civil war, international
war, population size, and regional differentiation. Equation 1.2 shows that ratification
of the ICCPR is a function of democracy, wealth, the two interdependence measures,
and past ratification action (no signature, signature, or ratification). Equation 1.3
resolves the system through substituting Equation 1.2 into Equation 1.1. For the
rights-norms relationship, Equation 2.1 shows that ratification of the ICCPR is a
function of past ratification action (no signature, signature, or ratification), human
rights protection, civil war, international war, population size, and regional
differentiation. Equation 2.2 shows that human rights protection is a function of
democracy, wealth, the two interdependence measures, and past human rights
protection. As in the solution for the norms-rights system of equations, Equation 2.3
resolves the rights-norms system through substituting Equation 2.2 into Equation 2.1.
27
Norms⇒⇒⇒⇒Rights
[1.1] Rights = Rights at t-1 + ICCPR ratification + Civil War + International War + Population + Regional Dummies + e
[1.2] ICCPR ratification = Democracy + Wealth + IGO membership + NGO membership + ICCPR ratification at t-1 + e
Which is resolved into
[1.3] Rights = Rights at t-1 + (ICCPR ratification = Democracy + Wealth + IGO membership + NGO membership + ICCPR ratification at t-1) + Civil War + International War + Population + Regional Dummies + e
Rights⇒⇒⇒⇒Norms
[2.1] ICCPR ratification = ICCPR ratification at t-1 + Rights + Civil War + International War + Population + Regional Dummies + e
[2.2] Rights = Democracy + Wealth + IGO membership + NGO membership + Rights at t-1
Which is resolved into:
[2.3] ICCPR ratification = ICCPR ratification at t-1 + (Rights = Democracy + Wealth + IGO membership + NGO membership + Rights at t-1) + Civil War + International War + Population + Regional Dummies + e
To estimate parameters for the norms-rights relationship, 2SLS regresses the ICCPR
ratification variable on the independent variables in Equation 1.2 and saves the
regression fit values as a new variable. It then uses this new 'instrumented' form of the
ICCPR ratification in a new regression of rights protection on the independent
variables specified in Equation 1.1. Since the analysis uses a pooled cross-section
time-series data set, the 2SLS parameters were estimated using the xtivreg procedure
in STATA 7.0. The procedure takes into account the panel and time structure of the
data set (i.e. countries and years), while also carrying out the instrumental stage of the
regression common to 2SLS estimation. The final parameter estimates are for
Equation 1.3. The exact same procedure was used to estimate the parameters in
Equation 2.3, while the results for both estimations across the different human rights
measures are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Tables 3 and 4 report unstandardised co-efficients for the variables with z-scores in
parentheses. Parameter estimates are not reported for those variables used in the first
28
stage of the 2SLS since they are captured by the 'instrumented' variables denoted in
Equations 1.2 and 2.2. Table 3 shows that ICCPR ratification is significantly related
to lower levels of human rights violation across the Amnesty measure of personal
integrity rights and the two Freedom House measures of civil and political rights, after
controlling for past human rights practices, conflict, population and regional
differences. Civil war and population size are significantly related to higher levels of
human rights violation, while by and large the norms-rights relationship is less strong
in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Table 4 shows that only the Freedom
House civil and political rights measures are significantly related to ICCPR
ratification, while very few of the other control variables achieve levels of
significance.
Comparing the results from the two tables suggests that the norms- rights relationship
is slightly stronger than the rights-norms relationship; however, there are three
reasons to be cautious. First, the results for the Amnesty measure of personal integrity
rights in Table 3 are significant at a 10% level of confidence, and the same is true for
the Freedom House measure of political rights in Table 4. Second, the Freedom House
measures of civil and political rights also contain institutional elements that make
them correlate with democracy measures. Table 2 shows that both Freedom House
measures are correlated with the Polity IV measure of democracy, while the political
rights measure is highly correlated (r = .85). The 2SLS parameters were thus
estimated with and without the Polity IV measure of democracy in the first stage of
the estimation. Tables 3 and 4 report those estimations without Polity IV. Third, the
2SLS procedure captures a model specification that assumes that the possible mutual
relationship between norms and rights is highly influenced by levels of democracy,
wealth, and interdependence. Thus, the results should not be seen as having
established a firm direct link between norms and rights, even though the norms-rights
direction of the relationship appears stronger.
29
Table 3. Two Stage Least Squares estimation of human rights protection with instrumental variables (Norms ⇒ Rights)
Dependent Variables (Human Rights measures)IndependentVariablesa
PIR Amnesty
PIR State Department
Freedom House CRb
Freedom House PRb
Torture
Constant -.47**(-2.89)
-.47**(-3.08)
.02(.15)
-.05(-.47)
-.95***(-3.44)
ICCPR Ratification
-.03*(-1.82)
-.02(-1.16)
-.03**(-1.98)
-.03**(-1.98)
-.04(-1.21)
PIR Amnestyt-1 .76***(48.10)
PIR State Departmentt-1
.79***(50.19)
Freedom House CRt-1
.92***(109.07)
Freedom House PRt-1
.92***(109.07)
Torturet-1 .67***(26.16)
Civil War .13**(2.27)
.13*(2.43)
.07*(1.67)
.07*(1.67)
.22**(2.60)
International War .03(.49)
-.03(-.65)
.03(.72)
.03(.72)
.07(.75)
Ln Population .06***(5.35)
.05***(5.22)
.02**(2.45)
.02**(2.45)
.10***(5.63)
Americas .30***(5.90)
.26***(5.56)
.05(1.32)
.05(1.32)
.47***(5.45)
Africa .29***(6.01)
.27***(5.75)
.21***(4.82)
.21***(4.82)
.42***(5.26)
Asia .19***(3.57)
.21***(4.15)
.17***(3.77)
.17***(3.77)
.34***(3.83)
Pacific .11*(1.64)
.10(1.55)
.04(.85)
.04(.85)
.21*(1.97)
N 1651 1651 2003 1998 819R2 .71 .72 .92 .91 .64Wald Chi2 3972.57*** 4228.22*** 22452.94*** 20852.63*** 1437.99***G2SLS random effects regression co-efficients reported with z-scores in parentheses; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .001aInstruments: Democracy (Polity IV), Wealth (Natural log of per capita GDP, IGO Membership, Natural log of NGO membership, ICCPR ratificationt-1 bSince Freedom House and Polity IV are highly correlated (r > .80), Polity IV was dropped as an instrument for CCPR in the equations for Freedom House Civil and Political Rights Measures. Initial parameter estimates using Polity IV were inflated.
30
Table 4. Two Stage Least Squares estimation of ICCPR ratification with instrumental variables(Rights ⇒ Norms)
ICCPR ratification by different human rights measuresIndependentVariablesa
PIR Amnesty
PIR State Department
Freedom House CRb
Freedom House PR b
Torture
Constant .03(.74)
.04(.39)
.01(.15)
.01(.15)
.11(.72)
ICCPR Ratificationt-1
.91***(90.70)
.91***(90.74)
.91***(95.30)
.91***(96.78)
.91***(62.97)
PIR Amnesty -.01(-1.13)
PIR State Department
-.01(-.87)
Freedom House CR
-.02***(-3.78)
Freedom House PR
-.01*(-2.18)
Torture .003(.15)
Civil War -.02(-.61)
-.02(-.63)
-.01(-.27)
-.01(-.40)
-.03(-.76)
International War .04(1.34)
.04(1.26)
.03(1.20)
.04(1.25)
.05(1.08)
Ln Population .01(1.52)
.01(.16)
.01***(3.08)
.01**(2.64)
.005(.53)
Americas .01(.39)
.01(.24)
.01(.41)
.01(.17)
-.01(-.18)
Africa -.02(-.82)
-.03(-.87)
.04(1.13)
.01(.28)
-.05(-1.12)
Asia -.08**(-2.40)
-.09**(-2.39)
-.04(-1.16)
-.06(-1.89)
-.10**(-2.15)
Pacific -.07(-1.57)
-.07(-1.59)
-.08**(-2.03)
-.08(-2.11)
-.11**(-1.93)
N 1651 1651 2003 1998 819R2 .91 .91 .91 .91 .90Wald Chi2 10169.20*** 9816.00*** 11519.46*** 11778.03*** 4893.19***G2SLS random effects regression co-efficients reported with z-scores in parentheses; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .001aInstruments: Democracy (Polity IV), Wealth (Natural log of per capita GDP, IGO Membership Natural log of NGO membership, ICCPR ratificationt-1 bSince Freedom House and Polity IV are highly correlated (r > .80), Polity IV was dropped as an instrument for both equations using Freedom House Civil and Political Rights Measures as independent variables. Initial parameter estimates using Polity IV were inflated.
31
Part IV. Conclusions and Implications
This paper has been concerned with the mutual relationship between the norms of
human rights contained within the international human rights regime, country
participation in that regime, and the degree to which such participation makes a
difference for human rights protection. It approached these areas of concern using
empirical theories drawn from international law, international relations, and
comparative politics. It showed that against certain sceptical corners within each of
these three traditions, there has been a convergence of ideas around the notion of
constrained agency at the domestic and international level. Such constrained agency
suggests that norms, ideas, and institutions limit the degree to which individuals and
states can act. This paper is concerned with the norms and institutions relating to
human rights protection. Unlike the norms and institutions that constrain agency for
inter-state relations around issues such as trade, environmental protection, and
finance, human rights seek to constrain the agency of states to violate the rights of
their own citizens. Thus, the international human rights regime is a special type of
regime that uses the mechanism of inter-state relations to govern the capacity of states
to protect individual human dignity, formally codified as a set of rights. Human rights
activists and scholars have long argued that the growth and proliferation of the human
rights regime out to make a difference for the de facto protection of human rights.
Using the notion of constrained agency, the paper specified and estimated a non-
recursive model of the norms-rights relationship that takes into account the
international variables of treaty ratification, membership in IGOs and NGOs, conflict,
and regional location combined with domestic variables of government type, level of
wealth, and population size. The results of analysis suggest that we ought to be
cautiously optimistic about the tangible benefits of the human rights norms
proliferation. On the one hand, the statistical results of the analysis show that the
norms- rights relationship appears stronger than the rights-norms relationship, at least
for the ratification of the ICCPR and the protection of civil and political rights. A
crude reading of these results would suggest that the international law of human rights
matters. On the other hand, the positive statistical results for ratification of the ICCPR
are obtained in the presence of patterns of democratisation, international inter-
dependence, and wealth, while controlling for conflict, regional differentiation, and
32
population size. Thus, the growth of the international human rights regime and the
protection of human rights themselves complement larger social and political
processes occurring in the world. Wealthy countries that are democratic and
increasingly interdependent are more likely to ratify human rights treaties and more
likely to protect civil and political rights. Such a reading suggests that larger social
and political processes mediate the direct relationship between norms and rights.
Increased levels of democratisation, wealth, and global interdependence in terms of
membership in IGOs and NGOs have produced in some sense a club of nations that
also participates in the international human rights regime. It may well be then that the
international law of human rights merely codifies existing state behaviour, but if the
norms- rights relationship is indeed stronger, then the proliferation of human rights
norms is important in shaping the ways in which new members of that regime behave.
Further research in this area ought to focus on third things. First, it needs to examine
whether the findings obtained here can be extended to other categories of human
rights. It is clear that using development indicators as proxy measures for the
protection of economic and social rights would uncover similar complementary and
inter-related social and political processes, where wealthy, interdependent, and
democratic countries would have a greater propensity to ratify treaties and would have
higher human development scores. Using violations measures for economic, social,
and cultural rights, however, may show a different picture altogether since it is
entirely possible for wealthy democracies to have de facto discrimination in their
health and educational systems. Second, further research should weight the
ratification of international human rights treaties for the presence of reservations to
the treaties. For example, many Middle Eastern and Arab countries have ratified
CEDAW (see Table 1) with so many reservations that the original intent of the treaty
is virtually undermined (see Landman 2004). Third, future research should examine
the activities of domestic and international non-state actors who use the language of
human rights as a powerful discourse to bring about positive change through
lobbying, grass-roots mobilizing, and campaigning within international fora for
human rights protection. While this analysis has been conducted for a handful of
comparative cases (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999),
global analysis of non-state actors has not yet been conducted.
33
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