non-refoulement on the basis of socio-economic deprivation

257

*SeniorLecturerandDirector,ResearchProgrammeinInternationalRefugeeLaw,InstituteforInternationalLawandtheHumanities,MelbourneLawSchool.ThisarticleisbasedonapaperpresentedattheLegalResearchFoundationConference,Human Rights at the Frontier: New Zealand’s Immigration Legislation — An International Human Rights Law Perspective(Auckland,12September2008).ItwasfinalizedbeforetheImmigrationBill2007haditsthirdreadingandwasenactedastheImmigrationAct2009on16November2009.Unlessotherwisenoted,referencesinittotheImmigrationBillarereferencestotheBill(No1322)asitpasseditssecondreadingon5March2009.TheauthorthankstheNewZealandLegalResearchFoundationandtheLawFacultyofTheUniversityofAucklandfortheinvitationtoparticipateinthisconference;andparticipantsattheconferenceforhelpfulcommentsandquestions.MaartendenHeijeralsoprovidedincisivefeedbackonanearlierdraftforwhichIamgrateful.IamalsoverygratefultoNawaarHassan,agraduateofMelbourneLawSchool,forexcellentandextensiveresearchassistanceinthepreparationofthisarticle.TheresearchforthisarticlewassupportedbyaUniversityofMelbourneEarlyCareerResearcherGrant.

Non-Refoulement on the basis of Socio-Economic Deprivation:

The Scope of Complementary Protection in International Human Rights Law

MiCHelle FosteR*

It is now well established that international human rights treaties

impose obligations on states to protect persons from refoulement

beyond the terms of the Refugee Convention. However, there remains

much disagreement concerning the scope of protection to be provided.

One of the most contentious issues is whether protection is restricted

only to persons who fear torture and/or a violation of the right to life

(narrowly understood), or whether it can also include persons whose

claims rely on a deprivation of socio-economic rights on return to

their country of origin — that is, whether return to deprivation in

the form of famine, or lack of medical treatment, or education, can

invoke a state’s international protection obligations. The notion

that the obligation to protect from refoulement may include socio-

economic rights violations has been thought to present such a threat

NZLR_2009_II_2ndPr.indd 257 1/12/09 7:40 AM

258 [2009] New Zealand Law Review

to state sovereignty that the right to seek such protection, at least in

the context of medical treatment, has been explicitly excluded from

some existing and proposed domestic schemes, most recently in the

proposed system of complementary protection to be introduced in

New Zealand. This article uses the exclusion on socio-economic

grounds proposed in the Immigation Bill 2007 as a method of testing

the scope of complementary protection at international law. Drawing

extensively on international, regional, and domestic jurisprudence,

this article argues that socio-economic rights are clearly implicated

and must therefore be considered by states in expulsion decisions,

and that, accordingly, blanket exclusions are inconsistent with

international law. The article concludes by calling for reasoned and

principled judicial and legislative decision-making in this area in

preference to the unsustainable policy concerns that are at risk of

dominating discourse in this field.

Introduction

Theconceptthatstateshavearesponsibilitytoprotectthehumanrightsofnoncitizens, includingthoseresidingoutsidetheirownterritory, isverymuchinvogue.1Althoughtheconceptismostofteninvokedinthecontextofdebatesabouttheobligationofstatestoundertakehumanitarianintervention— that is, toprotect civilians frommass atrocities andcrimes againsthumanityoccurringinanotherstate—ithasbeenseizeduponbyotherUnitedNationsactorsinothercontexts,includingrecentlybytheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(“theUNHCR”).In2006theUNHCRchosetheconceptofthe“responsibilitytoprotect”asthethemeforitsNote on International Protection,submittedtoitsExecutiveCommitteeinits57thsession.Inthatdocument, theUNHCRalludestothe call by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral for the internationalcommunitytoembracethe“responsibilitytoprotect”andnotesthatthisservesasareminderthattheresponsibilitytoprotectis“firstandforemostanindividualstateresponsibilityandthatwherethestatefails, thereisa

1 In2005thethenUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralKofiAnnanurgedtheworldto“embracetheresponsibilitytoprotect,andwhennecessary…actonit”;seeAnnan,“Inlargerfreedom:towardsdevelopment,security,andhumanrightsforall”(A/59/2005),para135.SeegenerallyFeller,“TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ClosingtheGapsintheInternationalProtectionRegime”,inMcAdam(ed),Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security(2008)283.


NonRefoulement on the basis of Socio-Economic Deprivation 259

collectiveresponsibilitytoact”.2WhiletheUNHCRwasnotsuggestingthatstateshaveanobligation,undertheauspicesofrefugeelaw,tointervenetopreventhumanitariancrises inother countries, the relevanceof thisconcepttorefugeelawisnonethelessclear.Thequintessentialexampleofaninternationalobligationtoprotectduetoastate’sprimaryfailureistheUnitedNationsConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees1951(“theRefugeeConvention”),whichrequiresastatepartytoprotectarefugeefromreturntoacountryinwhichheorshefearspersecution(inotherwords,theobligationofnon-refoulement).3Theunderlyingideaisthatthehomestatehasfailedtoprotecttherefugeefrompersecution,andthustheinternationalorsurrogateschemeofprotectionprovidedbytheRefugeeConventionisinvokedbytherefugeeinseekingprotectioninanotherstate.

However,theresponsibilitytoprotectinthecontextofrefugeelawisnowunderstoodtoinvolveawidersetofobligationsthanthosesetoutintheRefugeeConventionalone.AstheUNHCRnotedinitsNote on International Protectionin2006,“theremayalsobepersonswithinternationalprotectionneedswhoareoutsidetherefugeeprotectionframework,requiringfinerdistinctionstobemadetoprovideprotectioninwayscomplementarytothe1951Convention”.4 Indeed,while theExecutiveCommittee of theUNHCRrecently“reaffirm[ed]thatthe1951ConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugeestogetherwithits1967Protocolcontinuetoserveasthecornerstoneoftheinternationalrefugeeprotectionregime”,5itimmediatelywentontorecognizethat“indifferentcontexts, theremaybeaneedforinternationalprotectionincasesnotaddressedbythe1951Conventionandits1967Protocol”.6Accordingly,itencouraged“theuseofcomplementaryformsofprotectionforindividualsinneedofinternationalprotectionwhodonotmeettherefugeedefinitionunderthe1951Conventionorthe1967

2 UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,Note on International Protection,A/AC.96/1024(12July2006),para1.

3 BarbourandGorlickarguethat“[t]hehistoricalrecordsupportstheconclusionthatthegrantofasylumis,orwouldbe,inmanycasesthemostpractical,realisticandleastcontroversialresponsetoassistingvictimsofmassatrocities”,andthat“[t]hegrantofasylumandnon-refoulementandtheprotectionofIDPsasparticularprotectionandlifesavingmeasures,seemespeciallywarrantedforreferencewithintheanalysis,scopeandmeaningofR2P”;seeBarbour&Gorlick,“Embracingthe‘responsibilitytoprotect’:arepertoireofmeasuresincludingasylumforpotentialvictims”,UNHCRNewIssuesinRefugeeResearch,ResearchPaperNo159(July2008),22–23(http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/487b619b0.pdf)(lastaccessed13March2009).

4 UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,abovenote2atpara5. 5 UNHCRExecutiveCommittee,Conclusion on the Provision of International Protection

Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection(7October2005),ConclusionNo103(LVI).

6 Ibid.



Protocol”.7TheExecutiveCommittee’sconclusionmadeitclearthattheseinternationalprotectionneedswerebasedoninternationallawobligations—essentiallyinternationalandregionalhumanrightsinstrumentsthatpostdate theRefugeeConvention—andwere therefore tobedistinguishedfromdiscretionarydecisionsofstatestoprolongstayforcompassionateorpracticalreasons.8

Therecognitionofthiswiderambitoftheobligationtoprotectfromrefoulement isnot justwishful thinkingon thepartof theUNHCR. Ithasbeenrecognizedbytherelevant treatybodiesandmanystateshavenowimplementedaschemeofcomplementaryprotectionbasedontreatyobligationsincorporatedintodomesticlaw.Whilestateshavealwaysprovidedprotectionin“humanitarian”casesthatfalloutsidethestrictambitoftheRefugeeConvention,thesignificantdevelopmentinthepastfewdecadeshasbeenarecognitionthatstateshaveanobligation—notdiscretion—toprovideprotectiontoawidergroupofpersonsinneed.

However, while many states accept that they have obligations atinternationallawtoprotectpersonsfromrefoulement beyondthetermsoftheRefugeeConvention,thereremainsmuchdisagreementaboutthescopeofprotectiontobeprovided.Oneofthemostcontentiousissuesiswhetherprotectionisrestrictedonlytopersonswhofeartortureandoraviolationoftheright tolife(narrowlyunderstood),orwhetheritcanincludealsopersonswhoseclaimsrelyonadeprivationofsocioeconomicrightsonreturntotheircountryoforigin—thatis,whetherreturntoviolenceintheformoffamine,orlackofmedicaltreatmentoreducation,caninvokeastate’s internationalprotectionobligations.It is in thisareathatstatesaremuchmorelikelytopermitpersonstostayonlyontheexerciseofahumanitariandiscretion,ratherthanprovidearighttostayonthisbasisindomesticlaw.9Indeed,thenotionthattheobligationtoprotectmayinclude

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 ThisisexemplifiedinNewZealandwheresuchissuesareclearlyconsideredinthe

contextofassessingwhetherthereare“exceptionalcircumstancesofahumanitariannaturethatwouldmakeitunjustorundulyharshforthepersontoberemovedfromNewZealand”pursuanttos47(3)oftheImmigrationAct1987.See,forexample,Removal Appeal No 46278(RemovalReviewAuthority,30August2006);Removal Appeal No 46565(RemovalReviewAuthority,10July2008).SeealsoGower,“ImmigrantsEarnreprievefromDeportation”,New Zealand Herald,11March2008.Inaddition,whenconsideringwhethertoaffirmtherevocationofaresidencepermit, theDeportationReviewTribunalofNewZealandisdirectednot toconfirmtherevocationif“it issatisfiedthatitwouldbeunjustorundulyharshfortheappellanttolosetherighttobeinNewZealandindefinitely”;seeImmigrationAct1987,s22(5).Inanumberofdecisions,theDeportationReviewTribunalhasquashedarevocationonthebasisoftheriskofsocioeconomicdeprivationinthehomecountry;see,forexample,Rouf v



socioeconomicrightshasbeenthought topresentsuchathreat tostatesovereigntythattherighttoseeksuchprotection,atleastinthecontextofmedical treatment,hasbeenexplicitlyexcludedfromsomeexistingandproposeddomesticschemes,10most recently in theproposedsystemofcomplementaryprotectiontobeintroducedinNewZealand.Itis,therefore,timelytoundertakeananalysisofthescopeoftheobligationtoprotectfromrefoulement ininternationalhumanrightslaw,focusingspecificallyonthequestionwhethersuchobligationsextendtoprotectingfromrefoulement thosewhofearadeprivationofsocioeconomicrightsonreturntotheirhomecountryortoanotherstate.ThisarticleusestheexclusiononsocioeconomicgroundsproposedintheNewZealandImmigrationBill2007(No1322)11

Minister of Immigration[2007]NZDRT2(concerninga15yearoldprofoundlydeafBangladeshiboywhorequiredongoingassistanceinNewZealandforhisdisability);Zaman v Minister of Immigration (NZDRT,024/06,18March2008)(concerningaschizophrenicBangladeshimanwhohad“littlechanceofleadingameaningful,adequatelifeinBangladesh”).

10 Forexample, inCanada,ImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionAct(Can)(SC2001,c27)s97(1)providesarightfornoncitizenstoobtainprotectionfromdeportationinCanadaincertaincircumstances,aslongas“theriskisnotcausedbytheinabilityofthatcountrytoprovideadequatehealthormedicalcare”.ItislikelythattheNewZealandImmigrationBillisbasedonthisexclusion.ItisinterestingtonotethatthecomplementaryprotectionschemerecentlypresentedtotheAustralianParliamentdoesnotcontainsuchanexception;seeMigrationAmendment(ComplementaryProtection)Bill2009.Itshouldalsobenotedthatsomestates,suchasNewZealandandAustralia,excludepersonsfromqualificationfrompermanentresidence(outsidetheprotectionregime)onthebasisoftheirlikelihoodofbeingadrainonthehealthcaresystem;see,forexample,thediscussionofthehealthrequirementsoftheNewZealandResidencePolicyinVilceanu v The Minister of Immigration[2007]NZDRT1,para17,wheretheTribunalsetsout theHealthRequirementsImmigrationRegulations1999,rule4.1:“AllpersonsincludedinresidenceapplicationsmustmeetthehealthrequirementsassetoutintheAdministrationchapterorqualifyforawaiverofthehealthrequirements.”Theseregulationsfurtherprovide that“if theapplicantfails tomeet thenecessaryhealthrequirementsanddoesnotqualifyforawaiver,theapplicationmaybedeclined”.According to rule 4.1.5, “[a]ssessment provides that a consultant physician maydeterminethatanapplicantisnotofanacceptablestandardofhealthifthephysicianconsidersthattheapplicantis:(i)likelytobeadangertopublichealth,or(ii)likelytobeaburdenontheNewZealandhealthservices,or(iii)unfitforthepurposeofentrytoNewZealand”.SeealsothesubsequentdecisionoftheNewZealandCourtofAppealinVilceanu v The Minister of Immigration[2008]NZCA486.Therearesomecaseswherearefusedapplicanthasbeensuccessfulonappeal;seeRemoval Appeal No AAS14599andotherdecisionscitedinVilceanu v The Minister of Immigration[2007]NZDRT1,para50.

11 For the Immigration Bill (No 1322), see http://www.parliament.nz/enNZ/PB/Legislation/Bills/4/7/d/00DBHOH_BILL8048_1ImmigrationBill.htm(accessedon31August2009).



(“theImmigrationBill”)asamethodoftestingthescopeofcomplementaryprotectionatinternationallaw.

Itshouldbenotedattheoutsetthatthisarticleisnotconcernedwiththequestionwhetherapersonmayestablishawellfoundedfearofbeingpersecuted(andthusestablishaclaimforrefugeestatus)onthebasisofaviolationofsocioeconomicrightsforaRefugeeConventionreason.Mostdomesticregimes, includingtheNewZealandImmigrationBill,donotpurporttoaddressthisissue.Further,todosowouldclearlybeinconsistentwithinternationallawasthereisampleauthorityforthepropositionthatpersecutionmaybesoconstituted.12

ThisarticlebeginsbysettingoutthebackgroundandproposedprovisionsintheNewZealandImmigrationBill,beforeturningtoconsidertheconceptofnon-refoulementininternationalhumanrightslaw.Asexplainedinthatsection,sincetheprincipleofnon-refoulementhasbeenimpliedintogeneralhumanrightstreaties, thetaskofidentifyingitsprincipledbasisandscopeofoperationisnotastraightforwardone.Thissectionthereforeanalysestheconsiderablebodyofjurisprudenceemanatingfromanumberofkeyinternationalandregionaltreatybodiesinordertoprovideaframeworkofanalysisfortheremainderofthearticle.Thefollowingsectionsthenturntofocusonnon-refoulementspecificallyonthebasisofsocioeconomicrightsviolations,consideringfirsttheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights(“theICESCR”),followedbytheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(“theICCPR”).

The New Zealand Immigration Bill and Socio-Economic Rights as a Basis for Complementary Protection

NewZealandhashistoricallyimplementeditsobligationsundertheRefugeeConventioninamannerthatattainsinternationalbestpractice.Thehighqualityofitsrefugeestatusdecisionmakinghasbeennotedbyleadingcourtsinthecommonlawworld,includingtheHouseofLords,andthepolicyandpracticeof thegovernmenthasoftenservedtofillgapsin internationalprotection.Notwithstandingthis,NewZealand’slegislativeregimeofrefugee

12 RefugeeclaimsbasedonthedenialofhealthcaretothosewithHIV/AIDShavebeenrecognizedintheUnitedStates,Canada,andAustralia.“Accesstomedicalcareandtreatmentisafundamentalhumanrightandactionsamountingtoaneffectivedenialmayconstitutepersecution”;seeRRTReferenceN95/08165.Thefactthatthecountryoforiginispoorandundeveloped,andthushasonlybasicservices,doesnotprecludeaclaimwhere“peopleinfectedwithHIVmaybedeniedeventhelowlevelofcareavailabletoothers…”;seeRRTReferenceN94/04178.SeegenerallyFoster,International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (2007).



protectionhassufferedfromalimitation,namely,thatithastraditionallyrestrictedprotectiononlytothosewhoseclaimsfallwithintheRefugeeConvention,andnottothosewhoseclaimsforprotectionarebasedonotherexpressorimpliednormsofnon-refoulementatinternationallaw.13Oneofthemost important innovationsintheImmigrationBillcurrentlybeforetheNewZealandParliamentis,therefore,therectificationofthislacunaininternationalprotection.14TheBillrecognizes,asa“protectedperson”,apersonwhohasaclaimforcomplementaryprotectionundertheConventionAgainstTorture(“theCAT”)ortheICCPR.15

However,whileprotectionagainstnon-refoulementinthecaseoftortureismodelledverycloselyontheCAT,16 theNewZealandParliamenthassoughttodefinemorecloselythosewhomightbeprotectedundertheICCPR.Inparticular,whileaperson“mustberecognizedasaprotectedpersonunderthe[ICCPR]”ifthereare“substantialgroundsforbelievingthatheorshewouldbeindangerofbeingsubjectedtoarbitrarydeprivationoflife”orto“cruel,inhuman,ordegradingtreatmentorpunishment”ifdeportedfromNewZealand,17 theproposedlegislationexcludesfromprotectionthosewhoseclaimisbasedon“theimpactonthepersonof theinabilityofacountrytoprovidehealthormedicalcare,orhealthormedicalcareofaparticulartypeorquality”.18Apersonisexcludedfromassertingaclaimonthisbasisasitpertainstoariskofviolationofeithertherighttolifeortherightnottobesubjectedtocruelorunusualtreatment.Further,thelanguageintheImmigrationBill—“is not to be treated asarbitrarydeprivationoflifeorcrueltreatment”—suggeststhattheexclusionismandatory.

Thereislittleexplanatorymaterialregardingthisprovision,butapossiblerationaleforitmaybefoundinthebackgroundpapertotheImmigrationActReview,whichstates:19

13 TherehasbeenanincreasingtendencytointerpretlegislativeprovisionsauthorizingdeportationbyreferencetoNewZealand’sinternationalobligations;see,forexample,Geiringer,“InternationalLawThroughtheLensofZaoui:WhereisNewZealandat?”(2006)17PublicLRev300.However,itremainsthecasethattheexistingImmigrationActonlyexplicitlyprovidesprotectiontothosefallingwithintheRefugeeConvention.

14 ForadetailedoverviewoftheNewZealandImmigrationBill,seeHaines,“SovereigntyUnderChallenge”(2009)NZLR149–205.

15 ItshouldbenotedthatreferencesaretotheImmigrationBillasamendedbytheSelectCommittee.

16 Forexample,cl120(5)oftheImmigrationBill(No1322)statesthat“‘torture’hasthesamemeaningasinthe[CAT]”.

17 SeeImmigrationBill(No1322),cl121. 18 Ibid,cl121(2)(c). 19 SeeImmigration Act Review: Background Paper,para302.



BoththeEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)andEnglishcourtshaveemphasizedthattheICCPRobligationsdonotextendtoageneraldutynottodeportpersonswhoareinneedofmedicalcarethatwillnotbeprovidedintheirhomecountry.TheproposedapproachrelatingtomedicalcarereflectsthesefindingsandmirrorsCanada’slegislation.

Thissuggeststhattherationaleisbased,atleastinpart,onaperceptionaboutwhatisrequiredasamatterofinternationallaw.

Therearetwopreliminaryobservationsweshouldmakeattheoutset.First,althoughthebackgroundmaterialsuggestsaconcerntoimplementawiderrangeofnon-refoulementobligationsatinternationallawbeyondtheRefugeeConventionalone,theproposedlegislationisconcernedonlywithsometreaties.Moststrikingly,thenon-refoulementobligationsimpliedintotheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild1989(“theCRC”)20arenot incorporated,norisanymentionmadeofothertreatiessuchastheICESCR.21Second,itisinterestingtonotethatingeneralthedraftershavenotthoughtitnecessarytodefineexhaustivelythescopeoftherelevantconceptsindomesticlegislation,presumablyleavingitopentothetribunalsandcourtstodevelopinaccordancewiththeirevolvingmeaningatinternationallaw.Forexample,thereisnoguidanceastothemeaningof“torture”,“arbitrarydeprivationoflife”,or“cruel,inhuman,ordegradingtreatment”.Thus,theconcernemphaticallytoexcludeclaimsbasedonlackofhealthcareisanomalous.

Itshouldbenotedthatthereisalackofclarityastohow,andtowhatextent, theNewZealandImmigrationBillwill impactupontheexistingcommonlawpresumptionthatdomesticlaw,suchasthepowertoexpel,mustbereadconsistentlywithinternationalobligationsthatmightotherwisehavegivenrisetodefactoprotectionagainstrefoulement pursuanttoNewZealand’sobligationsundertheCATandtheICCPR.22Thisarticlefocuses

20 NewZealandratifiedtheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild1989on6April1993,andtherearenorelevantreservationsinplace.

21 NewZealandratifiedtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights1966on28December1978,andhasonlyenteredapartialreservationinrespectofArt8.SubmissionsweremadetotheImmigrationActReviewthattheseandothertreaties shouldhavebeen incorporated: see Immigration Act Review: Summary of Submissions (November2006).

22 SeeZaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2006]1NZLR289(SC).AsRodgerHainesnotes,thisissuewasnotarguedbeforetheNewZealandSupremeCourtinZaouiandis,therefore,tobeunderstoodasobiterdicta;seeHaines,“NationalSecurityandNon-Refoulement inNewZealand:CommentaryonZaoui v Attorney-General (No 2)”,inMcAdam(ed),Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security(2008)63,75.However,asHainesalsonotes(at76),theNewZealandGovernmenthadconcededinZaouithat“itisobligedtocomplywiththerelevantinternationalobligationsprotectingMrZaouifrom



only on the issues raised by the Immigration Bill’s incorporation of acomplementaryprotectionregimethatexcludesprotectionbasedoncertainsocioeconomicrights,anddoesnotpurporttoassesswhethertheremaybeanyremainingscopefortheseissuestobedealtwithundertheauspicesofthecommonlawdoctrine.

Non-refoulement in International Human Rights Law

UnliketheRefugeeConventionandtheCAT,theotherinternationalhumanrightstreatiesthatarefrequentlyimplicatedinananalysisofcomplementaryprotectionobligationsdonotcontainexplicitnon-refoulementprovisions.23Rather, therelevantinterpretativebodies,specificallytheUnitedNationsHuman Rights Committee (“the UNHRC”) in the case of the ICCPR,and theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights in thecaseof theEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms1950(“theECHR”),haveimpliedobligationsofnon-refoulementfromtheprimaryobligationsexpressedintherespectiveconventions.24Whilethere

returntothreatsoftortureorthearbitrarytakingoflife”;seeZaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2006]1NZLR289(SC),para75.Inadditiontothepreviouslyestablishedcommonlawpresumption,reliancewasalsoplacedinZaouiontheNewZealandBillofRightsAct1990.SeealsoGeiringer,abovenote13.

23 However,recenttreatiesmaysignalanewapproach;see,forexample,theInternationalConventionfortheProtectionofAllPersonsfromEnforcedDisappearance2006,Art16,whichprovidesthat“[n]oStatePartyshallexpel,return(‘refouler’),surrenderorextraditeapersontoanotherStatewheretherearesubstantialgroundsforbelievingthatheorshewouldbeindangerofbeingsubjectedtoenforceddisappearance”.ThisConventionwasadoptedon20December2006but,asof13September2009,isnotyetinforce;seehttp://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV16&chapter=4&lang=en.

24 TheICCPRcreates theUnitedNationsHumanRightsCommittee(“theUNHRC”)as thebodyresponsiblefor its implementation;seeespeciallyICCPR,Art40.TheviewsoftheUNHRC,especiallyasregardstheFirstOptionalProtocol,“representanauthoritativedeterminationbytheorganestablishedundertheCovenantitselfchargedwiththeinterpretationofthatinstrument. Theseviewsderivetheircharacter,andtheimportancewhichattachestothem,fromtheintegralroleoftheCommitteeunderboththeCovenantandtheOptionalProtocol”;seeUnitedNationsHumanRightsCommittee,General Comment No 33: The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(2008)CCPR/C/GC/33,para13.Inaddition,“[t]hecharacteroftheviewsoftheCommitteeisfurtherdeterminedbytheobligationofStatespartiestoactingoodfaith,bothintheirparticipationintheproceduresundertheOptionalProtocolandinrelationtotheCovenantitself.AdutytocooperatewiththeCommitteearisesfromanapplicationoftheprincipleofgoodfaithtotheobservanceofalltreatyobligations”;ibid,para15.Fordiscussionofthisissue,see



isdisagreementabout theirscope, in themain,stateshaveacceptedtheexistenceof impliednon-refoulementobligations,at least inconnectionwiththerighttolifeandtherightnottobesubjectedtotorture,ortocruel,inhuman,ordegradingtreatment.

However,controversieshaveemergedasaresultofdevelopmentsininternationallawinrecentdecadesthathaverecognizedandgivenforceto the theory of the “permeability of rights” — the notion that rightsthought traditionally to fallwithin thecategoryof“civilandpolitical”mayinfacthaveapplicationtosocioeconomicrights.25Examplesincludetherecognitionthathomelessnessmayengagetherighttoprivacyoreventolife,26thenotionthattheobligationofnondiscriminationcanapplytowelfareentitlements,27andthefindingthatinhumanordegradingtreatmentmaybeconstitutedbyadeprivationofsocioeconomicrights.28Thishasledtojurisprudenceandcommentaryastowhetheraprohibitiononnon-refoulementcouldextendtoanobligationnottoreturnapersontoacountrywheretheriskofviolationoftherighteithertolifeornottobesubjectedtoinhumanordegradingtreatmenttakestheformofadeprivationofsocioeconomicrights.Thisissuehas,however,beenhighlycontroversial.Indeed,thedoctrineasappliedtosocioeconomicrightshasbeenreferredtoasan“extensionofanextension”29intheUnitedKingdomcaselaw,whichtendstoquestionitslegitimacyaltogether.ThelegislativelimitationintheNewZealandImmigrationBillisanattempt,clearlyandunequivocally,topreventanysuchextensionbydecisionmakersinNewZealand,atleastinthecontextofmedicaltreatment.

At the heart of the question of the legality at international law ofexceptions,suchasthatcontainedintheNewZealandImmigrationBill,istheproperscopeoftheimpliednon-refoulementconcept,includinghowfaritextendswithinthetreatiestowhichitismostcommonlyapplied,andalsowhetherandtowhatextentitappliestootherhumanrightstreaties.Inordertoaddressthekeyquestionswithwhichthisarticleisconcerned,itisthere

Rishworth,“TheRuleofInternationalLaw?”,inHuscroft&Rishworth(eds),Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law(2002).TheNewZealandSupremeCourtdeferstotheviewsoftheUNHRC;seeGeiringer,abovenote13at314.

25 SeegenerallyFoster,International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (2007)ch4.

26 Ibidat185. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibidat187–188. 29 SeeAJ (Liberia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2006]EWCACiv1736,

para12,whereHughesLJcitedtheEnglishCourtofAppeal’sdecisioninN v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2004]1WLR1182(EWCA),paras37&46.InN,LawsLJstated(atpara36)thatthis“‘extraterritorial’effectconstitutesanexceptionalextensionoftheTreatyobligations…”.



forenecessarytoconsidertheoriginof,principledbasisof,andconceptualexplanationfor thisconcept.Althoughthere ismuchjurisprudenceandscholarlydiscussionrelatedtothedoctrineofcomplementaryprotection,there issurprisingly littleclarityconcerningtheprincipledbasisfor itsimplicationandscope.Inordertorespondtotheabovecriticismsandtoascertainthescopeofthedoctrineweneedtostartfromapositionofclarityregardingthebasisofstateresponsibilityfornon-refoulement.

Inansweringthisquestion,itisclearthatanumberofpossiblebasesforstateresponsibilitycanbeimmediatelydiscounted.First, it iswellestablishedthat,althoughsometimesreferredtoasanextraterritorialapplicationofhumanrightsobligations,ora“foreigncase”,30thisisamisnomer.Theimplied concept of non-refoulement, like an express non-refoulementobligation,doesnot relate toconductundertakenbya stateoutside itsterritoryorjurisdiction.Rather,theactthatispotentiallyprohibitedistheexpulsion,whichoccursintheterritoryoftheexpellingstate.Thus,it isnotrelevanttoconsiderthebasisonwhichastatemaybeliableforactsundertakenoutsidetheterritory.Norisitbasedontheideathatstatesareresponsibleforhumanrightsabusesanywhereintheworld.AstheUNHRCnotedinKindler v Canada:31

Ifapersonislawfullyexpelledorextradited,theStatepartyconcernedwillnotgenerallyhaveresponsibilityundertheCovenantforanyviolationsofthatperson’srightsthatmaylateroccurintheotherjurisdiction.InthatsenseaStatepartyclearlyisnotrequiredtoguaranteetherightsofpersonswithinanotherjurisdiction.

Second,theimpliedprohibitiononnon-refoulementisnotconcernedwithattributingresponsibilityforunlawfulactioncarriedoutbyonestate(thereceivingstate)toanother(thesendingstate).Thisisbecauseitisonlyinexceptionalcasesthatonestateisresponsiblefortheactionsofanother,noneofwhichapplyinthiscontext.32Specifically,thesearenotcaseswhereonestatedirects,controls,33orcoercesanotherstatetocommitanact.34

30 ThisphraseisregularlyinvokedintheUnitedKingdomcasesinthisarea. 31 (1993)CommunicationNo470/1991,UNDocCCPR/C/48/D/470/1991,para6.2. 32 Crawford, The International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility:

introduction, text, and commentaries (2002)147. 33 InternationalLawCommission,Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts (2001),Art17. 34 Ibid,Art18.SeealsoKaelin,“LimitstoExpulsionundertheInternationalCovenant

onCivilandPoliticalRights”, inSalerno(ed),Diritti Dell’Uomo, Estradizione ed Espulsione(2003)143,158.



Third,itisnotasituationwherethesendingstateisliableonthebasisthatithasaidedorassistedinthecommissionofaninternationallywrongfulact.35This isbecause thedeportationorexpulsioncannotbesaid tobecarriedout“withaviewtofacilitatingthecommissionof thewrongfulact”.36Evenmorefundamentally,astatecanonlyaidandassistanotherwheretheassistancefacilitatesasecondstateinviolatingthesecondstate’sinternationalobligations.37However,itisclearthatwhatisbeingassessedinthesecasesistheresponsibilityofthesendingstate,nottheresponsibilityofthereceivingstate.AstheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsexplainedinSoering v United Kingdom,38 “thereisnoquestionofadjudicatingonorestablishingtheresponsibilityofthereceivingcountry,whetherundergeneralinternationallaw,underthe[ECHR]orotherwise”.39Indeed,inmanycases,thereceivingstateiseithernotapartytothetreatyornotapartytotheadjudicativeprocedure.40

Thisassistsinclarifyingwhatis notthebasisforstateresponsibility,butleavesopenthequestionastowhatisthebasisofstateresponsibilityfortheconsequencesofexpulsion.Inseekingtoanswerthisquestion,Kaelinreferstothewellestablishedpropositionthathumanrightsobligationscontainbothnegativeaspects(adutytorespectorrefrainfromviolatingrights)andpositiveaspects(adutytoprotectbypreventingothersfromviolatingrights).Hesuggeststhattheexplanationfortheimpliednon-refoulementdoctrinesetoutbytheUNHRCisfundamentallybasedonthedutytoprotect,whereastheanalysisadoptedbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsisconcernedwiththedutytoabstain.41KaelinconcludesthatthejustificationoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsleads“tomoreconvincingresults”.42Incontrast,NollseesthemostplausibletheoreticaljustificationforthejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsasrelatedtotheobligationtoprotect.43

35 Ibid,Art16.SeealsoCrawford,abovenote32. 36 SeeCrawford,abovenote32at149.SeealsoKaelin,abovenote34at159. 37 Ibidat148. 38 (1989)11EHRR439(ECtHR). 39 Ibidatpara91. 40 See Kindler v Canada (1993) Communication No 470/1991, UN Doc CCPR/

C/48/D/470/1991.SeealsoKaelin,abovenote34at157;Crawford,abovenote32at145. 41 Kaelin,abovenote34at159–161. 42 Ibidat162. 43 Noll,Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection, and the Common

Market of Deflection(2000)468–472.SeealsodenHeijer,“WhoseRightsandWhichRights?TheContinuingStoryofNon-RefoulementundertheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights”(2008)10EurJMigration&Law277,291:“Ifone insistsonlabellingtheprohibitionofrefoulementaseitherapositiveornegativeobligation,themosttenablesolutionprobablyistoconsiderremovalcasesashybridcaseswhichimposebothpositiveandnegativeobligationsonanexpellingState.”



However,aclosereadingofthedevelopingjurisprudenceofthesesupervisorytribunalssuggeststhatitisnotpossibletodescribetheirreasoningasneatlybasedononetheoryoranother.Rather,itispossibletodiscernthreepossibletheoreticalexplanationsinthereasoningoftheUNHRCandtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandotherrelevantinternationaltribunalssuchastheInterAmericanCommissiononHumanRights.

Thefirstandbroadestpossiblebasisforthenon-refoulementobligationcouldbecharacterizedasan“effectiveness”principle.AstheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsnotedinSoering v United Kingdom:44

Ininterpretingthe[ECHR],regardmustbehadtoitsspecialcharacterasatreatyforthecollectiveenforcementofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms…Thus,theobjectandpurposeofthe[ECHR]asaninstrumentfortheprotectionofindividualhumanbeingsrequirethatitsprovisionsbeinterpretedandappliedsoastomakeitssafeguardspracticalandeffective.

TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsthenexplainedwhyitwaslegitimateto depart from its normal practice of declining to rule upon potentialviolationsinthecaseswherethepotentialviolationsaresaidtooccurasaresultofadeportationorexpulsion.TheCourtexplainedthatdeparturewasnecessary“inordertoensuretheeffectivenessofthesafeguardprovidedby[Art3]”.45Inotherwords,theobligationsimposedonstatesbyhumanrightsconventionscouldbeentirelyunderminedifastatecoulddisregardtheseobligationsinsendingapersontoaplaceinwhichitwasforeseeabletheywouldsufferaviolationofrights.Thisanalysismightbejustifiedasamatteroftreatyinterpretationonthebasisthatittakesintoaccountthecontext,object,andpurposeofthetreatyindeterminingthescopeoftheobligationsthatitimposes.46

Amoredirectandarguablymorelegitimatebasisforthenon-refoulementdoctrineisthatstateresponsibilityisrelatedtothesendingstate’sdutytoprotect.Forexample,theUNHRCheldinARJ v Australiathat:47

Statespartiesto[theICCPR]mustensurethattheycarryoutalltheirlegalcommitments,whetherunderdomestic laworunder agreementswithotherstates, inamannerconsistentwiththeCovenant.RelevantfortheconsiderationofthisissueistheStateparty’sobligation,underarticle2,paragraph1,oftheCovenant,to ensure to all individuals within its territory

44 (1989)11EHRR439(ECtHR),para87. 45 Ibidatpara90. 46 SeetheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties1969,Art31. 47 (1996)CommunicationNo692/1996,UNDocCCPR/C/60/D/692/1996,paras6.8–6.9

(emphasisadded).



and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant.…IfaStatepartydeportsapersonwithinitsterritoryandsubjecttoitsjurisdictioninsuchcircumstancesthatasaresult,thereisarealriskthathisorherrightsundertheCovenantwillbeviolatedinanotherjurisdiction,thatStatepartyitselfmaybeinviolationoftheCovenant.

InAhani v Canada 48 theUNHRCevenmoreexplicitly referred to thisconceptinstating:49

TheCommitteeemphasizesthat,aswiththerighttolife,therighttobefreefromtorturerequiresnotonlythattheStatepartyrefrainfromtorturebut take steps of due diligence to avoid a threat to an individual of torture from third parties.

Thelanguageof“ensure”and“duediligence”intheseextractssuggeststhattheUNHRCwasreferringtoastate’sdutynotonlytorespectrightsbyrefrainingfromviolatingthem,butalsotoprotectthem,byensuringthatothersdonotviolatethem.50

Inparticular, theconceptof“duediligence”referstothestandardofprotectionthatinternationallawcanlegitimatelyimposeonastate.51Thisanalysisthenessentiallyextendsthestate’sdutytoprotectagainstviolationsbynonstateactorswithinitsownterritorytoviolationsthatmightbecarriedoutbyotherstatesornonstateactorswithinotherstates.Inbothcases,thesendingstatehasanabilitytoinfluencewhethertheviolationoccurs—initsownterritory,bydirectlyofferingprotection,andextraterritoriallybynotexposingthepersontotheriskofharm.52

The third and most direct theory explaining the non-refoulementobligationmorecloselyresemblesthenotionthatthestateis itself inviolationofitsowndutytorespectrights(orrathertorefrainfromviolatingthemdirectly)inreferringtothestate’sexpulsionordeportationasacrucial

48 (2004)CommunicationNo1051/2002,UNDocCCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002. 49 Ibidatpara10.6(emphasisadded). 50 AstheUNHRCexplains,“thepositiveobligationsonStatesPartiestoensureCovenant

rightswillonlybefullydischargedifindividualsareprotectedbytheState,notjustagainstviolationsofCovenantrightsbyitsagents,butalsoagainstactscommittedbyprivatepersonsorentitiesthatwouldimpairtheenjoymentofCovenantrightsinsofarastheyareamenabletoapplicationbetweenprivatepersonsorentities”;seeUnitedNationsHumanRightsCommittee,General Comment No 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant(2004)CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13.

51 AconceptparticularlydevelopedbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights. 52 SeeNoll,abovenote43at467–473.



stepintheultimateviolation.Forexample,theUNHRCstatedinKindler v Canada:53

TheCommitteerecognizesthatCanadadidnot itself imposethedeathpenaltyontheauthor.Butbydeportinghimtoacountrywherehewasundersentenceofdeath,Canada established the crucial link in the causal chain that would make possible the execution of the author.

Thisseemstosuggest thatastatepartymaybeinbreachof itsdutytorespect,ortorefrainfromviolating,rightswhenitsactionshavebeen,orwillbe,acrucialelementintheviolationoftheapplicant’srights—almosta“butfor”causationanalysis.ThisanalysisisevenclearerinthejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.IntheseminaldecisioninSoering v United Kingdom 54 theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsexplainedthattheresponsibilityofthestatewasestablishedonthebasisof“itshavingtakenactionwhichhasasadirectconsequencetheexposureofanindividualtoproscribedilltreatment”.55

ThemostdirecttheoryofstateresponsibilitywasadoptedinD v United Kingdom,56wheretheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsheldthat:57

…theimplementationofthedecisiontoremovehimtoStKittswouldamounttoinhumantreatmentbytherespondentStateinviolationof[Art]3.

Thissuggeststhatitisthedeportationitselfthatistoberegardedasinhuman(andthusinviolationofArt3),ratherthanthatthestatepartywasinviolationbecauseitsdeportationwouldforeseeablyleadtoinhumantreatment.AsKaelinobserves,theactofexposingsomeonetoaseriousriskofinhuman

53 (1993)CommunicationNo470/1991,UNDocCCPR/C/48/D/470/1991,para10.6(emphasisadded).

54 (1989)11EHRR439(ECtHR). 55 Ibidatpara91.SeealsoChahal v United Kingdom(1996)23EHRR413(ECtHR).

InMamatkulov v Turkey (2005)41EHRR494(ECtHR),para69,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsreiteratedthat“thenatureoftheContractingStates’responsibilityunder[Art]3incasesofthiskindliesintheactofexposinganindividualtotheriskof illtreatment”.The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights has taken asimilarapproachtoimplyinganon-refoulementobligationintoArt1oftheAmericanDeclarationoftheRightsandDutiesofMan;seeThe Haitian Centre for Human Rights v United States(1997)ReportNo51/96,IACHR550,1997WL835742,paras167–168.

56 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR). 57 Ibidatparas50–53.Thatthiswasthebasisofthisdecisionwasreaffirmedinlater

decisions;see,forexample,Pretty v United Kingdom (2002)35EHRR403(ECtHR),para53.



treatmentbyanactofremoval“isinitselfatreatmentwhichcausesintenseanguishandsufferingandviolatesthebasicdignityofhumanbeings”.58

Inallofthesecases,thetestissaidtobeoneofforeseeability,thatis,“[t]heforeseeabilityoftheconsequencewouldmeanthattherewasapresentviolationbytheStateparty,eventhoughtheconsequencewouldnotoccuruntillateron”.59

Thekeyissueforpresentpurposesrelatestothesignificanceofthesedifferent theoretical explanations for state responsibility in terms ofidentifyingthescopeoftheimpliednon-refoulementdoctrine.Inparticular,doesthechoiceofconceptualbasisdeterminewhichrightsaresubjecttothenon-refoulementdoctrine?Analyzingthequestionthroughthelensofeithereffectivenessorastate’sdutytoprotectseemslikelytoproducetheresultthatthenon-refoulementprinciplecouldapplytoallrightsintherelevantconventions.Thisisbecausethereisnoselfevidentbasisonwhichonecandistinguishbetweentherightsthatastatemustprotectandthosethatitneednot.Certainly,Art2(1)oftheICCPR,whichrequiresstatesto“respectandtoensure”rights,appliestoallrightsintheCovenant.Similarly,allrightscouldpotentiallybeunderminedif theycouldbeignoredindeportationdecisions,thussuggestingthattheeffectivenessprinciplewouldalsoresultintheobligationofnon-refoulementapplyingtoallrights.

Turningtothemoredirectanalysis,namely,thatwhichisbasedonthenotionthatastatemaybeinviolationofitsobligationtorespectifitcarriesoutanactthatisanecessarystepinthechainofeventsultimatelyleadingtoarightsviolation,itagainseemsthatthisdoctrinecouldapplytoallrights.Perhapstheonlyconceptualapproachoutlinedabovethat isclearlyandobviouslyspecifictoonlyalimitedcategoryofrightsmightbethedirectanalysisapparentlyadoptedinD v United Kingdom60—thatis,wherethedeportationitselfistreatedasinhuman.IfthisisthetruebasisofatleastthereasoningoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinthisarea,thenitmightsuggestthatthenon-refoulementprincipleisconfinedtothistreatyobligationbecauseitmightbedifficulttoexpandthistoincludeotherrights(excepttotheextentthattheyamounttocruelordegradingtreatment).

Thedifficultyinreachingaconclusiononthispointisthatneitherthetreatybodiesnor theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshaveexplainedthescopeoftheimpliednon-refoulementdoctrinebyclearreferencetotheunderlyingrationalefortheimpositionofstateresponsibilityinthisarea.

58 Kaelin,abovenote34at161. 59 Kindler v Canada (1993)CommunicationNo470/1991,UNDocCCPR/C/48/D/470/1991,

para6.2,reiteratedinNg v Canada (1994)CommunicationNo469/1991,UNDocCCPR/C/49/D/469/1991,para6.2.SeealsoSoering v United Kingdom (1989)11EHRR439(ECtHR),para86.

60 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).



Further,while theyhaveattemptedtoprovidesomeinsight intothefullscopeofthenon-refoulementprinciple,thereisnosingleclearandconsistentexplanatorydoctrinetoemergefromareviewofthecaselaw.

Perhapsthemostconsistentthemeisthatattemptstolimitthescopeofthenon-refoulementdoctrinehavecentredontheseverityoftheviolationthatisatissue.BoththeUNHRCandtheCommitteeontheRightsoftheChildhaveindicatedthatthenon-refoulementprincipleiscapableofapplyingtomorethanjusttherighttolifeandtherightnottobesubjectedtotorture,andtocruelandunusualtreatment.However,inseekingtoexplainitsscope,bothtreatybodiesengagetheconceptof“irreparableharm”.Inrelationtothenatureofstatesparties’obligations,theUNHRChasstated:61

Moreover,the[Art]2obligationrequiringthatStatesPartiesrespectandensure[theICCPR]rightsforallpersonsintheirterritoryandallpersonsundertheircontrolentailsanobligationnottoextradite,deport,expelorotherwiseremoveapersonfromtheirterritory,where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by [Arts] 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.

Similarly, theCommitteeontheRightsoftheChildhasexplainedinitsGeneralCommentonnoncitizenchildren:62

Furthermore, infulfillingobligationsunder[theCRC],Statesshallnotreturnachildtoacountrywheretherearesubstantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the child, such as, but by no means limited to, those contemplated under [Arts] 6 and 37 of the [CRC],eitherinthecountrytowhichremovalistobeeffectedorinanycountrytowhichthechildmaysubsequentlyberemoved.

Thelanguageof“suchas”and“bynomeanslimitedto”makesitclearthatthetreatybodiesdonotconfinethescopeofthenon-refoulementprincipletotherightsmentioned.However,thisisapparentlylimitedbytherequirementthattheforeseeableviolationofrightsamountsto“irreparableharm”.It isnotclearwherethelanguageof“irreparableharm”isderivedfrom,asitisnotpresentinthejurisprudenceoftheUNHRCrelatingtothenon-refoulementprinciple,nor in itsGeneralCommentsdealingspecifically

61 UnitedNationsHumanRightsCommittee,abovenote50atpara12(emphasisadded). 62 UnitedNationsCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild,General Comment No 6: Treatment

of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin (2005)CRC/GC/2005/6, para27(emphasisadded).



withArts6and7oftheICCPR.Onthecontrary,theUNHRC’sdecisionsadoptverybroadlanguagethatsuggeststhatthenon-refoulementprincipleappliestoallrights,andindeedtheUNHRChasfoundanumberofclaimsadmissiblewherethenon-refoulementprinciplewasbasedonrightsotherthanArts6and7.63OnepossibilitymaybethattheUNHRChasborrowedtheterm“irreparableharm”fromitsrulesofprocedureconcerninginterimmeasures,64although,ifthisisso,itsrelevancetosuchadifferentcontextisnotselfevident.Inanyevent,thedifficultywiththeadoptionofthisconceptasamethodofdelimitingthescopeofthenon-refoulementdoctrineisthatitis,asNollpointsout,“ambiguousanddifficulttopindown”.65Itthus,Nollargues,“opensupanewarenaforindeterminacy,turningonthequestionofexactlywhatisreparableandwhatisnot”.66Interestingly,theUNHRChasnotsoughtinitsjurisprudencetoassessviolationsbyreferencetotheconceptof“irreparableharm”.Instead,atleastwheretheexpulsionconcernsArt6orArt7, theonlyquestioniswhethertheharmfearedamountsto“inhumanordegradingtreatment”oraviolationoftherighttolife.NorhastheUNHRCreferredtotheconceptof“irreparableharm”inassessingtheadmissibilityofclaimsbasedonotherrightsviolations.

IncontrasttotheUNHRC,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasengagedwiththisissuemoredirectly.InmanydecisionssinceSoering v United Kingdom 67 theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasalludedtothepossibilityofother rightsbeing implicated,buthasavoidedfinallyadjudicating the question as to whether the non-refoulement doctrineextendstorightsotherthanArt3oftheECHR.68However,inZ and T v

63 See, forexample,ARJ v Australia (1996)CommunicationNo692/1996,UNDocCCPR/C/60/D/692/1996;Judge v Canada(2003)CommunicationNo829/1998,UNDocCCPR/C/78/D/829/1998.Althoughit is interestingtonote that theconceptof“irreparableharm”wasusedbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinSoering v United Kingdom (1989)11EHRR439(ECtHR),para90.

64 SeeUNHRCRulesofProcedure(2005)CCPR/C/3Rev.8,rule92:“TheCommitteemay,priortoforwardingitsViewsonthecommunicationtotheStatepartyconcerned,informthatStateofitsViewsastowhetherinterimmeasuresmaybedesirabletoavoidirreparabledamagetothevictimoftheallegedviolation.”

65 Noll,abovenote43at466. 66 Ibid. 67 (1989)11EHRR439(ECtHR). 68 InSoering v United Kingdom (1989)11EHRR439(ECtHR),thefirstdecisioninwhich

theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsidentifiedtheimpliednon-refoulementdoctrine,theCourtnoted(atpara113)thatitdid“notexcludethatanissuemightexceptionallyberaisedunder[Art]6byanextraditiondecisionincircumstanceswherethefugitivehassufferedorriskssufferingaflagrantdenialofafairtrialintherequestingcountry”. ForadetaileddiscussionofthecaselawonprovisionsotherthanArt3inthiscontext,seedenHeijer,abovenote43at280–285.



United Kingdom,69thesolequestionfortheCourtwaswhetherthedoctrinecouldextendtoArt9oftheECHR,thatis,therighttofreedomofthought,conscience,andreligion.ThecasebeforetheCourtsought tochallengethebasisofthedecisionoftheHouseofLordsinR (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator,70inwhichtheirLordshipshaddecidedthat,whilethenon-refoulementprinciplewascapableofapplyingtoall ECHRrights,anapplicantwouldberequiredtoestablish“atleastarealriskofaflagrantviolationoftheveryessenceoftheright”beforeotherprovisionscouldbecomeengaged.71InexplainingitsdecisiontorejectthechallengetotheUllahlineofreasoning,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsbeganbynotingthedecisioninSoering,beforeexplainingthat:72

Thecaselawthatfollowed[Soering],andwhichappliesequallytotheriskofviolationsof[Art]2,isbasedonthefundamentalimportanceoftheseprovisions,whoseguaranteesitisimperativetorendereffectiveinpractice…TheCourtemphasizedinthatcontexttheabsolutenatureoftheprohibitionof[Art]3andthefactthatitencapsulatedaninternationallyacceptedstandardandabhorrenceoftorture,aswellastheseriousandirreparablenatureofthesufferingrisked.Suchcompellingconsiderationsdonotautomaticallyapplyundertheotherprovisionsofthe[ECHR].Onapurelypragmaticbasis,itcannotberequiredthatanexpellingContractingStateonlyreturnanalientoacountrywheretheconditionsareinfullandeffectiveaccordwitheachofthesafeguardsoftherightsandfreedomssetout inthe[ECHR](seeSoering,citedabove…andF v the United Kingdom[(ECtHR,ApplicationNo17341/03,22June2004)],wheretheapplicantclaimedthathewouldbeunabletoliveopenlyasahomosexualifreturnedtoIran).

Inthispassage,therationaleforthedoctrineisvariouslydescribedas:thefundamentalimportanceoftherightsandtheneedtorendersuchimportantrightseffective; theabsolute(andnonderogable)natureof therights inquestion;thefactthattheobligationsencapsulatean“internationallyacceptedstandard”;andthefactthattheirviolationwillleadtoseriousandirreparableharm.TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasfrequentlyemphasizedtheabsoluteandnonderogablenatureofArt3inthiscontextalthough,asNollargues,deducinga“hierarchicalstructurefromthetextualmanifestations

69 (ECtHR,ApplicationNo27034/05,28February2006). 70 [2004]2AC323(HL). 71 Z and T v United Kingdom(ECtHR,ApplicationNo27034/05,28February2006),4. 72 Ibidat6.



ofdelimitationsofrights”isproblematic.73Inanyevent,asdisplayedinthequotationabove,theCourtapparentlyunderminedthedeterminancyofthesefactorsinacknowledgingthatmanyotherrightsintheECHR,includingArt9,arecentral“foundationsofademocraticsociety”,andthatthenonrefoulementdoctrinecanapplytorightsthatarenotabsolute(suchastherighttoafairtrialinArt6,whichmaybederogatedfrominemergencies).74Inaddition,itisofcoursepossibletopointtomanyotherrightsthatreflectan“internationallyacceptedstandard”,andwhoseviolationwill leadtoirreparableharm(althoughnotetheinherentdifficultywiththisconcept,asdiscussedabove).

Perhapstheclearestexplanationforaconcerntolimitthenon-refoulementprincipletoviolationsofArts2and3,andtoextremeandflagrantviolationsoftheotherrights,isapolicybasedone.AstheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightswentontoexplaininZ and T v United Kingdom,75whilefreedomofreligionisindeedafoundationofademocraticsociety,itis,“firstandforemost thestandardappliedwithin theContractingStates,whicharecommittedtodemocraticideals, theruleoflaw,andhumanrights”.76ToimposeanobligationonaContractingStatenottoexpelapersonwhoseotherrightsmightbeviolatedonreturn,wouldimpose“anobligationonContractingStateseffectivelytoactasindirectguarantorsoffreedomofworshipfortherestoftheworld”.77Inotherwords,theECHRisprimarilydesignedtoprotectEuropeans,andpersonsfromotherstatescannotexpecttoenjoythesamelevelofprotectionasthosewhoenjoyprimaryprotectionundertheECHR.Thiscertainlyraisesaquestionastotheuniversalityofhumanrights.78

However,leavingtheuniversalityquestionaside,itshouldbenotedthatwhiletheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsarguablythoughtitlegitimatetoconsiderpolicyconcernsinthiscontext,anissuetowhichwewillreturnlater,theUNHRChasnotbeensowilling.Rather,asnotedabove,ithasexplicitlyleftopenthepossibilitythatachallengetoanexpulsiondecision

73 Noll,abovenote43at462,wheretheauthorquotesfromZuhlke&Pastille,Extradition and the European Convention — Soering Revisited (1999)that“tracingsuperioritywiththehelpofnonderogablerightsdwellsontheassumptionthatthoserightsarenonderogablebecausetheyaresuperior—aclassiccircularargument”.

74 SeealsoNoll,abovenote43. 75 (ECtHR,ApplicationNo27034/05,28February2006). 76 Ibidat7. 77 Ibid. 78 See,forexample,Higgins,Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use

It(1994)96–98:“Thenonuniversal,relativistviewofhumanrightsisinfactaverystatecentredviewandlosessightofthefactthathumanrightsarehumanrightsandnotdependentonthefactthatstates,orgroupingsofstates,maybehavedifferentlyfromeachothersofarastheirpolitics,economicpolicy,andcultureareconcerned.”



maybebasedonrightsotherthanthosefoundinArts6and7.Theviewthatthenon-refoulementdoctrineshouldbefurtherrestrictedhasbeenexpressedonlyindissent.InJudge v Canada 79anindividualopinionwassubmittedbyChristineChanetinwhichsheagreedwiththepositionoftheUNHRCthatCanadaviolatedtheauthor’srighttolifebyextraditinghimtoastateinwhichhewouldfacecapitalpunishment,80butobjectedtothefactthattheUNHRC“declareditselfcompetenttoconsidertheauthor’sargumentsconcerningapossibleviolationofArt14,paragraph5,oftheCovenant”aswell.81Althoughshethoughtthattakingthepositionthatnon-refoulementcanapplyinrelationtoapotentialviolationofanyorallICCPRrights“wouldcertainlybeastepforwardintherealizationofhumanrights”,shearguedthat“legalandpracticalproblemswouldimmediatelyarise”thattendedagainstsuchanapplication.82However,thisissofaraminorityview.

A lesspolicybased, andperhapsmoreconvincing, explanation fordistinguishingbetweentheabsoluterights(inArts2and3oftheECHRandArts6and7oftheICCPR)andthe“qualifiedrights”inthosesametreatieswasprovidedbyLordBinghamofCornhillinR (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator,namelythat:83

Thereasonwhyflagrantdenialorgrossviolationistobetakenintoaccountisthatitisonlyinsuchacase—wheretherightwillbecompletelydeniedornullifiedinthedestinationcountry—thatitcanbesaidthatremovalwillbreach the treatyobligationsof thesignatorystatehowever thoseobligationsmightbeinterpretedorwhatevermightbesaidbyoronbehalfofthedestinationstate.

Inotherwords,inthecaseofabsoluteandnonderogablerights,nopossiblejustificationforaviolationcanbeclaimedeitherbythesendingorbythereceivingstate.Thus,onceaviolationisforeseeable,astateisprohibitedfromexposingapersontothatviolation,includingbydeportingorexpellingtheperson.Incontrast,inthecaseofaqualifiedright,itmaybethattheviolationcouldbejustifiedbythesendingstate(onthebasisoftheimportance“ofoperatingfirmandorderlyimmigrationcontrol”)84orbythereceivingstate

79 (2003)CommunicationNo829/1998,UNDocCCPR/C/78/D/829/1998. 80 ThiswasareversaloftheearlierpositioninKindler v Canada (1993)Communication

No470/1991,UNDocCCPR/C/48/D/470/1991. 81 Judge v Canada(2003)CommunicationNo829/1998,UNDocCCPR/C/78/D/829/1998,

20. 82 Ibid. 83 [2004]2AC323(HL),para24,citingDevaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home

Department[2002]UKIAT702,para111. 84 Ibid.



underoneofthepermittedlimitations.ButasLordBinghamofCornhillexplained,thisisnotabalancethatacourtis“wellplacedtoassessintheabsenceofrepresentationsbythereceivingstatewhoselaws,institutions,orpracticesarethesubjectofcriticism”.85Therefore,itisnecessarytorequireforeseeabilityofaflagrantorextremeviolationinordertobesatisfiedthatstateresponsibilityisengaged.86Onthisanalysis,allrightsarepotentiallyrelevant,butthequestionisthenatureordegreeofthepotentialviolation.87

Havingconsideredinsomedepththeunderlyingrationalefortheimpliednon-refoulementobligationingeneralhumanrightstreaties,wenowturntoconsiderthescopeofthisdoctrineinthespecificsituationwhereapersonseekstoresistdeportation/expulsiononthebasisofafearofsocioeconomicrightsviolationsinhisorherhomecountryorathirdstate.

Non-Refoulement and Socio-Economic Rights: The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

Inconsideringwhethertheprincipleofnon-refoulementiscapableofapplyingsoastorestrainastatefromremovingapersonwherethefearedharmtakestheformofsocioeconomicrightsviolations,thelogicalstartingpointistheICESCR,sincethatisthekeyinternationalinstrumentfortheprotection

85 Ibid.Itshouldbenotedthat,althoughoneisnotassessingtheresponsibilityofthereceivingstate,thequestionremainswhetheraviolationislikelytooccurinthereceivingstate,whichmayinvolveassessingwhethertherewouldbeanylegitimatebasisonwhichtheviolationcouldbejustifiedinthereceivingstate,thusmakingitnotaviolationofeithertheECHRortheICCPR,asthecasemaybe.

86 SeealsoEM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2009]1AllER559(HL),inwhichtheirLordshipsrevisitedthecorrecttesttobeappliedincaseswhereexpulsionissaidtoengagethe“qualified”rightsintheECHR.WhiletheirLordshipsreiteratedthetestadoptedinR (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004]2AC323(HL),theyallemphasizedthehighthresholdrequired,explainingthatitistantamounttorequiringacompletedenialornullificationoftherightinquestion.WhilemostoftheirLordshipsappearedtoreiterateLordBinghamofCornhill’sreasoningforadoptingthistest,LordHopeofCraigheademphasizedthepolicyconcernsexpressedbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinZ and T v United Kingdom (ECtHR,ApplicationNo27034/05,28February2006)andN v United Kingdom (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR),para13.SeealsoRB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2009]UKHL10,inwhichtheHouseofLordsdiscussedtheapplicationofthe“flagrantbreach”testsinthecontextofArts5and6oftheECHR,ultimatelyrejectingtheclaimsonthisbasis.

87 Foradetailedandthoughtfulconsiderationofthisissueinthedistinctbutrelatedcontextofsecondaryrefugeemovements,seeLegomsky,“SecondaryRefugeeMovementsandtheReturnofAsylumSeekerstoThirdCountries:TheMeaningofEffectiveProtection”(2003)15:4InternationalJournalofRefugeeLaw567at645–654.



ofsocioeconomicrights.UnlikeinthecaseoftheICCPR,however,therelevant treaty body that oversees the ICESCR — the Committee onEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights—hasyettoconsidertherelevanceofthedoctrineofnon-refoulementtothatinstrument.Further,thereisanabsenceofanyscholarshipsuggestingthatsuchanapproachisevenpossible.Wemustthereforeanswerthequestionaccordingtofirstprinciples.

Themostobviousconcernaboutapplyingtheconceptofnon-refoulementtotheICESCRisthefactthatthatinstrumentisoftensaidnottoimposeimmediateandbindingobligationsonstates,but rather to imposeonlyobligationsofprogressiveimplementation.88ThisisonthebasisofArt2(1)oftheICESCR,whichprovidesthat:

EachStatePartytothepresentCovenantundertakestotakesteps,individuallyandthroughinternationalassistanceandcooperation,especiallyeconomicandtechnical,tothemaximumofitsavailableresources,withaviewtoachievingprogressively the full realizationof the rights recognized inthepresentCovenantbyallappropriatemeans,includingparticularlytheadoptionoflegislativemeasures.

Theconcernisthatitwouldbeimpossibleforasendingstateevertoascertainwhetheritsdecisiontoexpelwouldexposeapersontoarightsviolationinthereceivingstate,giventhatsuchanassessmentwouldinvolveanevaluationofmatterswellbeyondtheexpertiseorcapabilityofthesendingstate.Inotherwords,howcouldasendingstateeverassesswhetherthereceivingstatehadcommittedsufficientresourcestofulfilitslegalobligations?

However,suchanapproachignoresthefactthatsomeprovisionsoftheICESCRare,ontheirownterms,immediatelybinding,forexample,Art3(equalitybetweenmenandwomen),Art7(a)(i)(equalpay),Art8(righttoformtradeunionsandtostrike),Art10(3)(protectionofchildrenfromexploitation),Art13(2)(a)(freeprimaryeducation),andArt13(3)(freedomofparentstochoosethetypeofeducationfortheirchildren).

Second,itignoresthefactthatallrightsintheICESCRimposetwokeydutiesofanimmediatenature:theguaranteeinArt2(2)thatrightswillbeexercisedwithoutdiscriminationonspecifiedgrounds,andtheobligationinArt2(1)to“takesteps”.TheobligationofnondiscriminationinArt2(2)is

88 EvenwheretheICESCRhasbeenmentionedinthenon-refoulementcontext,ithasbeendismissedonthebasisthattherightsthatitcontains“arenotreadilyenforceableeitherdomesticallyorattheinternationallevel,inpartduetotheirprogressiverealization”;seeMcAdam,Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law(2007)164.SeealsoGoodwinGill&McAdam,The Refugee in International Law(3rded,2007)314.SeealsoLegomsky,abovenote87at649.



“subjecttoneitherprogressiverealizationnortheavailabilityofresources;itappliesfullyandimmediatelytoallaspectsof[forexample]education…”.89

Thesecondobligationofanimmediatenature—to“takesteps”—isin turnunderstoodashavingtwocomponents.Thefirst is that, inherentin theobligationtotakestepsandtoachieveprogressivelytherights intheICESCR,thereisastrongpresumptionagainstregressivesteps.Ataminimum,statesmustrefrainfrominterferingdirectlyorindirectlywiththeenjoymentofaright.Forexample,aviolationoftherighttofoodcanoccurwhereastaterepealsorsuspendslegislationnecessaryforthecontinuedenjoymentoftherighttofood,deniesaccesstofoodforparticulargroups,orpreventsaccesstohumanitarianfoodininternalconflictsorotheremergencysituations.90Totakeanothercommonexample,theCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRightshasmadeclearthat“forcedevictions”(definedasthe“permanentortemporaryremovalagainsttheirwillofindividuals,families,and/orcommunitiesfromthehomesand/orlandwhichtheyoccupy,withouttheprovisionof,andaccessto,appropriateformsoflegalorotherprotection”)are“primafacie incompatiblewith therequirementsof theCovenant”.91Therefore,“inviewof thenatureof thepracticeofforcedevictions,thereferenceinArt2.1toprogressiveachievementbasedontheavailabilityofresourceswillrarelyberelevant”.Thestate“mustitselfrefrainfromforcedevictionsandensurethatthelawisenforcedagainstitsagentsorthirdpartieswhocarryoutforcedevictions”.92Thesearebynaturedutiesofimmediateobligation.

Thesecondcomponenttotheobligationtotakestepsisthatstateshavea“coreobligationtoensurethesatisfactionof,attheveryleast,minimumessential levelsofeachof therightsenunciatedin theCovenant”.93TheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRightshasstatedthat:94

Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number ofindividualsisdeprivedofessentialfoodstuffs,ofessentialprimaryhealthcare,ofbasicshelterandhousing,orofthemostbasicformsofeducationis,prima facie,failingtodischargeitsobligationsundertheCovenant.

89 CommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,General Comment No 13: The Right to Education(1999)E/C.12/1999/10,para31.

90 CommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,General Comment No 12: The Right to Adequate Food(1999)E/C.12/1999/5,para19.

91 CommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,General Comment No 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions(1997)E/C.12/1997/4,para1.

92 Ibidatpara8. 93 CommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,General Comment No 3: The

Nature of States Parties’ Obligations(1990)E/1991/23,para10. 94 Ibid.



TheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRightshaselaboratedontheseminimumcoreobligationsinrelationtoanumberofspecificrightsintheICESCR,includingtherightstoeducation,food,health,andwater,andalsotherighttowork.95

AsaresultoftheseobligationsofanimmediatenatureimposedonstatesbytheICESCR,determiningwhetherapersonislikelytobesubjectedtoaviolationofsocioeconomicrightsonreturnisnotascomplicatedasmightinitiallyhavebeenassumed.Wherethepersonfearsaviolationbasedonthereceivingstate’sfailuretorespectrights(bywithdrawingorpreventingaccess torightsoractivelydenyingthemtoaparticularsegmentof thepopulation)orfailuretoprotectrights(bybeingunableorunwillingtoprotectagainstviolationbynonstateactors),theassessmentisarguablynomorecomplicatedthanwhereacivilandpoliticalrightisatissue.ThissuggeststhatthemerefactthatICESCRrights“arenotreadilyenforceableeitherdomesticallyorattheinternationallevel, inpartduetotheirprogressiverealization”96maynotbesufficienttojustifyarejectionoftherelevanceofICESCRtothenon-refoulementcontext.

Theotherpossibleobjectiontoimplyinganon-refoulementobligationintotheICESCRmaybethat,aswellasbeingsubjecttoArt2(1),allrightsintheICESCRarealsosubjecttoArt4,whichprovidesthatstatesparties“maysubjectsuchrightsonlytosuchlimitationsasaredeterminedbylawonlyinsofarasthismaybecompatiblewiththenatureoftheserightsandsolelyforthepurposeofpromotingthegeneralwelfareinademocraticsociety”.InRahman v Minister of Immigration 97—oneofthefewdomesticcasestohaveconsideredspecificallythepotentialfornon-refoulementobligationstoarisebyvirtueoftheICESCR—McGechanJheldthatArt4permittedNewZealandtoreturnapersontoacountryinwhichhisICESCRrightsmaybeatriskonthebasisoftheneedtopreserve“thegeneralwelfareofNewZealandsociety”.98However,thisdoesnotappeartobeavalidreadingof

95 SeerespectivelyCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,GeneralComment No 12: The Right to Adequate Food (1999)E/C.12/1999/5; General Comment No 13: The Right to Education(1999)E/C.12/1999/10;General Comment No 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2000)E/C.12/2000/4; General Comment No 15: The Right to Water (2002)E/C.12/2002/11;General Comment No 18: The Right to Work (2005)E/C.12/GC/18.

96 McAdam,abovenote88at164. 97 (HCWellington,AP56/99&CP49/99,26September2000,McGechanJ). 98 Ibidatpara62.HisHonouralsowentontoexplain(atpara64)thattheDeportation

ReviewTribunal’sdecisionwasvalidbecauseitweighedthesocioeconomicneedsoftheappellant“inthebalanceagainstNewZealand’sownneeds;aprocessentirelypermissibleundertheCovenant”.ItshouldbenotedthatthisappearedtobethekeybasisforrejectingtheargumentundertheICESCR,althoughtheJudgealsoreferred(atpara59)tothefactthattheICESCRislimited“bybeingtomaximumof‘available’



Art4sincethatprovisionis“primarilyintendedtobeprotectiveoftherightsofindividualsratherthanpermissiveoftheimpositionoflimitationsbytheState”.99ThisisexemplifiedinLegal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),100wheretheInternationalCourtofJusticeheldthatrestrictionsontheenjoymentofeconomic,social,andculturalrightsbyPalestinianslivingintheoccupiedterritoriesasaresultofIsrael’sconstructionofthewallcouldnotbejustifiedby“militaryexigenciesorbyrequirementsofnationalsecurityorpublicorder”.101ThisconfirmsthenarrowreadingoftheArt4exceptionbytheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,andcastsdoubtonthelegitimacyofseekingtodenytheexistenceof,orjustifyaviolationof,anyimpliednon-refoulementobligationintheICESCRonthebasisofgeneralpublicorder(includingimmigration)concerns.

Havingdismissedthesepotentialobjections,wecanseethatonceitispossibletoidentifythatthereisaforeseeableriskofanICESCRviolationtakingplaceorcontinuinginthereceivingstateonreturn, it isarguablethateitherthesendingstate’sdutytorespectICESCRrights(ietonotcarryout thecrucial linkinthecausalchain)or itsdutytoprotect(ie totakestepsofduediligence)couldpreventitfromsendingapersonbacktotheirhomestate.Indeed,theCommitteeontheRightsoftheChildhasimplicitlyaccepted asmuch in relation to theCRC—a treaty that eschews thetraditionaldichotomybetweencivilandpoliticalrightsandsocioeconomicrightsbyincorporatingbothsetsofrightsintheonetreaty.TheCommitteehasemphasizedthatthere“isnosimpledivisionorauthoritativedivision,ofhumanrightsingeneralorofConventionrights,intothetwocategories…theCommitteebelievesthateconomic,social,andculturalrights,aswellascivilandpoliticalrights,shouldberegardedasjusticiable”.102Accordingly,inelaboratingthenon-refoulementconceptimpliedintheCRC,theCommitteeontheRightsof theChildhasurgedstatesparties toassess theriskofreturn“inanageandgendersensitivemanner”andto“takeintoaccountthe

resources,andtoachievingNirvanaprogressively.Itisnotanopenendedorimmediateobligation.”TheJudgealsonoted(atpara62)thatthepresentwas“notanextremecase”.IamverygratefultoClaudiaGeiringerforalertingmetothiscase.

99 CommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,General Comment No 13: The Right to Education(1999)E/C.12/1999/10,para42.

100 (2004)ICJRep136(ICJ).101 Ibidatpara137.102 CommitteeontheRightsoftheChild,General Comment No 5: General Measures of

Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2003)CRC/GC/2003/5,para6.



particularlyseriousconsequencesforchildrenoftheinsufficientprovisionoffoodorhealthservices”.103

More recently,other actorswithin theUnitedNations systemhaveturnedtheirattentiontotheissueofnon-refoulementinthecontextofsocioeconomicrightsviolations,especiallytherighttofood.The(immediatepast)UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteurontheRighttoFoodexpressedtheviewthat,undertheICESCR,stateshavetheobligationto“respect,protect,andfulfiltherighttofoodofallpeople,livingwithintheirjurisdictionorinothercountries”,whichmeansthat“Governmentshavealegalobligationtohelptherefugeesfromhunger”.104ThisseemstorelyonboththefactthatthereisnoterritoriallimitationintheICESCR,105aswellastheobligationonstatesinArt2(1)to“takesteps,individuallyandthroughinternationalassistanceandcooperation,especiallyeconomicandtechnical”torealizetherightsintheICESCR,whicharguablyimpliesextraterritorialobligations.106Indeed,

103 CommitteeontheRightsoftheChild,General Comment No 6: Treatment of Unaccom-panied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin(2005)CRC/GC/2005/6,paras3&27.

104 SpecialRapporteurontheRighttoFood,Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council” (19January2007)A/HRC/4/30,para64.

105 CompareArt2(1)oftheICCPR,inwhichstatesundertaketoapplytherightsintheCovenant to“all individualswithinits territoryandsubject to its jurisdiction”.Art2(1)oftheICESCRcontainsnosuchlimitation.SeefurtherLegal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) (2004)ICJRep136(ICJ),paras107–112.Ofcourse, theremaybesomedifficultyin reconciling thenotion thatextraterritorialobligationsexplainan impliednon-refoulementobligation,asdiscussedabove.

106 ThereisanongoingdebateastowhetherstateshaveextraterritorialobligationsundertheICESCR.Somehavearguedthatactivitiesundertakenbyastatethataredirectlyattributabletoit,suchasdumpingunsafefoodonthemarketindevelopingcountries,dumpingtoxicwasteindevelopingcountries,orevenrefusinggovernmentsandcitizensofdevelopingstatesaccesstopatentsforcheapdrugs/medicineforHIV/AIDS,areviolationsof theobligationtorespect theright tohealthinArt12of theICESCR;seeCoomans,“SomeRemarksontheExtraterritorialApplicationoftheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights”,inCoomans&Kamminga(eds),Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties(2004)183,187.Indeed,supportfor thispropositioncanbefoundinanumberofGeneral Comments issuedbytheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights;seeCommitteeonEconomic,Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 8: The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1997)E/C.12/1997/8;CommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,General Comment No 12: The Right to Adequate Food(1999)E/C.12/1999/5andGeneral Comment No 15: The Right to Water (2002)E/C.12/2002/11.SeefurtherCraven,“TheViolenceofDispossession:ExtraterritorialityandEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights”,in



thenewexpertbodyoftheUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil—theAdvisoryCommittee—hasrecommendedthattheUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncilandtheUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneral“makeavailabletheirgoodofficessoastoextendtherighttonon-refoulement tohungerrefugees”.107Thelatterstatementmayreflectadesiretodevelopthelawprogressivelyratherthantoexpressaviewregardingexistingobligations.108However,itsuggeststhatthisisanevolvingareaandthusstatespartiesmustbecarefulbeforeassumingthattheconceptofnon-refoulement doesnotapplyinrelationtotheICESCR.109

Insum,totheextentthattheICESCRcanbeinterpretedasimposinganon-refoulementobligationonstatesparties,anattempttoexcludeoneimportant right,namely the right tohealth, isclearly inconsistentwiththeobligationsthattheICESCRcreates.Notwithstandingthis,itremainsthecase that there is insufficientauthorityatpresent forholdingstatesaccountableforrefoulementonthebasisoftheICESCR.ItispossiblethattherecentadoptionbytheGeneralAssemblyofanOptionalProtocoltotheICESCR(tobeopenedforsignature in2009),whichwillallowtheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRightstoreceiveandconsidercommunications from individuals or groups from states parties to theICESCRthatalsoaccedetotheProtocol,mayfacilitatethedevelopmentofthisprincipleinthefuture.110Inthemeantime,itisfarlesscontroversialtobaseouranalysisonthetreatiestowhichanon-refoulementobligationhas

Baderin&McCorquodale,Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (2007)75–77.

107 SeeHumanRightsCouncilAdvisoryCommittee,Report to the Human Rights Council on the First Session of the Advisory Committee(15August2008)A/HRC/AC/2008/1/L.11,1/6. See also Pillay, “Promoting a Broader Understanding of Refugee Law:TheJurisprudenceof theHumanRightsTreatyBodiesasaSourceof Interpretation”,OpeningKeynoteAddress,8thWorldConferenceoftheInternationalAssociationofRefugeeLawJudges,CapeTown(28January2009),8.

108 See,forexample,SpecialRapporteurontheRighttoFood,abovenote103atpara67,wheretheSpecialRapporteurreferstotheneedforrefugeeprotectiontobe“enlarged”toprotectrefugeesfromhunger,butitisnotclearwhetherthisreferstointernationalordomesticlegalregimes.

109 SeeAlston,“USRatificationoftheCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights:TheNeedforanEntirelyNewStrategy”(1990)84AmJIntL365,371,wheretheauthorexplainsthattheinterpretationoftheobligationsinhumanrightstreatiessuchastheICCPRandtheICESCRis“notsolelyamatterforastatepartyitselftodecide”since“[v]estingsuch[autointerpretative]authorityinastatewouldclearlyunderminetheconceptofaccountability,whichthe[ICESCR]isdesignedtoachieve”.Thus,thequestionofastate’scompliancewiththeICESCRisultimatelysubjecttodeterminationbytheICESCR.IamgratefultoJamesHathawayforhisthoughtsonthispoint.

110 SeeReportoftheHumanRightsCouncil:ReportoftheThirdCommittee(28November2008)A/63/435.



clearlybeenattached.We,therefore,nowturntoananalysisofthescopeoftheobligationofnon-refoulement intheICCPR,focusingparticularlyontheextenttowhichitiscapableofapplicationtosocioeconomicrightsviolations.

Non-Refoulement and Socio-Economic Rights: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

TheICCPRisprimarilyconcernedwiththeprotectionofcivilandpoliticalrights.However,asdiscussedabove,inrecentdecadesthenotionthatrightscanbeneatlycompartmentalizedintotwobroadandneatlydistinguishablecategories—“civilandpolitical”ontheonehand,and“socioeconomic”ontheother—hasbeenshowntohave“limitedconceptualintegrity”.111First,aconsiderationofthetextoftheICCPRandtheICESCRrevealsthattheybothcontainprovisionsofasocioeconomicnature,includingatleastsomeaspectsoftherightsofselfdetermination,equalprotection,protectionfromarbitraryinterferencewiththehome,freedomofassociation,aswellasminoritygrouprights(includinginrelationtoculturalandlanguagerights),rightsofchildhoodeducation,andrightstofamilyandwork.112

Second,boththetreatybodiesandregionalbodies,suchastheUNHRCandtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,haveinterpretedthelargelycivilandpoliticalrightscontainedintheICCPRandtheECHRinamannerthatincorporatesobligationsofasocioeconomicnature.113InitsGeneralCommentontherighttolife,forexample, theUNHRChasemphasizedthat thisright isnot tobe“narrowlyinterpreted”andthat“itwouldbedesirableforStatespartiestotakeallpossiblemeasurestoreduceinfantmortalityandtoincreaselifeexpectancy,especiallyinadoptingmeasurestoeliminatemalnutritionandepidemics”.114TheUNHRChasexplainedthatwhenreportingoncompliancewiththeobligationsunderArt6relatingtotherighttolife,statesshouldprovide“dataonbirthratesandonpregnancyandchildbirthrelateddeathsofwomen…[g]enderdisaggregateddata…oninfantmortalityrates”,and“informationontheparticular impacton

111 Foster,abovenote12at189.112 Ibidat182–183.113 Inoneoftheearliestcasesinwhichthisoccurred,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights

remarkedthat“thereisnowatertightdivisionseparating[thesphereofeconomicandsocialrights]fromthefieldcoveredbythe[ECHR]”;seeAirey v Ireland[1979]2EHRR305(ECtHR),para26.

114 UnitedNationsHumanRightsCommittee,General Comment No 6: The Right to Life(1982),para5.



womenofpovertyanddeprivationthatmayposeathreattotheirlives”.115Furthermore,inconcludingobservationspertainingtoparticularcountries,theUNHRChasnoted that a failure to take adequate steps to addressthesituationofhomelessnessmaycompromisetheright tolifeof thosepersons.116Similarly,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasnotedthat“anissuemayariseunderArt2[righttolife]ofthe[ECHR]whereit isshownthattheauthoritiesofaContractingStateputanindividual’slifeatriskthroughthedenialofhealthcarewhichtheyhaveundertakentomakeavailabletothepopulationgenerally”.117TheCourthasalsomadeclearthattherequirementtorespecttherighttolife“laysdownapositiveobligationonStatestotakeappropriatestepstosafeguardthelivesofthosewithintheirjurisdiction”,118whichmayincludeprotectionfromenvironmentalharm.119

InrespectofArt7—theprohibitiononcruel,inhuman,ordegradingtreatment or punishment— theUNHRChas routinely found states inviolationwheretheyhavesubjectedpersonswithintheircontrol,suchasprisonersanddetainees,toadeprivationofsocioeconomicrights.120UnliketheICESCR,whichissubjecttoresourceconstraintsasexplainedabove,aviolationoftheICCPRortheECHRcannotbejustifiedonthisbasis.Thus,forexample, inKalashnikov v Russia,121 theEuropeanCourtof HumanRightsrejectedRussia’sargumentthatsqualidprisonconditionsdidnotamounttoaviolationofArt3oftheECHRbecausetheywereaconsequenceofRussia’seconomicdifficultiesandweresufferedbymostdetaineesinRussia.122

115 UnitedNationsHumanRightsCommittee,General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women(2000)CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10,para10.

116 Foster,abovenote12at185.117 Cyprus v Turkey (2002)35EHRR30(ECtHR),para219.118 Ibid.119 SeeÖneryildiz v Turkey [2002]ECHR491(ECtHR),para71,cited inLoucaides,

“EnvironmentalProtectionThroughtheJurisprudenceoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights”,inLoucaides,The European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Essays(2007)177.

120 See, for example, C v Australia (2002) Communication No 900/1999, UN DocCCPR/C/76/D/900/1999;Williams v Jamaica (1997)CommunicationNo609/1995,UNDocCCPR/C/61/D/609/1995;Smith & Stewart v Jamaica (1999)CommunicationNo 668/1995, UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/668/1995; Rouse v The Philippines (2005)Communication No 1089/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/84/D/1089/2002. For similarjurisprudenceintheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,seeKalashnikov v Russia (2002)36EHRR587(ECtHR).

121 (2002)36EHRR587(ECtHR).122 See Rohl, “FleeingViolence and Poverty: Non-refoulement obligations under the

EuropeanConventionofHumanRights”,UNHCRNewIssuesinRefugeeResearch,WorkingPaperNo111(January2005),16–17.SeealsoÖneryildiz v Turkey[2002]ECHR491(ECtHR).



Thevitalquestionforourpurposes iswhether theobligationnot toremoveapersonwhencertainthathisorhercivilandpoliticalrightsareatriskofviolationonreturncanapplytoasituationwhenthefearedharminvolvessocioeconomicdeprivation.Inotherwords,dothepermeabilityorinterdependenceargumentsapplyequallyintheremovalcontext?Ifnot,is thereaprincipledreasonfordistinguishingbetweena“domestic”and“foreign”case in thisregard?123 In lightof thediscussionabove,whichestablishedthat theclearestandleastcontestablearticlesof theICCPRapplicabletotheexpulsioncontextareArt6(therighttolife)andArt7(therightnottobesubjectedtotortureortocruel,inhuman,ordegradingtreatmentorpunishment),thissectionwillfocusontheapplicabilityofthosearticlestosocioeconomicdeprivation.SincetheNewZealandImmigrationBillspecificallyexcludesclaimsbasedonaninabilityof thecountryoforigintoprovideadequatemedicaltreatment,butdoesnototherwiselimitthemeaningofArts6or7,thispartwillbedividedintotwosections.First,thequestionwhethertheNewZealandexclusionislegitimateatinternationallawwillbeconsideredbyreferencetocaselawthathasconsideredwhether“inhumanordegradingtreatment”canbeconstitutedbyadeprivationofmedicaltreatment.Second,thequestionwhetherformsofsocioeconomicdeprivation,otherthanalackofmedicaltreatment,mayberelevanttoanon-refoulement claimwillbeconsidered.

A Deprivation of health and medical care under Arts 6 and 7 of the ICCPR

WhiletheUNHRChasmadeitclearinGeneralComments,ConcludingObservations, and Individual Communications that the implied non-refoulement obligation applies to at leastArts 6 and 7, and that thoseprovisionscanimplicateaviolationofsocioeconomicrights, therehasbeenlittleconsiderationof thequestionofwhetherastate ispreventedfromremovingapersonwheretheArt6orArt7violationconcernssocioeconomicrights.

OneoftheonlyinstancesinwhichthisissuehasbeenconsideredisinC v Australia,124acommunicationbroughtbyanIraniannoncitizenwho

123 ThereisconfusionintheUnitedKingdomcaselawonthisquestion.InZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]EWCACiv1421,para28,BuxtonLJstatedthat“ithasneverbeensuggestedthatdifferentrulesoflawapply”asbetween“foreignanddomesticcases”.Manyoftheothercasesinthisarea,however,assumethatthereissomerelevancetothedistinction:see,forexample,J v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2005]EWCACiv629,para33;EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2009]1AllER559(HL),para19.

124 (2002)CommunicationNo900/1999,UNDocCCPR/C/76/D/900/1999.



claimedthatAustraliahadviolatedArt7of theICCPRintworespects:first,indetaininghimforaprolongedperiodpendinghisdeterminationofrefugeestatus,andsecond,inproposingtodeporthimtoIranwherehewouldbeunabletoobtaintreatmentforthepsychiatricillnessbroughtaboutbyhisdetentioninAustralia.TheUNHRCfoundthatbothaspectsoftheArt7claimweremadeout.Inexplainingitsreasonsinrelationtothesecondaspectoftheclaim,theUNHRCreferredtoadecisionoftheAustralianAdministrativeAppealsTribunalthathadfoundit“unlikelythattheonlyeffectivemedication(Clozaril)andbackuptreatmentwouldbeavailableinIran”.125TheUNHCRthenstated:126

In circumstances where the State party has recognized a protectionobligationtowardstheauthor,theCommitteeconsideredthatdeportationoftheauthortoacountrywhereit isunlikelythathewouldreceivethetreatmentnecessaryfortheillnesscaused,inwholeorinpart,becauseoftheStateparty’sviolationoftheauthor’srightswouldamounttoaviolationof[Art]7ofthe[ICCPR].

ThisisasignificantdecisioninthattheUNHRCfoundthatanexpulsionmayengageArt7wherethefearedharmonreturnwilltaketheformoftheunavailabilityofmedical treatment.However, theassociatedexceptionalcircumstancesof thatcase—that theapplicanthadatsomestagebeenfoundtobearefugee(althoughwassaidtohaveceasedtobeso)andthattheillnesswasactuallycausedbytheexpellingstateparty—suggestthattheapplicabilityofthisparticulardecisiontoothersituationsislimited.

Thequestionwhetheralackofmedical treatmentcanbeconsidered“inhumanordegradingtreatment”hasbeenconsideredfarmoreintenselybytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinthecontextofinterpretingthealmostidenticallywordedArt3oftheECHR:“Nooneshallbesubjectedtotortureortoinhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment.”Interestingly,thebackgroundpapertotheImmigrationActReview,referredtoabove,clearlyacceptstherelevanceofthejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandtheUnitedKingdomcourts,whichhavealsointerpretedtheECHRasitpertainstodomesticlaw,notwithstandingthatNewZealandisnotofcourseapartytotheECHR.Thisisentirelyappropriate,giventhecrossfertilizationof ideasthatfrequentlyoccursintheinterpretationofsimilarobligationsatinternationallaw.

Althoughaninability tobenefitfrommedicalcarecouldpotentiallyenlivenconsiderationoftherighttolife,mostcaseshavebeenconsideredbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsundertherubricoftheprohibition

125 Ibidatpara8.5.126 Ibid.



inArt3oftheECHRon“inhumanordegradingtreatment”.127Howdowedefine“cruel, inhuman,ordegradingtreatment”?TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasemphasizedthat“illtreatmentmustattainaminimumlevelofseverityifit istofallwithinthescopeofArt3[oftheECHR]”.Itshouldbenotedatthispointthataclaimthattreatmentwillamountto“degradingtreatment”requiresahigherthresholdthan“persecution”.128TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasalsoexplainedthattheassessmentofthe“minimumlevelofseverity”isrelative,and“itdependsonallthecircumstancesofthecase,suchasthedurationofthetreatment,itsphysicalandmentaleffectsand,insomecases,thesex,age,andstateofhealthofthevictim”.129

ThefirstcaseinwhichtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightswasaskedtoconsiderwhetherastatemightbepreventedfromexpellingapersonwheretheharmfearedtooktheformofalackofmedicaltreatmentwasD v United Kingdom,130acaseconcerningaStKittscitizenwithadvancedAIDS,whoseremovalfromtheUnitedKingdomwould“hastenhisdeathonaccountof theunavailabilityofsimilar treatment inStKitts”.131 Inadjudicatingthisclaim,theCourtnotedthat,until thatpoint, ithadappliedthenon-refoulementprincipleonlyincontexts“inwhichtherisktotheindividualofbeingsubjectedtoanyoftheproscribedformsoftreatmentemanatesfromintentionallyinflictedactsofthepublicauthoritiesinthereceivingcountryorfromthoseofnonStatebodiesinthatcountrywhentheauthoritiesthereareunabletoaffordhimappropriateprotection”.132However,theCourtwentontoexplainthat,inlightofthe“fundamentalimportance”and“absolutecharacter”ofArt3oftheECHR,itwasentitledto“scrutiniz[e]anapplicant’sclaimunderArt3wherethesourceoftheriskofproscribedtreatmentinthereceivingcountrystemsfromfactorswhichcannotengageeitherdirectlyor indirectly theresponsibilityof thepublicauthoritiesof thatcountry,orwhich,takenalone,donotinthemselvesinfringethestandardsofthatArticle”.133TheCourtthenwentontonotethattheremovalofDfromthe

127 UsuallythisisbecausetheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshassaidthatonceaclaimunderArt3oftheECHRismadeout,it isnotnecessarytoconsiderArt2;see,forexample,D v United Kingdom(1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR),para59.

128 Thisisbecause“persecution”canclearlyencompassawiderrangeofhumanrightsviolations.Thus,thefactthatasocioeconomicclaimisnotsufficienttowarrantanArt7orArt3violationdoesnotmeanthatitcannotformthebasisofasuccessfulrefugeeclaimifthenexusisestablished;see,forexample,AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007]EWCACiv297,para30.

129 N v United Kingdom(ECtHR,ApplicationNo26565/05,27May2008),para29.130 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).131 Ibidatpara40.132 Ibidatpara49.133 Ibid.



UnitedKingdomwouldentail“themostdramaticconsequencesforhim”.Inparticular:134

Itisnotdisputedthathisremovalwillhastenhisdeath.ThereisaseriousdangerthattheconditionsofadversitywhichawaithiminStKittswillfurtherreducehisalreadylimitedlifeexpectancyandsubjecthimtoacutementalandphysicalsuffering.Anymedical treatmentwhichhemighthopetoreceivetherecouldnotcontendwiththeinfectionswhichhemaypossiblycontractonaccountofhislackofshelterandofaproperdietaswellasexposuretothehealthandsanitationproblemswhichbeset thepopulationofStKitts…thereisnoevidenceofanyotherformofmoralorsocialsupport.Norhasitbeenshownwhethertheapplicantwouldbeguaranteedabedineitherofthehospitalsontheisland,which,accordingtotheGovernment,careforAIDSpatients.

TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsthusconcludedthatinviewoftheseexceptional circumstancesand“bearing inmind thecritical stagenowreachedintheapplicant’sfatalillness”,theimplementationofthedecisiontoremovehimtoStKittswouldamounttoinhumantreatmentbytherespondentstateinviolationofArt3oftheECHR.135Importantly,oncethetreatmentwasfoundtohaveattainedtherequisitelevelofseverity,theobligationnottoreturnwassaidnottobesubjecttoanyderogationorexaction.Rather,itwasabsolute.Therefore, theapplicant’scriminalactivityintheUnitedKingdomcouldnotjustifyhisremoval,however“reprehensible”itmighthavebeen.TheabsolutenatureoftheprotectioninArt3oftheECHRhasbeenreiteratedrepeatedlyinsubsequentcaselaw.136

OnefurtherpointshouldbemadeaboutD v United Kingdom.137Althoughthecasehasmostlybeenseenasconcernedonlywiththeunavailabilityofmedicaltreatment,138thereasoningoftheCourtincludedreferencetothegeneralconditionsofpovertyandsqualorinwhichDwouldberequiredtolive,inadditiontothelackofmedicaltreatment.139Thesignificanceofthisis that ithighlights that inhumanordegradingtreatment, intheremoval

134 Ibidatpara52.135 Ibidatpara53.136 See,forexample,Saadi v Italy [2008]INLR621(ECtHR), para127,citingprevious

authorityonthispoint.137 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).138 ThisishowD v United Kingdom(1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR)isusuallydescribed

inlatercases,seeespeciallyN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL),para15.

139 SeeMcAdam,abovenote87at165.



context,mightbeconstitutedbydeprivationsofsocioeconomicrightsotherthanmedicaltreatment.

D v United Kingdom 140representedasignificantconceptualdevelopmentinthejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandpromptedanumberofMemberStatesoftheCouncilofEuropetoamendtheirdomesticlawandpolicytoaccommodateit.Forexample,theFrenchCode de l’Entrée et du Séjour des Étrangers et du Droit d’Asile nowsetsoutalistofpersonswhomaynotbethesubjectofanexpulsionorder(otherthaninexceptionalcircumstances).141Thislistincludes:142

AforeignerwhohabituallyresidesinFranceandwhoisbenefitingfrommedicaltreatment,thelackofwhichcouldresultinexceptionallygraveconsequencesforhim,ontheconditionthathecouldnoteffectivelybenefitfromappropriatetreatmentinthereceivingcountry.

IntheUnitedKingdom,theAsylum Policy Instructionshavebeenamendedtonotethat:143

ApplicantsmayclaimthattheysufferfromaseriousmedicalconditionandthattheirreturnandtheconsequentwithdrawalofmedicaltreatmentbeingreceivedintheUKwouldamounttoinhumanordegradingtreatmentcontrary toArticle3.Medicalclaimswillonlyreachthe thresholdforArticle3inrareandextremecircumstances.

Astheseextractssuggest,whilestateshaveacceptedtheimportantconceptualshiftrepresentedinD v United Kingdom,144theyhavebeencarefultolimitit,atleastinthemedicalcases,toexceptionalsituations.Thisemphasisonthe“exceptional”natureofanArt3claimbasedonlackofmedicaltreatment

140 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).141 Forexample,inthecaseofbehaviourthat“threatensthefundamentalinterestsofthe

State,orwhichislinkedtoterroristactivity,orwhichconstitutesdeliberateprovocationofdiscrimination,hatred,orviolenceagainstapersonoragroupofpersons”;seeCode de l’Entrée et du Séjour des Étrangers et du Droit d’Asile,ArtL5213(translationbyNawaarHassan).

142 Code de l’Entrée et du Séjour des Étrangers et du Droit d’Asile,ArtL5213(translationbyNawaarHassan).

143 UnitedKingdomBorderAgency,Asylum Policy Instructions(October2006),15.Thereisalsointerestingcaselawfromotherjurisdictionssuggestingthatthepoorstateofhealthoftheapplicanttogetherwithalackofpropermedicaltreatmentinthehomecountrymaywarrantagrantofsubsidiaryprotection;see,forexample,O v Independent Federal Asylum Board (UBAS)(26September2007)Case1282:AdministrativeCourt(Austria),CaseNo2006/19/0521(translationbyAnneKallies).

144 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).



isinfactconsistentwiththewayinwhichtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsexplaineditsreasoninginD,assetoutabove.Indeed,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasrepeatedlyemphasizedthattheECHRdoesnotpermitnoncitizenstoremainintheterritoryofaContractingState“inordertocontinuetobenefitfrommedical,social,andotherformsofassistanceprovidedbytheexpellingstate”.145Rather,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshascontinuedtoemphasizetheextremecircumstancesthatgaverisetothesuccessfulclaiminD,particularlybydistinguishingmostothersubsequentclaimsfromDandthusfindingtheminadmissible.146

TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightswasrecentlypresentedwiththeopportunitytorevisitthescopeofD v United Kingdom 147inN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening),148arecentcaseinvolvingthedecisionbytheUnitedKingdomtoexpelawomansufferingfromHIV/AIDStoUganda.ThedecisiontoexpelwasupheldbytheHouseofLordsandNchallengedthisdecisionintheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.149RatherthantakingtheopportunitytooverruleD,infacttheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinN v United Kingdom150 reiteratedthepositionarticulatedinDthat:151

[T]hedecisiontoremoveanalienwhoissufferingfromaseriousmentalorphysical illnesstoacountrywherethefacilitiesforthetreatmentofthat illnessare inferior to thoseavailable in theContractingStatemayraiseanissueunder[Art]3,butonlyinaveryexceptionalcase,wherethehumanitariangroundsagainsttheremovalarecompelling.

145 Ibidatpara54.146 ThepostD caselawisdiscussedatlengthbytheHouseofLordsinN v Secretary of

State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL),paras37–50.AstheirLordshipsnoted(atpara34),theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights“hasneverfoundaproposedremovalofanalienfromaContractingStatetogiverisetoaviolationof[Art]3ongroundsoftheapplicant’sillhealth”.However,somepostDcasesweresettledaftertheEuropeanCommissionofHumanRightsfoundthemadmissible;see,forexample,BB v France (1998)RJD1998IV2595(EComHR).ForageneraldiscussionofpostD caselaw,seeN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL),paras32–45.

147 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).148 [2005]2AC296(HL).149 FordiscussionoftheHouseofLordsdecisioninN v Secretary of State for the Home

Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL),seeLester,“SocioEconomicRights,HumanSecurity,andSurvivalMigrants:WhoseRights?WhoseSecurity?”,inEdwards&Ferstman(eds),Human Security and Non-Citizens: Law, Policy, and International Affairs(2010forthcoming).

150 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).151 Ibidatpara42.



The European Court of Human Rights explained that in D, “the veryexceptionalcircumstanceswere that theapplicantwascritically illandappeared tobeclose todeath, couldnotbeguaranteedanynursingormedicalcareinhiscountryoforigin,andhadnofamilytherewillingorabletocareforhimorprovidehimwithevenabasicleveloffood,shelter,orsocialsupport”.152Incontrast,inN v United Kingdom,153 theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsfoundthatdueto thetreatmentavailable in theUnitedKingdom,theapplicantwasnot“atthepresenttimecriticallyill”.154Theevidencesuggestedthatifsheweredeprivedofhermedicaltreatment,herconditionwould“rapidlydeteriorateandshewouldsuffer illhealth,discomfort,pain,anddeathwithinafewyears”.155However,althoughtheCourtacceptedthat“thequalityoftheapplicant’slifeandherlifeexpectancywouldbeaffectedifshewerereturnedtoUganda”,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsrejectedherclaimunderArt3oftheECHRonthebasisthat:156

Therapidityofthedeteriorationwhichshewouldsufferandtheextenttowhichshewouldbeabletoobtainaccesstomedicaltreatment,support,andcare,includinghelpfromrelatives,mustinvolveacertaindegreeofspeculation,particularlyinviewof theconstantlyevolvingsituationasregardsthetreatmentofHIVandAIDSworldwide.

AlthoughtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsdidnotoverruleD v United Kingdom,157 itdoesappeartohavebeenatpainstostressitsexceptionalnature,andtherebytohavelimitedanypotentialforanexpansiveapproachtomedicalcarecasesinthefuture.

AnumberofobservationsaboutthereasoningoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightscanbemade.First,itissomewhatstrangethattheCourtjustifiedthedecisionprimarilyonthehypotheticalnatureoftheassessmenttobemade,especiallygiventhat this isanissueineveryremovalcase,regardlessofthefacts(asexplainedabove).Thisisparticularlycuriousinthiscaseasthereseemstohavebeenclear,undisputedevidenceastotheconsequencesofwithdrawingtreatment.Second, theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsappears tohavecreated“anelementofparadox”inthat,whileNwasnotdyingatthetimethattheexpulsiondecisionwasmade,thatwasonlybecauseshewasinreceiptoftreatmentthatwasclearlygoingto

152 Ibid.153 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).154 Ibidatpara50.155 Ibidatpara47.156 Ibidatpara50.157 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).



ceaseonherremoval.158TheparadoxliesinthefactthatadvancesinmedicaltreatmentforHIV/AIDShaveconsiderablyprolongedthelifeexpectancyandqualityoflifeforsuffererssincethatavailableatthetimeofD v United Kingdom159 meaningthatitisnowalmostimpossibletoestablishthat,atthetimeofremoval,apersonis“closetodeath”,eventhoughtheymaywellbeinsuchapositionassoonasthedecisiontoexpelisimplemented.Itmightalsobenotedthatrequiringthepersontobeeffectivelydyingseemstoignorethefactthat“degradingtreatment”doesnotneedtoamounttoalossoflife—otherwiseArt3wouldhavenoindependentoperation.160Further,itignoresthefactthatthetestisoneofforeseeability—thatis,theforeseeabilityoftheconsequencesofreturn.

Athirdobservation,whicharguablymakesthemostsenseofthedecisionoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinN v United Kingdom,161isthatitdemonstratesaclearandunequivocalconcernwithpolicyconsiderations.In justifyingits limitedapproachtomedicalcases, theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsarguedthat,“inherentinthewholeofthe[ECHR]isasearchforafairbalancebetweenthedemandsof thegeneral interestofthecommunityandtherequirementsoftheprotectionoftheindividual’sfundamentalrights”.162TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsthenwentontostate:163

Advances in medical science, together with social and economicdifferencesbetweencountries,entailthattheleveloftreatmentavailableintheContractingStateandthecountryoforiginmayvaryconsiderably.Whileitisnecessary,giventhefundamentalimportanceof[Art]3inthe[ECHR]system,fortheCourttoretainadegreeofflexibilitytopreventexpulsioninveryexceptionalcases,[Art]3doesnotplaceanobligationontheContractingStatetoalleviatesuchdisparitiesthroughtheprovisionoffreeandunlimitedhealthcaretoallalienswithoutarighttostaywithinitsjurisdictions.AfindingtothecontrarywouldplacetoogreataburdenontheContractingStates.

158 Thephrase“elementofparadox”wasusedinZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]EWCACiv1421,para12.

159 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).160 InN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening)

[2005]2AC296(HL),para13,LordNichollsofBirkenheadalludedtothisdilemmabyasking:“whyisitunacceptabletoexpelapersonwhoseillnessisirreversibleandwhosedeathisnear,butacceptabletoexpelapersonwhoseillnessisundercontrolbutwhosedeathwilloccuroncetreatmentceases(aswellmayhappenondeportation)?”HisLordshipnonethelesswentontodismisstheappeal.

161 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).162 Ibidatpara44.163 Ibid.



AlthoughwehavealreadynotedabovethereferencebytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightstopolicyissuesindiscussingthescopeoftheimpliednon-refoulement doctrine, thispassage fromN v United Kingdom164 issignificantlymorefarreachingasitsuggeststhatnotonlyarepolicyreasonsabletojustifyalimitedapplicationofthenon-refoulementprincipletothefullrangeofrightsintheECHR,butsuchconcernsalsopermitexceptionstotheabsolutenatureoftheprotectioninArt3incertainexpulsioncases.ThisresultsinadifferentiatedunderstandingofthesamerightdependingonwhetherthepersonisaEuropeanUnioncitizenseekingprotectionagainstviolationofArt3oftheECHRwithinastateparty,165oranoncitizenliabletoremoval.166Whilethismaybepossible(albeitdifficult)tojustifyinrespectofthequestionofwhichrightsmaybeprotectedunderthenon-refoulementprinciple,itisimpossibletojustifyasamatterofprincipleinrespectofthescopeofArt3oftheECHR,which,astheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasrepeatedlyremindedus,isabsolute.167Indeed,thiswasemphasizedbythejointdissentingopinionofJudgesTulkens,Bonello,andSpielmaninN v United Kingdom.168AstheJudgesnoted,themajorityoftheCourtadded“worryingpolicyconsiderations”toitsreasoning.169Theyexpressedtheir“strongdisagree[ment]”withthe“highlycontroversial”statementthatabalancingexerciseisinherentinthewholeECHR.AstheJudgesnoted,“thebalancingexerciseinthecontextof[Art]3wasclearlyrejectedbytheCourtinitsrecentSaadi v Italyjudgment”.170InSaadi v Italy,171theCourtstated:172

Sinceprotectionagainstthetreatmentprohibitedby[Art]3isabsolute,thatprovisionimposesanobligationnotto…expelanypersonwho,inthereceivingcountry,wouldruntherealriskofbeingsubjectedtosuchtreatment.AstheCourthasrepeatedlyheld, therecanbenoderogationfromtherule…

164 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).165 See,forexample,R (on the application of Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home

Department[2006]1AC396(HL),wheresuchpolicyconcernswerenotpermissible.166 SeeMcAdam,abovenote87at168,wheretheauthorreferstothisasa“geographically

basedrightshierarchy”.167 TheimpossibilityofjustifyingthispositionwasexplicitlyacknowledgedbySedleyLJin

ZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]EWCACiv1421,paras41–42.168 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).169 Ibidatpara6(jointdissentingopinion).170 Ibidatpara7(jointdissentingopinion).171 [2008]INLR621(ECtHR).172 Ibidatpara138.Interestingly,Hainessuggeststhatthebalancingconcernsintroduced

intothemedicaltreatmentcases“mayforceareexaminationoftheunexplainedrulingthattherightsofcitizensandoftheStatetoexistinsafetyandsecurityareirrelevantunder[Art]3oftheECHR”;seeHaines,abovenote22at86.



TheminorityalsosharplyrebukedthemajorityJudgesfortheirclearconcernaboutfloodgatesandbudgetaryissues—againinconsistentwithestablishedjurisprudence,asdiscussedabove,andalso,intheviewofthedissenters,unjustifiedasamatteroffact.173

Thequestionremainsastowherethisleavesdomesticlegislationthatseekstoexcludefromprotectionthosewhoseclaimsrestsolelyonalackofmedicaltreatmentinthehomestate.Regardlessofthecriticismthatcanbeleveledat theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights’restrictiveapproachtointerpretationofArt3oftheECHRinthiscontext,itremainsthecasethatArt3(and,therefore,presumablyArt7oftheICCPR)iscapableofapplyingtoasituationinwhichaperson’sclaimisbasedon“theimpactonthepersonoftheinabilityofacountrytoprovidehealthormedicalcare,orhealthormedicalcareofaparticulartypeorquality”.174Itmaybethatanexceptionalcasemustbemadeout,assuggestedbyN v United Kingdom,175butitisstillpossible.

Indeed,somuchisborneoutbyananalysisofpostN decisionsintheUnitedKingdomcourts.Forexample, inCA v Secretary of State for the Home Department,176theintendedremovalofawomanwhose(unborn)childwasatriskofcontractingHIVandwhowouldnothaveaccesstoadequatetreatmenttopreventtransmissionofinfectionwasheldtoviolateArt3oftheECHR,“sincetherewillbesubstantialriskofexposingthechildtoHIV/AIDSandthiswouldamounttoexposingtheappellant[themother]toinhumaneordegradingtreatment”.177Thiswasonthebasisthat,“[t]oseeanewbornchilddevelopHIViscapableofbeinginhumaneanddegradingtreatmentparticularlywhereitcouldhavebeenpreventedwithadequate[care]”.178InAJ (Liberia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,179aclaimbya17yearoldformerchildsoldierwasremittedtotheUnitedKingdomAsylumandImmigrationTribunalbecauseithadfailedtoconsider

173 SeeN v United Kingdom (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR),para8( jointdissentingopinion).TheunsatisfactorynatureofthetreatmentofthisissuebyboththeHouseofLordsandtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinNhasledEveLestertoquestionwhetherabetterapproachtoresolvingtheseissueswouldbetoaskwhether“astatehasanobligationtotakestepstoprotect thehumansecurityoftheindividualconcerned,eitheratanindividualleveloratthelevelofhercommunity”;seeLester,abovenote149.

174 SeeNewZealandImmigrationBill,cl121(2)(c).175 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).176 [2004]EWCACiv1165.Thisandthedecisionsbelowareclassifiedas“postN ”asthey

werehandeddownaftertheHouseofLordsdecisioninN,althoughpriortotheEuropeanCourt’saffirmationoftheLords’approach.

177 Ibidatpara25.178 Ibid.179 [2006]EWCACiv1736.



whether,having“nomoney,nohome,andnosupport”,theapplicant“wouldobtainthenecessarymedicationinLiberiaonreturn”.180

Accordingly, to theextent then thatdomestic legislation,suchas isproposedintheNewZealandImmigrationBill,precludessuchaclaim,itisarguablyinconsistentwithobligationsundertheICCPR.

It is interesting,however, tonotethatthereissomeambiguityintheImmigrationBillasitcurrentlystands.Torecall,theBillproposestoexcludefromprotectionthosewhoseclaimisbasedon:181

…theimpactonthepersonoftheinabilityofacountrytoprovidehealthormedicalcare,orhealthormedicalcareofaparticulartypeorquality.

Initsterms,theBilldoesnotexcludeallclaimsrelatedtomedicaltreatment,onlythosewherethecountryisunabletoprovidemedicalcareatallorcareofasufficientquality.Thissectionclearlypreventsaclaimwhereapersonisfromacountrythatsimplydoesnotprovideatallthetreatmentthatthepersonneeds,buttherearetwoscenariosthatmaynotfallwithinthewordsoftheexclusion.First,itisnotclearwhetherapersoncouldstillmakeaclaimwheretheircountryisabletoprovidehealthormedicalcare,butimposesachargeonaccesstothistreatmentthattheapplicantcannotafford;182andsecond,itisnotclearwhetherapersoncouldmakeaclaimwherethereisevidencethattheircountryisabletoprovideaccesstomedicaltreatment,butisunwillingtodosoeithergenerallyorintheparticularcase.

Asamatterofstatutoryinterpretation,itisarguablethattheexclusionplainlyleavesopenthepossibilitythataclaimbasedontheunwillingnessofastatetoprovidemedicalcareorfreemedicalcaremaybepossible.However,it isimportanttonotethatthesameissuehasariseninrespectofthesimilarCanadianprovision,onwhichtheNewZealandImmigrationBillisbased,andtheCanadianFederalCourtofAppealinCovarrubias v Canada183hasnowrejectedtheargumentthataclaimcanbemadewhere

180 Ibidatpara30.181 SeeNewZealandImmigrationBill,cl121(2)(c).182 ThisisclearlyarelevantfactorstillconsideredintheUnitedKingdomcourts,even

afterN v United Kingdom(2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).Forexample,inAJ (Liberia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006]EWCACiv1736,para30,theEnglishCourtofAppealquashedthedecisionoftheAsylumandImmigrationTribunalonthebasisthatitshouldhaveconsidered“theavailabilitytotheclaimantofwhatevermechanismsorfacilitiesexistinthedestinationcountry”.Takingintoaccountthattheapplicant“willhavenomoney,nohomeandnosupport,andthemedicalinfrastructureisexiguousatbest”,HughesLJ(withwhomKayLJandSirMarkPotteragreed)questionedtheAsylumandImmigrationTribunal’sconclusionthattheapplicantwouldbeabletoobtainthenecessarymedicationonreturntoLiberia:ibidatpara30.

183 [2007]3FCR169(CanFCA).



acountryhasthe“financialabilitytoprovideemergencymedicalcare,butchooses,asamatterofpublicpolicy,nottoprovidesuchcarefreelytoitsunderprivilegedcitizens”.184AlthoughtheFederalCourtinSingh v Canada185 hadpreviouslyacknowledgedthat“itisnotentirelyclearwhatParliament’sintentwasinthisregard”,186theFederalCourtofAppealinCovarrubias v Canada187 concludedthatthewords“inabilitytoprovideadequatemedicalservices”must includesituationswhere“aforeigngovernmentdecidestoallocateits limitedpublicfundsinawaythatobligessomeofits lessprosperouscitizenstodefraypartoralloftheirmedicalexpenses”.188TheCourt’sreasoningisverymuchbasedonpragmaticconsiderations,namelythatanyotherinterpretation“wouldrequirethisCourttoinquireintothedecisionsofforeigngovernmentstoallocatetheirpublicfundsandpossiblysecondguesstheirdecisionstospendtheirfundsinadifferentwaythantheywouldchoose”.189

Ontheotherhand,theFederalCourtofAppealwentontofindthattheexclusionshouldnotbeinterpreted“sobroadlyastoexcludeanyclaiminrespectofhealthcare”.190Rather:191

The wording of the provision clearly leaves open the possibility forprotectionwhereanapplicantcanshowthathefacesapersonalizedriskto lifeonaccountofhiscountry’sunjustifiedunwillingness toprovidehimwithadequatemedicalcare,where thefinancialability ispresent.Forexample,whereacountrymakesadeliberateattempt topersecuteordiscriminateagainstapersonbydeliberatelyallocating insufficientresourcesforthetreatmentandcareofthatperson’sillnessordisability,ashashappenedinsomecountrieswithpatientssufferingfromHIV/AIDS,thatpersonmayqualifyunder thesection,for thiswouldberefusal toprovidethecareandnotinabilitytodoso.However,theapplicantwouldbeartheonusofprovingthisfact.

“Inability”, therefore, includes inability either to provide any medicaltreatmentortoprovidemedicaltreatmentthatisfreeofcharge(oratleastaffordable),butitdoesnotincludeunwillingnesstoprovidemedicalcare.Thus,claimsbasedonunwillingnessmaystillbemadeoutinCanada,as

184 Ibidatpara25.185 [2004]3FCR323.186 Ibidatpara23–24.187 [2007]3FCR169(CanFCA).188 Ibidatpara38.189 Ibid.190 Ibidat39.191 Ibid.



exemplifiedinRe X,192inwhichtheImmigrationandReviewBoardofCanadaconcludedthat“theexceptioninsubsection97(1)(b)(iv)doesnotapplytothisclaim,astherisktotheclaimant’slifearisesfromtheunwillingnessoftheZimbabwegovernmenttotakereasonablestepstomakeadequatehealthcareavailabletoitscitizens”.193ThissameanalysiswillpresumablyapplyinNewZealandwhentheImmigrationBillcomesintoforce.

Butdoessuchadistinctionbetween“inability”and“unwillingness”toprovidemedicaltreatmentmakesenseasamatterofinternationallaw?Ofcourse, inthecontextofrefugeeclaims,aclaimwillmostclearlybemadeoutwherethereissuchanintentionaldeprivation,mainlybecauseitisotherwisedifficulttosatisfythenexusclause.Butgiventheabsenceofthenexusrequirementinclaimsbasedoncomplementaryprotection,doesitmakesensetodifferentiatebetweenclaimsbasedon“inability”andthosebasedon“unwillingness”?

Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights seems to havelatchedontothisdistinctionasawayofjustifyingitsdecisioninN v United Kingdom194whenstatingthatArt3of theECHR“principallyappliestopreventadeportationorexpulsionwheretheriskof illtreatment in thereceivingcountryemanatesfromintentionallyinflictedactsofthepublicauthoritiesthereorfromnonStatebodieswhentheauthoritiesareunabletoaffordtheapplicantappropriateprotection”.195TheCourthasjustifieda“highthreshold”inmedicalremovalcasesonthebasisthat“theallegedfutureharmwouldemanatenotfromtheintentionalactsoromissionsofpublicauthoritiesornonStatebodies,butinsteadfromanaturallyoccurringillnessandthelackofsufficientresourcestodealwithitinthereceivingcountry”.196Thistendstosuggestthatthethresholdrequiredtobemetbyanapplicantwillbelowerwhenthelackofmedicaltreatmentisaresultofdeliberateactiononthepartofthestateoforigin.

However, thisappearstobeindirectconflictwithexistingauthority(citedalsobythemajorityinN )thatmakesitclearthat“thesufferingwhichflowsfromnaturallyoccurringillness,physicalormental,maybecoveredby[Art]3,whereitis,orrisksbeingexacerbatedbytreatment,whetherflowingfromconditionsofdetention,expulsionorothermeasures,forwhichthe

192 (ImmigrationandRefugeeBoardofCanada,RPDFileNoTA700927,25January2008,CliffBerry).

193 Ibidatpara48.SeealsoRN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2008]UKAIT00083.194 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).195 Ibidatpara31.SeealsoN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence

Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL),para23.196 Ibidatpara43.



authoritiescanbeheldresponsible”.197Thisindicates,asdiscussedabove,that the“inhumanordegradingtreatment”(asrequiredbyArt3of theECHR)forwhichtheauthoritiesareresponsibleistheremoval/expulsion,andtheresponsibilityofanyotherstateornonstateactor is irrelevant.Thismustbecorrectsince,asestablishedatthebeginningofthisarticle,deportationcasesdonotconcernthestateresponsibilityofthereceivingcountry.AsthejointdissentingopinioninN v United Kingdom,198therefore,argued,aslongastheminimumlevelofseverityisattained,thefactthatthemedicaltreatmentisunavailableratherthanbeingwithheldshouldnotaffectthevalidityoftheclaim.199Ifthisiscorrect,thenitsuggeststhatthereisnojustificationforahighthresholdforcaseseitherofinabilityor unwillingness.Theonlypossiblejustificationwouldbethattheminimumlevelofseverityisreachedmoreeasilywherethehomestatehas“addedtothedegradation”byadoptingpoliciesthatmakeaccesstomedicaltreatmentmoredifficult.200

Notwithstanding this lackofclarity, there is recentauthority in theUnitedKingdomupholdinga“varyingthreshold”to theengagementofArt3,“dependentupon theresponsibilityof thereceivingstate for thecircumstancescomplainedof ”.201Thissuggeststhatwhereanapplicantcanestablishthatthereceivingstateisunwillingtoprovidetreatmenttothem,itwillbemucheasiertomakeoutaclaimforprotectionunderArt3oftheECHRorArt7oftheICCPR.

Beforeconcludingthissectionitshouldbenotedthatthereisonefinalmethodwherebyremovalcouldimplicatetheprohibitiononinhumanor

197 SeePretty v United Kingdom (2002)35EHRR403(ECtHR),para52;N v United Kingdom(2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR),para29.

198 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).199 Ibidatpara5(jointdissentingopinion).200 See theargumentofcounsel inRS (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home

Department[2008]EWCACiv839,para15.201 SeeRN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2008]UKAIT00083,para254,inwhichtheAsylum

andImmigrationTribunalciteditsearlierdecisioninHS (Returning Asylum Seekers) Zimbabwe CG [2007]UKAIT00094,whichhadsetoutthisreasoning.HShadalsoconcernedZimbabwe,butatthetimeitwasdecidedthattherewasinsufficientevidencethat thestatewasresponsiblefor thesocioeconomicdeprivationoccurringin thatcountry.Bycontrast,inRN,theTribunalstated(atpara255)thatthe“freshevidencenowbeforetheTribunaldemonstratesthatthestateisresponsibleforthedisplacementoflargenumbersofpeoplesoastorenderthemhomelessand…theevidencedemonstratesalsothattherehasbeendiscriminatorydeprivationofaccesstofoodaidwhich,plainly,isadeliberatepolicydecisionofthestateactingthroughitschosenagents”.AlthoughtheCourtofAppealhadrejectedthisdistinctioninZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]EWCACiv1421,paras14–16,thelaterdecisioninRS (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2008]EWCACiv839,paras31–35(PillLJ)&39–41(ArdenLJ)suggeststhatthedistinctionmaybevalid.However,thereasoningoftheEnglishCourtofAppealisnot,withrespect,entirelyclearonthispoint.



degrading treatment in the contextofmedical concerns, although it isconceptuallysomewhatdifferentfromthoseconsideredthusfar.Itisacaseinvolvingrisktothementalhealthofaperson(typicallyariskofsuicide)causedbythedecisiontoexpel.Incaseswheretheclaimantreliesonalackofadequatepsychiatricorotherfacilitiesinhisorherhomecountry,essentiallythesameanalysisasoutlinedabovewouldapply.202However,itisalsopossibleforaclaimtobemadeoutbasedonArt3/Art7wheretheimpactofinformingtheapplicantofafinaldecisiontodeportmayincreasetheriskofsuicide.203Insuchacase,“[a]n[Art]3claimcaninprinciplesucceed”,204althoughthecourtshaveallowedsuchclaimsonlyinexceptionalcases.205SuchacasewouldremainopeninjurisdictionssuchasCanadaandNewZealand,notwithstandingtheexclusionofclaimsbasedonlackofmedicaltreatmentalone,sincetheavailabilityoftreatmentinthereceivingstateisnotatissue.206

202 ForauthorityoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsonthispoint,seeBensaid v United Kingdom (2001)33EHRR10(ECtHR),inwhichtheCourtheldthatArt3ofECHRiscapableofapplyinginsuchcases,althoughthecircumstanceswerenotsufficientlyexceptionalorcompellinginthatcase.AlthoughtheEnglishCourtofAppealinCN (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007]EWCACiv587,para25,hasacknowledgedthatthe“circumstancesarenotpreciselyanalogous”,ithasnotedthat“thesimilaritiesaremoreimportantthanthedifferences”.Forrecentauthorityonthisissue,seeKN (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2008]EWCACiv1430;RA (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Health Department[2008]EWCACiv1210,para49.

203 SeeJ v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2005]EWCACiv629,para17.204 Ibidatpara29.205 InR (on the application ofKurtoli) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2003]EWHC2744(Admin),para84,aclaimwasmadeoutonthebasisthat“thenotificationofthedecisiontoremoveMrsKwithhermentalhealthproblemscausedbyherexperiencesinKosovoandtheimplementationofthatdecisionwouldmean…that[her]medicalconditionwouldprobablydeterioratesothatshewouldprobablyormightwellsucceedincommittingsuicide”.

206 AstheCourtnotedinR (on the application ofKurtoli) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003]EWHC2744(Admin),para80,thebasisoftheArt3complaintwas“thelikelytraumacausedtoMrsKandtheconsequencestoherfamilyofhercontemplatingamoveandactuallymovingabroadfromDover.ThereisnocomplaintwhatsoeveroflackofresourcesfortheclaimantoutsidethiscountrywiththeresultthatthereasoningofthemajorityoftheCourtofAppealinNisinapplicabletothiscase.”ThisdistinctionwasalsoclearlydrawninthelaterdecisionoftheEnglishCourtofAppealinJ v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2005]EWCACiv629,inwhichDysonLJnotedthatincasesinvolvingtheriskofsuicide,theriskofaviolationofArt3(and/orArt8)“mustbeconsideredinrelationtothreestages”.Thefirststage—“whentheAppellantisinformedthatafinaldecisionhasbeenmadetoremovehimtoSriLanka”—is“plainlyadomesticcase”:ibidatpara17.Althoughbeingdescribed



B Other deprivations of socio-economic rights under Arts 6 and 7 of the ICCPR

AlthoughmostdiscussionconcerningtheapplicationofArt3/Art7toremovalhasfocusedontherighttomedicaltreatment,thereisanimportantquestionastowhetheritcanapplytoothercontextsaswell,particularlyinlightofthefactthatdomesticlegislationsuchastheNewZealandImmigrationBilldoesnotattempttoprecludeclaimsbasedonsocioeconomicrights,otherthantherighttomedicaltreatment.InN v United Kingdom 207theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsobservedthatalthoughthatcase,likemostofthepreviouscaselaw,wasconcernedwiththeexpulsionofapersonwithanHIVandAIDSrelatedcondition,“thesameprinciplesmustapplyinrelationtotheexpulsionofanypersonafflictedwithanyserious,naturallyoccurringphysicalormental illnesswhichmaycausesuffering,painandreducedlifeexpectancyandrequirespecializedmedicaltreatmentwhichmaynotbesoreadilyavailableintheapplicant’scountryoforiginorwhichmaybeavailableonlyatsubstantialcost”.208TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsdidnot,however,discusstheapplicationofthoseprinciplestoothercasesinvolvingsocioeconomicrights.

CertainlyArt3of theECHRhasbeeninterpretedsoas toapply toothersocioeconomiccontextsin“domesticcases”asalludedtoabove.Forexample,inR (on the application of Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 209theHouseofLordsfoundthattheUnitedKingdom’spolicyofprohibitingasylumseekersfromreceivingwelfarebenefitswhentheirapplicationswerenotfiled“assoonasreasonablypracticable”amountedto“inhumanordegradingtreatment”inviolationofArt3oftheECHR.AsLordBinghamofCornhillexplained,thiswasbecauseanasylumseeker“withnomeansandnoalternativesourcesofsupport,unabletosupporthimselfis,bythedeliberateactionofthestate,deniedshelter,food,orthemostbasicnecessitiesoflife”.210

InDulas v Turkey,211theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsfoundthattheactionoftheTurkishsecurityforcesinburningdowntheapplicant’shomeinthecourseofasecurityoperationamountedtoaviolationofArt3oftheECHR.TheCourtnotedthat:212

asa“domestic”case,whichimpliesalowerthreshold,itappearsthatitnonethelessremainsdifficulttomakeoutacaseonthisground.

207 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).208 Ibidatpara45.209 [2006]1AC396(HL).210 Ibidatpara7.211 (ECtHR,ApplicationNo25801/94,30January2001).212 Ibidatparas54–55.



Theapplicantinthepresentcasewasagedover70atthetimeoftheevents.Herhomeandpropertyweredestroyedbeforehereyes,deprivingherofmeansofshelterandsupport,andobliginghertoleavethevillageandcommunity,whereshehadlivedallherlife.Nostepsweretakenbytheauthoritiestogiveassistancetoherplight.Havingregardtothemannerinwhichherhomewasdestroyedandherpersonalcircumstancestherefore,theCourtfinds that theapplicantmusthavebeencaused sufferingofsufficientseverityfortheactsofthesecurityforcestobecategorizedasinhumantreatmentwithinthemeaningof[Art]3.

Thequestioniswhetherthesameanalysiscanbeappliedintheexpulsioncontext.Further,ifitcan,isitrestrictedtocaseswherethesocioeconomicdeprivationwillbecausedbyintentionalactiononthepartofastate(oranonstateactorwhomthestatecannotcontrol),orcanitapplytomoregeneralizedpoverty?

IntheUnitedKingdomthereisdevelopingjurisprudenceontheextenttowhichArt3oftheECHRprohibitstheremovalofapersonincircumstanceswhereheorshewill faceseriouslydisadvantagedeconomicconditionsonreturn,otherthanalackofmedicaltreatment.Inperhapsthecleareststatementofsupportforsuchextension,theUnitedKingdomAsylumandImmigrationTribunalhasconfirmedthat“[i]tisuncontroversialthatifasaresultofaremovaldecisionapersonwouldbeexposedtoarealriskofexistencebelowthelevelofbareminimumsubsistencethatwouldcrossthethresholdofArt3harm”.213Althoughtheword“uncontroversial”mightbeoverstatingthecase,214claimantshavesuccessfullyarguedthatArt3prohibitstheirremovalinvarioussituations,including,forexample,wheretheapplicantwouldbereturnedto“acampwhereconditionsaredescribedas‘subhuman’and[heorshewould]facemedicalconditionsdescribed

213 Mandali v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2002]UKIAT0741,para10.Forarecentclearstatementonthispoint,seeRN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2008]UKAIT00083,para59,wheretheAsylumandImmigrationTribunalnoted:“Wedoacceptthatpoorlivingconditionsarecapableofraisinganissueunderarticle3iftheyreachaminimumlevelofseverity.”SeealsoPancenko v Latvia(ECtHR,ApplicationNo40772/98,28October1999).

214 Thecaselawhassometimesemphasizedthatsuchacasewillbedifficulttoestablish,althoughhasnonethelessleftthepossibilityopen;see,forexample,R (on the application of Doka) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal[2005]1FCR180,para27,wheretheEnglishQueen’sBenchDivisionquestionedwhether“MrsDokacanpossiblycomeuptoandclearthehighthresholdrequiredin[Art]3”simplyonthebasisofthedestitutionthatshewouldfaceonreturntotheSudan.LindsayJnonethelessquashedthedecisionoftheImmigrationAppealTribunaltorefusepermissiontoappealonthebasisthatthismatterhadnotbeenadequatelyconsidered.



assomeoftheworstintheworld”;215whereanapplicantwas“anamputeewhohadseriousmentalproblemswhowouldnotreceiveeitherfinancialormedicalsupportintheGambia,andwouldonlyhaverecoursetobeggingforhissupport”;216andwherea16yearoldboyreturnedtoKosovowouldbedestituteandwithoutanyprotection.217Thisindicatesahighthreshold,butitshowsthatdireconditionsofpovertymaywellengageArt3oftheECHR(andbyinferenceArt7oftheICCPR).218Italsosuggeststhatthisanalysiscanapplyevenwherethe“inhumanordegradingtreatment”isconstitutedbyanomissioninthereceivingstate,whichisofcourseconsistentwiththereasoninginD v United Kingdom219andN v United Kingdom220 thatthe“implementationofthedecisiontoremove”apersontoanexceptionallydiresituationofsocioeconomicdeprivationmayitselfamounttoinhumantreatment.221As theUnitedKingdomAsylum Policy Instructions state,“[t]heremaybesomecases(althoughanysuchcasesarelikelytoberare)wherethegeneralconditionsinthecountry—forexample,absenceofwater,food,orbasicshelter—aresopoorthatremovalinitselfcould,inextremecases,constituteilltreatmentunderArticle3”.222

Interestingly,theEnglishCourtofAppealappearstohaveupheldthisapplicationofArt3eveninlightoftheHouseofLords’morerestrictiveapproachtomedicalcasesinN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening).223InGH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of

215 SeeOwen v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2002]UKIAT03285,para27.216 SeeR v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Kebbeh(QBD,CO/1269/98,

30April1999,HiddenJ),para58.217 SeeKorca v Secretary of State for the Home Department(UKIAT,AppealNoHX360001

2001,29May2002),para9.TheImmigrationAppealTribunalalsofound(atpara9)thatabreachofArt8(concerningtherighttofamilylife)wouldbebreachedgiventhe“appellant’sage,theabsenceofanyhomeorfamilyinKosovoandtheestablishmentofsomedegreeofhomehere[intheUnitedKingdom]”.SeealsoLM (Democratic Republic of Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008]EWCACiv325.

218 ThehighthresholdseemstohavebeenassumedbytheCourtofAppealinAH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007]EWCACiv297andtheHouseofLordsinAH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008]1AC678(HL).Thesewerecasesconcerning“internalrelocation”inthecontextoftheRefugeeConvention,butitisassumedinthesejudgmentsthatexpulsionmaybepreventedbyArt3oftheECHRwheretheharmfearedisseverepoverty—thepointinthesecasesisthatsuchahighthresholdisnotrequiredforinternalrelocationnottobeareasonableoption.

219 (1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR).220 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).221 SeeD v United Kingdom(1997)24EHRR423(ECtHR),para53.222 UnitedKingdomBorderAgency,Asylum Policy Instructions(October2006),18.223 [2005]2AC296(HL).



State for the Home Department 224theSpecialAdjudicatorhadfoundthattoreturntheapplicantandhisfamilytoKabulwouldamounttoinhumanordegradingtreatmentinviewofthefactthatthefamilywouldbe“reducedeithertolivinginatentinarefugeecampor…inacontainerwithholesknockedinthesidetoactaswindows”.225Inaddition,theapplicantwouldnotbelikelytoobtainworkandhewould“becompetingwithothersforscarceresourcesoffoodandwateraswellasaccommodation”.226TheSpecialAdjudicatorwasparticularlyconcernedabouttheimpactoftheseconditionsonthe“fiveyoung(someofthemveryyoung)children”.TheSecretaryofStateappealedagainstthisdecisiononthebasisthat“adisparityinthesocial,medical,andotherformsofassistanceinthetwostatesisnotbyitselfsufficient”.227Inrejectingtheappeal,theEnglishCourtofAppealstated:228

ThisisnotamedicaltreatmentcaseofthekindconsideredbytheHouseofLordsin[N v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL)]…ForthepurposesofthiscaseitwasnotnecessaryfortheAdjudicatortocompareconditionshereandinAfghanistan.Allthathehadtodowastolookatconditionsthereandconsidertheprobableimpactonthisfamily,bearingfirmlyinmindthatfailedasylumseekersdooftenhavetobereturnedtoacountrywhereconditionsareworsethanthosewhichtheyhaveexperiencedinthe[UnitedKingdom].

Furthermore, in ZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department 229theEnglishCourtofAppealhasalsoindicatedthatthefactofamedicalcondition,suchasHIV/AIDS,maygiverisetoaclaimbasedonArt3oftheECHR,notmerelyonthebasisoflackofmedicaltreatment,butalsowheretheparticulartreatmentaffordedtoanAIDSsuffereronreturn,“intermsofostracism,humiliation,ordeprivationofbasicrights…[adds]toherexistingmedicaldifficulties”.230Ofcourse, insuchan“exceptional”casetheapplicantwouldhaveastrongclaimforrefugeestatusonthebasis

224 [2005]EWCACiv1603.WhilethisdecisionpredatestheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsdecisioninN v United Kingdom (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR),itpostdatestheHouseofLordsdecisioninN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL),whichwasessentiallyendorsedbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.

225 Ibidatpara5.226 Ibid.227 Ibidatpara19.228 Ibidatpara20.229 [2005]EWCACiv1421.230 Ibidatpara18.SeealsoRS (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2008]EWCACiv839,para41,referringtothecasewhereapersonsufferinganillness



ofmembershipofaparticularsocialgroup,butitindicatesthattheUnitedKingdomcourtscontinuetoviewotherformsofsocioeconomicdeprivationasbeingrelevanttoArt3claimsaswell.

Thefinalpointtomakeisthat,asisindicatedbythereferenceaboveinGH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 231 totheapplicant’schildren,acasemaymeettheArt3thresholdmoreeasilywhenitconcernsachild.232ThisisentirelyconsistentwiththeviewoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsthatassessingwhetherthe“minimumlevelofseverity”hasbeenmetisrelative—“itdependsonallthecircumstancesofthecase,suchasthedurationofthetreatment,itsphysicalandmentaleffectsand,insomecases,thesex,age,andstateofhealthofthevictim”.233Indeed, theEuropeanCommissionofHumanRightsfoundacomplaintagainsttheUnitedKingdom’sdeportationofchildrentoNigeriaadmissibleunderArt3oftheECHRonthebasisthatthechildrenwere“ill,isolated,uneducated, and suffering the lossof the facilities they enjoyed in theUnitedKingdom”.234InthemorerecentdecisioninMayeka v Belgium,235theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsfoundthatBelgiumhadviolatedArt3oftheECHRinconnectionwiththemannerinwhichitexpelledachild,namely,inthefactthatitdidnotensurethatshewasaccompaniedorthatshewasmetonreturntoKinshasaintheCongo.

wasputintoaconcentrationcampandsubjectedtoforcedlabourorotherdegradingtreatment.

231 [2005]EWCACiv1603.232 TheHouseofLordshasalso recentlyemphasized the importanceofassessingall

“foreign”(ieexpulsion)casesfromtheperspectiveofanychildreninvolved.InEM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2009]1AllER559(HL)theapplicantssuccessfullychallengedtheremovalofamotherandchildtoLebanononthebasisthatthecompulsoryremovalofthechildfromthemother’scustody(whichwouldoccurasaresultofdiscriminatoryfamilylawinLebanon)wouldviolatetherighttofamilylifeofboththemotherandchild(protectedbyArt8oftheECHR).BaronessHaleofRichmondparticularlyemphasized(atpara48)theimportanceofconsideringthecase“fromthechild’spointofview”.

233 SeeN v United Kingdom (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR),para29.Foranapplicationofthistothecaseofayoungwoman,seeLM (Democratic Republic of Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008]EWCACiv325.

234 Fadele v United Kingdom (1990) HRCD vol 1(1) 15, cited in Blake & Husain,Immigration, Asylum and Human Rights(2003)100.SeealsoTaspinar v Netherlands(1984)8EHRR47(EComHR),wheretheDutchauthoritiesgrantedachildtherighttoremainfollowinganadmissibilitydecisionunderArt3oftheECHR.

235 (2008)46EHRR23(ECtHR).



ThisapproachisalsoconsistentwiththeviewsoftheCommitteeontheRightsof theChild,whichhasemphasizedthat thenon-refoulementobligationsimpliedintotheCRCapply:236

…irrespectiveofwhetherseriousviolationsofthoserightsguaranteedunder theConventionoriginatefromnonStateactorsorwhethersuchviolationsaredirectlyintendedoraretheindirectconsequenceofactionorinaction.Theassessmentoftheriskofsuchseriousviolationsshouldbeconductedinanageandgendersensitivemannerandshould,forexample,takeintoaccounttheparticularlyseriousconsequencesforchildrenoftheinsufficientprovisionoffoodorhealthservices.

Although,asnotedabove, theNewZealandImmigrationBilldoesnotexpresslyincorporatethenon-refoulementobligationsoftheCRCintoitsdomesticcomplementaryprotectionprovisions, it remains thecase thatNewZealandisboundtocomplywiththeCRCanditwouldthereforebeappropriatefordecisionmakerstointerpret“inhumanordegradingtreatment”inviewoftheparticularvulnerabilityofchildren.

Conclusion

Theanalysisinthisarticlehasestablishedthatwhilesocioeconomicrightsareclearlyimplicatedandmustthereforebeconsideredbystatesinexpulsiondecisions,thepotentialramificationshavebeenacauseforconcernnotonlyforthelegislativeandexecutivearmsofstates,butalsoforthejudiciary.JudicialconcernshavebeenexpressedperhapsmosteloquentlybySedleyLJinZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department 237inwhichhisLordshipacknowledgedthatthequestionsraisedinsuchcaseshavenotgivenrisetosatisfactoryjurisprudentialanswers.238AshisLordshipadmitted:239

IfHIVwerearareaffliction,readilytreatableinthe[UnitedKingdom]butnottreatableexceptforthefortunatefewinmanyothercountries,thecourtswouldhavelittlehesitationinholdingremovalofsuffererstosuchcountriestobeinhumantreatmentcontraryto[Art]3.ItisthesheervolumeofsufferingnowreachingtheseshoresthathasdriventheHomeOffice,

236 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin(2005)CRC/GC/2005/6,para27.

237 [2005]EWCACiv1421.238 Ibidatpara41.239 Ibid.



theImmigrationAppellateAuthority,andthecourtstofindjurisprudentialreasonsforholdingthatneither[Art]3or[Art]8canordinarilyavailHIVsuffererswhofaceremoval.

HisLordshipwentontonotethat“[t]hereasoningoftheHousein[N v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Terrence Higgins Trust intervening)240]accepts,ineffect,thattheinternallogicofthe[ECHR]hastogivewaytotheexternallogicofeventswhentheseeventsarecapableofbringingaboutthecollapseofthe[ECHR]system…justasthe[ECHR]hasgrownthroughitsjurisprudencetomeetnewassaultsonhumanrights,itisalsohavingtoretrenchinplacestoavoidbeingoverwhelmedbyitsownlogic”.241HisLordshipfurtherstated:“Ifwhatresultsarerulesratherthanlaw,thatmaybeanunavoidablepricetobepaidforthemaintenanceofthe[ECHR]system.Onehadmuchratheritwerenotso.”242

Theseextractsprovidefascinatinginsightintojudicialreasoninginthisareaandraiseanumberofimportantissues.Clearly,therestrictivereasoning,whichatleastoneprominentjusticehasadmittedisdifficulttojustifyasamatterofprinciple,isbasedonfloodgatesconcerns.Theproblemisthatsuchconcernshavetraditionallynotbeenthoughttoconstitutelegitimatelegalargument.Asexplainedabove,anapprehensionastopresentorfutureabilityandresourcestofulfilanobligationisnotadefencetoaviolationoftheICCPR(ortheECHR).InR (on the application of Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department243 — thecasediscussedaboveinvolvingachallengetotheUnitedKingdom’spoliciesconcerningworkandwelfareentitlementsforasylumseekers—theHouseofLordsacknowledgedthatthelegislationinthatcasewasbasedon“alegitimatepublicconcernthatthiscountryshouldnotmakeitsresourcestooreadilyavailableto[asylumseekers]whiletheirrighttoremaininthiscountryremainsundetermined”,244butremainedfirmthat“engagementinthispoliticaldebateformsnopartofthejudicialfunction”.245

240 [2005]2AC296(HL).241 ZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]EWCACiv1421,para42. 242 Ibid.Interestingly,JonathanParkerLJexplicitlystated(atpara44):“Idonot,formy

part,sharethesentimentsexpressedbySedleyLJinparas41and42above.AsIseeit,practicalconsiderationsarecentraltotheconceptofproportionalitywhichisenshrinedinthe[ECHR].AccordinglyIdonotrecognizethatthe[ECHR]hasan‘internallogic’whichonoccasionhastogivewaytothe‘externallogicofevents’.Onthecontrary,asitseemstome,the‘logic’ofthe[ECHR]positivelyembracespracticalconsiderations.”

243 [2006]1AC396(HL).244 Ibidatpara13.245 Ibidatpara14.ThiscanbecontrastedwithLordHopeofCraighead’sstatementinN v

Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening) [2005]2AC296(HL),para53thatshouldtheHouseallowtheappeal,“[t]hiswouldresultin



Furthermore,evenifweweretoallowconsiderationoftheseissues,itisstrikingthatthefloodgatesconcernisnotsupportedbytherealityofrefugeemovements,at leastastheyimpactondevelopedcountries.InitsrecentreportonthetreatmentofasylumseekersintheUnitedKingdom,theHouseofLords/HouseofCommonsJointCommitteeonHumanRightscriticizedtheUnitedKingdomGovernment’sassertionofthephenomenonof“healthtourism”,onwhichithasbasedanumberofpoliciesthatrestrictaccesstohealthcareforcertaingroupsofasylumseekersessentiallyonthebasisthatprovidingtreatment,suchasHIVtreatment,would“actasadrawforotherstocometothe[UnitedKingdom]forfreetreatment”.246TheCommitteefoundthattherewasnoevidenceatalltosupporttheextentofsuch“healthtourism”.247Rather,researchsuggestedthatmostrecentmigrantswithHIVwereunawareoftheirillnessuntiltheyhadbeenintheUnitedKingdomformorethanninemonths.248AsBettinsonandJonespointout,thismakessensewhenweconsiderthelackofaccesstotestingcentresinlargepartsofsubSaharanAfricaandtheknownstigmathatHIVcarriesinmanycountries.249Indeed,thejointdissentingopinionintheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsdecisioninN v United Kingdom250 citedstatistics—notablylackingfromthedecisionsofthemajorityoftheHouseofLordsinN v Secretary of State for the Home Department(Terrence Higgins Trust intervening)251 andSedleyLJinZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department 252—thatmakeitclearthat“thesocalled‘floodgate’argumentistotallymisconceived”.253Intheabsenceofgoodevidencebearingoutthefloodgatesconcern,theHouseofLords/HouseofCommonsJointCommitteeonHumanRightsrecommended

averygreatandnodoubtunquantifiablecommitmentofresourceswhichitis,tosaytheleast,highlyquestionablethestatespartiestothe[ECHR]wouldeverhaveagreedto”.HisLordshipthenwentontopropose(atpara53)thatthebettersolutionwouldbe“forstatestocontinuetoconcentratetheireffortsonthestepswhicharecurrentlybeingtaken,withtheassistanceofthedrugscompanies,tomakethenecessarymedicalcareuniversallyandfreelyavailableinthecountriesofthethirdworld”.

246 HouseofLords/HouseofCommonsJointCommitteeonHumanRights,The Treatment of Asylum Seekers, TenthReportofSession20062007,HLPaper812(30March2007),para164.

247 Ibidatpara5.248 Ibidatpara161,citingevidencepresentedtotheCommitteebytheTerrenceHiggins

Trust.249 Bettinson&Jones,“TheFutureofClaimstoResistRemovalbyNonNationalsSuffering

fromHIV/AIDS”(2007)28LiverpoolLRev183,192–193.250 (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR).251 [2005]2AC296(HL).252 [2005]EWCACiv1421.253 N v United Kingdom (2008)47EHRR39(ECtHR),para8( jointdissentingopinion).



that,inthedevelopmentofasylumpolicy,“theGovernmentshouldproceedonthebasisofevidence,ratherthanassertion”.254

Whilewecanpredictsuch(sometimesmisconceived)policyargumentstostronglyinfluencepoliticaldecisionsconcerningimmigration,includingtheintroductionoflimitationsandexclusionsintodomesticlegislation,itisofgraveconcernthatsuchfactorshavebeguntoinfiltratejudicialreasoninginthisarea.Thisarticlethereforeconcludeswithacalltoalldecisionmakersvestedwiththetaskofinterpretinginternationaltreatyobligationsinthenon-refoulementcontexttotakeaprincipledapproachthatrecognizesthelogicofaccommodatingsocioeconomicrightsviolationswithintherubricofexistingnon-refoulementobligations.Itisarguablethatacommitmenttotheruleoflaw—nottopoliticalconcerns—andfidelitytotheobjectandpurposeofinternationaltreatiesisthesurestmethodofmilitatingagainstanypotential“collapse”255oftheinternationalhumanrightssystem.

254 HouseofLords/HouseofCommonsJointCommitteeonHumanRights,abovenote246,para5.

255 ZT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]EWCACiv1421.


non-refoulement on the basis of socio-economic deprivation

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