The Southern Journal uf Philosuphj. (1987) Vol. X X V . No. 4

NOMlC RELIABILISM: WEAK RELIABILITY IS N O T ENOUGH* Frederick Adams Central Michigan University David Kline Iowa State University

1.

Reliabilism has received its share of bad press of late both as a theory of knowledge! and as a theory of epistemicjustification.2 We believe its credibility as a theory of knowledge may have been unjustly tarnished and we plan to defend it. However, we hasten to add that we shall defend reliabilism from attack only upon its credentials as a basis for a theory of knowledge. We shall not defend it as a theory of epistemic justification. although we do believe that the latter is a worthy endeavor.’

For clarification. there are three questions at the heart of episte- mology that reliability theories may help answer: ( K ) When does S’s belief that p constitute knowledge?; (J) When does S’s belief that p constitute an epistemically justified belief?; (R) When does S’s belief that p constitute a rational belief?

The questions are listed separately because we4foresee the possibility of three independent answers. Some epistemic theories (coherentism seems to f i t ) aspire to a unified theory of knowledge. justification and rationality-where one analysis fits all. But there is no antecedent reason why the answers to these three questions could not come apart.

With respect to reliability theories. it is imaginable that they will answer question (K), but neither (J) nor (R). This would result if the analysis of knowledge required a nomic relation between believer and world (reliable relation) where the grounding of that relation went

Frederick Adatm is an Assisran! Prufessor q f Phi1osoph.v at Central Michigan Uniwrsir,.. He has published in rhe areas qrepisrerno1og.l~. philosophy qfmind, and acrion theor,,.

David Kline is an Associare Professor of Philosophy a1 Iowa Stare University. He has published arricles in rhe philosophy vf science, ethics. and history qfphilosophli. He is also a co-editor andconrriburor ro Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science. He is (urrenrlr chair qf rhe deparrnienr ar 1ou.a Srare.

433

essentially beyond the cognitive grasp of the knower. The question of knowledge would receive an “externalist” answer-for, it would turn out not to be in the head . , . not only in the head.5

Justification and rationality, on the other hand, may require that the agent have cognitive grasp of what justifies his belief or makes it rational. The questions of justification and rationality may require, at least in part, an “internalist” or “coherentist” answer. For they may require cognitive grasp as an essential component-meaning that they cannot be outside the head . . . not wholly.

There is also the possibility of reliability theory corning up with answers to ( K ) and (J), but not (R). This would be the result of showing that S’s true belief that p could constitute knowledge if reliably caused and if the justification for the belief is beyond S’s cognitive grasp (external). Yet, since S does not have grasp of the reliable formation of his belief he may, from his perspective, think it is only a hunch or a whim which causes him to believe that p. S could himself consider his believing that p irrational. This is so in Laurence Bonjour’s “clair- voyance cases,”6 where the clairvoyant believes, with good reason, that he is not a clairvoyant. Yet, he is! So he has knowledge, says a reliabilist, even if he is irrational (assuming rationality does not receive a purely reliabilistic interpretation). He has knowledge, and justified belief (externally justified) solely on the basis of the belief‘s reliable etiology.’

Other possibilities should be readily available to support our initial open-mindedness. Of course, the final outcome turns on how reliability theories come to be fleshed out. Lately they have come under heavy fire and while all is not well, we feel thafa premature burial is being planned. Some object ions may indeed have killed off reliabil ists’ answers to question (R), or (J) but not to ( K ) . We fear that a failure to sort out these possibilities may lie at the heart of a good many of the objections to reliabilism, and that is why we open with these distinct questions. Their answers may well come apart.

For instance, one may show that S’s belief is rational orjustified from the perspective of all information available to S-but S may lack knowledge due to the unreliability of the formation of the belief and to detect this may require information that no one possesses. This may show that a justified or a rational belief may not depend on reliable formation. I t does not, however, show that knowledge does not so depend. We shall heed this general strategy in what follows for showing what is not wrong with reliability approaches to question ( K ) .

11.

Reliabilists depict knowledge as reliably caused (informed or causally sustained) belief. Nearly everyone accepts that a belief must be true to constitute knowledge. And nearly everyone agrees that the cause of the truth of the belief cannot be a matter of accident8 (brain tumor, toss of coin, misinformation, etc.). After that, agreement fragments. Yet,

434

reliability theorists unite in holding that there must be an information- bearing relation (causal for some, not all) stretching from the fact that corresponds with the belief (rendering it true) to the formation of the belief. That relation must be reliable and i t must be reliably instantiated in order for the belief-end of the relation to constitute knowledge. Differences among reliability theorists come upon the scene in the analysis of the reliability relation and in the analysis of the instantiation of the reliability relation.9

A currently popular strategy for attacking reliabilism is to try to show that reliable belief-formation is not necessary for knowledge. The structure of argument is to define a"weak"sense of reliability and claim that if an attack works to show that not even weak reliability is necessary for knowledge, then surely the same argument would work against stronger conditions on reliability.10

Let the weak reliability relation be one in which the processes that lead to belief-formation yield statistically more true beliefs than false beliefs over a specified measure of time." That will serve for a standard of "weak reliability."The goal of the critic is to find a process that is not even weakly reliable but one which still yields knowledge.

Ourjob will be to deflect such cases. We will go through the standard moves to provide them and show why they do not work. Then we shall try to account for the temptation to construct such attempts at counter-examples.

Case I : S comes to believe that p via a process type P (perceptual, say) that generates mostly false beliefs in other people, but not in S.

We can fill this out as we please. S may deceive others with respect to process type P or a demon D may deceive others but let S alone (nomically avoid S). If S's cognitive belief-formation process P is type- identical with that of those deceived, then the process type P will be statistically unreliable-yielding more false beliefs than true on average (across all perceivers). But still it seems that S should be able to know that p by process P-for, recall, S is systematically not affected by the deceit as are the others. Then, S knows that p by a process type that is not even weakly reliable.

A closer look reveals that case 1 is not a case of knowledge-minus- reliably-formed-belief. The identity conditions for process type P will either embrace S's perceptual system or not. I f they do, then the demon (or whatever) that is causing the deceit in the perception of others must be active in S's own perceptual system. Otherwise, S and others will not share a type of process P. But if this is the case then S will not know that p via process P. S will not as long as there is no way to tell when P is defective and when not-as must be the case for S, if it is so for others and they share the same process type P upon which their beliefs rest. In this way lies no counter-example to reliabilism. P is not weakly reliable for S nor the others, but neither does it yield knowledge. For in the case

435

we must assume that S’s perceptual processes are type-identical to P and P is unreliable. That means that S’s instantiation of P is subject to demon deception at any time and the case also assumes that neither S nor anyone has a way of telling when the deception begins or ends. Under these conditions S does not know that p via process type P.

For example, suppose demon D causes hallucinations from time to time and that there is no indication when the hallucinations begin or end. So neither S nor anyone can tell, of a particular perceptual experience via process P. whether it is veridical o r not-say, that a cup is on the table. Fo r on a random occasion it may be a cup S sees and on another random occasion it may be nothing that S sees, as D is causing it to seem to S as if there is a cup when there is not.

O n the other hand, let us look at the case from a different perspective-one in which S may well have knowledge. I f the identity conditions for the process type P do not include S’s own perceptual system, then S’s system may well be more than weakly reliable. It may be nomical/v reliable. For if demon D systematically never interferes with S’s perceptual system, that system has a different causal etiology than that of S’s peers. S’s perceptual process may be nomically reliable and generate knowledge that p for S. Still there is no counter-example. N o unreliable process is yielding knowledge that p for S. Suppose that D is benign with respect to S (something of a guardian angel) but to no one else. Suppose also that D is absolutely felicitous with respect to avoiding interfering with S’s perceptual system P so as to be nomically so. I t is clear to us that the etiologies of perceptual process P for S and P for everyone else are different. Different enough to make P for S (call i t P*) and P for everyone else (call it P’, not P*) different-as different as an electrical switch with a short in it as opposed to one without. If P* holds reliably under conditions of nomic non-interference by D, but P’ does not, because of D’s interference, then we have no counter- example on this reading of the case. A nomic reliability relation is still required for knowledge(a process like P*, not P’). But then, there is still no counter-example even on this reading of case 1 .

The failure of case I suggests a new attempt a t a counter-example to be constructed by relativizing reliability to a single person. One may want t o say that process P is reliable fur S. The following case is thought12 to show that even relativizing what counts as a reliable process type to a single individual will not save reliability theories, for one can still know via a process not even weakly reliable.

Case 2: S has been deceived by demon D in the past, but is deceived no longer with respect to process P. S knows this about P. S now forms the belief that p via process P.

The thought here is that since P has been manipulated by demon D i n the past, its average output may favor false beliefs over true ones for S. Hence, it is statistically unreliable. But, since the demon is no longer

436

active, S may know that p now. Say, for instance, S knows via sight (P) that his coffee cup is full (p) and knows this by a process not even weakly reliable-because of the demon’s prior activity.

Again, we maintain that there can be no counter-example. Let us be careful about the specification of the example. S supposedly knows at t3 (a time posterior t o demon D’s final act of deception): that he is not presently under the manipulation of a demon, that he has been manipulated in the past at t I (a time prior t o the demon’s last official deception), that p, and that the cognitive process P resulting in S’s belief that p is unreliable (due to the long period over which it has averaged more false than true outputs).

It is crucial t o the example that the same cognitive process be in operation at times t 1 and t3. I f not, the example fails-for in virtue of one process (at t3) S knows that p, while in virtue of another (at t I ) S does not. There is no counter-example since S’s knowledge that p, when it comes, is not via a single type of unreliable process P.

To insure the same process type P is in operation throughout we shall drop S’s knowledge about past and present demon behavior. Thus, we d o not have to worry about whether S has a special knowing process (demon intuition) other than P via which S knows of the demon. Let the demon D be active. At t l D is malevolent, after t3 D is nomically benign. Now S will clearly come to believe that p via a single cognitive process type P prior to t3 or after, but there is then no counter-example. Under these conditions S does not know that p. For, prior to 13 S cannot differentiate the times t I or t3 and does not know when the demon is active (inactive). 13 Thus, under these conditions in case 2, S does not have knowledge and there is no counter-example.

We may, however, have another reading of case 2 upon which S does come to have knowledge. Call the perceptual process which generates belief p in S, R I . Also if S knows of the demon, let us call the process by which S knows this R2. If S were to know that p when the demon is no longer active (at t3 or after), it must be by process R * ( R I + R2). At t I , when S’s cognitive processes are unreliable, S employs the process R I only. Clearly R* and R1 are different-not the same process type P. Thus, there is no counter-example-no single unreliable process type P via which S knows that pa t one time, but not at another-even if there is a reading of the case on which S could have knowledge. For we are assuming that if process R * is to give S knowledge that p, R * must be a strongly reliable (nomically reliable) process. It must enable S to discriminate when the demon is (or is not) operating on S. Otherwise, we have the reading of the case in the preceding paragraph and there is no counter-example because there is no knowledge.

We could turn this case around-say that the demon has not deceived S in the past or present. S o S now knows that p via process P. But the demon will begin shortly to deceive and in the long run the process type P will be not even weakly reliable for S or anyone. But this is just the

437

mirror image of case 2. The same points hold against it, muratis mutandis. Either, prior to deceit there is a different process (mirror image of R*) and S knows that p via that reliable process; or there is not a different process and S does not know that p. for he cannot differentiate when the demon becomes active from when not. The process is not reliable and does not yield knowledge (mirror image of R I ) .

The next case is designed to relativize not to persons but t o contexts. I t is thought to be problematic to d o so, but we will try to relieve that suspicion. 14

Case 3: Suppose a demon deceives us, not about everything experienced from perceptual process P, but only about rhings more than two.feet away. Then S comes to believe that p via process P.

Since more of our beliefs via P may be about things more than two feet away than not, P may be an unreliable process on average. Yet if S can know that p via P, we have a counter-example. (Let p = that there is a cup on the table 16 inches from S; and continue to let P = perception).

Our intuitions unflaggingly tell us that we have no counter-example here. As we see i t , there are two ways to approach this. They concern how one type-identifies the process P. We can include the actions of the demon in the specification ofthe process type P. I f so, then thecase goes pretty much the way of the last two. Or we can identify the process P independently of the demon and think of the demon as providing inputs t o the process. He does not interfere with the process itself, but only with the background conditions under which the process is optimal.

On an interpretation of case 3 which yields knowledge that p for S, there is no counter-example to nomic reliabilism. Suppose we know that the demon is active and know his nomic boundaries are perceptions beyond a two-foot radius. Now all we need to know is how to tell when something is less than two feet away. But surely that is manageable. Since the demon is nomically inactive inside of two feet we can even use measuring rods! What is the problem? When there is knowledge, as we d o not deny, i t is by a nomically reliable process. No counter-example! (Notice: we do not even have to include that we know the demon's boundaries. We would have knowledge of things inside of two feet regardless. However, we would not have metaknowledge that we had knowledge of things inside of two feet if we did not know the demon's nomic boundaries.)

On the other hand, if there is no way to tell when something is inside of two feet (for what reason we d o not know), then we fail t o see how a counter-example could be generated. Perceptual knowledge via process P would not be possible in such a world. For any given perceptual belief that p, its truth would be purely accidental under the description"be1ief formed via process P." Again, no counter-example-no reliable belief- formation, but no knowledge generated either.

438

Alternatively, one might identify the process type P independently of the demon’s activity. The perceptual process may be quite reliable, taken by itself.15 Things go wrong when the demon skews the inputs- like feeding false inputs into a validity machine. The validity machine is perfectly reliable, as long as the demon leaves its innards alone. But the whole process (inputs + machine) will be unreliable, if falsehoods are fed in for the most part. If the demon skews the inputs (information in perceptual inputs), this too will throw the whole perceptual process (perceptual mechanism + inputs) into disarray. But even here, no counter-example can be formed. For, in such a case, perceptual knowledge via a perceptual process widely type-identified in this way will simply not be possible. I t would be only if S had a way to detect when an input was skewed-as if one had a way to know when a false input went into a validity machine. We are assuming S has no such means. but were he to, that would make perceptual knowledge possible. But it would then be possible by a process that is reliable. Perceptual process P + detection process P’ (detecting skewed inputs) would generate a nomically reliable composite process P* (along the lines we saw earlier with R*). Thus, there is still no counter-example to nomic reliabilism.

We are not assuming that, in general, one must beable to tell when his beliefs are reliably formed and when not (second order knowledge). For the most part. in normal contexts, as long as our beliefs are reliably formed ( in the strong sense of “reliable”) then we will have knowledge. But in cases 2 and 3, recall, there is a demon active and we must, in such a world, be able to discriminate the boundaries of his actions to have any knowledge at all. (We are assuming that our world is not the demon world, but if it were, then we would have to be able to discriminate- second order-reliably formed beliefs to have any knowledge-first order-as well.)

Case 3 adds a new wrinkle-relativization of reliability to a domain. Several recent papersih have attacked this idea but without justification. I t is nodoubt preferable to not relativize ifpossible, but not disastrous if necessary. The obvious point is that if one relativizes too far ( to truth), one trivializes the notion of reliability. But no one has shown that reliability theories must go this far.

I t is standard practice to build instruments, say, that work in a certain domain or within a certain tolerance. Within the domain or tolerance they may be as reliable as you please. As long as we have a way of telling when we are within the given domain, there is no threat to reliabilism. The level on my gas gauge is accurate when my car is standing still, but not when it is moving. It is moving more often than not when I am in my car. So it is not even weakly reliable when I am in my car. But surely when standing still 1 know how much gas is in my car by using the gauge. We fail t o see how this could generate a counter-example. The relativization here is t o the car’s being moving or not moving, not t o

439

“whatever the conditions are when the proposition about how much gas is in the tank is true.” That would be one way to relativize, but i t is clearly the wrong way and clearly not the only way. We cannot here respond to every objection to relativization, but we believe the spirit of our replies to them is captured by examples of instruments and optimal functional domains and tolerances. Specifying a domain of optimal functioning for a conduit of information (nature’s or man’s) need not trivialize the notion of reliable processes. This is no more true than that specifying the background conditions under which an ideal law holds trivializes the law.

111.

We hope to have laid to rest some worries about reliabilism. Their sources are not totally clear, but some possible misconceptions spring to mind. One is the very notion of “weak reliability”itse1f. It suggests that if weak reliability is a statistical accounting of minimally more true outputs than false, then strong reliability must be statistically more true outputs than false. Any strongly reliable process, then, can be analyzed in these terms. But this is a huge misconception. A purely statistical fact that a process yields significantly more truths than falsehoods is at best a symptom of reliability, not its analysis. Part of what makes a process reliable will surely involve the content of the propositions processed. That is, why is it that the process averages significantly more true outputs than false ones? Surely something about the well-functioning conditions of such a process will be involved and the most likely answer will be that it hasa means ofdetectingcontentsl7and truthvaluesand of sifting the falsehoods from the truths. Therefore, we would expect a full analysis of reliable processes to show sensitivity to the content of the information being processed and utilized to yield the statistical symptom of high truth to falsehood ratios. Even if reliable processes are not sensitive to truth values and contents per se there may be a correlation between what a process is sensitive to and truth and content. But the point is that there must be much more to it than the statistical notion. Reliability must have more of a nomic flavor and a mechanism to sustain it.

Another is the problematic matter of how high the output ratio of truths to falsehoods must be. Raise i t too high and we insure skepticism. Make it too low and we will seem to know things we d o not. I t is expected, for example, that most would place “strong”re1iability in the 99%+ neighborhood of true to false outputs. This is, however, too weak. A gas gauge, for instance, with a 99.8% reliable rating, but with no way to detect the .2% occasion of errors will not yield knowledge. I t may indeed be good enough to yield rational beliefs or justified beliefs. (Recall, we hold out the possibility of separating out questions ( K ) , (J) and (R)). And it is plain that this has been a source of confusion over reliabilism. Showing that a belief formed by a n unreliable process is a

440

rational belief does not, by itself, show the demise of reliabilism. One must also show that reliabilism must hold rationality to depend on reliable processes or show that reliabilism has no means of coping with internalistic approaches to rationality vs. externalistic approaches. Neither has been done and yet some arguments against reliabilism presuppose one or the other. So how high must the reliability go and are there any sources of such reliability in existence? Probably no such gas gauges exist, for instance!

Finally, the difficulty facing type-identification of reliable processes presents enormous challenges. In our analysis of the errors of cases above, we show how losing track of the causal chains which carve out the boundaries for such processes leads to misunderstanding. We were able to detect errors stemming from merely confusing the causal chains themselves-feeding into the reliable (or unreliable) processes. We did not even get to the challenge of carving out processes which are reliable under one description, but not reliable under another. We think this can all be handled, of course-but not here. Therefore, we admit the challenges for reliabilism are there, but steadfastly maintain that they have not been shown to be insurmountable. Despite many an ominous prognosis-reliabilism lives and is still epistemically sound.

NOTES

* We wish to thank Robert Audi. Richard Foley. John Heil. Steve Kimbrough and Andrew Naylor for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

I See[6], [9], [lo], [ I I ] . [8]contains many critiques of Dretske's information-theoretic analysis of knowledge(which we regard as a nomic reliabilism of the type we are defending here). [lo] contains objections aimed specifically at Dretske's information-theoretic account and at reliabilism. in general. Our defense of a nomic reliabilism answers these objections and supports a view such as Dretske's as well.

*See[6],[9],[11],and[l3]. ? Alston [ I ] and [2]. and Bach [5 ] defend a reliability theory ofjustification. We would

endorse this defense if we could agree that justification is a necessary condition of knowledge. See [3].

Ginet makes a similar division for similar reasons in [ 131. 5 We mean that the knowledge relation itself is not "in the head"so that the information

6 See BonjourS examples in (61. 'See [3] for other examples and similar defense of a nomic reliabilism which allows

knowledge even when the belief formed is not justified from the perspective of the believer. For two senses of "accident." one of which would allow knowledge. see [3]. For the

most part, however. accidentally formed belief is coincident with lack of knowledge. Contrast. for example, the views of Dretske [7]. [8] and Goldman [I21 who differ

significantly. despite being what we would consider reliabilists. (As stated, we find ourselves closer to Dretske's version.) Fine distinctions proliferate at this point and we intend to resolvedifferences in an attempt at simplification. We shall not actually attempt to hammer out an analysis of the reliability relation itself that is satisfactory on all sides. Instead. we shall show that certain complaints which are aimed at showing that no such satisfactory analysis is forthcoming are wide of the mark. For this reason we shall not try to cover every conceivable angle on the difficult matter of analyzing the reliability relation. And from time to time we shall single out for attention only certain links or

channel which secures knowledge may also extend beyond our grasp.

44 I

segments of the reliable relationship between fact and belief. For each link or segment must itself be reliable to yield knowledge.

lo Foley takes this strategy in [lo] and [ I I]. Goldman characterizes reliabilism in such a way that one could construe reliability

weakly in [ IZ] . Foley [lo]. [ I I ] and others pick up and use this to reject reliabilism. We believe that this is a mistake and that only a nomic analysis will suffice for knowledge.

I? See both Foley [lo], [ I I ] and Feldman [9]. I 3 Unlike Lehrer [I41 and others. we d o not hold that knowledge requires

metaknowledge (that knowing that p requires knowing that one knows that p nor that knowing by means of a reliable process P requires knowing that P is reliable) and we should not be taken to be implying this by these cases. In them one must be able to distinguish certain processes which are reliable from others which are not, but not necessarily know that they are reliable. For example, ifwe havea perfectly reliable watch and one that is unreliable and we would absolutely never wear the unreliable one(not our style). we must be able to distinguish the reliable watch from the unreliable one to have knowledge of the time by using i t . We d o not need to prove i t is reliable!

l 4 See [9]. [lo]. and [ I I].

defending reliability theories. Lehrer makes a similar move in [ 141. although the context is different and he is not

I h For examples. see Feldman [9]. Foley [lo], [ I I]. and Goldman himself [12]. I f See [4] where arguments are considered (and rejected) to show that content cannot

figure in a causal explanation of behavior (nor. by extension. into a causal explanation of reliable belief-formation). This isan important point at which epistemologyand cognitive science overlap-the problem of semantic content and causal explanation.

REFERENCES

[ I ] Alston. William. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" The Munisr. 68 (1985): 57-89.

[2] . . . . . . "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology" fhilosophicol Topics. 14 ( 1986): 179-22 I ,

[3] Adams. Frederick. "The Function of Epistemic Justification" Conadion Journal of Philosoph.r. 16 ( 1986): 465-492.

. . ."Comparison Shopping in the Philosophyof Mind"Cririco. 27( 1986): 45-71.

[5] Bach. Kent. "A Rationale for Reliabilism" The Monist. Vol. 68 (1985): 246-263.

[6] Bonjour. Laurence. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge" Midwesr Studies in fhilosophj.. Vol. 5 (1980): 53-73.

[7] Dretske. Fred. Knowledge ond rhe Flow qf hformorion. (Cambridge. MA: MITI Bradford. 1981).

[8]. . . . . . "Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information" The Behaviorolond Bruin Sciences. Vol. 6 (1983): 55-90.

[9] Feldman. Richard. "Reliability and Justification" The Monisr. Vol. 68 ( 1985): 159- 174.

[ 101 Foley. Richard. "Dretske's 'Information-Theoretic' Account of Knowledge" Svnrhese. 70 ( 1987): 159- 184.

[ I I ] . , , . . . "What's Wrong with Reliabilism?" The Monisr. Vol. 68 (1985): 188-202

442

[I21 Goldman, Alvin. “What is Justified Belief?” in George S. Papas, ed., Justification and Knowledge (Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 1979): 1-23.

[I31 Ginet, Carl. “Contra Reliabilism” The Monist. 68 (1985): 175-187.

[I41 Lehrer, Keith. “The Coherence Theory of Knowledge” Philosophical Topics. 14 (1986): 5-25.

443