1. 1. 5 Contents Click on number to go to pageForeword................................................................................... 12Preface to the Updated Edition.................................................... 15 NotesPreface....................................................................341. Fanning the Flames................................................................ 36 NotesChapter 1 ................................................................452. The Origins of the Special Relationship.................................. 47 1. Levels of Support: Diplomatic, Material, Ideological ..............48 2. Causal Factors .................................................................54 2.1 Domestic Pressure Groups and their Interests ...........54 2.2 U.S. Strategic Interests.............................................61 2.2.1 Threats to U.S. Control of Middle East Oil ...................62 2.2.2 The Indigenous Threat: Israel as a Strategic Asset ........66 2.2.3 Subsidiary Services ..................................................71 3. American Liberalism and Ideological Support for Israel ..........78 NotesChapter 2 ................................................................873. Rejectionism and Accommodation ........................................... 95 1. A Framework for Discussion ..............................................96 1.1 The Concept of Rejectionism ....................................96 1.2 The International Consensus.....................................98 2. The Stands of the Major Actors ........................................102 2.1 The United States ..................................................102 2.2 Israel .....................................................................104Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
2. 2. 6 2.2.1 The Rejectionist Stands of Labor and Likud ...............104 2.2.2 The Legacy of the Founding Fathers .........................114 2.2.3 The Disguise .........................................................116 2.3 The Population of the Occupied Territories ...................118 2.3.1 Attitudes under Occupation .....................................119 2.3.2 The Carrot and the Stick .........................................124 2.3.3 The Peace Process ..............................................131 2.3.4 The United States and the Conquered Population .......132 2.4 The Arab States and the PLO .................................134 2.4.1 The Erosion of Rejectionism and the U.S.-Israeli Response........................................................................................134 2.4.2 Sadats Trip to Jerusalem and the Rewriting of History 1443. The Continuing Threat of Peace .......................................152NotesChapter 3 ..............................................................1614. Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds........................... 1741. The Pre-State Period ................................................1752. The War of Independence/Conquest ..........................1833. The Israel-Arab Wars ................................................1894. After the 1967 Conquest ..........................................196 4.1 The Settlement Policies of the Labor Governments ........197 4.2 Settlement under Begin and Reagan .......................202 4.2.1 Policies.................................................................202 4.2.2 Reactions..............................................................204 4.2.3 Policies (Continued) ...............................................212 4.3 The Demographic Problem and its Solution ............217 4.4 The Workforce and the Labor Alignment .................219 5. The Ways of the Conqueror .............................................229 5.1 The West Bank ......................................................229 5.2 The Golan Heights .................................................243Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
3. 3. 75.3 The Attack on Palestinian Culture ...........................2465.4 The Opportunity to Work in Israel ........................2555.5 Israeli Inquiries and American Suppression .............258 6. The Testimony of the Samidin..........................................261 7. The Cycle of Occupation, Resistance, Repression and MoralDegeneration .........................................................................267 7.1 Americans Hear the News ......................................267 7.2 The Rise of Religious-Chauvinist Fanaticism ...........272 8. Conflicts within Israel .....................................................281 8.1 Within the Jewish Community ................................281 8.2 Non-Jews in the Jewish State .................................282 9. The Zionist Movement and the PLO ..................................288 9.1 The Boundaries of Zionist Aspirations ..................288 9.2 Moderates and Extremists ......................................293 9.3 The Use of Terror ...................................................295 10. The Problem for Today..................................................300 NotesChapter 4 ..............................................................3025. Peace for Galilee.................................................................. 323 1. The Rational Basis for Attacking the Civilian Population ......325 2. The Northern Border of Greater Israel................................327 3. The Background in Lebanon ............................................329 3.1 The PLO and the Civil War .....................................329 3.2 Syria and Israel in Lebanon ....................................330 3.3 The Population under the PLO and the Phalange ....332 3.4 Israeli Military Operations in Lebanon in the 1970s 335 4. From July 1981.............................................................343 4.1 The July Bombardments and the Habib Cease-Fire .343 4.2 The Occupied Territories .........................................343 4.3 The Sinai Withdrawal .............................................344Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
4. 4. 84.4 Israeli Provocations and the U.S. Response ............3464.5 The Pretext for the Invasion of Lebanon ..................3494.6 The Reasons for the Invasion of Lebanon ................352 4.6.1 The Imperatives of Rejectionism...............................352 4.6.2 Achieving National Unity .....................................369 4.6.3 A New Order in Lebanon .....................................371 4.7 The Green Light from Washington ..........................374 5. War is Peace .................................................................380 5.1 Extermination of the Two-Legged Beasts.................381 5.2 Beirut: Precision Bombardment ..............................3925.3 Caring for the Victims: Prisoners, Patients, Refugees ........................................................................................3995.4 The Grand Finale ...................................................419 6. The Taste of Victory........................................................4226.1 The Victors .............................................................4226.2 The Liberated .........................................................4236.3 Israelis ...................................................................4366.4 The American Scene...............................................454 7. The Critique of the Media ................................................4837.1 The American Media ..............................................483 7.2 The Broad-scale Mass Psychological War againstIsrael ................................................................................496 7.3 The Israeli Media ...................................................509 8. The Image Problem ........................................................512 8.1 In Lebanon .............................................................512 8.2 Solving the Problem ...............................................515 8.2.1 Extraordinary Humanitarian Efforts ...........................515 8.2.2 Flowers and Rice ................................................521 8.2.3 The Biggest Hijacking in History .......................530 8.3 The Image of the Fighters .......................................535Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
5. 5. 98.3.1 The Palestinians ....................................................5358.3.2 The IDF ................................................................538 NotesChapter 5 ..............................................................5416. Aftermath............................................................................ 563 1. A Chapter of Jewish History............................................564 2. A Glorious Victory...........................................................570 2.1 The Achievements of Operation Peace for Galilee .570 2.2 The Syrian Phase of the War ..................................574 2.3 The West Falls into Line .........................................577 3. The Taste of Victory Turns Sour .......................................583 3.1 Reagans Peace Plan ..............................................584 3.2 The Israeli Response ..............................................593 3.2.1 The Incorporation of the Occupied Territories .............594 3.2.2 The March on West Beirut ......................................604 3.3 Ungrateful Clients ..................................................606 4. The Invasion of West Beirut.............................................612 4.1 The Gemayel Assassination ....................................612 4.2 To Prevent Bloodshed and Acts of Revenge..........613 5. A Chapter of Palestinian History .......................................619 6. Who is Responsible?.......................................................637 6.1 The Background for the Inquiry ..............................637 6.2 The Charges ...........................................................640 6.3 We and They: Defiling the Beautiful Israel ........642 6.4 On Moral Idiocy ...................................................654 6.5 Putting a Snake into a Childs Bed: The UnitedStates and its Commitments .............................................6586.5.1 The Defenseless Remnants......................................6586.5.2 The Brought-in....................................................6616.5.3 More on Hypocrisy .................................................663Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
6. 6. 106.6 The Principal Culprits ..........................................6656.7 Reactions: Israel and Elsewhere .............................6676.8 The Commission of Inquiry (the Kahan Commission) ........................................................................................674 7. Elsewhere in Lebanon.....................................................6937.1 The South ..............................................................6947.2 The Chouf ..............................................................7067.3 Beirut after the Israeli Invasion ...............................7107.4 Under Syrian Control ..............................................714 8. Israels Moral Lapse........................................................715 NotesChapter 6 ..............................................................7267. The Road to Armageddon...................................................... 742 1. The Fateful Triangle........................................................743 2. The Threat to the Local Parties ........................................744 2.1 The Logic of Occupation .........................................744 2.2 The Next Round .....................................................754 3. The Threat to the United States and the World...................757 3.1 The Risk of Superpower Confrontation ....................757 3.2 The Evasions of the Peace Movement .....................760 4. Prospects ......................................................................762 4.1 Assuming U.S. Rejectionism...................................763 4.1.1 The Spectrum of Israeli Political Thinking..................763 4.1.2 From Coexistence to Hegemony.............................766 4.2 Assuming an Abandonment of U.S. Rejectionism ....779 4.2.1 The Effect on Israeli Policy ......................................779 4.2.2 Israels Secret Weapon............................................780 NotesChapter 7 ..............................................................7888. The Palestinian Uprising ....................................................... 792 1. Let Us Cry ..................................................................795Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
7. 7. 11 2. The Reality of the Occupation ..........................................804 3. Scenes from the Uprising ................................................810 3.1 Repression and Resistance .....................................811 3.2 Some Personal Observations...................................818 3.3 Elsewhere under Occupation ..................................834 3.4 Israels Peace Movement ........................................837 NotesChapter 8 ..............................................................8489. Limited War in Lebanon .................................................... 8551. The Rules of the Game ...................................................8562. The Logic of Terror .........................................................8623. Safeguarding the Occupation ...........................................8724. Post-Oslo Lebanon .........................................................877NotesChapter 9 ..............................................................88010. Washingtons Peace Process ............................................ 8841. Oslo I .......................................................................884 2. Oslo II ..........................................................................895 3. Another Crushed Nation? ..............................................923 NotesChapter 10 ............................................................933Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
8. 8. Foreword 12ForewordFateful Triangle may be the most ambitious book ever attemptedon the conflict between Zionism and the Palestinians viewed ascentrally involving the United States. It is a dogged expos ofhuman corruption, greed, and intellectual dishonesty. It is also agreat and important book, which must be read by anyone concernedwith public affairs. The facts are there to be recognized for Chomsky, although no oneelse has ever recognized them so systematically. His mainly Israeli andU.S. sources are staggeringly complete, and he is capable of registeringcontradictions, distinctions, and lapses which occur between them. There is something profoundly moving about a mind of such nobleideals repeatedly stirred on behalf of human suffering and injustice. Onethinks here of Voltaire, of Benda, or Russell, although more than anyone of them, Chomsky commands what he calls realityfactsover abreathtaking range. Fateful Triangle can be read as a protracted warbetween fact and a series of mythsIsraeli democracy, Israeli purity ofarms, the benign occupation, no racism against Arabs in Israel,Palestinian terrorism, peace for Galilee. Having rehearsed the officialnarrative, he then blows it away with vast amounts of counter-evidence. Chomskys major claim is that Israel and the United Statesespe-cially the latterare rejectionists opposed to peace, whereas the Arabs,including the PLO, have for years been trying to accommodatethemselves to the reality of Israel. Chomsky supports his case bycomparing the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflictso profoundly
9. 9. Foreword13inhuman, cynical, and deliberately cruel to the Palestinian peoplewithits systematically rewritten record as kept by those whom Chomsky callsthe supporters of Israel. It is Chomskys contention that the liberalintelligentsia (Irving Howe, Arthur Goldberg, Alan Dershowitz, MichaelWalzer, Amos Oz, Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, Shlomo Avineri, MartinPeretz) and even segments of the organized Left are more culpable,more given to lying, than conservatives are.Nor is Chomsky especially gentle to the PLO, whose self-destruc-tiveness and suicidal character he criticizes. The Arab regimes, hesays, are not decent, and, he might have added, not popular either.In the new edition, Chomsky includes invaluable material on the Osloand Wye accordsan unnecessary line of Arab capitulation by which Is-rael has achieved all of its tactical and strategic objectives at theexpense of every proclaimed principle of Arab and Palestiniannationalism and struggle. For the first time in the twentieth century, ananti-colonial liberation movement has not only discarded its ownconsiderable achievements but has made an agreement to cooperatewith a military occupation before that occupation has ended.Witnessing such a sorry state of affairs is by no means amonotonous, monochromatic activity. It involves what Foucault oncecalled a relentless erudition, scouring alternative sources, exhumingburied documents, reviving forgotten (or abandoned) histories. It involvesa sense of the dramatic and of the insurgent, making a great deal ofones rare opportunities to speak. There is something profoundlyunsettling about an intellectual such as Chomsky who has neither anoffice to protect nor territory to consolidate and guard. There is nododging the inescapable reality that such representations by intellectualswill neither make them friends in high places nor win them officialhonors. It is a lonely condition, yes, but it is always a better one than agregarious tolerance for the way things are.Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
10. 10. Foreword 14 Edward W. SaidNew York, New York January 1999Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
11. 11. Preface 15Preface to the Updated EditionFor some time, Ive been compelled to arrange speakingengagements long in advance. Sometimes a title is requested fora talk scheduled several years ahead. There is, Ive found, onetitle that always works: The current crisis in the Middle East.One cant predict exactly what the crisis will be far down the road, butthat there will be one is a fairly safe prediction.That will continue to be the case as long as basic problems of the re-gion are not addressed.Furthermore, the crises will be serious in what President Eisenhowercalled the most strategically important area in the world. In the earlypost-War years, the United States in effect extended the MonroeDoctrine to the Middle East, barring any interference apart from Britain,assumed to be a loyal dependency and quickly punished when itoccasionally got out of hand (as in 1956). The strategic importance ofthe region lies primarily in its immense petroleum reserves and theglobal power accorded by control over them; and, crucially, from thehuge profits that flow to the Anglo-American rulers, which have been ofcritical importance for their economies. It has been necessary to ensurethat this enormous wealth flows primarily to the West, not to the peopleof the region. That is one fundamental problem that will continue tocause unrest and disorder. Another is the Israel-Arab conflict with itsmany ramifications, which have been closely related to the major U.S.strategic goal of dominating the regions resources and wealth.
12. 12. Preface 16 For many years, it was claimed the core problem was Soviet subver-sion and expansionism, the reflexive justification for virtually all policiessince the Bolshevik takeover in Russia in 1917. That pretext havingvanished, it is now quietly conceded by the White House (March 1990)that in past years, the threats to our interests in the Middle Eastcould not be laid at the Kremlins door; the doctrinal system has yet toadjust fully to the new requirements. In the future, we expect that non-Soviet threats to [our interests will command even greater attention, theWhite House continued in its annual plea to Congress for a huge militarybudget. In reality, the threats to our interests, in the Middle East aselsewhere, had always been indigenous nationalism, a fact stressed ininternal documents and sometimes publicly.1 A worst case prediction for the crisis a few years ahead would be awar between the U.S. and Iran; unlikely, but not impossible. Israel is pressing very hard for such a confrontation, recognizing Iranto be the most serious military threat that it faces. So far, the U.S. isplaying a somewhat different game in its relations to Iran; accordingly, apotential war, and the necessity for it, is not a major topic in the mediaand journals of opinion here.2 The U.S. is, of course, concerned over Iranian power. That is one rea-son why the U.S. turned to active support for Iraq in the late stages ofthe Iraq-Iran war, with a decisive effect on the outcome, and whyWashington continued its active courtship of Saddam Hussein until heinterfered with U.S. plans for the region in August 1990. U.S. concernsover Iranian power were also reflected in the decision to supportSaddams murderous assault against the Shiite population of southernIraq in March 1991, immediately after the fighting stopped. A narrowreason was fear that Iran, a Shiite state, might exert influence over IraqiShiites. A more general reason was the threat to stability that asuccessful popular revolution might pose: to translate into English, theClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
13. 13. Preface 17threat that it might inspire democratizing tendencies that wouldundermine the array of dictatorships that the U.S. relies on to controlthe people of the region.Recall that Washingtons support for its former friend was more thantacit; the U.S. military command even denied rebelling Iraqi officersaccess to captured Iraqi equipment as the slaughter of the Shiitepopulation proceeded under Stormin Normans steely gaze.Similar concerns arose as Saddam turned to crushing the Kurdish re-bellion in the North. In Israel, commentators from the Chief of Staff topolitical analysts and Knesset members, across a very broad politicalspectrum, openly advocated support for Saddams atrocities, on thegrounds that an independent Kurdistan might create a Syria-Kurd-Iranterritorial link that would be a serious threat to Israel. When U.S.records are released in the distant future, we might discover that theWhite House harbored similar thoughts, which delayed even tokengestures to block the crushing of Kurdish resistance until Washingtonwas compelled to act by a public that had been aroused by mediacoverage of the suffering of the Kurds, recognizably Aryan and portrayedquite differently from the southern Shiites, who suffered a far worse fatebut were only dirty Arabs.In passing, we may note that the character of U.S.-U.K. concern forthe Kurds is readily determined not only by the timing of the support,and the earlier cynical treatment of Iraqi Kurds, but also by the reactionto Turkeys massive atrocities against its Kurdish population rightthrough the Gulf crisis. These were scarcely reported here in themainstream, in virtue of the need to support the President, who hadlauded his Turkish colleague as a protector of peace joining those whostand up for civilized values around the world against SaddamHussein. But Europe was less disciplined. We therefore read, in theLondon Financial Times, that Turkeys western allies were rarelyClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
14. 14. Preface 18comfortable explaining to their public why they condoned Ankarasheavy-handed repression of its own Kurdish minority while the westoffered support to the Kurds in Iraq, not a serious PR problem here.Diplomats now say that, more than any other issue, the sight of Kurdsfighting Kurds [in Fall 1992] has served to change the way that westernpublic opinion views the Kurdish cause. In short, we can breathe a sighof relief: cynicism triumphs, and the Western powers can continue tocondone the harsh repression of Kurds by the protector of peace, whileshedding crocodile tears over their treatment by the (current) enemy.3Israels reasons for trying to stir up a U.S. confrontation with Iran,and Islamic fundamentalism generally, are easy to understand. The Is-raeli military recognizes that, apart from resort to nuclear weapons,there is little it can do to confront Iranian power, and is concerned thatafter the (anticipated) collapse of the U.S.-run peace process, a Syria-Iran axis may be a significant threat. The U.S., in contrast, appears tobe seeking a long-term accommodation with moderate (that is, pro-U.S.) elements in Iran and a return to something like the arrangementsthat prevailed under the Shah.How these tendencies may evolve is unclear.The propaganda campaign about Islamic fundamentalism has itsfarcical elementseven putting aside the fact that U.S. culturecompares with Iran in its religious fundamentalism. The most extremeIslamic fundamentalist state in the world is the loyal U.S. ally SaudiArabiaor, to be more precise, the family dictatorship that serves as theArab facade behind which the U.S. effectively controls the Arabianpeninsula, to borrow the terms of British colonial rule. The West has noproblems with Islamic fundamentalism there. Probably one of the mostfanatic Islamic fundamentalist groups in the world in recent years wasled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the terrorist extremist who had been a CIAfavorite and prime recipient of the $3.3 billion in (official) U.S. aid givenClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
15. 15. Preface19to the Afghan rebels (with roughly the same amount reported from SaudiArabia), the man who shelled Kabul with thousands killed, drivinghundreds of thousands of people out of the city (including all Westernembassies), in an effort to shoot his way into power; not quite the sameas Pol Pot emptying Phnom Penh, since the U.S. client was far morebloody in that particular operation.Similarly, it is not at all concealed in Israel that its invasion of Leba-non in 1982 was undertaken in part to destroy the secular nationalismof the PLO, becoming a real nuisance with its persistent call for apeaceful diplomatic settlement, which was undermining the U.S.-Israelistrategy of gradual integration of the occupied territories within Israel.One result was the creation of Hizbollah, an Iranian-backedfundamentalist group that drove Israel out of most of Lebanon. Forsimilar reasons, Israel supported fundamentalist elements as a rival tothe accommodationist PLO in the occupied territories. The results aresimilar to Lebanon, as Hamas attacks against the Israeli military becomeincreasingly difficult to contain. The examples illustrate the typicalbrilliance of intelligence operations when they have to deal withpopulations, not simply various gangsters.The basic reasoning goes back to the early days of Zionism: Palestin-ian moderates pose the most dangerous threat to the goal of avoidingany political settlement until facts are established to which it will haveto conform.In brief, Islamic fundamentalism is an enemy only when it is out ofcontrol. In that case, it falls into the category of radical nationalism orultranationalism, more generally, of independence whether religious orsecular, right or left, military or civilian; priests who preach thepreferential option for the poor in Central America, to mention a recentcase.The historically unique U.S.-Israel alliance has been based on theClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
16. 16. Preface20perception that Israel is a strategic asset, fulfilling U.S. goals in theregion in tacit alliance with the Arab facade in the Gulf and otherregional protectors of the family dictatorships, and performing serviceselsewhere. Those who see Israels future as an efficient Sparta, atpermanent war with its enemies and surviving at the whim of the U.S.,naturally want that relationship to continueincluding, it seems, muchof the organized American Jewish community, a fact that has longoutraged Israeli doves. The doctrine is explained by General (ret.)Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli military intelligence and a seniorofficial of the military administration of the occupied territories. After thecollapse of the USSR, he writes,Israels main task has not changed at all, and it remains ofcrucial importance. Its location at the center of the ArabMuslim Middle East predestines Israel to be a devotedguardian of stability in all the countries surrounding it. Its[role] is to protect the existing regimes: to prevent or haltthe processes of radicalization and to block the expansion offundamentalist religious zealotry.4 To which we may add: performing dirty work that the U.S. is unableto undertake itself because of popular opposition or other costs. Theconception has its grim logic. What is remarkable is that advocacy of itshould be identified as support for Israel. With some translation, Gazits analysis seems plausible. We have tounderstand stability to mean maintenance of specific forms of domina-tion and control, and easy access to resources and profits. And thephrase fundamentalist religious zealotry, as noted, is a code word for aparticular form of radical nationalism that threatens stability. Despite shifting alliances in a highly volatile region, Israels role as aClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
17. 17. Preface 21U.S. strategic asset seems stable in the foreseeable future. Its advancedeconomy, like that of its patron, relies very heavily on the creativity andfunding of the enormous state sector. The two countries are linked injoint research and development projects, mostly military and spin-offs,and Israel provides basing and storage facilities for the vast U.S. systemof intervention forces targeting the oil-producing regions. Thougheffectively an extension of the U.S. military and economic interests,Israel is not entirely under controlclient states commonly pursue theirown paths, to the chagrin of the masters. Contradictions abound, atleast contrary strains, as they do in U.S. policy as well. The Israeli AirForce is very visibly carrying out maneuvers in Eastern Turkey aimed atIran, using advanced U.S. 15-E jets that can attack Iran and returnwithout refueling. At the same time. headlines in the Israeli press report,Israel and Iran have been conducting direct trade relationsfrom1994. Unlike the U.S., Israel does not officially list Iran as an enemystate, and there are no official barriers to trade, which is small butgrowing.5Israels development and deployment of weapons of mass destructioncontinues under U.S. aegis, as it has since the Kennedy years. The well-informed military analyst Uzi Mahanaimi reports that Israeli assaultaircraft have been equipped to carry chemical and biological weaponsmanufactured at a top secret institute near Tel Aviv, military sources re-vealed yesterday. Crews flying U.S. F-16 jets are trained to fit anactive chemical or biological weapon within minutes of receiving thecommand to attack. The weapons are manufactured at a biologicalresearch institute in Nes Ziona, near Tel Aviv, which attractedunwanted scrutiny when Dutch authorities confirmed that it was theintended destination of an El Al airliner that crashed in Amsterdam,killing many people on the ground, and found to have been carryingnerve gas components. There is hardly a single known or unknownClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
18. 18. Preface22form of chemical or biological weaponwhich is not manufactured atthe institute, according to a biologist who held a senior post in Israeliintelligence. Nes Ziona does not work on defensive and protectivedevices, but only biological weapons for attack, according to the BritishForeign Report. The devices have already been used, the reportcontinues, in the attempt by Mossad agents to kill Khaled Mishal in Jor-dan, which backfired.6Once again, Israel is following in the footsteps of its patron. AfterWorld War II, the U.S. took over the hideous biological warfareoperations of Japanese fascists, including the personnel, and protectedthem from war crimes prosecutionridiculing Russian war crimes trialsof these Class A war criminals as Communist-style show trials. The U.S.takeover of the programs was denied until it was exposed in the Bulletinof Concerned Asian Scholars in 1980. The achievements of theJapanese Mengeles became the core of U.S. biological warfarecapabilitiesone reason, along with nuclear bombs, why the U.S.official stand from 1950 was that it is fallacious to divide weaponsinto moral and immoral types, and that the concept of weapons ofmass destruction does not appear to have any significance. The JointChiefs of Staff included biological warfare in war plans by 1949. Shortlyafter, the plans included a first-use option, along with nuclear weapons,a position formalized by the National Security Council in 1956 and inforce until the 1972 treaty banning biological warfare. Recently releasedChinese and U.S. archives raise questions about the actual use of theseweapons in North Korea and China, previously assumed (by me as well)to have been Communist propaganda; China appears to havedownplayed their use, so as not to provide information to the enemy. 7The international framework in which these developments are pro-ceeding is fraught with danger and uncertainty. The U.S. has beenisolated for years in its policies on Israel and the Palestinians, and onlyClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
19. 19. Preface 23since its Gulf War victory has it been able to institute the program it haddemanded in opposition to a very broad international consensus. TheU.S. is now quite isolated in its policies towards Iran, which most of theworld wants to reintegrate into the international system. In the case ofIraq, the U.S. and U.K. have lost much of the limited support they hadin the past, and must now pursue military action in increasingly brazenviolation of the UN Security Council and regional opinion. Secretary ofDefense William Cohen won no public support when he visited SaudiArabia and five other friendly Persian Gulf countries to explain the U.S.policy of punitive raids against Iraq in March 1999. A senior Saudiofficial stated: We object to any nation taking matters into its ownhands, and using bombing as an instrument of diplomacy. Saudi Arabiahas consistently refused to allow U.S. combat planes based there to joinin operations against Iraq.8The U.S. hope is that the regions governments are sufficiently des-potic so as to be able to suppress the growing popular opposition to thesavage devastation of the civilian society of a neighboring Arabcountryopposition that is growing elsewhere as well.Concerns over these developments must surely have become seriousas the U.S. and its British client were seeking to prepare the ground forbombing of Iraq in late 1997. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wassent to Saudi Arabia, but treated with noticeable coolness. In sharp con-trast, former Iranian president Rafsanjani, still a pivotal figure inTehran, was given an audience by the ailing King Fahd in Saudi Arabia,and as his 10-day trip ended on March 2, Foreign Minister Prince Sauddescribed it as one more step in the right direction towards improvingrelations. He also reiterated that the greatest destabilising element inthe Middle East and the cause of all other problems in the region isIsraels policy towards the Palestinians and U.S. support for it. Thesepolicies might activate popular forces that Saudi Arabia greatly fears, asClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
20. 20. Preface 24well as undermining its legitimacy as guardian of Islamic holy places,including the Dome of the Rock in East Jerusalem, now effectivelyannexed by U.S./Israeli greater Jerusalem programs. Shortly before,the Arab states had boycotted a U.S.-sponsored economic summit inQatar that was intended to advance the New Middle East project ofClinton and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Instead, they attendedan Islamic conference in Teheran in December 1997, joined even byIraq.9 The increasingly prominent Turkish-Israel alliance is not welcome toother countries of the region, and there are signs that they may beconsidering Iranian initiatives to develop a regional system that would bemore independent of U.S. control, including the Gulf oil producers,Egypt, and Syria. That is not a prospect that U.S. planners can lightlytolerate, particularly with the reasonable likelihood that not too far in thefuture the current oil glut will decline and the Middle East share inglobal oil production will substantially increase. It is against thebackground of such possible developments in the region that U.S.planning with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be assessed. Israels internal economy and social structure are coming to resemblethat of its patron and paymaster, with growing inequality and thecollapse of social support systems, along with a sense of social solidaritygenerally One grave internal problem is the costeconomic, social, andculturalof sustaining a large and growing ultra-religious (Haredi)population, which draws heavily on educational and welfare programsbut contributes little to the economy. In a 1997 study, economists fromthe Hebrew University and Boston University found that Israelsworkforce participation for men is well below that of Western Europeand the U.S., and declining as ultra-Orthodox non-participationispermanent and increasing at a geometric rate. If the tendencies persist,they will make Israels welfare system insolvent and bankruptClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
21. 21. Preface 25municipalities with large ultra-Orthodox populations. Refusal to workamong the Orthodox is a specific Israeli phenomenon, not the caseelsewhere or historically in anything like the manner of contemporaryIsrael. With the religious population doubling every 17 years, economicbankruptcy is imminent, the economists conclude, though the ultra-Orthodox Rabbi who chairs the Knesset finance committee feels that allis under control because this country is living with miracles.10Conflicts between the secular and religious populations are becomingmore intense, exacerbated by class and ethnic correlations. Populationgrowth is increasing among Palestinians and ultra-religious Jews,declining among secular and privileged sectors, as in Europe. ManyIsraelis find the looming civil war more ominous even than thedangerous international conflicts that are likely to persist.As in the U.S., the Israeli political system is converging in a narrowcenter-right spectrum with little differentiation, and the traditionalparties (Likud, Labor) are virtually collapsing. Their current leaders,Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, have two identical maps,political commentator Yosef Harif observes: from a political point ofview there is no difference today between Netanyahu and Baraknotthat matters were very different before, apart from the differences ofstyle that trace to the differing constituencies of the political blocs.Netanyahus plan is Allon Plus, an amplification of the traditionalLabor Party Allon Plan that grants Israel effective control over desirableregions and resources of the occupied territories. Baraks alternative iswhat he calls the expanded Allon Plan, which amounts to about thesame thing. Barak demands that we must not uproot settlements orabandon the Jewish settlement in Hebron, and it is forbidden for usto agree to a Palestinian state. One listens to the ideas of Barak andhears the voice of Netanyahu, the reporter observes, paraphrasing theBiblical passage. Considering their records, commentator Avi Shavit,Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
22. 22. Preface26speaking for the left, asks why do we hate Benjamin Netanyahu somuch, particularly since he bears responsibility for less bloodshed andless harm to human rights than the two patrons of peace who occupiedthe prime ministers chair before him, Yitzhak Rabin and ShimonPeres, the former anointed as Messiah in delusional fantasies of theleft, Shavit comments.11With regard to the Palestinians, the U.S. and Israel continue toimplement the extreme rejectionist program they have maintained sincethe early 1970s, in international isolation until the Gulf war gave theU.S. free rein to institute its version of the peace process: keepingunilateral control, rejecting Palestinian rights, and moving to implementa variant of South Africas homeland policies, though without many ofthe advantages that South Africa conferred on the Bantustans. The stepsare reviewed in the text that follows and the chapters that update thestory from 1983 to the present.At the time of writing (March 1999), the most recent stage in thepeace process is the Wye Memorandum signed at the White House onOctober 23, 1998, and approved by the Israeli Cabinet on November11. In agreeing, the Cabinet declared that The Government willcontinue to pursue its policy of strengthening and developing thecommunities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, on the basis of amulti-annual plan, including security roads for Jews throughout theterritories and preservation of Israels national interests: securityareas, the areas around Jerusalem, the areas of Jewish settlement,infrastructure interests, water sources, military and security locations,the areas around north-south and west-east transportation arteries, andhistoric sites of the Jewish people. Immediately following the accord,settlers established more than 12 new settlements throughout the WestBank, heeding the call of Israels Foreign Minister, Ariel Sharon, tograb as much West Bank land as possible. By January 1999, theClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
23. 23. Preface 27land grab was accelerating, including isolated settlements that wouldbe the first candidates for eventual evacuation under any settlement thatis not a complete caricature. Standard practices are being followed,among them, razing Palestinian houses in the search for Jewisharchaeological remains and establishing nature reserves, later to beconverted to Jewish housing.Of particular significance is new post-Wye development in the GivatZeev Bloc northwest of Jerusalem, in pursuance of the Bush-ClintonRabin-Peres programs of cutting off what will be left to the Palestiniansfrom the region around Jerusalem (let alone Jerusalem itself, the centerof their cultural, social, and economic existence) and from the territoryto the south.12The UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Israel toobserve the Fourth Geneva Convention, which bans settlement in theoccupied territories. The resolution was passed 115 to 2, the usualtwo.13The Wye agreement changes territorial arrangements in trivial wayswhich are not easy to determine, since it is the first redeploymentaccord without a map indicating areas to be transferred to Palestinianadministration.14 But it is presumably a step towards something like the50-50 split of the territories that was Rabins goal in the Oslonegotiations, at least if Israel is sensible enough to abandon uselesslands where the population may rot in peace in scattered and isolatedenclaves. The most significant and innovative aspect of theMemorandum is its barely concealed call for state terror to achieve thegoals of the U.S.-Israel program. That breaks new ground forinternational agreements. The Memorandum emphasizes that thePalestinian security forces, which have a shocking record of torture andterror, must act to ensure the security of Israelis. The CIA will supervisethem as they carry out arrests, hold mock trials, collect arms, andClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
24. 24. Preface 28criminalize incitement against the agreements. They must operate onthe principle of zero tolerance for terror (against Israelis), a conceptthat is broadly construed, as anyone familiar with the record of the CIAwill understand.The Memorandum does contain a sentence stating that withoutderogating from the above, the Palestinian Police willimplement thisMemorandum with due regard to internationally accepted norms of hu-man rights and rule of law.There is no reciprocity: the security of Palestinians is not an issue,and even the meaningless and shameful comment just quoted does notapply to Israel, despite its brutal record of terror, torture, and violation ofelementary legal and human rights obligations, too well-documented toreview. Included are hundreds of killings of Palestinians since Oslo, mostof them unlawful according to Amnesty International (AI), andexceeding killings of Israelis by a considerable margin (though less thanbefore, when the ratio was extreme). AI reports further that therecontinues to be almost total impunity for unlawful killings ofPalestinians, not to speak of house demolitions, expulsion fromJerusalem and elsewhere, imprisonment without trial, systematic tortureof prisoners, etc.all well-documented by major human rightsorganizations, including Israeli organizations, but of no concern to theframers of the latest stage of the rejectionist program. No less striking isthe praise of the Clinton-Gore Administration for the harsh and illegalmeasures employed by the Palestinian security forces to suppressopposition to the accords and ensure security for Israelis.15Amnesty International published an assessment of the human rightssituation since Oslo as the Wye Memorandum was signed.16 AIestimates 1600 Palestinians routinely arrested by Israeli military forcesevery year, half systematically tortured. AI notes once again, as othermajor human rights organizations regularly have, that Israel is alone inClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
25. 25. Preface29having effectively legalized the use of torture (with Supreme Courtapproval), determining that in pursuit of Israels perceived security needsall international rules of conduct could be broken. AI reports similarpractices on the part of the Palestinian Authority, including execution oftwo Palestinians for incitement against the peace process. The StateSecurity Courts that conduct such abuses have been endorsed by theU.S. State Department as demonstrating Arafats commitment to thesecurity concerns of Israel, with the support of Vice-President Al Gore.Clintons achievement in bringing the two parties together to agree onthe Wye Memorandum was hailed with the usual awe. He proved him-self to be the Indispensable Man, the New York Times headline read,praising him for the Crucial Salvage Mission. Clinton is staking outthe moral high ground by insisting on the terms of the WyeMemorandum. He preached accommodation to immutable realitiesimmutable because they are demanded by U.S. power. He crownedhis moral achievement with an uplifting, optimistically Americanspeech, while tethering the vaunted U.S. idealism, which someIsraelis and some Palestinians believe to be diplomatic naivet, is thepromise of a fat new American purse. Nevertheless, the idealism andmoral high ground cast a radiant glow over the proceedings.17Particular cases illustrate the reality of U.S. policy. When some atroc-ity occurs, Palestinians are placed under harsh curfew, no matter who isresponsible. A striking illustration was the massacre of 29 Arabs prayingin a Mosque by the right-wing American religious settler BaruchGoldstein in February 1994, followed by severe curfew of Palestiniansand killing of many more Palestinians. Visitors to the Kiryat Arba suburbwhere Goldstein settled can walk to the shrine established for him,where they can worship in praise of the martyr who died clean ofhands and pure of heart, as the words on the gravestone read. In one ofthe innumerable other curfews, in September 1998, a day-old infantClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
26. 26. Preface30died in Hebron and another, three months old, died in her mothersarms, both on their way to the hospital, when Israeli soldiers refused tolet them pass through security barriers that had been set up to ensurethat Jewish settlers could observe ritually prescribed seven days ofmourning without disturbance. The soldiers made a mistake injudgment the military spokesperson stated, ending the matter18A few days later, Osama Barham, who now holds the record forimprisonment without charge by Israeli military authorities, reached theend of five years of administrative detention, then extended by themilitary without any court decision. A secular journalist, Barham issuspected of membership in Islamic Jihad, without evidenceorconcern from the overseers. Barham can consider himself lucky bycomparison to those sent to the Israel-run torture chamber Al-Khiam inLebanon, administered by the mercenary army Israel established in thesecurity zone it occupies in violation of a unanimous UN SecurityCouncil resolution of March 1978 ordering it to withdraw immediatelyand unconditionally; U.S. tolerance renders the decision moot. The firstnews in nine months from Al-Khiam was brought by Hassan, releasedafter 12 years of regular torture, he reports, confirming ample evidencesince 1982. Hassan may have been lucky too, as compared with the 71Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails as hostages for futurenegotiations after having been kidnapped in Lebanon, with theauthorization of Israels courts.19Israeli military operations in Lebanon continue, while its occupyingforces come under more successful attack by the increasinglysophisticated Hizbollah resistance (called terror in the U.S.,sometimes in Israel). Israeli military operations are not confined to thesecurity zone. In February 1999, three Israeli officers from an elitecommand unit operating north of the zone were killed in a Hizbollahambush. Israel warned that it would attack Lebanese civilian targets inClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
27. 27. Preface 31retaliation, as, in fact, it has regularly done in the past. Since the end ofIsraels invasion of Lebanon in 1982. some 25,000 Lebanese andPalestinians have been killed, according to Lebanese officials andinternational relief agencies, along with 900 Israeli soldiers.20 The achievement of imposing its rejectionist program in nearinternational isolation is impressive enough. But U.S. power won anideological victory that is in some ways even more dramatic. By now, itsrejectionist peace process is adopted as the framework of a justsettlement worldwide, even among those who only a few years ago werecalling for recognition of Palestinian rights and Israeli withdrawal fromthe occupied territories (in accord with UN 242 of November 1967, asinterpreted throughout the world, including the U.S. until 1971). So far, U.S. and Israeli leaders have been unwilling to move as fartowards accommodating Palestinian rights as South African advocates ofApartheid did towards Blacks 35 years ago. Their solution was Blackstates, to which the unwanted populations could be confined, to serveas a cheap labor force when needed. Presumably, the U.S. and Israelwill sooner or later realize that they can gain by adopting a moreprogressive stand of the South African variety. If so, they will agree tocall the Palestinian enclaves a state and perhaps even allow them adegree of industrial development (as South Africa did), so that U.S.- andIsraeli-owned manufacturers, joining with rich Palestinians, can exploitcheap and easily exploitable labor, subdued by repression. Calls for a Palestinian state are being heard, though it is instructive tolook at them closely At the extreme pro-Palestinian end of mainstreamdiscourse, Anthony Lewis, joining in the standard denunciations ofNetanyahu, contrasted him with the unsentimental old soldier YitzhakRabin, who, with his sheer intellectual honesty, was willing to sign theOslo agreements. But unlike Rabin, Netanyahu opposes any solutionthat would give the Palestinians a viable statetiny, disarmed, poor,Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
28. 28. Preface 32dominated by Israel, but their own. That is the heart of the matter,the crucial distinction between the saintly Rabin and the badNetanyahu. And because of Netanyahus recalcitrance, Oslo is dying.21In fact, Rabin, and his successor Shimon Peres while in office, force-fully rejected any idea of a Palestinian state, while the Netanyahugovernment has been more ambivalent on the matter (see below). Butno doubt Rabin would sooner or later have come to grant thePalestinians a state that is tiny, disarmed, poor, dominated by Israel,but their own. There is no more reason to doubt that Netanyahu wouldalso agree to that, as his Minister of Information has already stated.Similarly all but the most extreme fanatics in the Arab and Islamic worldwould probably be willing to grant the Jews a state that is tinydisarmed, poor, dominated by Palestine, but their own. And they mighteven take the heart of the matter to be the unwillingness of someultra-extremist to adopt this forthcoming stand.A thought experiment suggests itself. One might ask what the reac-tion would be to a presentation of the heart of the matter in the termsjust stated. The answer tells us a good deal about the ideological victoryof U.S. power.Recently Hillary Clinton indicated her interest in running for the Sen-ate in New York. In an article headlined New Yorks Palestinian State,James Dao of the New York Times asked whether she had made amonumental political gaffe in advocating a Palestinian state. What shehad said to a group of young Israelis and Arabs a year earlier is that Ithink that the territory that the Palestinians currently inhabit, andwhatever additional territory they will obtain through the peacenegotiations, should evolve into a functioning modern statea statethat would, surely, be tiny disarmed, poor, dominated by Israel.White House aides had immediately disowned comments by HillaryRodham Clinton about the need for a Palestinian state and insisted thatClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
29. 29. Preface33she was speaking only for herself, and she came under considerable at-tack. But when announcing her candidacy, she received some supportas well. A political science professor was quoted as saying thatsupporting a Palestinian state used to be the peacenik position, anextreme left-wing position. But perhaps now no more. Perhapsadopting the stand of South African racists 35 years ago can no longerbe condemned so easily as the peacenik position, an extreme left-wingposition.22 Struggles for freedom and rights are never over, and this one is noteither. All of the contesting parties in the region face very serious andpossibly lethal threats. It cannot be said that the dominant outsidepower has helped to smooth the way towards a meaningful solution oftheir problems, or even towards reduction of the dangers. But that storyhas not come to an end either, and there are many options open toconcerned people who hope to seek and pursue a far more constructiveand honorable course.Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
30. 30. Preface34 NotesPreface1.Sections of this Preface are based on No Longer Safe, Z Magazine,August 1993. See my Deterring Democracy (Verso, 1991; updatededition, Hill & Wang, 1992), chapter 1, and sources cited.2.See David Hoffman, Making Iran Public Enemy No. 1, WashingtonPost Weekly, Mar. 22-28, 1993, reporting from Jerusalem on Israelsefforts and those of two of its US. propaganda agencies, the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee. Also IsraelShahak, How Israels strategy favours Iraq over Iran, Middle EastInternational, Mar. 19, 1993.3.John Murray Brown, Financial Times, Mar. 23,1993.4.Gazit, Yediot Ahronot, April 1992, cited by Israel Shahak, Middle EastInternational, Mar. 19, 1993.5.Eli Kamir, Maariv, Nov. 12; Dorit Gabai, Maariv, Dec. 21, 1997.6.Uzi Mahanaimi, Haaretz, Oct. 4; Eli Kamir. Maariv, Feb. 5, 1998.Gordon Cramb, Air crash shakes faith in Dutch politics, FT, Feb. 21,1999.7.Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States andBiological Warfare (Bloomington: Indiana, 1998). For misleading articleson the topic, see Ralph Blumenthal, New York Times, Mar. 7, 1999,Judith Miller and Blumenthal, NYT, Mar. 4; see also my ZNetCommentary, On Staying Informed and Intellectual Self-Defense, ZNet,Mar. 8, 19998.Douglas Jehl, Saudis Admit Restricting U.S. Warplanes in Iraq, NYT,Mar. 22, 1999.9.David Gardner, FT. Feb. 28; Robin Allen, FT. Mar. 3 1998.10. Avi Machlis, FT. Mar. 17,1999.11. Harif, Maariv, Dec. 3; Shavit, Haaretz, Dec. 26, 1997.12Report on Israeli Settlements 9.1, January-February 1999, Foundationfor Middle East Peace. For excellent analysis of the agreements, seeNorman Finkelstein, Security Occupation: The Real Meaning of the WyeRiver Memorandum, New Left Review (November/December 1998),Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
31. 31. Preface35revised February 1999; Nasser Aruri, The Wye Memorandum:Netanyahus Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity, J. of Palestine Studies28.2 (Winter 1999); documents appear here as well. David Sharrock,Guardian Weekly, Jan. 17, 1999.13. Reuters, Boston Globe, Feb. 10, 1999, 50 words.14. Report on Israeli Settlements, November-December 1998.15. Human Rights Watch, Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human Rights Underthe Palestinian Authority (1988), cited by Finkelstein, op cit.16. AI, Five Years after the Oslo Agreement (September 1998). See GrahamUsher Middle East International, Oct. 16, 1998; Finkelstein, op cit.17. Deborah Sontag, Indispensable Man, NYT, Dec. 14, 1998.18. Gidon Levi, The Dead Children of Hebron, Musaf Haaretz, Sept. 4,1998.19. Gidon Levi, Letters from the Israeli Prison, Musaf Haaretz, Sept. 11,1998; David Sharrock, Guardian, May 25, 1997.20. Aliza Marcus, Boston Globe, Mar. 1,1999.21. Lewis, Solving the Insoluble, NYT, Apr. 13, 1998.22. Dao, NYT, Feb. 28, 1999; Agence France-Presse, NYT, May 7; JamesBennet, Aides Disavow Mrs. Clinton on Mideast, NYT, May 8,1998.Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
32. 32. 1. Fanning the FlamesIn the war of words that has been waged since Israel invadedLebanon on June 6, 1982, critics of Israeli actions have frequentlybeen accused of hypocrisy.1 While the reasons advanced arespurious,* the charge itself has some merit. It is surely hypocriticalto condemn Israel for establishing settlements in the occupied territorieswhile we pay for establishing and expanding them. Or to condemn Israel* Through the summer of 1982, the media were flooded with letters of astrikingly similar format, typically asking of critics: Where were you when?,where the gap is filled by the writers favorite Palestinian atrocity, ofteninvented. Another typical format was the accusation that it is hypocritical tocriticize Israeli atrocities unless one goes on to condemn the Russians inAfghanistan, the Syrians for the terrible massacre in Hama, etc. No similarrequirements were imposed when the PLO was bitterly condemned for terroristatrocities. In fact, it has been a common pretense that the media and othershad not condemned PLO atrocities or even that the media have been pro-PLO(e.g., Leon Wieseltier: There is a scandal, and it is the moral and politicalprestige of the PLO [in media] coverage of the Middle East). Entering stillfurther into the world of fantasy, we even find the charge (Robert Tucker) thatnumerous public figures in the West, even a number of Western governments(all unnamed) have encouraged the PLO in its maximalist course of winner-take-all, i.e., destruction of Israel. When the intellectual history of this period issomeday written, it will scarcely be believable.
33. 33. Fanning the Flames37for attacking civilian targets with cluster and phosphorus bombs to getthe maximum kill per hit,2 when we provide them gratis or at bargainrates, knowing that they will be used for just this purpose.3 Or tocriticize Israels indiscriminate bombardment of heavily-settled civilianareas or its other military adventures,4 while we not only provide themeans in abundance but welcome Israels assistance in testing the latestweaponry under live battlefield conditionsto be sure, against a vastlyoutmatched enemy, including completely undefended targets, always thesafest way to carry out experiments of this sort. In general, it is purehypocrisy to criticize the exercise of Israeli power while welcomingIsraels contributions towards realizing the U.S. aim of eliminatingpossible threats, largely indigenous, to American domination of theMiddle East region.Clearly, as long as the United States provides the wherewithal, Israelwill use it for its purposes. These purposes are clear enough today, andhave been clear to those who chose to understand for many years: tointegrate the bulk of the occupied territories within Israel in somefashion while finding a way to reduce the Arab population; to dispersethe scattered refugees and crush any manifestation of Palestiniannationalism or Palestinian culture;5 to gain control over southernLebanon. Since these goals have long been obvious and have beenshared in fundamental respects by the two major political groupings inIsrael, there is little basis for condemning Israel when it exploits theposition of regional power afforded it by the phenomenal quantities ofU.S. aid in exactly the ways that would be anticipated by any personwhose head is not buried in the sand. Complaints and accusations areindeed hypocritical as long as material assistance is provided in anunending and ever-expanding flow, along with diplomatic andideological support, the latter, by shaping the facts of history in aconvenient form. Even if the occasional tempered criticisms fromClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
34. 34. Fanning the Flames38Washington or in editorial commentary are seriously intended, there islittle reason for any Israeli government to pay any attention to them. Thehistorical practice over many years has trained Israeli leaders to assumethat U.S. opinion makers and political elites will stand behind themwhatever they do, and that even if direct reporting is accurate, as itgenerally is, its import will gradually be lost as the custodians of historycarry out their tasks. The basic point seems simple enough, and is well-understood outsidethe United States, including Israel. A dissident Israeli journalist observesthat All this delusion of imperial power would stop if the United Statesturned off the tapin anger at some excessive lunacy.6 The LondonEconomist comments:Holding up the supply of shiny new weapons is Americastraditional slap on Israels wrist. But an embargo isineffective unless it is certain to last Much more effectivewould be the belief in Israel that this time an Americanpresident will stick with his policy, including if need be alasting embargo on arms and a rethink of the extent ofAmericas aid.7 The point, as noted, seems simple enough. Some years ago it was infact as simple as it seems. It would then have been possible to influenceIsrael to join in the international consensuswhich has long includedthe major Arab states, the population of the occupied territories, and themainstream of the PLOin support of a two-state political settlementthat would include recognized borders, security guarantees, and reason-able prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The precondition,of course, was for the U.S. itself to join this consensus and cease itssupport for the adamant rejectionism of the Labor Party and thenClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
35. 35. Fanning the Flames 39Menachem Begins Likud coalition. Though this picture of recent historyis remote from the standard version here, it is familiar abroad, and hasthe additional merit of accuracy.8What seemed simple several years ago, however, has becomeconsiderably more complex today. By now it is not at all clear what theeffect would be if U.S. policy were to shift towards the internationalconsensus, abandoning the commitment to a Greater Israel that willdominate the region in the interests of American powera commitmentthat is expressed in deeds, whatever the accompanying words may beand terminating its immense material, diplomatic and ideological contri-butions towards ensuring that the quite reasonable international consen-sus will not be realized. The question is of no small significance. I willreturn to the background, the issues, and the current prospects.What follows is not intended as a comprehensive review or analysisof the network of relations among the United States, Israel and thePalestinians. Rather, its more modest aims are to bring out certainelements of the special relationship between the United States andIsrael, and of their relationships to the original inhabitants of the land,which I think have been insufficiently appreciated or addressed andoften seriously misrepresented, with the consequence that we havepursued policies that are both disgraceful and extremely dangerous,increasingly so.These remarks will be critical of Israels policies: its consistentrejection of any political settlement that accommodates the nationalrights of the indigenous population; its repression and state terrorismover many years; its propaganda efforts, which have been remarkablysuccessfulmuch to Israels detriment in my viewin the UnitedStates. But this presentation may be misleading, in two respects. In thefirst place, this is not an attempt at a general history; the focus is onwhat I think is and has been wrong and what should be changed, not onClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
36. 36. Fanning the Flames40what I think has been right.* Secondly, the focus on Israeli actions andinitiatives may obscure the fact that my real concern is the policies thathave been pursued by the U.S. government and our responsibility inshaping or tolerating these policies. To a remarkable extent, articulateopinion and attitudes in the U.S. have been dominated by people whodescribe themselves as supporters of Israel, a term that I will alsoadopt, though with much reluctance, since I think they should moreproperly be called supporters of the moral degeneration and ultimatedestruction of Israel, and not Israel alone. Given this ideological climateand the concrete U.S. actions that it has helped to engender, it isnatural enough that Israeli policies have evolved in their predictableway. Perpetuation of these tendencies within the U.S. and in U.S.-Israelrelations portends a rather gloomy future, in my view, for reasons that Ihope will become clearer as we proceed. If so, a large measure ofresponsibility lies right here, as in the recent past.The essential features of the U.S. contribution towards the creation ofa Greater Israel were revealed in a stark and brutal form in theSeptember 1982 massacre of Palestinians in Beirut, which finally didelicit widespread outrage, temporarily at least. I will return to the eventsand their background later. For now, it suffices to observe that the* One of the things that is right is the Hebrew-language press, or at least,significant segments of it. I have relied extensively on the work of thoughtful andcourageous Israeli journalists who have setand metquite unusual standardsin exposing unpleasant facts about their own government and society. There isnothing comparable elsewhere, in my experience. See also TNCW, p. 450 (seenote 5); Robert Friedman, The West Banks brave reporters, Middle EastInternational, March 4, 1983. I am indebted to several Israeli friends, primaryamong them Israel Shahak, for having provided me with a great deal of materialfrom these sources, as well as much insightful comment.Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
37. 37. Fanning the Flames41Israeli invasion of Lebanon was supported by the U.S. and by editorialcomment generally, though qualms were raised when it seemed to begoing too far (perhaps threatening U.S. interests) or to involve too manycivilian casualties. All of this is reminiscent of the U.S. attack on SouthVietnam in 1962, then most of Indochina a few years later, to mentionan event that did not take place according to standard U.S. journalismand scholarship, just as official Party history recognizes no such eventas the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.The Israeli occupation of West Beirut on September 15 also elicitedno official U.S. criticism, though the Sabra and Shatila massacres thatfollowed aroused angry condemnation. The condemnation was directedin the first place at the Christian Phalange, which was accused of theactual massacre, and in the second place at the Government of Israel,for failing in its responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the camps. Aflood of letters and articles in the press contrasted Begins reliance onforce and violence, his deception, his high-handed rejection (at first) ofan official inquiry, and his efforts to evade responsibility, with the standof the opposition Labor Party both now and when it had held power.The beautiful Israel of earlier years was disappearing, because ofBegin and Sharon.Col. Eli Geva, who had been dismissed from the IDF* after refusingto lead his troops against West Beirut, was quoted as saying:The feeling is that the house is on fire. I am referring to acountry which is in a type of deterioration, or landslide, andeveryone who believes in this country, has to contribute tostopping the landslide.9* Israel Defense Forces; the army of the State of Israel.Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
38. 38. Fanning the Flames 42Many agreed, specifically, many long-time supporters of Israel (in thespecial sense of the term mentioned earlier), who dated the deteriorationfrom the invasion of West Beirut, or of Lebanon, or perhaps somewhatearlier, though surely after Begin took power.Within Israel, the Beirut massacre evoked much anguish and anunprecedented wave of protest against the government, including animmense popular demonstration, backed, for the first time, by theopposition Labor Party. There was, however, little evidence of anysignificant loss of support for Begin and his governing Likud coalition.The strong and often passionate support for the military operation inLebanon on the part of the majority of the population also appears tohave been unaffected by the massacre, though opposition grew in thefollowing months as the costs began to mount.The response in the U.S. was interesting. After initial sharpcondemnation, the general reaction, across quite a broad spectrum, wasthat the events and the reaction to them highlighted the uniquely highmoral standards of Israel. A New York Times editorial commented thatIsraels anguish is only appropriate for a society in which moralsensitivity is a principle of political life. Even in journals that are oftenregarded as taking a critical stance towards Israel, similar sentimentswere voiced. Time, for example, commenting on protests within the IDF,wrote that it has from the start been animated by the same righteousanger and high moral purpose that has guided Israel through itstumultuous history.10 When the Report of the Israeli Commission ofInquiry into the massacres appeared a few months later, commentarywas rhapsodic: Israel had sought and attained salvation; itsachievement was sublime (see chapter 6, section 6.8).No state in history merits such accolades; such comments would bedismissed with contempt with reference to any other state (apart fromones own, in patriotic speeches or the more dismal segments ofClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
39. 39. Fanning the Flames 43scholarship). But with reference to Israel such references are socommonplace as to pass without notice, quite across the board inAmerican journalism and scholarship, with rare exceptions. In contrast,the Palestinians and their organizations, and the Arabs more generally,have been portrayed in terms of violence, terrorism, irrationality, and un-compromising refusal to come to terms with the existence of Israel or toaccept the norms of decent behavior. The contrast is clear enough injournalism and scholarship, and it is also familiar in standard mediafare, where the Arab terrorist is routinely contrasted with the heroicIsraeli. It would, for example, be inconceivable for a TV drama to portrayan Israeli or Jewish character in the manner of the standard Arab villain,despite the ample record of Israeli terrorism over many years, effectivelyconcealed in the United States.Colonel Gevas comment, cited above, may well be accurate, but thequestion of timing is of some significance, as is the stanceboth currentand historicalof the Labor Party that dominated the pre-state Zionistmovement and ruled from the establishment of the state to 1977. Thisis a question that will be addressed below. The record shows quiteclearly, I believe, that it is a serious error to attribute the deterioration toBegins Likud coalition. The house was on fire long before, andsupporters of Israel have been fanning the flames, a fact long deploredby many true Israeli doves. Those who have watched the landslide insilence, or have helped it along, or have successfully concealed it byoften vulgar apologetics, or have blamed the Palestinians when they arepersecuted or killed in alleged retaliations, have laid the groundworkfor the current conflagration, and for the atrocities in Beirut that finallyevoked some temporary protest. The reasons for this judgment willappear as we proceed.It would be salutary, then, to abandon hypocrisy. Either we providethe support for the establishment of a Greater Israel with all that itClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
40. 40. Fanning the Flames 44entails and refrain from condemning the grim consequences of thisdecision, or we withdraw the means and the license for the pursuit ofthese programs and act to ensure that the valid demands of Israelis andPalestinians be satisfied. This can, perhaps, still be accomplished,though the possibilities recede with each passing year as the GreaterIsrael that we are creating becomes more firmly implanted, and as itsmilitary powernow estimated to be surpassed only by the U.S., theUSSR and China11continues to grow. A point of no return may soon bereached, with consequences that may be appalling for Israel and thePalestinians, for the region, and perhaps for the entire world.Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
41. 41. Fanning the Flames45 NotesChapter 1Fanning the Flames1.Leon Wieseltier, New Republic, Sept. 23, 1981; Robert W. Tucker,Lebanon: The Case for the War, Commentary, October 1982.2.Richard Ben Cramer, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 30, 1982. Reprinted inThe Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (Claremont Research and Publications,New York, 1982), a useful collection of press clippings for June/July1982. On the extensive scale of Israeli use of cluster bombs in heavilypopulated areas, see Warren Richey, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 2,1982, reporting the findings of munitions experts from the multinationalpeacekeeping force. Doctors in Beirut reported that other anti-personnelweapons, such as phosphorus bombs, were no less devastating in theirimpact upon civilians, though the major effect was from the massive air,sea and artillery bombardment itself.3.It could not be known, of course, that an American marine (Cpl. David L.Reagan) would also be killed by a cluster bomb of the type supplied toIsrael by the U.S.; J. Michael Kennedy, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 2; Time,Oct. 11, 1982.4.On August 5, 1982, New York Times correspondent Thomas Friedmanreported indiscriminate shelling of West Beirut by Israeli planes,gunboats and artillery. The editors deleted the word indiscriminate asinconsistent with the approved image of our Israeli ally. Washington Posteditors, in contrast, felt that it was permissible to report indiscriminateIsraeli bombardment on the same day. See Alexander Cockburn, VillageVoice, Sept. 21, 1982, for discussion and details, including Friedmansprotest to the editors for their lack of courage - guts, for being afraid totell our readers and those who might complain to you that the Israelis arecapable of indiscriminately shelling an entire city. The solicitude ofTimes editors for Israel during this periodas beforehas beenremarkable, as we shall have occasion to observe below.5.Amos Perlmutter describes the destruction of Palestinian nationalism inany form as one of Begins most extreme and cherished ambitionsClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
42. 42. Fanning the Flames 46(Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982). The same was true of his predecessors, whotypically denied that it existed and sought to destroy its manifestations.On the measures taken under the occupation to prevent even culturalexpression, see my Towards a New Cold War (henceforth, TNCW;Pantheon, New York, 1982, pp. 277-8).6.Haim Baram of Haolam Haze; cited in the Manchester Guardian Weekly,Sept. 12, 1982.7.Economist, Sept. 11, 1982.8.For ample though only partial evidence, see TNCW, chapters 9-12. Wereturn to this matter, and other questions touched on here.9.UPI, Boston Globe, Sept. 26, 1982.10. Editorial, New York Times, Nov. 6, 1982; Time, Oct. 11, 1982.11. The estimate is that of the London-based International Institute ofStrategic Studies; Time, Oct. 11, 1982. Israelis tend to rank their powerone notch higher, describing themselves as the third most powerfulmilitary force in the world. See, for example, Dov Yirmiah, YomanHamilchama Sheli (My War Diary; privately printed, Tel Aviv, 1983, tobe published in English translation by South End Press), an importantrecord of the Lebanon war to which we return.Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
43. 43. 2. The Origins of the SpecialRelationship
44. 44. The Origins of the Special Relationship48 1. Levels of Support: Diplomatic, Material, IdeologicalT he relationship between the United States and Israel has been a curious one in world affairs and in American culture. Its unique character is symbolized by recent votes at the United Nations. For example, on June 26, 1982 the United States stood alone invetoing a UN Security Council resolution calling for simultaneouswithdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, on thegrounds that this plan was a transparent attempt to preserve the P.L.O.as a viable political force, evidently an intolerable prospect for the U.S.government.1 A few hours later, the U.S. and Israel voted against aGeneral Assembly resolution calling for an end to hostilities in Lebanonand on the Israel-Lebanon border, passed with two nays and noabstentions. Earlier, the U.S. had vetoed an otherwise unanimousSecurity Council resolution condemning Israel for ignoring the earlierdemand for withdrawal of Israeli troops.2 The pattern has, in fact, beena persistent one. More concretely, the special relationship is expressed in the level ofU.S. military and economic aid to Israel over many years. Its exact scaleis unknown, since much is concealed in various ways. Prior to 1967,before the special relationship had matured, Israel received the highestper capita aid from the U.S. of any country. Commenting on the fact,Harvard Middle East specialist Nadav Safran also notes that thisamounts to a substantial part of the unprecedented capital transfer toIsrael from abroad that constitutes virtually the whole of Israelsinvestmentone reason why Israels economic progress offers nomeaningful model for underdeveloped countries.3 It is possible thatrecent aid amounts to something like $1000 per year for each citizen ofIsrael when all factors are taken into account. Even the public figuresClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
45. 45. The Origins of the Special Relationship 49are astounding.* For fiscal years 1978 through 1982, Israel received48% of all U.S. military aid and 35% of U.S. economic aid, worldwide.For FY 1983, the Reagan administration requested almost $2.5 billionfor Israel out of a total aid budget of $8.1 billion, including $500 millionin outright grants and $1.2 billion in low-interest loans.4 In addition,there is a regular pattern of forgiving loans, offering weapons at specialdiscount prices, and a variety of other devices, not to mention the tax-deductible charitable contributions (in effect, an imposed tax), used inways to which we return.5 Not content with this level of assistance fromthe American taxpayer, one of the Senates most prominent liberalDemocrats, Alan Cranston of California, proposed an amendment to theforeign aid bill to establish the principle that American economicassistance to Israel would not be less than the amount of debt Israelrepays to the United States, a commitment to cover all Israeli debtsand future debts, as Senator Charles Percy commented.6This was before the Lebanon war. The actual vote on foreign aidcame after the invasion of Lebanon, after the destruction of much ofsouthern Lebanon, the merciless siege and bombardment of Beirut, theSeptember massacres, and Israels rapid expansion of settlement in theoccupied territories in response to Reagans plea to suspend settlementin accord with his peace proposals, which Israel rejected. In the light ofthese events, the only issue arising in Congress was whether to punishIsrael by accepting the Presidents proposal for a substantial increase in* The General Accounting Office (GAO) has informed Congress that the actuallevel of U.S. aid may be as much as 60% higher than the publicly availablefigures. This is the preliminary result of a detailed study of U.S. aid to Israel bythe GAO. A major issue could develop next year [1983] over how much of theGAO study may be made public. James McCartney. Philadelphia Inquirer,August 25, 1982.Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
46. 46. The Origins of the Special Relationship50the already phenomenal level of aidwhat is called taking a get-toughapproach with Israel7or to take a softer line by adding even more tothe increases that the President requested, as the Senate and mostliberals demanded. Fortunately, the press was sufficiently disciplined sothat the comic aspects of this characteristic performance weresuppressed. The consequences of this message of approval to Israel forits recent actions on the part of the President and Congress are not at allcomic, needless to say.It should be noted that in theory there are restrictions on the use ofAmerican aid (e.g., cluster bombs can be used only in self-defense;development funds cannot be spent beyond Israels recognizedi.e.,pre-June 1967borders). But care has been taken to ensure that theserestrictions will not be invoked, though the illegal use of weaponsoccasionally elicits a reprimand or temporary cut-off of shipments whenthe consequences receive too much publicity. As for the ban on use ofU.S. funds for the settlement and development programs that the U.S.has officially regarded as illegal and as a barrier to peace (i.e., beyondthe pre-June 1967 borders), this has never been enforced, and the aidprogram is designed so that it cannot be enforced: in contrast to mostother aid relationships, the projects we fund in Israel are not specified,Ian Lustick observes, and no official of the State Department or the aidprogram has ever been assigned to supervise the use of our funds bythe Israeli government.For comparison, one may consider the U.S. aid program to Egypt (thelargest recipient of non-military U.S. aid since Camp David), which isrun by an office of 125 people who supervise it in meticulous detail.Many knowledgeable Egyptians have been highly critical of the aidprogram, alleging that it reflects American rather than Egyptianpriorities, financing U.S. imports which must be brought on Americanships and U.S. consultants, when trained personnel are available inClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
47. 47. The Origins of the Special Relationship51Egypt for a fraction of the cost. They also note the emphasis on theprivate sector, pay[ing] Mid-west farmers for wheat which could begrown at half the price in Egypt (according to a former AID director),and in general the infiltration of Egyptian society to the extent that someperceive a threat to Egyptian national security.8These examples illustrate the diplomatic and material support thatthe U.S. provides for Israel.9 A concomitant, at the ideological level, isthe persistence of considerable illusion about the nature of Israeli societyand the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1967, discussion of these issues hasbeen difficult or impossible in the United States as a result of aremarkably effective campaign of vilification, abuse, and sometimesoutright lying directed against those who dared to question receiveddoctrine.* This fact has regularly been deplored by Israeli doves, whohave been subjected to similar treatment here. They observe that theirown position within Israel suffers because of lack of support within theU.S., where, as General (Res.) Mattityahu Peled observed, the state ofnear hysteria and the blindly chauvinistic and narrow-minded supportfor the most reactionary policies within Israel poses the danger ofprodding Israel once more toward a posture of callousedintransigence.10 The well-known Israeli journalist and Zionist historian* Israeli intelligence apparently contributes to these efforts. According to a CIAstudy, one of its functions is to acquire data for use in silencing anti-Israelfactions in the West, along with sabotage, paramilitary and psychologicalwarfare projects, such as character assassination and black propaganda.Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there areZionists and other sympathizers, who render strong support to the Israeliintelligence effort. Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels forinformation, deception material, propaganda and other purposes. They alsoattempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition.Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle Noam Chomsky
48. 48. The Origins of the Special Relationship52Simha Flapan describes the prejudice of American Jewry as now themajor obstacle to an American-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestiniandialogue, without which there is little chance to move forward in thedifficult and involved peace process.11 In concentrating on the role ofAmerican Jewry, these Israeli writers focus much too narrowly, I believe.To cite one last example, an article in the American Jewish pressquotes a staff writer for Haaretz (essentially, the Israeli New YorkTimes) who says that you American Jews, you liberals, you lovers ofdemocracy are supporting its destruction here by not speaking outagainst the governments actions, referring to the wave of repression inthe occupied territories under the civilian administration of ProfessorMenachem Milson and General Ariel Sharon introduced in November1981 (see chapter 5, sections 5-8). He goes on to explain the plans ofBegin and Sharon: to drive a large number of Arabs out of the WestBank, specifically, the leaders and those with a potential for leadership,by every illegal means. How?You activate terrorists to plant bombs in the cars of theirelected mayors, you arm the settlers and a few Arabquislings to run rampages through Arab towns, pogromsagainst property, not against people. A few Arabs have beenkilled by settlers. The murderers are known, but the policeare virtually helpless. They have their orders. Whats yourexcuse for not speaking out against these violations of Israelilaw and Jewish morality? The settlers, he adds, are Religious Jews who follow a higher lawand do whatever their rabbis tell them. At least one of the Gush Emunimrabbis has written that it is a mitzvah [religious duty] to destroy Amalek[meaning, the non-Jewish inhabitants], including women andClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky
49. 49. The Origins of the Special Relationship53children.12 The Haaretz journalist adds that his journal has a file ofhorror stories reported to us by soldiers returning from occupation dutyin the West Bank. We can refer to them in general termswe can railagainst the occupation that destroys the moral fibre and self-respect ofour youthbut we cant print the details because military censorshipcovers actions by soldiers on active duty.13 One can imagine what thefile contains, given what has been printed in the Israeli press. It shouldbe noted, in this connection, that many crucial issues that are freelydiscussed in the Hebrew press in Israel and much that is documentedthere are virtually excluded from the American press, so that the peoplewho are expected to pay the bills are kept largely in the dark about whatthey are financing or about the debates within Israel concerning thesematters. Many examples will be given below.The dangers posed to Israel by its American supporters haveconsistently been realized, leading to much suffering in the region andrepeated threat of a larger, perhaps global war.Classics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky