no. 64 - u.s. policy toward the korean peninsula

8/9/2019 No. 64 - U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

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Independent Task Force Report No. 64

Charles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairs

Scott A. Snyder,Project Director

U.S. Policy

Toward theKorean Peninsula


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U.S. Policy Toward

the Korean Peninsula


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Independent Task Force Report No. 64

Charles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr.,ChairsScott A. Snyder, Project Director

U.S. Policy Towardthe Korean Peninsula


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v

Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that theyendorse the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group,

though not necessarily every nding and recommendation. They par-ticipate in the Task Force in their individual, not institutional, capacities.

Task Force Members

Michael R. Auslin

Douglas K. Bereuter

Victor D. Cha

Charles B. Curtis

Nicholas Eberstadt

Robert L. Gallucci

Michael J. Green

Stephan Haggard

Siegfried S. Hecker

Fred C. Ikl

Charles Jones

William J. Lennox Jr.

Marcus Noland

Don Oberdorfer

Michael OHanlon

Jonathan D. Pollack

Charles L. Pritchard

Evans J.R. Revere

Stanley Owen Roth

James J. Shinn

Susan L. Shirk

Scott A. Snyder

John H. Tilelli Jr.


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Foreword ixAcknowledgments xiii

Task Force Report 1Introduction 3The North Korean Challenge 6U.S. Policy Options 11A Regional Framework for Stability 20A Comprehensive Agenda 30U.S.-South Korea Relations 37

Recommendations 42

Additional or Dissenting Views 57Endnotes 61Task Force Members 65Task Force Observers 76

Contents


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ix

It is one of the last remaining geopolitical problems of the twentiethcentury: a divided peninsula occupied by two countries still technically

at warone dynamic and modern, the other closed, impoverished, andbelligerent. The countries, of course, are the two Koreas, and the penin-sula they share represents one of the most vexing challenges facing theworld today.

The gravest threat is North Koreas nuclear program. The Northsnuclear arsenal, its pursuit of more advanced missile technology, andthe possibility that it could transfer nuclear weapons or materials toothers (whether states or terrorist groups) pose signicant dangers to

the United States and its allies in the region and beyond. Successive U.S.administrations have struggled, largely unsuccessfully, to address thisset of dangers. In particular, the Six Party Talksconsisting of China,Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United Stateshavefailed to bring about North Koreas denuclearization. The Council onForeign Relations wrestled with issues involving the Korean peninsulain ve separate Independent Task Force reports between 1995 and 2003,and it has now done so again in 2010, indicating both the seriousness of

the problems and the lack of progress in resolving them.The urgency of the threat is undeniable. North Korea possessesnuclear-weapon and missile capabilities, has threatened its neighbors,and has been willing to sell nuclear materials and technology to thehighest bidder. Its reclusive leadership is unpredictable, something yetagain underscored by the unprovoked destruction of the Cheonan, aSouth Korean naval vessel, by a North Korean torpedo in late March2010. Moreover, the future of its regime is uncertain, with the potentialfor a contested succession or breakdown of authority after the death of

Kim Jong-il.But while the danger is clear, progress is elusive. North Korea has

boycotted nuclear disarmament talks since 2008, and their future is

Foreword


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x Foreword

now in doubt after the sinking of the Cheonan and the resulting loss offorty-six South Korean lives. Moreover, it is far from obvious what theSix Party Talks could accomplish in the way of denuclearization even ifthey should resume.

This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation onthe peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valu-able ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a rm commitment from theObama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean penin-sula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustainedpolitical pressure, in addition to increased eorts to contain prolifera-tion. It notes that Chinas participation in this eort is vital. Indeed,

the report makes clear that any hope of North Koreas dismantling itsnuclear program rests on Chinas willingness to take a strong stance.For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that thelong-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the regionthan the short-term risk of instability. The report also recognizes thatrobust relations between Washington and its allies in the region, Japanand South Korea, must underpin any eorts to deal with the NorthKorean problem.

It is also worth noting that the report does not stop at calling for theresumption of the Six Party Talks and additional diplomacy to bringabout denuclearization. It looks as well at regime change and scenariosthat could lead to reunication of the peninsula. There could be oppor-tunities to make progress toward denuclearization or, with time, evenreunication after Kim Jong-il departs from the scene. Again, though,Chinas role is likely to prove critical.

At the same time that the Task Force emphasizes the danger and

urgency of North Koreas behavior, it recognizes and applauds thebenecial U.S. relationship with South Korea, which has proved to bea valuable economic and strategic partner. In this vein, the Task Forceadvocates continued close coordination with Seoul and urges promptcongressional passage of the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement.

On behalf of the Council on Foreign Relations, I thank the TaskForce chairs, Jack Pritchard and John Tilelli, and the individual TaskForce members and observers, who all contributed their signicantexperience and expertise to this thoughtful report. I also urge readers

to review the additional and dissenting views written by several TaskForce members.


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xiForeword

My thanks go as well to Task Force Program Director Anya Schme-mann, who guided this project from start to nish, and to AdjunctSenior Fellow Scott Snyder for ably and patiently directing the proj-ect and drafting the report. The Task Force took on one of the worldsknottiest and most protracted challenges and produced an importantstudy that helps to underscore the severity of the threat and the highcosts of inaction.

Richard N. HaassPresidentCouncil on Foreign Relations

June 2010


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xiii

Acknowledgments

The report of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward theKorean Peninsula is the product of much work and eort by the dedi-

cated members and observers of the Task Force, and I am appreciativeof the time and attention they devoted to this project. In particular, Ithank our distinguished chairs, Charles L. Jack Pritchard and John H.Tilelli Jr., for their leadership. It has been a pleasure to work with themand to travel with them to Seoul.

I am thankful to several people who met with me and various rep-resentatives of the Task Force, including Stephen W. Bosworth andWendy Cutler, who briefed the Task Force on the Obama administra-

tions positions. South Korean ambassador Han Duck-soo has alsobeen gracious and helpful.

The report also beneted from consultations with experts and o-cials in the region. I am grateful to the Seoul Forum for InternationalAairs, especially Chairman Hongkoo Lee, Kim Daljoong, and KimSunghan, for arranging to host a workshop in Seoul on October 28,2009, in conjunction with a parallel task force eort that they convenedon the Korean side. I am particularly grateful to the Korea Foundation

and its former president, Ambassador Yim Sung-joon, for generouslysupporting this project.The chairs and I met with several ocials in Seoul, including

Ambassador Wi Sunglac, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young, and For-eign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, as well as U.S. ambassador KathleenStephens and U.S. Forces Korea commander Walter L. Skip Sharp.In addition, Ambassador Pritchard and I traveled separately to Pyong-yang along with Nicole Finneman of the Korean Economic Instituteand met with the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)

director general for North American aairs Ri Gun and several Minis-try of Trade ocials, including Hyon Chol, head of the Korean ForeignInvestment Board.


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xiv Acknowledgments

The Task Force also received helpful input from many CFR mem-bers. The Washington Meetings team organized an event with CFRmembers in Washington, led by Task Force member Marcus Noland;the New York Meetings team organized an event for CFR members inNew York, led by Task Force member James J. Shinn; and the NationalProgram team organized a series of sessions with CFR members onthe West Coast, led by Task Force member Stephan Haggard and CFRmembers David W. Lyon and Greyson L. Bryan.

I am grateful to many at CFR: CFRs Publications team assisted inediting the report and readied it for publication. CFRs Communica-tions, Corporate, External Aairs, and Outreach teams all worked to

ensure that the report reaches the widest audience possible.Anya Schmemann and Kristin Lewis of CFRs Task Force Program

were instrumental to this project from beginning to end, from the selec-tion of Task Force members to the convening of meetings to the carefulediting of multiple drafts. I am indebted to them for their assistance andfor keeping me on track. I would also like to thank Nellie Dunderdale,Joyce Lee, and particularly See-Won Byun for their research in supportof the Task Force report.

I am grateful to CFR President Richard N. Haass, Director of Stud-ies James M. Lindsay, and former director of studies Gary S. Samore forgiving me the opportunity to direct this eort. In addition to the KoreaFoundation, the members thank David M. Rubenstein for his supportof the Task Force Program.

While this report is the product of the Task Force, I take responsi-bility for its content and note that any omissions or mistakes are mine.Once again, my sincere thanks to all who contributed to this eort.

Scott A. SnyderProject Director


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Task Force Report


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3

Introduction

The Korean peninsula simultaneously oers dramatically contrast-ing opportunities for and dangers to U.S. interests in Northeast Asia.

On the one hand, a democratic and free marketoriented South Koreahas developed enhanced military capacity and political clout and anexpanded set of shared interests with the United States. This enablesmore active cooperation with the United States to respond to NorthKoreas nuclear challenge and promote regional and global stabilityand prosperity. On the other hand, a secretive and totalitarian NorthKorea has expanded its capacity to threaten regional and global stabilitythrough continued development of ssile materials and missile deliv-

ery capabilities, and has directly challenged the global nonproliferationregime and U.S. leadership.

The challenge posed by North Koreas nuclear development eorthas global, regional, and bilateral dimensions. An internationally coor-dinated response must take all facets of the challenge into account. ThisTask Force report identies three essential elements: rst, denucle-arization of the Korean peninsula and an approach that attempts toresolve rather than simply manage the issue; second, regional cohesion,

enabled by close U.S.-South Korea relations; and, third, Chinas coop-eration and active engagement.Given the high level of mistrust between the United States and North

Korea, the United States will not be able to change the situation by itself.It will need cooperation from counterparts in Asia who have alreadyarmed their supportthrough the Six Party Joint Statement of Sep-tember 19, 2005for the objectives of denuclearization, improvedbilateral relations in the region, regional economic development, andthe establishment of peace on the Korean peninsula. The United States,

China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea have all signed onto this statement. The goal of the Obama administration should be towork with its partners to pursue its full implementation.


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4 U.S. Policy Toward the Korea Peninsula

The United States and its partners have divergent interests and pri-orities regarding the North Korean challenge. China is more narrowlyfocused on the regional dimension and prioritizes stability. South Koreaand Russia support denuclearization but want to achieve that objectiveby peaceful means. For Japan, the issue of how to deal with Japanesecitizens abducted by North Korea in the 1970s has been a higher pri-ority than denuclearization. The United States is understandably con-cerned about the global implications of Koreas nuclear program, theconsequences for the global nonproliferation regime, and the potentialspread of weapons, materials, and know-how to rogue states, terror-ist groups, or othersespecially in the Middle East. These dierent

approaches and priorities were highlighted in the early responses to theMarch 2010 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan; the UnitedStates and South Korea implicated North Korea and have taken a toughapproach designed to punish the North Korean regime, while Chinaworried about further escalationhas downplayed the incident.

A strong U.S.-South Korea alliance remains the foundation for coor-dination of policy toward North Korea. Both U.S. president BarackObama and South Korean president Lee Myung-bak have agreed that

their top policy objective vis--vis North Korea is its complete denu-clearization. Their common goal is to promote a regional strategy thatconstrains North Koreas destabilizing activities and counters the risksresulting from its nuclear and missile activities. In the wake of the shipsinking, the two administrations have worked particularly closely toforge bilateral and multilateral responses designed to strengthen deter-rence and ensure that North Korea cannot engage in such provocationswith impunity.

Productive Sino-U.S. consultations on North Korea have beenlauded in recent years as evidence that the United States and China canwork together to address common security challenges. Conversely, thefailure to collaborate to achieve North Koreas denuclearization willrepresent a setback and an obstacle to other areas of U.S.-China secu-rity cooperation. For this reason, it is essential for the United Statesand China to develop a clear understanding regarding how to deal withNorth Korea, thereby establishing a framework for lasting stability on anonnuclear Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

There is widespread pessimism that North Korea will voluntarilygive up its nuclear capabilities through negotiations alone, and China,


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5Introduction

Japan, and South Korea are reluctant to pursue tougher, coercive stepsdue to fears of instability. The rollback of North Koreas nuclear pro-gram will not be easy, especially given that no state that has conducted anuclear test has subsequently reversed course without a change in politi-cal leadership. The Task Force notes, however, that despite the dicultyof the challenge, the danger posed by North Korea is suciently severe,and the costs of inaction and acquiescence so high, that the UnitedStates and its partners must continue to press for denuclearization.

Although the six-party process remains the preferred framework,the United States and its partners may in the end nd it necessary toapply nondiplomatic tools such as sanctions or even military mea-

sures, especially if North Korea conducts further nuclear or long-range missile tests or proliferates nuclear materials or technologiesto other states or to nonstate actors. Specically, the Task Force callsfor the establishment of a dialogue with China about the future of theKorean peninsula, for bilateral talks with North Korea regarding mis-sile development, and for the continuation of close consultations withallies South Korea and Japan.

The Task Force nds that the Obama administration should deal

with North Koreas policy challenges in the following order: preventnuclear exports to others (horizontal proliferation), stop further devel-opment of North Korea nuclear capability (vertical proliferation), rollback Koreas nuclear program, plan for potential North Korean insta-bility, integrate North Korea into the international community, andhelp the people of North Korea.

The report takes stock of the North Korean threat and the Obamaadministrations responses thus far, and considers the four major policy

courses available to the United States. It then explores the motivationsand interests of the other parties in the Six Party Talks and underscoresthe importance of a regional approach anchored by U.S.-South Koreacooperation and by Chinese action. The report then looks beyond thenuclear problem to take account of important items on the agenda withNorth Korea and the valuable bilateral relationship with South Korea.


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North Koreas series of provocations in the rst half of 2009includ-ing missile and nuclear testsdeed an emerging Northeast Asian

regional consensus on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, sus-pended the normalization of diplomatic relations between parties in theregion, and deferred the pursuit of economic development and peace onthe peninsula and in Northeast Asia. These provocations underscoredthe failure of two decades of U.S. and international diplomatic eortsto block North Koreas nuclear development, as well as North Koreasseeming imperviousness to international pressure and sanctions.

Past U.S. administrations have attempted bilateral deal-making and

multilateral implementation (the Clinton administrations AgreedFramework), neglect (rst George W. Bush administration, 20012004), and bilateral engagement within the context of Six Party Talks(second George W. Bush administration, 20052008). None of theseapproaches was successful in deterring North Korea from pursuit ofits nuclear program. Five previous CFR-sponsored Independent TaskForce reports have documented the persistent challenge represented byNorth Korea and the deciencies of the international responses.

North Korea conducted its rst nuclear test in 2006. This and itssubsequent test constitute a direct challenge to peace and stability inNortheast Asia. The risk of proliferation of ssile materials to otherregions has ramications for stability in the Middle East, as well asfor the global nonproliferation regime. North Koreas nuclear testssharpen the dilemma for the international community over whether itis willing to use coercive toolssuch as pressing for tougher sanctionsunder new UN resolutions targeting North Korean trade and nancialtransactions, implementing a more intrusive export control regime, or

additional military measuresin combination with negotiations in aneort to roll back North Koreas nuclear program.

The North Korean Challenge


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7The North Korean Challenge

President Obama inherited this perilous situation when he tookoce in 2009, following last-ditch eorts on the part of the George W.Bush administration to convince the Democratic Peoples Republic ofKorea (DPRK) to accept international verication of its nuclear facili-ties as part of a February 2007 implementing agreement under the six-party framework. Rather than taking conciliatory measures to openthe way for a new relationship with the Obama administration in early2009, North Korea appears to have placed every possible obstacle inthe way of renewed dialogue. In the process, North Korea undertooka series of actions aimed at pushing the Obama administration towardimplicit recognition, if not explicit acceptance, of it as a nuclear weap-

ons state.Before Obamas inauguration, the DPRK Foreign Ministry asserted

that there was no linkage between normalization of U.S.-DPRK diplo-matic relations and North Koreas denuclearization, instead assertingthat North Korea would maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as it isexposed even to the slightest U.S. nuclear threat. Then, on April 5,2009, North Korea launched a rocket that could be used for long-rangemissiles, claiming that it had the right to pursue a peaceful satellite

launch. This action was immediately condemned by Obama in a speechin Prague the next day on the need for global nuclear arms reductions.President Obama criticized North Koreas actions, saying, Rules mustbe binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean some-thing. The Obama administration pursued a UN presidential state-ment condemning the launch as a violation of UN Security Council(UNSC) Resolution 1718, which imposed restrictions on North Koreanmissile launch capacities following the DPRKs 2006 nuclear test.

North Korea responded with outrage to this condemnation, pledging towalk away from the Six Party Talks and threatening to conduct a secondnuclear test, which it did on May 25, 2009.

In response to this test, the Obama administration worked energeti-cally at the UN to gain unanimous support for UNSC Resolution 1874.The resolution, passed in June 2009, calls on member states to exer-cise strengthened vigilance against North Korean horizontal prolifera-tion activitiesthat is, the exchange of North Korean nuclear-relatedtechnology and materials with other state or nonstate actors. Through

the end of 2009, the resolution had been successful in blocking a half-dozen North Korean shipments of weapons and other suspicious goods


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under the UN sanctions. The Obama administration also appointed asanctions coordinator to promote international implementation of theresolution. However, such counterproliferation activities will not besucient to completely stop the illicit spread of nuclear technology andknow-how to new nuclear aspirants.

Beyond implementing sanctions imposed under UNSC Resolu-tion 1874, the Obama administration has not attempted to draw redlines around North Korean activities that would provoke a strongerU.S. response. North Korea has crossed every previous line the UnitedStates has drawn, including around the testing of a nuclear device, withimpunity. Following North Koreas 2006 nuclear test, President Bush

attempted to draw yet another line around North Korean proliferation,but that did not stop covert North Korean collaboration with Syria onconstruction of a nuclear plant to produce plutonium, a plant that wasbombed by Israel in September 2007. The only red line that remainsis the threat (reinforced indirectly by the conclusions of the April 2010Nuclear Posture Review) that as long as North Korea is outside theNuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) it will be treated as the primesuspect and be the target of immediate retaliation by the United States

in the event of an act of nonstate nuclear terrorism.

In light of pastU.S. failures to enforce its red lines with North Korea, the challenge forthe Obama administration is how to take actions that would enhancethe credibility of U.S. threats.

Cu rre nt u .S. Po li Cy

Early in his term, President Obama declared that his administrationwould not fall into the same pattern [as previous administrations]with North Korea. Rather, he said, it is incumbent upon all of us toinsist that nations like Iran and North Korea do not game the system. . . .Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselvesfor nuclear war. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stated that theObama administration will not buy this horse for a third time. Sec-retary of State Hillary Clinton said, The international communityfailed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. We

are now engaged in diplomatic eorts to roll back this development.These statements, coupled with past negotiating experience, highlightthe deep levels of mistrust U.S. policymakers harbor toward North


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9The North Korean Challenge

Korea. The dominant American perception of this experience is thatNorth Korea pursues negotiations primarily to extract concessionsfrom its counterparts while making commitments it does not intendto keep.

While enforcing sanctions, the Obama administration has contin-ued to exert what it calls strategic patience and extend an open diplo-matic hand to North Korea, contingent on North Koreas return to thesix-party framework and the path of denuclearization. Following Spe-cial Representative Stephen W. Bosworths December 2009 meetingsin Pyongyang, Secretary Clinton stated that the approach that ouradministration is taking is of strategic patience in close coordination

with our six-party allies. This is characteristic of the current U.S.policy approach: a continued commitment to denuclearization, dedica-tion to the six-party process, willingness to engage (with conditions),and eorts to work within multilateral frameworks to sanction andpressure North Korea.

Meanwhile, North Koreas eorts to develop its missile programscontinue unchecked. The Pentagons February 2010 Ballistic MissileDefense Review report concluded that if North Koreas nuclear and

missile programs continue to progress along the current trajectory,North Korea will eventually have both a nuclear capability and thecapacity to deliver a nuclear weapon to its neighbors and to the UnitedStates. The task of addressing North Koreas nuclear status is muchharder now that North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests. Thechallenges posed will likewise be even more dicult once the countrydevelops an eective nuclear weapons delivery capability.

Despite accepting the six-party framework established by the

George W. Bush administration as the main vehicle for pursuing nego-tiations, the Obama administration has signaled a shift from past policyby emphasizing reassurance of South Korean and Japanese allies. Thisis partly a response to the perception in the region that the George W.Bush administration leaned too heavily on bilateral negotiations withNorth Korea at the expense of alliance consultation. Special Repre-sentative Bosworth has engaged in frequent policy consultations withNorth Koreas neighbors, including China and Russia, to promoteregional cohesion in response to North Koreas nuclear pursuits.

When North Korea initiated a charm oensive in the latter part of2009 by renewing diplomatic outreach to the United States and SouthKorea, the Obama administration responded by sending Bosworth to


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Pyongyang in December 2009 to convey the message that North Koreashould return to the denuclearization path by coming back to the SixParty Talks.

The Task Force nds that the Obama administration has employedprimarily reactive measures in response to North Korean provoca-tions. Secretary Clinton described the baseline for U.S. policy whenshe stated that within the framework of the Six Party Talks, we are pre-pared to meet bilaterally with North Korea, but North Koreas returnto the negotiating table is not enough. Current sanctions will not berelaxed until Pyongyang takes veriable, irreversible steps toward com-plete denuclearization. Its leaders should be under no illusion that the

United States will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with anuclear armed North Korea.

Despite the strong words, the Obama administrations actions todate suggest that the objective of rollback of North Koreas nuclearprogram is halearted. The time frame for achieving denuclearizationis so vague that there is a signicant risk that strategic patience willresult in acquiescence to North Koreas nuclear status as a fait accompli.Responsibility within the administration for implementation of policy

toward North Korea has been divided under several envoys into dierentbasketsnegotiations, sanctions implementation, and human rightswith no clear evidence that these discrete missions are backed by a senseof urgency or priority at senior levels in the administration. The TaskForce nds that the Obama administrations current approach does notgo far enough in developing a strategy to counter North Koreas con-tinuing nuclear development or potential for proliferation.


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Although the facts of North Koreas progress in pursuing nuclearweapons are undeniable, how neighboring states and the United

States respond to North Koreas nuclear ambitions will have signi-cant regional and global political and security consequences. By testingtwo nuclear devices, the DPRK has challenged the United States andthe region to accept its nuclear status. Ironically, although intended asa declaration of strength, North Koreas nuclear and missile tests alsoshow its weakness, vulnerability, and desperation, underscoring itspolitical isolation, failing economy, lagging conventional military capa-bilities, and keen desire for international acceptance and recognition. It

is this reality that may allow a coordinated response to succeed.The Task Force debated four policy options for the United States

and its partners: (1) explicit acquiescence, (2) containment and man-agement, (3) rollback, and (4) regime change. The Task Force concedesthat U.S. policy is constrained and that the United States has limitedability to eect change on its own. Given the reality of a bad situationwith few good choices, the Task Force considered the pros and cons ofeach option and its likelihood of adoption and success. The Task Force

ultimately rejects options 1 and 4, acknowledges the interim benets ofoption 2, and endorses option 3denuclearization.

oPtion 1ACquieSCenCe

The rst option is that the Obama administration could conclude thatthere are no viable options for achieving North Koreas denucleariza-tion, thus conceding failure and acquiescing to its nuclear status. In this

case, the administration might accept the idea put forward by the NorthKorean leadership that an improved diplomatic relationship should bedelinked from the denuclearization decision by focusing on reducing

U.S. Policy Options


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tensions and improving relations with North Korea regardless of itsnuclear status. Such an approach would immediately ease the crisis inrelations with North Korea and open a much broader array of diplo-matic and political options for bilateral engagement.

Explicit acquiescence, however, would threaten the sustainability ofexisting U.S. alliances in Asia. Japan and South Korea would considerU.S. acquiescence as undermining Washingtons ability to provide fortheir security, regardless of U.S. security commitments of extendeddeterrence and provision of a nuclear umbrella as protection. Explicitacceptance of a nuclear North Korea might also catalyze considerationof a wider range of military options in South Korea and Japan, including

the acquisition of preemptive strike capabilities and nuclear weapons inan attempt to restore a regional balance in capabilities, thus setting oa regional arms race. Moreover, the people of Japan and South Koreawould not accept a nuclear North Korea, and U.S. political oppositionwould likely make political hay out of the issue, accusing the Obamaadministration of appeasement. Acquiescence would be an embarrass-ing admission of defeat and would weaken perceptions of U.S. poweraround the world. Such capitulation would make negotiations with Iran

and other nuclear hopefuls more dicult, if not impossible.Current U.S. policy acknowledges the de facto reality that North

Korea has developed a nuclear capacity, but does not accept North Koreaas a nuclear weapons state. This lack of acceptance will be credible onlyif the United States continues to take commensurate eorts to roll backNorth Koreas nuclear program. Benign neglect, or the absence of sucheorts, would amount to acceptance of a nuclear North Korea.

The Task Force nds that any U.S. administration is unlikely to

openly acquiesce to North Korean nuclear ambitions and that the nega-tive consequences for the nuclear nonproliferation regime outweighany potential benets of this course. Such acquiescence would weakencredibility of U.S. security commitments in the region, and NorthKorea would stand as a monument to the failure of the NPT and as amodel for other potential nuclear aspirants.

oPtion 2MAnAge And ContAin

A second option is to pursue a policy that classies the North Koreannuclear challenge as a problem to be managed, with a low likelihood of


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13U.S. Policy Options

near-term resolution. Recognizing that it will take a long time and a con-certed eort to denuclearize North Korea, the administration wouldwork in concert with partners to contain North Korean onward prolif-eration as its primary objective, while blocking North Korean verticalproliferation by preventing it, through a combination of negotiationsand coercive measures, from increasing the size or the sophistication ofits nuclear arsenal and missile delivery capacity. The Task Force believesthat this approachcontaining the problem and managing the real-ity while paying lip service to the objective of rollbackis the closestamong the four options to the Obama administrations current policy.

Conditional on support from allies Japan and South Korea, eorts

to prevent North Koreas vertical proliferation could include a U.S.strike on North Koreas long-range missile launch facilities (akin torecommendations made by Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perrybefore North Koreas 2006 long-range missile launch) in the eventthat North Korea prepares once again to defy existing UNSC resolu-tions. Prior to North Koreas two nuclear tests, this recommendationseemed premature and dangerous, but cannot be ruled out easily nowthat an enhanced missile capacity would give North Korea the capacity

to deliver a nuclear weapon.

A manage and contain approach focuses on risk reduction rst,

while waiting for circumstances conducive to North Koreas even-tual denuclearization. It prioritizes three nos as primary immediateobjectives in dealing with North Korea: no export of nuclear technolo-gies, no more bombs, and no better bombs. The Obama admin-istration would pursue counterproliferation aggressively throughimplementation of UN resolutions while taking steps to constrain

North Korea from building more bombs by negotiating a missile mor-atorium or improving its existing arsenal through additional nucleartests by ensuring that the scope of international sanctions is expandedin retaliation for further tests. To back these counterproliferationeorts, the administration should clearly state that as long as NorthKorea remains outside of the NPT and uncommitted to denucleariza-tion, it is suspect number one in the event of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors, thereby putting North Korea in the crosshairs for a U.S.retaliatory strike if such an event were to occur.

This approach would focus on maintaining a freeze on nuclear devel-opment activities at the Yongbyon facility and on building internationalsupport to urge North Korea against conducting any further nuclear


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tests. Another facet of this approach would address North Koreas ver-tical proliferationthat is, North Korean eorts to mount a nucleardevice on a missileby attempting to negotiate a moratorium on NorthKorean missile tests.

Even if the United States remains adamantly opposed to NorthKoreas continued development of a nuclear weapons and deliverycapability, there are limits to what it can do without cooperation fromNorth Koreas neighbors, especially China. China shares the objectiveof containing North Koreas program and preventing North Koreanactions that would further heighten tensions but is unlikely to pursuethe potentially destabilizing path that might result from pressing for

denuclearization of North Korea. By pursuing the option of simplymanaging and containing North Koreas nuclear program, perhaps inthe hope that North Koreas own internal politics might eventually dic-tate abandonment of nuclear weapons, the United States would avoida quarrel with China, given Chinas prioritization of regional stabilityover denuclearization.

The Task Force concedes that containment is attractive and prob-ably the easiest and most practical option, given the diculty of achiev-

ing rollback and the undesirability of escalating a sense of crisis on theKorean peninsula when the Obama administration is facing so manyother challenges. Both China and South Korea, given the choice betweenfacing a new crisis or deferring such a crisis in favor of the short-termmaintenance of the status quo, may believe that the status quo servestheir interests, especially if they are able to work together to contain thenegative spillover eects of North Koreas nuclear ambitions. However,such an approach will not resolve the problem, and manage and contain

must be seen only as an interim option.The Task Force nds that though containment is essential to U.S.counterproliferation objectives, such a strategy by itself is insucient.It risks the likelihood that, over time, the overall security situation willdeteriorate as North Korea continues to secretly make progress in itsmissile development and nascent nuclear capability. The manage andcontain approach may also lead to the perception that the United Statesis interested only in counterproliferation, leading eventually to acqui-escence rather than denuclearization, regardless of administration

assertions to the contrary. The Task Force considers that manage andcontain, as evidenced by the current approach, may be a useful interimstrategy, but does not resolve the larger problem and must ultimately be


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coupled with continued eorts to denuclearize. Implementation of thisoption is necessary, but not enough to achieve denuclearization, whichremains an important U.S. objective.

oPtion 3rollbACk

A third option would be to immediately and consistently press forNorth Koreas return to the path of denuclearization. This approachwould involve a stepped-up combination of sanctions and incentivesdesigned to make North Korea abandon its nuclear programs. There

would be constant political pressure by the international communityon North Koreaincluding the ratcheting up of the international sanc-tions regimeto limit its alternatives to negotiation. In return for coop-eration, North Korea would receive political and economic benets,such as development and energy assistance, through implementation ofthe September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement. Conversely, its failure tocooperate would result in enforced sanctions and other penalties.

This option envisions a denitive resolution of North Koreas nuclear

challenge by strengthened regional security cooperation between theUnited States and North Koreas neighbors. It means that the Obamaadministration must treat the rollback of North Koreas nuclear pro-gram as a realizable objective, and use all the tools at its disposal(including raising the prole of the work of the sanctions coordinator)to increase pressure on North Korea, both directly and indirectly, bycoordinating with other members of the six-party framework. Such anapproach requires that the United States convince China that denucle-

arization is necessary for long-term regional stability and nd ways toencourage China to cooperate. Active eorts to roll back North Koreasnuclear gains run the risk of heightening tensions on the Korean penin-sula in the short term, but these temporary pressures would be relievedby North Koreas resumption of the implementation of its denuclear-ization commitments outlined in the Six Party Joint Statement.

Pursuit of this option entails North Koreas neighbors working inconcert with one another to implement agreed-on UN sanctions untilNorth Korea recommits itself to denuclearization. Any party, such as

China, that fails to fully implement its obligation under the UN resolu-tions would be eectively validating North Koreas claim to be a nuclearweapons state. Thus, it should not be in the interest of any party to


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prematurely relent until North Koreas leadership takes actions in thedirection of denuclearization.

If North Korea returns to the Six Party Talks and resumes imple-mentation of its denuclearization commitments, the other partieswould have to also meet their own obligations under the agreement.North Korean ocials complained that the other parties were drag-ging their feet in providing the economic assistance promised underthe implementing agreement of February 13, 2007, thereby providinga pretext for North Korea to avoid its own obligations. The UnitedStates and Japan have obligations under the joint statement to normal-ize political relations with North Korea, including eventual diplomatic

recognition and the exchange of diplomatic representation. The jointstatement also references the need for a separate negotiating forum toestablish arrangements to replace the existing armistice with a perma-nent peace mechanism.

North Korean leaders must be convinced by mobilized coercivemeasures preventing such an outcome that the pursuit of nuclearweapons is hazardous to their regime survival, and that a path towarddenuclearization would provide them new opportunities in the form

of available expanded political and economic benets. North Koreasleadership has spent decades pursuing nuclear weapons as the silverbullet to assure sovereignty, respect, and deterrence of external powers.It is unlikely to voluntarily give up this pursuit without a combinationof political and economic inducements, which may come in the formof energy and economic development assistance. For this reason, it willbe essential for the U.S. administration to outline concrete benetsthat North Korea would gain from denuclearization. South Korean

president Lee Myung-bak has proposed a massive development com-mitment to North Korea if it abandons its nuclear weapons and opensto the outside world. But North Korean leaders would be more likelyto view such a proposal as credible if the United States also oered todevelop a new relationship with the North.

The Task Force believes that the regional consensus must be pushedfrom rhetoric to action and that the strength of Chinas commitmentsto support and enforce global nonproliferation should be tested. Thusthe Task Force believes option 3continued pressure on North Korea

to return to the Six Party Talks and to a path of denuclearizationis thenecessary course of action.


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oPtion 4regiMe ChAnge

A fourth option for achieving denuclearization would be to pursueregime change in North Korea. This might include support for subver-sive activities intended to undermine the current leadership, expansionof economic sanctions, strengthened measures to inspect and interdictall cargo to and from North Korea, and a rhetorical policy designed topublicly support regime change.

Given the widespread pessimism regarding the likelihood of thecurrent regime voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapons, its lack ofcredibility in implementing past diplomatic agreements, and its will-

ingness to sell conventional weapons and missile technologies to thehighest bidder, this approach prioritizes denuclearization over stability.It assumes that any negotiations will be a pretext for delay rather thana vehicle for successfully managing or resolving the dangers posed byNorth Koreas nuclear weapons program.

It also implicitly assumes that a new North Korean regime wouldbe more amenable to negotiations and willing to give up the weapons,though this may not be the case. Given current North Korean leader

Kim Jong-ils advanced age and reported ill health, leadership may passto a designated successor, who may or may not continue the policiesof the current regime. There are many uncertainties and dangers in aregime change scenario (detailed in a later section on contingency plan-ning), but the option accepts North Koreas destabilization as a meansto ensure denuclearization. This option entails a willingness to bear theimmediate costs of instability for the establishment of a new order inNorth Korea, either through Korean reunication or the installation of

a reform-oriented North Korean leadership.An obstacle to the regime change option is that it contradicts thehigh priority North Koreas neighbors place on a stable transition to anew leadership in North Korea. As a result, U.S.-driven regime changewould come at a high cost to U.S. interests and relationships in theregion. China prioritizes regional peace and stability over denuclear-ization as a policy objective. The South Korean government has alsotraditionally been cautious about pursuing externally imposed regimechange on the North for fear that the near-term costs of a sudden tran-

sition in the North would be more than the South is willing or able tobear. The fears of violence, ows of refugees, spillover, and costs are not


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unreasonable or unfounded, and the United States should take thoseconcerns into consideration.

Nonetheless, the option of actively supporting regime changeshould be held in reserve as a possible course of action in the event thatNorth Korea continues to pursue horizontal or vertical proliferation ornuclear development activities in deance of existing UN resolutions.North Koreas failure to return to the path of denuclearization couldalso lead the United States and other members of the Six Party Talks toconclude that regime change is the only possible way to roll back NorthKoreas nuclear program.

It is unlikely that the Obama administration will pursue this option,

at least not openly, given its stated commitment to engagement andinternational norms. It should be noted, however, that several TaskForce members thought that this course should be quietly considered inparallel to a public commitment of continued pressure to denuclearize.

north koreAS i ntegrAtionw i th t he o u tSi d e w orld

To counter North Koreas provocations, the United States has histori-cally emphasized the employment of sanctions against North Korea toisolate it from the international community. However, by reinforcingits isolation, continuation of a comprehensive sanctions regime againstNorth Korea may ironically strengthen the regimes capacity to main-tain political control. For this reason, the Obama administration shouldconsider an array of engagement initiatives along with the UN sanctions

that have been targeted at North Koreas nuclear and missile programs.Expanding the exposure of individual North Koreans to the outsideworld may eventually result in internally driven regime transformation,a result that the United States and North Koreas neighbors would wel-come and support. Engagement may also lead to a greater understand-ing of North Koreas infamously opaque decision-making processesand increase levels of trust in the region, while constraining NorthKorea from pursuing rash actions.

Engagement strategies, including support for more liberalized visa

policies, nongovernmental, educational, and cultural exchanges, andother methods of engagement, should be designed to lay the foundations


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for political change by providing North Koreans with more exposure tointernational norms and standards. The main criterion by which theUnited States should judge engagement strategies toward North Koreais whether they will increase the pace of change in North Korea or canbe used to strengthen the political control of the regime.

The economic lever has proved a politically powerful tool for pro-moting reform-oriented political leadership in other inward-focusedsocieties, and a U.S. policy of selective engagement with North Koreamay help facilitate government-led economic reforms. Engagementcould facilitate grassroots-led marketization and the spread of capital-ism, which ultimately could undermine the North Korean leaderships

eorts to maintain strict economic and political controls over its popu-lation. The development of economic ties with outside partners couldalso fuel a domestic political competition between political reformersand conservatives. The small-scale spread of farmers markets and slowbut steady dissemination of information across North Koreas bordersalready challenge the North Korean leaderships ability to completelycontrol the population.

North Koreas economic transformation and integration into the

global community would be a bigger threat to its own leadership thanto the international community. For example, North Korea has to meetinternational standards on reporting and transparency regarding itsinternal nancial system to receive loans from international nancialinstitutions (IFIs). Its eorts to meet IFI reporting and transparencyrequirements are an important vehicle in achieving mutually benecialintegration with the international nancial community.

The Obama administrationin close coordination with South

Koreashould pursue forms of engagement with North Korea mostlikely to improve the lot of North Koreans and bring about change in thecountry, regardless of the policies of the North Korean leadership. Whileimplementing sanctions targeted primarily at North Koreas nuclear andmissile programs, the administration should support nongovernmentalexchanges in areas where grassroots or nongovernmental interactionmight broaden North Koreas exposure to international norms.


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20

Each member of the Six Party Talksthe United States, China, Japan,Russia, and South Koreahas its own set of interests, political priori-

ties, and domestic constraints and pressures regarding North Korea.Despite having divergent views, all have agreed to the Six Party JointStatementsupporting denuclearization, the normalization of rela-tions, and advancement of peace and prosperity on the Korean penin-sulaand signed on to sanctions resolutions. Any hope of resolving theNorth Korean stando will depend on all parties cooperating with oneanother and being rm with North Korea. China in particular has a cen-tral role to play.

Chi nAS koreA PoliCy And koreAS rolein u.S .-Chi nA relAtionS

The Task Force nds that Chinas policy toward the Korean penin-sulaand the role of cooperation and competition on Korean issues asa component of the U.S.-China relationshipis a critical variable that

inuences the range of available tools for addressing North Koreasnuclear program. The current DPRK regimes survival depends onChinas willingness to supply the necessary food and fuel to ensureNorth Korean sustainability. If North Koreas economy is on life sup-port, the Chinese are providing the necessities to keep it alive.

Although China and North Korea have a shared history and ideo-logical foundation, bilateral ties have frayed over the past two decadesas China has taken a path of economic reform and North Korea hascontinued to pursue autarchy and isolation. Hence, China and North

Korea have less and less in common. In fact, Chinas policy towardNorth Korea is contradictory to overall trends in Peoples Republic ofChina (PRC) foreign policy. Whereas China works to promote regional

A Regional Framework for Stability


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21A Regional Framework for Stability

stability, a nuclear North Korea provides a fundamental challenge tosecurity in the region. These contradictions are at the core of Chinaspolicy dilemma as it manages its relations with North Korea.

That China continues to view the Korean peninsula through the lensof its relationship with the United States exacerbates these contradic-tions. China has continuously insisted that the core motivation forNorth Koreas nuclear pursuits lies in its mistrust of the United Statesand that security assurances in the context of improvements in theU.S.-DPRK political relationship would belie North Koreas need fora nuclear program. Even though North Koreas nuclear pursuits havedirectly challenged Chinese interests, mistrust of U.S. intentions on

the Korean peninsulawhich dates to the Korean Warhas inhibitedSino-U.S. cooperation on Korean issues.

China has emerged as a mediator between Washington and Pyong-yang by hosting the Six Party Talks, a role in which Chinese diplomatshave taken great pride, but Chinese mediation eorts are more focusedon Chinas desire to keep both sides calm rather than on achieving asolution. North Koreas continued insistence on defying Chineseeorts to mediateeven as its economy depends utterly on Chinese

importsdemonstrates Chinas patience.While China is concerned about North Koreas development of a

nuclear weapons capacity, its greater concern is the possibility of NorthKorean instability. For this reason, China emphasizes negotiations andhas been reluctant to consider coercive measures as part of its strategytoward North Korea. China remains wary of U.S. preferred tools foraddressing the North Korean nuclear issue, eschewing pressure andsanctions in favor of economic incentives and attempts to entice North

Korea to join in dialogue and cooperation. A U.S. approach that empha-sizes regional cohesion in dealing with North Korea requires Chinesecooperation, but there are limits to the range of options China is willingto consider.

China wants to maintain its own independent approach to theKorean peninsula, even as it cooperates with the United States. Follow-ing North Koreas rst nuclear test in 2006, some Chinese analysts crit-icized their government for working too closely with the United States,which, they charged, resulted in a cooling of Sino-North Korean ties

and a perceived loss of Chinese inuence in North Korea. After NorthKoreas 2009 test, Beijing chose to reinforce ties with Pyongyang evenwhile going along with a strong UNSC resolution condemning the test.


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This bifurcated course of action may have preserved Chinese inuencein North Korea, but China has thus far been unable to use that inuenceto convince North Korea to recommit itself to denuclearization.

The task of persuading China to assume greater responsibility forNorth Koreas denuclearization is a challenging one. Chinas leadersmust come to the conclusion that a nuclear North Korea under its cur-rent unpredictable leadership risks the stability that China has investedso heavily in trying to preserve. Past experience suggests that Chinatakes action only when it perceives increased tensions or the possibilityof military conict between North Korea and the United States. In early2003, China determined that it would play a more active mediating role

when it appeared that the prospect of military confrontation betweenthe United States and North Korea was rising. China has also beenconcerned about the negative eect of North Korean provocation ofits neighbors. For example, Chinese leaders were alarmed when NorthKoreas 2006 tests prompted discussions in Japan about preemptionand the question of whether to consider its own nuclear option.

China has also responded when its leaders perceive that NorthKorea is a high priority for the United States or feel that the United

States might negotiate directly with North Korea. President Bushs per-sonal eorts to discuss North Korea with Chinese president Hu Jintaomobilized enhanced Sino-U.S. cooperation, though former assistantsecretary of state Christopher R. Hills visit to North Korea in June2007 without consulting with or debrieng Beijing evoked concern.For China and the United States to succeed in coordinating their poli-cies toward North Korea, the subject of how to achieve a nonnuclearKorean peninsula will have to be treated as a top priority on the bilateral

agenda, ideally at the presidential level.It will not be easy for the United States to catalyze further coopera-tion from China. But Chinese leaders should seriously consider thepossibility that North Korean proliferation resulting in nuclear terror-ism would likely draw a much sharper U.S. military response.

China worries about the emergence of an unfriendly regime in afuture unied Korea. If the Obama administrations eorts to buildregional cohesion and closer Sino-U.S. cooperation are to bear fruit,the United States will need to clarify its objectives toward the Korean

peninsula and provide reassurance about its intentions. The Task Forcecalls for a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula


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and principles of a united Korea. Such a dialogue could include dis-cussion about the process of potential unication and what a uniedKorea might look like, including the number, location, and even pres-ence of U.S. troops in Korea and a pledge to keep the peninsula nuclear-free. Any discussion with China regarding desired outcomes or futuredevelopments on the Korean peninsula would have to be based on full,prior U.S. coordination with allies in Seoul and Tokyo.

u.S.-JAPAn AlliAnC eAnd koreAn Pen inSulA

The emergence of a new government in Japan under the DemocraticParty of Japan (DPJ) in September 2009 is a historic development fol-lowing more than ve decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party.This development by itself may not shift Japans policy toward NorthKorea in the near term, but recent friction and uncertainty in the U.S.-Japan alliance (in part over disagreement on the relocation of the U.S.air base at Futenma to another site) could become a new variable in

the overall international approach to the North Korean nuclear prob-lem. Although there appears to be little likelihood that Japan wouldtake independent initiatives toward North Korea before its summer2010 Upper House election, a DPJ-led government might eventuallyconsider the possibility of pursuing renewed bilateral diplomacy withNorth Korea.

Japan faces near-term and long-term challenges in its relations withNorth Korea. The near-term challenge has two aspects. The rst is

related to the Japanese publics strong expectation that its governmentwill focus on the accounting for missing Japanese citizens abducted orpresumed abducted by North Korea. This issue involves a number ofJapanese citizens kidnapped by North Koreans from Japanese soil (andperhaps from abroad) in the 1970s and 1980s whose whereabouts havenot been satisfactorily investigated. To Japan, the U.S. position appearsto be too narrowly focused on a denuclearization-for-normalizationdeal. Critics in Japan say that the United States has failed to take intoaccount the fervent Japanese desire to see progress on the abduction

issue. Without North Korean cooperation on this issue, substantiveJapanese assistance, as part of any denuclearization agreement, will


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prove dicult. To the extent that Japanese politicians and the Japanesepublic continue to make the abduction issue Japans foremost priority,Japan is unlikely to contribute eectively to diplomatic eorts focusedon denuclearization through the Six Party Talks.

A second aspect of Japans near-term challenge is Japanese expecta-tions and anxieties over whether the United States can be depended onto defend it from North Korean aggression. These anxieties were com-pounded by the U.S. decision during the George W. Bush administra-tion to reengage in the Six Party Talks after initially taking a hard-lineposition against North Koreas nuclear and illicit activities. This changein approach was seen in Japan as an about-face. The Bush administra-

tions October 2008 decision to take North Korea o the terrorist listin return for its incomplete declaration of its nuclear facilities was par-ticularly damaging to U.S.-Japan relations. The 1998 North KoreanTaepodong test and North Koreas 2006 missile test also remindedthe Japanese public that North Koreas missile delivery systems posea direct threat to nearby Japan, yet missiles are not yet publicly on theU.S. diplomatic agenda or the agenda of the Six Party Talks. Thus,Japanese concerns about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and

North Koreas missile program cause Japan to be suspicious of any U.S.eorts to negotiate directly with North Korea about its nuclear weap-ons program.

The longer-term dilemma relates to Japanese concerns about whata future unied Korea might look like. Japan and Korea have a compli-cated historical relationship, and Japan worries that Korean reunica-tion might alter the status quo on the Korean peninsula in ways thatcould be detrimental to Japan. If a unied Korea is hostile to Japan, it

would fuel long-standing Japanese security concerns. Japanese uncer-tainty about the future orientation of the Korean peninsula aects itsrole in the six-party process and causes it to be cautious rather thanassertive.

The United States should continue to reassure Japan that progresson denuclearization will not come at the expense of Japans concernsabout abductees, and at the same time make clear to North Korea that itcannot neglect the abductee issue in talks with Japan. The United Statesshould coordinate closely with Japan on any future missile negotiations

with North Korea while continuing to strengthen missile defense capa-bilities against the North Korean threat.


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ruSSiA And the koreAn Peni nSulA

Russia has historically played a role on the Korean peninsula, but itscapacity to inuence the security situation there is low. Its participa-tion in the Six Party Talks arms Russias relevance and role in North-east Asian aairs despite its current relative lack of regional inuence.Russia supports the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and wel-comes progress toward inter-Korean reconciliation and possible uni-cation, but has relatively few diplomatic or other resources availableto contribute to the process. As a result, Russias sway in diplomaticeorts to achieve North Koreas denuclearization has been marginal.

Nonetheless, Russia maintains a long-term geostrategic interestin Korean stability. Russian security concerns would arise only in theevent of a single great power assuming a dominant role on the penin-sula. Russia would welcome a unied Korea that is friendly or neutraland would oppose the continuation of a U.S. military presence in a uni-ed Korea. But Korean reunication is unlikely to have a direct eect onRussias vital security interests.

The Task Force nds that the North Korea challenge is one in which

the United States and Russia have overlapping concerns and no greatdierence of view. The Task Force further notes that the Six Party Talksprovide a forum for positive and constructive U.S.-Russia cooperationand coordination, which helps to build trust and foster ties that may beuseful in other areas, such as Iran. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.,for example, has credited Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)negotiations with Russia for strengthening the global consensus thatnations who violate their NPT obligations should be held to account.

Moreover, as a member of the UN Security Council, a nuclearweapons state, and a longtime participant in nuclear arms and coop-erative threat reduction activities, Russia may have important skills andtechnical expertise to contribute in practical terms to North Koreasdenuclearization process. For example, Moscow has shown interestin developing railway and energy links in the region that could provideNorth Korea with economic development benets in the context ofdenuclearization. Although its role and interest in the forum has beenrelatively passive, Russia values its participation in the Six Party Talks

and has the potential to make technical contributions if North Koreamoves to denuclearize.


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The new START treaty, signed by presidents Obama and DmitryMedvedev in April 2010, provides a strategic context for cooperationto address North Korea as a state that violated NPT obligations andwithdrew from the treaty. Obama administration statements implythat renewed U.S.-Russia steps toward disarmament should be accom-panied by commensurate responsibilities among nonnuclear statesto uphold commitments to denuclearization, including applicationof pressure against North Korea and Iran as challengers to the treaty.The United States should deepen diplomatic coordination with Russiaregarding policy toward North Korea and encourage Russias contin-ued involvement in and tangible contributions to multilateral eorts to

denuclearize North Korea.

u.S.-South koreA AlliAnCe

Inter-Korean relations deteriorated rapidly with the February 2008inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as president of South Korea, whosemore skeptical approach to North Korea overturned a decade of pro-

gressive eorts to engage the North and promote peaceful coexistence.North Korea responded with numerous aggressive statements andthreats of attack, although its conventional military capabilities lag farbehind the South.

The divergence of priorities between the United States and SouthKorea on policy toward North Korea has been a continuing challengefor the U.S.-South Korea alliance since the negotiation of the AgreedFramework in the early 1990s. The Republic of Koreas (ROK) pri-

orities have understandably been focused on the peninsula, favoringstability and engagement, while the United States has larger globalconcerns about proliferation and ramications beyond the peninsula.Ongoing consultations are needed to bridge this gap in perspectives,which results from the U.S. view about the dangers of North Koreanproliferation potential compared with South Koreas prioritization ofthe need for peninsular stability.

With the exception of a short period during the Clinton and KimDae-jung administrations in 19992000, when both the United States

and South Korea were pursuing active engagement with North Korea,the management of dierences between Washington and Seoul in theirapproaches to North Korea has required frequent attention. Alliance


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coordination on North Korea became a major source of dicultyduring the Bush and Roh administrations and even limited militaryplanning for North Korean contingencies.

These dierences in priorities, however, have been minimized as aresult of Lee Myung-baks strong commitment to North Koreas denu-clearization and the breakdown of the Six Party Talks in late 2008. Thiscommitment was reected during South Koreas 2007 presidential elec-tion campaign, when Lee announced his Denuclearization, Openness,3,000 policy. As Lee reiterated in his inaugural address, he committedto make South Korean investments in North Korea with the objectiveof raising North Koreas per capita GDP to $3,000. These investments

would be conditioned on North Korea pursuing policies of denuclear-ization and openness to the outside world.

The Lee administration came into oce in February 2008 deter-mined to restore U.S.-ROK alliance coordination toward North Korea,eectively aligning its priority of denuclearization with that of theUnited States. Although this emphasis has caused tensions in inter-Korea relations, the Lee administrations approach improved relationsbetween the United States and South Korea at the end of the Bush

administration and under the Obama administration. It also deprivesNorth Korea of the leverage with which it had previously exploited dif-ferences between Washington and Seoul. The Lee Myung-bak admin-istrations emphasis on denuclearization brings U.S. and South Koreanpolicies closer in line with each other. At the same time, it is possiblethat South Koreas aversion to coercive or military options that mightlead to instability on the peninsula could come into conict with Ameri-can measures to pursue counterproliferation or prevent transfers that

might enable nuclear terrorism.The Lee administrations prudent and careful response to the sus-picious sinking of a South Korean corvette in disputed waters in theWest Sea on March 26, 2010starting with the establishment of aninternational investigation team and its determination to work closelywith the United States in responding to the incidenthas further bol-stered condence in Washington regarding President Lees leadershipand commitment to the alliance. This incident will require contin-ued close coordination between the United States and South Korea,

including joint consultations on available response options now thatNorth Korea is indisputably tied to the incident. As a practical matter,the incident will eectively suspend any diplomatic engagement with


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North Korea until the South Korean government is prepared to resumethose eorts.

Co nti ng e nCy PlA nni ng

North Koreas refusal to return to the path of denuclearization height-ens the prospect of diplomatic confrontation and rising regional ten-sions. Moreover, North Koreas economic situation remains direbecause the regime is unable to provide for the needs of its people.In addition, Kim Jong-ils eorts to establish a hereditary successionby designating his third son as his successor may or may not succeed.Given the uncertainties and associated risks related to North Koreasfuture, it is necessary and sensible for its neighbors to consider thepossibility of volatility in North Korea and plan for its possible eects.

Planning for contingencies in North Korea is not the same as pre-dicting instability or pursuing a policy that induces instability; however,it is prudent to consider how to respond to instability as part of thefull range of possible outcomes in dealing with North Korea. Con-

tingency planning also provides an opportunity to identify potentialareas of misunderstanding or disagreement between the United States,South Korea, and others, improve coordination mechanisms, and iden-tify needed resources. Moreover, participating in dialogue about futurescenarios reassures China, Japan, and South Korea that their concernsabout instability are being taken seriously. Believing that the negativerepercussions of increased pressure on North Korea will be satisfacto-rily managed may allow them to consider stronger, tougher measures

against North Korea.It is dicult to know with certainty what will happen in North Korea

as a result of a leadership succession; there is a strong possibility, how-ever, that a contested or failed succession would lead to a breakdownof political control and the development of humanitarian or other chal-lenges. These would pose political, security, or humanitarian spillovereects to North Koreas neighbors, principally South Korea and China.

Contingency planning is made more challenging by the fact that noneighbor of North Korea wants to be seen as pursuing such a plan atthe expense of diplomacy. Planning for Kims departure feeds NorthKorean paranoia about the intentions of its neighbors. The Task Forcebelieves that the United States and South Korea should deepen quiet


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discussions to forge a whole-of-alliance approachwhich shouldthen be expanded to include Japan, and then China and Russiatoenhance preparedness to respond to potential political instability in theNorth. As discussed in the China section, the Task Force also callsfor a U.S. strategic dialogue with China to discuss the future of thepeninsula.

These discussions would develop a shared understanding of the vari-ous challenges, the preferred responses and objectives of the parties,the available resources that might be brought to bear to contain insta-bility and restore security, and how to avoid the use of nuclear weaponsand ensure the security of North Koreas nuclear weapons and nuclear

materials in the event of lost central government control.The establishment of discussions on these issues would provide an

important opportunity to clear misunderstanding, build trust, anddevelop plans that would reduce the possibility of uncoordinated orconicting responses to instability in North Korea.


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30

This Task Forces primary focus has been on how the United States andits allies should respond to North Koreas nuclear development; how-

ever, several other issues on the bilateral agenda have received relativelylittle international attention but must also be addressed. North Koreasmissile program is a signicant concern because advancements in thisarea will allow North Korea to deliver a nuclear weapon. In addition, theabysmal human rights situation in North Korea looms large. Finally, apersistent challenge for the United States has been how to improve theeectiveness of humanitarian aid to the North Korean people.

north koreAS MiSSi le develoPMenteffortS

As North Koreas nuclear tests have drawn attention from the UnitedStates and the international community, its missile development hasproceeded in parallel. North Koreas missile development has drawncensure, but the George W. Bush administration chose not to address

missiles as part of the six-party agenda. The Task Force emphasizes thatstopping North Koreas missile development should be a high-priorityissue for the Obama administration and the international community.The threat of North Koreas missile program cannot be overstated.The development of an adequate delivery capacity would enable NorthKorea to expand the scope of its arsenal and threaten or actually delivera nuclear strike to its neighbors.

North Koreas intercontinental missile capability emerged as asignicant concern in August 1998, when North Korea launched its

rst Taepodong missile in an eort it claimed was the launch of a sat-ellite. In 2006, the North Koreans tested a multistage missile, but thetest failed less than a minute after the launch. North Korea has also

A Comprehensive Agenda


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31A Comprehensive Agenda

conducted periodic tests of short- and medium-range missiles since2006, especially in 2009. There has been occasional discussion of theneed to add missiles to the six-party agenda, but the issue has not beenformally taken up, in part because the nuclear issue has been deemedmore urgent.

North Koreas earlier announcement of a multistage rocket launchcarrying an articial satellite payload in April 2009 was designedto evade international censure. The reasons for this test appear tohave been driven by internal political considerations related to NorthKoreas eorts to put into place a leadership succession process fromKim Jong-il to his third son, Kim Jong-eun. North Korea launched a

similar missile test in the week before Kim Jong-ils formal assumptionof power in September 1998, presumably as a show of strength. TheApril 2009 test, only hours before Obamas speech in Prague announc-ing his commitment to promoting global nuclear weapons reductions,drew immediate condemnation from the Obama administration andthe international community.

Given the need to constrain North Korean missile development andthe fact that eorts to address the missile issue have not previously been

a part of the six-party agenda, the Task Force recommends that theUnited States pursue bilateral negotiations with North Korea connedto the missile issue and separate from denuclearization talks, whichshould occur in the six-party framework. The rst task of this negotiat-ing eort would be to convince the DPRK to recommit to a moratoriumon missile tests as negotiations over its nuclear and missile programscontinue. North Koreas expanded missile delivery capacity must befactored in to South Korean defense eorts, including strengthening

missile defense and developing additional response capabilities neces-sary to oset that capability.At the same time, the United States should continue to strengthen

missile defense coordination with Japan and South Korea to installproper defenses against any expansion in North Korean capabilities.With the consent of Japan and South Korea, the United States mightconsider declaring a willingness to pursue preemptive actions againstfuture North Korean missile launches to reinforce existing UN Secu-rity Council resolutions against North Korean long-range missile

tests.Of concern to the United States is the potential for North Korea to

proliferate its existing weapons materials and technologies to other


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state or nonstate actors, particularly Iran. North Korea and Iran areknown to have shared technology and information with each other aspart of their respective missile development programs. And thereare strong suspicions that cooperation between them extends to thenuclear eld, including possibly both uranium- and plutonium-basednuclear development eorts.

Cooperation in the missile eld is long-standing and well known,with North Korean and Iranian scientists reportedly even present toobserve their respective missile tests. In addition, there are indicationsthat North Koreas technical assistance to Syria to build a small-scalenuclear plant for plutonium production may have been leaked to Iran.

Some estimates of the value of North Korea-Iran annual trade in theseillicit areas run as high as $2 billion in recent years.

The possibility of further cooperation is of great concern to theUnited States and the international community. It directly challengesinternational norms embodied by the NPT, dees UNSC Resolutions1718 and 1874, and challenges the capacity of member states to imple-ment UNSC Resolution 1540, which requires cooperation to preventthe international transfer of ssile materials. UNSC Resolution 1874

seeks to prevent additional DPRK imports of sensitive technologies orcomponents that might be used to improve North Koreas missile devel-opment capabilities. The Task Force calls on all parties to implementthese measures strictly in order to constrain further progress in NorthKoreas development of a missile delivery capability or risk facing theconsequences that would result from an even more dangerous NorthKorea with the capability to deliver a nuclear device to any part of SouthKorea or Japan.

huMAn r ightS

The Task Force continues to be deeply concerned about deplorable con-ditions in North Korea and strongly decries human rights abuses underthe current regime. As the leadership has enriched itself and operateda vast prison camp system to control the population and punish itspolitical enemies, the North Korean people have suered extreme pov-

erty and devastating famines that have led to food shortages and lackof essential services. The totalitarian regime asserts almost complete


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control over its populace and does not allow basic political freedoms.Free speech is severely curtailed and any perceived opposition to orcriticism of the leadership is brutally suppressed.

North Korea has routinely been cited as having the worlds worsthuman rights practices by the Heritage Foundations Freedom Indexand other global surveys. The United States cannot seek to improverelations with North Korea without taking signicant steps to bring itshuman rights conditions up to international standards. Not address-ing North Koreas most serious human rights failings will also makeit impossible for the U.S. Congress to cooperate with the U.S. admin-istration to provide nancial support for any eort to improve U.S.-

DPRK bilateral relations.The North denounces criticism of its human rights record as anti

North Korean propaganda designed to undermine its regime and attackits legitimacy. Yet it appears susceptible to international criticisms ofits human rights policies, as illustrated by the North Korean mediasdefensive responses and the regimes (failing) eorts to keep the worsthuman rights practices hidden from international scrutiny. Indeed, theKim regimes desperate desire for international recognition and appro-

bation may oer an opening for increased eorts to improve the lot ofits people.

There has been almost no success in establishing ocial channelsfor dialogue on human rights with the DPRK. However, internationalactivism designed to draw public attention to, and thereby increase,international pressure to deal with North Korean human rights abuseshas grown, fueled by an increasing ow of North Korean refugees toSouth Korea during the past decade. The number of North Korean

defectors to the South passed 16,000 in 2009, according to the ROKMinistry of Unication, with annual ows reaching more than 3,000.

American human rights activists have played a major role in draw-ing international attention to the cause of North Korean human rightssince the late 1990s by bringing North Korean refugees to CapitolHill to spotlight their stories, developing a global

no. 64 - u.s. policy toward the korean peninsula

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