no. 129 march/ april 1998 - department of defence · no. 129 march/april 1998 contents...

NO. 129

MARCH/APRIL1998

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier A.S. D’Hagé, AM, MC (Chairman)Commander R.J. Sherwood, RANLieutenant Colonel N.F. JamesGroup Captain J. Kennedy, RAAFMs C.M. Robinson

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© Commonwealth of Australia 1997ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 1997

No. 129 March/April 1998

Contents

5. Intelligence and National SecurityLieutenant Colonel C.W. Orme, RAAC

13. Maritime Casualty EstimationS. B. Boyd and N. M. Burman, DSTO, Department ofDefence

19. The Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating SocialChange Within the Australian Defence ForceLieutenant Colonel T. P. Hodge, RFD

27. Common Induction TrainingCaptain R. J. Worswick

31. Learning to LeadMajor E. J. Stevenson, RAAC

43. Harnessing the News Media During ConflictWing Commander A.E. Dowse

53. Laverton: A Historic and Significant AirfieldMelissa Weller, RAAF Museum, Point Cook

67. Book ReviewsFront CoverHMAS ANZAC

Photograph by:PO Kym Degener

Managing EditorMichael P. Tracey

EditorIrene M. Coombes

Printed in Australia by National CapitalPrinting, Fyshwick, ACT, 2609

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the informationcontained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts noresponsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readilygiven by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Anyreproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are the author’s own and shouldnot be construed as official opinion or policy.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 129 MARCH/APRIL 199822

A Townsville-based RAAF Caribou assisting in the delivery of rice to drought stricken PNGPhotograph by Corporal Darren Hilder


Identifying the threats facing society has always been the task of the intelligence services

By Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Orme, RAAC

The fundamental task of government is to providenational security. To achieve this it must identify

the basic values that its society wishes to protect, anddetermine how to protect them. The threats to asociety can be external, from competing nations orenemies; or internal, from groups with political aimsto overthrow the Government. However, nationalsecurity is not necessarily the protection of a state’sterritorial boundaries, nor the repulsion of foreignattack. In some cases a nation may be required tosacrifice some of its territory, or renounce some of itsclaims, in order to preserve another, more intrinsicelement of that society.

Identifying the threats facing a society is the taskof the intelligence services. Sun Tsu identified thelink between intelligence and security when he wrote:“the reason the enlightened prince and the wisegeneral conquer the enemy… is foreknowledge.” Hesaid that this knowledge must be obtained from “menwho know the enemy situation”. Intelligence servicessupply such people who study all informationavailable, from any source, covering a range of issuesincluding economic, political, military, technological,cultural or diplomatic. They attempt to determinetrends and future intentions and to provide a guide toaction for governments to achieve their national aimsand objectives. Intelligence is of most use beforeconflict, when nations are in “competition” with oneanother; when the broadest strategies can be pursued,be they diplomatic, economic, or military. The earlyidentification of threats, coupled with appropriateresponses, provides the basis for providing nationalsecurity. Most wars are preceded by secret warfarebetween intelligence services in search of informationconcerning the other’s intentions, structure anddispositions. In this way many wars have beenavoided, while unfortunately, the failure ofintelligence has led to wars beginning.

National security is concerned with thepreservation of the values and ways of life a societyconsiders important. It takes many forms but most ofthese have similar characteristics. Echoing the wordsof Bismark, Lord Palmerston once noted that“England has no eternal allies… and no perpetualenemies… only eternal and perpetual interests.” In

light of this description it is possible to describenational security as the protection and development ofa nation’s interests. These interests may be difficult todefine, and may change over time. They may alsoinclude such vague considerations as freedom,equality, territorial integrity and free enterprise.

Translating these notions into a concept ofnational security is not easy. It raises issues ofnational power and the relationships of thoseelements that make up national power. Somestrategists and political scientists have attempted tocategorise national power by examining the elementsthat contribute to a nation’s strength. Paul Kennedy,in the introduction to his book The Rise and Fall ofthe Great Powers,linked the success of a nation stateto the “interaction between economics and strategy”1.He argued that the “triumph of any one GreatPower… or the collapse of another, has usually beenthe consequence of lengthy fighting by its armedforces.”2 He goes further to say that the results ofthese wars have been driven by a nation’s ability towage war for extended periods and thereforeoverwhelm their opposition in a war of attrition. Thekey element in the equation has been the economiccapacity of a nation to sustain a long war. Kennedy’sthesis focuses on the outcome of wars as a measure ofsuccess, with the relative economic strength ofnations being the key determinant to their ability tosucceed in war. What Kennedy fails to do is attributesufficient importance to a nation’s intelligencecapability as a determinant of success.

National intelligence services provide informationto governments to allow them to accurately assess theintentions of friends, competitors and enemies.Although Kennedy focuses military and economiccapability as the main determinants of success, it doesnot take into account the ability of nations which havebeen fundamentally weaker, both economically andmilitarily, to defeat and gain long-term ascendancyover their rivals. An example is Israel. Over the last50 years Israel has been able to maintain its nationalsecurity against the threats posed by surroundingArab nations who have been able to achieve vastlysuperior military ratios in their favour, and amassgreater economic power, yet have failed to defeatIsrael. The Israeli success can be attributed to a rangeof factors, of which the foremost could be argued to

Intelligence and National Security

be its intelligence efforts. Arab failure underpins theimportance of intelligence as a key element in anyformula which attempts to define national power ornational security.

Intelligence services are responsible for collecting,evaluating and distributing assessed informationconcerning foreign strengths, motives, plans andintentions. They are also responsible for denyingaccess to that same information concerning their ownnation. They must advise the policy makers of thestrategic picture and provide clear guidance before itbecomes necessary to mobilise military force. Indemocratic societies they aim to prevent war before itoccurs or accurately predict when a war is likely tocommence. In this way intelligence acts as a combatmultiplier which can greatly assist a nation overcomea materiel inferiority. The intelligence cycle is theprocess by which information is collected, analysedand disseminated. The first stage is the determinationof what information is required. With the vast amountof information available it is critical to the economyof the process and its ultimate success that agencieslook for the right information. The informationoverload is akin to looking for a needle in a haystack,and therefore it is important to be looking in the righthaystack.

Once the information requirement is determined itis necessary to collect the information. Until thiscentury human intelligence (HUMINT) was the mostimportant means of collection. HUMINT includesinformation from open sources such as books,periodicals, newspapers, radio and televisionbroadcasts, diplomatic sources or travellers. Opensource material can provide useful backgroundinformation but generally fail to indicate specificinformation about the plans and intentions ofadversaries. At this point other forms of intelligencetake over. This may include covert actions such asespionage. However, the recent trend has been tomore technical means of collection. These includesignals intelligence (SIGINT), photo reconnaissancefrom aircraft and satellites, remote sensing, aerialthermography, spectral pattern recognition, andmicrowave sensing. Of these SIGINT is probably thebest known and has been practiced since the advent ofelectronic communications.

The most famous success in the use of SIGINThave been from the Admiralty in the First World Warand Room 40, where German naval codes werebroken. Of even greater importance were thesuccesses of SIGINT in the Second World War withthe breaking of the ENIGMA codes and thesubsequent ULTRA intelligence. There has beensome debate in recent times about the value of

SIGINT. While SIGINT offers a plethora ofinformation concerning detailed locations ofbattalions, pilots’ names and relatively low gradeinformation, the advent of computer technology hasrendered codes virtually impossible to break, leadingto a situation where the vast quantity of informationcollected defeats the quality of the intelligenceproduced. There is also the problem of disinformationor deception using SIGINT as a means to achievethis.

After the information is collected it is analysed. Itis this process of analysis that converts informationinto intelligence. It is important to understand thatinformation can be considered to be a fact, whereasintelligence is the interpretation of a number of factswhich are coalesced into an assessment of what thosefacts might mean. Analysis of information providesthe recipe for success as well as failure for intelligenceservices. Accordingly it is worth exploring analysisfurther to come to better understand the strengths andweaknesses of intelligence in providing nationalsecurity.

There are many examples of countries which,although in possession of all the facts needed toindicate another nation’s hostile intent, failed tounderstand or successfully interpret that information.Eliot Cohen identified one of the reasons for failuresof analysis as “mirror imaging”3. As an example hecites Sherman Kent’s4 defence of an inaccurateassessment of the Soviet’s intentions to deploymissiles to Cuba: “the (US) estimate of what wasreasonable for the Soviet Union to do was a lot betterthan Kruschev’s, and therefore he was correct inanalysing the situation as it should have been seen bythe Soviets.”5 In this problem, analysts drewconclusions from information based on theirassessment of what they believed the other nationshould do, rather than determining what anothernation would do.

It is a truism that intelligence does not exist in avacuum and this leads on to the third element in theintelligence cycle, dissemination. The disseminationof intelligence to the right user, and in a timelyfashion, is the key to the success of the intelligenceservices. It is one thing to have determined anenemy’s intention, it is another to have thatinformation delivered to the appropriate agency andhave that agency or government respond accordingly.It is at this point that the relationship betweenintelligence and national security becomes apparent.

Intelligence and national security are joined inwhat will be termed the national security planningprocess. The national security planning process canbe described as the integration of economic,


diplomatic, military and intelligence efforts to fulfilthe objectives of the government in power. Theprocess, although it aims at providing a rationalresponse to the demands of national security, is alsothe victim of political interplay, bureaucraticcompetition, national prejudices and the baggage ofhistory. One of the most important elements of theprocess is the identification of the threats facing anation. The threat is the major component and itdrives all other elements. Therefore the organisationthat provides the threat analysis is arguably the keyplayer in the process.

Different countries have integrated intelligenceinto their security planning process in different ways,with differing results. Most of these have resultedfrom differences in the analysis of information. In theold West Germany the final assessment of intelligencewas restricted to the country’s political leadership.This system worked well, but relied heavily on ahighly experienced political leadership. This was alsothe case during the Second World War in Britain,where Winston Churchill personally, and his cabinetin general, consistently reached more accurateassessments than the intelligence analysts. A similarsituation existed in the former Soviet Union where thefinal assessment remained in the hands of thePolitburo. The key point to note is that it is at theexecutive level that intelligence and national securityare combined.

The mechanisms by which intelligence reachesthe executive differ from nation to nation. One of the

issues of general concern is the competition betweenthe gifted amateur and the intelligence bureaucracy. Itis clear that current intelligence bureaucracies arecapable of identifying what is going on, due to theirtechnical surveillance resources. However, they haveproved less capable in identifying the intent of thetarget. The major weakness of most intelligencebureaucracies this century has been their inability toproduce accurate long-range assessments. One reasonidentified for this6 is that the best long-rangeintelligence estimates have been made by individualsand the worst by the committees on which currentintelligence bureaucracies are based.

A good example of accurate long-rangeassessment is provided by the American Homer Lea.In The Valor of Ignorance(1909) and The Day of theSaxon(1912) he described the essential elements ofthe major conflicts of the 20th Century, including theidentification of the landing beaches used by theJapanese in their invasion of the Philippines. Otherprophets of future trends in warfare were ignored, totheir native country’s detriment in this century.Writers such as J.F.C. Fuller, Liddell Hart and deGaulle predicted the rise of mechanized warfare butwere largely ignored at home. Major Pete Ellis, of theUS Marine Corps, was another who developed anestimate of future warfare in 1921 which became thefoundation for successful US amphibious operationsin World War II. Having identified these luminaries,it must also be said that there have been a largenumber of professionals and amateurs predicting

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 7

Early technical means of collecting information

different trends for the future. The secret lies indetermining who is going to be correct, and to whatdegree. The similarities between long-rangeassessments and gambling are obvious; the difficultyfor governments is that the stakes are immeasurablyhigher!

Intelligence may provide the assessment, but it isincumbent on the Government to take the actionrequired in response to that assessment. WalterLaquer agreed with Plotinus’s saying: “Knowledge, ifit does not determine action, is dead to us,”7 especiallyin regard to intelligence. However, he also identifiedthe complexities of intelligence when he identified thevague and overlapping distinction between militaryand political intelligence. He described the absence ofa clear dividing line between the two as “untidiness”8,but also said that the decisive issues in the recent pasthave been political rather than military, and that theseare unlikely to change in the near future.

A good example of the link between intelligenceand national security planning is demonstrated by thecase of the US in the period leading to World War II,and in the post war period. America’s emergence as aworld power in the early part of this century led it toconsider a global strategy in defence of its interests.These interests included the traditional goal of thedefence of the US mainland, as well as the defence ofAmerica’s possessions in the Philippines. Thisstrategy was formulated by a Joint Army-Navy Boardconsisting of four members representing the ArmyGeneral Staff and four from the General Board of theNavy, that drafted common plans to ensure thecoordination of the two services in war.9 This largelyad hocbody amounted to the highest level of nationalsecurity planning for the US. No other formalmechanisms, short of the President and his cabinet,were available to coordinate or correlate the range ofissues which would impact on national security in theyears leading up to the war. Apart from individualservice intelligence branches there was littlecoordination of intelligence matters which may haveassisted the President to come to a betterunderstanding of world affairs in the lead-up to war.

Until the late 1930s US planning focussedprimarily on the Japanese threat to the Pacific, relyingon the American fleet to perform its traditionaldefensive role. Plan Orange10 foresaw little possibilityof coalition warfare, placing the burden for meetingthe Japanese expansionism squarely upon Americanforces. When Hitler demonstrated his intentions inEurope, and also signed the Anti-Comintern Pact withJapan in 1936, it became clear that the plans based onAmerican-Japanese conflict were increasinglyunrealistic. As a result contingency plans were

produced to take into account the possibility of war inEurope coupled with a Japanese threat to thePhilippines. The resulting plans, code namedRainbow Oneto Five, were approved by the JointArmy-Navy Board in June 1939.11

The German invasion of France in the Spring of1940, as well as Germany securing naval bases inDenmark and Norway, led the US to focus awayfrom protecting the Western Hemisphere from apossible future invasion of successful Axis forces.Concluding that America did not possess sufficientforces to defeat such an invasion and prosecute anoffensive campaign in the Pacific, planners called fora defensive posture with respect to Japan. Rooseveltdirected that joint US-British operations should beplanned, leading to the “Europe first” strategy whichsaw success in Europe as a precursor to full-scaleoperations against Japan. This strategy called forconsiderable forces and resources to be earmarked forEurope, leaving only enough forces for a defensiveposture in the Pacific. Under the auspices of PlanRainbow Five,the bulk of forces would go to theEuropean theatre. Roosevelt was convinced that themajor threat facing long-term security was thesuccess of Germany and therefore the main effort hadto be on Europe. The US Army would protect thefrontiers of the Philippines but no additional forceswould be allocated. Europe would come first. Thus,the national security planning process was responsiveto, and in many ways driven by, the intelligenceassessment of the nature of the ensuing war. Historyhas shown that at the strategic level the assessmentwas sound; but that this strategy did have failings.One of these was an underestimation of the Japanesecapability in the Pacific. This was to be realised withsignificant consequences at Pearl Harbor.

The reason for the US being caught out at PearlHarbor can be directly related to its inability to fullyappreciate the need for wide-ranging intelligence. Itdid not have a centralised intelligence agency and wascaught unawares by the attack, “even though therewas considerable evidence available to indicateJapanese intentions”.12 Also, its existing intelligenceprocedures were inadequate to the challenges facedby the US as an emerging global superpower. The UShad simply not appreciated the important role itwould play on the world stage; isolationism could notbe sustained and the US needed the trappings andmachinery of power. The effect of Pearl Harbor wasto galvanise the US and force it to address therelationship between intelligence and nationalsecurity. This US response, both during the war andin the ensuing decades, makes a useful case study to


demonstrate how intelligence and national securityare closely linked.

Although the Rainbow Plansmentioned earlierwere prepared before WWII, in general the USmaintained a strong isolationist position. Someindividuals, such as William Donovan, wereadvocates of the US taking a greater role in worldaffairs in order to guarantee international stability andsecurity. To achieve this Donovan suggested that theUS should be aware of other nation’s capabilities andintentions through overt and covert means. At theoutbreak of war the US was still without an effectivenational intelligence agency and Donovan was taskedby Roosevelt to build such an organisation, whichwas eventually to become known as the Office ofStrategic Services (OSS). The US turned to theBritish security service for their model. Donovanvisited Britain, a country more than happy to assist,knowing full well that they needed the vast resourcesof the US for the successful prosecution of the war. Inturn Donovan was equally impressed with the Britishapproach to intelligence and sought to imitate theirorganisations and methods.

In 1941 Donovan was appointed head of theOffice of the Coordinator of Information (COI). Thisorganisation was established to look at internationalmilitary affairs and to report directly to the President.The COI was initially dogged by bureaucraticcompetition with the other security organisations suchas the FBI and the military. However, the debacle atPearl Harbor demonstrated the need for a centralisedagency and led to a truce in the internal competitionof the intelligence and security agencies. The resultwas the transformation of the COI to become the OSSin June 1942. The OSS was able to collect andanalyse intelligence while remaining secret andanswerable to the President alone.

The OSS received mixed reviews for itsperformance during the war. Many of their operationsfailed, whilst others were so bizarre as to defy belief.Although Donovan had lobbied Roosevelt for thecreation of a centralised intelligence agency in peace,Truman was not convinced and as a result the OSSwas disbanded in September 1945. Althoughdisbanded as an organisation, the capabilities residentin the OSS were not. Operatives active in theResearch and Analysis Division were assignedpositions in the State Department, while thosefamiliar with espionage who wished to remain ongovernment service went to the War Department.However, the onset of the Cold War led Truman toreconsider his position and in late 1945 the EberstadtReportrecommended the establishment of a nationalsecurity council, containing a central intelligence

agency as an essential part of an effectivegovernment. In 1946 the Central Intelligence Group(CIG) was created. It was limited in its ability to beindependent as it relied on funds from the Secretaryof State, Navy and War who supervised the CIGthrough the National Intelligence Authority (NIA).The problem was finally addressed by the NationalSecurity Act of 1947which created the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA).

The National Security Act saw the US attempt tointegrate all those elements of national power andnational security, to provide the mechanisms forgovernment to effectively address the problems ofdomestic and international security. These elementsranged from economic assistance through diplomaticinitiatives to the application of military force. Theresult of the National Security Actwas the creation ofthe security establishment that still functions inAmerica today. Central to the Actwas the creation ofthe National Security Council (NSC) whose purposewas to advise the President on the “integration ofdomestic, foreign, and military policies relating tonational security” as well as to “assess and appraisethe objectives, commitments and risks of the US inrelation to our actual and potential military power.”This organisation appealed to Truman who had longenvied the British superiority in coordinating allbranches of government. In the British wartimegovernment Churchill formed the apex of militaryand political planning. As Prime Minister he presidedover the War Cabinet, which considered both militaryand political topics. Holding the position of DefenceMinister as well, Churchill ruled over the DefenceCommittee in which representatives most involved inthe war held seats. These included the Minister ofForeign Affairs, three civilian cabinet ministers incharge of the War Office, the Admiralty, and AirMinistry, and the three military chiefs of the services.The service chiefs formed a Chiefs of Staff Committeethat held the authority for issuing instructions to theforces.

Although membership of the NSC changed overthe years the key players were the President, VicePresident, the Secretary of State, and other memberswho could be invited (such as the heads of the JointChiefs of Staff, and CIA). The original intention wasthat the NSC would operate in a similar manner to theBritish War Cabinet; though over time each presidentshaped it after his own image. As its founder, Trumanwas clearly a supporter of the NSC and mandated thatall options concerning major issues in nationalsecurity should be directed through the NSC. UnderEisenhower, the power of the NSC grew even morewith weekly meetings becoming the rule. The


Council focussed on long-range policy making,leaving shorter term issues of immediate importanceto either the President himself or one of hisSecretaries of State.

The establishment of the CIA by the NationalSecurity Actwas a significant moment for the US, anation that had no history of established intelligencecentres in peace and which had an abiding fear of biggovernment that might threaten civil rights. By itsoriginal mandate, the CIA was subordinated to theNSC and was directed to coordinate, not supervise,the activities of other agencies. It was to advise theNSC on intelligence issues, make recommendationsregarding coordination of intelligence activities andcollection, and correlate, evaluate, and disseminateintelligence. It was also to “perform such otherfunctions and duties related to intelligence… as theNSC may from time to time direct.”13 While the CIAwas responsible for operations overseas, the FBI wasresponsible for domestic intelligence and security.The basis for this division of labour was the Britishmodel which saw M15 responsible for counter-intelligence in Britain and M16 responsible foroperations abroad. It has been argued by Fitzgibbonthat this simplistic arrangement was the cause ofmany future organisational and jurisdictional battles,not to mention inefficiencies, and was inappropriatefor the Cold War world, where hostile intelligenceactivities were not so clearly delineated.14 He states:“As an intelligence organisation it would appear tohave been… frustrated by an almost unbelievable andclumsy structure, also based on ancient, legalisticmodes.”15

Through the vehicle of the NSC the intelligenceestimates of the threats to the US formed the basis ofstrategic military plans. These early plans, variouslynamed Pincher, Broiler, Fleetwoodand Wringer,were based on assessments coordinated by the CIA.In this way we can see how intelligence wasintegrated into the national security planning process.The overall effect of these reforms was to putstrategic military planning on a wartime footing inpeace. The changing nature of the post war world andthe demands of the policy of containment led to newdemands on the apparatus of government. As Bollpoints out: “Maintaining America’s national securityduring periods of peace as well as during war couldhenceforth be the single most important item ofnational concern.”16

While the CIA was the first centralisedintelligence agency created after the war, it was notthe last. Under a subsequent presidential order, theNational Security Agency emerged in 1952. Itsfunction was to provide centralised coordination,

direction, and control of all SIGINT and COMSEC.In 1961 the Defense Intelligence Agency made itsappearance, in part to ensure that the President andother key policy makers had alternate sources ofinformation. Its responsibilities included review andcoordination of all Defense Department intelligenceresources, with its head reporting to the Secretarythrough the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The creation ofthese separate organisations were an attempt to notonly achieve the best intelligence available, but alsoto provide checks and balances to that advice. Theorganisations were not designed to operate incompetition, although that may have well been theresult on many occasions; rather they were tocomplement one another’s strengths whilst leavingthe executive authority in the hands of the President.

It can be argued that the National Security Act of1947established a structure for national securityplanning of the first order. Indeed the Dulles Reportof 1949 argued that the US could create the bestintelligence service in the world on the basis that “freemen could be more efficient than unfree.”17 Theintelligence organisations were coordinated by theCIA, the military was under the unified control of theJoint Chiefs, and the President had the NationalSecurity Council to provide him the advice he neededto make decisions and determine policy. However,the mere presence of these organisations was not aguarantee of success. The key role played byintelligence in this process is highlighted by the manyfiascos which plagued the US throughout the 1950sand 1960s. The bomber gap, the missile gap, the Bayof Pigs and the Cuban Missile crisis all serve asexamples of the failure of the intelligence services toget it right, leading to threats to national security.Also, throughout the early years of the CIA theassessment of Soviet military capabilities andintentions remained the most important topic for USintelligence. The heavy emphasis on Europe was notsurprising but it did overlook the prospect of war inKorea.

This article has taken a broad view of intelligenceand its relationship with national security throughoutthe 20th Century. The nub of the issue in terms of therelationship between intelligence and nationalsecurity remains the conundrum that is intelligence.Intelligence is about looking at observable data, oftenincomplete and only in half light, to determine what isgoing to happen next. Almost by definition it mustfail. If it correctly predicts the political or militaryinitiative of another nation, and if as a result of that acourse of action is adopted to counter that initiative,and that initiative does not then take place, it is opento accusations that the assessment was incorrect in the


first place. However when intelligence fails to predictan event or course of action, inquiries and committeesare established, and with the benefit of hindsight,determine how they could have got it wrong. It isalmost a case of being damned if you do and damnedif you don’t. The key measure of success forintelligence is the extent to which it is able toinfluence policy. Although Frederick the Great wrote“If you know the enemy’s intentions beforehand onecould always defeat him, even with an inferior army”his record does not bear this out, for there is muchthat can go wrong even if the enemy’s intentions areknown. The fundamental issue is that whilstintelligence provides a significant contribution tonational security, unless the other elements of nationalpower are in place then there is little chance ofsuccess. This echoes our earlier theme raised byKennedy that, in the end, success is a function of

strategic and economic strength and intelligence isjust one of the components which comprise nationalpower.

NOTES1. Kennedy p.xvi2. loc. cit.3. Cohen p.764. Senior US Intelligence official in 1980.5. Cohen p.786. Kennedy p.197. Laquer p.xxi8. loc. cit.9. Boll p.410. ibid., p.911. ibid., p.1012. West p.213. Boll p.6014. Fitzgibbon pp.324-32815. ibid., p.32716. Boll p.7917. Laquer p.311


Lieutenant Colonel Craig Orme entered the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1978 and was commissioned in the Royal AustralianArmoured Corps in 1981. He served in 1st Armoured Regiment from 1982-84 as a tank troop leader, a period which also includeddetachments to 3 RAR as a Rifle Platoon Commander in Malaysia in 1982 and as a Guided Weapons Troop Leader in the UnitedKingdom with 16/5 Queen's Royal Lancers in 1984. From 1985 to 1988 he served in the Second Cavalry Regiment in variousappointments in a Sabre Squadron and as the regimental Operations Officer and Adjutant. In 1989 he served with the United NationsIran/Iraq Military Observer Groups in Iran and returned to Australia as the Aide de Camp to the Chief of the General Staff. A tour as theOfficer Commanding Long Tan Company at the Royal Military College, Duntroon was followed by attendance at the AustralianCommand and Staff College in 1992. In 1993-94 Lieutenant Colonel Orme was the Australian Exchange Tank Squadron Commander,serving as the Officer Commanding C Squadron in the 4th Royal Tank Regiment in Osnabruck, Germany, followed by a tour as theOfficer Commanding G Squadron in the 1st Royal Tank Regiment in Tidworth, UK. On return to Australia he was the Second inCommand of the School of Armour and on promotion in mid-1995 became the Senior Career Adviser at the Directorate of Officer CareerManagement. Lieutenant Colonel Orme was appointed the Commanding Officer of 1st Armoured Regiment (Tank) in December 1996.


Casualty being treated during a crash on deck exercisePhotograph by PO Chris Woods

By S. D. Boyd & N. M. Burman, Naval PlatformSurvivability, Ship Structures and Materials Division,Aeronautical and Maritime Research Laboratory,Defence Science and Technology Organisation,Department of Defence.

A method is presented whereby estimates of injuryto personnel in a confined multi-level steelstructure, such as the interior of a ship, may bemade by the simple application of overlays to ascaled drawing of the structure. The injurythresholds used in this project were derived fromblast tests carried out in the 1950s and 60s, recentmathematical modelling of human/blastinteraction, and from results derived from theShip Survivability Enhancement Program (SSEP)trials held on the former HMAS Derwentin late1994.

The capability to accurately predict personnelcasualties is vital to the efficient planning and

execution of both real and simulated ADF operations.In particular, battle casualty estimates, i.e. numbers ofpersonnel killed and incapacitated (including type,number and severity of injuries), are vitally importantto the effective planning of short-and long-termmedical support requirements, including numbers ofmedical personnel, facilities, equipment and stores.

At present there is no systematic capability for theprediction of casualties on ships of the RAN resultingfrom the range of regional battlefield threats. It isunderstood that current ADF casualty evaluationmethods for explosive warhead effects on navalplatforms are based on a mixture of limited overseasinformation, RAN experience and best guessing. As aconsequence, there is limited confidence in our abilityto accurately predict medical support requirements,which may accordingly be providing eitheran expensive,logistically inefficient and wastefuloverestimate or a dangerously inadequateunder-estimate of resource requirements.

This article details the first part of thedevelopment of a systematic method which can beused for the prediction of RAN fleet battlefield

casualties resulting from a range of ship threatengagements from explosive filled munitions threateffects.

Blast EffectsReadily available data on casualty effects

resulting from explosive blast loading are basedlargely on experiments carried out in the 1950s and60s. The great majority of these experiments wereperformed by US Defense Agencies and Laboratorieswhich studied simulated nuclear explosion blastloading effects on dummies in the open air, as well asshock tube experiments against a range of small tomedium sized animals. A significant outcome ofthese experiments was the generation and publicationof a range of survivability curves which relate thenature and extent of personnel casualty effects to thecombination of blast overpressure and impulseexperienced by the test. These curves can be used topredict the level of injuries, ranging from Primaryblast injuries like temporary to permanent hearingloss, lung, bronchial and gastrointestinal rupture, upto Tertiary injuries such as major bone breakage anddeath due to “whole body translation” i.e. the effect ofbeing bodily lifted and thrown against a solid object.The above data was generated exclusively for freefield conditions, i.e. personnel in the open, and caremust be taken when extrapolating/interpolating theseresults to predict weapons effects in enclosedstructures.

Baker1 further normalised these experimentalcurves to include variations due to altitude,atmospheric pressure, and body weight. These typesof curves can provide the basis for the prediction ofbattlefield casualties based on the use of a number ofbasic assumptions, i.e. simulations occur at sea leveland an atmospheric pressure of 101.3kPa, and for thecalculation of pressure induced whole bodytranslation an average sailor is assumed to weigh70kg. For whole body translation the terminalvelocity of a standard body due to dynamic blastpressure loading was calculated using a simplifiedmodel of a human (a cylinder of appropriate height

Casualty Models

Introduction

Maritime Casualty Estimation

and width) with approximate mass and dragcoefficients. The resulting terminal velocity is used toevaluate whole body translation personnel casualtylevels.

To evaluate the casualty levels due to strikes byregional weapons on naval combatants it was decidedto use a range of explosive filling masses from 0.5kgto 100kg (representing the range from gun launchedprojectiles to Anti Ship Missiles) at distances from thedetonation position of 0.1m to 40m. The computerprogram CONWEP2 was used to evaluate blastpressure as a function of time and distance for theidentified warhead explosive filling levels. Values ofpeak overpressure and impulse were extracted fromthe Baker normalised casualty curves for eardrumrupture, lung damage, skull fracture and death andthen used in conjunction with the weapons blastpressure effects curves to evaluate the maximumrange at which each of the injuries would be expectedto occur. Values were plotted for each casualtytype to produce a set of injury threshold curves, seeFigure 1.

These curves allow a mathematical model to beproduced which has parameters that vary for different

explosive filling masses. The equations allowevaluation of the range of damage thresholds for anywarhead explosive mass and can be used to generatedamage extent for any specific warhead type. Theseresults are directly applicable to crew on ship weatherdecks for either external weapon detonation, orinternal weapon detonation where structural damagebreaches the weather deck. However, for crewpositioned below decks these thresholds require somemodification to reflect the containment influence ofship compartments and structures on blastpropagation. The method used to modify these openfield damage threshold effects for internal shipstructures is presented in the next section.

These mathematical models are used to generate aseries of scaled overlays for a specific warhead type.These overlays are used with a similarly scaleddrawing of a Naval platform to define the extent ofeach personnel damage type centred on thedetonation position. With a knowledge of thepersonnel distribution within the platform, availablefrom the ships crew watch and station bill, estimatesof casualty levels for each blast injury threshold canbe made.


Figure 1. Injury Threshold Curves

Extensive analysis of wartime ship explosivedamage incidents has shown3 that for blast inducedstructural failure, the extent of vertical damage istypically half that in the horizontal direction. Thiseffect is primarily due to the decks being generallythicker and stiffer than compartment bulkheads,restricting vertical damage and associated blastpropagation. Realistic damage thresholds areaccordingly generally defined as circular regions inthe horizontal plane and elliptical in the vertical plane,with the resulting 3D damage volume represented byan ellipsoid.

In analysing the results of the Ship SurvivabilityEnhancement Programme (SSEP) trial Walsh4

confirmed these earlier findings and found that forlarger warheads the area affected by the blast in thehorizontal plane also encompasses the extent offragment spread; the Fragment Damage Zone (FDZ).In the vertical plane the FDZ extends beyond theprimary blast area, as it does with the smallermunitions in both planes. Based on these resultsWalsh generated formulae for radii of blast andfragment zones which differ in both the vertical andhorizontal directions.

In comparing Bakers’ results for open field andWalsh’s data for shipboard damage effects, it isobvious that the range for the onset of skull fractureand death due to blast generated whole bodytranslation appears to be relatively small whencompared to other explosive munition damageeffects. These other effects include primaryfragmentation due to the munition warhead andsecondary fragments and debris both from thewarhead and the ship structure. In general, primaryfragments from fragmenting munitions are spreadthrough a narrow arc of approximately 40º distributedabout the perpendicular to the warhead/missilelongitudinal axis (the main beam spray). However,due to the forward motion of the warhead/missile thearc of the main beam spray is vectored forward to anextent dependent on the warhead terminal velocity,typically 15º.

Since the bearing and remaining angle of amunition warhead, relative to the ship, will vary withevery incident, it is difficult to conceive a simplerepresentation to denote personnel fragmentationdamage effects for a wide range of munition/shipengagement orientations, as well as incorporating thepossible variation in the horizontal and vertical extent

of fragment damage. If, however, for a given weapon,we consider a large number of randomly orientedweapon strikes, detonated at a single position on theship, the extent of the total 3D FDZ will be defined byan ellipsoid volume with dimensions defined by theextent of the fragment beam spray. When rotated in3D space the main fragment beam spray produces aconic section with a calculable volume, and the ratioof this conic section relative to the total FDZ volumeis typically 0.22.

Accordingly, for randomly oriented warheads,crew within the FDZ volume have a 22 per centprobability of a crew member suffering fragmentincapacitation, and the product of the number of crewwithin the FDZ and the incapacitation probabilitydefines the number of personnel effected. That is, 10crew within the FDZ fragment spray volume for arandomly oriented warhead indicates that in a typicalengagement two crew will be incapacitated byfragments.

Walsh also found that there is an area, which hecalled the Total Destruction Zone (TDZ), surroundingthe warhead detonation point, within which there wastotal destruction of all equipment and fittings, andsuggested that anybody within this area would almostcertainly be killed. Typically the TDZ extends wellbeyond the death and skull fracture ranges generatedfrom blast effects alone, and it is reasonable to totallyreplace these casualty levels with the TDZ.

Walsh also suggested that within an area with aradius of approximately 1.5 times the TDZ, defined asthe Combat Incapacitation Zone (CIZ), any crewmember would be injured and rendered incapable offunctioning in a combat role within five minutes ofwarhead detonation (similar to the infantry 5 MinuteAssault Casualty Criterion). Walsh found that thecompartment walls were utterly destroyed and, alongwith debris generated by the blast from equipmentand fittings, were translated horizontally with theexpectation of inflicting serious Secondary personnelinjuries. The CIZ closely delineates the range where50 per centof the crew would be expected to sufferlung damage due to blast effects, and to reduce thenumber of overlays these two damage thresholds areconsidered to coincide.

Walsh defined a set of equations which describethe TDZ, CIZ and FDZ in both the vertical andhorizontal directions. These equations allow the threeclose in blast effects to be replaced by the TDZ, CIZ

Rationalised Incapacitation Zones

Combined Blast and FragmentationEffects

MARITIME CASUALTY ESTIMATION 15

and the FDZ. For ease of use, the two zones for50 per centEardrum Rupture and Lung DamageThreshold were considered to coincide, and arereplaced by a single zone. There are now four curves,see Figure 2, to describe the four zones which can beused to predict the onset of injury.

These new values can be used to create overlaysto cover those casualty levels for a range ofequivalent TNT masses or specific warheads. Figure3 shows a typical overlay for an explosive mass >1Kg on a Representative Ship Plan. Since theseresults have been derived for personnel in the open,some adjustment is necessary to reflect the influenceof ship compartments and structures on the extent ofblast propagation.

Further analysis of the results of the SSEP shiptrials4 indicates that for internal ship warheaddetonation, injuries to personnel beyond theCIZ would only occur if the CIZ intersecteda compartment or passageway, or if a blastroute existed from these areas to adjacentcompartments/passageways through an open orunprotected doorway. Accordingly, the 50 per cent

eardrum rupture and lung threshold and eardrumrupture personnel casualty levels can only be appliedfor internal detonations and internal personneldispositions where an open or weak blast route wasavailable to adjacent ship areas. Application of theweapons effects overlays will require some care tofollow possible blast routes and identify internal shippersonnel damage effects.

The extent and severity of personnel injury levelsgenerated by this estimation method is based onextensive explosive event test data, however, thegenerated information is not exact due to both theinterpolation and extrapolation of this data as well asthe many assumptions and simplifications used. Thus,although the templates define boundary levels forspecific personnel incapacitation for a given warhead,variations in ship construction (e.g. the presence orabsence of doors, weak bulkheads and passageways)

Cautionary Comments


Figure 2. Modified Injury Curves

MARITIME CASUALTY ESTIMATION 17

Figure 3. Typical Overlay for Explosive Mass> 1Kg on a Representative Ship Plan

will certainly effect the exact position of the damageboundary. Accordingly, the extent of the predicteddamage effects will vary gradually towards, and oftenbeyond, the template boundary and should beconsidered as an approximation rather than defining asudden transition.

It must be stressed that the ranges for eardrumrupture and lung damage threshold are derived fromfree-field pressure values. It is known that pressureregimes within a structure such as a ship can be verydifferent to the open air situation, depending on thegeometry of the structure and the location of thedetonation within that structure. An interim methodhas been described for evaluation of internal shippersonnel casualty effects beyond the CIZ limits byfollowing simple blast routes to gauge the damageextent. More work will be needed to properlyquantify the pressure and impulse within a shipstructure, using appropriately instrumented dummies,to improve the accuracy of these techniques.

Although this method is readily applicable to anybattlefield scenario, it must be stressed that the TDZ,CIZ and FDZ are the direct result of ship basedexperimental data and may not be applicable in a non-ship environment.

This method has been implemented in adocument5 for use by medical support planners in theOffice of the Surgeon General ADF (OSGADF),Headquarters Australian Defence Force. This manualsystem is the first stage of a plan to provide OSGADFwith a computer based automated system which willprovide not only casualty information, but will:• list injured personnel;• provide medical materiel requirements; and• indicate treatment time limits and consequences

of failure to treat.

A simple evaluation method has beendemonstrated which can be used to predict shipboardthreshold levels for a range of personnelincapacitation criteria, based on the blast andfragmentation effects of typical explosive filledprojectile and missile warheads.

The identified method can be used to producewarhead effects templates which, when overlaid onan identically scaled drawing of a ship, can predictnumbers and types of personnel casualties.

The application of this technique provides thebasis for the planning of immediate and longer termfirst-aid and patient care requirements, includingnumbers of medical personnel as well as stores,equipment and facilities.

This method has application outside of themaritime environment.

NOTES1. Baker W.E., Cox P.A.,et.al., Explosion Hazards and

Evaluation, 1983, Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., pp. 581-601

2. CONWEP - Conventional Weapons Effects program Version2.00, 1991, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways ExperimentStation, Vicksburg, MS, U.S.A.

3. UK Ministry of Defence, Weapon Effect, Manual CB 8844,Ver 4.88, April 1988.

4. Walsh B.E., SSEP - Assessment of Conventional WeaponsDamage and Structural Outcomes (RESTRICTED), presentedat 1996 Annual Meeting of TTCP WTP-1, DRA, Ft Halstead,Dunfermline, 1-8 May 1996.

5. Boyd S.D., Burman N.M, Maritime Casualty EstimationManual,in preparation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThis work was carried out under DSTO Task NAV 95/059,“Surface Ship Survivability Assessment”, which is jointlysponsored by the Director General Force Development (Sea) andthe Director Naval Warfare, following a request from HeadquartersAustralian Defence Force, Office of the Surgeon General. Wewould like to show our appreciation for the ongoing support ofCMDR G. James of DGFD (Sea), LCDR N. Galletly of DNW andLCDR T. Lennard of OSGADF.

Conclusions

Future Development


Stephen Boyd has worked at AMRL for 25 years in a variety of roles, transferring to the Naval PlatformVulnerability/Survivability Section in 1993. He completed a Bachelors Degree in Mathematics at R.M.I.T. Universityin 1995.

Norbert Burman graduated with BApp Sc (Hons) (Adelaide) and PhD (Monash) degrees in 1970 and 1976respectively. Since joining the Aeronautical and Maritime Research Laboratory (AMRL) in 1975 he has undertakenresearch into the interaction of explosives and materials, and in particular the design, optimisation and performanceevaluation of high explosive munitions. He is currently working as a Principal Research Scientist and is in charge ofthe Naval Platform Vulnerability/Survivability Section within the Ship Structures and Materials Division of AMRL.

By Lieutenant Colonel T.P. Hodge, RFD

I t is often suggested that defence force reserves serveas a bridge between the military and the civilian

community, a link between the host society and aninstitution very different from that society in itsstructure, composition and values. The reserves beingseen to occupy a position somewhere in between,straddling both but not quite one or the other, it is saidthat they provide the linkage which ensures that “themilitary does not become socially unrepresentativeand ideologically narrow in its social, political andother perspectives”1 while at the same time, throughtheir historical and contemporary links to the widercommunity, also providing the military with a criticalpath into the community.2

Consistent with this notion of a bridge, thereserves are the medium in a relationship which worksin two directions. From the defence force side, thereserves bring to the community the benefits of theirmilitary training, whether these be skills whichtransfer directly to the civilian workplace or otherbenefits such as physical fitness, secondary skills suchas first aid, or disciplinary training.3 It has also beensuggested that the reserves fulfil an educative role inthat their presence “in the workplace, in civilianorganisations of many kinds and in the widercommunity leads to greater public knowledge andunderstanding of the armed forces”.4 While notdenying that the regular or permanent members of thearmed forces are also citizens, the reservist isconsidered to be closer to the community and hence ina better position to foster and encourage communitysupport and to raise the military’s profile andcommunity acceptance.5

From the other direction, reservists are said tobring to the defence forces a range of best practice

civilian management, professional and trade skillsacquired in their day-to-day lives6, skills which thedefence forces have not had to pay for.7 These areskills such as medical and legal specialisations whichmay be of use during hostilities but which are not cost-effective to maintain in peacetime on a full-time basis.8

Such benefits are manifest and readily acknowledged.It has also been suggested, however, that the reserveshave a critical social influence on the military.According to Coates & Smith, the presence of“civilians in uniform” within the military means notonly the importation of skills from the community butalso what is referred to as a leavening influence.9

Through reservists, they maintain, “regulars will bemore exposed to ideas and attitudes that are held bythe community at large”, an influence which wouldserve to “reduce the natural conservatism of armedforces and militate against any tendency towardisolation from the rest of society.”10 Janowitz expressesit in terms of “an infusion of the sensibilities of civilsociety” for the purposes of properly embedding themilitary within the community.11 Because the reservistis principally and primarily a member of the broadercivilian community and only secondarily or, asHuntington puts it, “temporarily” a professionalsoldier, motivations, values and behaviour will oftendiffer greatly from those of the career professional.12

There is a dividend in this difference, however, inthat the reservists will have fresh ideas and attitudes“leavened by (their) day-to-day involvements in thecivilian community”13 and will bring that outlook tothe military. For example, it has been suggested thatthe presence of reservists has facilitated changes inattitudes within the forces on issues such as the role ofwomen14. From a social point of view, the reserveswould therefore appear to be a critical factor for thesurvival of the military which, unless it makes aneffort to understand, embrace and participate in thesocial changes happening around it, will not cope withthese changes and may become regarded as a costlyirrelevance.15 The reserves not only serve to moderatethe different outlook which inevitably develops withinan institution which emphasises its uniqueness andputs itself above the norms of its host society, but willalso be a catalyst for the changes which must occur. If,as it must, the military is to get closer to thecommunity (and it will be the military, not the

The Reserves as a Leavening Influence

Introduction

The Influence of the Army Reserve in Facilitating SocialChange Within the Australian Defence Force

community, which will have to shift), much willdepend on the leavening influence of the reserves tofacilitate acceptance of the need for change and tointroduce the new ideas and attitudes.

With so much, then, of the future of the defence forceriding on the capacity of its reserves to stimulate andfacilitate change, it is appropriate to take a closer lookat this concept of a leavening influence. What impactdo reservists actually have in facilitating social changein the defence forces? Where the institutionalrelationship between regulars and reservists has for solong been subject to strain and uncertainty, and whereit is almost “a law of nature that regular forces willtend to be dismissive of reserve forces or at leastdownplay their value”16, do the reserves have anycapacity to influence regulars? And what evidence isthere, some 20 years after the Australian Army beganthe process of integrating its reserve and regularforces, of any adaptive changes in that Service whichcould be attributed to the influence of its reserves?

This article seeks to challenge the concept of theleavening influence. It does so on two grounds. Firstly,it questions the assumption that there are fundamentaldifferences in attitude, motivation and outlookbetween the reserves and the regulars. It will be arguedthat in many significant ways it is difficult todifferentiate regulars and reservists, that the twogroups belong to essentially the same militarysubculture, and therefore that the capacity of thereserves to stimulate change is limited. If there is littledifference between them, the question is what newideas or attitudes could the reserves bring?

The second part of the challenge is that thecapacity of the reserves as agents of influence islimited by the nature of the relationship with theirregular counterparts.

While regulars and reserves share much in the wayof background, motivation and outlook, it is asimilarity the regular member appears reluctant toacknowledge. The reservist’s “defence force” willinclude his regular counterpart but the regular’s willnot include the reserve. If the Reserve is not acceptedas belonging, what potential or credibility does it haveto effect change?

The focus of this article is principally on the ArmyReserve. Because the Royal Australian Navy and theRoyal Australian Air Force maintain only relativelysmall numbers of reservists who are generallyintegrated individually or in small numbers into full-time operational and support units, and because the

majority of Navy and Air Force reservists are formerfull-time members who do not have a trainingobligation17, it is questionable whether the Navy and AirForce Reserves provide any significant link betweenthe Australian Defence Force and the community.

The value of the reserves as a leavening influenceis predicated on their being different. If they are toreduce the natural conservatism of the military andlimit its isolation from society, they must by inferencehave more liberal and socially aware ideas andattitudes and they must be capable of bringing thatdifferent outlook to bear on their permanentcounterparts.

There are indeed differences between regulars andreserves. Smith reports that at all ranks, Army Reserveofficers are distinctly older on average than regularofficers.

There are also higher rates of female participationin the Army Reserve (17 per cent, compared with 9.5per centfor the ARA) and of educational attainment(with 41 per centof the ARes completing Year 12, asopposed to 22 per centof ARA).18 While there hasbeen little comparative attitudinal research, Furry19

reports that Army Reserve attitudes about servingalongside homosexuals are more liberal than those ofthe ARA. There was also a major difference betweenthe ARA and ARes in attitudes about working withwomen (just over 50 per centof ARes officers and 61per centof ARes soldiers preferring to work in mixedgender units, compared with 39 per centof ARAofficers and 35 per centof ARA soldiers), a differenceFurry attributes to the fact that the majority of AResmembers work in mixed gender civilian employmentorganisations.

At the same time, there is much to support theargument that the defence force reserves are really justvariants of a single “warrior culture.”20

Notwithstanding the noted gender, education andofficer age differences, both groups are essentiallydrawn from the same young, male, English-speaking-background segment of the community, and for thisreason the same concerns about representativenessarise. While female participation may be higher in thereserves, at 17 per centit could hardly be argued thatwomen have an effective voice or are being heard.

Reserves Not Representative of Society

Regulars and Reservists: FundamentallyDifferent or Substantially the Same?

A Challenge to the Concept of theLeavening Influence


Like the ARA, the Army Reserve also has theproblem of under representation of minority ethnicgroups which, together with an over representation ofrecruits from rural areas, led Smith to suggest that theArmy Reserve was somewhat unrepresentative ofAustralian society as a whole.21 Arguably then,without the representation of minority groups thereserve forces will, as Bergin et al suggest of theregular forces, be much more likely than the civiliancommunity to support ethnocentrist views.22 Evenwere the defence forces to be more receptive tomulticultural views, it seems unlikely that this wouldbe the message the reserves would bring.

One other factor on which the reserves fail toreflect the community structure is in relation to civilianemployer. While 74 per centof Australian wage andsalary earners are employed in the private sector23,only 42 per centof surveyed ARes officers and 58 percentof soldiers were not Commonwealth, State orLocal Government employees.24 Undoubtedly theavailability of paid leave for defence reserve trainingincreases the attractiveness of reserve service forpublic servants. However, the public servant’s interestin reserve service could reflect a similar need forinstitutional affiliation that attracted them to civilianservice. Whatever the reason, the figures mean thatalmost half of the reserve work in a civilianenvironment itself not representative of society onmany factors including race, ethnicity, geographiclocation, education and socioeconomic level.

To the extent that it is true to criticise publicservants as being out of touch, it will also be true forhalf of the reserve forces.

As well as resembling the regular forcesdemographically, the reservist also has a strong desireto identify or affiliate with the military institution. Onequarter of the Army Reserve soldiers in the surveyreported by Furry indicated that trying Army lifebefore applying for the Regular Army was aninfluence on their decision to enlist, while one thirdsaid that help in gaining entry to the ARA was afactor.25 Institutional or intrinsic reasons such as“Doing something for my country” and “Thechallenge of military training” were the most citedreasons for joining, and some 92 per centof AResofficers and 84 per centof soldiers made it clear thatthe Reserve was regarded as more than just a job.

Other recent research has reached much the sameconclusion. Full-time and part-time Army surveyrespondents having similarly ranked 16 reasons for

military service, it was concluded that both groupsserved for essentially the same vocational orinstitutional reasons. It was evident that there was astrong institutional culture in the reserve forces andthat, for both groups, institutional values wereassociated with a strong commitment to long-termservice. Full-time and part-time values were verysimilar and the two groups were closer than theythought in their ideas about the meaning ofprofessional service.26 It has also been noted that inother respects the reserves have tended increasinglysince the Second World War to emulate regularservice, giving rise to common training, officerproduction and subsequent officer training,particularly within the Army.27

With the reserves sharing so many of theidentifying characteristics, cultural values and normsof the military institution, it is difficult to avoid theconclusion that they are substantially the same as theregulars and are part of that institution. This couldperhaps explain why, despite the reserves constituting40 per centof the total ADF and 52 per centof theArmy28, there is still little indication of any socialchange within the military which could be attributed tothe reserves, and why the ADF remains a substantiallyseparate institution from Australian society.29

From the reservist’s point of view, the GlennReview’sdescription of a reservist as a “citizen inuniform”30 does not capture the strength of his/hercommitment and identification with the military. Part-time service is clearly more than just a hobby3l orcompensation for under-employment in the primaryjob.32 While Army reservists acknowledge their lack ofpreparedness in their current reserve roles33, they stilloverwhelmingly believe that the reserves have aneffective role in the defence of Australia and that theycould make a worthwhile contribution to that task.34

Clearly, they regard themselves as integral to theADF, more like “soldiers in suits” than “citizens inuniform”.

Such views are not generally shared by the regularforces. As noted earlier, the relationship betweenregulars and reserves has not been smooth. Neither hasunderstood or been inclined to understand whatmotivates the other, the differing circumstances underwhich they serve or the limitations of thesecircumstances.35 It has been a relationshipcharacterised by paternalism, jealousy andobstructiveness36, and, in so much that it has militatedagainst finding a suitable role for the reserves in the

The Reservist as an Agent of Influence

The Institutional Similarities of Regularsand Reservists

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ARMY RESERVE IN FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE WITHIN THE ADF 21

ADF, could be counted as one of the major obstaclesin trying to turn the Total Force concept into reality.37

Because of the limited nature of their involvementwith the military, reserve forces are not regarded bytheir regular counterparts as professional.38 USNational Guardsmen and reservists are commonlydeprecated as “weekend warriors” and criticised aslacking dedication, commitment and militaryprofessionalism.39 There would be little reason todoubt that similar views expressed by the ARA over20 years ago regarding Citizen Military Forcessoldiers as pretentious and less than competent40 wouldnot also be held of the Army Reserve today. Morerecently, Sigma Consultancy’s survey of theperceptions of full-time members’ attitudes towardsthe Army Reserve reported a lack of empathy, limitedunderstanding of reservists’ values and commitment,and little appreciation of the advantages part-timepersonnel could bring to the defence forces.41 Theregular member tended to equate the reservist’scompetence with his/her military rank, notappreciating that many reservists in the lower rankswere people with successful business or professionalcareers.42 The full-timers did not perceive the reserveforces as credible in terms of role or performance andsaw integration as a threat to their professionalstandards and status.

The regular soldier’s belief that the reserve serviceis not real soldiering has been accepted as at least partof the explanation for the low rate of transfer fromregular service to the reserves.43 Addressing this issue,Sigma Consultancy found that, apart from thoseleaving full-time service to put the Army completelybehind them or to dedicate more time to family or thenew civilian career, full-time members wereessentially unwilling to be involved in something thatwas not credible or in which their skills would not bevalued.44

If the prevailing perception of the reserves is thatthey lack professionalism, competence and credibility,they are unlikely agents of change. In socialpsychology terms, the regulars and reserves, at least asfar as the regulars are concerned, constitute twoseparate reference groups. From the regular’s point ofview, theirs is a closed, exclusive in-group for whom“we” or “us” does not include the reserves. Theregular soldier’s views of the reserves are generallysomething acquired when joining the regulars andadopts its norms, attitudes and stereotypes. Becausetheir relationship with the reserve group is essentiallyin conflict, they will hold negative attitudes andstereotypes of the reserves. Under Kelman’s theory ofattitude change, the reserve will have no influence onregular soldier’s views because the reserves are notperceived as being either a powerful or attractive

source and because their message does not fit withregulars’ existing values and cognitions.45 This wasdemonstrated by the experience with the ReadyReserve. While it may have been hoped that contactbetween regulars and a more capable, better trainedReady Reserve would have ameliorated some of theregulars’ negative feelings about the reserves, themajority of regular Army officers and soldierssurveyed up to 1995 remained opposed to the ReadyReserve46,47 and continued to justify their views interms of established stereotypes.48

It has not been the intention of this article toquestion that the defence force reserves provide abridge between the military and the community. It isclear that through the reserves there is an ongoing andmutual exchange of skills and knowledge of benefit toall concerned. The reservist also has something of adual ambassadorial role, representing communityinterests when in uniform and fostering communityunderstanding and acceptance of the military in thecivilian workplace.

However, the reserves are not agents of socialchange. I have sought to challenge the view that,through their contact with the community at large, thereserves bring to the military fresh ideas and attitudesand thereby facilitate change. This challenge has beenon two grounds. Firstly, it has been argued that thereserves, seeking to identify with and striving so hardto be like the regulars, see themselves as members ofthe same military subculture. Certainly, they sharemuch in the way of background, motivation andattitudes, to the extent that it is doubtful whether thereserves are much less “socially unrepresentative andideologically narrow”49 than the regulars. From thispoint of view, reservists are not fundamentallydifferent from regulars and do not have a particularlydifferent outlook to bring. Secondly, it has beenargued that because the reserves have such poorstanding with the regular service, they have limitedcapacity to initiate change on social issues within themilitary. As Smith notes, the sociology of the ADFhas changed (albeit gradually and under externaldirection) to reflect developments within Australiansociety50 but there is no indication that any suchchange can be attributed to the influence of thereserves since the process of integration commenced.

What of the future? As the movement towardintegration of regular and reserve componentsaccelerates, any capacity the reserves may have forsocial bridge building seems likely to diminish. The

Conclusion


Glenn Reviewconcedes that integration will ask moreof the part-time members51, a commitment which canonly be met at some cost to their civilian employmentand their family. As their military commitmentincreases and their skill levels rise, the part-timersmove closer to the military institution and at the sametime away from the community. Particularly as the“revolving door” movement between full-time andpart-time service increases, any difference in valuesand attitudes will become blurred. At this point surely,the bridge will begin to crumble. Unless at the sametime the integrated ADF has been moving to embeditself more firmly within Australian society, there willnow be a gap between them. The newly integrateddefence forces may need to look for direct links withthe community through strategies such as outsourcing(e.g. the Commercial Support Program) and thecivilianisation of non-core business to span the gap.

If the role of the reserves to date as facilitators ofsocial change has been unclear, their future role isuncertain. The reserves themselves are on thethreshold of major structural, functional and socialchange. While such change may well resolve many ofthe reservist’s problems in trying to occupy a difficultintermediate position between the military and thecommunity52, it will inevitably bring others.

NOTES1. Pinch, F.C., “Military Manpower and Social Change:

Assessing the Institutional Fit”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol8, No 4, 1982, 575-600, p. 592.

2. Australian Defence Force, Serving Australia: The AustralianDefence Force in the Twenty-First Century, Personnel PolicyStrategy Review Team, Defence Centre, Canberra, 1995,p. l65. This report is commonly referred to as the “GlennReview”.

3. Hatt-Cook, M.E., “Call up the Reserves: A Brief Study of theNeed to Change National Attitudes to the Reserves in GreatBritain”, RUSl Journal, Vol 136, No 4, Winter 1991, 26-28,p. 28.

4. Coates, J. & Smith, H., Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme,Report prepared for the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministerfor Defence, Unisearch, Canberra, 30 June 1995,p. l9.

5. Australian Defence Force, op cit,1995, p. 165.6. Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia – Defence

White Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p. 74.7. Millar, T.B. (Chairman), Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen

Military Forces, Report, AGPS, Canberra, March 1974, p. 6.8. Commonwealth of Australia, op cit,1994, p. 74.9. Coates, J. & Smith, H., op cit,1995, p. l9.10. Coates, J. & Smith, H., op cit,1995, p. l9.11. Janowitz, M., The Professional Soldier, Free Press, New York,

1971, cited in Pinch, F.C., op cit,1982, p. 591.12. Huntington, S.P., The Soldier and the State, The Belknap Press

of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967, p. l7.13. Pinch, F.C., op cit,, 1982, p. 592.14. Coates, J. & Smith, H., op cit,1995, p. 20.15. Wrigley, A.K., The Defence Force and the Community, Report

to the Minister for Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1990,p. 212. Pinch (op cit, 1982, p. 578) makes much the samepoint.

16. Smith, H., The Army Reserve and Australian Society in the1990s, Working Paper No 7, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, University College, October 1992, p. 11.

17. The 1994 Defence White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia,op cit,1994, pp. 74-75) reports that on June 1994 figures theNavy Reserve at 4,957 members represents 25.1 per centofthat Service, some 3,500 of this number being inactivereservists. The Air Force Reserve, at 4,419, represents 19.9 percentof the RAAF, over 67 per centof Air Force reservistsbeing inactive. For Army, the 28,912 reservists represent 52.3per centof that Service, the overwhelming majority (87.5 percent) of whom were active reservists.

18. ibid, 1992, p.l4, p.21 and p.22. In relation to the age difference,it could also be suggested that the older Army Reserve officer,rather than having a liberal leavening influence, may bring tothe military the more conservative values that are commonlyassociated with age. Certainly if, as Dixon (1976) suggests,conservatism is associated with a commitment to custom andtradition, the reservist as a member of a unit with stronghistorical community links may be as resistant to change or asunlikely to sponsor change as his regular counterpart. (Dixon,N.E., On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Futura,London, 1976, p. l62).

19. Furry, R.C., General Reserve (GRes) Attitude and OpinionSurvey 1995, WP 11/95, 1st Psychological Research Unit,Department of Defence, Canberra, November 1995, p. 23 andp. l7.

20. Sigma Consultancy, Army Manpower Control MechanismsProject – Stage III, March 1996, p. 47.

21. Smith, H., op cit,1992, p. l5.22. Bergin, A., Hall, R., Jones, R. & McAllister, I., The Ethnic

Composition of the Australian Defence Force: Management,Attitudes and Strategies, Working Paper No 11, AustralianDefence Studies Centre, University College, University ofNew South Wales, ADFA, Canberra, May 1993, p. 9. Whilerelative to the ethnic/racial composition of the civilianpopulation in the 15-54 age group, the ARes at 45% shows ahigher representation than the regular forces which rangebetween 25-36%, recruits from non-English speakingbackgrounds are still significantly under represented.

23. Australian Bureau of Statistics World Wide Web InformationService, “Wage and Salary Earners: Private and Public Sectors,February 1995”, Employed Wage and Salary EarnersAustralia.

24. Furry, R.C., op cit,November 1995, Table 2 at p. 5.25. Furry, R.C., op cit,November 1995, p. 9.26. Sigma Consultancy, op cit,March 1996, pp. 15-17.27. Submission by the Defence Reserves Association to the Joint

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,reported in: The Parliament of the Commonwealth ofAustralia, Officer Education: The Military After Next, JointStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,AGPS, Canberra, October 1995, p. l26.

28. Commonwealth of Australia, op cit, 1974, p. 74.29. With reference to its Army Manpower Control Study Stage I

Report on ARA attrition/retention issues, Sigma Consultancysuggests that “the institutional culture of the military hasremained strong, even over a period where the growingoccupational nature of military service may have beenexpected to have been a threat to the culture” (SigmaConsultancy, op cit,March 1996, p. l7).

30. Australian Defence Force, op cit,1995, p. l65.31. Sigma Consultancy, op cit,March 1996, p. l7.32. Mehay, S.L., “Reserve participation versus moonlighting: Are

they the same?”, Defence Economics, Vol2, No 4, 1991,325-337, p. 336.

33. As reported by Furry (op cit,November 1995, p. l3), only 25per centof ARes officers and soldiers thought that theirtraining had prepared them well for duties in their current AResposting.

34. Furry, R.C., op cit,November 1995, pp. l3-14.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ARMY RESERVE IN FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE WITHIN THE ADF 23

35. Millar, T.B. (Chairman), op cit,March 1974, p. 82.36. Millar, T.B., “The Defence Force Reserve”, in Langtry, J.O. &

Ball, D. (Eds), A Vulnerable Country? Civil Resources in theDefence of Australia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,ANU Press, Canberra, 1986, p. 286.

37. While the suggestion that the Regular-Reserve relationship hasbeen an impediment in resolving a role for the reserves, thelink between defining a role and failure to turn the Total Forceconcept into reality is made by Coates & Smith (op cit,1995,p. 3).

38. Zurcher, L.A. & Harries-Jenkins, G., “Introduction”, inZurcher, L.A. & Harries-Jenkins, G. (Eds), SupplementaryMilitary Forces, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1978, p. l3.

39. Philbin, E.J. & Gould, J.L., “The Guard and Reserve: InPursuit of Full Integration”, in Wilson, B.W. (Ed), The Guardand Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983,National Defense University Press, Washington, 1985, p. 45.

40. Millar, T.B. (Chairman), op cit,March 1974, p. 81.41. Sigma Consultancy, op cit,March 1996, p. 10.42. This comes as no surprise considering Furry’s (op cit,

November 1995, Appendix E) report that “Doing somethingdifferent” was the most frequently cited reason (92.6 per cent)of ARes soldiers for joining, and the fourth highest reason(85.2 per cent) for ARes officers.

43. Smith, H., op cit, 1992, p.11. Smith cites Wrigley’s (op cit,1990, p.330) figures showing only 5-6 per centof ArmyReservists with prior regular service compared with 50-60 percent in the US Army Reserve.

44. Sigma Consultancy, op cit,March 1996, p. 34.45. Kelman, H.C., “Compliance, identification and internalization:

Three processes of attitude change”, Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol 2, 1958, 51-60, cited in Triandis, H.C., Attitudeand Attitude Change, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1971.

46. Salter, J.S., 1995 Soldier Attitude and Opinion Survey –Miscellaneous items, WP 14/95, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, February 1996.

47. Salter, J.S., 1995 Officer Attitude and Opinion Survey –Miscellaneous Issues, WP 17/95, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, February 1996.

48. As reported by Hodson (Hodson, S.E., Internal Report onRegular Army Soldiers ‘ Attitudes Towards Employment in theReady Reserve, 1st Psychological Research Unit, Canberra,June 1994, p. 8) many ARA soldiers believed that RRessoldiers were not committed to the Army and were onlyinterested in the tax-free pay, education benefits and job searchassistance. Such views were strong even among those regularswith whom the RRes more closely worked. These views havebeen attributed to the perception of the RRes as a threat toARA job security.

49. These are Pinch’s words, cited earlier (See note 1). 50. Smith, H., “The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian

Defence Force”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 21, No 4,Summer 1995, 531-551, p. 532.

51. Australian Defence Force, op cit,1995, p. l78.52. Smith, H., op cit,1992, p. 16.

BIBLIOGRAPHYAustralian Defence Force, Serving Australia: The Australian

Defence Force in the Twenty First Century, Personnel PolicyStrategy Review Team, Defence Centre, Canberra, 1995.

Bergin, A., Hall, R., Jones, R. & McAllister, I., The EthnicComposition of the Australian Defence Force: Management,Attitudes and Strategies, Working Paper No 11, Australian

Defence Studies Centre, University College, University ofNSW, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, May1993.

Coates, J. & Smith, H., Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme,Report prepared for the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministerfor Defence, Unisearch, Canberra, June 1995.

Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia – Defence WhitePaper 1994, Australian Government Publishing Service,Canberra, 1994.

Dixon, N.E., On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Futura,London, 1976.

Furry, R.C., General Reserve (GRes) Attitude and Opinion Survey1995, WP 11/95, 1st Psychological Research Unit, Departmentof Defence, Canberra, November 1995.

Hatt-Cook, M.E, “Call up the Reserves: A Brief Study of the Needto Change National Attitudes to the Reserves in Great Britain”,RUSl Journal, Vol 136, No 4, Winter 1991, 26-28.

Hodson, S.E., Internal Report on Regular Army Soldiers’ AttitudesTowards Employment in the Ready Reserve, 1st PsychologicalResearch Unit, Department of Defence, Canberra, June 1994.

Huntington, S.P., The Soldier and the State, The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967.

Janowitz, M., The Professional Soldier, Free Press, New York,1971.

Kelman, H.C., “Compliance, identification and internalization:Three processes of attitude change”, Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol 2, 1958, 51-60.

Mehay, S.L., “Reserve participation versus moonlighting: Are theythe same?”, Defence Economics, Vol 2, No 4, 1991, 325-337.

Millar, T.B. (Chairman), Committee of Inquiry into the CitizenMilitary Forces, Report, AGPS, Canberra, March 1974.

Millar, T.B., “The Defence Force Reserve”, in Langtry, J.O. & Ball,D (Eds), A Vulnerable Country? Civil Resources in the Defenceof Australia, ANU Press, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,Canberra, 1986.

Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Officer Education:The Military After Next, Joint Standing Committee on ForeignAffairs, Defence and Trade, AGPS, Canberra, October 1995.

Philbin, E.J. & Gould, J.L., “The Guard and the Reserve: In Pursuitof Full Integration”, in Wilson, B.W. (Ed), The Guard and theReserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983,National Defense University Press, Washington, 1985.

Pinch, F.C., “Military Manpower and Social Change: Assessing theInstitutional Fit”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 8, No 4, 1982,575-600.

Salter, J.S., 1995 Soldier Attitude and Opinion Survey –Miscellaneous Items, WP 14/95, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, February 1996.

Salter, J.S., 1995 Officer Attitude and Opinion Survey –Miscellaneous Issues, WP 17/95, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, February 1996.

Smith, H., The Army Reserve and Australian Society in the 1990s,Working Paper No 7, Australian Defence Studies Centre,University College, October 1992.

Smith, H., “The Dynamics of Social Change and the AustralianDefence Force”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 21, No 4,Summer 1995, 531-551.

Triandis, H.C., Attitude and Attitude Change, John Wiley & Sons,New York, 1971.

Wrigley, A.K., The Defence Force and the Community, Report tothe Minister for Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1990.

Zurcher, L.A. & Harries-Jenkins, G. (Eds), Supplementary MilitaryForces, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1978.


Lieutenant Colonel Hodge is an Army Reserve officer currently serving with the Reserve Staff Group. Having enlisted with 3 PsychUnit in 1972 and been commissioned with 12 Psych Unit in 1975, he subsequently served with OCTU 2 Training Group,Headquarters Training Command and I Psychological Research Unit before taking up his current posting. He is currentlycompleting a Master of Defence Studies degree at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

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SOLD OUT

By Captain R. J. Worswick

“We will increase the number and effectiveness ofcombat troops by strengthening the contributionof reservists or part-time soldiers. Most reservepersonnel will have an initial six weeks full timetraining”. 1

The plan to revitalise the General Reserve as partof Restructuring the Army (RTA) has generated

the need for a better training standard for Part-Timesoldiers. It was determined that one way to raise thetraining standard was to provide better inductiontraining for Part-Time soldiers. Induction training isthat required to prepare a soldier to serve in a unit andis comprised of recruit (i.e. all corps soldier skills)and initial employment training (IET) (i.e. specific tocorps soldier skills). Having Part-Time soldierscomplete the same induction training as Full-Timesoldiers (i.e. Common Induction Training or CIT),would raise the present training standard forPart-Time soldiers, better preparing them for servicewithin an integrated Army. Two pilot courses havebeen conducted at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion(1RTB), one in March/April and the other inJuly/August 1997, using Full-Time and Part-Timesoldiers enlisted to infantry and artillery. As planningfor the first CIT course unfolded, and subsequentlyduring the two trial courses, a number of significantissues were encountered that directly impact on thepresent method of soldier training and development inthe Army. This article will look briefly at theevolution of the CIT recruit course to provide abackground for a detailed discussion on aspects thatimpact on soldier training.

The CIT pilot course attempted to transform thecurrent 12-week recruit course by reducing it to sixweeks. Time was made up by the removal of revisionperiods and administrative activities (e.g. leave,duties, etc.) resulting in 85 per centof the 12-week

course being taught over six weeks. The CIT pilotcourse provided valuable information with regard tocourse content and training assimilation by recruits.Most importantly, the course proved to be sophysically intense and mentally demanding that therewere assimilation problems not usually encounteredduring the normal 12-week course. This is becausethere was no time available for revision in the six-week course. It was also discovered that the quiettimes during the 12-week course (such as duties andfree time on weekends) allowed the recruits tophysically recover and mentally “recharge theirbatteries”. This quiet time also assists trainingassimilation but again is not available in the six-weekcourse.

The course content for the second CIT trial wasmarkedly different to the pilot course. A trainingadvisory panel consisting of a number of corps andcommand RSMs examined the results of the pilotcourse, the TMP for the current 12-week course andthe doctrinal basis for soldier training, the Manual ofLand Warfare Part 3 Volume 1 Pamphlet 8, All CorpsSoldier Training Requirement (MLW 3-1-8). Theresultant finding was that recruits were receivingtraining beyond that required of an individual allcorps soldier. This led to a reduction in the amount(not nature) of training to allow more time forrevision and proper assimilation of knowledge. Theresultant product was a six-week and three day coursewhich accounted for 75 per centof the instructionalperiods2 in the 12-week course. From the outset then,CIT can be seen to have significant ramifications onsoldier training in the Australian Army.

Time When the concept of CIT was raised, one ofthe first issues that had to be addressed was time.Whilst not a problem for Full-Time soldiers,Part-Time soldiers were unlikely to be released bytheir employers for prolonged periods. The presentFull-Time recruit course consists of ten weeks oftraining conducted over a 12-week period, with aweek of administration before and after the course,and a short period for duties during the course. Thecurrent Part-Time recruit course on the other hand is

Impact on Soldier Training

Evolution of the CIT Recruit Course

Introduction

Common Induction Training

two weeks long. To achieve a common standard andat the same time produce a sufficiently trained (allcorps) soldier, it was determined that approximatelysix-weeks recruit training would be required. Inplanning CIT, it was determined that the minimumcommitment a Part-Time soldier will have to make issix-weeks. This means that Part-Time soldiers maynot necessarily complete their IET trainingimmediately after they complete recruit training.

IET training varies in length between corps andlike the recruit course, Part-Time soldiers would beunable to complete a present IET course in its entiretydue to time constraints. Again it was determined thattraining would have to be adapted to fit within a sixweek time frame. For many of the technical corpsthis presents a significant problem, and a great deal ofeffort has been expended to ensure that each corp canbest tailor its existing course to meet their units’needs, within an approximate six-week time frame.

Delivery of Training To cater for the needs ofPart-Time soldiers, a degree of flexibility must also beincorporated into the delivery of training to meet time(and resource) constraints. Modularisation of IETtraining is also being examined to allow Part-Timesoldiers that can’t complete their training in sixweeks, to attend two three-week modules instead (orthree two week, etc). Modularised competency basedtraining would provide the flexibility to meet therequirements of Part-Time soldiers, whilst stillproviding the same level of training compared withFull-Time soldiers. Regardless of the method ofdelivery, the reduction in length of both recruit andIET courses due to time constraints means that anamount of training must be transferred. The conceptof “training transfer” is central to the success of CITand will impact significantly upon the Army.

Training Transfer When compared to presentinduction training, under CIT Full-Time soldiers willhave a shortfall in their training when they arrive attheir units. This is not a new concept, as all soldiersrequire further training in their units before beingdeemed Private (proficient), otherwise known asPTE(P). CIT means that the amount of training thatmust be made up will increase and it will be theresponsibility of units to provide this training (both allcorps and corp specific) for their soldiers. The besthypothetical examination of the logic behind trainingtransfer is physical training. Prior to CIT, recruitswere required to pass the BFA to march out of 1RTB.However, an infantry soldier was not recognised asbeing “proficient” until 18 months after thecompletion of IETs3. Why then should a recruit/IETbe expected to be at the same level as a soldier who isPTE(P)? If the time for a C Pass in the 2.4km is10 minutes, hypothetically speaking then it is logical

that 1RTB get all recruits to a standard of 12 minutes,corps schools get them to 11 minutes, and units getthem to 10 minutes.

As a result of Project Dunlop, the concept oftraining transfer was initiated in 1996 with regard tophysical training. Project Dunlopdetermined thatthere was an alarming rate of lower limb injuryamongst recruits, particularly females, and that thiswas caused by poor physical fitness upon enlistment,and a physical training regime that did not allow for aprogressive development from an initially lowstarting level. As a result of Project Dunlop, 1RTBaltered its physical training programme so thatrecruits were only required to complete a 2.4 km run(this was when the 5 km run was the distance for theBFA), and in conjunction with PTIs at the corpsschools, progressive physical training was developed.

The concept of training transfer requires theidentification of an end state, and determining a pathto reach this end state. MLW 3-1-8 provides the endstate by listing the competencies that a soldier mustbe proficient in. However, soldier training in theAustralian Army is deficient because although an endstate is identified, there is currently no uniform path toproficiency due to lack of coordination betweenrecruit, IET and unit training responsibilities. In otherwords, there was no training continuum for all corpsand some corps specific soldier skills. Trainingtransfer and the continuum of training is crucial to thesuccess of CIT because when CIT becomes the onlymethod of entry into the Army, units may beresponsible for up to 40 per centof all corps soldiertraining.

All Corps Soldier Training The need to transfertraining prompted an examination of soldier trainingrequirements. The doctrinal basis of all corps soldiertraining is laid down in MLW 3-1-8, which details theall corps competencies a soldier requires to bePTE(P), and for progression through the ranks.However, examination of the doctrine reveals whatcan best be described as a training imbalance, whichhas shaped the conduct of CIT and will have far-reaching implications for the Army. The imbalance isthat in the two years that it takes an infantry soldier tobecome PTE(P) (three months recruit training, threemonths IET training and then 18 months on the job ina unit), 90 per centof the all corps trainingcompetencies are achieved in the first three months ofthe soldier’s career, before the completion of recruittraining.

Continuum of Training Another significantfinding was that there was no formal continuum oftraining and assessment that would take a soldierfrom 90 per centtrained at the completion of recruittraining, to completely trained in all corps


competencies as per MLW 3-1-8. The degree towhich training in specific competencies continues inIET schools varies considerably depending on corps.There is no synchronous between the recruit TMPand the various corps IET TMPs, therefore soldiertraining is neither continuous nor progressive. Themost telling example of no training continuum is theF89 LSW, which is currently not taught at 1RTB.4

Most corps schools do not provide formal instructionon the F89, which means that the first time a soldier isformally tested on the F89 is when that soldier isgiving lessons on it during his/her Subject One forCorporal. However, MLW 3-1-8 states that a trainedsoldier must be able to “apply fire with selectedService weapons”. Theoretically then it would seemthat a significant proportion of soldiers deemed to bePTE(P) are not so.

Competency Log Books The requirement totransfer some aspects of all corps and corps specifictraining produces the requirement for a formalmethod of accounting for a soldier’s proficiency intraining competencies. However, this method alreadyexists and is used by some corps, and extensively bythe Navy. It is the competency log book, which is arecord of training that follows soldiers through theircareer, formally documenting the attainment oftraining competencies. The competency log book iscrucial to the success of CIT as it identifies thetraining a soldier needs before being deemed PTE(P).It is particularly important though for Part-Timesoldiers, who may take up to two years to completeall of their recruit and IET training.

Competency log books will have a far-reachingeffect when introduced, and not just with respect toinduction training. The continuum of trainingrequired for a soldier from recruit to RSM will bedocumented in the competency log book. Whyshould a soldier have to attend an entire SubjectCourse, if some of the competencies required at thecompletion of the course had already been achievedand formally recorded in their competency log? Thisis particularly relevant for Part-Time soldiers whocould complete an IET or Full-Time subject courseby modules, with the qualification formallyrecognised when all training competencies arerecorded as attained in the competency log.

The competency log book can also provideinformation for determining pay and allowances forsoldiers. For private soldiers, the competency logwould provide formal documentation of attainment ofthe training competencies for PTE(P). If a soldier’scompetency log book shows that he/she has achievedthe training competencies required for PTE(P), whyshould this soldier not receive the higher pay level?This would also apply if a performance-based pay

system based not on time in rank but on qualificationsgained, was introduced. The competency log bookwould also provide flexibility for soldiers changingcorps or re-enlisting by documenting competenciesalready attained, and therefore identifying the trainingshortfall that would have to be achieved to make thatsoldier competent in their new corps.

Training Continuity The introduction of CITmeans that there must be a continuity between thecompletion of recruit training and the commencementof IET training. A recent examination showed that onaverage, soldiers wait 17 days to start their IETcourse, although the soldiers that entered 1RTB on 18August 1997 that were selected as ECN 345 Riggerwill have had to wait 86 days before starting their IETcourse.5 This is inefficient use of training time, andmust certainly have a negative impact on the moraleof soldiers who find themselves “bashing dixies”whilst waiting to start training. Batching andmustering (i.e. recruiting soldiers to specific corps tostart their IET course on a certain date) at the point ofenlistment would alleviate this problem, although thismay not be practical.

A proposal currently being examined is thefeasibility of holding soldiers who have completedrecruit training at 1RTB until there are sufficientnumbers to commence an IET course. In other words,1RTB would be batching and mustering to the Army.The advantage of this is that with the development ofa training continuum and competency logs, thesesoldiers could be trained and tested in specificcompetencies whilst waiting to start IET training,therefore reducing the training transfer and making upsome of the training that IET schools could not tailorinto their six-week course. In this case it is notunrealistic to assume that some soldiers will leave1RTB as qualified or more qualified than theircounterparts who completed the 12-week course.

Unit Training Cycles As Land Command unitswill be responsible for up to 40 per centof theindividual training requirements for Full-Timesoldiers due to the transfer of training from trainingestablishments, CIT will effect unit training cycles.The “embedding” of Part-Time soldiers into theestablishment of Full-Time units results in furtherindividual training liability, to provide revision andcontinuation training for these Part-Time soldiersduring periods of Full-Time service. This will impacton present training priorities, with less emphasis oncollective training (i.e. field exercises) because of therequirement for individual training. Unit trainingcycles are likely to resemble those of the VietnamWar era, with greater time spent on (formal)individual training and development in barracks andless time spent in the field.

COMMON INDUCTION TRAINING 29

Throughput CIT will significantly impact on thethroughput at 1RTB and IET schools. The net trainingliability (NTL) for these schools will increase, with1RTB estimating that its NTL will increase three fold.It is reasonable to expect that Part-Time soldiers willmake up the larger proportion of trainees during theNovember - February period, when the majority ofPart-Time personnel will be on leave from their usualemployment, or on study break. During the remainderof the year it can be expected that Full-Time traineeswill be in the majority. This scenario is similar to theRRes scheme and the similarities between CIT andRRes are in some cases, indiscernible.

RRes Revisited? There are many similaritiesbetween CIT and the RRes. The aim of improving theindividual readiness of Part-Time soldiers remainsunchanged. A study conducted in May/June 1997 foundthat the Part-Time soldiers likely to be recruited for CITwill be from the same backgrounds as the RRes. Theconditions of service for GRes soldiers undergoing CITmay be improved (as it was for the RRes) and theopportunity for transfer between the Full-Time and Part-Time Army as the RRes experienced, will mostcertainly be a feature of the new “One Army” concept.The majority of training will be conducted during theNovember - February period as was the case with theRRes. Although Part-Time soldiers that complete CITwill not undergo a year of full-time training, under RTAit is proposed that they be embedded in Full-Time unitsto provide the expansion capability.

Screening The success of CIT strongly dependsupon correct and comprehensive screeningprocedures being conducted at the point of enlistment.Screening is used to determine an individual’sphysical, medical, psychological and personalsuitability to undergo recruit training. The intensityof the CIT course places greater demands on recruitswith less scope for back squadding, particularly forphysical training deficiencies and/or injury. The mostimportant finding of Project Dunlopwas that therewas a positive correlation between poor startingfitness level and the likelihood of a recruit notfinishing training. This correlation was proven by astudy conducted at 1RTB that determined that arecruit who cannot pass a pre-training fitnessassessment (PTA) (consisting of a “beep stage test”6,15 pushups and 45 situps) had a greater than 50 percentchance of not completing recruit training, and inthe case of female recruits, had a high likelihood ofsuffering permanent lower limb injury. This wasconfirmed on the CIT pilot course, where of the four

recruits who did not pass the PTA, three failed tocomplete the course and the fourth was unable tocommence IET training due to stress fractures. Afterthe pilot course it was decided that successfulcompletion of the PTA at the point of enlistmentwould be a pre-requisite for CIT.

The advantages of CIT and the resulting changesto soldier training are perhaps greatest for Part-Timesoldiers. Better training and resources will improvethe quality of individual soldiers and units, and allowfor integration of Part-Time soldiers into Full-Timeunits. Modularisation of training and developmentalcourses will allow Part-Time soldiers to undertake thesame courses as their Full-Time counterparts, manyof which are currently denied to them. Mostimportantly, the common standard of training willallow Part-Time soldiers to transfer to the Full-TimeArmy, and vice versa. This exemplifies the “OneArmy” concept upon which RTA is based.

CIT is inevitable and it will impact on the waythat Army trains its soldiers. It will necessitate achange in the emphasis from collective to individualtraining and many units may think that the basicallytrained soldiers they are receiving from IET schoolswill not be as good as their predecessors, and that thiswill impact on the operational effectiveness of theirunits. What they must realise is that no soldier thathas marched in to a unit has been “proficient”. Fromthe preceding discussion it can be seen that CITacknowledges what training hasn’t been done,quantifies it, and now makes sure it’s done properly.

NOTES1 Minister for Defence Ian McLachlan Defence Policy

Ministerial Statement, House of Representatives, 15 Oct 1996.2 Periods allocated to revision and administration activities were

not included in calculations.3 The figure of 18 months is drawn from the author’s experience

whilst posted to 1RAR. INDMAN Volume 1 Instruction 0101states that a soldier is eligible for PTE (P) after completing aminimum of 12 months service after the completion of IETtraining.

4 The F89 was introduced into the CIT Recruit Course afterrecommendations by the training advisory panel.

5 From the HQTC-A Recruit/IET Plan Training Year 1997/98correct as at 16 May 97.

6 The beep stage test is a 20m shuttle run. An audio tape emits a“beep” sound every time the runner should turn to commencethe next shuttle. As the test progresses the beeps get closertogether. The standard of 7.5 for recruits is equivalent to a pass inthe BFA for a 40 year old. (i.e. 1200m in 6 minutes 30 seconds).

Conclusion


Captain Worswick graduated from ADFA with a Bachelor of Science Degree (Hons). He served as Platoon Commander andCompany 2IC with 1RAR from 1993-95 during which time he was involved with Operation Solace. From 1996-97 Captain Worswickwas Adjutant of 1st Recruit Training Battalion. He is currently posted to AST Headquarters and studying a Masters of DefenceStudies through Deakin University.

By Major E. J. Stevenson, RAAC

In the billions of acts that comprise the leadershipprocess, or parts of it, a pattern can be discernedthat makes possible generalizations aboutleadership, generalizations that in turn wouldunderlie an effective general theory and serve asa guide to the successful practice of leadership.The answer will not be found in conventionalwisdom and the hoary adages about leadership -that leaders are born and not made, or made andnot born, they must be trained, or cannot betrained, that they have to exhibit certain physicalqualities like imposing height or unusualendurance or commanding voice, or mentalqualities like memory for faces and names orunusual intelligence, or magical qualities...leadership... is a function of complex biological,social, cognitive, and affective processes, that it isclosely influenced by the structures of opportunityand closure around it, that it may emerge atdifferent stages in different peoples’ lives, that itmanifests itself in a variety of processes andarenas...

James MacGregor Burns1

Leadership is an elusive art, an influencing processthat must be learnt over time and, as Burns

indicates above, involves the dynamic interactionbetween the leader’s intrinsic knowledge, skills andattitudes, and external factors such as the environmentin which the leader operates. As a complexphenomenon, despite numerous books on the subject,scholars of leadership have made limited progress indeveloping a widely accepted model of how leadersactually lead. If agreement cannot be reached on howthe process works, what hope is there for educators tobe able to teach leadership to those aspiring to lead?

Nearly everyone who commands, controls orpersuades other people, has a view on how leadershipshould be instilled in others. While the methods theypropose vary, most have concentrated on engendering

specific desirable traits using what could be termed a“cook book” approach - identify the ingredients of agood leader, mix them judiciously in a leader aspirantand you can produce a Nelson, Napoleon or a Slim.But success with this technique is not guaranteed andevidence of it consistently producing good leaders hasbeen erratic.

Furthermore, most of the existing models ofleadership are not supported by reality because, inconcentrating on a leader’s traits, behaviour orespoused vision, they have tended to be too narrow intheir description of the complicated process. What isneeded is a more holistic description of leadership, astrategic look at the intricate variables described byBurns, because it is only by standing back andviewing the process in its entirety that the true natureof the leadership phenomenon can be identified.

For the purposes of this article, leadership isdefined as, “...the ability to get others to do what youwant them to do, because they want to do it.”2 Thekey aspect of this definition is that it is an influencingprocess where the followers are committed to theleader’s goals and have a genuine desire to worktogether to achieve some activity. Over the years anumber of approaches have evolved to describeleadership and a short description of the main oneswill serve to introduce the reasoning behind theproposed model.

Trait ApproachUp until the 1950s, researchers believed that

leadership could be understood by identifying twothings, the different physical or personal traitsexhibited by leaders and followers, and the qualitiesof good and bad leaders.3 The concept was, if acommon set of traits could be found in good leaders,for example integrity, courage or decisiveness, thoseaspiring to be leaders need only emulate the importanttraits, and avoid the less desirable ones.

However, research failed to clearly establish anyuniversally accepted correlation between specifictraits of a leader and his or her performance4, although

Historical Development

Introduction

Learning to Lead: A Contextual Model for Educating andTraining Leaders

a reasonable correlation was found betweenleadership and intelligence.5 Fiedler also found acorrelation between intelligence and effectiveness,but qualified his findings by indicating that the resultswere highly situational.6 Unfortunately, for manyyears the influence of the situation remainedunderstated in early research as entire schools ofleadership searched for a panacea to the leadershipconundrum. It was also discovered that traits werenot a reliable indicator of a successful leader becausesome people clearly demonstrated many of thedesirable traits, yet they did not live up toexpectations when placed in a position of leadership,for example Major General Neil Ritchie in NorthAfrica in 1942.7 Conversely, some very good leaderswith few of the more overtly popular traits wereparticularly successful, Mahatma Gandhi forinstance.8

To complicate the issue, in many cases what areoften described as traits are in reality a set of learnedbehaviours. For example, courage is frequentlytouted as an admirable trait in a leader, yet there is noindication that people are born courageous, rather it iseither learned over time in response to externalpressures such as fear of failure in front of followers,or it is forced on the leader by virtue of thecircumstances. This is supported by recent

psychological research which suggests that people areactually only born with five intrinsic traits,introversion/extroversion, neuroticism, degree ofagreeableness, conscientiousness and openness toexperience. 9

Behavioural ApproachDissatisfaction with the Trait Approach led a

second school of researchers to suggest that anevaluation of the leader’s actions may hold the key.Although a number of studies were undertaken, themost famous group of researchers were at Ohio StateUniversity.10 They looked at (Figure 1) the effect ontask completion of the interaction betweenconsideration for subordinates and initiating structure(the level of direction provided by the leader).

Despite early results supporting their hypothesisthat high consideration and high initiating structureprovided the best indicator of good leadership, it wasnot replicated in later experimental work.11 Althoughconsideration for workers and the leader’s degree ofdirection to them are an aspect of leading, researcherswere beginning to realise that factors other thanconsideration had an influence on the leader’seffectiveness; for example they began to realise thatthe task itself and working conditions warrantedserious consideration.


Figure 1 - Ohio State Leadership Styles

The search for a more accurate description of theleadership process led Blake and Mouton to developthe Managerial Grid, which was later refined to themodel at Figure 2.12 Blake and Mouton felt that aleader’s style was based on balancing a concern forpeople with a concern for production.

Despite extensive development, all thebehavioural models were still concentrating onaspects of leadership, not the whole phenomenon.However, they did have some utility in that undercertain circumstances, they could model someleadership behaviours. The search for a moreaccurate model therefore continued.

Contingency ApproachFrom the late 1960s, a third major approach

emerged when research indicated that leader

behaviour was not the sole explanation for theleadership process. It was termed the ContingencyApproach and leadership was described using“situational modifier variables”13, the key elements ofwhich House defined as task, environmental andindividual.14 It was based on the earlier inspirationalwork by Fiedler, in which he examined the influenceof the leader’s style and the situational aspects,concentrating on leader-member relations, taskstructure and positional power.15 Models in theContingency Approach advocated that there weremore than two variables influencing the leadershipprocess, and that any examination of leadership mustallow for the complex interaction between thesevariables under a variety of situations.

A number of models have been developed, butspace precludes their discussion in this article.

LEARNING TO LEAD: A CONTEXTUAL MODEL FOR EDUCATING AND TRAINING LEADERS 33

Figure 2 - Managerial Grid

However, one that is pertinent to the modelintroduced later was developed by Hersey andBlanchard, and based heavily on the Ohio studies.Hersey and Blanchard looked at situational theoryand introduced a new variable - consideration of thetask being performed. They believed, “Theleadership style of an individual is the behaviourpattern that a person exhibits when attempting toinfluence the activities of others...”16 See Figure 3.

One of their main hypotheses was that the leaderbecomes more relationship oriented, rather than taskoriented, as the group members’ maturity increases.They later went on to develop the model toincorporate an “effectiveness” dimension which madeit tri-dimensional, thereby allowing for situationaldemands and supposedly making it more predictiveof the leader’s behaviour. This model is importantbecause it emphasised that the leader’s behaviour isdynamic, where previous models lacked flexibility inthis area. In a third version of the model Hersey andBlanchard incorporated a bell curve pattern ofdirective behaviour which described leadership stylesranging from delegating in the low end of thespectrum, through supporting, coaching and directingat the high end (Figure 4).17

In his book The Competent Manager,Boyatzispresents the results of a study to identify which

personal characteristics correlate with effectivemanagerial performance.18 Although he was directinghis research at managers, many of the competenciesrequired of an effective manager are similar to thoserequired of an effective leader. The competencybased model he developed for his study has becomeknown as the “onion ring” model and, like previousleadership models, depicts the art of influencing as thedemonstrated behaviour resulting from the interactionbetween the manager and his or her environment.19

His interpretation of the decision making process hasa number of advantages over earlier models in that itallows for the central influence of critical skills andvalues on the manager’s performance. It also has theadvantage of incorporating a wider range ofsituational factors than previous models, therebyproviding the manager with more completeinformation for his or her decision making.

Of all the models examined for this article,Boyatzis came the closest to depicting the process ofleadership, although even his model had a number ofserious weaknesses. An integral part of a manager’swork is managing people, yet Boyatzis seems toignore this critical element in his model, and he doesnot allow for the complex interaction between theindividuals being managed. Furthermore, theinterface between the variables in the model is not as


Figure 3 - Situational Model

clearly delineated as the model suggests, as all thefactors have an effect on each other, with the extent ofthat effect varying depending on the situation.Similarly, the task is not necessarily part of theorganisational environment as it can exist as adominant factor in itself, and the reasoning why traitsand motives are surrounded by self-image, which islinked rather unusually with social roles, is not clear.A manager will have a variety of important valuesand attitudes which will colour his or her behaviour,for example, integrity, responsibility and selflessness -none of which are true traits or values. There is alsono mention of the manager’s knowledge, a criticalaspect in either managing or leading. But perhaps thestrongest criticism of Boyatzis’ model is that, like theearlier leadership models, it provides a limiteddescription of some of the more importantcompetencies, not how an individual actuallymanages or leads.

In summary, many of the above modelsconcentrate on specific aspects of leadership andalthough each has some merit under certaincircumstances, most do not weather accurate testingand scrutiny. In particular, existing models do notencompass all the activities involved in leading andtend to ignore many of the external influences on thefollowers. The search for a more comprehensive

model therefore continues amidst exhaustive debatebetween the proponents of the various approaches. Amore holistic model will therefore be suggested.

In essence, leadership is the behaviour resultingfrom the dynamic interaction between a set of keycompetencies and the context within which thosecompetencies operate. This phenomenon may bedescribed in the model at Figure 6.

At the centre of the model are the essentialcompetencies required of a leader, the knowledge,skills and attitudes most often taught on leadershipcourses. Despite the inference to the contrary withinearlier leadership models, the competencies aredynamic, constantly developing and maturing withtime and experience. Furthermore, they arecontextual and therefore subject to the nuances of acombination of the organisational context, groupdynamics, physical environment and the nature of thetask being performed. To claim that a single aspect ofleadership controls the whole process is misleadingand it is therefore not surprising that previous modelshad difficulty describing leadership outside theparameters of their conception in the laboratory.

A New Model of Leadership


Figure 4 – Situational Leadership

The concept of a holistic approach to leadership isnot new as many pundits have articulated certainaspects of it in the past, but the emphasis on theleader’s behaviour resulting from the marriage ofinternal and external variables is somewhatevolutionary. As it may generate some debate, a briefdiscussion of each of the variables is warranted.

CompetenciesIn the report Enterprising Nation: Renewing

Australia’s Managers to Meet the Challenges of theAsia-Pacific Century,Karpin et al, list a number ofdefinitions for a “competency” including:

An underlying characteristic of a person (whichcan be a motive, trait, skill, aspect of one’s selfimage or social role, or a body of knowledgewhich the person uses) that is necessary for thesuccessful performance of a particular job. 20

The competencies in the model are more than thesum of their parts and this is why the model depicts acapability to lead, not simply a collection of learnedbehaviours. It is also recognised that thecompetencies required of a leader are not solelyrestricted to leadership, as they may be learnt andused in other areas such as management, marketing or

teaching. Unlike previous models, it is not so much acase of which individual competency is needed -intelligence, physical dexterity or oral skills, as allmay be needed to varying degrees, it is a matter ofwhich combination of competencies orchestratebehavioural responses at a particular point in time.The key determinants of the appropriate response arethe extrinsic circumstances impinging on the leader,and all need to be taken into consideration, if only fora very brief period. This is one area where previousmodels were lacking. 21

Competencies should not be confused with tasks,as competencies underpin tasks. Furthermore, taskscan change, whereas the underlying competenciesevolve over time and remain largely unchanged. Anexample of the type of competencies required of aleader may be seen in those proposed by theManagement Charter Institute in the UnitedKingdom.22 They believe that senior managers onlyrequire eight personal competencies to makedecisions and achieve effective results - judgement,self-confidence, strategic perspective, achievementfocus, communication, information search, buildingteams and influencing others.23 Competenciestherefore form the core of leadership and occur in thethree key areas discussed below.


Figure 5 – Boyatzis Model

Knowledge

The content of leading - the knowledge thatleaders must have - is almost always thought of asmore important as a determinant of leadershipeffectiveness than the process of leading. Suchthings as knowing the state-of-the-art-theoriesand practices in a profession; understandinghuman behaviour, situations, environmentalstress, and future trends; having a grasp of thetechnical information and even an imputativeunderstanding of what all these new ideas meanfor the profession or organization one is leading,these are the real essence of leadership, the stuffthat separates the real people from the quichemakers.

Joseph Rost24

Knowledge of oneself, one’s profession or tradeand more particularly, one’s followers is required.Rost’s statement is only partially correct as technicalknowledge is but one aspect, a good leader can alsouse the knowledge of his or her followers to achieve

the aim. In the context of the model, knowledge is“learned information” and differs from intelligence,which, although it is not a mandatory requirement,would be an advantage. Knowledge provides a leadercredibility, status, and a degree of expertise, it boostshis or her confidence and allows the leader tounderstand what is happening around him or her andrespond accordingly. Langenbach also believed:

Knowledge cannot be as easily equated withperformance (as skills). One can knowsomething, but not act on it. If knowledge isrequired for a certain performance, it must belearned before the performance can be expected.Knowledge can be viewed as affecting thecapacity for changing performance. 25

Knowledge supports understanding and allowsreasoning by permitting the leader to comprehend allthe external influences, decide appropriate actions andbehave accordingly. The gaining of knowledgeshould also be seen as a continuum, maturing andgrowing with each leadership experience.


Figure 6 - Dynamic Capability Model

The knowledge should be contextual as far aspossible, for example, schools similar to the“Outward Bound” style, facilitate leaders gainingknowledge of their own values by placing them understressful physical conditions to help them “find”themselves. Conger conducted studies into theeffectiveness of this type of generic training andconcluded that, other than providing a knowledge ofoutdoor roping techniques, the leadership lessonslearnt were often not related to performance in theworkplace and therefore of limited value.26

Skills

A skill is a practiced ability and Baker27 believesthat leadership skills may be:• conceptual• communicative• human relations/interpersonal• counselling• decision-making

Similarly, Hersey and Blanchard believetechnical, human and conceptual skills are needed.28

Like knowledge, the skills are dynamic and arelearned through a combination of experiences andstructured lessons and, although some skills dominatethe leadership process at various stages, no singleleadership skill is applicable in all situations.

Attitudes

Attitudes are elusive. Typically attitudes areinferred states of mind or predispositions.Certain behaviours can reflect certain attitudes,and vice versa.29

The Australian Army’s School of InstructionalTraining described attitudes in a 1986 document as,“An internal frame of mind which tends to affect anindividual’s choice of action toward some object,person or event.”30 Attitudes are difficult to measuredirectly but key indicators of attitude can be observed,for example a positive attitude may be evidenced byadherence to instructions, enthusiasm for completingassigned and implied tasks, and the absence of fraud.Attitude is closely linked with skills and knowledgeand tends to operate at a higher order of magnitude.At the Chief Executive Officer level, where a leader isoften removed from direct interaction with his or herfollowers, a leader’s attitude may be more importantthan his or her detailed subject knowledge orcommunication skills.

The most important aspect of attitude is a leader’svalues. Values inspire and shape the leader’sbehaviour by providing motives, goals, reason,conviction and direction, the will to continue with atask long after some people have surrendered. For theexceptional leader, it is the essence of the visionwhich gets extraordinary things out of ordinary


Figure 7 - Learning Process

people. In research conducted in both New Zealandand Australia, Blyde and Bebb found that, “...77 percent of executives strongly agree that developing as aleader starts on the inside with one’s values, motives,and assumptions.” 31

BehaviourBehaviour is the way a leader acts or reacts in a

given situation and is the key to integrating thediverse variables in the model. In effect it is theconduit between the essential competencies and theexternal contextual variables. The behaviour iscontinuous, can be modified through learning fromexperience or practice, and may be either voluntary orinvoluntary. Behaviour has either been the missingingredient in previous models, or only one narrowaspect of behaviour, such as leader-follower relations,has been considered.

Based on the work of Kurt Lewin, Kolb et al,presented a model of the learning process behindbehaviour.32 They saw it as a continuous, four-stagecycle which allows individuals to conceptualise andultimately extrapolate ideas based on criticalreflection on experiences. They also believed that theprocess was continuous as the individual frequentlyevaluates and re-evaluates the learning.

Although there are many ways of learning to lead,the importance of Kolb’s model is that it provides atheoretical construct for learning leadershipbehaviour.

Organisational Context

The human being is by nature a motivatedorganism. The organization is by naturestructured and controlled. It is the function ofleadership to modify the organization to providefeedback for individuals to realise theirmotivation potential for the fulfilment of theirneeds and to contribute to the accomplishment oforganisational goals.33

A leader does not operate in isolation, he or she issubject to the support and constraints of his or herparent organisation. Key aspects of the organisationalcontext affecting a leader include the culture,hierarchical structure, and the organisation’s vision,mission and goals.

Culture

Any culture - national, bureaucratic, ororganisational - emerges out of its particularhistory, geography, technology, and philosophy.No two are alike.34

Kolb et al,describe organisational culture as “...apattern of shared values and beliefs that producecertain norms of behaviour.”35 They state that strongcultures are characterised by:a. People in the organisation can easily identify the

dominant values.b. The selection processes target people who are

likely to fit into the culture and find it satisfying.c. Socialisation and training convey to newcomers

the “ropes” they need to learn.d. Employees who do not fit the culture or produce

in accordance with its values are sometimes fired.e. People within the company are rewarded for

acting in accordance with the dominant values ofthe organisation.

f. By their behaviour, leaders and managers sendclear, consistent signals about desired values andnorms.

g. Managers measure and control what is importantto the culture.36

Culture therefore has a strong impact on theleader’s behaviour by creating, as Stoner et aldescribe, “The set of important understandings, suchas norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs, shared byorganisational members”.37

Hierarchical StructureMost organisations operate within a strict

hierarchical structure, particularly the military. Thiscan assist the leader by providing a clear delineationof responsibilities, positional power, avenues foradvice and issue resolution, and access to resourcesnot otherwise available to an individual. Coupledwith culture, it has the potential to save time, reduceconfusion, avoid overlapping and may help generate arespect for the overall worth of the task beingundertaken.

Organisation’s Vision, Mission and GoalsFinally, a leader’s own vision, mission and goals

are likely to be influenced by the organisation’s andthis is likely to effect his or her leadership style.

Group DynamicsGroup dynamics is the study of the interplay of

ideas, forces and actions within a group. A leaderneeds to be aware of group dynamics and take intoconsideration the forces and strengths acting on agroup when making decisions. As withOrganisational Context, the group undertaking a taskis likely to have its own group norms, goals andexpectations, which may or may not mirror the parentorganisation’s. Contrary to what some anarchists and


nihilists may claim, group synergy studies show thatgroups are generally more efficient or productive thanindividuals.38 The actions of a leader who moulds thegroup’s activities to make them more effective is notalways a sinister manipulation of power.

A leader needs to take into consideration that thegroup creates a sense of belonging and socialinterdependence, power, experience, interdep-endency, and structure, and his or her behaviourshould be adjusted accordingly. In summary, humansare social beings and perform better when groupdynamics are utilised effectively.

TaskThe term “task” applies to the action or actions to

be undertaken by the group and is normally qualifiedby time, function and or location. All tasks are notthe same and different leadership behaviours may berequired. For example, the task may range from easy,through medium to complex, it may need to be donenow, soon or later, and completed in the short-,medium- or long-term. To further complicate theissue, the task may also be classified as either:• important and urgent;• important but not urgent;• not important but urgent;• not important and not urgent.

All these types of tasks necessitate a range ofreasoned behaviours from the leader and show thatthe nature of the task has a larger impact on the leaderthan intimated by previous models. Most earliermodels seem preoccupied with aspects of the leader’squalities, paying insufficient heed to the situationalvariables, and omitting discussions on the nature ofthe actual task being performed. There may be anumber of reasons for this, the model’s proponentsmay have preferred to concentrate on the genericqualities of a leader, qualities operating across avariety of tasks and situations, or they may havebelieved that their particular model’s value lay in asound replication of one aspect of the process. Whilethese may be true, consideration of specific aspects,without considering the task to be performed, is alimited view of the total process of leadership.

Physical EnvironmentUndertaking tasks in the relative comfort of an

office is likely to be different from completing thesame tasks in the central Australian desert. Thephysical environment normally affects a leader’sbehaviour and includes the geography and weatherrelated to the conduct of the task, the physicalresources, for example computer equipment, budget,

specialist tools, and even the availability and nature ofthe human resources. T.E. Lawrence’s resources inuniting the Arab Tribes in the First World Wardiffered markedly from those available to NormanSchwarzkopf in his leadership during the Gulf War.The physical resources available to a leader have amarked effect on the task being performed and theleader’s behaviour in influencing his or her followers.Why earlier models ignored available resources is notknown.

Significantly, the Dynamic Capability Model isapplicable at varying levels depending on the positionof the leader - at the “operational” level on the shopfloor, at the “theatre” level in the realms of middlemanagement and at the “strategic” level in the ChiefExecutive Officer’s domain. The model also hasutility for a number of specific uses, for example:• it provides a relatively simple visual conception of

a complex process;• it has the ability to accommodate an infinite

variability of operations;• it provides points of comparison for leadership

discussions/behaviours in different circumstances,or different leaders in similar circumstances;

• it has the potential to aid prediction.

To examine the model’s validity, initial testingwas conducted on cadets undergoing initial officertraining to be leaders at the Australian Defence ForceAcademy. Each year the Academy conducts a fourday leadership activity near Canberra for officercadets from the Navy, Army and Air Force in theirsecond year of study. The activity is called ExerciseLeadership Challenge IIand consists of small groupsof up to 10 cadets completing 22 physical and mentalleadership tasks around a 60 km circuit. Each cadet,whether male or female, must carry 30 kgs ofpersonal field equipment with them. The statedexercise objectives are for cadets, “To apply attitudes,knowledge and skills of teamwork and leadership; tolead and be an effective member of a group in achallenging environment.”39

An analysis based on a combination of individualcadet questionnaires and personal interviews was

Initial Testing

Model’s Value


undertaken to evaluate the cadets’ leadershipexperiences. The theoretical framework for theanalysis centred on identifying what influenced theleaders’ behaviour and to some extent, why. Thequestionnaire was designed to establish the effectsand content of the learning process, while theinterviews were aimed at determining the differencesin the decision making process between successfuland unsuccessful leaders.

The preliminary data indicated that the DynamicCapability Model accurately described the cadets’leadership experiences on the Exercise. Cadetsbelieved that when they were placed in a leadershiprole they would examine the task, identify whatresources were available, consider the constraintsimpinging on the activity, make a plan, then directand monitor the group based on previous learnedexperiences. Their behaviour conformed to Kolb’smodel (Figure 5), that is, reflection on concreteknowledge and skills experiences, followed byformation of abstract concepts and generalizations,resulting in the application of concepts in newsituations.

Effective leaders explained that they based theirdecisions on past successful leadership activities,ineffective leaders had difficulty identifying what hadinfluenced their behaviour but frequently cited“instinct”; an instinct that invariably proved wrong.Not surprisingly, the more the successful behaviourhad been practiced, the more effective the outcome.Two further elements about the quality of previousbehaviours were evident, leaders were mostsuccessful when the previous task undertaken closelyresembled the current activity, and behaviours thattaught flexible problem solving activities werenormally more valuable in complex problems.

The cadets were specifically questioned about theexternal factors affecting their behaviour. Themajority agreed the group dynamics, physicalenvironment, the task itself and to some extent theorganisational context influenced their leadershipstyle. More importantly, the cadets could not identifyany other external variables that influenced theirbehaviour.

Further testing of the model in the private andpublic sectors is continuing, with studies currentlybeing undertaken with leadership consultancy firms,the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial ResearchOrganisation and St Mark’s National TheologicalCentre. Initial indications of the model’s universalvalidity are encouraging.

It is possible to teach leadership using theDynamic Capability Model because it breaks theleadership process down into its component parts.Someone charged with inculcating leadership inindividuals need only teach the model’s keycomponents and create an environment conducive tolearning leading. In effect, the model acts as anintegrating framework, drawing all the componentvariables of leadership together to present a holisticview of the process.

The validity of each of the components in themodel has already been established in leadershipresearch. Firstly, there exists a wealth of literature onwhat elements make up the knowledge, skills andattitudes required of a good leader. Secondly, theexternal variables for each leadership situation aregiven and therefore it is possible to teach prospectiveleaders those contextual aspects applicable to theirfuture leadership roles. The aspect of whichbehaviour is appropriate is more complex.Fortunately there are a range of existing models toindicate how a leader should act in a specificleadership situation. Based on the integratingframework provided by the Dynamic CapabilityModel, a leader should select the most appropriateactions for a given situation, for example Hersey andBlanchard’s Situational Model may indeed be thebest guide to behaviour under certain circumstances(providing the model is not considered in isolation).However, caution should be exercised in not using thesame model in every leadership situation as thevariables will undoubtedly change with the situation.

The leadership process is a complex phenomenonwhich, despite the best efforts by those aspiring tomaster its intricacies, remains an elusive, almostmagical art that often defies understanding. Variousapproaches have tried to explain the process, theTrait, Behavioural and Contingency schools forexample, but often theories developed in thelaboratory do not survive testing in the real world.This may be due to the fact that each of theapproaches tended to concentrate on specific, thoughpopular aspects of the leadership process, rather thantaking a holistic view of how a leader behaves.

Conclusion

Learning to Lead


In essence, leadership is the behaviour resultingfrom the dynamic interaction of a set of essentialcompetencies, and the context within which thosecompetencies operate. This interaction may bedepicted in a simple model, the Dynamic CapabilityModel, which shows leadership operating withinthree concentric circles. In the centre are thecompetencies required of a leader, the knowledge,skills and attitudes most often taught on leadershipcourses, in the outer circle are four situationdependent, external variables, and in between, abehaviour circle which acts as the two-way conduitbetween the two.

Leadership is a learnt behaviour involving criticalreflective thinking over a period of time. Rather thanteaching leadership theory in isolation, it needs to beinculcated as a continuum, not through a “cook book”approach of memorising certain traits or skills, butthrough an understanding of the external and internalvariables mentioned above. The model can be usedto teach leadership to those aspiring to lead because itallows the leadership process to be broken down intoits component parts, each of which can then be taughtin the most appropriate context.

NOTES1. J.M. Burns, Leadership, Harper and Row, New York,

1978, pp. 427-428.2. L.M. Jarman, The Major General Sir James Harrison

Memorial Lecture: 29 November, Royal Military CollegeDuntroon, Canberra, 1990, p. 120.

3. R.P. Vecchio, G. Hearn, and G. Southey, OrganisationalBehaviour: Life at Work in Australia, Harcourt Brace,Sydney, 1992, p. 336 and B.M. Bass, Bass and Stogdill’sHandbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, andManagerial Applications, 3rd edn., Free Press, New York,1990, p. 38.

4. P. Hersey and K.H. Blanchard,Management ofOrganisational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources. 6thedn., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1993, p. 97.

5. Vecchio, op cit., p. 336.6. ibid., p. 337.7. N. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence,

Pimlico, London, 1976, p. 126.8. H. Gardner, Leading Minds, Harper Collins, 1995, pp.

268-284.9. J.M. Duggan, “Personality Structures: Emergence of the

Five Factor Model’, in Annual Review of Psychology, No41, 1990, pp. 417-440.

10. J.A.F. Stoner, R.E. Freeman, and D.R. Gilbert, Jr,Management, 6th edn., Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1995,p. 476.

11. Vecchio, op cit., p. 340.12. R.R. Blake and J.S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid, Gulf

Publishing, Houston, 1964 and Stoner, Freeman andGilbert, op cit., p. 478.

13. G.A. Yukl, Leadership in Organisations, 3rd edn.,Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1994, p. 285.

14. Bass,op cit.,p. 46.15. F.E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness,

McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, pp. 16-35.16. Hersey and Blanchard, pp. 128-129.17. ibid., p. 257.18. R.E. Boyatzis,The Competent Manager,John Wiley, New

York, 1982, p. 8.19. ibid., p. 35.20. D.S. Karpin, Enterprising Nation: Renewing Australia’s

Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia-PacificCentury, Australian Government Publishing, Canberra,1995, p.50. Karpin indicates that he is paraphrasingBoyatzis’ interpretation of the term.

21. Bass, op cit., p. 838.22. Management Charter Institute, Senior Management

Standards Pocket Directory, Russell Square House,London, 1995.

23. ibid., p. 106.24. J.C. Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century,

Praeger, Westport, 1993, p. 4.25. M.L. Langenbach, Curriculum Models in Adult

Education, reissued edn., Krieger, Florida, 1993, p. 21.26. J.A. Conger, Learning to Lead,Jossey-Bass, San

Francisco, 1992, p.12.27. C.V. Baker, “Leadership Training in the Navy of the

1980s: a Systems Approach”, in Defence Force Journal,No 36, Sep/Oct, 1982, p. 26.

28. Hersey and Blanchard, op cit., p. 8.29. Langenbach, op cit.,p. 21.30. Army School of Instructional Training, Training and

Development Handbook, Headquarters TrainingCommand, Sydney, 1986, p. xii.

31. P. Blyde and M. Bebb, “Developing Leaders Down Under:760 Executives Have Their Say” People and Performance,March, 1996, p. 29.

32. D.A. Kolb, J.S. Osland and I.M. Rubin, OrganisationalBehaviour: an Experiential Approach,Prentice-Hall,Englewood Cliffs, 1995, p. 49.

33. Bass, op cit., p. 43.34. W. Bennis, Why Leaders Can’t Lead, Jossey-Bass, San

Francisco, 1990, p. 155.35. Kolb, op cit., p. 354.36. ibid., p. 367.37. Stoner, Freeman and Gilbert, op cit., p. 182.38. D.W. Johnson. and F.P. Johnson, Joining Together Group

Theory and Group Skills,4th edn., Prentice Hall,Edgewood Cliffs, 1991, p. 25.

39. Leadership Challenge II Handbook, Australian DefenceForce Academy, Canberra, 1996, p. 1.


Major Stevenson has contributed to the Australian Defence Force Journal on a previous occasion. This article is based on the workhe is undertaking for his Doctoral Thesis at the Australian Defence Force Academy, where he is in his second year of part-time study.Major Stevenson is currently posted to Army Headquarters where he has been seconded to the team managing the transition of theDefence Reform Program within Army.

By Wing Commander A.E Dowse

“There is inevitably going to be extensive mediacoverage of any modern conflict. The public willdemand it; it is an essential part of maintainingsupport for our efforts in the war, and we themilitary might as well get used to the idea andwork out how best the process can be managedfor the national good.”1

Before 1990, military planners considered study ofthe media as somewhat of a peripheral activity.

Since then, the attention given to the impact of theworld’s media of foreign and security policies,particularly on the successful application of militarypower, has increased dramatically. The media’sability to influence public opinion, particularlythrough its use of instantaneous reporting andpowerful imagery, together with the importance ofpublic support to a nation, makes it a powerful playerin the development of foreign policy and militarystrategies.

The development of technology has madeinformation an essential component in the conduct ofwar, thus the military is obligated to develop skill inutilising that component as a combat multiplier.2 Thisobligation is widely understood in the military as itapplies to information warfare and the developmentof technical capabilities associated with command,control and intelligence systems. However, thedevelopment of skill associated with the managementof public information is at least as important. Thisskill necessarily involves consideration of the mediaand how best to utilise the power of the media in theevent of conflict.

Independence of reporting by the news media isimperative in a liberal democracy. Thomas Jeffersonwrote that “our liberty depends on freedom of thepress, and that cannot be limited without being lost”.3

The news media has such a significant role in ademocratic society that it is commonly considered asthe “fourth estate” of government in the US.

The Government relies on the news media toinform and interact with the public, which in turnhelps the media draw audiences and raise circulation.This relationship benefits both parties, yet invariablyit is contentious. Both the Government and the newsmedia have an obligation to serve the public interest,although they often have divergent views of thatinterest. This conflict can be attributed to two factors:the media’s role as a “watchdog” and the potential forprivate interests to influence both institutions.

The media’s role as a government watchdog isbased upon its need to be certain of the truth of whatis reported and to protect society from the power ofgovernment, instead of simply acting as aninformation conduit. This role raises the issue of ademocratic society’s need for open and informeddebate versus its need for secrecy in the conduct of aneffective national security policy.4 An ideal populistdemocracy would feature such open debate of policymatters, although populism is not entirely achievablein that the media and public “do not have theknowledge of national security issues, nor thesupporting intelligence information to make aninformed decision”.5 Thus, the intelligence andanalysis capabilities of the Government provide anunderlying source of much conflict betweenGovernment and the media.

Both Government and media can be influenced byprivate interests. Government’s private interests areentirely political, with foreign and security policiesoften influenced by the proximity of an election.Information release to the public may be controlledon the basis of its political sensitivity and consequentperceptions of the Government’s performance, ratherthan on national security grounds. The media’sprivate interests relate to competition, in thatcirculation and audience share can outweigh the needto serve the public interest. A more sinister side of theAustralian media is that its private interests could beaffected by media ownership, which will be discussedlater in this article.

The remainder of this section will examine thenature of the news media, control of the news agenda,the public opinion influence and the media ownershipissues affecting the Government-media relationship.

The Government-Media Relationship

Introduction

Harnessing The News Media During Conflict

The Nature of the News MediaThe news media must attract and retain its

audiences attention to maintain competitiveness. Thisnecessity manifests in confrontational, sensationaland shallow reporting, as well as the dominance ofimagery. Images may convey powerful impressionsto the audience, although context and analysis areneeded (and often neglected) to explain them. Whilsttelevision is more at fault than the print media in thisrespect, television is the dominant means ofdisseminating news to the public. Moreover,television provides a fixed format of short newsstories – foreign policy issues are generally allocatedonly three to four minutes of a news bulletin. Thesestories are necessarily episodic, giving littlebackground to the piece. The print media providesrelatively greater depth and is more reflective andorganised, but whether an individual reads articles inthat depth is entirely discretionary. Thus, the publicmay form an opinion from a simplistic televisionnews item, but feel disinterested in furtherinvestigating the matter in any detail.

The development of global media networks,particularly satellite, has increased the timeliness andvolume of news information. In the absence of themedia’s capacity to analyse this information, theincreased speed and volume do not greatly enhanceunderstanding of foreign and security policy issues bythe media or the public. The news media is lessinterested in the cause of acts than the actsthemselves, and places more importance on a desireto influence government actions than on promotingunderstanding of international affairs. Televisionnews organisations, in particular, often presentcomplex, political situations in personal and emotiveterms that appeal to audiences without providing afoundation for critical analysis. The media is notentirely to blame here, as the problem can also beattributed to the lack of discussion by successivegovernments on strategic policy.6 The problem ofmedia’s focus on entertainment and audience share atthe expense of news quality and enlightenment hasbeen described as the “dumbing-down of America”.7

Considering similar traits of the Australian media andthe influence of the US media, the same must be saidfor Australia.

Media networks transgress the borders of nationstates, with both positive and negative effects. On thepositive side, it crosses cultural barriers and promotesunderstanding between nations, a fact that appears tohave been overlooked in the decision to reduce RadioAustralia broadcasts into Asia. On the negative side,the difference between cultures, reflected in the style

of media reporting, has the potential to create tensionsbetween nations.8

Who Sets the Agenda?The primary contributors to the news agenda that

affect security and foreign policy are events, theGovernment and the Opposition. In this context,events include the actions of foreign governments, aswell as conflicts and crises. The media shows greatinterest in the views of elected officials. In particular,public information releases from the Government arefavoured more than most sources because of ease ofaccess, dependability, media’s need to maintain arelationship with the Government and the usefulnessof citing and challenging authority.9 In this respect,the government has a significant role in setting thenews agenda. Opposition press releases are alsofavoured in that they provide a valuable source ofconflict and fuel media’s government watchdog role.The Opposition party source provides open debate oneconomical and ideological issues. However, defenceand security policies commonly receive bipartisansupport, which limits their press coverage.

Secondary sources of news, including interestgroups and broader social participation, normallyonly receive coverage when conflict in Parliamentacts as a catalyst. Two examples of this phenomenoninvolve US media coverage in the Vietnam and GulfWars. Although the poor public support of theVietnam War was widely attributed to the US press,the discussion was sustained by opposition to the warin Congress. In contrast, very little debate over the USinvolvement in the Gulf War was reported afterCongress passed a resolution to support theadministration.10 Despite the existence of a modestopposition to the Gulf War by interest groups, lessthan one per centof all Gulf War coverage in the USmedia referred to domestic dissent.11 Consideringmedia’s dependence on domestic opposition, the mostsuccessful indicator of effective public informationstrategy by a government is favourable mediacoverage even when opposition (both political and inpublic opinion polls) would appear to warrant morecritical media treatment.12

The media has a significant role in the newsagenda. Regardless of who sets the agenda, the mediahas the opportunity to critique the news material.Critique may comprise the way in which stories arepresented, the priority given to a story, the time givento opposing views and the choice of independentanalysts. Concerning the latter method of critique,two extreme cases during the Gulf War are of note:the majority of US television networks employedretired servicemen to act as independent analysts,


whereas the Australian Broadcasting Commissionutilised an academic who was clearly sympathetic tothe Iraqi cause and was critical of Australia’s supportfor the Coalition intervention.13

Additionally, the media is capable of setting theagenda itself by drawing attention to overseasconflicts. Approximately thirty conflicts currently aretaking place worldwide, a figure that has remainedfairly constant since the end of World War II.14 Withfinancial and air-time constraints, the media cannotcover more than a handful of these. The media’s oftenarbitrary choice of which conflict to cover, togetherwith its powerful visual messages to take action onhumanitarian grounds, has an inordinate effect onforeign policy in democratic societies. The real-timeglobal reporting capabilities of the media maypressure Governments to make policy decisions thatare “hasty, ill-conceived, damaging to future optionsor tempered by domestic opinion rather than long-term state interests”.15 Thus, the Government mustresist pressure to react to media deadlines, but shouldbase policy on analysis and prepare strategic mediastrategies to deal with unanticipated events.

Public OpinionPublic opinion provides an indicator of a nation’s

support for government actions. This support, ornational will, is the key to successful implementationof foreign and security policies, and is a preconditionof any decision to use military force.The Governmentuses the media to inform, influence and gauge theopinion of the public.

The traditional model of a democratic societyfeatures a press that conveys the policy approaches ofthe Government, and later indicates the results ofthose approaches. The political leaders then may bejudged and held accountable retrospectively for theiractions by the public. The modern news media,however, advocate a model in which the publicevaluates each new issue, decides what is to be doneand authorises its leaders (via polls or on-linesurveys) to take appropriate action.16 This model isreferred to in various references as populistdiplomacy, teledemocracy and the new world orderbut, regardless of what you call it, the limitationsoutlined make such an approach impracticable. Theessence of this argument is whether the Governmentelite are leaders or followers. A leader who wishes tosurvive the next election might follow the opinion ofthe public. However, a true leader is one who is awareof the benefits and disadvantages of particularoptions,and uses the media to influence public opinion.

The earliest view of the Government’s use of themedia to influence public opinion is conversion

theory. Conversion theory suggests the public areeasily led by propaganda. If a news source is clearlypositively or negatively biased, an individual willaccept or reject the message accordingly withoutabsorbing the arguments used. However, conversiontheory is widely dismissed in modern democraticsocieties.

The commonly accepted model for the use ofmedia to influence the public is the two-step theory,in which information is modified according to theindividual’s socialisation.17 Even the best informedmembers of the public will often not evaluate thearguments of an issue, but will align on the basis ofideology or partisanship.18 Thus, the importance ofbipartisan support of foreign and security policies isundeniable if public support is to be maximised.However, if public support simply followed partisanlines, a majority government would feel quite securein proceeding with its strategies. Public support isusually far less predictable.

Polls provide a useful indicator of public support,and can strongly influence government actions.During the lead up to and conduct of the Gulf War,about 2500 opinion polls relating to the crisis werepublicly released in the US.19 The US Governmentused these polls to gauge support, as well as tomodify its military and media strategies. However,polling is not an exact reflection of public opinion andcan itself be influenced by the choice of words used inquestions (as well as whether the respondents are anaccurate reflection of society). For example, two pollstaken simultaneously in November 1990 producedtwo vastly different results: the Washington Post andGallup polls on the topic of whether force should beused against Iraq showed 70 per centand 32 per centsupport respectively.20 Opinion polls taken during theGulf War also revealed two other effects: that supportfor offensive action increased with politicalawareness, and that some level of polarisation alongpartisan lines exists.

The influence of the media and public opinionpolls on government is not always as might beexpected. Following the graphic footage of Somalisdragging the body of a dead US serviceman throughthe streets of Mogadishu in 1993, US public opinionpolls reflected a strong demand to commit forces instrength to punish those responsible.21 Despite thepower of the video images and the weight of publicopinion, the US administration realised that escalationwould not be successful in the long term andwithdrew its forces. Although this situationdemonstrated the power of the media to influencegovernment, more importantly it is an excellent

HARNESSING THE NEWS MEDIA DURING CONFLICT 45

example of a government taking public opinion intoaccount but basing its actions on sound analysis.

Media OwnershipThe matter of ownership of media in Australia is

one of great debate in government and mediaorganisations. The debate comprises two issues:diversity of media ownership and foreign control.Both issues have significant implications for nationalsecurity.

Media organisations have progressivelyconcentrated in past decades to the present situation inwhich only a handful of organisations controlsAustralia’s television and print media. The three mainplayers in Australian media are PBL, News Corp andFairfax, with the latter under increasing threat ofbeing subsumed. In 1991, former Prime Minister MrFraser advised a parliamentary committee that:

“If there are only a few [media companies] thepower of the media is enormous. But if there areonly one or two, the power is sufficient, I think torival the power of the Parliament itself”.22

The impact of media concentration is that moreinformation presented to the Australian public iseffectively controlled by a select few. This situationhas the potential to reduce the objectivity of reporting,as well as to increase the power of the media toinfluence the news agenda and present a uniform biason news issues.

Most of the Australian media is foreign owned, orat least effectively foreign controlled. Additionally,much of the news material that affects foreign andsecurity policies is sourced from the internationalmedia. The Australian Government faces aconundrum in that foreign ownership of the mediacannot be constrained if diversity is to be retained.Given that much of the news content is foreignsourced in any case, maintenance of foreignownership limits would appear contradictory. Thus,the Media Alliance suggests that foreign ownershiplimits should be relaxed to ensure diversity, on thecondition that foreign investors commit toenforceable charters of editorial independence.23

The importance of local editorial influence inAustralia’s media is critical to national security. The“jingoistic” bias associated with reporting armedconflict is inherent in the media and reflects the publicsupport of the nation. Kalb wrote that “when Americagoes to war, so too does the press, wrapped in the flagno less proudly than the troops themselves”.24 Anyloss of editorial independence would result in anAustralian media that is indifferent to public supportof the nation at war. Two factors remain that reducethe impact of a foreign controlled media on national

security. Firstly, media owners realise that editorialindependence is essential if the media is to retainaffinity with its audience.25 Secondly, the internationalmedia that provide foreign-sourced news areprimarily controlled by US and UK interests, whichminimises the potential for conflicts of interest onnational security issues.

Another issue in media ownership is the globaltrend for governments to reduce expenditure on (orprivatise) public media. Publicly funded, independentmedia provide the educational arguments on foreignand security policies that is generally lacking in thecommercial media. Perversely, the objective nature ofsuch educational reporting may actually detract fromthe public support that the government is attemptingto maximise. The coverage of the Gulf War by theABC is such an example, where by the ABC wascriticised for being objective in comparison with thejingoistic reporting of the commercial news media.Similarly, the BBC was accused of non-patriotism foran impartial report on the civilian casualties in theAmariya bomb shelter in Baghdad.26

The news media’s ability to instantaneouslyreport matters globally has altered the thinking ofsecurity and military planners. Not only does themedia evoke public support on humanitarian groundsfor military intervention in countries such as theformer Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia, it alsosets constraints on the level of force that the militarymay use. Moreover, the media and public’s scrutinyof armed conflict impose considerable politicalsensitivity to the risk of taking and inflictingcasualties, which has a significant effect on thewillingness of governments to commit themselves tomilitary intervention. Badsey describes this influenceas the media age, which features pressure formultilateral responses to global crises and thedifficulty of mounting an effective response.27

With national will being critical to the success ofmilitary power, the military must implement aneffective public information policy during armedconflict.

Evolution of Public Information PolicyPublic information policy addresses the inherent

contention between the military’s desire to controlinformation and the media’s wish to report eventsaccording to their own discretion. The rationalebehind current public information policy can be

Media in Armed Conflict


attributed both to the unfettered press coverage inVietnam and the contrasting press managementexercised by the British in the Falklands. Followingthe successful media management in the latterconflict, Lieutenant Commander Humphries, amember of the US Naval War College, wrote in 1983that:28

_ “To maintain popular support for a war, yourside must not be seen as ruthless barbarians.”

_ “You cannot allow the public’s sons to bewounded and maimed right in front of themvia their TV sets at home.”

_ “You must, therefore, control correspondents’access to the fighting”

Only months later, a public affairs policy was putin place for operations in Grenada that echoedHumphries’ paper. This policy kept the press out ofthe area of operations for two days after the invasion.Media organisations immediately complained aboutthe lack of access to Grenada, resulting in creation ofthe Sidle Commission in 1984. The SidleCommission formalised the approach of mediacontrol by establishing a concept of accreditedreporters who would form a pool whenever militaryaction was being planned. This pool wouldaccompany and be supported by the military forceand submit reported information on a shared basis.This approach was transformed into an ABCA paperthat, in 1985, was the foundation for an ADF paperthat eventually developed into ADFP 41 – DefencePublic Information Policy during Periods of Tensionand Conflict.29 ADFP 41 outlines the ADF PublicInformation Policy, which is based upon a system ofaccredited correspondents established under theDefence Media Advisory Group, and features the useof public information plans and media supportcapabilities.

The pool system was utilised in the US invasionof Panama in 1989. Although the operation was asuccess for the US military, the small media pool wasconstrained in movement and was unable to file anyreports for more than ten hours after the invasion.This situation was viewed by the media as somewhatof a failure, as the reports filed by accreditedcorrespondents were released some time after news ofthe invasion had been leaked.

In the case of the Gulf War, news was controlledlargely by the release of material at coalitionbriefings. The fact that 38 of the 43 days of theconflict were fought in the air, with reportersgenerally unable to obtain any better information thanthat provided at briefings, made the military’s job ofcontrolling information release much easier. Onlycorrespondents accredited with the coalition countries

that committed significant ground forces were able toaccompany those forces. Of over 1400 mediapersonnel in Saudi Arabia during the crisis, only 100were able to spend any time with the combat forces -many of the others might as well have stayed home towatch the mass briefings.

The accredited correspondent and poolarrangements provide the media with a good sourceof official information. However, the competitive and“search-for-the-truth” nature of media organisationsmeans that they will also commit resources to non-accredited reporting. Thus, any significant conflictwill involve a “media circus”, where journalistsattempt to target direct and independent sources ofreporting. These sources were generally not possiblein the Gulf War, except for CNN reporting fromBaghdad. A better example was in Somalia, wherethe pool journalists accompanying the initialamphibious lodgement were upstaged by the presenceof numerous television crews recording the event atthe landing site. In this respect the Gulf War is morethe exception than the rule, in that most (particularlyintrastate) conflicts will offer easy access to non-accredited correspondents. This fact fuels the beliefby many in the media that those who defy the poolsystem get better rewards than those who conform toit.

The Military-Media RelationshipOver the last decade, the ADF has placed greater

emphasis on media awareness in professional militaryeducation programs. Conversely, despite involvementin the Defence Media Advisory Group, the Australianmedia has very little knowledge of defence. Thepaucity of military knowledge in the media can betraced to the period following the Vietnam conflict.During this period, many media organisations inAustralia and the US reduced military expertise aspart of a wider rationalisation of analysis capabilitiesto concentrate on news reporting. In Australian mediaorganisations, defence issues are normally handled byjournalists with general government responsibilities,and the media must rely on external commentators(academic or ex-military) for any in-depth analysis.The poor military knowledge of the media mightappear inconsistent with the audiences interest inconflict.30 However, this is not to say that the media isnot interested in reporting conflict, but that its lack ofunderstanding of military operations results in apoorly informed public.

The Gulf War is a good case study for examiningthe media’s knowledge of the military. An extremeexample is that involving the Associated Press, whichsent its drama critic as its representative at the


coalition media briefings.31 This choice was probablymore due to a lack of qualified journalists at AP thana misunderstanding of the term theatre of operations.The poor knowledge of the reporters in the mediabriefings was reflected later by Brigadier-GeneralNeal, who said that the press had never asked any ofthe difficult questions for which he had “spent four orfive hours preparing each day during the Gulf War”. 32

Although both the military and media benefitedfrom the Gulf War, much controversy followed. TheGovernment criticised CNN for its objectivecoverage, while media organisations complained ofcensorship and disinformation in coalition briefings.This contention can be attributed to an attempt byboth sides to position themselves better in futureconflict. 33 However, the media should recognise thatthe censorship imposed by the military is minorcompared to the censorship that media effectivelybrings upon itself through its ignorance of militaryoperations and the political presumptions behindconflict, as well as its poor analysis of availableinformation. Unless the media develops suchcapabilities, it will be destined to provide superficialcoverage derived largely from official sources infuture conflicts.

CensorshipCensorship is difficult to implement at a national

level, particularly as legal options and the D Noticesystem are not well suited to the protection of short-term operational security matters. Additionally,censorship of the international media is virtuallyimpossible. Thus, the essence of military publicinformation policy is that censorship, if required,must occur in theatre. The use of accreditedcorrespondents is based upon trust more thancensorship, and public information policy must avoidunnecessary censorship that might lead tospeculation.

The primary purpose of media censorship inarmed conflict is to maintain operational security,which relates to protection of information concerningthe activities of friendly forces. Censorship ofoperationally sensitive material is largely time-dependent and, considering the global and real-timetelecommunications used by the media, is essential inmodern conflict. Accredited correspondents arerequired to sign an undertaking to comply withsecurity guidelines and to submit reports to themilitary for review. The main danger to operationalsecurity remains the non-accredited reporter with asatellite dish. However, the media are well aware ofthe importance of operational security andexperienced journalists usually understand what news

is acceptable. For instance, the US media censoreditself in coverage of Iraqi SCUD attacks during theGulf War, in recognition of the fire adjustment valueof time and geographical references.34 Any mediaorganisation that is found to cost lives of its nation’sservice personnel through a breach of operationalsecurity would not only face loss of accreditation but,more importantly, be castigated by the public. In thisrespect, self-censorship by the media serves itscompetitive interests as much as any duty to thepublic.

Censorship is also used to maintain publicsupport, which is a purpose not so well accepted bythe media. Cohen suggests that whereas the humancosts of war may be pictorial, the political imperativesare not so easily conveyed by the media: thus,government management of information in a theatreof war is essential to the use of military power.35 Infact, the use of censorship to sustain the nation’smorale is increasingly becoming more important thanthe maintenance of operational security.36 Themanagement of information to maximise publicsupport is discussed later.

National interest is a concept that is notappreciated by the Australian media. The briefingdocument for the Treasurer, Mr Costello that wascompromised by the Australian media in July 1997illustrates this point. The publication of thedocument’s contents was intended to provide politicalembarrassment and thus attract audience/readerattention, but had much more damaging effects on thenational interest than on any political target. Theimplication for military operations is that the mediamay be committed to censorship of operationalsecurity where otherwise they might “get our troopskilled”, but anything else generally is considered as“open slather” regardless of national interestimplications.37 Therefore, the primacy of media’scompetitive interests must be considered in publicinformation planning.

If effective news management is a multiplier inthe application of combat power, then a strategy toidentify and prioritise the objectives of the mediacampaign would be worthwhile. Figure 1, whichborrows from the concept of Warden’s targetingstrategy, provides a universal model of the mediacampaign objectives in armed conflict. In order ofimportance (and thus the priority in which theyshould be targeted), the objectives for the use of the

Media Campaign Strategy


media are: strengthening national will, reducing theadversary’s national will, building internationalsupport, signalling and deception.

National WillA high national will is the most valuable asset a

nation can possess, as it is the foundation of thenation’s commitment in a conflict.38 TheGovernment’s roles in building national will are tojustify the worthiness of conflict, to demonstrate thatother non-military options have been addressed and tosolicit bipartisan support. An example of successfulmedia management by the US Government involvesPresident Bush’s portrayal of Saddam Hussein asHitler to justify US intervention against Iraq. In thiscase, popular opinion was manipulated byhumanitarian themes and demonisation of theadversary, rather than the more complex underlyingpolitical objectives. Thus, the US Government wasable to take advantage of the media’s inability toanalyse the complex and played to their strength ofportraying issues in simple humanitarian images.

The military has a significant responsibility tomaximise national will in the planning and conduct ofoperations. This responsibility comprises ahumanising role and a dehumanising role. Thehumanising role is the use of public relations to depictthe military forces as part of the nation’s community,and thus build patriotism. The dehumanising role isthe management of news to demonstrate theeffectiveness of military forces and weapons while

avoiding any show of human loss or suffering. USnational will was effectively manipulated in the GulfWar, with accredited correspondents performing thefirst role and the military’s selection of bombtargeting videos accomplishing the second. In thiscase, national will was maximised because of thelimited number of casualties taken by coalition forcesand the limited access by the media to record imagesof human loss and suffering.39

Adversary’s Will and International SupportThe global nature of modem media enables the

targeting of an adversary’s national will to reducetheir resolve in conflict. Appropriate use ofinformation may prompt opposition within theadversary’s nation to suggest that their actions andpolicies are unjust or that they face significant lossesin military action.

International support of a nation’s or coalition’sactions is also important, in that international opinioncan influence the national will of countries on bothsides of the conflict. The global media may even bethe only effective weapon system used by thecommander of a peacekeeping mission. Internationalopinion is also a major factor in the formation of amultilateral response to a crisis. In the conduct ofmultilateral operations, media management mustaddress the national will of all countries involved inthe coalition force, which may be difficult if thenations involved have differing societal standards orexpectations.


NationalWill

Adversary's Will

InternationalSupport

Signalling

Deception

Figure 1 . Media Campaign Objectives

The effect of public information on the nationalwill, the adversary’s national will and internationalsupport is a complex subject. A one-sided conflictmay increase the national will if limited casualties aretaken, and decrease the adversary’s resolve to sustainhigher losses. However, such a situation may alsoraise opposition against the dominant nationinternationally and in pacifist sections of that nation.

Signalling and DeceptionThe media is an important mechanism of

signalling a nation’s intentions and potentialresponses to an adversary. For instance, the USGovernment’s failure to signal its likely reaction toIraqi threats in July 1990 resulted in Iraq’s invasion ofKuwait. This failure should be compared with thesuccessful signalling by the US in September 1990that an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia could provokeuse of nuclear weapons.

Deception, or disinformation, may be used tomislead an adversary and thus gain a militaryadvantage. Deception may be implicit (misleading) orexplicit (lying). A good example of implicit deceptionis the public relations coverage of amphibious landingtraining prior to the ground phase of the Gulf War,which was simply a feint for the main invasion.40

Disinformation may also be used to directly affectpublic opinion, an example of which was the explicitdeception employed by the Iraqis in relation to thecoalitions destruction of a “baby milk factory”. ADFP41 advises against the use of explicit deception (lying)to the media in public information policy, because ofthe damage that such actions would have oncredibility and military-media relations. Additionally,ADFP 41 identifies that deception is an intelligenceactivity that should be kept separate from the publicrelations function.

Media Management in Future ConflictThe Gulf War provided numerous lessons and is

often presented as a model for media management infuture conflicts. However, conditions such as themilitary’s ability to manage information releasebecause of the media’s limited access, theinternational support for the coalition and the unevenmatch of forces makes the Gulf War more anexception than the rule. Media management would bemore difficult in a more typical scenario that involvesintrastate conflict, easy access by non-accreditedcorrespondents, guerrilla warfare, the use of groundforces with undefined front-lines, greater casualtiesand greater difficulty in achieving political objectives.

Regardless of the nature of a future conflict, theobjectives shown at Figure 1 remain the same,

although they may require different strategies toachieve. The success of media management in futurearmed conflict depends on the application of a soundpublic information strategy, which should provideincentive to media organisations to commit to theaccredited correspondent scheme. Additionally,military commanders must consider likely mediainterest in their operations and be aware of the publicopinion implications of their actions.

The information war is not confined to themilitary’s command, control and intelligence systems.This war is also waged in the public domain, in newsreports that are presented on television, radio and inprint. National will, the foundation of any nation’spower, is directly and critically influenced by themanner in which public information is presented.Thus, it is in the interest of the Government, includingthe military, to possess strategies to effectivelymanage public information, whilst not infringing onthe media’s imperative for independent reporting.

The relationship between the Government and themedia is based upon the Government’s release ofpublic information. As the media has little analysiscapability, the manner in which the media influencesthe public depends largely on the level of oppositionto that information. A significant characteristic of themedia that should be considered in public informationstrategies is that the media’s competitive interests canpotentially outweigh its commitment to the publicinterest.

Effective public information management by themilitary is essential during conflict, when nationalwill is most important and the inherent contentionbetween the military and media regarding the controlof information becomes prevalent. The ADF publicinformation policy provides a formalised system toprovide public information via accredited mediacorrespondents. Military public information strategiesmust recognise, however, that the media will seek toobtain independent reporting in theatre by the use ofnon-accredited correspondents.

This article has proposed a universal model toidentify media campaign objectives that should beapplied in public information planning for conflict.These objectives, in order of priority, arestrengthening national will, reducing the adversary’snational will, building international support,signalling and deception. Targeting these objectives

Conclusion


in a media campaign during conflict should allow thepower of the media to be harnessed.

NOTES1. Gration P. “Keynote Address” First International Conference

on Defence and the Media, Brisbane April 1992 p. 6.2. Chiaventone, F. “Ethics and Responsibility in Broadcasting”,

Military Review, August 1991, pp. 74 – 75.3. Kurz, R., in Serfaty, S. (ed) The Media and Foreign Policy,

MacMillan, London, 1990, p65.4. Serfaty, S. The Media and Foreign Policy, MacMillan,

London, 1990, p. 7.5. Odom, W. The Media and Foreign Policy, MacMillan,

London, 1990, p. 161.6. Serfaty, op. cit., p. 12.7. Badsey, S. Modern Military Operations and the Media, SCSI,

Camberley, 1994, p. 18.8. For instance, the Australian media’s interest in human rights

problems in Southeast Asia and reporting of our own racialintolerance are potential causes of tension.

9. Entman, R. and Page, B. in Bennett, W. and Paletz, D. (ed)Taken by Storm: the Media, Public Opinion and US ForeignPolicy in the Gulf War, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,1994, p. 96.

10. Bennett, W. Taken by Storm: the Media, Public Opinion andUS Foreign Policy the Gulf War, University of Chicago Press,Chicago, 1994, p. 25.

11. Tiffen, R. “Marching to whose Drum? – Media Battles in theGulf War”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol46, No 1, May 1992, p. 44.

12. Bennett, op. cit., p. 29.13. Holmes, J. in Bickerton, I. (ed) Forty three days: the Gulf War,

Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1991, pp. 199 -200.14. Badsey, loc. cit.15. Bennett, op. cit., p. 14.16. Zaller, J. in Bennett, W. and Paletz, D. (ed) Taken by Storm:

the Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the GulfWar, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 202.

17. Badsey, op. cit., p. 8.18. Zaller, op. cit., p. 186.19. Tiffen, R. “Marching to whose Drum? – Media Battles in the

Gulf War”,Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol 46,No 1, May 1992, p. 50.

20. Zaller, op. cit., p. 195.21. Johnson, D. “The Impact of the Media on National Security

Policy Decision Making”, SSI, US Army War College, 1994,p. 17.

22. Najman, J. and Western, J. (ed) A Sociology of AustralianSociety, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1993, p. 588.

23. MEAA, “Submission to the Federal Government’s Reviewof Cross Media Ownership”, November 1996,http://www.dca.gov.au/.

24. Kalb, M. in Bennett, W. Taken by Storm: the Media, PublicOpinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, University ofChicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 3.

25. Carney S., Contributing Editor, The Age, telephone interview,22 July 1997.

26. Tiffen, op. cit., p. 46.27. Badsey, op. cit., pp. 3-4.28. Kennedy, W. The Military and the Media, Praeger, Westport,

1993, pp. 114-115.29. Young, P. “Reporting Conflict: The Relationship between the

Armed Forces and the Media in Low Intensity and LimitedConflicts”, ADFA, 1987, p. 88.

30. For instance, CNN had its ratings boosted during the Gulf Warto 11.7 in the US, far greater than any of the commercial

networks and more than 10 times its normal rating.31. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 121.32. ibid., p. 10.33. O’Heffernan, P. in Bennett, W. and Paletz, D. (ed) Taken by

Storm: the Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy inthe Gulf War, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994,p. 234.

34. Wilesmith, G. in Bickerton, I. (ed) Forty three days: the GulfWar, Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1991, p. 183.

35. Cohen, B. in Bennett, W. and Paletz, D. (ed) Taken by Storm:the Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy in the GulfWar, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 8.

36. Hayden, W. “Opening Address by Governor-General”, FirstInternational Conference on Defence and the Media, Brisbane,April 1991, p. 11.

37. Carney, loc. cit.38. DI(AF) AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual, Second Edition,

1994, pp. 20-21.39. In the one notable instance where human losses were shown

by the media at the Amariya bomb shelter, coalition targetingwas constrained to limit any further detraction of publicsupport.

40. O’Heffernan, op. cit., p. 244.

BIBLIOGRAPHYADFP 41 Defence Public Information Policy during Periods of

Tension and Conflict, First Edition, Canberra, 1993.Badsey, S. Modern Military Operations and the Media, SCSI,

Camberley, 1994.Baker, B. “Desert Shield/Storm: the War of Words and Images”,

Naval War College Review, Vol XLIV, No 4, Autumn 1991,pp. 59-65.

Bennett, W. and Paletz, D. (ed) Taken by Storm: the Media, PublicOpinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, University ofChicago Press, Chicago,1994.

Bickerton, I. (ed) Forty three days: the Gulf War, Text PublishingCompany, Melbourne, 1991.

Carney S., Contributing Editor, The Age, telephone interview,22 July 1997.

Chiaventone, F. “Ethics and Responsibility in Broadcasting”,Military Review, August 1991, pp. 64-76.

DI(AF) AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual, Second Edition, 1994.Edgar, D., Earle, L. and Fopp, R. Introduction to Australian

Society, Prentice Hall, New York, 1993.Gration, P. “Keynote Address”, First International Conference on

Defence and the Media, Brisbane, April 1991.Haddock, E. “Media on the Battlefield – an Underestimated

Weapon”, Marine Corps Gazette, October 1992, pp. 30-32.Hayden, W. “Opening Address by Governor-General”, First

International Conference on Defence and the Media, Brisbane,April 1991.

Johnson, D. “The Impact of the Media on National Security PolicyDecision Making”, SSI, US Army War College, 1994.

Kennedy, W. The Military and the Media, Praeger, Westport, 1993.Machamer, E. “Avoiding Military-Media War in the Next Armed

Conflict”, Military Review, April 1993, pp. 43-54.Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA), “Submission to

the Federal Government’s Review of Cross Media Ownership”,November 1996, http://www.dca.gov.au/.

Najman, J. and Western, J. (ed) A Sociology of Australian Society,MacMillan, Melbourne, 1993.

Ricks, C. “The Military-News Media Relationship: ThinkingForward”, SSI, US Army War College, 1993.

Serfaty, S. (ed) The Media and Foreign Policy, MacMillan,London, 1990.

Tiffen, R. “Marching to whose Drum? – Media Battles in the Gulf


War”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol 46,No 1, May 1992, pp. 44-60.

Wheelwright, T. and Buckley, K. (ed) Communications and theMedia in Australia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987.

Young, P. “Reporting Conflict: The Relationship between theArmed Forces and the Media in Low Intensity and LimitedConflicts”, ADFA, 1987.


Wing Commander Andrew Dowse graduated from the RAAF Engineer Cadet Squadron in 1984 with a degree in CommunicationsEngineering and now holds a Master of Information Science. He currently is the Deputy Director, Information OperationsRequirements in Australian Defence Headquarters. This article was prepared as an essay for thr RAAF Command and Staff Course in1997 and does not necessarily reflect ADF policy.

New National Defence News ProgramA new half-hour Defence news program,

“Defence Watch” is now being broadcast by SkyNews nationally on Foxtel and Optus Vision. Theprogram, which features tri-service news andreports, a job profile as well as reports from DSTOgoes to air on the second Tuesday in each month at8.30pm with a repeat broadcast on the fourthTuesday of the month.

The first “Defence Watch” went to air inFebruary and featured reports on:• the Army’s work building social amenities for

the Aboriginal community at Bulla in theNorthern Territory;

• the RAAF’s recent air training exercisesouthwest of Darwin;

• DSTO’s development of metal fragment proofvests for use in Australian environments;

• the Navy’s Spectacle Island Museum in NSW;• disabled Army sailor Graham Raynor’s

participation in the recent BT Global Challengeaboard the Yacht Time and Tide;

• the recent reunion of a Rwandan student and aCorporal involved in the Australian UNpeacekeeping force in Rwanda;

• a job profile of life in the RAN’s Band unit;• the Army’s new infantry vehicles being trialed in

Queensland; and• the recent recovery of the remains of seven

Australian Airmen lost in PNG during theSecond World War.The third program in the “Defence Watch”

series goes to air on Tuesday 14 April.

By Melissa Weller, RAAF Museum, Point Cook

Whilst operations officially ceased on the RAAFWilliams (Laverton) Airfield in September,

1996, the departure of a single jet Vampire from theairfield on February 12 last year effectively signifiedthe end of the airfield’s longstanding service to theRoyal Australian Air Force.

Laverton Airfield has been utilised by the RAAFfor more than 70 years.1 During this time, a vast arrayof aircraft, including Hawker Demons, Beauforts,Hercules, Anson A4-1s, Wapitis, Bristol Bulldogfighters and jets such as Vampires, Sabres, Meteors,and Canberras, have used this important facility.However, Laverton Airfield’s true significance doesnot lie solely in the variety of aircraft which haveutilised it, but rather its often underestimated role inthe development of the Royal Australian Air Force’scapability levels. It is important to recognise, forinstance, in relation to the contribution which thisairfield made to the early development of the RAAFthat for more than ten years this airfield, together withthose at Point Cook and Richmond, represented theRAAF’s only “permanent airfields” and for the mostpart of these ten years, remained the main support ofAir Force operations.2

Through an examination of the range of its usesover the airfield’s past, this article will serve toillustrate that this facility has made an importantcontribution to the history of the Royal Australian AirForce. The significance of aircraft operations awayfrom Laverton as a home base, will be considered aswell as the activities which actually took place on theairfield itself. At the same time, this study will alsoattempt to provide some explanation for the airfield’sclosure by a review of post-war and more recentchanges within the Royal Australian Air Force. Itmust be emphasised, however, that by no means isthe following an exhaustive account of the AirForce’s operations from Laverton.

Laverton base was established in the mid 1920slargely to accommodate No 1 Aircraft Depot and itsoperations.3 Originally it had been envisaged that aStores Depot would be located at Point Cook.4 Once,however, the cost of constructing a railway fromLaverton to Point Cook and in particular, a railwaybridge across Skeleton Creek to the south of Lavertonhad been calculated, it was deemed more costeffective to purchase land close to the railway atLaverton and develop another base there.5 The 160acre site acquired in 1921 was able to accommodate alanding strip.6 Taking into consideration the majorresponsibilities of the Aircraft Store Depot – theconstruction, overhaul and testing of aircraft – thecapacity to provide for an airfield was an importantattribute of the location.7

In the mid to late interwar period, LavertonAirfield was extensively used for a variety ofpurposes. A unit which utilised the airfield frequentlyafter relocation to Laverton in March, 1926, was ofcourse No 1 Aircraft Depot. As this unit wasprimarily concerned with the assembly, test anddelivery of new aircraft, Laverton was the departurepoint from which many aircraft test flights wereconducted.8 Among the number of notable “first testflights” carried out from Laverton over the course ofthe interwar period was that of the first BritishBulldog single seat fighter (May, 1930), the firstWestland Wapiti (May, 1929), the first HawkerDemon aircraft (May, 1935) and significantly, thefirst Australian assembled Moth (October, 1935).9

Associated with No 1 Aircraft Depot’s (1AD)activities, Laverton Airfield served as the point ofdeparture and return for a significant and remarkableflight for the Royal Australian Air Force in 1927. InJuly of that year, three aircraft which together hadestablished a Northern Survey Flight within 1AD inthe previous year, departed Laverton on a journeyaround Australia and through much of its centre.10

When the party returned to Laverton in earlySeptember, they had flown across 11 890 miles,visited 48 places (including Tennant Creek, Broome,

Laverton Airfield in the Interwar Years

Introduction

Laverton: A Historic and Significant Airfield


No 1 Aircraft Depot at Laverton, Aerial view of LavertonPhotograph courtesy of Central Photographic Establishment RAAF Williams

LAVERTON: A HISTORIC AND SIGNIFICANT AIRFIELD 55

Katherine and Normanton) and flown most civilairline routes then in existence.11 The importance,however of this flight does not lie merely in thedistance travelled at this stage in early aviation, northe number of locations visited, but the impact whichthis flight made upon Sir Richard Williams, theacclaimed “Father” of the RAAF, who piloted one ofthe participating aircraft. Sir Richard Williams laterexpressed that as a result of this trip, he understood“for the first time the immensity of this country ofours...[and] now had a reasonable picture of thecountry for whose defence the Royal Australian AirForce should be developed.”12 Given that at the timeof the flight Australia was renowned as apparentlyone of the worst mapped countries in the world, thecompletion of this journey should also be consideredas constituting somewhat of a feat.13

With the formation of No 21 Squadron, as aCitizen Air Force Squadron, in April 1936, LavertonAirfield also received considerable use. Together withits function as a site from which night flying wascarried out, in the late interwar years, LavertonAirfield was the location of at least one ground andair exercise (in 1937) which ultimately resulted in anattack upon it during a simulated bombing raid.14

Laverton Airfield also served as a site of departure forsearch missions conducted towards the end of theinterwar period by this Squadron.15

Another squadron to utilise the airfield facility atLaverton in the late interwar period, though onlywithin a short space of time, was No 12 Squadron.Shortly after its formation at Laverton in February1939, No 12 Squadron undertook in May aconcentrated flying program which had by the end ofthat month, provided the Squadron with the necessaryskills to conduct live bombing practice and nightflying exercises.16 By mid September of 1939, No 12Squadron’s relocation to Darwin was complete withthe last of the Squadron’s aircraft arriving at thistime.17 This short term utilisation by No 12 Squadronwas to prove quite characteristic of the airfield’s useduring the Second World War when a number ofSquadrons were based at Laverton only temporarilybefore moving to the theatre of war; thusdemonstrating that the airfield was used to prepareoperational squadrons prior to war service.

That Laverton Airfield was utilised by somesquadrons for only brief periods of time is alsoexemplified by No 2 Squadron’s operations atLaverton between May 1937 and December 1941.Towards the end of the interwar period, (from lateApril, 1938), the airfield was used extensively by No2 Squadron as it concentrated on its general service

flying training on Anson aircraft with “around theclock operations”.18

For several years in the interwar period, LavertonAirfield also served as a point of departure and returnfor flights connected with the North AustralianSurvey Program. In 1935, a North Australia SurveyFlight comprising No 1 Squadron Personnel andaircraft was established which conductedphotographic work for the North Australian AerialGeological and Geophysical Survey Program.19 On 29April, 1935, the North Australian Survey Flight partydeparted Laverton not returning until 16 September.20

Whilst the party did experience considerabledifficulties with one of the aircrafts’ engines, by thetime the party returned to Laverton, they had coveredsome 80 000 kilometres and had photographed 8 900square kilometres working in areas such as Cairns,Cooktown, and Cloncurry.21 Aside from the large areawhich had been successfully photographed, theimportance of this flight was as stated in the surveyreport prepared for Parliament, that this had been“....the largest aerial work ever undertaken by theRoyal Australian Air Force, and that it was the largestoperation carried out by the Air Force away from itsbase.”22 The North Australia Survey Program,although varying in its organisational form, continuedto involve the RAAF and utilise Laverton Airfield asone of its main points of departure and return untilonly several months before the outbreak of WorldWar II.23 Whilst the Program had involved eminentfigures such as Sir Herbert Gepp (in a flightassociated with the program in 1935), and hadwitnessed some truly heroic efforts in the mapping ofAustralia’s north, its overriding importance reallybecame apparent later in World War II when themaps produced by the Program served as the mostcurrent available to guide military operations.24

On a different note, Laverton Airfield onNovember 10, 1934, played host to an impressive airdisplay, being one of the many celebrations for theoccasion of the Centenary of the State of Victoria andCity of Melbourne. In the company of official guestsincluding the Duke of Gloucester, the Governor, LordHuntingfield, and Premier of Victoria, a tremendouscrowd of spectators which official estimatesnumbered between 200 000 and 250 000 watchedaround forty aircraft participate in the display25. Itfeatured inverted flying performed by Moth aircraft ofNo 1 Flying Training School and aerobatics and“crazy flying” presented by Instructors of No 1 FlyingTraining School.26 A further highlight of the displaywas that during an air drill performed by No 1 and No3 Squadrons when the aircraft formed a letter “H” as


a mark of respect to the Duke of Gloucester.27 As thenumbers in attendance suggest, the 1934 Air Displayheld at Laverton Airfield had stimulated much interestin the general public and as the following presscomment indicates, this display also made a definiteimpression on those who did attend: “They [theplanes] did everything a bird could do in the way offlight. They did more: for they flew, in perfectcontrol, upside down, and who ever saw a bird dothat?”28 In direct connection with the Centenary AirDisplay held on Laverton Airfield, it is also extremelysignificant that the winner of the Centenary Air Racebetween London and Melbourne first landed theiraircraft at Laverton on 23 October 1934, aftercrossing the race finish line over Flemington RaceCourse.29

Finally, during the interwar period, the airfieldwas not devoid of its share of mishaps. On theweekend of 13 and 14 August, 1938, (a Citizen AirForce Weekend) an Anson A417 collided withboulders, whilst attempting to take off on the northeast corner of the airfield.30 Similarly, in 1936, aDemon aircraft landed awkwardly on the airfield.31

Over the course of the Second World War,Laverton Airfield served as an important facility fromwhich many important support operations werecarried out. No 1 Aircraft Depot (No 1 AD) heavilyutilised the airfield during these years to assemble,test and deliver thousands of aircraft to meet theneeds of the war effort.32 Between December 1939and February 1941 the Depot Test Pilot flew 190 ofthe first 237 Wirraways brought into service in a totalof 576 sorties.33 The test flights not only illustrate thedegree to which No 1 AD utilised the airfield duringthe War but, as Wirraways constituted “the RAAF’sfirst line fighters” at this time, also indicate theimportance of the activities carried out fromLaverton.34 Further confirmation of the airfield’sfrequent usage by 1 AD is the fact that in 1944, therewere 60 pilots employed within the Test and FerrySquadron of 1 AD, all of whom were expected to becompetent at testing and flying “all 20 differenttypes” of aircraft dealt with on a monthly average bythis Squadron.35 Moreover, the airfield was utilised bythe Squadron on completion of all other duties whenthe Ferry Pilots and accompanying crews departed 1AD to transport the aircraft to forward areas, such asTownsville and Port Moresby.36

No 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron continuedto operate from Laverton Airfield until late 1940,when it relocated on an active service role in the war.In the first six months of 1940, No 21 Squadron flewAnson aircraft from Laverton conducting anti-submarine patrols.37 More historically significant fromthe perspective of the Squadron is that in December1939, three of four Ansons that were involved in No21’s first operational assignment, supporting a convoyaround Victoria’s coastline, originated fromLaverton.38

Once World War II started, the airfield alsobecame a departure point for No 2 Squadron’s majoroccupation at this time – conducting search patrols toensure the safety of convoys in southern waters;although airfields including those at Ceduna,Mallacoota and on Flinders Island were progressivelyused as advanced operating bases whilst aircraft wereaway from Laverton.39 Much activity upon the airfieldwas also stimulated when in mid 1940, the Squadronbegan to make its conversion to Hudson aircraft.40 Inlate September of 1941, four of No 2 Squadron’saircraft departed Laverton on what constituted a verysignificant flight. Basically, this flight was linked toan agreement made by Australia in early 1941 that itwould support the Dutch in defending their islandsenveloping the Banda Sea in the event that Japanwent to war and as such allowed the No 2 Squadrondeployment to observe airfields along the route,undertake comprehensive reviews of theirdeployment bases and conduct patrols in their futurearea of operation.41

The formation of 1 Air Performance Unit (APU)on 1 December, 1943 also served to encourage flyingactivity and thus further utilisation of the airfield. Asone of the Unit’s major responsibilities was toundertake “full scale flight testing” in concurrencewith laboratory research carried out, this functionalone necessitated considerable use of the airfield.42

An indication of the level of activity requiring usageof the airfield by 1 APU is provided by the fact thatduring the first month of this Unit’s existence, theCommanding Officer reported that “at present thereare 32 aircraft allotted to the Unit for testing purposes,and with the present strength of personnel [104] it isnot possible to carry out the duties efficiently.”43

From the latter part of the Second World War(mid 1943) until mid 1946 Laverton Airfield alsoprovided the point of departure and return for No 37Squadron’s frequent transport flights. During thisperiod, No 37 Squadron carried out routine courierflights – Darwin via either Perth or Alice Springsbeing one of a number of common destinations.44 Theimportance of these flights, especially given the

Laverton Airfield’s WartimeInvolvement


environment of war, can be ascertained by the cargothis Squadron typically transported – “urgentlyrequired” aircraft spares, and personnel, eithertravelling on pressing work related business orundertaking compassionate leave.45 In early 1944,when the passenger ship which usually crossed BassStrait was required for Naval service, 37 Squadronalso operated from Laverton twice each weekday toLaunceston transporting Air Force, Army and Navypersonnel.46

In addition, from early 1943 until shortly after theend of World War II, Laverton Airfield functioned asa point of departure and return for No 67 (GeneralReconnaissance Squadron) aircraft. This Squadronwas based at Laverton in April 1943 and was one ofthe two Squadrons in the south responsible forcarrying out anti-submarine patrols, continuously inthe first few months of 1943, and providingreconnaissance.47 Given Australia’s reliance at thistime on merchant vessels for the provision ofmunitions and essential overseas supplies, theimportance of the airfield’s direct contribution for 67Squadron’s convoy escorts around the south easterncoastline should not be discounted. 48

In similar fashion to No 21 (City of Melbourne)Squadron, No 100 Squadron also used the airfield for

a short period of time in the Second World Warbefore proceeding to undertake front line service.From early July until early September, 1942, No 100Squadron was based at Laverton and its Beaufortscarried out enemy submarine patrols along both thesouth coast of NSW and Victoria.49 Of greaterhistorical significance is that this Squadron wasdirectly involved in one of the final air battles of theMilne Bay operation, after several Squadron aircraftmoved from RAAF Base Laverton. On 7 September,1942, six of No 100 Squadron’s Beauforts, togetherwith 3 Hudsons from No 6 Squadron, 8 Kittyhawksfrom No 75 Squadron, 8 Kittyhawks from No 76Squadron and 3 Beaufighters of No 30 Squadron,were engaged in an attack upon a destroyer andcruiser near Cape Karitahua on Normanby Island.50

Whilst the Kittyhawks flew above providing topcover, “the Hudson aircraft steered towards the targetarea and attempted to hit the destroyer’s stern.”51 Twoof the three Beaufighters executed their torpedo runs– failing to hit any of their targets.52 Whilst the attackwas not successful in that neither of the enemy shipshad received serious damage, its importance shouldbe viewed in the light of the fact that the combinedapproach undertaken by the involved Squadrons wasthe first operation of this nature conducted by the

A display of aircraft that have used the airfieldPhotograph courtesy of Central Photographic Establishment RAAF Williams


RAAF.53 The six Beauforts involved in this operationhad arrived at Milne Bay on 5 September afterleaving Laverton only on 1 September.54

Further affirmation of Laverton Airfield’simportance in the Second World War is provided bythe improvements which were made to the keycomponents of this facility in this period. Subsequentto a visit made by members of the Joint Committeeon War Expenditure to Laverton, in September 1941the Committee outlined to the Prime Minister thatwhilst construction of runways would prove a costlyundertaking the benefits to be obtained would in theend outweigh this expense.55 Two centralconsiderations in the Committee’s stance were thestate of the airfield’s surface in particular and theRAAF’s use of the airfield in general.56 The outcomeof the Committee’s expressed opinions – the decisionlater made to build two concrete runways and aperimeter taxiway upon Laverton Airfield.57 Thiswork, in line with many improvements made for thewar, was completed during early 1943.58

The period of time between the conclusion of theSecond World War and September 1996, when theRAAF’s operations on Laverton Airfield officiallyceased, is one which mirrors the RAAF’s overallpostwar development and is characterised by greatchange. In October 1945, the RAAF had 317 regionaland mainland airfields within its command.59 Plan“D”, however, which officially represented thegeneral outline of the RAAF’s postwar developmentfrom 1947, held that only 133 of these 317 airfieldswere still required.60 After a review of the expenserequired to improve these 133 airfields to satisfyminimum criterion, twelve airfields were thenregarded as of the highest importance.61 Whilst theairfields situated at Scholfields, Port Moresby,Canberra and significantly, Laverton, were notconsidered to have equal operational priority as theselect twelve bases (located mainly in the north),these four airfields were, nonetheless set aside for“improvement”.62

Despite much change in the time leading up to theclosure of Laverton Airfield, air displays at Lavertonairfield were an enduring and popular feature ofLaverton base’s activity. A number of these airdisplays are particularly noteworthy. On20 September 1954 for instance, Laverton Airfieldwas the site of an air display signifying both the end

of Air Force Week and Battle of Britain Day, with anestimated crowd numbering somewhere between45 000 and 50 000.63 Amongst the attendees whowitnessed flying by Vampire jet fighters, a Lincolnbomber and notably, the first Sabres to be received bythe RAAF, was the then Chief of Staff, Air MarshalJohn McCauley.64 On 18 April 1971, LavertonAirfield again hosted an air display to help celebratethe 50th anniversary of the Royal Australian AirForce, on what could only be described as a grandscale. During the two and a half hour display, theRAAF’s then newly acquired Phantoms carried out asimulated strike on ground targets, whilst the Delta’saerobatic team provided a marvellous flyingdemonstration.65 No less exciting to view was theaerobatic display carried out notably, by visiting RAFLightning aircraft, which apparently “skidded insmall circles, at 600 mph, around the airfield like dirttrack riders”.66 Estimates suggest between 160 000and 170 000 were present at the airfield on thisimportant occasion.67 More recently, on 17 March1985, an Open Day was held coinciding with theState of Victoria’s 150th Anniversary celebrations.Whilst the day itself was overcast, cool and wet,literally thousands still attended and witnessed animpressive air display provided by the Roulettes, aMirage, HS 748 and F111 among other aircraft.68 Inrelation to this day, the following statement made bythe then Officer Commanding of RAAF Laverton,Group Captain J. Gazley, provides some indication ofthe changes taking place within the Air Force andtheir subsequent impact upon the RAAF in generaland RAAF Base Laverton in particular:

“In recent years the budgetary situation hasforced the RAAF to concentrate almostexclusively on essential operational tasks with theresult that Open Days are held less often thanthey used to be. This is unfortunate as previousOpen Days at Laverton invariably generated alevel of public interest which was not surpassed atsimilar functions held elsewhere in Australia.”69

For an entirely different reason, Laverton Airfieldwas involved with many civilians in late December1974 and early January 1975. As part of anevacuation process for Cyclone Tracey, Herculesaircraft transported large numbers of civilians fromDarwin to Laverton in the immediate weeksfollowing the natural disaster.70

Since the end of the Second World War, LavertonAirfield has been the site of a number of unfortunateincidents; on a more tragic scale than those referred toin the interwar period. On 11 October 1968, forinstance, a Navy Vampire aircraft conducting air sea

Post-War Changes to Laverton Airfield


exercises from Laverton, aborted its takeoff whichresulted in the deaths of the crew.71 Before coming torest ablaze only 20 yards from the GeelongMelbourne Road, the Vampire jet drove through theend of the runway, hit the nearby railway line, ranthrough both a railway cable and wire fence andnosed towards the ground.72 In comparison, on22 October, 1963, a far less serious incident tookplace when a U-2 Aircraft (of the USAF Detachmentthen situated at Laverton) was forced to make a“wheels up” landing owing to a mechanical fault.73

Whilst precautionary measures were taken to assistthe landing, namely in the form of a “foam path”applied to the runway, the U2 landed causing onlypartial damage to the aircraft and the pilot escapeduninjured.74

No 21 (City Of Melbourne) (Fighter) Squadron(formerly No 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron)experienced a change in its status in the early 1960swhich quite significantly reduced flying activity onLaverton Airfield. Between April 1948 and April1960, this Squadron, operating as a reserve fighterSquadron, utilised the airfield when both itspermanent and to a lesser extent, Citizen Air Forcepersonnel carried out their flying training, includingsome night, cross country and instrument flying.75 The16 day Citizen Air Force Camp of September 1950,over the course of which a concentrated flyingprogram was conducted, illustrates the extent towhich No 21 (City of Melbourne) (Fighter) Squadronused the airfield.76 In early 1960 however, thisReserve Squadron’s flying was discontinued (as wasthe flying for its four sister reserve squadrons) as aresult of a policy change stemming from in part, theeconomic expense which the Reserve Squadrons’flying entailed and a lack of resources for theprovision of technical support.77 The impact whichthis policy change made on the level of activity uponthe airfield can be established by the fact that whenthe Squadron was informed of the change in January,almost immediately two of the Squadron’s Vampireswere conveyed to storage and by the end of the lastweek in February, (this representing the Squadron’sfinal full flying month), only five aircraft remained.78

Since 1960, some limited flying has been carried outby No 21 Squadron in Caribou aircraft as acomponent of its maintenance training program andmore recently, in the 1980s, in a Vampire jet for thepurposes of a group restoration project.79 For the mostpart, however, No 21 Squadron’s use of LavertonAirfield for flying had finished in 1960.

A change of defence policy to No 1 AD’s majorfunction of aircraft repair in early 1961, alsodiminished the level of flying activity at Laverton

Airfield. Whilst a large number of aircraft were eitherrelocated to storage or rather, simply scrapped by1AD in the immediate post-war years in line withdemobilisation, it is important to acknowledge thedegree of flying which No 1AD’s post-war operationsstimulated, especially given their historicalsignificance.80 For instance, in May 1947, a 1AD Pilotconducted the first official flight test for acceptance ofthe first Vampire jet assembled at 1AD.81 Similarly, inMay 1952, the first Meteor assembled in Australiawas flight tested by 1AD at Laverton.82 More inkeeping with its maintenance role, in 1950, LavertonAirfield was also the point of return for a crashedBeaufighter retrieved by a party of 1AD personnelfrom Ceduna, South Australia.83 In May 1961,however, the 1AD Aircraft Repair Squadron closeddown (No 2 AD’s Aircraft Repair Squadron atRichmond also suffering the same fate); the outcomeof a change in policy largely on account of theprioritisation of No 3 Aircraft Depot’s activities –sustaining the new F111 aircraft at Amberley.84

Notwithstanding the fact that aircraft engines wereserviced at 1AD until 1968, this Depot’s longestablished use of Laverton Airfield effectively endedin 1961, when Aircraft Repair Squadron closed.

Despite closure of No 1AD’s Aircraft RepairSquadron in May 1961, in September 1962, Lavertonhosted important foreign guests. During this month, aU-2 Aircraft, detachment of a USAF WeatherReconnaissance Squadron came to Laverton.85

A more recent development having a markedeffect upon the extent of flying on the Airfield was therelocation of the Australian Research DevelopmentUnit (ARDU) (formerly APU) to Edinburgh in 1977.With the exception of the period September 1946 toOctober 1948, when APU (which became ARDU inSeptember 1947) was temporarily located at PointCook while the Unit’s establishment at Laverton wasrefitted, Laverton Airfield was utilised extensively bythis unit after World War II.86 In spite of thepervading atmosphere of demobilisation in theimmediate post-war years winding down manywartime operations, the APU continued to carry outmany flight trials, including some for the benefit ofbodies outside the RAAF. In April 1946 for instanceand as requested by the Department of Civil Aviation,APU conducted a course of tests to establish thesuitability of the Anson Mark Aircraft for CivilAviation purposes.87 No less significant, howeverwere the test flights carried out to establish complexperformance data for newly serving RAAF aircraft; aseries of these types of tests undertaken in November1945 supplied data for cruise control charts forSquadron aircraft.88 Whilst some of ARDUS’s flying


was increasingly carried out from the new airfield atnearby Avalon after 1953, much flying activitystimulated by ARDU was still apparent at Laverton;involving such aircraft as the Sabre, Canberra, Dakotaand Sycamore Helicopter (in the late sixties) as wellas the Macchi, Iroquois, Kiowa, Macchi and again,the Canberra and Dakota aircraft (in the early to midseventies).89 In early 1977, however, ARDU relocatedto Edinburgh, SA.90 This unit’s departure represents aturning point in the history of the airfield’s existencein that after this time, home base flying by a full-timesquadron no longer took place.91

After ARDU’s departure until the airfield’seventual official closure in 1996, Laverton continuedto serve as a military airhead for Victoria. For manyyears, Laverton served as a major base for visitingaircraft to Victoria and had been a base of majoraircraft movements with a busy Air MovementsSection.92 In 1987 for instance, it was anticipated thatthe Air Movements section would deal with 930turnarounds.93 Hercules aircraft which flew intoLaverton several times a week on their transportflights, (these flights referred to as “The SouthernService”) greatly contributing to this flying activity atLaverton.94 Additionally, in connection with Lavertonbase’s role as a military airhead, both Orion andFalcon 900 aircraft utilised the airfield. During thelate 80s FA-18 aircraft also occasionally used theairfield as one of their stopover points.95 Whilstunrelated to Laverton’s role as a military airhead, itshould be acknowledged that as recently as 1991 and1992, the airfield was utilised by Hawker DeHavilland to conduct flight tests on Macchi aircraft aspart of this company’s “Life of type Extension”project.96

The end of 1992 brought with it a number ofchanges which signalled the fast approaching end ofthe RAAF’s use of the airfield. At the end of 1992,No 1 Flying Training School, based at Point Cook,closed down. For at least thirty years, No 1 FlyingTraining School had used Laverton Airfield as asatellite airfield to support its training programs.97

One example highlighting the use of the airfield bythis Flying Training School is that in the mid 1960s,BFTS’s (the previous abbreviated name given to No1 Flying Training School) usage of the airfieldinvolved two or three parallel runways in operation atthe one time.98 At the end of 1992, the airfield’sControl Tower ceased to operate providing morecompounding evidence of the conclusion of the AirForce’s use of the airfield for flying activity.99

On 30 May 1991, the then Minister for Defence,Senator Robert Ray, stated that the RAAF’s airfieldsat Point Cook and Laverton would be closed andsold; this announcement forming part of theGovernment’s response to the “1991 Force StructureReview”.100 Following on from this announcement, on6 June, a meeting was held – attended by amongstothers, the Premier of Victoria, the Minister forDefence and various representatives of the local shireand region – which decided that a ConsultativeCommittee was required to explore possible optionsfor future use of the two bases.101 The ConsultativeCommittee, whose members included the FederalMember for Lalor, the Mayor of Werribee, TheCommissioner of the Western Region Commissionand representing the RAAF, the AOC HeadquartersTraining Command, was also to consider and makerecommendations “...on the Defence timetable for theclosure and/or transfer of operations from RAAFWilliams.”102

In October 1991, the Committee placedadvertisements within both Australia and overseas inparticular aviation and financial publications inviting“expressions of interest in leasing, owning, and/oroperating either or both airfields...”103 Theseadvertisements resulted in 26 proposals forcommercial uses and by September 1992 anadditional 16 “expressions of interest” had beensubmitted.104 After the Committee’s review of theexpressions of interest, it was apparent to the RAAFthat there were no feasible proposals which wouldhave utilised the facilities effectively – owing toincompatibility between the proposal parties’ requiredoccupation of the site and time needed by the RAAFto relocate its units.105 For this reason, together withthe fact that some of the Proposals would haveinvolved only partial use of the advertised Lavertonfacility and that there were representations by theCommittee to the Minister for Defence to maintainRAAF units at Laverton, the Defence Ministertherefore requested that Defence carry out a thoroughexamination of facility requirements in theMelbourne area.106 As a result of this examination, inJuly 1992, the Minister of Defence accepted aDefence update regarding the future use of RAAFWilliams Laverton Base.107 Essentially, it outlined thatwhilst Headquarters Logistics Command wouldrelocate from its then present location, St Kilda Road,to Laverton and that a number of Units, initially

The Closure of the Airfield

LEVERTON: A HISTORIC AND SIGNIFICANT AIRFIELD 61

DH Vampire parked on the hardstand at LavertonPhotograph by courtesy of the Central Photographic Establishment RAAF Williams


earmarked for relocation, including the RAAFCentral Band and Defence International TrainingCentre, would now remain at Laverton, the airfieldwould, nevertheless close.108 More specifically, as tothe long-term future of the airfield, the Defenceposition was that it would either be leased or disposedof – this action predicted to take place sometimebetween January 1993 and December 1994.109

Whilst in August 1992, there was some evidenceto suggest that the local Werribee Council wouldcampaign for the airfield to remain open (in the hopethat the National Air and Space Museum would beestablished at Laverton and use the airfield) this effortlater proved unsuccessful.110 In early 1995, when theRAAF revealed the planned relocation of LogisticsCommand Headquarters from St Kilda Road toLaverton, the irreversible status of the airfield wasalso apparent in Air Marshal Fisher’s statement thatdespite this development, “RAAF Williams wouldnot be a flying base” and that “the RAAF [would] sellthe airfield for light industry usage.”111 Furthersubstantiation of this position has been supplied mostrecently in the inclusion of the airfield on the listingof ‘Planned Future Disposals’ within the DefenceEfficiency Review.112

In seeking explanations for Laverton Airfield’sclosure the fact that its basic function, essentially, theenabling of aircraft operations had largely passedonce ARDU relocated from Laverton, must beviewed the most significant. During the interwaryears, and assuredly throughout the Second WorldWar, Laverton airbase represented the main air baseon Australia’s southeast coast; an air base from whichmuch of the RAAF’s test and training exercise flyingwas conducted.113 Since the 1960s, however, whendevelopments affecting the airfield’s usage, such asthe conclusion of Reserve Squadron Flying and morerecently, ARDU’s relocation to Edinburgh, began tobecome evident the importance of the airfieldprogressively diminished. The decreasing importanceof the airfield is for instance, reflected in therecommendation made in 1973 that if the activitiesinvolving flying were relocated, the airfield shouldthen simply be disposed of.114 For this reason, theabsence of any resident flying units at Laverton, notedin 1987, undoubtedly carried some consequence inthe decision made only four years later to close theairfield.115

The influence of the RAAF’s prioritisation of itsnorthern facilities should also be considered in theattempt to interpret the airfield’s closure. Whereas inthe 1950s Air Force policy held for reasons ofeconomy that forces should be maintained largely inthe south and move to defend the north when sorequired, since 1991 the RAAF’s policy has been toactually relocate operational forces to the North.116

This move has necessitated substantial developmentof the Air Force’s northern infrastructure.117 Theestablishment of an operations area in Darwin and theconstruction of RAAF Base Scherger, anticipated tobe complete by the year 2000, are indicative of theRAAF’s recent focus upon the north.118 The degree towhich this emphasis has affected RAAF facilities insouthern Australia, such as Laverton, is revealed inthe following statement that “ ...in order to providethose strategically important facilities” (referring to a“chain” of bases to be developed across the north) ,“it is essential that there be an ongoing review ofactivities in southern Australia, to identify whereitems are either no longer relevant to our present andforeseen strategic circumstances, or could beundertaken more efficiently. Some contraction in thenumber of bases in the south might be necessary, ifsufficient priority is to be accorded to development ofnorthern infrastructure...”119 For this reason, there is adirect relationship between the development of theAir Force’s northern facilities and the decline ofsouthern bases, including Laverton.

To a large extent, the controversial issue ofairspace, together with the restricted length of theairfield’s runways provided plausible explanation forthe closure of Laverton Airfield. Towards the end ofthe airfield’s service to the Royal Australian AirForce, there was considerable pressure from CivilAviation for the RAAF to either cease to occupy, oralternatively, decrease the airspace which it utilisedover Laverton.120 During the early 1990s airspacefrom Altona around Point Cook to Point Nepean inthe South, around Laverton to Meredith in the Westand to Torquay and Moriac in the South West wasquarantined for the RAAF’s aircraft to operate fromLaverton.121 Whilst airspace does not appear to havebeen an issue in the early years of Laverton base’soperations, the advent of jet aircraft, easily coveringdistances in much shorter periods of time than earlieraircraft, presented an increasing problem for bothregular operations carried out by the RAAF and CivilAviators, whose airspace was often encroachedupon.122 ARDU’s activities, for instance, were oftenaffected by this problem.123 Moreover, the airspacefrom ground level to 25 000 feet to the South West ofMelbourne, which was essentially only for the

Why Did the Airfield Close?


RAAF’s use, proved a considerable hindrance tocivilian flying activity into both Tullamarine andEssendon and additionally, across Port Phillip Bay toMoorabbin Airport.124 In regard to the influence of therunways’ shortfall upon the closure of Laverton’sAirfield, it should be recognised that owing to theirlimited length, C130 Aircraft could not take off fromor land at Laverton without adhering to a set restrictedweight, whilst Boeing 707 aircraft, could not beaccommodated by the airfield.125 The fact thatLaverton’s airfields were so short in length alsorequired ARDU’s increasing use of the longerrunway at nearby Avalon after 1953, particularly forMirage test flying.126 Whilst the restriction whichapplied to C-130s did not apparently substantiallyaffect their “routine operations”, the existence of thislimitation combined with the increasing issue ofairspace undoubtedly served as factors influencing thedecision to close the airfield.127

A final contributing factor for the closure ofLaverton Airfield can be found in the prevailingcircumstances within the Air Force characterised byrestricted funds and the need to operate more costeffectively. In the face of increasing personnel andoperating costs there has been no accompanying realgrowth in Defence spending.128 These circumstanceshave forced the Air Force to strive for even furtherefficiency.129 As the closure of Laverton Airfield wasaccepted as a means of deriving personnel savings, itsclosure can be directly linked to current Air ForceResource Management constraints. 130

At present, the airfield is held in ownership by theAustralian Property Group. Despite its official closurelate last year, the airfield has nonetheless since thenbeen utilised by several external organisations;namely, “Driveskill International” and “Stay UprightMotorcycle Techniques”.131 In addition, both ToyotaMotor Corporation Australia and Audi have also usedthe airfields for short periods of time to conductvarious performance tests on their latest vehicles.132

Following considerable advertisement both in theoverseas and national press, offers are in the processof being made for the airfield.133 In the recent past, itwas anticipated that bids above six million dollars forthe airfield would be made.134 Regardless of the finalsum paid for the airfield, its future use would appearto most likely lie with industrial and commercialaims.135

Despite Environmental test results which haverevealed some contamination within the airfield, thereis a also a more remote possibility that it could beused for sporting, recreational, residential or acombination of purposes.136

Laverton Airfield has given the Royal AustralianAir Force time honoured service. From the RAAF’searly beginnings until its closure, the airfield has beena site from which a multitude of Air Force relatedactivities have been conducted. In the interwar period,the airfield served as a departure and return point for aseries of flights which successfully mapped vastdistances across northern Australia. It was also duringthis time that 1AD Test flying and flying training andsearch missions carried out by 21 Cadre Squadronalso ensured substantial use of the airfield.Furthermore, in 1934, the airfield was the venue ofthe publicly well received Centenary Air Display andfirst landing place for the winner of the London toMelbourne Centenary Air Race.

During World War II, Laverton Airfield was anextensively used facility, from which bothtemporarily and permanent based Squadrons, manyof which played an important protective role againstenemy attack upon Australia’s southeastern coastline,operated. Both No 1AD and No 1APU in particular,heavily utilised the airfield over this period to helpintroduce and maintain wartime aircraft.

From the end of the Second World War until itsofficial closure, Laverton Airfield experienced anumber of changes in its standing largely as a resultof new priorities and cost cutting measures. Despitethese changes, the airfield during this time, continuedto stage well attended, large scale air displays and waswell utilised by Units / Squadrons including: ARDU,No 21 Squadron, 1AD and more recently, varioustransport and miscellaneous aircraft. Owing to thisgreat past, when the eventual final transfer ofownership is made, the Royal Australian Air Forcewill hand over a significant and historic airfield.

NOTES1. M. Dunlevy, “Vintage Airfield offers unzoned land sell-off”,

in The Weekend Australian,15/2/97, p.5 (Property).2. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother,North Sydney,

Allen &Unwin, 1991, p.119. *It should also be acknowledgedthat an Experimental Section in Sydney (between 1924 -1930) and a temporary base at Bowen (between 1926 - 1928)were also in operation at the specified times.

3. ibid, pp.128-129.

Conclusion

The Current Status and Future ofLaverton Airfield


4. Sir R. Williams, These are Facts,Canberra, AGPS,1977,p.140.

5. ibid, and C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother,pp.129-30.6. Compiled by the RAAF Historical Section, Units of the Royal

Australian Air Force: A Concise History - Volume 1,Introduction, Bases, Supporting Organisations,Canberra,AGPS, 1995, pp.141- 42.

7. Sir R. Williams, These are Facts,p.140.8. SQNLDR R. Christensen, No.1 Aircraft Depot From the

beginning, Laverton, RAAF Publications Unit, 1994, p.20.9. ibid, pp.12,8,15,17.10. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother,pp.392-393.11. Sir R. Williams, These are Facts Canberra, AGPS, 1977,

pp.188,190-193. *In reference to the number of places visitedon the journey, it should be acknowledged that the numberquoted includes places visited twice.

12. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother,pp.393 -394.13. Sir R. Williams, These Are Facts,p.188.14. SQNLDR W.H. Brook, Demon to Vampire: The Story of No

21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron,Glen Waverly,Demonvamp Publications,1986, pp.22-23.

15. ibid, pp.14,21.16. Compiled by the RAAF Historical Section,Units of the Royal

Australian Air Force: A Concise History – Volume 3, BomberUnits,Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.33.

17. ibid, p.34.18. J. Bennett, Highest Traditions, Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.100

and Compiled by the RAAF Historical Section, Units of theRoyal Australian Air Force: A Concise History - Volume 3,Bomber Units, p.8.

19. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, North Sydney,Allen & Unwin, 1991, pp.428-429.

20. ibid, p.429.21. ibid.22. ibid, pp.429-430.23. ibid, pp.431-439.24. ibid, pp.431, 439, and SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft

Depot: From the beginning,Laverton, RAAF PublicationsUnit, 1994, p.17.

25. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother,pp.402-403 , “AirForce Display thrills crowd”, in The Argus,12/11/34, p.11 and“Centenary Celebrations. Air Pageant.” in The Age,12/11/34,p.9.

26. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother,p.403 and “AirForce Display thrills Crowd”, in The Argus, 12/11/34, p.11.

27. “Air Force Display thrills Crowd”, in The Argus,12/11/34,p.11.

28. “Centenary Celebrations. Air Pageant.”, in The Age, 12/11/34,p.9.

29. “Scott wins Centenary Air Race”, in The Age,24/10/34, p.11.30. SQNLDR W.H. Brook, Demon to Vampire: The Story of No

21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron,Glen Waverly,Demonvamp Publications, 1986, pp. 33,34,36.

31. SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft Depot: From thebeginning,Laverton, RAAF Publications Unit, 1994, p.19.

32. ibid, p.25. 33. ibid.34. ibid.35. “An Aircraft went back to the War”, Wings, 3/10/44, p.28 in

ibid, p.31.36. ibid, SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft Depot: From the

beginning,p.28 and compiled by the RAAF Historical Section,Units of the Royal Australian Air Force, A Concise History -Volume 7, Maintenance Units, Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.2.

37. W.H. Brook, From Demon to Vampire: The Story of No 21(City of Melbourne) Squadron, Glen Waverly, Demonvamp

Publications, 1986, p 54. * This Squadron also conducted itssubmarine patrols from advanced landing grounds at MtGambier and Yanakie.

38. ibid, pp.52, 318.39. J. Bennett, Highest Traditions, pp.104-106.40. ibid, p.108.41. ibid, pp.115-116.42. Compiled by the RAAF Historical Section, Units of the Royal

Australian Air Force, A Concise History, - Volume 9,Ancillary Units, Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.158. and,“Summary of Events” (for December 1943), No.1 AircraftPerformance Unit, Operations Record Book, Laverton, p.1.

43. “Summary of Events” (for December 1943), No 1 AircraftPerformance Unit, Operations Record Book, Laverton, p.2.

44. Compiled by the RAAF Historical Section, Units of the RoyalAustralian Air Force, A Concise History, -Volume 4, Maritimeand Transport Units, Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.62.

45. ibid, pp.62,63.46. ibid, p.63.47. G. Odgers, Air War against Japan, Canberra, Australian War

Memorial, 1957, p.141 and compiled by the RAAF HistoricalSection, Units of the Royal Australian Air Force, A ConciseHistory - Volume 4, Maritime and Transport Units,p.85.

48. G. Odgers, Air War against Japan,pp.140, 142 , Compiled bythe RAAF Historical Section,Units of the Royal AustralianAir Force, A Concise History - Volume 4, Maritime andTransport Units,p.85 and, J Bennett, Highest Traditions,Canberra, 1995, p.109. * No 67 Squadron though based atLaverton, also operated from Yanakie, Mallacoota,Warrnambool and Bairnsdale. In addition, the Squadron latersubdivided to form two flights which operated on aninterchanging basis from Laverton and Mallacoota.

49. Compiled by the RAAF Historical Section, Units of the RoyalAustralian Air Force, A Concise History - Volume 3, BomberUnits, Canberra, AGPS, 1995 pp.99-100.

50. D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42,Canberra,Australian War Memorial, 1962, p.615 and N M Parnell, & CA Lynch, Australian Air Force since 1911,Sydney, AH &AW Reed Pty Ltd, p.81.

51. D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42,p.616.52. ibid.53. ibid, and N.M. Parnell & C.A.Lynch, Australian Air Force

since 1911, p.81.54. D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942,p.615 and

compiled by the RAAF Historical Section, Units of the RoyalAustralian Air Force, A Concise History: Volume 3-BomberUnits, p.99.

55. ‘Runways at RAAF Stations - Laverton and Point Cook’, WarCabinet Agendum No: 246/1943, Copy No 15, dated 31/5/43,p.2.

56. ibid.57. ibid.58. ibid, ‘Runways at RAAF Stations Laverton and Point Cook’,

Notes on War Cabinet Agendum No: 246/1943, dated 5/6/43,and SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft Depot: From thebeginning, Laverton, RAAF Publications Unit, 1994, p.28.

59. A. Stephens, Going Solo, Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.50.60. ibid, and A. Stephens, Power Plus Attitude:Ideas, Strategy

and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force,1921-1991,Canberra, AGPS, 1992, pp.102,117.

61. A. Stephens, Going Solo,p.50.62. ibid.63. “Our Sabres crash sound”, in The Argus,20/9/54, p.5.64. ibid, and W. H. Brook, Demon to Vampire: The Story of

No 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron,Glen Waverly,Demonvamp Publications, 1986, p.251.


65. RAAF Air Display Pictorial Souvenir, Laverton, 18/4/71,pp.26-27.

66. J. Macdonald, “Zip Muscle as RAAF celebrates 50 years”, inThe Age,19/4/71, p.11.

67. ibid.68. RAAF Base Laverton Open Day Brochure, 17/3/85, p.3,11

and W. H. Brook, Demon to Vampire: The Story of No 21(City of Melbourne) Squadron,pp.300-301.

69. Message from Group Captain J.G. Gazley, OfficerCommanding RAAF Laverton, RAAF Base Laverton OpenDay Brochure, 17/3/85, p.3.

70. Interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97.71. J. Darmody, “I’m in trouble - then crash. Navy pilot, RAAF

man killed”, in The Age,12/10/67, p.3.72. ibid.73. “Officer Commanding’s Report”, Headquarters RAAF

Laverton, October 1963, Headquarters RAAF Laverton, UnitHistory Sheets, Volume 2, Feb 63 - Jan 67.

74. ibid.75. W. H. Brook, Demon to Vampire: The story of No 21 (City of

Melbourne) Squadron,p.224.76. ibid.77. A. Stephens, Going Solo,Canberra, AGPS, 1995, pp. 45,327.78. W. H. Brook, Demon to Vampire: The Story of No 21 (City of

Melbourne) Squadron,p.260.79. ibid, pp.286-287, RAAF Base Laverton Open Day Brochure,

17/3/85, p.29, R J Cooksey, Report to the Minister forDefence, “Review of Australia’s Defence Facilities”,Canberra, AGPS, 1988, p.209 and interview with AirCommodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97.

80. SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft Depot: From thebeginning,Laverton, RAAF Publications Unit, 1994,pp.32,33.

81. ibid, p.33 and RAAF Base Laverton Open Day Brochure,17/3/85, p.16.

82. SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft Depot: From thebeginning,p.41.

83. ibid, p.39.84. A. Stephens, Going Solo,Canberra, AGPS, 1985, p.393 and

SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft Depot: From thebeginning,p.60.

85. SQNLDR R. Christensen, No 1 Aircraft Depot: From thebeginning, p.60.

86. A. Stephens, Going Solo, p.434.* The Aircraft PerformanceUnit (APU) became the Aircraft Research and DevelopmentUnit (ARDU) in September 1947.

87. Summary of Events (for April 1946), No 1 AircraftPerformance Unit, Operations Record Book, Laverton, p.63.

88. A. Stephens, Going Solo,p.437 and Summary of Events, (forNovember 1945), No 1 Aircraft Performance Unit, OperationsRecord Book, Laverton, p.55.

89. A. Stephens, Going Solo,Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.434,Interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97, andinterview with Group Captain John Baker, 22/5/97.

90. A. Stephens, Going Solo,p.447.91. Interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97 and with

Group Captain J. Baker, 22/5/97.92. Interview with Group Captain (Ret) R. Gretton, 17/5/97.93. R.J. Cooksey, Report to the Minister of Defence, “Review of

Australia’s Defence Facilities”, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p.210.94. ibid, p.207, Interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook,

3/5/97 and Group Captain (Ret) R. Gretton, 17/5/97.95. Interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97.96. ibid.97 A. Stephens, Going Solo, p.158.98. ibid.

99. Interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97.100. Consultative Committee on the Future use of Defence

Property – RAAF Williams at Laverton and Point Cook,September 1992, p.1.

101.ibid.102.ibid, Recommendations, “Term of Reference IV”, p.7.103.ibid, “Summary of Committee Activities”, p.2.104.ibid.105.ibid, p.3.106.ibid, and interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97.107. Consultative Committee on the Future Use of Defence

Property at RAAF Williams Laverton and Point Cook,September 1992, Annex G, G2-G3 Table 1: Laverton. *Thisupdate also outlined the Defence Position in terms of PointCook Base’s future use.

108.ibid.109.ibid, Annex G.110. “RAAF on the move: Mayor in Battle for Airfields”,in

Werribee Times,19/8/92, front page and “Council looks atAirfield options”, in Werribee Banner, 19/8/92, front page.

111. N. Protyniak, “RAAF base boost”, in Werribee Banner,15/2/95, front page.

112. “Report of the DER, Future Directions for the Management ofAustralia’s Defence”, Secretariat Papers, Canberra, DirectorPublishing Visual Communications, 1997, p.250.

113. A. Stephens. Going Solo,Canberra, AGPS, 1995, pp.50,51.114. R.J. Cooksey, Report to the Minister for Defence, Review of

Australia’s Defence Facilities, Canberra, AGPS, 1988, p.208115.ibid, pp.207, 271, Appendix 2, “Visits to Defence Facilities”.116. A. Underwood, “RAAF ready in South to defend the North”,

in The Courier Mail, 10/5/54, p.2 and D. Schulz, “The BigPush North”, The Bulletin, 19/11/96, p.28.

117.ibid.118.ibid.119. R.J. Cooksey, Report to the Minister of Defence, “Review of

Australia’s Defence Facilities”, p.158. 120. Interview with Air Commodore I. Ashbrook, 3/5/97 and

supplementary information, dated 23/5/97 provided by AirCommodore I. Ashbrook.

121.ibid.122.ibid.123.ibid.124.ibid.125. R.J. Cooksey, Report to the Minister of Defence, “Review of

Australia’s Defence Facilities”, pp.207, 210.126. A. Stephens, Going Solo,Canberra, AGPS, 1995, p.434 and

interview with Group Captain J. Baker 22/5/97.127. R.J. Cooksey, Report to the Minister of Defence, “Review of

Australia’s Defence Facilities” p.207.128. SQNLDR D. J. Mazlin (ed), “1997 Air Force: Preparing for

the Future” Booklet, Canberra, Graphic Services, 1997, p.18and Report to the Minister for Defence, “Force StructureReview”, May, 1991, Canberra, AGPS, 1991, p.39.

129. SQNLDR D.J. Mazlin (ed), “1997 Air Force: Preparing forthe Future” Booklet, p.20.

130. Report to the Minister for Defence, “Force Structure Review”,p.31.

131. Interview with OC, RAAF Base Williams, Group Captain D.McCardle, 6/4/97.

132.ibid.133.ibid.134. M. Dunlevy, “Vintage Airfield offers unzoned land sell-off”,

in The Weekend Australian, 15/2/97, Property p.5.135.ibid.136. ibid. and oral interview with O.C. Williams, Group Captain

D. McCardle, 6/4/97.


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Courier Mail, 10/5/54.Williams, Sir Richard, These are Facts,Canberra, AGPS, 1977

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the immeasurable assistanceprovided by: those whom I interviewed, the staff of the pastHeadquarters Logistics Command, and individuals such as SteveWright and within the RAAF Museum, Point Cook, DavidGardner and Monica Walsh.

Melissa Weller graduated from Monash University in 1996 with a Bachelor of Arts (European Studies) Degree. Melissa works on avolunteer basis at the RAAF Museum, Point Cook. She has a keen interest in research and military history, the latter largelyattributable to a strong air force family background.

BITTER WATERS: Life and Work in Stalin’sRussia.Gennady Andreev-Khomiakov, Ann E.Healy (Translator). Westview Press, Colorado,1997, pp.224.Reviewed by Major Darren Kerr

In the late 1920s, Josef Stalin began a colossalsocial engineering project to transform the SovietUnion’s largely rural and illiterate society into that ofa modern industrial state with a powerful armsindustry. This project would bring about the birth ofthe modern Soviet state, a state which would rise tobe a world superpower before disintegrating under itsown internal problems. However, it would be a birthaccompanied by untold suffering among the Sovietpeople.

Bitter Waters: Life and Work in Stalin’s Russiaisan autobiographical account of life in the first twodecades of Stalin’s rule. Gennady Andreev-Khomiakov was a writer of short stories who wassentenced in 1927 to 10 years in the Gulag for“counter-revolutionary activities”. He was released in1935 and obtained a job in the forest industry, aposition in which he would experience first-hand thecorruption, inefficiency and brutality which was somuch a part of the Stalinist era. Captured by theGermans during the Second World War, he did notreturn to the Soviet Union at the war’s end. Rather, hestayed in West Germany (later moving to the UnitedStates) where he wrote this book and several otherautobiographical pieces. During his lifetime (he diedin 1984), his works were only published for theRussian emigre community. Bitter Watersis the firstof his works to be translated into English.

Bitter Waters is a fascinating, albeit occasionallydifficult, read. Andreev-Khomiakov writes withhonesty, humour, energy and insight. His observationson Stalinist society reveal much on how the systemdid or didn’t work – and how the cunning andresourceful could work around it to achieve realoutcomes. It was a system that set unrealistic goalsand brutally punished those who failed to achievethem, the only option was ingenuity, dishonesty andmanipulation. Andreev-Khomiakov writes of a periodof which many outsiders have heard much but ofwhich few can truly comprehend. A time in whichincredible development occurred, but at the cost ofmassive waste – both of material and of lives.

While Andreev-Khomiakov is telling his story, heis actually speaking for those who had no voice. Hereveals clearly the love that Russians feel for theirland – his poetic descriptions of the steppes arememorable – but also the distress that was felt bymany Russians at what amounted to no more than arape of the land in the name of development.

While the book covers a distressing period inRussian history, Andreev-Khomiakov manages to fillthe book with vibrant humour. Similar to many of thebest Australian POW books, bleak and painfulmoments are defeated by the stoicism and good-nature of those who would otherwise have no choicebut to curl up and die. In the final analysis, this is apositive book about the inner-strength of theindividual who can rise above brutality and hardshipas long as they retain their humanity in the face of asystem that would dehumanise them.

A very worthwhile read.

CLOSE QUARTER BATTLE by Mike Curtis,published by Transworld Publishers 40 Yeo StreetNeutral Bay NSW 2089, RRP $39.95, 395 pp witheight double pages of photos in colour, no maps.Complete glossary at end of book, in hardcoverwith dust jacket in colour.Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant (Retd) H.S. BrennanRFD JP

After receiving and before reading this book myfirst thoughts were that here was another personalaccount of one man’s experiences in the S.A.S. as Ihad already read both Bravo Two Zeroby AndyMcNab and Stand By – Stand Byby Chris Ryan,however it did not take long to realise that MikeCurtis has given us a description of Specialised ArmyService in much more detail than either of the othertwo books which would fall into the same category.

Close Quarter Battlegives the reader acomprehensive insight into Curtis’s early life as a coalminer in Wales and goes into great detail to describehis lifestyle before joining the British Army and beingaccepted into 2 Parachute Regiment initially where hesaw service in the Falklands War, followed byvarious stints in other trouble spots throughout theworld. To me it would appear that the author carried adiary with him as his description of militaryengagements appear in minute detail whether it is in

Book Reviews

training or during actual active service, it wouldappear that in reading the book his narrative is not justfrom memory.

On leaving the Parachute Regiment and beingsuccessful in joining the S.A.S. his Service careercovered many operations including the jungles ofSouth America and deserts of Africa, the invasion ofKuwait by Saddam Hussein which action is coveredat some length and mention is made of the loss ofS.A.S. Members under the control of Andy McNab.

Mike Curtis describes in great detail the training ofS.A.S. personnel both in Britain and overseas in jointoperations with the Americans and Norwegian peoplebut throughout the book he does not fail to refer to hisparents and his wife and two daughters which indicatesthat he was not only a professional soldier but also afamily man with consideration for his close relatives.

In my opinion the book is well worth obtainingand reading as the author’s style makes the storyinteresting from start to finish and I would express theopinion that the book is a valuable asset to anyoneinterested in S.A.S. training and operations and Iwould compliment Mike Curtis for the job he hasdone by putting it all down on paper and composing avery interesting account of his and his fellow soldiersexploits during their period of service.

KOKODA TRAIL – A WALK IN THEIRFOOTSTEPS by Andrew J. Stone, published byAustralian Military History Publications13 Veronica Place LOFTUS NSW 2232.In paperback format with coloured frontispiece102 pages, numerous photographs and map withlocation index at back. Priced at $20.00 includingpostage from the PublisherReviewed by Flight Lieutenant (Retd) H.S. BrennanRFD JP

This little book, and that only refers to the size notthe scope and detail covered by the author, is a resultof an adventure training trek along the old originalKokoda Trail used by Australian Servicemen duringthe 1935-45 War and retraversed by Andrew Stoneand 19 other currently serving members of theAustralian Army including a father and daughtercombination.

The book is broken up into 20 chapters coveringtheir arrival at Port Moresby then each segment of the

trek and finishing up with the travel back home, plusa Preface and Epilogue and several characterreferences of some of the participants. ReadingAndrew Stones’ accounts of the trek makes onerealise just how much circumstances have changedsince the cessation of hostilities in 1945, as it wouldappear that the local inhabitants of the area made theAustralians most welcome wherever they passedthrough or stopped at a village en route. Because itwas a walking tour each person had to carry their ownessential supplies of food in the form of ArmyCombat Rations plus other necessities and as Andrewwas the official medic he also had medical supplies tocarry. According to the narrative they only had oneresupply drop during the trek covering 18 days, thiswas by plane which landed and disgorged packedrations etc., instead of war-time parachute dropswhich may or may not have landed in the approvedarea, however from the authors’ description of thetrack and the jungle climate the changes have notbeen very great, the biggest change being the lack ofhostilities. Apparently once used weapon pits are stillvisible even after 50 years, I would have thought thatwith the rapidity of jungle growth nothing wouldhave been left but it would add to the interest ofanyone contemplating a similar trip.

Counting the cover photograph there are 47illustrations including a map, personal photographs orphotographs taken during the trek. Included in these isa photograph of the War Cemetery at Bomanasituated about 30 kms from Port Moresby andcontaining the earthly remains of Australians lost inthe 1939-45 War. The Cemetery is apparentlyextremely well kept and this photograph is the first ofthe Cemetery which I have ever seen. The onlycomment which I might make is that it is a pity thesnapshots are in black and white, some of themespecially the Cemetery would have been outstandinghad they been in colour.

From my point of view A Walk In Their Footstepsmakes very interesting reading especially for thosewho have some knowledge of the Kokoda Trail andfor the younger ones who have only heard about itfrom their fathers or grandfathers. At the price of$20.00 it is a very economical buy and well worthkeeping. I recommend the book without reservation.


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