nigeria’s ‘megaphone diplomacy’ and south africa’s...

Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 2, December, 2013.

Nigeria’s ‘Megaphone Diplomacy’ and South Africa’s

‘Quiet Diplomacy’: A Tale of Two Eras

Chidozie Felix C. 1

Agbude Godwin A. 2

&

Oni Samuel 3

1Department of Political Science and International Relations,

School of Social Sciences, College of Development Studies,

Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State Nigeria. [email protected]



Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State Nigeria.



Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State Nigeria.

Abstract: Nigeria, under Murtala/Obasanjo regime was widely acknowledged to have adopted

an overtly active foreign policy toward the rest of Africa, and particularly, South Africa‟s

apartheid regime, which was in tandem with her Afro-centric posturing at the time. This

multilateral cum bilateral diplomatic relations earned Nigeria the status of a „frontline state‟ and

wider recognition at other multilateral levels, but much animosity from the West. South Africa,

under Mbeki regime was acknowledged to have adopted an overtly active foreign policy relation

toward the rest of Africa, but covert diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe, which was in tandem

with her African-renaissance posturing at the time. This multilateral cum bilateral diplomatic

relations earned South Africa the status of a „backline state‟ and further diminution at the global

stage. Nigeria and South Africa are arguably perceived as regional hegemons in Africa, whose

national interest vacillate between cooperation and conflict. The fate of contemporary Africa,

however, rest on the convergence of these ambivalence of interests. The work adopts the realist

framework of analysis to interrogate the permutations of Nigeria and South Africa diplomatic

trajectories at the periods under investigation. Furthermore, comparative analysis is applied to

the discourse with a view to placing the analysis within theoretical context. The understanding of

the diplomatic calculations that governed these two eras and their implications for contemporary

Nigeria/South Africa relations vis-a-vis African politics is instrumental. Ultimately, the fact that

these diplomatic permutations played out within the context of the international economic

capitalism makes the analysis more interesting.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Megaphone Diplomacy, Quiet Diplomacy, Foreign Direct

Investment

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INTRODUCTION

Nigeria and South Africa are two

potential giants and powerful African

states. Both are uniquely located

within Africa to respond to the

global challenges that are unfolding

for the continent in the new century.

The tremendous phenomenal

changes that started evolving in the

global system since the beginning of

the 1990s, including the

democratization process that

commenced in the South African

racist enclave, have had a significant

bearing on relations between the two

countries and constitute a watershed

for bilateral relations between them.

This consciousness is jointly shared

by the two countries and has

continually defined and redefined

their relationships within the global

politics (Onimode, 1999).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research adopts a critical

conversational method which

involves literature review, histo-

empirical analysis, critical

conceptual clarification and analysis.

As a way of exhausting the content

of this research topic, the literature

review affords us the opportunity of

laying bare the concepts of

Megaphone diplomacy and Quiet

diplomacy of the two countries

within the purview of our intellectual

interrogation. The histo-empirical

analysis affords us the opportunity of

grounding this discourse on the

empirical facts surrounding the

foreign policies of these two

countries rather than mere abstract

pontifications. Critical conceptual

clarification and analysis is

necessary in ensuring that we do not

escape into the world intellectual

irresponsibility by disengaging those

that are not familiar with issues in

Political Science and International

Relations. Thus, there will be clear

clarifications of the concepts that

formed the bases of our discourse. In

other words, this research adopts a

qualitative method relying mainly on

secondary data.

NIGERIA AND SOUTH

AFRICA: A CRITICAL

DISCOURSE

Since its independence in 1960,

Nigeria has been in the forefront of

African and global politics.

Although, the country initially tried

to maintain an independent identity,

it did not pursue an independent

course. Rather, it was actively

pursuing a pro-Western policy

especially during the First Republic

(1960-1966). All that changed,

during consequent events in global

politics that demanded a more

assertive role for Nigeria, in

liberating other African countries

from the clutches of colonialism and

white supremacist regimes. This

redefinition of roles by Nigeria in

African politics was clearly marked

by the posturing and perceptions of

the successive military regimes

which had wrested power from the

more conservative regimes of the

immediate post-independent era.

Thus, Nigeria‟s perception as the

„giant‟ of Africa and its almost

altruistic commitment to the growth,

development, peace and security of

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the African States conferred on her a

leadership position in Africa (Ogwu,

1999).

In essence, among the military

regimes which held power at the

period of decolonisation, the most

active was the Murtala-Obasanjo

regime of the 1966-1970. In driving

the course of decolonization, the

Murtala-Obsanjo regime did not

involve in rhetoric, but actually

deployed all military and diplomatic

arsenal at the disposal of the state to

thwart the anti-decolonisation

policies of the west and secure

independence for Rhodesia (now

Zimbabwe) and Namibia, while

placing the issue of South Africa‟s

apartheid on the international

agenda. According to Joseph Garba,

the primacy of apartheid on the

foreign policy agenda under

Murtala/Obasanjo could not be

overemphasized. He argued thus:

No other foreign policy issue

has pre-occupied Nigerian

governments more since our

independence in 1960.

Nigeria has made friends with

countries with whom she has

nothing in common; she has

conversely made enemies of

erstwhile friends- all on

account of their attitude

towards the South African

question. We have formulated

economic policies that have

sometimes been detrimental

to our own development

because of our commitment to

the eradication of apartheid

(Garba, 1987:101).

The commitment to the course of the

liberation of South Africa, earned

Nigeria the status of a front-line

state, even though she shares no

geographical proximity with the

South African region (Ogunsanwo,

1986; Akinboye, 2013) and

consequently, commendations at

multilateral stages. Paradoxically,

the gains in the decolonisation

process engendered by Nigeria

through her active Afro-centrism

earned her much hatred from the

west leading to strains in her foreign

policy relations with the latter.

The extent of South Africa‟s

influence and involvement in Africa

and global politics is comparatively

less than that of Nigeria. This is

understandable. For several years,

South Africa was a pariah state due

to its apartheid system. The

obnoxious policy had been in place

for over four decades. It remained in

existence until the early 1990s when

a process of democratisation was

initiated by the last apartheid

President, Fredrick de Klerk, and the

country began to parley with other

states in the global system

(Akinboye, 2005). However, since

the dismantlement of apartheid and

entrenchment of a democratic setting

in 1994, South Africa has been fully

engaged in African and global

affairs. The successive regimes in

South Africa have been instrumental

in the more robust activities of the

African Union (A.U),

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Commonwealth of Nations and the

United Nations (U.N). The post

apartheid South Africa has

continually asserted their hegemonic

influence within the Southern

African Development Community

(SADC), participating actively in

peace keeping efforts, especially in

Burundi and Democratic Republic of

Congo (DRC) (Alao, 1998; Pfister,

2000; Habib, 2008).

The active and influential personality

of Thabo Mbeki, who succeeded

Nelson Mandela as the second

president of the post-apartheid South

Africa best exemplifies the tempo

characteristic of the post-apartheid

foreign policy of South Africa. Some

scholars have recognised the unique

challenges facing the immediate

post-apartheid South Africa such as

democratic consolidation, socio-

economic disparity, rampaging

effects of HIV/AIDS, land-based

issues, gender-based divisions, and

deep racial cleavages; which

understandably occupied the

attention of the Nelson Mandela

administration and which also

informed the defensive foreign

policy of his regime (Ala, 2003;

Landsberg, 2005; Mazrui, 2006).

But following Thabo Mbeki‟s

coming in 1999 as the successor to

Nelson Mandela; he chose instead to

actively and dominantly stamp South

Africa‟s foreign policy on a regional

and global stage. With deft

diplomatic collaboration with

Obasanjo‟s Nigeria and Wade‟s

Senegal, Mbeki was able to initiate

the birth of New Partnership for

Africa‟s Development (NEPAD),

which consequently led to the

transformation of Organisation of

Africa‟s Unity (OAU) to AU in

2002. In view of these bilateral cum

multilateral moves, Mbeki left no

one in doubt about his government‟s

determination to jettison the

conservative and defensive

diplomatic approach of his

predecessor (Adebajo and

Landsberg, 2003).

It therefore, came as a surprise to the

international community to notice

the conservative approach with

which South Africa treated her

bilateral relations with Zimbabwe on

the heels of the legitimacy question

in the latter. A number of conjectures

have been postulated by theorists and

analysts to explain the bilateral

trajectories of South Africa‟s Mbeki

and Zimbabwe‟s Mugabe, which

incidentally are not within the

confines of this paper. But it is

important to observe that the

continual defiance of the

international outcry against the

leadership crisis in Zimbabwe on the

heels of the post-election crisis

earned South Africa massive

condemnation in the international

community, leaving Mbeki with

credibility questions, copiously

painted by the west. As earlier

mentioned in the abstract, the

patronising approach of Mbeki to the

Zimbabwe question may not be un-

connected to his African-renaissance

philosophy which dotted every line

in his foreign policy agenda

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(Landsberg, 2003, Chikane, 2012;

Chikane, 2013).

It is against this background that this

paper interrogates the issues

involved in the two eras under

investigation and their implications

for Africa‟s development. The issues

are placed within the context of the

international capitalist environment

within which the regimes operated.

After the introductory part of this

paper, the second section

conceptualises realism as a

theoretical approach in diplomacy.

Following in the third section, the

Murtala-Obasanjo regime is

highlighted with special emphasis on

the activism that informed the mega-

phone diplomacy of the era. The

fourth section interrogates the

conservatism that characterised the

quiet diplomacy of Mbeki in

Zimbabwe. An attempt will be made

consequently to bridge the gaps in

analysis by a systematic and

comparative approach in the fifth

section. Finally, the concluding

section wraps up the discourse.

REALISM AND DIPLOMACY:

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

The field of international relations is

laden with concepts which are best

described as contentious and worst

as vague depending on the view

point of the scholar. This

problematic usually comes to play in

an attempt to conceptualise terms in

the cause of scientific investigations.

Therefore, defining diplomacy and

realism will not substantially defer

from this difficulty in the discipline.

Martin Griffiths, in his attempt to

deconstruct the concept of realism

from the traditional polarisation of

the term, usually when being

compared to idealism, voiced this

growing concern in a rather poignant

way. According to him, one of the

difficulties of treating realism as

clear-cut school of thought is that its

representatives differ vastly in the

way they use the assumptions which

are said to define the school in the

first place. For this and other

reasons, he argued, there is not even

a derivative consensus on how to

define realism beyond a few broad

assumptions about the importance of

states as actors, the institutionally

anarchic environment within which

states co-exist, and hence the

importance of power as the master

variable to explain broad patterns of

states‟ interactions. He concludes

that at this level of generality,

realism is simply a set of

assumptions about the world rather

than a particular theory, let alone

anything so pretentious as a

scientific paradigm (Griffiths, 1992).

Ultimately, how one understands and

evaluates realism in international

relations depends a great deal on

whether one views it as a

philosophical disposition, a scientific

paradigm, a mere framework of

analysis, a testable explanatory

theory of international politics, or an

ideology of great power

conservatism (op.cit, 1992). Off

course, there are many other attempts

to define realism more rigorously

and narrowly so that it may be

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compared to and evaluated against

competing schools of thought. The

works of Hans Morgenthau

exemplified the best traditions of

realism. The core of Morgenthau‟s

thesis is that realism is based on

interest defined in terms of power.

Based on this, he posits that foreign

policy built on any other thing but

national interest is bound to fail

(Morgenthau, 1951).

Realism maintains that universal

moral principles cannot be applied to

the actions of states in abstraction,

but that they must be filtered through

the concrete circumstances of time

and space. It believes that the world,

as imperfect as it is from the rational

point of view, is the result of forces

which are inherent in human nature.

To improve the world, one must

work with these forces, not against

them. This being inherently a world

of opposing interests and of conflict

among them, moral principles can

never be fully realised but at best

approximated through the ever-

temporary balancing of interests and

the ever-precarious settlement of

conflicts. It aims at achievement of a

lesser evil rather than of the absolute

good (Johari, 2009; 186).

Diplomacy on the other hand has an

intricate conceptual link with the

concept of realism. This is not far-

fetched because the traditional

representatives of countries who are

diplomats have a primary objective,

among others which is to protect,

preserve and project the national

interest of their countries. Viewed

from this stand-point, one may, at the

risk of reaching premature

conclusion, tie the concept of

diplomacy to realism in a technical

sense. In its simplistic analytical

understanding therefore, diplomacy

is the planning and management of

relations between nations by the

representatives of a country abroad;

it also means at a lower level, skill or

art of dealing with people or

situation (Nwolise, 1998). In

international affairs, diplomacy

entails the combination of political

skills and method, particularly

negotiation, give and take strategy,

and subtle threats, for the conduct

and management of bilateral

relations between two states and

multilateral relations among three or

more states (Akindele, 2007).

At a higher intellectual level

however, diplomacy can be viewed

within the context of institutional

mechanisms for fostering

international relations through the

instrumentality of the diversity of

international actors, having the state

as the primary actor. According to

Amstutz, diplomacy can be seen as

the process by which states and other

international actors pursue official

international relations, reconciling

competing and conflicting interests

through negotiations (Amstutz,

1995). Following this

conceptualisation, it becomes

important to note at this juncture

that, with the wave of globalisation

which has implications for state and

non-state relations within the larger

dynamics of the international

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environment, the field of diplomacy

cannot be restricted to state actors

alone, but involves other non-state

actors, some of which have

constituted great threats to, indeed,

subverted the sovereignty of states.

In essence, the steadily escalating

tempo of globalisation has

dramatically and welcomingly added

value to, as well as increased the

prominence of, multilateralism as a

channel for the conduct of modern

diplomacy, without ignoring

fundamentally, the historically

preeminent position of bilateralism

as an approach to the conduct of

foreign policy and management of

the inter-state relations (Akindele,

2007).

According to Rafiu Akindele, any

attempt to dichotomize the concepts

of multilateralism and bilateralism,

either as competing approaches to or

as parallel steams in the conduct of

external relations, quite obviously

ignores or, at least, trivialises the

essential linkages and mutual

interdependence between them. He

argued that just as the processes of

multilateral diplomacy that are

neither prefaced by, nor anchored to,

a simultaneous series of bilateral

contacts and consultation among

nation-states drain themselves of

creative wisdom and professional

sagacity essential for diplomatic

success, the management of bilateral

diplomatic relations that does not

take cognisance of the

interpenetration of multilateralism

and bilateralism in the conduct of

foreign policy begins the journey in

the diplomatic arena with an opaque

vision, a false start and on the wrong

foot (Akindele, 2007). This position

essentially explains why the

approach in this essay avoids the

strict bifurcation of these two

elements of diplomacy in comparing

the „mega-phone diplomacy‟ of the

Murtala-Obasanjo regime in Nigeria

and the „quiet diplomacy‟ of the

Mbeki administration, but rather is

geared toward the combination of

their intricacies to make for a more

robust analytical framework.

Hans Morgenthau, in what appears to

be a welding of the bridge that might

otherwise divide the concepts of

diplomacy and realism, perceives

diplomacy as the act of bringing

different elements of national power

to bear with maximum effect upon

those points in international situation

which concern the national interest

most directly. In bringing the

relevance of diplomacy to bear on

the management of a country‟s

foreign policy through the projection

of her national interest, Morgenthau

asserted that „it is the brain of

national power, as national morale is

it soul; if its vision is blurred, its

judgment defective, and its

determination feeble, all the

advantages of geographical location,

of self-sufficiency in food, raw

materials, and industrial production,

of military preparedness, of size and

quality of population will in the long

run avail a nation little‟

(Morgenthau, 1966).

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In this context, diplomacy could be

viewed as the instrument that

harmonises or synchronises all the

other components of national power

of every nation to make it produce

maximally in her foreign policy

relations, hence it is safe to

technically merge the concepts of

diplomacy and realism within a

reasonable intellectual limit. By and

large, if time and history are

important shapers of diplomatic

relations, human actors, particularly

leaders, are the key instrumentalities

and vehicles through which the

contours of diplomatic landscape are

designed, dug and cultivated, or

truncated (Akindele, 2007).

It is indeed true, that national

resource endowment for the conduct

of foreign policy is a key national

asset. But arguably as important, if

not more so, is the use to which

national resource capacity is put and

managed by leaders who control the

affairs of the state at any particular

time. This poignantly situates the

context of our analyses to leadership

styles in the two eras under

investigation. Put another way, the

vision and mission of the leadership

styles of Murtala-Obasanjo of

Nigeria (1976-1979) and Mbeki of

South Africa (1999-2008) within the

organic processes of history best

explains the policies adopted by

these leaders and or the outcome of

such policies. We now turn our

attention to the regimes under

investigation.

MURTALA-OBASANJO AND

NIGERIA’S MEGAPHONE

DIPLOMACY

The Murtala/Obasanjo era was

basically a military regime which

reflected in the nature and character

of decision making, especially as it

related to foreign policy making. The

style of the administration in

decision making was that of

command structure. There was no

element of bargaining and persuasion

usually associated with democracy.

Besides, the policies of Obasanjo

who succeeded Murtala Muhammed

was of incremental nature, which

explains why the period under

review is generally referred to in

many literatures as

Murtala/Obasanjo era (Ajala, 1986;

Garba, 1987). Nevertheless, the

Murtala-Obasanjo era in the conduct

of Nigeria‟s multilateral diplomacy

has been widely acknowledged as

the golden era of Nigeria‟s foreign

policy (Fafowora, 1984; Ajala, 1992;

Garba, 1987; Saliu, 2006,). It is

common knowledge that Nigeria‟s

component of national power with

careful and skillful combination of

leadership vision connived to bring

Nigeria‟s diplomacy of this era into

international limelight.

The Murtala Muhammed brief but

exciting government (1975-1976)

that succeeded the more cautious

Gowon administration was, right

from the outset, prepared to take

radical measures in both the

domestic and foreign affairs. The

goal of the administration was the

total liberation of the continent of

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Africa from every vestige of

colonialism, imperialism and racism

which informed her Afro-centric

foreign policy. Indeed, Murtala

sought to move the country‟s foreign

policy towards a more genuinely

non-aligned position. The immediate

demonstration of her determination

at eradication of all forms of

discrimination against Africans was

the authorisation for the opening of

offices for the freedom fighters in

Africa in the capital, Lagos, which

was hitherto an impossible task by

the preceding administration of

Gowon. Owing to this, massive

military, material and money

supports were granted to the freedom

fighters in an unprecedented

dimension (Ajala, 1986).

In any case, the most widely

acknowledged diplomatic effort of

this administration was the open

support and recognition granted to

the Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

government in Angola against the

joint coalition of National Front for

the Liberation of Angola (FLNA)

and National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola (UNITA) in

view of the latter‟s alliance with the

racist regime of South Africa and

other western powers to mount a

military operation against the former,

irrespective of the effort in the offing

by Nigeria and other African states

under the instrumentality of the then

Organisation of African Unity

(OAU) to form a government of

National Unity in Angola. No doubt,

this action was hailed in Nigeria as

singularly the most daring and

responsible foreign policy decision

taken by the Nigerian government

since independence (Ajala, 1986;

Ajala, 1993; Akinboye, 2013).

The Obasanjo regime (1976-1979)

which succeeded the Murtala

administration following the

assassination of General Murtala in

an abortive coup attempt, not only

continued with the laudable policies

begun by the Murtala administration

but also adopted an open-door policy

for African exiles from Southern

Africa. It also embarked on various

man-power training programmes in

Nigeria for people from Southern

Africa. One of the most laudable

attempts at institutionalising the

struggle against apartheid in South

Africa adopted by the Obasanjo

regime was the introduction of the

Southern African Relief Fund

(SARF) which was officially

launched in December, 1976 (Garba,

1987).

Among other objectives, the primary

aim of the SARF was to generate

resources to assist the victims of the

Southern African oppressive policies

through education, healthcare and

nutrition, and ultimately to put more

funds in the hands of the freedom

fighters to hasten the quick exit of

the racist regimes in Southern Africa.

In line with this policy, the Obasanjo

administration, in a bid to continue

with the massive decolonisation

agenda of his predecessor, moved

swiftly to take advantage of the post-

election dilemma in Rhodesia (now

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Zimbabwe), to secure independence

for the latter. The Obasanjo

administration, through the

deployment of appropriate tools of

diplomacy, by way of nationalisation

of the British Petroleum share of

Shell BP in which the British

government had an interest,

prompted the Lancaster House

Constitutional Conference that

worked out the constitution for an

independent Zimbabwe. Nigeria

provided both Zimbabwe African

National Union (ZANU) and

Zimbabwe African People‟s Union

(ZAPU) with substantial sum of

money in order to fight the pre-

independence elections successfully

(Ajala, 1986).

However, the most remarkable credit

to the administration of Obasanjo in

the fight against racism, and by

implication, the singular most

relevant event that stamped the issue

of racism on the international agenda

is the initiation of and consequent

hosting of a World Conference for

Action Against Apartheid in 1977,

under the pioneering influence of the

country‟s long-term chairmanship of

the UN‟s Special Committee against

Apartheid. The conference was not

only a galvanisation, for the first

time of people at the grassroots from

United States, Europe and Australia,

but had in attendance the most vocal

dignitary-fighters against racism as

well as the opinion shapers in the

Nigerian domestic environment

(Garba, 1987).

Among other immediate and long-

term outcomes of the conference,

two very significant ones deserve

attention at this point: one was the

recommendation to set up the World

Campaign against Military and

Nuclear Collaboration with South

Africa, which helped tremendously

to curb the military and nuclear

excesses of the then racist regime in

South Africa with their international

military-industrial accomplices; and

second, was the November, 1977

Security Council Resolution 418,

imposing a mandatory embargo on

the export of arms to South Africa,

invoking for the first time in this

context Chapter V11, designating the

racial situation in South Africa a

threat to international peace and

security (Garba, 1987).

Indeed, the basic feature

characteristic of the Murtala-

Obasanjo regime as enunciated

above is the dominant trace of

activism in their bilateral and

multilateral diplomacy through their

policy of Afro-centrism, without any

form of contradictions. What became

evident as well was the antagonism

and unpopularity attracted by this

approach especially against the

western powers, whose interest in the

African politics was never disguised.

The struggle was for the soul of the

African state, even though the human

elements were at the centre of the

issues, and the stake was the

economic determinism of the

western capitalist ideology prevalent

in the international economic system.

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MBEKI AND THE QUIET

DIPLOMACY IN ZIMBABWE

At the centre of international

criticism of South Africa‟s policy

towards Zimbabwe during the

administration of Mbeki is its „quite

diplomacy‟. Quite diplomacy is

defined as a combination of

measures that includes behind the

scene engagements, secret

negotiations, and subtle coaxing; it

also comprises the protection of the

target state from external criticism

and the provision of a life-line in

terms of international economic

relations. This involves, above all,

personal or direct diplomacy

between the heads of state or senior

officials and persistent negotiations,

yet also leaves the appearance of

limited action or even inaction (Prys,

2007; Chikane, 2012).

In the case of Zimbabwe this

manifested itself by keeping in

regular contact with President

Mugabe and by actively assisting the

Zimbabwean government through

facilitation of communication

between the Movement for

Democratic Change (MDC) and the

government particularly after the

failed referendum in 2000, and both

presidential and parliamentary

elections. Also, links with

international financial institutions

were encouraged, and Zimbabwean

acceptance of certain proposal of the

United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) on land reform

was generally regarded to be the

indirect result of South Africa‟s

diplomatic initiatives (Prys, 2007).

Quiet diplomacy epitomises the

principle of constructive engagement

which embodies the foreign policy

relations between nations that share

common interest as demonstrated in

South Africa and Zimbabwe case

under a common sub-regional

platform of Southern African

Development Community (SADC).

According to Jo-Ansie Van Wyk,

quiet diplomacy is itemised as non-

coercive diplomatic measures and

non-violent strategies such as

international appeals (moral

persuasion to conflicting parties),

fact finding missions, observer

teams, bilateral negotiations, third

party informal diplomatic

consultations, track two diplomacy

(by non-official, non-governmental

parties), third party mediation,

conciliatory gestures and economic

assistance (Wyk, 2002).

In furtherance to the above, South

Africa also followed development

and governance approaches such as

policies to promote national

economic and social development

via continued economic trade and

Zimbabwe‟s economic integration in

the region as well as recommending

economic reforms and standards.

Added to the list is that South Africa

upheld all bilateral cooperative

agreements and programmes

between them and attempted to

promulgate and enforce human

rights, democratic and other

standards via its participation in

monitoring most of Zimbabwe‟s

elections (Wyk, 2002).

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The Zimbabwean crisis has its root

in the agrarian policy or the land

reform policy of the Robert

Mugabe‟s administration against the

western interest in Zimbabwe, but in

reality the crisis has economic origin

which dates back to the 1980s.

During the emerging crisis,

Zimbabwe nevertheless intervened

into the war in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (DRC) with

3,000 troops behind President

Laurent Kabila with further

devastating consequences for the

state budget. This intervention was

largely interpreted to mean an

attempt by President Mugabe to gain

influence over DRC‟s wealth of

natural resources to assist in

revamping her ailing and moribund

economy. All these eventually set the

pace for the grave consequences that

accompanied the aftermath of the

presidential and parliamentary

elections in 2002 and 2005

respectively, the rise of the MDC,

led by Prime Minister Morgan

Tsvangirai as a formidable

opposition to the government-led

political party, Zimbabwe African

National Union- Patriotic Front

(ZANU-PF), and the emergence of

political stalemate that became a

protracted feature of the

Zimbabwean political landscape

until after the slippery political

compromise that restored a

semblance of order in the polity

(Chikane, 2013).

Many literatures have attempted to

advance the reasons why South

Africa under Mbeki chose quiet

diplomacy over other diplomatic

options in dealing with the

Zimbabwe situation in which case

her core values were threatened and

she risked the loss of reputation at

the international level. In Miriam

Pry‟s exposition, she elaborated on

the reasons behind South Africa‟s

constructive tie with Zimbabwe

using three more specific, both

competing and complementary role

conceptions or themes of the former,

which she identified as; first

misunderstood regional power,

which contains an element of

exceptionalism, second, as African

anti-imperialist state, and third as the

responsible actor facilitating in both

Zimbabwe‟s domestic struggles as

well as its global interaction as

guarantor against the west (Prys,

2007).

What this translates to is that South

Africa‟s role perception in Southern

Africa and by implication in

Zimbabwe emphasise the need that

Zimbabwe is a sovereign country

and therefore its domestic problems

need to be solved by Zimbabwean

themselves; that South Africa,

especially some powerful elements

in the African National Congress

(ANC) sense that there is an

indication of strong perception of

racism and neo-imperialism by

western states in the Zimbabwe

crisis; and finally, that South Africa

has the responsibility to assist

Zimbabwe reconcile her conflicting

groups within the parameters granted

her by the latter. The underpinnings

of the above postulation point very

246


poignantly at the principles of

partnership, sovereignty and African

solidarity as characteristic of the

South Africa constructive

engagement with Zimbabwe.

According to Linda Freeman, the

policy inconsistencies that

characterised the quiet diplomacy of

Mbeki were more deeply rooted in

factors order than the above

sentiments of African solidarity and

African partnership. Freeman argued

that the Southern African

government‟s approach to Zimbabwe

is rooted in continental ambitions,

regional interests and national

imperatives. He argued that one must

therefore, look beyond an analysis

which focuses primarily on the

internal factors which have shaped

policy to include the Mbeki

government‟s vision of South Africa

in Africa and within the changing

global order (Freeman, 2005).

Continental ambition here connotes

South Africa‟s increasing inter-

penetration of the African continent

with her capitalist ambition, re-

enforced by her hegemonic and

dominant status within the continent.

The contradiction that has

continually informed the policies of

the post-apartheid state of South

Africa is how to reconcile her

towering economic status with the

fears of dominance it is likely to

engender in her relations with the

rest of Africa (Alden and Soko,

2005; Hudson, 2007; Alden and

Pere, 2009). Hence, in an address to

the South African parliament in

2003, Thabo Mbeki stated that he

wished “to assure our neighbours

and the peoples of the rest of Africa

that the government we lead has no

great power pretentions. We claim

no right to impose our will on any

independent country. We will not

force anything on anybody” (cited in

Freeman, 2005:13).

The issues of hegemony and

dominance at the continental levels

have been posed even more sharply

at the regional level. There is no

question that, as the giant among a

set of significantly smaller states in

the Southern Africa, South Africa‟s

pre-eminence continues to be the

central structural reality in the

region. Most of the SADC member

states are dependent on the economic

structure already built by the defunct

apartheid South Africa for their

national economic survival. To this

end, the reality of their economic tie

to South Africa will remain a

significant part of the factor that will

continue to shape their relationship

with the country.

Closely allied to these is the national

imperative of the Mbeki

administration to remain committed

to the cause of stabilising the polity

by tactful prevention of a likely

influx of her domestic environment

by any possibility of an implosion in

the neighbouring Zimbabwe. This

explains why the Mbeki

administration steadfastly resisted

the option of armed invasion or

forceful removal of the incumbent

regime in Zimbabwe, but rather

247


continually sought other was of

peaceful transition of power

(Freeman, 2005)

The reaction of the opposition forces

within Zimbabwe, led by MDC

differ fundamentally from the view-

points expressed above believed to

be the force behind Mbeki‟s

constructive engagement with

Zimbabwe. For the domestic

opposition, it is precisely such

questions of human rights,

democracy and the rule of law which

are central to the crisis in which

Zimbabwe is foundering. In their

view, the land reform on which the

government had embarked was less

an attempt to right historical wrongs

than an opportunistic attempt to

regain popular favour in face of the

most serious challenge to its power

since independence. Support for

Mugabe, according to this school of

thought, represents a betrayal of

mass public opinion and backing for

a regime riddled with venality and

corruption (Freeman, 2005). To the

domestic opposition, therefore, to

jettison the possibility of armed

invasion in Zimbabwe by South

African-led force is to tow the path

of un-patriotism and to postpone the

evil days ahead.

The reaction of the Western powers,

if anything to go by, was

antagonistic to the constructive

engagement policy of the South

African government in Zimbabwe.

The recourse to neo-imperialistic

agenda by the Mbeki and Mugabe

governments as the forces behind the

crisis in Zimbabwe was the greatest

source of frustration to the west. The

expectation of the western powers

was that South Africa would assume

a more robust leadership role in the

region where it wields enormous

political and economic powers. In

their view, South Africa‟s quiet

diplomacy is generally considered to

be a failure. In their reasoning, South

Africa had made no direct use of its

potentially hegemonic leverage, had

applied no sanctions or economic

screws to enforce rule of law, free

and fair elections and a commitment

of human rights in Zimbabwe. To the

western powers, what quiet

diplomacy, which they describe as

hypocritical has achieved is simply

to buy time for the embattled regime

of Mugabe to continually plunder the

people of Zimbabwe and jeopardise

western interest in the country

(Chikane, 2013).

The Mbeki government‟s position

never wavered in the heat and

pressure of both domestic and

external attacks. There is no better

way to represent the Mbeki

government‟s position than in a

statement released by Aziz Pahad, a

government official, in the cause of

Presidential Debate on South

Africa‟s Policy in Zimbabwe at the

South African National Assembly.

He argued thus;

Once again we have been

subjected to hysterical

concerns about our so called

failure to tackle the

Zimbabwe issue. We remain

248


convinced that the collapse of

Zimbabwe will have serious

implications for the whole

region and especially South

Africa. Why would we want

this to happen? Our quiet

diplomacy is criticised

without any credible

suggestions on what we

should do more than we are

doing. Our critics fail to

explain what „megaphone

diplomacy‟ has achieved.

They fail or refuse to

acknowledge that since the

politic and economic crisis

started we have been tirelessly

engaged in efforts to help the

Zimbabweans to deal with

their crisis (Pahad, 2003:8)

RESEARCH RESULT

Nigeria’s Megaphone Diplomacy

and South Africa’s Quiet

Diplomacy: Building Conceptual

Synergy

The „megaphone diplomacy‟ of the

Murtala/Obasanjo era in Nigeria‟s

international politics came in the

wake of the African decolonisation

spearheaded by the Nigerian

government. This was made possible

by the structure of the Nigerian state

which was military in orientation.

Two fundamental forces however,

coincided to aid the diplomatic

approach of the Nigerian state during

the Murtala/Obasanjo era. First was

the Cold War politics which was

characterised by unbridled struggle

for power and influence in Africa by

the antagonistic blocks of the West

and the East. The international

environment was very tense at the

time as both the East and the West

were engaged in vile and hostile

propaganda against each other. Both

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) and defunct Warsaw

military blocs of the West and East

respectively had been solidified with

bases in their respective spheres of

influence; each bloc had imposed

restrictions on trade between it and

its friends on the one hand and its

opponents on the other. Each bloc

had embarked on the development of

nuclear weapons as well as indulged

extensively in spying against the

other (Ajala, 1993).

The second factor that aided

Nigeria‟s „megaphone diplomacy‟

during Murtala/Obasanjo era was the

oil politics that yielded enormous

resources to the Nigeria state. At the

time, the clamour and drive for

alternative sources of energy had not

assumed an urgent dimension, and

oil remained the commodity that

dictated the dynamics of the

international politics. Indeed, oil

politics was instrumental to the

decision by the British government

under Margaret Thatcher to yield to

the pressure by the Nigerian state to

nationalise the former‟s share of the

British Petroleum (BP) in Nigeria

and a ten percent cut in oil supply to

that company in the event of the

struggle for the independence of

former Rhodesia (Now Zimbabwe)

in 1979 (Gambari, 2008; Whiteman,

2008).

249


No doubt, the double-edged forces of

cold war politics which permitted

and tolerated dictatorial tendencies,

imposed constraints on the limits of

power in the international system,

down-played the primacy and

supremacy of human rights matters,

and sustained the politics of

compromise and contention for

dominant spheres of influence by the

two ideological blocs on the one

hand; and oil politics which enjoyed

international mercantilist monopoly

of the market forces placed Nigerian

government in a privileged position

in international politics and gave her

the required leverage to dictate

international political outcomes to a

large extent.

The „quiet diplomacy‟ of the Mbeki

administration came in the wake of

African-renaissance- reawakening of

the African consciousness in the

international economic environment,

spearheaded by the South African

government. The South African

government, with her commanding

heights of economic dominance in

the African economic mainstream

had sought through the platform of

New Partnership for Africa‟s

Development (NEPAD), to

reposition Africa in the „New World

Order‟ for sustainable economic

development and favourable

competitive edge among other

comity of nations. This became

necessary in view of the mounting

debt profile of most of the African

states and the donor-fatigue that had

set-in in the area of attracting

Foreign Direct investment, partly

owing to the attention of the

international financiers which had

shifted to the emerging economies of

Asia. For that to be attained, the

philosophy of African solidarity,

partnership and respect for

sovereignty of countries in Africa

had to be implemented (Benneh,

2001; Adebajo and Landsberg,

2003).

We can also identify two

fundamental forces or factors that

appear to have influenced the

constructive engagement policy of

Mbeki‟s administration in the 20th

century politics. The first is the post-

cold war politics which redefined the

scope of international relations and

set new standards for international

businesses, whether state or private

sector and the second is the

globalisation politics, a corollary to

the first, which has both widened the

opportunities and risks for

international engagements.

The collapse of communist

governments in Eastern Europe,

marked most graphically by the fall

of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the

seeming ascendancy of Western-

style liberal democracy and free-

market economic systems, led to a

widespread clamour for more open

political systems and free enterprise.

During this period, the continuing

realities of intra-state conflicts,

increasing poverty, and social

disintegration ravaging the continent

of Africa led scholars to suggest that

the world was headed towards a new

world disorder. Since this period

250


technically coincided with South

Africa‟s demolition of apartheid and

re-institution of her first popular

democratic transition, she assumed a

natural leadership position to seek

for new ways of re-aligning African

continent to the new international

realities for maximum benefit.

Although the first democratic

government in South Africa, under

the conservative leadership of

Nelson Mandela played down on the

reality of the new international

environment and the place of South

Africa in African politics, his

successor, Mbeki made no

pretentions about his un-wavering

willingness to position South Africa

to assume her rightful place in

history (Freeman, 2005).

The second factor that dramatically

influenced South Africa‟s „quiet

diplomacy‟ under Mbeki‟s

administration is a corollary to the

above factor, which is the

globalisation politics. Globalisation

is widely believed to be associated

with faster economic growth, higher

standards of living and expanded

opportunities for technological

development and cultural

advancement for the participating

countries. Therefore, there is thus

this belief that, in the present

international scenario, there is little

alternative to globalisation (Chishti,

2002).

But there is a sense in which

globalisation throws up a host of

contradictions. According to Kunle

Amuwo, globalization is a complex

process and phenomenon of

antinomies and dialectics: integrating

and fragmenting world; uniformity

and localization; increased material

prosperity and deepening misery;

homogenization and

hegemonization. Globalization is

nothing but a mixed grill. On the one

hand, it has the potentiality of

eroding national sovereignty of the

weakest and poorest states, whilst

widening the technological divide

amongst states; on the other, it tends

to provide an enabling environment

for greater respects for human rights

and gender equality. It is an

economic orthodoxy that is failing

the people, but enriching investors

and big corporations. When Africa‟s

political leaders rein into it, it is

problematic; and when nation-states

propose or seek to implement

alternatives, they are pundits

(Amuwo, 2004).

In view of the two forces identified

above, South Africa, under Mbeki

fashioned her foreign policy to

reflect aspects of the post-cold war

politics and globalisation politics.

Being aware of the increasing wave

of pressure being exerted on nation-

states by the rampaging effects of

these twin-factors, the onus rested on

South Africa to protect the fledgling

economies of most African states.

And to do that successfully, she had

to rely on the components of African

solidarity and partnership in other to

win the support and cooperation of

African states. Whether the

motivation for South Africa‟s foreign

policy of constructive engagement

251


rests in her mercantilist tendency in

Africa remains an issue for continual

assessment by scholars of African

development studies. But what is not

in doubt remains the widening gulf

of inequality fostered by the current

international capitalist environment

and the negative implications of this

on the weak economies of smaller

competitors like African states.

CONCLUSION

The thrust of this essay is the

juxtaposition of the historical

antecedents of the megaphone

diplomatic foreign policy of Murtala-

Obasanjo era in the 1970s and the

quiet diplomatic foreign policy

approach of the Mbeki

administration in the 2000s. The

argument advanced here is that the

combination of domestic factors and

external forces dramatically

influenced the choice of these

approaches. Added is that the

political and economic structures of

the states involved and the personal

philosophy of key actors connived to

bring about the varying outcomes.

More significantly, the reactions of

the international community are

repeatedly shaped by the

international economic structure

under which they operate. The

implications of all of these issues for

contemporary African states are not

in doubt. The struggle for the soul of

Africa is still un-ending and the

gladiators are still un-changing.

RECOMMENADTION

Despite the differences in foreign

policies of different African

countries, we recommend that the

post-colonial African states should

endeavour to evolve foreign policies

that will enhance the unity and the

development of members of the

African Union. Africa as a continent

should transcend the stage of

underdevelopment to becoming a

leading continent with less internal

conflicts and wars resulting to

perennial appeal for Aid from the

Western world. African states‟

foreign policies should not only

develop the members of African

Union (AU), it should be such that

will solidify African relevance in

world social eco-political systems;

and not just as a means of

developing the developed nations but

asserting itself as a global player in

international politics.

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