nigerian unity: in the balance

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STUDIES

INSTITUTE

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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

NIGERIAN UNITY:IN THE BALANCE

Gerald McLoughlinClarence J. Bouchat

June 2013

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ISBN 1-58487-577-1


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FOREWORD

Nigeria is the key country in Sub-Saharan Africafor the success of American policy and interests, but ispoorly understood by policymakers. Nigeria is an Afri-can powerhouse blessed with a large growing economy,huge reserves of oil and natural gas, the largest popu-lation in Africa, a rich cultural diversity, and powerfulregional inuence. Nigeria is also beset by chronic in-ternal strife and unstable governments, corruption, poor

human development and human rights records, and is ahub for international crime. Although currently enjoy-ing a period of democracy and economic growth, theforces that balance Nigerian unity are fragile and mayyet fatally fracture Nigerias polity and state integrity.

To overcome this lack of understanding of Nigeria,this monograph analyzes where fractures in the stateoccur and why. It offers practical recommendations

to U.S. Government ofcials to support positive out-comes in Nigeria that ensure a stable, prosperous coun-try that can partner with the United States in attainingmutual goals.

This monograph is particularly relevant for govern-ment and military ofcials tasked with responsibilitiesin West and Sub-Saharan Africa, but who may not pos-sess much understanding of Nigeria and its importanceto the United States. The Strategic Studies Institute ispleased to publish this paper as a contribution towarda more complete understanding of Nigeria in order toadvance both its interests and those of the United States.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

GERALD MCLOUGHLIN is a retired U.S. ForeignService Ofcer with extensive service in Sub-Saha-ran Africa, most notably Cameroon, Mozambique,and Nigeria. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army WarCollege, Hunter College (CUNY), and SouthernConnecticut State College.

CLARENCE J. BOUCHAT, a retired U.S. Air Forcelieutenant colonel, is currently a senior researcherwith the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and anadjunct professor at the U.S. Army War College(USAWC) Department of Distance Education. His lastassignment was as a faculty member of the USAWC.Immediately after retirement, he went to Liberia aspart of a Security Sector Reform team meant to recon-

stitute a new Ministry of Defense. He has publishedseveral works concerning security issues in the contextof Sub-Saharan Africa. Lieutenant Colonel Bouchatis a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and theUniversity of Southern California.


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SUMMARY

Nigerias continuation as a cohesive functioningstate is important to the United States due to the bilat-eral economic relationship, Nigerias inuence in theinternational community, and its pivotal role for U.S.interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the impor-tance of Nigeria to the United States, the centrifugalforces that tear at the countrys unity and the centrip-etal forces which have kept Nigeria whole are not wellunderstood and are rarely examined. Those who makeor execute U.S. policy will nd it difcult to advanceU.S. interests in Africa without an understanding ofthe pressures that bind and tear Nigeria.

This monograph examines why Nigeria is impor-tant to the United States, and the historic, religious,cultural, political, physical, demographic, and eco-

nomic factors that will determine if Nigeria remainswhole. It identies Nigerias major fault lines andmakes policy recommendations for the United Statesto support Nigerians in their efforts to maintain afunctioning and integrated state and, by so doing,advance U.S. interests.


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NIGERIAN UNITY:IN THE BALANCE

The existence of Nigeria as a unied state is in jeop-ardy. Nigerias continuation as a cohesive functioningstate is important to the United States due to the bilat-eral economic relationship, Nigerias role in the inter-national community, and its centrality to U.S. interestsin Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the importance of Ni-geria to the United States, the centrifugal forces thattear at the countrys unity and the centripetal forcesthat have kept Nigeria whole are not well understoodand are rarely examined. Those who make or executeU.S. policy will nd it difcult to advance U.S. inter-ests without an understanding of the pressures thatbind and tear Nigeria.

This monograph examines why Nigeria is impor-

tant to the United States and the historical, religious,cultural, political, physical, demographic, and eco-nomic factors that will determine if Nigeria remainswhole. It identies Nigerias major fault lines andmakes policy recommendations for U.S. supportto Nigerians in their efforts to maintain a function-ing and integrated state and, by so doing, advanceU.S. interests.

NIGERIAS IMPORTANCETO THE UNITED STATES

Nigeria is central to U.S. interests in Sub-SaharanAfrica and important to U.S interests beyond the Af-rican continent. Its value to the United States is best

understood in the context of post-Cold War Sub-Sa-haran Africas growing strategic importance.1 This isprimarily due to Sub-Saharan Africas expanding role


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in supplying the world economy, including key U.S.allies and potential rivals, with oil, gas, and nonfuel

minerals. This has been highlighted by the expansionof efforts of emerging powers to obtain greater accessto Sub-Saharan African resources and markets withChina, in particular, achieving notable success.2

In rough tandem with its global role, Sub-SaharanAfricas signicance to the United States has grownas it supplies a steadily growing amount of oil to theUnited States, and its commercial market is also grow-ing in signicance as U.S. companies tap into non-extractive sectors of the Sub-Saharan economy. TheUnited States has already become Sub-Saharan Afri-cas second-largest industrial supplier, with Americanbusinesses exporting over $6 billion worth of goods toAfrica in 2010 and importing goods from Africa worthmore than $16 billion.3

In this context, U.S. Government agencies haveidentied specic U.S. economic and related se-curity objectives in Africa as preserving access tonatural resources, deterring violent extremist activi-ties (especially those linked to international terroristorganizations), and reducing maritime piracy and Af-rican-based international crime. In addition, ongoingAmerican humanitarian interests in resolving destabi-lizing humanitarian crises, human rights abuses, andhealth crises with implications for global health arealso often stressed in Africa.4 These objectives shouldnot be seen in isolation, but rather as interrelated waysto achieve a prosperous and stable Africa that, in turn,will help achieve the wider strategic U.S. goal of a be-nign environmentfor global security and growth.5

The centrality of the Federal Republic of Nigeria tothe achievement of these interests is difcult to over-state. Nigeria is the single most important Sub-Saharan


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African source of oil for the United States. It supplies11 percent of U.S. oil imports, making it Americas

fourth-largest supplier in 2011.6

Nigeria ranks 10th inthe world in proven oil reserves with 37.2 billion bar-rels, 10th in production, and eighth in exports. With5.292 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves,Nigeria rates eighth in the world. However, naturalgas production and exports rank much lower, sincethis resource has not been adequately harnessed, butis anticipated to replace oil as Nigerias leading foreignexchange earner.7 Nigeria, by virtue of its central loca-tion, large population, diverse and dynamic economy,and huge oil reserves, is a major power in the regionand one of the regions most politically and economi-cally important states.8 In fact, Nigerias potentialshould make it the great giant [that] . . . will assumethe natural leadership of Sub-Saharan Africa.9

Nigeria is also one of the few credible Sub-SaharanAfrican security partners for the United States. Nige-ria, which helped found the two principal organiza-tions of African statesthe African Union (AU) andthe Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS)remains disposed and able to act region-ally and, to some degree, outside the region. It hasbeen a major contributor of military forces to secu-rity operations supported by the United States on thecontinent, notably in Liberia and Somalia. It has longbeen the largest African contributor to United Nations(UN) peacekeeping operations in Africa and beyond.10Nigerian leaders often state their ambitions to play alarger role on the international scene, and Nigeria waselected a member of the UN Security Council in 2011.

The United States, then, has both signicant eco-nomic and security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa thatdepend upon Nigerias continued constructive inter-


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national role. Nigeria can play a productive role in theregion and contribute to global economic growth as a

large, economically powerful unied state. At best, nogroup of conceivable Nigerian successor states wouldhave the resources to continue these positive roles. Atworst, a collection of failed states would be sources offurther spreading instability.

However, Nigerias unity is threatened by disrup-tive forces that come from within its own borders. Themost immediate threats to Nigerias coherence, andtherefore its ability to support U.S. interests while pur-suing its own, are organized crime syndicates, whichoperate major crude oil theft operations, massive drugtrafcking, numerous cybercrimes, and rampant pi-racy that affect U.S. (or allied) economic assets.11 Atthe same time, regionally and ethnically based armedgroups in Nigeria, some linked to international terror-

ist organizations, have attacked Nigerian targets anddeclared the United States to be their enemy.

Nigeria, then, is a key country that greatly affectsU.S. interests in Africa. Nigeria is also a major sourceof environmental pollution in the region. Its largepopulation routinely suffers from humanitarian andhealth crises. It is a source of criminal and extrem-ist activities. It is also a major source of energy re-sources, a potentially large commercial market, and astabilizing presence.

Nigerias strategic location, large diverse popula-tion, diplomatic muscle, and growing economy willensure that it plays an important role inuencing U.S.and other global states interests in Africa. For thesereasons, U.S. policymakers need to better understand

Nigeria and its people in order to best inuence it tosupport mutual interests.


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NIGERIA AS AN ENTITY

The fault lines along which Nigeria may devolvewere established in the process of its very formation.Like most post-colonial African states, Nigeria is botha mosaic of tribes, related or allied ethnic or ideologi-cal groups, and nations now linked economically andpolitically under a common government in a colo-nially imposed territorial unit. The British colonialgovernment created a unied Nigeria in 1914 to de-marcate its area of control from those of its Europeancompetitors and because its northern protectoratewas too poorly resourced to stand on its own. It wastherefore created as a state by externally imposed at,not for any internal, organic reason. Before the Britisharrived, there was no shared national consciousness,culture, or language in Nigeria, nor was there any sen-

timent to coalesce its peoples into a coherent nationunder colonial rule. After the formal amalgamation in1914, a northsouth split in the colonial administra-tion remained as northern and southern Nigeria con-tinued along divergent political, economic, and socialdevelopment trends. The British then further dividedthe south into eastern and western political entities.In 1954, the British started Nigeria towards indepen-dence under a constitution that reinforced the three-region system with robust regional governments un-der a weak federal system. Thus at independence in1960, Nigeria consisted politically of Western, Eastern,and Northern Regions, which effectively broke thesouth in two, while leaving the north intact.12 Theseregions reinforced Nigerias major geographical, cul-

tural, and ethnic groupings with the Hausa and Fulaniconcentrated in the north, Yoruba in the southwest,and Igbo in the southeast. This conguration contin-


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ued past independence until 1966 when the regionswere abolished during the run up to the Biafran civil

war.13

The rough borders between these three areasmay become Nigerias major fault lines along whichthe country could divide.

The British had created a unifying constitution, inan attempt to preserve the integrity of Nigeria as singleunit, but it was an inherently unstable state structurethat failed to survive for even a short while. ModernNigeria, more so than other post-colonial African stateswith similar arbitrary borders and conjoined peoples,emerged from a colonial state that had never success-fully integrated its different constituent partsindeedthat never intended to form a coherent nation and acorresponding national consciousness.14

With varying success, subsequent post-indepen-dence governments repeatedly attempted structural

reform to build a legal and constitutional frameworkto govern a united Nigeria. Since independence in1960, Nigeria has endured three republics, numer-ous military dictatorships and unsuccessful coups,and both British parliamentary and American presi-dential forms of government, with none able to ad-equately deliver stability or a sense of unity to thecountry.15 The creation of its governmental structureboth unied the country as a political entity whileincorporating fundamental political geographic di-visions. Nigerias subsequent political evolution hasnot balanced these built-in centripetal and centrifugalforces. To understand these tensions, it is necessary toexamine the underlying religious, cultural, political,physical, demographic, and economic forces that hold

Nigerians together as an entity and threaten the statewith fragmentation.


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CROSS AND CRESCENT

The most important political fault line, the one be-tween the North and the South, is reinforced by theirdifferent religious orientations. In fact, the role of re-ligious afliations in Nigeria has become increasinglyimportant, grown violent,16 and demonstrates howproximity to past foreign pressures continues to af-fect many aspects of Nigerian history and culture.17Although traditional religious beliefs were once asnumerous and pervasive as the many ethnic groupswith which they were afliated, by some estimates,less than 10 percent of Nigerians today exclusivelypractice the animist beliefs of their ancestors.18 Sincetheir earliest contacts, Muslim and Christian mission-aries have zealously converted indigenous Nigerians,so that approximately 50 percent of Nigerians today

may be Muslim and 40 percent Christianand bothnow compete directly against one another.19

Christianity was introduced in the eastern part ofNigeria during the 15th century by Portuguese trad-ers.20 Non-Catholic forms of Christianity spread un-der British inuence from the coast during the 1800sto establish itself among the southeast, central, andpartially in the southwest and northeast populationsof Nigeria. With this new faith, some minority ethnicgroups reasserted themselves against the accultur-ating dominance of Islamic rule to which northernminorities were subordinated, while others em-braced the success imparted to the middle class andelites that Christian-Western values rewarded underBritish rule.21

Under the British governing system of indirectrule, however, Islamic institutions were protectedwhere they already existed, which hobbled Christian


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missionary activity in these mainly northern areas.22There were exceptions, however, as with the Yoruba

of the southwest, who split between the two majorreligions when many Ijebu tribesmen accepted Angli-canism and British rule after a military defeat in 1892,while others remained Muslim.23 In the south, Yorubaelites tried to use Christianity to forge a unied Yorubapolitical and cultural identity.24 This was partially suc-cessful among the Christian Yoruba, while introduc-ing new strains between Christian and non-ChristianYoruba. As a side effect, stress on a common Christianidentity increased ties with Christians in other ethnicgroups. It also highlighted differences between themore Christian South and the North, where Islam hadalready provided a common identity.

Islam arrived with Arab travelers and scholarsacross the northern Saharan trade routes in the 9th

century.25

It was slowly adopted in the north and westby already reigning dynastic rulers who used Islam tolegitimize their rule; promote internal unity; organizetheir administrations; and gain the commercial, intel-lectual, and military advantages of association withthe greater Islamic community. The Sefawa dynastyof the Kanem-Borno Empire of northern Nigeria, forexample, ruled for over 1,000 years, in large part be-cause of the unity and practices conveyed by Islam.From the 1800s onward, the powerful Sokoto caliphateruled smaller Islamic states in northern Nigeria. It notonly enabled stability and prosperity, but also forcedmass conversions to Islam when needed.26 During therst half of the 19th century, this caliphate becamethe largest system of theoretical political allegiance in

Sub-Saharan Africa. It never functioned as a central-ized government, however, nor was it imposed pri-marily by conquest. It represented a connected series


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of coup dtats by Muslim and Fulani elements whoseleaders were awarded the title of emirs, but were, in

effect, independent rulers. The Fulani emirs soughtto establish better standards of Islamic observanceand banded together in case of outside attack, butotherwise did not interfere in local governance. Theminor states annexed into larger formations retainedtheir identity, even as a common Islamic culture tookhold.27 Gradually, Islam became the common culturethat transcended ethnicity . . . in the north, and Is-lamic Sharia law applied more widely, and in somerespects more rigidly . . . than anywhere else outsideof Saudi Arabia.28

Traditionally, Nigerian Muslims are predominant-ly Sunni of the Qadiriyya orders within the Su move-ment, the more mystical form of Islam, organized inrelated, but independent, lodges. However, the com-

peting Tijaniyya order was embraced by some Nige-rians to counter the entrenched Qadiriyya structure,which resulted in frequent clashes over economic andpolitical power between the two Su orders duringmuch of the 20th century.29 Both, in turn, were chal-lenged by the Izala movement. Founded during the1970s in the city of Jos (a city marked by violent clash-es between immigrating ethnic groups), it vehementlyopposed the mysticism of Susm in favor of a moreorthodox and public role for Islam. Izala has par-ticularly attracted young men hoping to change oldpolitical and religious structures, but this burgeoningyouthful population is also increasingly attracted tomore militant armed groups, including Kala-Kato, yanBori, and Iranian-connected groups.30

Although overt Muslim missionary work by Nige-rians had traditionally been directed primarily towardanimists and backsliding Muslims, this changed inrecent times, most markedly in the 1980s. Partially


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inspired by foreign Muslim missionaries, some Ni-gerian Muslims began to direct their efforts towards

Christians, with often violent rhetoric.31

The most de-stabilizing of such Muslim groups may be JamaatuAhlis Sunna Liddaawati Wal-Jihad or Boko Haram, asit is popularly known, formed in northern NigeriasBorno state in 2002. It has announced plans to tie it-self more closely to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreband to the Shabab, al-Qaedas ally in Somalia.RecentAmerican intelligence assessments have reportedlyfound that Boko Haram has trained with al-Qaeda-linked militants in camps in the deserts of Mali andmay seek to expand its campaign of violence beyondNigeria.32 The U.S. Department of State designatedthree of its key leaders as Specially Designated GlobalTerrorists in June 2012.33 Sometimes also called the Ni-gerian Taliban, it calls for strict observance of Sharia

law throughout Nigeria, not just the 12 predominatelyMuslim states of the north where it is now used forMuslims (although only two states have appliedit rigorously).34

There is no national or regional organization thatcan exercise religious authority over Islam or Christi-anity in Nigeria. Both religions have shown a strongtendency to divide into sub-sects, often strongly op-posed to co-religionists. In addition, both have grownin part from politically inspired conversions. Underincreased economic and social pressure, this tendencyto divide into ever more fragmented and divisive sub-sects with political intentions has notably increasedin modern times. Overt struggles between the majorgroups break out as well. Southeast states, like Cross

River, resist the northern states move to Sharia lawby implementing Christian Law as a counter.35 Re-ligious competition is often politicized, which com-pounds the many ethnic and regional differences.


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Although these religious, ethnic, cultural and re-gional afliations are often exploited as the basis for

discord in Nigeria, they do not necessarily condemnNigeria to factionalization. The Yoruba serve as amodern example of coexistence, since many Muslim,Christian, and animist Yoruba dwell peacefully, notonly in the same cities, but also in the same house-holds.36 Even some northern Christians have acceptedSharia law as a better way to protect their lives andproperty than the current corrupt system.37 Histori-cally, Nigerians have shown they can tolerate one an-other and thrive despite their differences. Conicts aregenerally exceptions that must be managed. They arenot indicative of inevitable and intractable conicts ingreater Nigerian society.38

THE CULTURES AND REGIONS

With a very large population packed into a rela-tively small but diverse physical region, a remarkablenumber of distinct groups have emerged from whichNigerians may draw strength through diversity orfracture along acrimonious cultural and regional lines.Depending on the characteristics used to distinguishits peoplesincluding language history, ancestral af-liation, food, customs, social organization, housing,settlement pattern, and locationthere exist between200 and 350 different ethnic groups in Nigeria.39 Tengroups comprise 80 percent of the population, withfour language groupsHausa (21 percent), Yoruba(20), Igbo (17), and Fulani (7)dominating.40 The Igbo,Yoruba, and Hausa (the Hausa and Fulani are usually

considered as allied groups in Nigeria) may be con-sidered as ethnicities or nationalities knitted out ofsmaller sub-units that do not necessarily have a trace-


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able blood relationship, but are united by a commonculture and language. The Ilesha, Egba, Itshekiri Ijaw,

and some other peoples of Nigeria, however, may bedescribed as distinct tribes.41

Each ethnic group is associated with an ancestralhomeland with the Hausa and Fulani in the north, Yo-ruba in the southwest, and Igbo in the southeast. Thismeans the north is most inuenced by Muslim Arabtraditions and the south by Western British customs.The rough divisions between these three areas maybe considered Nigerias major political seams, as theydivide Nigeria geographically, culturally, and ethni-cally. However, there are few ethnically pure areas.The intermixture and interspersing of ethnic groupshas been a common historical occurrence in Nigeria,with 60 ethnic groups living in the small Niger Delta,for example, and the northeast area containing nearly

half of Nigerias ethnic groups.42

Rapid urbanizationhas also attracted migrants from throughout the coun-try so that nearly every ethnic group can be found in-termingled in major cities like Kano and Lagos.43

The cultural traits of ethnic groups vary greatly.The Yoruba are traditionally more urbanized with ahighly organized social structure. The Igbo are tradi-tionally organized no higher than the clan level; theystress individual achievement and personal advance-ment, and value education highly. The Igbo are oftenresented by other ethnic groups for their competitive-ness and for their success.44 Cultural differences suchas these may irritate ethnic relations, especially wherethere is a large successful immigrant minority, whichaccounts for some of the backlash against the Igbo

that precipitated both the Nigerian civil war and morerecent violence.


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Before British colonialism, Nigerians cultural andregional differences could be seen as a source of inter-

dependence, and each community had specic attri-butes for which it was known, a specic contributionthat it made for the overall well-being of the entire re-gion.45 Prominent Nigerian historian Adiele Agbonoted in southeastern Nigeria that different culturessought ties with each other to leverage their strengths,causing so much cultural overlap that it was impos-sible to tell geographically where one group of peopleended and another began.46 Widespread contact fos-tered interethnic marriages, occupation-based secretsocieties, cultural exchanges, and complimentary eco-nomic relationships that allowed, for instance, largelyconict-free relations between the Yoruba and Hausathroughout the 20th century, except for two rare in-stances settled by mediation.47

In many ways, British rule continued the historictrend toward Nigerian coherence48 by the imposi-tion of English as Nigerias ofcial and most com-mon second language; English common law alongwith Islamic and traditional laws; and a more mod-ern economic structure and education system.49 Thesechanges also unied Nigerians in an unintended wayby creating an educated elite at British schools. Thiselite used English to bridge ethnic divides in orderto ameliorate the effects of colonialism and eventu-ally overthrow it. To protest British rule, these elitemembers encouraged nationalism as expressed incultural ways, that is, in deliberate efforts to pro-mote Nigerian food, names, forms of dress, lan-guages, and even religions.50 However, the political

consciousness that might have enhanced a sense ofNigerian nationality and united the disparate eth-nic groups within the borders of the former colony,


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also took the form of ethnic nationalism, emphasiz-ing local ethnic culture and traditions. Nationalists

succeeded in wresting independence from the foreigncolonialists but failed to integrate the country intoa whole.

As they competed for power, prestige, and asso-ciated benets, nationalist elites sought support frommembers of their own ethnic groups by stressing eth-nic differences. Drawing on the British policy of in-direct rule, which endorsed or created local leaders(but not necessarily inheritable national institutions),different cultural and ethnic groups were mobilizedfor objectives that ostensibly ranged from regional au-tonomy to the total breakup of Nigeria. Their forma-tion of political parties along ethnic and regional linesduring the colonial period created an aggressive re-gionalism based on cultural, religious, and economic

differences.51

For example, the Northern Peoples Con-gress (NPC) was formed by northern educated elitesin 1949, while the National Council for Nigeria andthe Cameroons (NCNC) started as a national politi-cal party, but was quickly taken over by Igbo politicalleaders. In the west, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa metamor-phosed into a political party, the Action Group, domi-nated by Yorubas in 1951. These regional political par-ties sought to advance regional and ethnic interests.They did so partially by dening other ethnic groupsas political rivals.

Although successful in unifying enduring basesof local support, this process took ethnic hostility toa new level.52 The development of creating and exac-erbating friction between the different ethnic groups

as part of a deliberate political strategy was a ma-jor factor in the disastrous Igbo attempt to secede inthe 1967 Biafra War. In fact, membership in political


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parties was primarily determined by ethnicity untilthe 1990s, when ideology and platforms became more

important. Increased Nigerian nationalism, spurredby urbanization, increasing pride in national sym-bols, and the horrors of the Biafra War, all weakenedsectionalism in political life.53

MANY PEOPLES, MANY SYSTEMS

Although sectionalism was weakened by theemerging national political process, it did not disap-pearpartially because of the different political expe-riences of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria. Pre-co-lonial Nigerias many societies governed themselvesthrough a variety of political structures with differingeconomic bases. In the north, the Hausa and Fulanideveloped Muslim-based emirates and the caliphate,

while the southwest had centralized Yoruba and Be-nin Kingdoms. In the southeast, the geography anddiffuse settlement patterns supported less centralized,more democratic village-based hierarchies. Through-out pre-colonial Nigeria, additional small indepen-dent societies resided among these other entities.54Although these societies were mainly autonomous,they maintained sophisticated interrelationshipsthat recognized commonalities and linkages amongthem.55 British rule of Nigeria through its policy ofindirect rule, or Native Authority, tried to use thesepre-existing traditions and structures as the Britishunderstood them, but was ultimately unsuccessful inmaintaining cultures or inter-Nigerian relationships.56

Strong British inuence in Nigeria began in the

early 1800s as interdiction efforts against the trans-Atlantic slave trade. By the 1860s, the British had es-tablished themselves in Lagos to better ght slavery


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and develop more legitimate trade. In 1898, the Brit-ish converted lands previously granted to the private

Royal Niger Company (RNC) in the north, creatingthe Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, which was unit-ed with the southern protectorate in 1914 to form aunied territory.57

The British governed the new union through apolicy of indirect rule to protect and empower tra-ditional social structures, thereby making the colonialexperience as unobtrusive as possible58 to local in-habitants by using the institutions they themselveshad invented.59 This method was formed and usedmost successfully in the north where established au-thorities served as proxies for the British. However, itcame at the expense of societal growth. The north wasespecially hampered in adopting Western education,which in turn retarded economic growth compared to

the south.60

Nonetheless, the British controlled unciv-ilized or inappropriate behavior such as the harshermeasures in Islamic law.61

Indigenous rule and indirect rule did not coordi-nate well in the south. This forced traditional culturesto change, imposed alien governing schemes, andimplemented policies that were a disaster. Proof ofthese failures were seen in the subsequent riots in thesouthwestern city of Abeokuta in 1918 and Aba in thesoutheast in 1929.62 Inevitably, colonial governancechanged societies throughout Nigeria, twisting indig-enous structures and relations until they were ineffec-tive, but not replacing them sufciently with Westernsubstitutes.63 Thus began the problems that continueinto today, including competing sectional and sectar-

ian interests and the tendency of political leaders toexploit ethnic and religious rivalries rather than buildnational interests and unity.64


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Subdividing a state composed of ethnic groups inconict is often used as a way to spread power and al-

leviate minorities fears of stronger groups. However,in the case of Nigeria, it enabled regionalism and po-litical conict by entrenching the political parties ofthe three major ethnic groups.65 Independent Nigeriacontinued this practice when the Midwestern Regionwas carved from the Western Region during a violentcrisis in 1963.66 After Nigerias rst military coup in1966, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi feared the creep-ing fragmentation of Nigeria along cultural fault lines.He abolished the regions and the accompanying pref-erential treatment given to indigenous groups in theirhomeland. Rioting began in the north, and a counter-coup set in motion the violent ethnic conicts that ini-tiated the attempted secession of the Eastern Region tobecome Biafra and Nigerias bloody civil war.67

The new leader, General Yakubu Gowan, declaredan emergency and divided the country into 12 states68to allay fears of domination by any one group andto reduce the strength of the oil producing EasternRegion.69 Once the Biafran secession was crushed in1970, splintering continued with the number of feder-al states increasing to 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991,and 36 in 1996.70 Although more minority groups areappeased by having greater inuence within one ofthe 36 states, not all of the over 250 ethnic groups weresatised since most do not have their own homelandby which to control revenues from the central gov-ernment.71 The major ethnic groups are also unhap-py since their inuence is dilutedwith the formerNorthern Region, for example, now fractured into 19

states. Whether the existence of these many states willact as the balancer against domination by major eth-nic groups remains to be seen.72 However, a call for 35


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more states was made in 1994, although the currentnumber seems rm in the 1999 constitution that estab-

lished the fourth republic.73

Creating new states attempts to address the prob-

lems of ethnic and religious balance, but fracturingcreates smaller and weaker states, some of which arenot economically viable without the support of sharedfederal revenues. Many small states also increase therelative power of the central government with respectto the states and may have been intentionally createdto remove future threats of secession.74

This fragmented arrangement has also proven sopolitically unwieldy that an informal arrangement ofsix geopolitical zones75 was developed for power shar-ing among the regional elites, with each of the top fed-eral positions to be rotated among one representativefrom each zone.76 Although a balancing mechanism,

zoning hardly fosters unity, as each top ofcial maynot be selected on merit and may represent his zonesinterests over that of the country.77 This system was al-ready out of kilter by the election of southern PresidentGoodluck Jonathan in 2011, when many Northernersfelt that this cycle was theirs to ll the presidency.78The regionalization, fracturing, and zoning of Nigeriahave not stabilized the competing demands of ethnic,religious, economic, and political constituents.

From historic political structures to partisan mod-ern party activities, politics has been a mostly divisiveforce in Nigeria, with strong communal tendenciesoverbearing statewide interests. Colonial governingseemed to have reinforced detrimental elements of localgoverning systems without reinforcing positive aspects

or establishing a better workable arrangement. Mod-ern Nigerians have resorted to factionalizing their stateto accommodate ethnic fears and aspirations through


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a method that seems to have established an unwieldygoverning system that reinforces fragmentation of

the state.

THE LAND

Without a well-rooted national, political, or ideo-logical identity, Nigeria can then be seen less as a singlenation-state and more as a complex region resultingfrom many interacting inuences and conicting pres-sures over its long rich history. The most basic of theseinuences, the nature of the physical environment it-self, has both unied and divided Nigeria. Aspects ofNigerias physical environment exercise centripetalinuences, creating a natural unity for the country.79The widely diverse distribution of natural resources,such as the Norths tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead,

and zinc, and the Souths crude oil and natural gas,80

and resulting dissimilar economic opportunities ledto a robust and complementary economy. This helpedknit Nigeria together since the time of independence.

Nigerias physical geography also unies the coun-try through its river systems and the potential for theregions to complement one another through humanactivities that harness local natural specialties. TheNiger River and its main tributary, the Benue, unifyNigeria through major waterways and water shedsthat dene the country as a physical region distinctfrom its neighbors. Historically, these waterways arethe primary lines of communication and commercebinding Nigerians together. Even here, however, rap-ids and falls common to the river systems, and large

seasonal swings in water ow due to the monsoons,curtail navigation along some parts of the rivers.81The Y shape formed by the conuence of the Niger


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and Benue Rivers also creates and links three sepa-rate regions. Ironically, the very communication links

between them are sometimes cited as dividing linesby Nigerians.

Nigerias vast and diverse land area, about twicethe size of California or four times that of the UnitedKingdom (UK), can be divided into two physical zones:the forest zone of the south with tropical forests andtall grass-derived savannah, and the grassland zone ofthe north with natural savanna and near desert condi-tion sub-zones.82 These geographic zones include sev-en relief zones that, along with proximity to the Gulfof Guinea, result in multiple climates ranging fromhumid tropical of the south to the arid semi-desert inthe north.83 Rainfall denes two distinct seasons, wetand dry, the length and intensity of each dependingon the seasonal dominance of monsoonal dry winds

from the Sahara and rain-giving winds from the Gulfof Guinea.84 Thus the north may receive only 20 inch-es of rain during its 5-month rainy season, while thesouth may receive 120 inches over 9 months.85

Such physical differences result in varying types ofvegetation. These differences in vegetation mean dif-ferences in the availability of agricultural pursuits, in-digenous building materials, and types of settlementpatterns86 that shaped local cultures in different ways.The northern Sahel savanna and semi-desert allowedthe formation of cattle raising, cavalry, and caravanbased centralized states, with strong cultural inuenc-es from North Africa owing along well-establishedtrade and communication lines. The often impenetra-ble forests of the south protected the independence of

small agriculture-based states and larger more egali-tarian confederations. The even more difcult terrainof the southwest gave rise to the multiple tightly knit


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independent communities with separate languagesthat remained highly resistant to outside penetration

or control. The physical environment allowed or en-couraged the formation of communities with funda-mentally different ways of life over which a politicalsuperstructure was imposed.

Physical geography, then, has helped shape anddene cultural differences in Nigeria through varia-tion in climate, vegetation and agricultural pursuits,availability of mineral resources, and the need to sus-tain the environment. Over 33 percent of Nigeriasland is arable (compared to 18 percent for the UnitedStates and 23 percent for the UK).87 Throughout theirhistory, agriculture has been Nigerians main eco-nomic activity, still accounting for 30 percent of grossdomestic product (GDP) and 70 percent of the laborforce in 2010.88 Water and land resources are thus criti-

cal to social stability throughout Nigeria. Guinea cornand palm are the main indigenous food crops in Ni-geria, but maize, cassava, yams, rice, and some fruitshave been successfully introduced over the past 2 cen-turies.89 These are grown mainly for consumption inNigeria and much of it by subsistence farmers who ac-count for 60 percent of the working population.90 Cot-ton, cocoa, peanuts, rubber, and palm oil are Nigeriasmain commercial crops.

Climate and soil dictate where crops are grown,with more dry-tolerant crops like peanuts, grains, andcotton planted in the north; cocoa in the southwest;and palm, roots and tubers, and maize throughout thesouth.91 In the north, the raising of livestock is a tra-ditional agricultural pursuit adapted to the ever drier

environment.92 In the southwest, monsoonal condi-tions create a benecial second short dry season thatallows harvesting of two crops annually to better sup-


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port an urban culture, while the transitional climateof the Middle Belt allows a wide variety of crops like

tomatoes, yams, and soybeans.93

Fishing is an impor-tant source for food and trade along the coast, in theNiger Delta, and in the north around Lake Chad, al-though the latter is diminishing due to reduction ofthe lake.94 Commercial crops have also suffered, withcocoa production, the only remaining major agricul-tural export, dropping from 300,000 tons to 180,000tons in 25 years.95

The dry north is particularly sensitive to changesin climate, and, since droughts in the 1970s and 1980s,the resulting shifts in human and animal patterns. Forinstance, demand for irrigation water among the fourcountries that border Lake Chad has quadrupledmuch from demand in Nigeriaaccounting for halfof the 90 percent loss of surface area this once major

body of water held in 1960.96

The overall pressure ofa rapidly growing population on land resources alsocontributes to over cropping, over grazing, and de-forestation, resulting in soil impoverishment, erosion,and desertication in the north where the Sahara Des-ert advances by two to three miles every year.97 Thenatural environment of Nigeria is degrading rapidly,pressuring its people, economy, and politics. In ad-dition to an increase in overall stress, one immediateeffect of environmental change has been increased in-ternal migration with the consequent accentuation ofexisting fault lines or the creation of new ones.

A clear example of the differences can be seen incentral Plateau State, which is located in the heart ofthe divide between the mercantile, largely Muslim

pastoralist peoples of the north and the traditionallyfarming, mostly Christian peoples of the south. Herethe mass movement of Northern herders into farm-


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ing areas has accentuated existing fault lines betweendifferent cultures and ethnic groups. Agriculture and

pastoralism have coexisted side-by-side for centuries,and many herding and farming communities in thesame area have often developed usually benecial in-terdependent relationships. However, in the last fewdecades, small-scale conicts between herders andfarmers have been repeatedly linked with other eth-nic, political, and religious conicts and escalated intowidespread violence and displacement of people.

For example, in 2004, President Obasanjo of Nigeriadeclared a state of emergency in Plateau State,when herder-farmer conicts resulted in near-mutual genocide of Christians and Muslims andmore than 20,000 refugees eeing to neighboringCameroon . . .98

The ow of refugees into Jos, its largest city, com-bined with outside Muslim and Christian support(both Nigerian and foreign) for co-religionists, havegreatly increased tension. Armed groups such as BokoHaram have used the opportunity to stage attacks andbombings on civilian targets in an apparent effort toexpand the conict, with the Nigerian government

caught in the middle.

POPULATION

Shaped by Nigerias physical geography, environ-mental pressures, and economic changes, the settle-ment and demographics of the population are markedby a pattern of uneven distribution. Nigerias total

population of 155,215,000 people as of 2011 makes itby far the most populous state in Africa and the 8thlargest in the world. Its high birth rate of 1.9 percent


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(an average of 4.74 children born to a woman duringher lifetime) means that Nigerian society currently

counts 41 percent of its population below the age of15, and its burgeoning population will double in sizein just over 37 years at its present growth rate. Suchnumbers strain economic growth and human devel-opment, which is demonstrated through related poorhealth statistics: a life expectancy of 47.6 years in 2011(220th in the world), 91.5 infant deaths out of 1,000 intheir rst year of life, and 840 maternal deaths out of100,000 births, ranking respectively 10th and 9th worstin the world. A high risk of HIV/AIDS, malaria, andother tropical disease exposure in Nigeria explain, inpart, these abysmal numbers.99

Nigeria has three main population clusters: thenorth around the city of Kano with a density of over100 people per square mile, the southwest with a den-

sity of over 140, and the southeast with over 150.100

In2010, Nigeria's population was split evenly betweenurban and rural locations, but it is rapidly urbanizingat an annual rate of 3.5 percent.101 In 1970, less than10 percent of the population lived in towns of 50,000people or more. Most of those were in the southwestwhere city living is part of traditional Yoruba culture,making them the most urbanized group in Africa.102In contrast, the Ibibio and Igbo people of the south-east live in a densely populated region, but tradition-ally dwelled in dispersed compounds or villages, nottowns, due to the inability of the terrain and vegeta-tion to support larger concentrated settlements.103

Rural to urban migration is the single most impor-tant movement of people in Nigeria. Since the 1970s,

spells of drought in the Sahel have driven environ-mental refugees from northern Nigeria and neighbor-ing countries into urban slums. Kanos population hasincreased by 14 fold in just 45 years, to 3.6 million,


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making it the second largest city in Nigeria.104 Refu-gees from politics and violence also drive migration

in Nigeria. There have been movements after manyrecent ethnic clashes, including one million Nigeri-ans displaced between 1999 and 2004105 and the Ni-gerian Civil Wars 1.8 million refugees from 1967 to1970. Movement goes as far back as the early 1800swhen thousands founded wartime refugee campsthat became the modern Yoruba cities of Abeokuta,Oke-Odan, Ibadan, and Ijaye.106 Economic opportu-nity is a third reason for internal migration, as show-cased by people of southeast Nigeria whose pooragricultural land, high unemployment, and few lo-cal opportunities forced many of the people, mostespecially the Igbo, to immigrate to other Nigeriancities as traders.107 The success of the Igbo as smallbusiness men and civil servants often make their pres-

ence as migrants in other parts of Nigeria resented byindigenous people.108

The southwest coastal city of Lagos is the epitomeof these trends. Its population of 10.2 million makesit one of the worlds 25 megacities.109 Encounteringgrinding poverty and lacking the support and re-straints of their ethnic cultures, many urban migrantshave not successfully integrated into their new envi-rons, making this predominately youthful popula-tion prone to lawlessness and violence and creatingintercommunal clashes.110 Thus a combination of fac-tors makes for uneasy tensions between migrant andlocal populations.

One demographic indicator of particular interestis education, for the divisions it represents and the

unity it offers. Education is often embraced as themeans to reverse undesired economic and develop-mental trends for the betterment of society. However,only about two-thirds of the Nigerian population is


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literate, averaging 9 years of schooling. The differencebetween male and female literacy is about 15 percent,

with a 2-year spread in education.111

Unfortunate asthose numbers are, the regional and cultural differ-ences in embracing Western-style education bodeworse for Nigerian unity and progress.

Southern Nigeria readily adopted western edu-cation, and the Christianity that went hand-in-handwith it, during the colonial period.112

Through this, the Southern elite was . . . able todominate the civil service and other sectors thatdemanded formal educational training. . . . Formaleducation also proved an advantage in raising loansfrom the banks, providing funds to start or consolidatenew businesses.113

Western-style education grew faster in the south

than in the north,114 where well-established Islamicsocieties favored their own religious based educa-tion systems and, often with good reason, suspecteda Christian agenda even in allegedly secular Westerneducation. These suspicions persist. It is telling that thename of Boko Haram, the Nigerian Islamic terroristgroup, means Western education is sinful (forbid-

den by Islamic law); and the group repeatedly attacksschools.115 The violence against Igbos at the openingof the Nigerian civil war was due in part to North-erners, reaction against a unitary federal government,which aroused fears in the north that the more high-ly educated Igbos would soon dominate the federalgovernment.116

Thus literacy rates, school enrollment, and success

in national examinations decrease the further northeach is measured, and female literacy is as low as 21percent in the northeast and north.117 Islamic schoolshave not resolved the education gap. In Kano state in


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2010 for instance, 80 percent of the 3.7 million of thosebetween 5 and 21 years of age are estimated to attend

some form of Islamic school, either exclusively or inaddition to a state school. Many of these neither liveup to parents moral expectations nor impart the skillsnecessary for developing the region.118

Western-style education remains an importantmeans for modern advancement, however, and was acrucial element shared by the elite that deposed Britishimperialism and established Nigerias modern sover-eignty. Common experience in Western-style schoolsenabled the elite to come together, thus overcomingsome of the barriers created by ethnic and regional di-visions.119 Education became both a unifying factor(providing common ground for those, especially theelites, who received it) and a centrifugal factor, par-ticularly in pre-independence days, for those who saw

it as a Christianizing agent120

or as yet another institu-tion dominated by the South.121

Recognizing educations divisive and unifyingpotential, Nigerian nationalists used a mass educa-tional program to reform colonial society and addressthe regional educational imbalance to foster nationalintegration in the 1960s. U.S. assistance through theCarnegie Corporation, motivated partly by Cold Warpolitics during the era of decolonization, played asignicant role in reforming the elitist British educa-tional system. This made it possible for Nigerians tolink the opening to education for different classes andthe expansion of access across regional lines to thelarger project of economic development and nationbuilding.122 Most importantly, this effort helped cre-

ate and spread a common English-speaking nationalNigerian culture.

The demographics of the Nigerian people holdpromise as a unifying factor through education and in-


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tegrated settling, while also posing pressures throughpoorly addressed health needs, rapid population

growth, poorly managed urbanization, as well as sus-picion of Western education by some and inadequateliteracy for modernization.

THE ECONOMY

Perhaps the greatest single factor shaping the Ni-gerian economy is the change from a relatively in-tegrated agricultural-based economic system witha growing manufacturing based sector to a highlyconcentrated single resource-based economy. In pre-colonial days, commercial routes united Nigerianswho traded coastal sh and salt for kola nuts and cas-sava from the forests; beans, horses, and cattle prod-ucts from the north; and yams from the Middle Belt.123

Although much of Nigerias food today is imported,the age-old trade in regionally raised food stuffs con-tinues between north and south, reinforcing their co-dependency.124 Beyond the roads, river transportationnetworks bind the country, as noted earlier, as do therailroads built by the British in the late 1800s and early1900s. The railroads improved inter-Nigerian trade infood and cash crops, exported minerals from the in-terior, allowed the spread of ideas, and fostered mi-gration to pursue economic opportunitiesthus moreclosely integrating northern and southern Nigeria.125Nigerias economic differences make its regions de-pend upon and complement one another.

PETROLEUM POLITICS

At independence in 1960, the economy was thenrelatively well-integrated. Agriculture was the main-


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stay of the economy as well as the cultural base of mostethnic groups. In 1964, it contributed 61 percent of the

GDP and 71 percent of total exports. Nigeria was notonly self-sufcient in food production, but also was anexporter until 1973.

Economic integration began to unravel as oil roseto dominate the Nigerian economy. Since its discov-ery in 1956, oil has played an ever greater and now all-consuming role in Nigerias economy, politics, and so-ciety.126 Petroleums share of GDP rose from 1 percentin 1960 to 26 percent in 1970, and its share of total ex-port revenue grew to 94 percent by 1976.127 As invest-ment shifted, agricultures contribution to GDP andtotal exports quickly fell.128 Further undercutting localproducers, crude oil earnings were primarily used forhuge imports of consumables.129 This transformed thematerial base of society.130 High government revenue

derived from easily controllable petroleum created aclassic rentier state, with the government receivingrevenue streams independent of broadly based taxa-tion and the electorate, and hence largely unaccount-able to its people.

A similar crowding out of investment was seen inthe once promising manufacturing sector. Pre-colonialNigeria had a long tradition of industry that exploitedavailable natural resources like cotton for textiles andpalm for oil processing and soap production.131 Dur-ing the colonial period, Western economic inuence,especially a monetary base for the economy, rootedquickly and deeply among the coastal societies, butwas resisted in the more static cultures of the north,economically widening the existing physical, cultural,

and religious gaps.132 These were the foundations forlarger scale manufacturing starting in the 1950s.133Over the last 2 decades, manufacturing based on Ni-gerias natural resources continued with the produc-


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tion of petroleum-derived chemicals and fertilizers,paper and pulp, steel, cement, textiles, beverages, food

stuffs, and rubber products.134

Most of these industriesare located in vibrant southern Nigeria where naturalresources, capital, and a better educated work forceare centered.135 But manufacturing remains starvedof investment and infrastructure, which is more of-ten geared towards extraction activities. In electricalgeneration, for example, Nigeria produces only 40percent of the countrys needs, forcing manufactur-ers and households to resort to expensive electricalgenerators for power.136 With a heavy focus on oilproduction, a long tradition of manufacturing in Ni-geria has been unable to progress sufciently due inlarge part to poor policies, lack of investment, andinsufcient infrastructure.

Nigerias economy is large, reecting its huge

population and centuries of integration into the globaleconomy. The Nigerian economy ranks 32nd in theworld in GDP purchasing power parity, with $378 bil-lion in 2010, and a very healthy real growth rate aver-aging over 7 percent since 2003.137 However, a dismaleconomic record for the decades preceding this recentspurt dropped per capita income from a promising$1,500 during the 1970s to less than $300 in 1998 beforerecovering to $1,470 per capita GDP (ofcial exchangerate) in 2010.138 During the worst period (1980-2000),Nigerias poverty rate doubled to 70 percent whereit stubbornly remained until 2007 (the latest guresavailable). Even the recent higher growth rates cancreate ethnic friction when development opportuni-ties bring together previously separated groups, with

new arrivals resented by the natives.139 Nigerias greateconomic potential has so far been under-realized,with a scarcity of economic activities foster[ing] com-petition over resources.140


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CORRUPTION

The most harmful effect of the vast sums petro-leum brings to Nigeria is almost certainly the equal-ly vast corruption it leaves in its wake. Widespreadcorruption explains much of the poor performancein all of Nigerias economic sectors. TransparencyInternational, the corruption nongovernment organi-zation (NGO) watchdog, rated the perception of cor-ruption in Nigerias public sector at 2.4 (where 10 isthe cleanest government). This places Nigeria at 143of 180 countries measured.141 Corruption has doggedthe government for decades, with up to a quarter ofoil revenues disappeared, and Nigerias anti-cor-ruption chief reporting 70% of Nigerias oil wealthwas wasted or stolen in 2003, however, by 2005 thenumber dipped to only 40%.142 The scale of corrup-

tion has grown alongside the revenues collected fromoil, giving the ruling elite easy access to state mon-ey and shorting its citizens of economic and humandevelopment funds.143

Deepening poverty throughout the country iswidely blamed on Nigerias leaders who are oftenseen as only looking after their own interests.144 Theexplosion of corruption during periods of militaryrule damaged the militarys legitimacy as an institu-tion and the related claims that it should govern inorder to clean up Nigerian political life.145

In Nigeria, elected ofce has become one of themost effective ways of getting rich and gaining per-sonal power.146 In addition to outright theft, the elitealso rig the system in their favor to the detriment of

ordinary Nigerians and the economy by preventingrepairs to government reneries, for example, to ben-et vested interests in imported petroleum products,


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or by stalling power plants in order to prot from thesales of generators.147 The traditional client-patron re-

lationship in Nigerian societies lends itself to moderncorruption, where, for instance in the north, a pow-erful and wealthy feudal elite held power for 200years through patronage and appeal to religious senti-ment.148 Corruption is recognized for its ill effects, butofcial and civil society efforts to thwart it have fre-quently been opposed or circumvented. Even reformthrough religiously led struggle, or jihad for Muslims,has been co-opted, driving some Nigerians into moremilitant Islamic fundamentalism to combat this evil.149Poor economic conditions, lack of opportunity, andoutright corruption all contribute to violence withinNigeria, often on a regional or ethnic basis.150

The dominance of petroleum in Nigerias econ-omy and politics has made the country subject to a

single, internationally uctuating source of income,has diminutized other sectors of the economy, andhas made Nigeria one of the most politically unstableand corrupt states in the world.151 In particular, theconcentrated location of oil and accompanying natu-ral gas deposits in (and increasingly off-shore) thefragile coastlands area of the Niger Delta had evenmore profound effects. This transformed the Deltainto one of the most intractable sources of politicaldestabilization, [which] constitutes a profound threatto national security, and economic development of theNigerian state.152

Problems in the Delta.

The Niger River Delta, the source of much of Nige-rias current wealth, consists of 9 of Nigerias 36 statesand occupies 12 percent of the countrys territory. The


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core delta states of Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, and AkwaIbom have more than three-quarters of the onshore

oil production and half of the regional population.The concentration of oil production and populationhas greatly degraded the environment, devastatinglocal shing and farming,153 with little to no effectivecompensation. This results in the paradox that theDelta has Nigerias lowest standard of living and suf-fers considerable environmental degradation from itsrich hydrocarbon extraction.154 Little has been done tocounter the environmental despoliation caused by un-fettered oil exploitation. Flaring of by-product naturalgas also pollutes crops and air, and is destructive towildlife. Farming and shing grounds have been ru-ined, and gas aring in the Delta is cited as Africassingle biggest contribution to greenhouse gas emis-sions.155 The predominantly rural population, which

consists of at least 40 different ethnic groups withperhaps 250 languages and dialects, has developeda common identity of being Delta people, withouta strong sense of being Nigerians. Cities like Warri,Port Harcourt, Sapele, and Ughelli have long sinceexceeded their carrying capacity and have little tono infrastructure.156

Responding to the destruction of their traditionaleconomic and cultural base, much of the populationat least passively supports a wide variety of armedcriminal and political groups who kill for hire andtarget Western oil companies for extortion. Smugglingof stolen petroleum by sea in exchange for weapons aswell as cash is endemic (and a signicant cause of cor-ruption in the Nigerian military).157 Armed separatist

groups repeatedly form and reform. Violent clasheshave resulted in 1,500 deaths annually in the region

and a destabilizing ow of internally displaced per-


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sons, adding to an already high rural to urban migra-tion rate.158 The Delta has become a signicant fault

line in Nigeria.159

Paradoxically, it may also be a uni-fying factor, as the other regions appear unwilling toeither lose the economic resources it controls or allowcompeting groups to gain complete control.

WHAT DIVIDES CAN UNITE

Despite its destructive role, both in the Delta andnationally, the oil economy is also a strong unifyingfactor, perhaps the most important at work in Nigeriatoday. Oil revenues distributed by the central govern-ment to Nigerias states and provinces may be the mostpowerful of all incentives for unity among the manydisparate economic, religious, ethnic, and regionalgroups. Each faction is beholden to the federal gov-

ernment for its share of the wealth, and with it result-ing patronage, increase in government workers, andmore central government control over the economy.160Ironically, the distribution of this wealth is often thecause of conict among Nigerians, but, with bettermanagement, Nigerian oil revenues could be the keyto stability and progress. The high economic growthrates recently achieved in Nigeria may be testamentto the success of such improved management. As ris-ing standards of living tend to reduce factionalism,the new economy and high oil prices reinforce long-established economic centripetal forces in keeping Ni-gerians working together.161

Despite its past of poor economic performance andrampant corruption, which have stunted and twisted

Nigerias economy to the detriment of many of its peo-ple, the economy remains the single most integratingforce in Nigeria. With a history of regional specializa-


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tion and resulting trade, respectable current economicgrowth, and vast natural resource wealth to boost eco-

nomic and human development, Nigerians may see abrighter economic future together than apartassum-ing that politics and communal strife do not intervene.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

The ultimate cause behind the regional, ethnic, andreligious rivalries and conict, made worse by previ-ous colonial and federal government policies, maynow be the struggle for control over Nigerias wealth,mainly its petroleum income. Management of Nige-rias political economy (a broad concept that looks foreconomic motives behind political and social actions,and is concerned about the interconnection of eco-nomic and political structures in social formation162)

may well decide Nigerias future. Oxford UniversitysPaul Collier explains that the primary motivation forconicts are the opportunities to be gained from them,rather than the past grievances enduredmeaningthat regional, ethnic, or religious afliations may bemore the traits around which to organize to attainpolitical economy ends rather than the real causes ofviolence.163 This political economy explains in partwhy Nigeria is Balkanized today, with disputes ex-acerbated by institutional weaknesses, identity grouprivalries in zero sum competition, and political cor-ruption. The political economy is both Nigerias mostimportant centripetal and centrifugal factor, and itsmanagement will determine Nigerias future unity.

Identity afliations can be instrumentalized by

groups to protect or enrich themselves through po-litical power and economic resources, and cumulativebouts of violence make each instance of organizing such


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instruments easier.164 The Berom, mainly Christianfarmers from the central Plateau State, are an example

of an ethnic minority who fear that weak connectionsand lack of patronage from the federal governmentallows dominant groups to displace them or despoiltheir lands with pollution from nearby tin mines.They organize as ethnic and economic groups to gainprotection, autonomy, and control over resources.165Similar situations concerning the rights of indigenousminorities and migrants play out from the Niger Deltato northern Kaduna state creating some of Nigeriaslargest and deadliest conicts.166 To alleviate suchconcerns, the federal government has granted largerminorities nancial considerations for their loyalty tothe government, and some have been granted theirown states.167

Institutional deciencies in Nigeria have abetted

the scramble for resources and power. As noted ear-lier, poorly imposed Western structures and systemsmade indigenous methods and modern institutionsdysfunctional.168 In modern Nigeria, the inadequatecondition of public services, policing, infrastructure,and the bureaucracy result in inequitable distributionof public goods and services. The dependence on andneed for this public distribution, and its effect of cor-rupting ofcials and politicians, aggravates socialdivisions and undermine[s] the legitimacy of govern-ment.169 Organizing identity groups to protect mi-norities against dominating majority groups, of whichthe Berom are an example, is enshrined in Nigeriasconstitution by which state and local governmentsmay protect indigenous communities by discriminat-

ing against non-natives.170


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However, competing claims to rights and entitle-ments create friction between groups where place of

origin is more nebulous than the constitution envi-sions, and indigeneship contradicts other constitu-tional rights guaranteeing all Nigerians freedom fromdiscrimination and freedom of movement.171 For ex-ample, the Niger Delta violence occurs mainly becauseService delivery across the region is appalling andheavily compromised by patronage and corruption,despite this region having produced $200 billion inpetroleum revenues for the federal government dur-ing the past decade.172 Out of desperation, some Ni-gerians, especially the youth, resort to vigilantism orethnic militias to supply policing where it is formallyinsufcient or go so far as violence and terrorism toattain their political or economic demands.173 Unfor-tunately, the laws and structures in place to ensure

regional and national protections and progress havebeen undermined since independence through poorimplementation by Nigerias elites who have provenvenal, partisan, self-serving, and lacking in nationalpolitical will.174 Strong leadership can correct theproblems of weak institutions, but Nigeria has none.This lack of strong national leadership encourages fac-tionalism through indigeneship and competition forpower and resources.

The constitution thus enables partisan leaders toexploit the compounding fractures in Nigerian soci-ety by organizing groups in self-serving, sometimesviolent, ways. This is another cause of Balkanizationin Nigeria and a tradition dating back to the Britishpolicy of divide and rule. Politics used for private

ends to enjoy the wealth of public resources is widelyprevalent in Nigeria.175 Distribution of nite resourc-es and wealth through political power is a zero sum


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competition among political elites who exacerbatetheir constituencies differences for their own personal

gain and to deect attention from overall poor gover-nance and economic conditions.176 Political parties inNigeria seem to organize to economically and politi-cally advance their own elite by doling out patronageto clients in arrangements one author described asMaa-like associations.177

The instrumentalization of identity is apparent inthe recurring crises in Plateau States capital of Jos.Here fear that domination by Muslim Hausa-Fulanisettlers would displace Christian indigenous elitesfrom their privileged position motivated the use ofthe indigenous masses as pawns on the chessboardof the political elite.178 The expectation of access tolucrative powerful positions in government by theelite is rampant at state and federal levels and is a pil-

lar of the zoning system described earlier.179

Beforetheir proliferation, state governments were scallyself-sufcient, but since the 1960s, the power of stateshas grown relatively weaker as the size of their bu-reaucracies grew and they began to depend on federalsubsidies.180 What has not changed is the desire ofmembers of the political class for access to power andmoney, and need to control the federal governmentand its distribution of revenues that leads to deepregional antagonisms.181

The allocation of resource revenues from the fed-eral government is probably the central point aroundwhich ethnic groups contend, shifting the distribu-tion formula based on who holds power. States thatproduce most of Nigerias revenues have been able to

extract more funds for their development, the deriva-tion principle. These funds have grown from 3 per-cent in the early 1990s to 18 percent, although they are


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still not the level of 20-25 percent sought. Some groupsuse threats of violence to gain political and economic

strength. Ethnically and regionally organized groups,like the Movement for the Emancipation of the NigerDelta (MEND), curbed Nigerias petroleum outputby about 25 percent through violence in 2006, driv-ing in part changes in revenue distributions.182 This isa successful example of a common method by whichgroups use violence so that they can gain greater fa-vor from the government.183 Nigerias political econ-omy is a lucrative resource divided among its eliteswho mobilize identity groups based on ethnicity, re-ligious, and regional afliations although those mo-bilized masses more often insufciently benet fromtheir participation.

Weak institutions and mobilization of identitygroups are often exploited by Nigerias ruling class

for their own selsh benet. Political and economiccorruption, then, may be the origin of the ghtingover the political economy, and the violence derailingfurther Nigerian unity and development. Economicgains from holding ofce are the primary motivationof politics in Nigeria.184 Distorted traditional formsof the client-patron relationship have co-opted con-stituents of politicians, civil servants, and the militaryinto making political corruption a venue by whichconnected Nigerians are enriched. Voters are oftenconvinced that they gain when their identity groupsbenet by the actions of politicians, and are mobilizedto their servicelegitimate and otherwise.185

The enriched elite and their associates, then, mustprotect their power to continue to derive these bene-

ts. Thus, to maintain political position, corruption inmodern Nigeria has been essential through electoralfraud, killing and imprisoning opposition members,


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use of violence and intimidation, extortion and out-right stealing to name just some methods.186 Nigerian

elites employ competing identity groups to ensure thefuture of their power and economic bases, and addresstheir constituents political anxiety and collectivefears of the future, which the elites callously createor reinforce.187 Unfortunately, the perception that themasses in these identity groups benet from factionalpolitics is misplaced, because the greed and lack of ac-countability of its leaders, especially at the state andlocal levels, leave little to trickle down. This accountsfor the miserable state of the Niger Delta communi-ties despite billions in revenue now allocated to thesestates.188 Since the elite depend on resource distribu-tions rather than taxes for funds needed for governingand their illicit personal revenues, they have growndismissive of their constituents except when needed

to mobilize in support of the elites interests.189

Localmilitias and terrorist groups, like MEND and BokoHaram, are a reaction against the corruption of localethnic and religious elites. Their aim is to gain morecontrol of power and resources for the constituentsrather than their corrupt representatives and lead-ers.190 Economic and political corruption by Nigerianelites has hijacked the political economy of Nigeria,leaving in its wake a fractured and impoverishedcountry and a roiling citizenry.

Despite its complex past, reason for hope remainsfor unity among Nigerians, especially as the FourthRepublic matures politically. Historian Adiele Agbobelieved Nigerian unity could be rebuilt through thelessons of its pre-colonial histories, in which differ-

ing ethnic, religious, regional, economic, and politicalgroups complemented one another and settled differ-ences more constructively than today, although not


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conict free.191 Recent political events also may indi-cate that Nigerias fractious past is ending, with four

consecutive elections for executives with successfultransfers of power and the 2011 poll showing a markedimprovement over previous ones, as signs of coopera-tion. The election in 2011 of President Jonathan, a mi-nority Ijaw from the impoverished Niger Delta stateof Bayelsa, may be a welcome change from businessas usual.192 As Nigerian citizens experience the cur-rent federal political system, they are gaining a moretolerant view of its workings, even among skepticalnorthern Nigerians.193 The single strongest factor inpreserving Nigeria is perhaps that no powerful group,from the military to the minorities, seriously wants todismember Nigeria, all seeing the economic advan-tages of unity, even while ghting over its spoils.194Nigeria today hangs in balance with unity or devolu-

tion both possible. The result depends upon how itsleaders guide Nigeria through its crises and manageits extreme and violent elements.

FAULT LINES

Nigeria already possesses the characteristics of ashatter belt, the fracturing of a region under persistentstress from external forces. Parochial interests createdby religious, cultural, ethnic, economic, regional, andpolitical secessionist tendencies, as outlined herein,are endemic in Nigeria. Under such stresses, Nigerianunity may fail. Should Nigerias leaders mismanagethe political economy and reinforce centrifugal forcesin Nigeria, the breaks to create autonomous regions

or independent countries would likely occur along itspreviously identied fault lines.195 Having already ex-perienced one brutal civil war, Nigeria is at risk for a


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recurrence of conict or dissolution, especially sincesome of the underpinning motivations of the war re-

main unresolved.196

From 1999 to 2006, 14,000 Nigeri-ans were killed across the country, and three millionNigerians were displaced in intercommunal clashes.197

Should Nigerians be unable to reconcile the im-peratives of nationhood with entrenched regional,ethnic, and religious identities, they could split un-der conditions similar to recent successions in Indo-nesia, Ethiopia, and Yugoslavia, or the de facto breakin Somalia.198 Indeed, East Timor, Eritrea, Croatia, andSomaliland indicate that the weakest point of failingstates is along relict colonial borders. Each of thesecontiguous states was administered separately by dif-ferent colonial masters before being poorly merged to-gether prior or subsequent to independence. Of moreinterest for Nigerian unity is that this may also occur

between regions separately administered by a com-mon colonial power as occurred between Malaysiaand Singapore, and North and South Sudan, wheredifferences proved irreconcilable after the departureof British administration. At least some of the result-ing regions and states of a possible Nigerian devolu-tion may divide along such internal lines.

Although the two protectorates that formed mod-ern Nigeria formally existed for only short periods (14years from 1900 for the north, and 8 years from 1906for the south), they themselves were formed from ear-lier autonomous protectorates (the Colony and Pro-tectorate of Lagos to the west, a smaller Protectorateof Southern Nigeria to the east extending westwardacross the Niger River to include modern Ebo state,

and a very recognizable Protectorate of Northern Ni-geria).199 This north-south colonial border represents amyriad of persistent physical and human differences


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in Nigeria that endure today as a relict political bound-ary. As early as 1905, the northern border of southern

Nigeria was delimited by the British as a straight linefrom the German Kamerun border 10 miles south ofTakum due west to Ida through then uncharted ter-ritory, to follow westward the approximate northernborders of present day states Edo, Ondo, Ekiti, Osun,and Oyo.200 Although this line has been adjusted sub-sequently to reect better knowledge and evolvingcircumstances, its essence has remained little changedto the current era.201

The two protectorates that joined to form the 1906Protectorate of Southern Nigeria are also important inany possible future devolution story because they ap-proximate a second fault line in modern Nigeria alongthe Niger River and its Delta, which demarcates thetraditional areas of the Yoruba and Igbo. The west-

ern Lagos protectorate was acquired by the British in1861 and grew in size until 1886 when the territorywas rst administered directly from Lagos itself. Afterthe Berlin Conference in 1885, the British establishedthe separate Oil Rivers Protectorate spanning from theNiger Delta to Old Calabar. In 1893, this protectoratewas expanded westward to the Lagos protectorateand northward to the Niger River port city of Idah(Ida or Idda) 40 miles south of Lokoja, approximatingthe later boundaries of the 1906 Protectorate of South-ern Nigeria. Unlike the territorial self-government ofLagos, however, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeriawas administered directly from the Colonial Ofce inLondon.202 The 1906 amalgamation of southern Nige-ria proved eeting, however, when in 1939 the Brit-

ish split it again along the Niger River, conrming thedeep differences between the more urban and central-ly organized Yoruba as the Western Province, and the


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village-oriented sub-tribal stage of development ofSobo, Igbo, and Ibibio Eastern Province.203 Again co-

lonial administration reected traditional differencesthat persisted in manifesting themselves throughoutNigerias history and started a long sequence of frac-turing in Nigerian political states.

In turn, these early colonial regions reectedclosely the outline of 19th century pre-colonial statesand peoples with the Fulani Sokoto Caliphate andBornu Kingdom to the north; Igbo, Ibibio, and relatedpeoples communities to the east; and a collection ofYoruba dominated states to the west, including theKingdoms of Benin and Warri. Only the Igala, Idoma,Tiv, and Jukun people along the south bank of theBenue River were outside of the 1960 Northern Regionto which they would be a part.204 Early British admin-istrators recognized the divergent interests of these

western, eastern, and northern regions, but were com-pelled to merge them because the northern protector-ate could not economically sustain itself. In one formor another, these internal regional boundaries proveddurable for a century.

The administrative lines that separated the protec-torates also roughly demarcate a series of other physi-cal and human differences within Nigeria that havesharply delineated its people, as outlined throughoutthis monograph. Physical geography, which is thefoundation for human activities such as agriculture,housing structures, settlement patterns, and other cul-tural activities helped to form the different regional,ethnic, and cultural groupings in Nigeria. Such groupsmay complement each other, adding to Nigerias di-

versity and strength through trade, diplomacy, anddiffusion of ideas, as often occurred in the regionspre-colonial history.205 However, if the differences are

nigerian unity: in the balance

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