nigeria: the policy conundrum

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Nigeria: The Policy ConundrumAuthor(s): Adonis HoffmanSource: Foreign Policy, No. 101 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp. 146-158Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149414 .

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Nigeria: The Policy Conundrum by Adonis Hoffman

f all the countries in Africa, Nigeria presents American policymakers with a unique political and foreign policy quandary. Once expected to become black Africa's economic showpiece and continental powerhouse, Nigeria now faces a political and

economic crisis of historic proportions. Its relations with the West are at an all-time low. Despite considerable posturing by the United States and Great Britain on measures to coax and compel Nigeria's military government to comply with international norms of governance, the West is reluctant to impose any framework that would irremediably jeopardize or disrupt bilateral relations with the most populous nation on the African continent. While U.S. policy involves a tenuous mixture of quiet diplomacy and limited sanctions, it is evident that Washington does not quite know what to do about Nigeria.

Nigeria's departure from the path to democracy and the country's rocky history following the annulment of the June 12, 1993, election have been well chronicled. After what appeared to have been a cer- tifiably free and fair presidential election, yielding an apparent winner in Moshood Abiola, Nigeria's military suspended the electoral process. Former defense minister General Sani Abacha seized power, instituted a form of martial law, began rule by decree, disbanded all state and local legislatures, closed independent newspapers, and

A D 0 N I S H 0 F F M A N is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. From 1991 to 1993, he served as counsel and staff director of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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NIGERIA

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MAP BY DAVID MERRILL



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banned all political activities. Dissidents were jailed, harassed, or sought exile, and an ugly chapter in Nigerian history unfolded.

What followed was vociferous opposition from a Nigerian citizenry with high expectations and unrealized dreams for a democratically elected civilian government. After Abiola's arrest on charges of trea- son for declaring himself president in June 1994, demonstrations and riots broke out as did a prolonged strike against the country's petroleum industry. Divided along deep and long-standing regional, religious, and ethnic lines, Nigeria appeared to be headed for internal war. As the world watched, a series of tragic events suggested the pos- sibility of another African failure, not unlike those of Liberia, So- malia, Angola, and Rwanda.

One year ago I predicted, like others, that Nigeria was on the brink of an imminent and disastrous civil war. I was wrong. Those foreign policy experts who predicted that Nigeria would deteriorate into an internecine bloodbath comparable to that in Rwanda were also wrong. Anyone now looking at Nigeria's situation objectively should acknowledge that times have changed, and the prospect of civil war is remote.

In recent months, countless commentators, reacting to Nigeria's fall from the high road toward civilian rule, have prescribed various courses of action for the United States. Despite the honorable in- tentions of groups favoring human rights, democracy, and economic reform, the debate on American policy toward Nigeria has been de- void of political realism. If U.S. policy on Nigeria is to be sound, and if bilateral relations are to be restored to normalcy, there is no room for fictionalizing or oversimplifying Nigeria's political predicament.

After a recent visit to Nigeria in which I had the opportunity to meet with political leaders from all factions-including Abacha; Abi- ola, imprisoned winner of the annulled June 12 election; members of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Nigeria's principal opposition group; and traditional local leaders-I am firmly con- vinced that the United States can play a critical role in Nigeria's political and economic expiation. That role must be tempered, however, by an uncluttered sense of America's short- and long-term interests, an appreciation of Nigeria's history, and an acceptance of each nation's limitations.

America's capacity to effect positive change in Nigeria is sub- stantially larger than what is implied by the two stark options an-

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choring the current debate: enacting a policy of harsher sanctions against Nigeria or acquiescing to the Abacha regime's stated timetable for transition to civilian rule. Developing and maintaining a policy that is sensible and efficacious vis-.i-vis American and Nigerian interests will be no easy task for President Bill Clinton and his administration.

BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS, READING

CONFLICTING SIGNS

he Nigeria policy conundrum involves balancing competing and equally compelling interests. On one side, there is a small but vocal chorus of concerned groups led by Amnesty Inter-

national, members of the Congressional Black Caucus (cBc), Green- peace, Human Rights Watch, TransAfrica, and Nigerian-American organizations demanding that the United States isolate and sanction the Nigerian government until its ruler, General Abacha, builds a bet- ter human rights record and ultimately capitulates in favor of an elected government. Anti-Abacha activists have likened the current regime to South Africa under apartheid, and they have embarked on a high-profile campaign of confrontation politics that includes demonstrations at the Nigerian Embassy and the use of Hollywood celebri- ties to promote sanctions against the Nigerian government. Although Clinton is troubled by Abacha's stubbornness, he is reluctant to ac- quiesce leadership on Nigeria policy to American protesters-and he should be.

On the other hand, the Clinton administration is mindful of Nigeria's importance and its economic relationship with the United States. Nigeria has been a consistently reliable supplier of petroleum, choosing not to participate in the Arab oil boycott of the 1970s. Re- cently, Nigeria has been anywhere from America's fifth- to its second-largest foreign source of crude oil. Overall U.S. investment in Nigeria approaches $4 billion, principally in the petroleum sector. By the end of the decade, Nigeria could become an important supplier of natural gas for the United States, where demand is rising. Given the depth and growth potential of American investment in Nigeria's energy sector, the United States is reluctant to pursue policies that could undermine its commercial and energy interests there.

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Other considerations further complicate U.S. policy deliberations regarding Nigeria. The first is Nigeria's size and regional dominance. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated 100 million people. Approximately one out of every seven Africans is Nigerian. Its economy is the subcontinent's second largest, following South Africa, and it is a major contributor to United Nations peacekeeping efforts and operations throughout the world. Nigeria assumed a leadership role (along with Ghana) in helping to enforce a ceasefire of and negotiate a settlement to the protracted Liberian civil war. This influence has not been lost on ei- ther Clinton or National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, both of whom came to office touting the administration's unwavering commitment to engagement and conflict resolution in Africa.

Further complicating American policy has been Nigeria's less- than-sterling international reputation. Its commercial credibility and financial creditworthiness have been seared by a legacy of government corruption and well-chronicled international business scams. Although it neither produces nor consumes narcotics in any appre- ciable quantities, Nigeria is widely reputed to be a major transship- ment point on the international narcotics circuit. American Embassy officials in Lagos point out that there is no hard evidence implicat- ing high-ranking Nigerian government officials; nonetheless, the United States decertified Nigeria for its failure to comply with international narcotics-interdiction efforts. As a result, the United States must suspend consideration of applications for Overseas Private In- vestment Corporation and Export-Import Bank projects in Nigeria and vote unfavorably on matters pertaining to Nigeria in international multilateral development forums.

Nigeria's inability or reluctance to institute economic reform has been as problematic for the West as have the country's political problems. Its annual per capita income-once among the highest in Africa-is now less than $320, despite the fact that oil export rev- enues over the last 25 years exceeded $210 billion. In 1993, the World Bank ranked Nigeria among the world's 20 poorest countries: With an inflation rate estimated at 55 per cent, an unemployment rate that continues to climb, and an external debt burden of more than $37 billion, the economy will continue to deteriorate in the absence of economic reform. As a result, Nigeria has forfeited its once-uncon- tested claim to the mantle of African economic leadership.

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While the West has lamented both the gradual erosion of the Nigerian economy and the lapsed efforts at democratic reform, these alone have not been sufficient to compel significant changes in American policy. Over the last two years, however, three major events in Nigeria have presented both the Americans and the British with particularly difficult policy decisions: l Heralded as a shift from military rule and a restoration of civilian

democracy, the June 12, 1993, national election, Nigeria's first in a decade, was viewed by international observers as essentially free and fair. It yielded an apparent winner in Abiola. The election's annulment by then Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida has become a watershed event for Nigeria. The subsequent assumption of power by the Nigerian military and the imprisonment of Abi- ola ignited the current internal political crisis.

0 The military's systematic crackdown on government critics has been especially difficult for the West. Leaders of virtually every credible human rights, legal, and pro-democracy opposition group have been jailed, harassed, or have sought exile at some point, re- sulting in intermittent civil unrest and several major strikes. The arrest, trial, and sentencing of 40 Nigerians, including former president Olusegun Obasanjo, on charges of complicity in an alleged coup against Abacha may have been the coup de grace. Unlike any other single event, the arrests and subsequent sentences, some of which included death, imposed by a secret military tribunal, gal- vanized British and American resolve. Obasanjo, who received a life sentence, is highly recognized and respected and has garnered world citizenship through service on foundation boards in the United States and Europe and his extensive network of international supporters. As the only Nigerian president to voluntarily relinquish power, Obasanjo remains something of a role model. In August, Clinton telephoned Abacha advising him that relations would worsen if executions occurred. In October, Abacha announced that the death sentences were commuted and Obasanjo's sentence was reduced to 15 years.

0 After promising to relinquish control to a civilian government, Abacha announced on October 1, 1995, that the transition would take place over three years. This lengthy time frame disappointed the West, which hoped for a shorter period. While the Clinton administration applauded Nigeria's commutation of the sentences

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of the coup plotters, its dissatisfaction with the time frame and the lack of detail on the transition program prompted it to main- tain existing sanctions.

NIGERIA'S REALPOLITIK

By any standard, the problems facing the Republic of Nigeria are complicated: The situation in Nigeria rivals a few of the world's current trouble spots in both complexity and irresolvability, in-

cluding the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nigeria's political predicament is arguably the most important item on America's policy agenda in Africa. But if Western policymakers are to help Nigeria through this crisis, they must first acknowledge several hard realities about Nigerian politics.

The Military

The military has ruled Nigeria, often brutishly, for 25 of the 35 years since its independence from Great Britain. Under the lofty but transparent pretext of rescuing the republic from disintegration and corrupt civilian government, successive military regimes have engaged in wholesale larceny of the public trust. They have suppressed the development of truly national political institutions and have benefited from the political and economic disarray following each failed effort at democracy. A prevailing belief within Nigeria's army is that military rule is not anathema to progress or democracy, and they cite the history of military regimes in South Asia and Latin America as justification for this belief.

Abacha is firmly entrenched and does not intend to relinquish power to any civilian government, regardless of who leads it. How- ever turbulent the interim period becomes, Abacha appears willing to withstand external reprobation and internal dissension because he believes that the military in Nigeria is the custodian of the public trust. What has made the Abacha regime unique has been its open avowal to remain unaffected by the West's disapproval. It is unlikely that pressure from the West will diminish the strength or importance of the military in Nigeria. The best prospect for minimizing, or altogether nullifying, military dominance in Nigerian political affairs is to structure a rapprochement between military and civilian leaders

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such that each respects the inherent domain of the other. The West will have to abandon or put in abeyance its notion that Western-style multiparty democracy is the only paradigm for every country in Africa if such a rapprochement is to succeed.

The Opposition

A formalized political opposition still exists in Nigeria, but, contrary to reports in the United States, it is not monolithic. The opposition is also not particularly well-organized or consolidated around a common ideology, process, or set of objectives, although it certainly agrees on one thing: opposition to Abacha and military rule. Beyond that, serious fissures divide the united front, including disagreement on whether to press for "actualisation," the term the opposition uses for the implementation of the annulled June 12 election, including the installation of Abiola; whether to promote the establishment of a government of national unity; or whether to support the call for a Nigerian government-in-exile.

The opposition appears to be based in Lagos and the other large cities. In rural areas, political preferences often depend on region and tribe, and there is greater regard given to day-to-day economic matters than to who controls federal affairs. The political leadership in small villages and towns throughout Nigeria, especially in the pre- dominantly Hausa-Fulani, Muslim north, is concerned primarily with subsistence and subsidies. If the federal government can master those two areas, it will receive little opposition from the states.

Of the several opposition groups in Nigeria, NADECO is the largest and most prominent: Its membership consists of intellectuals, pro- fessionals, and former government officials. With multiethnic (primarily Yoruba with some Ibo) participation, NADECO has been able to keep a flicker of opposition alive in Nigeria, though it is limited to the greater Lagos area. NADECO has been more effective outside the country, particularly in the United States and the United King- dom, than inside Nigeria. Its clout in the country appears to be limited by several factors: divisions among the leadership on strategy and tactics, general political apathy among the Nigerian populace despite widespread disaffection with economic conditions, absence of a con- sensus on the June 12 issue, and continued arrests and restrictions imposed by the government. Despite these limitations, NADECO has

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kept dissent alive in Nigeria, and, for that alone, has reserved a place at the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, the opposition appears to be dividing along ethnic lines, reducing its potential national influence. With several opposition leaders in exile in the United States and Britain, NADECO is facing an internal crisis of leadership and direction and runs the risk of becoming irrelevant. Many opposition leaders have been jailed, ex- iled, or intimidated in a visible (and increasingly successful) effort by the military to quash resistance. Some in exile have adopted a con- ciliatory tone toward the military while others have abandoned the opposition altogether.

Nobel laureate author Wole Soyinka, head of the National Liber- ation Council, has called for the establishment of a government-in- exile with Abiola as titular president in absentia. The existence of such an entity would present problems for American policymakers, because the United States does not generally embrace dual recogni- tion. In effect, a government-in-exile would preclude any further dialogue between such a group and the U.S. government, and it would lead to further peripheralization of the opposition.

Unlike other countries where military rule has been met with armed resistance, there is scant evidence of such a phenomenon in Nigeria. Opposition groups have not engaged in or incited guerrilla resistance or terrorism aimed at the military government, nor are these tactics likely to be pursued. This missing element may reflect a lack of capacity, a lack of will, or a resignation in the face of over- whelming odds. The opposition, for its part, maintains that the re- pressive measures of Abacha's regime have driven armed resistors un- derground but that they are waiting to emerge.

A prolonged struggle requires two sides willing to promote and de- fend to the death their clearly defined interests. The absence of this element sets the Nigerian opposition apart from many others in Africa. In particular, it may be contrasted with the struggle of the African National Congress against apartheid in South Africa. This lack of capacity for armed resistance allows both the West and the Nigerian government itself to take the opposition less seriously.

At the same time, Abiola's victory in the June 12 election was im- pressive. Not only was he able to transcend Nigeria's deep ethnic, religious, and regional divisions by winning majorities in 19 of Nige- ria's 30 states, but he was able to instill a sense of hope that regional

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balance in national politics could finally be achieved. As the first southerner to win countrywide election, Abiola was on the road to an historic presidency in Nigeria. There is little doubt that his well- cultivated relations with the United States and Great Britain would have led Nigeria to new levels of foreign investment and trade.

It was not to be. Unfortunately, Abiola's victory, though decisive and witnessed by the world, will become but a rallying cry for pro- democracy die-hards and a footnote in Nigerian history. This trav- esty is a truism of the Nigerian political crisis.

The prospects for Abiola's imminent release and subsequent reemergence into Nigerian politics are not bright. While Abiola remains a popular national figure whose imprisonment is broadly viewed as unjustified, Abacha's October 1 address foreclosed an im- mediate release and placed Abiola's fate in the courts. The organized political opposition does not appear to be as strong as it was even a year ago, except in the southwest. Thus, Abacha's imprisonment of Abiola has been largely successful in removing him from the political memory of many Nigerians. The best hope for the West is to continue pressing for the safe and humane treatment of Abiola, while seeking to negotiate his permanent release.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

he Clinton administration has taken a number of steps to demonstrate U.S. disfavor with Nigeria, and it has sent clear signals that stronger actions could follow. Sanctions now in-

clude suspension of all military assistance, including training and joint exercises; a case-by-case review of all defense related export li- censes with presumption of denial; suspension of all nonsecurity foreign aid, except humanitarian and democracy assistance; and the denial of entry visas to high-ranking members of the Nigerian government and their families.

Though sanctions generally have had an almost negligible effect, the travel restrictions have been fairly effective. Confined by U.S. law to the 25-mile radius around Columbus Circle near the United Nations in New York, Nigerian officials have been unable to travel in the United States or make their case in the press and among policymakers. FAA restrictions on direct flights between the United States and Nigeria due to lax security at Lagos Airport have also

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proved bothersome for Nigerians engaged in international trade and commerce.

Another element in the U.S. approach is a measure of diplomacy. Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Donald McHenry has been appointed special envoy with broad-ranging diplomatic author- ity. McHenry's mission of quiet persuasion has taken him to Nigeria seven times in the last year. Widely respected by the Nigerians as a level-headed and skilled diplomat, McHenry has provided the United States with the most consistent channel to Abacha, and there is cau- tious optimism that his efforts could still pay off.

Overall, however, the U.S. effort has yielded few results. Nigeria's refusal to budge on the issue of Abiola's release and the laggard timetable it has proposed for the return to civilian rule have fueled increased debate over the need to impose stronger sanctions. Propo- nents of stronger measures contend that the best way to resuscitate the democratic process is to punish Nigeria by cutting off commercial, economic, and governmental discourse with the recalcitrant Abacha regime.

Following the Nigerian government's less-than-complete commutation of Obasanjo's sentence, some pro-democracy activists have suggested that the United States downgrade diplomatic relations with Nigeria. While such a move would signal America's disapproval, it would carry long-term consequences. If Abacha remains in power over the next three years, the United States could lose its ability to influence long-term change. The United States would also lose a diplomatic presence that, if nothing else, protects American commercial interests from unreasonable Nigerian governmental intrusion.

Several groups in Nigeria, Britain, and the United States recom- mend an embargo of Nigerian crude oil as a way to influence the Nigerian government. While TransAfrica, the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, and some members of the cBc have supported this approach, the Clinton administration has been reluctant. Its con- cerns are several: > A unilateral oil embargo by the United States will likely benefit

European oil companies while not necessarily penalizing the Nigerian government. Some American oil executives fear that Eu- ropean companies would capitalize quickly on an American with- drawal.

) An embargo could harm the American consumer. On the East

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Coast, where much of the Nigerian oil imported into the United States is used, consumers could be forced to pay higher prices at the pump in the short term. U.S. oil companies might suffer ir- reparable commercial losses is for their operations in Nigeria if their infrastructure were nationalized under Nigerian law.

P A 1994 U.S. General Accounting Office report pointed out that there is "little international political support for imposing a multilateral oil embargo. . . . With respect to a U.S. unilateral embargo on Nigerian oil, such an effort would have almost no im- pact on Nigeria's oil exports and economy, or the world oil market. Because the world oil market is highly integrated, [Nige- ria] could quickly adjust to a disruption in the usual patterns of supply caused by a unilateral embargo." Another proposal often made is that the Clinton administration

freeze the U.S. assets of the Nigerian government. Nigeria has promised to respond to any suspension by instituting a reciprocal suspension or forfeiture of American assets in Nigeria. Litigation in international forums to recover such a loss would be protracted and possibly futile.

A REALIST VIEW

Tt has become de rigueur to compare the situation in Nigeria with that in South Africa during apartheid. Though emotionally ap- ealing, this argument is fallacious. Sanctions will not isolate the

assets and revenue sources of the ruling elite, because much of the world will continue to do business with Nigeria no matter what the United States does. Sanctions, therefore, will not help ordinary Nige- rians topple their government. Unlike many other countries, Nigeria is insulated from outside pressure by virtue of its oil wealth and extensive involvement in African political affairs. A policy of sanctions would most likely have the effect of marginalizing U.S. influence over the current or successor regime. If efforts to force Zaire-a country with fewer resources and greater susceptibility to outside pressure- to enact democratic reforms have failed, then isolation alone is unlikely to work with Nigeria.

Engagement through overt government-to-government negotiation need not imply acceptance of the Abacha government's policies, as some pro-democracy activists argue. Engagement is necessary for the long-term promotion of democracy. Thus the United States

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should not rule out continued negotiation with the Nigerian military. African leaders such as Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Robert

Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda have all been involved in constructive engagement with the Abacha government since last year, and their nudging appears to be at least partially re- sponsible for the commutation of Obasanjo's sentence. Their approach recognizes Nigeria's political realities but refuses to accept them as immutable. This African view provides a guidepost for U.S. policy. It shows that direct engagement can be pursued in concert with other policy options, including the threat of sanctions.

Nigeria's political crisis cannot be resolved without a prolonged dialogue. This was needed in South Africa, Angola, and Mozam- bique, and it will be needed in Zaire and several other countries facing internal political conflict. Dialogue takes time and evidence of good faith by all parties to a negotiation, and it might require the suspension of penalties until a final resolution-or impasse-is reached.

The prerequisite to a policy of engagement and continued U.S. involvement in any negotiating process should be a commitment from Abacha to release Abiola and to refrain from political repression. The United States should then press Nigeria to pursue a political system that institutionalizes participatory democracy. To improve bilateral relations, the United States should work to present to Nigeria a range of incentives and disincentives and to seek the inclusion of Great Britain, Germany, France, and Japan into a "contact group" that would monitor progress. In sum, the Clinton administration must de- velop a set of practical policies based on the political realities of Nige- ria's unique situation.

Nigeria is a complex country. Regional, religious, and ethnic divisions roil the waters beneath an already turbulent political surface. There are few clean hands and few uncorrupted actors. The United States must be careful not to impose its notions of democracy on a country with traditions, objective conditions, and expectations that are markedly different from its own. A policy that ignores Nigeria's political, historical, and cultural realities not only risks being super- seded by events but also risks irremediable damage to America's interests in Africa's most populous nation.

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nigeria: the policy conundrum

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