new atheism and the causes of religious violence introduction...terrorism than to say that religion...
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New Atheism and the Causes of Religious Violence
Marcus Schulzke
University of Leeds
Introduction
The Global War on Terror raises important questions about the links between religion and
violence. Each time a terrorist attack occurs, politicians and media commentators are quick to
take up the debates over whether it was inspired by religion and the extent to which an attack by
religiously-motivated terrorists implicates all members of a religious community. These issues
have been particularly contentious following attacks by Islamic terrorists and have provoked
further concerns about immigration, ethnocentrism, and a looming ―clash of civilizations.‖
During this same period, new atheists have engaged in a concerted effort to challenge religion‘s
influence on public life. As part of this effort they have called attention to the links between
religion and violence, and those between religion and terrorism in particular. New atheists have
sought to demonstrate that religion encourages violence and that international security may be
improved through secularization.
Terrorism studies and new atheism share an interest in exploring the links between religion
and violence, yet they are separate discourses that rarely engage with each other. Terrorism
studies is overwhelmingly an academic enterprise that is carried on by social scientists and
addressed to other social scientists or policymakers. By contrast, new atheism is a diffuse social
movement that is informally led by public intellectuals and that takes a more inclusive form
because of their efforts at public outreach and persuasion. My goal in this essay is to generate
some dialogue between these fields by showing the extent to which each can benefit from the
other‘s insights.
I argue that new atheism provides a compelling account of how religion promotes terrorism,
which improves on some of the theories developed in terrorism studies. Studies of religious
terrorist organizations have produced important empirical findings, yet they often fail to address
some fundamental questions about the relationship between religion and violence. In particular,
they fail to note the ways in which faith motivates and excuses violence. New atheists give
greater attention to the causal mechanisms that underlie religious violence and are able to more
effectively explain things like how faith influences violent actors, the links between religious
moderates and extremists, and the persistence of religious violence over time.
New atheism can likewise benefit from drawing more heavily on terrorism studies. New
atheists develop strong theoretical accounts of how religion and violence are linked, yet their
empirical support comes from a relatively small range of high profile examples of religious
violence. New atheists tend to focus on organizations like Al Qaeda, while overlooking the many
other terrorist organizations with different ideological configurations. New atheists‘ critique of
religion can gain greater sophistication and nuance by acknowledging that religion does not
simply cause violence but rather does so in conjunction with grievances that may not have a
religious dimension.
The Rise of Religious Terrorism
No ideology has a monopoly on the use of violence or on terrorism in particular. A diverse
range of actors engage in terrorism, with motives ranging across the political spectrum.
Throughout much of the 20th
century, terrorism was most closely associated with leftist
organizations, and indeed the history of modern terrorism is often traced back to communist and
anarchist organizations that were formed in Russia during the final decades of the nineteenth
century. The most infamous terrorist organizations of the 1960s, and 70s, were generally left-
wing and nationalist organizations that did not have strong religious affiliations. Even some of
the precursors to religious terrorist organizations, such as those representing the Palestinians,
were primarily secular and motivated by non-religious goals.
The ideological character of terrorism changed during the 1980s, when the incidence of
religious terrorism rapidly increased at the same time as many leftist organizations were
destroyed or went into decline (Enders 2005: 47; Rapoport 2004). Although secular terrorist
organizations continue to exist and still carry out attacks around the world, they have been
overshadowed by the proliferation of religious terrorist organizations that have carried out major
mass casualty attacks. Islamic terrorists have created the most active and prominent
organizations, but they are joined by a host of other violent actors with different religious
affiliations (White 2001; Rapoport 2004; Pratt 2010). Christian identity theorists carried out
several major attacks in the United States, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing and the
Centennial Olympic Park bombing, as well as smaller attacks against abortion clinics, religious
sites, and members of the media. Japan was attacked several times by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.
Jewish terrorists have instigated violence between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as killing
more moderate Jewish leaders, including Yitzhak Rabin (Pedahzur 2009).
Despite the proliferation of attacks from organizations with strong religious affiliations
pursuing religiously-motivated goals, there is a great deal of debate in the terrorism studies
literature about the extent to which religion is a cause of violence. For some commentators,
religious terrorism represents a distinctive form of violence that is characterized by a particular
set of objectives, tactics, and ways of organizing. Others think that religion‘s influence on
terrorism is overstated and contend that ostensibly religious terrorist organizations are either less
threatening than they appear or that they are largely driven by non-religious motives.
Enders and Sandler take the former perspective, as they identify ―eight essential contrasts‖
between religious terrorists and the left-wing terrorists that preceded them (2005: 48). These
contrasts are important to consider, as the debate over the link between religion and violence in
terrorism studies is generally a debate over the extent to which these types of claims about the
distinctiveness of religious terrorism are accurate. First, whereas left-wing terrorists attempted to
represent a particular group, religious terrorists claim to represent the will of God. This divine
mission makes religious organizations less concerned with alienating potential supporters and
third-party audiences. Second, while left-wing terrorists tended to attack selected targets that
with minimal use of force, religious terrorists favor mass casualty attacks launched against
general targets. Third, in an effort to minimize casualties left-wing terrorists often gave warnings
about impending attacks. Religious terrorists, for whom the casualties themselves are the desired
goal, attack without warning and attempt to promote a generalized fear of unexpected attacks in
the future (Enders and Sandler 2005: 49).
Fourth, left-wing terrorists generally avoid suicide bombing, while some religious
organizations endorse this tactic as a means of intimidation and an act of religious devotion.
Fifth, left-wing terrorists showed an interest in their constituency and maintaining its supports,
and while religious terrorists also depend on their constituencies, they are generally less strongly
attached to them and less concerned with acting according to constituents‘ wishes. Sixth, left-
wing terrorist organizations favored tactics such as ―robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations‖
and religious organizations prefer ―bombings, armed attacks and kidnapping‖ (Enders and
Sandler 2005: 49). Seventh, left-wing terrorists have no interest in using weapons of mass
destruction because these weapons are indiscriminate and counterproductive in building
popularity. Religious terrorists, by contrast, often show an interest in obtaining and using those
weapons. Finally, whereas left-wing terrorists treat violence as a means to an end, religious
terrorists may see violence as an end in itself because it is directed against nonbelievers who
deserve divine punishment (Enders and Sandler 2005: 49).
Two issues are particularly important in this characterization of religious terrorism: whether
religion causes or promotes terrorism, and whether religious terrorism is more destructive or
threatening than secular terrorism. As I will discuss later, the literature on religious terrorism has
found compelling evidence to show that religious terrorism does tend to be more pernicious and
less restrained than secular variants. However, researchers have generally been more reluctant to
take on the issue of whether religion actually causes violence. One literature review of the field
notes that ―[m]ost of the literature that we reviewed avoids or skirts the issue of religion (except
in studies that purport to show that it is not an important factor in terrorism)‖ (Davis 2009:
xlviii). It goes on to say that ―Intellectually, scholars are uncomfortable highlighting religion
because they see it as a mere subset of ideology (or, at least, as heavily overlapping with
ideology)‖ (Davis 2009: xlix). Aside from a few noteworthy exceptions (Stern 2003a;
Juergensmeyer 2003, 2006), this characterization is fairly accurate. Thus, while terrorism studies
has reached well-supported conclusions about the destructiveness of religious violence, there is
substantial room for improving accounts of the causal mechanisms that produce it.
Evaluating the Causes of Terrorism
Juergensmeyer (2003, 2006) has made one of the most influential cases for thinking that
religion promotes terrorism, and is probably the most widely cited proponent of this view in
terrorism studies. Juergensmeyer does not think that religion directly causes terrorism, as this
would make little sense when so many religious people do not engage in any kind of violence.
Rather, he says that religion creates a ―culture of violence‖ that makes violence an attractive
strategy for achieving political change. This culture makes it possible to incite religious
extremists to take up arms when they have grievances and discourages them from attempting to
achieve their goals peacefully. Thus, it is more accurate to say that religion promotes or enables
terrorism than to say that religion causes terrorism.
Juergensmeyer argues that ―cultures of violence‖ that develop within various religious
traditions allow adherents to see violence as a necessary and just strategy. He identifies cultures
of violence in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Sikhism, thereby providing evidence
that the culture of violence is endemic in religion and not unique to a particular religious
tradition. Despite their many differences, these and other religions are similar in their capacities
for justifying violence. First, they see violence as having a transcendental significance. It is not
simply a means to an end but a way of stating a religious motive. It is an act of devotion
designed to demonstrate the religion‘s truth. This is why attacks are usually ―performative acts‖
designed to garner international media attention (Juergensmeyer 2003: 127). Second, religious
groups describe their violence in terms of a cosmic war between good and evil. This demonizes
enemies and justifies any tactics that are used to counter them while also separating the world
into martyrs and demons.
Opponents of the argument that religion promotes terrorism often make the point that violent
religious organizations are typically pursue some secular motives and take this as evidence that
there is nothing distinctive about religious violence. However, this is a point that Juergensmeyer
readily accepts. His contention is not that religion is the sole motive for violence but that when
religion is a motive or when it helps to justify attacks, it is extremely dangerous. As he says,
―What makes religious violence particularly savage and relentless is that its perpetrators have
placed such religious images of divine struggle – cosmic war – in the service of worldly political
battles‖ and cast their political objectives as part of ―a much larger spiritual confrontation‖
(Juergensmeyer 2006: 149). Juergensmeyer goes on to emphasize this point by saying that
―religion is not the initial problem, but the fact that religion is the medium through which these
issues are expressed is problematic‖ (2006: 141).
A number of other commentators support this point with accounts of how religion promotes
or excuses violence. Hoffman says that religion has ―a legitimating force justifying violence‖
(2006: 89) and credits this with making religious terrorism more destructive than its secular
counterpart. Elsewhere he explores the way religion helps to construct a culture that encourages
self-sacrifice and stubborn resistance against powerful enemies as ends in themselves (Hoffman
2007). Stern (2003b) provides interview data that is similar to Juergensmeyer‘s, though it only
covers Christian, Muslim, and Jewish terrorists. She argues that those from each religion have
similar attitudes about violence, such as the belief in heavenly rewards and a belief that they are
at war with evil. This suggests that religious doctrines play an important role in motivating
terrorists to carry out attacks.
Nevertheless, few researchers engaged in terrorism studies seem prepared to make strong
claims about the links between religion and violence, and many offer opposing explanations of
terrorism that dissociate the two. Sometimes this is done by positing alternative motives for
terrorist organizations that appear to be inspired by religion. Nedoroscik argues that Islamist
terrorism in Egypt is ―not simply one based on religious extremism‖ and that it ―grew out of the
socio-economic conditions as well as the cultural and political tensions existing for the poorest of
Egypt‘s poor‖ (2002). Bergesen and Lizardo (2004) maintain that religious terrorism is really
part of a reaction against US hegemony and a world system that supports it. Burke even
downplays Al Qaeda‘s religious motives saying that its ―agenda is a basically political one,
though it is couched, of course, in religious language and imagery‖ (2003: 24).
Gunning and Jackson ―argue that the distinctions typically drawn between ‗religious‘ and
‗secular‘ terrorism are problematic, both conceptually and empirically, and that the term is
misleading in its assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as
‗religious terrorist‘‖ (2011: 370). As they see it, the concept of religious violence is invoked to
delegitimize certain violent actors and is rooted an even deeper misconception about the concept
of religious violence itself. They contend that ―The notion of a distinct category of ‗religious
terrorism‘ is based on the assumption that religion is clearly definable and distinguishable from
the secular and political realms.‖ (Gunning and Jackson 2011: 374). As they see it, this
assumption suffers from two serious conceptual problems.
First, it is difficult to demarcate religious from secular phenomena. Any effort to distinguish
between religion and other ideologies leads to the insurmountable challenge of explaining how
the two differ. Even attempting to draw this distinction based on appeals to faith or irrationality
is, they maintain, unsatisfying because secular terrorists, such as Marxists and nationalists, make
their own faith-based assumptions.
Second, the understanding of what constitutes religion in terrorism research is rooted in a
particular historical context. Religion is seen as a private matter that is outside of the secular
public sphere and as an irrational belief system in contrast to scientific rationalism. Moreover,
religion is seen as the source of some of Europe‘s most destructive wars and most divisive
political antagonisms. ―Within such a framework, ‗political religion‘ is clearly both anathema
and inherently threatening‖ (Gunning and Jackson 2011: 365). This conception of religion,
Gunning and Jackson argue, is inaccurate for those who see religion as being a matter of public
concern and a guide for their everyday lives.
In addition to these conceptual problem, Gunning and Jackson raise a more practical
concern about how religious and secular terrorist organizations can be distinguished. It is, they
contend, difficult to determine exactly what leads an organization to qualify as being religious
rather than secular. Any potential demarcation criteria seem to exclude some organizations that
are typically seen as religious or to include others that seem to be secular. Gunning and Jackson
(2011: 377) discuss Hamas as an example and correctly point out that although the organization
relies heavily on religious doctrines for ideological support and religious institutions for material
support, its leaders are predominately secular figures, its targets are usually non-religious, and its
objectives are primarily nationalistic. They conclude that Hamas displays a complex mixture of
religious and secular characteristics, and that this makes it misleading to categorize the
organization in terms of a simple binary.
New Atheism and Political Violence
Most studies of religious terrorism take an ahistorical perspective by focusing on recent
attacks carried out by organizations that are currently active. Attention to contemporary
manifestations of terrorism is certainly warranted and extremely important. It is even fair to think
that this should be the main focus of terrorism studies, particularly because much of the research
is directed at informing security policy. Nevertheless, the ahistorical perspective makes religious
terrorism appear as a relatively brief and unique phenomenon. The long history of religious
violence is overlooked, and any possibility of noticing the inherently violent character of religion
tends to disappear along with it. Worse still, religious terrorism is often called ‗new terrorism‘
and contrasted with earlier forms of violence, such as terrorism by left-wing organizations,
national liberation movements, and anarchists. The label ‗new‘ wrongly suggests that there is
something peculiarly modern about religious violence. Moreover, drawing parallels between
religious terrorist organizations and secular predecessors that existed for relatively short periods
gives the sense that religious terrorism is merely a phase that will pass in the near future.
Even some of the most prescient analysts of religious terrorism fall victim to this tendency.
Rapoport is one of the few commentators in terrorism studies who has given adequate attention
to the influence of religion on terrorism. He even contents that ―[b]efore the nineteenth century,
religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror‖ (Rapoport 1984: 658).1
Nevertheless, when describing the waves of terrorism, Rapoport (2104) characterizes
international religious terrorism as a relatively new phenomenon and predicts that it will die off
by around 2035. Moreover, even his historical analysis of terrorism overlooks the deep links
between religion and violence. Because it is only directed at non-state actors that engaged in
organized religious violence it shifts attention away from the many forms of religious violence
that occurred informally or at the behest of political authorities. This is beyond the scope of
Rapoport‘s interest in terrorism, yet this narrow framework has the undesirable consequence of
making religious violence appear less common and more deviant than it would be in a broader
study that includes all types of religiously-motivated attacks.
An even more serious limitation of the literature on religious terrorism is the tendency of
maintaining a strict distinction between moderates and extremists. Although Rapoport correctly
notes the persistence of religious violence throughout history, he also says that ―deviant groups
reflect or distort themes distinctive to their particular major religion‖ (1984: 660). Elsewhere he
calls attention to the conflicts between orthodox and messianic religious people, with the former
attempting to suppress the attitudes that drive the latter to violence (Rapoport 1987). Linking
1 For another noteworthy exception to the ahistorical view of religious terrorism see: (Kushner 1996).
violence to messianism also suggests that the impetus behind religious violence is only a
particular type of religious belief system. Juergensmeyer (2003) likewise seems to think that
religious terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon and that religious terrorists represent aberrant
strands within their religious traditions.
Closely related to this is the concern many have expressed that linking religion and violence
too closely or describing terrorist organizations in terms of their religious commitments may
alienate moderates. This concern is particularly strong when it comes to Islamic terrorism
(Antúnez 2013; Jackson 2007). There is a large body of work directed at showing that Islam is
not a violent religion and that Islamic terrorists represent a deviant faction of the religion
(Lawrence 1998). This supports efforts to distinguish moderates from extremists.
New atheists‘ accounts of how religion promotes violence challenge terrorism studies‘
inattention to the pervasiveness of religious violence throughout history, as well as efforts to
downplay the similarities between moderates and extremists. Each of the leading new atheist
writers offers a similar account of how religion causes violence, and terrorism in particular, yet it
is worth discussing several examples of their work that reflect some of the slightly different ways
they have formulated this argument.
Dawkins argues that the world‘s most powerful religions tend to venerate violent impulses,
even deifying them by having them embodied in allegedly perfect gods. He calls the God
represented in the Old Testament ―a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive
bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal,
pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully‖ (Dawkins
2006)31). He goes on to point out that many of the formative figures in the world‘s great
religions have teachings that justify violence, encourage us vs. them thinking, and praise those
who kill and die to defend their beliefs.
Even more significant is religion‘s veneration of faith, which Dawkins characterizes as
―belief without evidence‖ (2006: 199). Faith encourages obedience and discourages doubt,
thereby promoting an absolute and unwavering commitment to a set of beliefs while also
suppressing self-critical impulses. Thus, religion fosters a way of thinking that lends itself to
misdirection in violent acts. A person who has absolute faith in his cause and is immune from
doubt is a person who cannot see the value in others‘ perspectives and that can easily rationalize
extreme actions that are carried out as demonstrations of the true faith. By the same standard,
anyone who values faith must to some degree condone terrorists‘ violent demonstrations of that
revered quality. ―As long as we accept the principle that religious faith must be respected simply
because it is religious faith, it is hard to withhold respect from the faith of Osama bin Laden and
the suicide bombers.‖ (Dawkins 2006: 306). Because terrorists carry out attacks based on the
same faith-based reasoning that is praised by all religious adherents, any endorsement of faith as
an end in itself or as a justification for holding particular beliefs is at the same time an
endorsement of the beliefs of religious terrorists.
Because faith discourages self-criticism and doubt, it clouds moral judgment and makes it
possible to establish false equivalences that can be used to rationalize violence. When discussing
anti-abortion activists in the United States Dawkins notes that ―[a] certain kind of religious mind
cannot see the moral difference between killing a microscopic cluster of cells on the one hand,
and killing a full-grown doctor on the other‖ (2006: 294). He also calls attention to the social
dimensions of the perpetuation of faith, and by extension the social dimensions of violence.
―Teaching children that unquestioned faith is a virtue primes them – given certain other
ingredients that are not hard to come by - to grow up into potentially lethal weapons for future
jihads or crusades‖ (Dawkins 2006: 308).
As evidence of the power of faith to inspire attacks, Dawkins briefly delves into the terrorism
studies literature by citing Juergensmeyer‘s work on Christian terrorists in the United States.
This offers Dawkins an illustration of how real terrorists rationalize attacks on doctors by basing
their moral valuations on faith. Dawkins makes good use of Juergensmeyer‘s analysis of how
religion justifies violence, but he also goes beyond it to explain that the mindset of religious
terrorists is deceptively ordinary.
―Our Western politicians avoid mentioning the R word (religion),
and instead characterize their battle as a war against 'terror', as
though terror were a kind of spirit or force, with a will and a mind
of its own. Or they characterize terrorists as motivated by pure
'evil'. But they are not motivated by evil. However misguided we
may think them, they are motivated, like the Christian murderers of
abortion doctors, by what they perceive to be righteousness,
faithfully pursuing what their religion tells them.‖ (Dawkins 2006:
304).
Finally, Dawkins counters the point that extremists are deviants who are fundamentally
different from religious moderates by arguing that if religion is based on faith there can be no
standard on which to judge whose interpretations of doctrine are correct. He asks: ―how can there
be a perversion of faith, if faith, lacking objective justification, doesn't have any demonstrable
standard to pervert?‖ (Dawkins 2006: 306). Thus, Dawkins suggests that any effort to distinguish
between different types of religious adherents is apt to make the mistake of claiming that
moderates are the ones with the legitimate interpretation of their religious doctrines even though
there is no theological basis for this.
Harris makes a similar argument about the dangers of faith, blaming religion for encouraging
the kind of unquestioning hatred of others that can motivate attacks. However, he goes even
further than Dawkins in establishing parallels not only between moderates and extremists but
also between those who see themselves as being on opposing sides of the War on Terror.
―[T]here is something that most Americans share with Osama bin Laden, the nineteen hijackers,
and much of the Muslim world. We, too, cherish the idea that certain fantastic propositions can
be believed without evidence‖ (Harris 2005: 29). Harris clarifies that the only significant sense in
which extremists really are extreme is in the greater extent of their faith. Their faith is
quantitatively different from religious moderates, but not qualitatively different. This should,
Harris thinks, be grounds for thinking that faith is inherently dangerous and for changing our
attitudes toward it.
Harris also identifies a deeper problem with the sensitivity and respect shown for religious
people. Faith is something to be esteemed, even by the non-religious, and harsh comments about
religions are supposed to be avoided for fear of offending their adherents. According to Harris,
this encourages the tacit acceptance of religion and a fear of criticizing it, regardless of how
religious people behave. ―Political correctness and the fear of racism have made many Europeans
reluctant to oppose the terrifying religious commitments of the extremists in their midst.‖ (Harris
2006: 85). He is particularly concerned about the reluctance to speak out against Islam, which he sees
as being more prone to violent manifestations than other religions. Although it is impossible to be
sure, the aversion to insulting people‘s religious beliefs may have some role in discouraging scholars
from devoting more attention to religious violence and the role that moderates play in condoning
faith-based actions.
Among the leading new atheist writers, Christopher Hitchens is probably the one who has had the
most extensive personal experience with violent religious extremism and its consequences through
his work as a journalist. Hitchens is also uniquely sensitive to the ways in which the threat of terror
influences politics, and the freedom of expression in particular, in democratic states. In writings and
lectures he frequently retells his experiences with Salman Rushdie, whose death was ordered by the
Ayatollah Khomeini (Hitchens 2007: 11). The death threat had profound political significance, as it
was a threat by a foreign head of state to kill a citizen of another country for a religious crime.
Moreover, it was an attempt by a religious authority to impose values on others‘ by threat of force.
The fact that attempts were made to kill Rushdie and that several translators were attacked provides
evidence of how far religious groups may go when defending their faith, as well as evidence that
religion can, apart from other grievances, be an excuse for murder.
As with Dawkins and Harris, Hitchens thinks that religions share a complicity in promoting and
excusing attacks. He points out that although the attempts to kill Rushdie were carried out by
Muslims, they received significant rhetorical support from Christians who thought that Khomeini
was right in attempting to assert religion‘s immunity from criticism by force (Hitchens 2007: 12). As
further evidence of this he recounts the way Christian leaders were quick to blame the 9/11 attacks on
America‘s own moral failings. Religion‘s effectiveness in justifying violence was such that even
different religious traditions could easily imagine reasons why mass killings could be justified on
theological grounds. These incidents show that the reverence for faith not only creates a context that
legitimizes faith and prevents it from being criticized but that it can even generate some degree of
solidarity between members of different religions who share a desire to inflict divine punishments.
Explaining the Root Causes of Religious Violence
Terrorism research has found strong evidence that religious violence is distinctive in the
ways that Enders and Sandler identify. Hoffman argues that religious terrorists are more willing
to engage in indiscriminate and mass casualty attacks. He even goes so far as to say that ―the
religious imperative for terrorism is the most important characteristic of terrorist activity today‖
(Hoffman 2006: 87). Ranstorp argues that religious terrorists are distinctive because they are
‗relatively unconstrained in the lethality and the indiscriminate nature of violence used‘ because
they lack ‗any moral constraints in the use of violence‘‖ (1996: 54). Nevertheless, terrorism
researchers are generally reluctant to draw firm conclusions about why religious terrorists use
different tactics than secular terrorists.
The need for a closer look at faith itself is evident from the debate over how a person can be
inspired to engage in suicide attacks – a debate that appears to be intractable because inadequate
attention has been given to faith itself. Some commentators, most notably Robert Pape (2003,
2005), question whether suicide terrorism is inspired by religious conviction. Pape argues that
suicide terrorism is a strategic decision and that its use is guided be an effort to coerce Western
democracies that are averse to what they consider to be nihilistic violence. By his account,
suicide terrorism is primarily motivated by nationalistic impulses and misleadingly characterized
in terms of religious influence. As evidence of this, he cites the LTTE, which makes extensive
use of suicide bombing despite having a Marxist/Leninist ideology (Pape 2003: 343).
Atran contests Pape‘s findings and maintains that Pape overstates the extent to which secular
organizations have carried out suicide attacks. He also points to the critical difference in
terrorists‘ personal motivations. ―Tamil suicide operatives are actively selected by recruiters and
cannot withdraw from planned operations without fear of retaliation against their families,
whereas the martyrs of the Al Qaeda network are mostly self-recruiting and deeply committed to
global ideology‖ (Atran 2006: 131). Others have likewise criticized Pape‘s findings, and his
effort to downplay the significance of religion (Moghadam 2006; Piazza 2008). For example,
Wade and Reiter (2007) find that the incidence of suicide terrorism in a country increases as
number of distinct religious minorities increases. These and other studies have advanced the
study of suicide terrorism by raising strong evidence of its religious basis, yet it remains limited
by inadequate theoretical accounts of what causes suicide terrorism. This is a point that many
who study suicide terrorism would likely ascent to. After all, much of the research is done using
quantitative analysis, which can only show correlation between attacks and various individual or
organizational characteristics without directly getting at the issue of causation (Atran 2006: 130).
New atheists provide a plausible causal explanation of suicide terrorism in their account of
faith. It is, they content, in the nature of faith to give people absolute certitude about their beliefs,
such that they would be willing to die for them. Dawkins emphasizes that the only way to make
sense of suicide bombers is to acknowledge that ―these people actually believe what they say
they believe” (2006: 305-306). Of the 9/11 attackers Hitchens notes that ―[t]he nineteen suicide
murderers of New York and Washington and Pennsylvania were beyond any doubt the most
sincere believers on those planes‖ (2007: 32). Finally, Harris argues that ―[s]ubtract the Muslim
belief in martyrdom and jihad, and the actions of suicide bombers become completely
unintelligible, as does the spectacle of public jubilation that invariably follows their deaths‖
(Harris 2005: 33). Thus, new atheists suggest that suicide terrorism must be attached to religion,
or potentially a secular ideology with similarly strong appeals to faith, because suicide bombers
must be motivated by a belief system that it could promise rewards that could compensate them
for the loss of life and silence any qualms they have about sacrificing themselves.
This explanation of terrorism is particularly compelling when one recognizes that suicide
terrorists are generally rational people who understand the consequences of their actions. One of
the themes of recent research on terrorism is that terrorists are surprisingly normal when judged
in terms of their reasoning abilities (Horgan 2005; Wilson 2000). As Post points out, people with
psychological problems must be actively excluded from organizations, as they cannot be trusted
with the complex planning and secrecy that are essential for carrying out successful attacks (Post
2007). If terrorists are rational in the sense and not coerced into carrying out suicide attacks, then
it would seem that their attacks must be motivated by a sincere faith in their cause and the
rewards they are promised. Or as Harris puts it, suicide bombing is only rational if those who
engage in it ―simply know that they are going to a better place‖ (2005: 136).
A similar debate over the connection between religion and terrorism has taken shape over the
issue of whether religious organizations are more likely to use weapons of mass destruction.
Tucker attempts to show that there is nothing distinctive about religious terrorism, or at least that
many of its supposed distinguishing characteristics are illusory. In particular, he contests the
claims that religious organizations are more likely to engage in mass casualty attacks or more
likely to employ WMDs. He finds that ―most terrorist groups with religious motivations today
conduct their operations with methods and results (in numbers wounded) that do not differ from
their secular predecessors‖ (Tucker 2001: 7). Moreover, Tucker makes an effort to distinguish
between different types of religion and contends that only religions that encourage detachment
from the world and intense paranoia are apt to incite WMD attacks.
Gunning and Jackson (2011) take issue with the oft-repeated argument that religious
terrorists are more violent than secular terrorists, saying that this is empirically inaccurate.
However, their support for this contention is limited. As evidence they cite the greater lethality
of secular organizations like FARC, LTTE, and PKK compared to religious organizations like
Hamas and Hezbollah. Such a selective comparison is misleading, especially when compared to
the weight of evidence offered by more systematic studies of violent organizations. Furthermore,
without controlling for other contextual characteristics, such as the availability of weapons,
strength of opposing counterterrorist forces, and organization resources, which all influence the
extent to which an organization has the ability to act out its violent wishes, this comparison of
secular and religious organizations is deeply misleading. There is no inconsistency in saying that,
all things being equal, religious organizations are inclined to be more violent than secular ones
but that religious organizations facing a developed state with a powerful military, as Hamas and
Hezbollah do, have more limited opportunities for carrying out attacks than secular organizations
that face much weaker armed forces.
The difference between violent goals and the capacity to reach them is particularly important
when one considers religious organizations‘ efforts to carry out mass casualty attacks with
weapons of mass destruction. Aum Shinrikyo‘s attacks in Matsumoto and the Tokyo metro may
have only killed twenty people altogether, but the organization‘s goal in dispersing Sarin gas in
crowded public areas was clearly to inflict a far greater number of casualties. Similarly, Al
Qaeda has thus far been unsuccessful in obtaining WMDs for a major attack, yet there is ample
evidence showing that they have attempted to acquire WMDs. One study of Al Qaeda found that
although the organization lacks the capacity to deploy nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons
―all evidence from Western sources and al-Qaeda's own websites and publications indicate that the
movement itself and its various affiliates are aggressively pursuing such a capability‖ (Salama 2005:
643). If we judge these and other religious terrorist organizations by their intentions to carry out
mass casualty attacks and their lack of inhibitions against using WMDs, rather than simply in
terms of what attacks they have the capacity to carry out successfully, the profound hostility of
these religious ideologies becomes clear.
Here again new atheists provide a compelling account of why religious violence is
distinctive. Dawkins acknowledges that many different types of ideologies can promote violence
and that they tend to do this in similar ways: by discouraging critical thought and encouraging
belief without evidence. However, he argues that what distinguishes religion from other faith-
based belief systems is that it is more effective in discouraging rational thought (Dawkins 2006:
306). Religion makes higher promises of reward and greater threats of punishment than secular
ideologies, thereby providing grounds for more extreme forms of violence. Moreover, religion
makes it possible to imagine the end of the world, which could conceivably be brought about by
a major WMD attack, as a desirable goal – one that is so desirable that it must be reached at any
price.
Bringing Empirical Research into New Atheism
Although I have focused on how new atheism can contribute to our understanding of
terrorism, the benefits of linking new atheism and terrorism studies are not unidirectional.
Terrorism studies has amassed a wealth of empirical research on terrorism that can help new
atheists respond to some of the challenges that are raised against them. In particular, research on
terrorism provides evidence against two of the claims that are most frequently made against new
atheists: that new atheism is militant and that efforts to promote secularism may generate more
religious violence. These are related points, since it is generally atheist militancy that is credited
with having the power to drive religious people to more extreme positions.
Quiring argues that secularism promotes extremism by alienating religious people from the
social institutions that help to contain religion‘s extreme impulses. ―Normally, religious
institutions function as correctives, counterbalanced by their embeddedness in imperfect persons
and societies‖ (Quiring 2008: 65). By this account, religion remains peaceful when it is part of
society and violent when it is isolated from other domains of life. Wilde (2010)accuses new
atheists of promoting militant secularism and discouraging democratic processes. For him, new
atheism threatens to destroy an important dimension of social life and to alienate the religious
moderates who are able to resolve their differences through deliberation. Finally, Kitcher
contends that ‗militant modern atheism‘ is intellectually simplistic, aggressively intolerant, and
dangerously polarizing‖ (2011: 2). He goes on to say that atheists push moderate believers
toward more extreme views by making them feel threatened. Worst of all, Wilde and Kitcher
persistently describe new atheists as being ‗aggressive‘ and ‗militant‘, thereby suggesting that
the completely nonviolent new atheist movement is in some way perpetrating violence.
Research on terrorism refutes the view that religious communities promote moderate views
and peaceful deliberation. Studies consistently show that social support networks and peer
influence are extremely important in inspiring acts of violence and sustaining those who engage
in violence (Post 2003; Ismail 2006; Malthaner 2014). Support networks based on religious
communities are especially pernicious. Religious communities are more effective than secular
organizations when it comes to discouraging defection, screening potential recruits, and
providing incentive for carrying out attacks (Berman 2009, 2008). Berman goes so far as to say
that ―Radical religious communities who turn to organized violence operate with a huge
advantage over other militants‖ (Berman 2009: 13). This is because ―radical religious groups, or
sects, operate as economic clubs. They collectively provide both spiritual services and an entire
array of concrete social services through mutual aid systems‖ (Berman 2009: 103).
Research on terrorist organizations likewise indicates that societies in which religion heavily
influences public life are generally more violent than secular societies. Intensely religious
societies such as those in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Mindanao, Somalia, Yemen, and Pakisan
are the source of many terrorists who engage in mass casualty attacks. More secular countries,
such as those of Western Europe, have experienced a rise in attacks perpetrated by their own
citizens. However, the attackers are typically those that belong to insular religious communities
that shun the mainstream secular values (Kirby 2007; Sageman 2008a). Membership in these
communities also exacerbates feelings of isolation and alienation that are often blamed for
driving people to join terrorist organizations. Thus, there seems to be a reciprocal relationship by
which membership in a religious community is both a cause of marginalization and an
opportunity structure for engaging in violence. Sageman expresses this well when he says that
―[f]eeling marginalized is, of course, no simple springboard to violence. Many people feel they
don‘t belong but don‘t aspire to wage violent jihad. What transforms a very small number to
become terrorists is mobilization by networks‖ (Sageman 2008b).
The social aspects of religious terrorism support the new atheists‘ position in several ways.
First, it shows that new atheists are correct in thinking that religious violence cannot be
dismissed as a deviant trend or something that is only supported by extremists. Although a
minority of religious people are directly engaged in acts of violence, the numbers that support
violence are much larger than those who are directly involved in attacks because of the
extensiveness of support networks. Second, it shows that new atheists are generally correct in
thinking that religion can exert a harmful influence on entire communities and that allowing
religion to play a role in social life does not eliminate its potential for violence, as new atheists‘
opponents have said.
Although new atheists generally raise convincing accounts of the links between faith and
violence, they sometimes make arguments that lack the level of nuance required when
confronting such a complex topic as terrorism. For example, Harris contends that Osama bin
Laden‘s desire to kill cannot be explained in terms of poverty, a lack of education, or insanity
and that he must be seen as a religiously-motivated attacker. Harris‘ point is sound, since bin
Laden had a privileged background and lacks many of the grievances that would potentially
drive a person to violence. However, Harris‘ single-minded focus on religion as the root cause of
terrorism leads him to overlook the extent to which religion acts alongside other causal factors to
cause terrorism. It is clearly not the case that religion simply causes violence, as this would
suggest a much higher incidence of terrorism than currently exists. Rather, as Juegensmeyer
observes, terrorism must in some way create a climate that accepts or even encourages violence –
a climate that may be activated by specific grievances, such as poverty, marginalization, or lack
of opportunities. New atheists provide a compelling account of how religion creates those
preconditions, yet it could benefit from acknowledging that the grievances that might act as the
proximate cause of violence, as well as some of the objectives being sought, may be non-
religious.
The same point can also be made in reverse, which again highlights the mutual benefit of
drawing parallels between terrorism research and new atheism. A number of commentators have
attempted to show that religion is not a cause of terrorism by pointing out that terrorists have
many secular grievances. As I pointed out earlier, this is one of the main grounds for claiming
that religion does not actually cause terrorism. However, this conception of causation is far too
heavily focused on the proximate causes of violence. On this point, Harris correctly notes that
religion has the power to recast and intensify grievances that might not provide independent
grounds for attack. ―Muslims do not merely feel the outrage of the poor who are deprived of the
necessities of life. They feel the outrage of a chosen people who have been subjugated by
barbarians‖ (Harris 2005: 30). That is to say, religious beliefs establish the necessary
preconditions for carrying out attacks, particularly the willingness to act on faith, even when
some of religious terrorist organizations‘ goals are secular.
Conclusion
As I have argued, there is much to gain from linking empirical research on terrorism and new
atheism. New atheism can make several important contributions to research on religious
terrorism, as well as research on religious violence more generally. First, new atheists provide a
convincing account of how religion facilitates violence, which calls attention to the links
between moderates and extremists, the persistence of religious violence over time, and the
importance of faith in motivating and justifying attacks. Second, new atheists can help to clarify
the difference between religious ideologies and other types of ideologies. This makes it possible
to sustain the conceptual distinction between different types of violence based on their
ideological motivations. At the same time, terrorism studies provides new atheists with greater
empirical support for some of the criticisms they have raised against religions, especially those
about the dangers of religion in public life. Terrorism research can also push new atheism to
develop more nuanced accounts of how religion causes violence, especially when it comes to
explaining how religion acts alongside other influences to incite violence.
The new atheist account of how religion promotes violence raises the question of what
counterterrorism strategies could potentially be effective. The clear answer is that greater
secularization, and in particular a decline of faith, would discourage religious terrorism.
Moreover, they call attention to the universality of this project. The type of faith that promotes
and excuses violence is pervasive, existing in all religions and to a lesser extent in secular
ideologies. This indicates that counterterrorism efforts directed at the ideological foundations of
violence must be directed at changing attitudes toward faith. Much as counterterrorism strategists
advocate winning over unaligned people in areas where terrorists operate to dismantle terrorists‘
support networks, one might imagine secularization as an effort to win over moderates to
delegitimize faith and eliminate the religious institutions that often responsible for sustaining
intensely religious communities.
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