new angleton document

8/20/2019 NEW ANGLETON DOCUMENT

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/new-angleton-document 1/4

T O P

s w E T

Z3 February 1955

MEMO RANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT:

Exfiltration of CAMUSO/Z a nd CAMB AR0/2

1. Pursua nt to your requ est. an

exam ination was ma de of

this case. The study wa s directed principally to an ana lysis of

the agents' comm unications which we re set forth in two files

furnished by SR: A few select operational m em orandum were

read for backgrou nd purposes. The m ost useful information,

howe ver, was obtained from the responsible case officers. A

num ber of days could be spent on a m ore exhaustive analysis, but

the views expre ssed herein were derived from an eight-hour

review of the case.

Z. Be fore going into deta ils of this case, it is ray w ish to

state here that a study of the aforeme ntioned information offers

no firm evidence w hich justifies a view that

these gents

are under

foreign control. Furthermore, since clear commitments were

ma de to the agents and because they have performed in accordance

with their instructions, it is subm itted tha t we a re ob ligated to do

everything

within our power to exfiltrate them from a position of

jeopardy. At present they are imprope rly docume nted and lack

legal status in the area . They are or will soon be faced w ith the

uncomfortable prospect of apprehension and probab le comprom ise

of their m ission, or, in view of our inab ility to perform, m ay b e

forced to go into the woods with the partisans. There are other

unpleasant consequences w hich may flow from our failure to

evacuate them soon.

3, Since w e do not have counter.intelligence capabilities in

the area nor adequ ate sensitive intelligence de rived from ST D sources,

It is obvious that we ca nnot crosscheck and that any a nalysis based

solely on available documentation is not in ftseilf infallible.

Nevertheless, we are forced to accept their bona fides, and, in this,

DECLASS IF I ED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL I NTELL IGENCE AGENCY

SOURCESMETRODSEXEMPT ION 382B

NAZI WAR CR IMES DI SCLOSURE AC1

DATE 2 7

T O P

s [ r E T

copy 2 of 3



TOP SEE1

page two

the exfUtration in one sense represen ts in its most unh appy light

an act of desperation to which we are inflexibly com mitted.

4.

During the course of the study the possibilities of

control kept com ing to the surface. It should be evident that such

doubts are inevitable particularly in a ease

of this typo.

5.

U the subject case is doubled who UY or in pAirt then it

I. evident that the Soviets have ach ieved a high de gree of sophistication

In the developm ent of double agents. It would also mea n that they

have not only apprehe nded and broken successfully the agents in

question but have recreated their persona/Hie-8 the preOise nature

of their m issions their dange r signals and have m anipalsited theist

into cooperative and active elements o f their own. The case officers

state that the m essages both in ton e and attitude reflect consistently

the p ersonalities and p eculiarities of subjects. As to the techn ical

aspects they state that some seven or eight danger signals were

given to each secretly. I f the age nts are so highly m otivated and

courag eous as described then it is difficult to reason wh y they

wo uld have given up a ll their danger signals and not retained at

least one. The Wel absence of dang er signals during the past tw o

and on e.haU yea rs argues persuasively in favor of the view that

the agents are no t under w itting control.

6.

U the agents are under control then Ike artist attribute to

the Soviets the setting up of the factual or notional nets in the area

which have been reported to us and Which have much to do with the

degree of confidence w hich we plate In subjects. In extending the

framew ork of the operation the Soviets have also increased sib-

stantially the security risks inherent in any doubling reface they

enlarge the possible channels through wh ich we could conceivably

cross.check the op erational health of subjects. he existence of

new a nd indepen dent assets in the area is not in itself cenclueive

evidence of the presence or absence of control. It is believed

however that in this case it would not have been necessary for

the Soviets to have taken upon them selves these new burdens in

order to instill confidence in us.

U

the agents were under control

and creatively coope rative there are innum erable double-agent



T O P

S r P F T

• page three,

t r icks wh ich could have bee n w orked against us without resort ing to

the r isk, of im plementing an operat ional net .

7. On the basis of the docu m entat ion alone, there are certain

negat ive facts which em erge :

(a ) A third man was d ispatched to m ake contact with

one o f the subjects . He has never been heard f rom.

Oho can only assume that he w as e ither kil led on the

t r ip o r ca ptured . U captured , the quest ion o f h i s

confess ion is pert inent. If h is contact w as unde r

control, then he is the victim of an inteaticatisei.

Such success w ould lead ta ja m uch h igher regard for

the double play and temp t any Service to al locate its

super ior ta lent and assets to the case .

(b )

There has been betw een the var ious messages a

cons iderable t ime lag . If subjects are under con trol ,

these delays would permit and favor the working out

of a watert ight playb ack. It would give the local control

suffic ient t ime for c lear ing with M oscow a l l develop.

m eats and m essages in the case and a lso enable them

to concentrate hea vily on the security controls of

subjects and the ir a l leged net . In addit ion, the t ime

lag would m ake it possible for the Sov iets to fol low up

the counter - intel ligence leads der ived from this

operat ion both in the U.S. and in Germ any.

8. The a f f irm at ive v iew expressed in paragraph Z above i s

quali fied as fo l lows: It is recom m ende d that a traf f ic :analysis be m ade

through STD in order to see whether there is ref lected any u nusual

act iv ity coincident with the arr iva l andier comm unicat ions f rom the

agents . I t i s assumed that i f the Soviets are in fact dou bling subjects ,

then all aspects of the case would hav e to be cleared on a continuing

bas is wi th Moscow. Th is i s based on the assump t ion that M oscow wou ld

know that subjects work for Cen tral Intel l igence . Given their experience

in W IN .and in other cases, they could not help but deal with it as a

m atter of the h ighest ope rat ional pr ior ity. (Accbrding to the ca se of f icers ,

the ag ents a re aw are o f our A gency s ident i ty .) U doubled , the nature

T



T P SE ET

page four.

of the messages wou ld require a considerable velum* of com mu nications

between the lima control and Mo scow. It is of course unknown to w hat

degree the H all or others are in a po sition to con tribute. It is important,

however, that in and bey ond

this

particular case, a check.

Ou t po in t

f or T/A be autom at ica l ly ut i l ised and that the technic ians be pu t on

notice as to

our

requ irement f o r such coverage and su pp or t . In the

event that the Hen shou ld have the per t inent T/A;

their

f

i

roj ings

P 4 4

be such as to m ake i t certa in on e way

or th the; as to the existence

of contrail.

9. To,

the agents have ne t replied to the last conumm i.,

catisms setting ioIth the exfiltration proposal, It is presumed that

the DM will not appreach

th

Swedes pending some reaction from the

:agents,

10. Thou gh gratuitous, it would appear that the current Oleo

may be frustrated through the lack of cooperation by the Swedes, It A.

also questionable whether the State Depa rtment will permit the gothic.

How ever, these observations should not dilute what appears to be a

clear.cut obligation en our part to perform in accordance w ith our

commitments to the

subjects,

II, In the even t that

subjects respond favorably to the proposed

exfiltration plan, then ft le advised that steps be taken im med iately

in the event that they are controlled) to send messages from our end

indicating that the exfiltration is triggered to some

important and highly

sensitive operational matters which w ill take place in the not too distant

future, the nature of which requ ires their presence.. The purpose of

such messages Should be

to create a substantial dilemm a in the minds

o f those Sovie ts U they exis t) who m ay be p lann in g to cap i talize on the

exfiltration regarding it to be the h igh point of the do uble- play

Insofar as subjects are participants, and to argue in suppo rt of the view

that there I. mu ch greater p rof i t to be

gained

i f the

ex/titration is

permitted bi

take p lace. This idea wi l l be exp an ded with

SR.

JAMES

AN GL ET O N

Chief Counter.Intelligence Staff

Distribution:

Copy 1 original): C/OP

Copy Z:

Chief, SR

Copy 3:

r

new angleton document

Documents