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Te ongoing revolution in biology, symbolized by the completion o the HumanGenome Project, undoubtedly has enormous potential or beneft or example,in the development o more eective, saer medicines. However, serious concernshave been raised about the consequences o the misapplication o the new capabil-

ities or hostile purposes. As Proessor Meselson, Tomas Dudley Cabot Proessoro the Natural Sciences at Harvard University, has said: [a] world in which thesecapabilities are widely employed or hostile purposes would be a world in which

Neurobiology:

A case study of theimminent militarizationof biologyMark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando*Mark Wheelis is Senior Lecturer in Microbiology at the University of California,

Davis, CA (USA), and Malcolm Dando is Professor of International Security at the

University of Bradford (UK) and Director of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre.

Abstracthe revolution in biology, including advances in genomics, will lead to rapid

progress in the treatment o mental illness by advancing the discovery o highlyspeciic ligands that aect speciic neurological pathways. he status o brainscience and its potential or military application to enhance soldier perormance,to develop new weapons and to acilitate interrogation are discussed. I suchapplications are pursued, they will also expand the options available to torturers,dictators and terrorists. Several generic approaches to containing the malign

applications o biology are shown, and it is concluded that success or ailure indoing so will be signiicantly dependent on the active involvement o the scientiicand medical communities.

: : : : : : :

* An early version o this analysis was presented at the 20th Workshop o the Chemical and Biological WeaponsStudy Group o the Pugwash Conerences on Society and World Aairs, Geneva, 89 November, 2003.


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the very nature o conict had radically changed. Terein could lie unprecedentedopportunities or violence, coercion, repression or subjugation1

When renewed concerns about biological warare arose in the mid-1990s, there were some open publications in which initial assessments weremade o the way in which traditional microbiological agents might be modiiedby genetic engineering,2 and o how new kinds o agents might be produced inthe longer term.3 Subsequently, consideration has been given to other kinds oagents, such as bioregulators, that might be misused.4,5 Most recently, analy-sis has suggested how traditional agents, modiied traditional agents, and thenadvanced biological agents targeted at specifc physiological processes mightsuccessively become threats over the coming decades.6,7

In late 2003, the Oice o ransnational Issues o the US Central

Intelligence Agency issued as bleak a warning about the uture o biologicalweapons as any academic or non-governmental organization has yet produced.he report, titled he Darker Bioweapons Future, argued that [g]rowing under-standing o the complex biochemical pathways that underlie lie processes hasthe potential to enable a class o new, more virulent biological agents engineeredto attack distinct biochemical pathways and elicit speciic eects.8 he reportcited a number o speciic examples o new biological weapons that mightbecome possible, and noted that the panel o experts which had been convenedto produce the report considered that [t]he eects o some o these engineered

biological agents could be worse than any disease known to man. 9However, to date no open analysis has taken Meselsons argument seri-

ously and asked where we might end up later in the century i the militarizationo biology is not prevented. Obviously it is not possible in a single paper to sur-

vey all o the areas o biology that might be subject to misuse, so here we ocuson the potential or hostile manipulation o the human nervous system. We dothis in part because the widespread public concerns over the misuse o microbiol-ogy have obscured other dangerous possibilities, but also because there are veryclear reasons to have worries about the misuse o neuroscience by the military.

No doubt, others could also have an interest in misusing the new knowledge, but

1 Matthew Meselson, Averting the hostile exploitation o biotechnology, Chemical and BiologicalConventions Bulletin, Vol. 48, June 2000, pp. 1619.

2 William Cohen, Prolieration: Treat and Response, Department o Deense, Washington DC, 1997.3 Steven M. Block, Living Nightmares: Biological Treats Enabled by Molecular Biology, Te New error:

Facing the Treat o Biological and Chemical Weapons, Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Soaer, George D.Wilson (eds.), Hoover Institution Press, Stanord, 1999, pp. 3975.

4 George Poste, Advances in biotechnology: Promise or peril, 2002, available at (visited 24 August 2005).

5 Claire Fraser and Malcolm Dando, Genomics and uture bioweapons: Te need or preventive action bythe biomedical community, Nature Genetics, Vol. 29, 2001, pp. 253255.6 James B. Petro, Teodore R. Plasse and Jack A. McNulty, Biotechnology: Impact on biological warare

and biodeense, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Vol. 1, 2003, pp. 161168.7 Mark Wheelis, Does the new biology mean new weapons?,Arms Control oday, July/August 2004, p. 6.8 Oice o ransnational Issues, he Darker Bioweapons Future, Central Intelligence Agency,

Washington, DC, 3 November 2003, p. 1.9 Ibid.


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it is unlikely that they will have the kind o resources available to the militaryand thus be able to lead the way to misuse. It is thereore the military that haveto be the irst concern and it is on the militarization o neuroscience (broadlyconceived) that we concentrate here.

In the next section (he uture threat) we assess the growing capabili-ties that could arise or misuse rom the rapid advances in our understanding othe nervous system and the evidence that there might be those with the inten-tion to make such use o the new knowledge. We conclude that there will beknowledge available or misuse and there will be some willing to misuse it. henin the ollowing section (Implications) we sketch out the implications both inthe medium term and, more tentatively, in the longer term i such misuse can-not be prevented. We conclude that there are terrible threats to human rights

and dignity on the horizon. In a inal section (Responses) we review whatresponses are available to prevent neuroscience, and by implication much o therest o biology, rom becoming widely used or military purposes.

The future threat

Tere is no doubt that the revolution in biology has greatly changed the situationrom when the development o the frst means o dealing with mental illnesses

with eective drugs in the 1950s led in turn to the initial eorts by the mainCold War adversaries to develop incapacitating chemicals.10 In particular, the elu-cidation o the structure o the diverse neuronal receptors or neurotransmitterchemicals11 and the increasing discoveries o the unctional circuits o the brainthrough neuroimaging techniques, promises much or good. As Andreasen hasnoted, we live in an age in which two huge knowledge bases will be increasinglyinterwoven: the map o the human genome and that o the human brain.12

In a report card or progress to date Andreasen shows plainly, however, thatonly in regard to the treatment o mood disorders can we say that we can now do a

great deal better than in the 1950s. Te near uture will see diagnosis, understand-ing pathophysiology, treatment and prevention all be made more rational and eec-tive in regard to the dementias, schizophrenia, mood, and anxiety disorders.

George Poste appears to have come to the same conclusion as Meselson.He has argued, or example, that as we begin to understand the exquisite molecu-lar mechanisms that regulate this remarkable structure called the human body() the ability to understand those circuits means simultaneously we gain thecapacity to scramble them.13 Pointing out the need or thinking beyond bugs hehas reerred to the brain bomb and noted that such capabilities imply that you

10 Malcolm Dando, Te New Biological Weapons: Treat, Prolieration and Control, Lynne Rienner, Boulder,2001.

11 A orm o what are generally termed ligands small molecules that bind to proteins.12 Nancy C. Andreasen, Brave New Brain: Conquering Mental Illness in the Era o the Genome , Oxord

University Press, Oxord, 2001.13 Poste, op. cit., (note 4).


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can engineer a series, a complete spectrum o activity rom transient immobiliza-tion () to catastrophic eects which can be acute or chronic.14

It is certainly true that there have been enormous advances in our under-standing o the human nervous system15 since it was recognized in the seven-teenth century that the brain controlled our behaviour. But there are, neverthe-less, well-inormed sceptics who still doubt that a mechanistic understanding othe brain is likely to come about soon even i it is a ormal possibility.16

In order to assess whether the new developments will allow the crea-tion o advanced biological agents there are clearly two basic questions to beanswered: does neuroscience seem likely to gain the necessary mechanisticunderstanding o the brain or malign manipulation to be, at least theoretically,possible, and who might wish to take advantage o that knowledge? Our two

questions are thereore the amiliar ones about capabilities (that could ariserom the increasing understanding o the nervous system) and intentions (tomisuse this new understanding or hostile purposes).

Capabilities

Mental illness causes an enormous worldwide burden o disease in terms omorbidity, mortality and social and economic costs.17 Rightly, great eorts arebeing made in medicine and biology to understand the causes o diseases like

depression and to ind more eective means o helping alicted people. Oneimportant development in this eort appears to be a coming together o pre-

viously disparate approaches to understanding human behaviour; one recentbook, or example, was titled Neuropsychiatry and Behavioural Neuroscience.his text has a chapter on the principles o neuroscience that lists regularities predictable brain-behaviour relationships which can be used in under-standing and helping to deal with mental illnesses.18

It is not di cult to accept such ideas, or example in regard to languageproduction and comprehension. It has been known or many years that damage to

specifc areas o the brain produces specifc defciencies in language capability.19

14 Ibid.15 Stanley Finger,Minds behind the Brain: A History o the Pioneers and their Discoveries, Oxord University

Press, Oxord, 2000.16 Dai Rees and Steven Rose, (eds.), Te New Brain Sciences: Perils and Prospects, Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge, 2004.17 World Health Organization, Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope, World Health Report 2001,

WHO, Geneva.18 Jerey L. Cummings and Michael S. Maga, Neuropsychiatry and Behavioural Neuroscience, Oxord

University Press, Oxord, 2003. Some thirty such regularities are discussed, and it is clear that what is

being described is a mechanistic science. For example, the frst several principles state: Brain-behaviourrelationships underlying neuropsychiatric syndromes are rule-governed and reproducible acrossindividuals () All mental processes derive rom brain processes (...) Neuro-psychiatric symptoms aremaniestations o brain dysunction () [which] reect abnormalities o underlying brain unction,whether produced by genetic, structural or environmental inuence

19 Working in the nineteenth century, Broca showed that damage to what is now called Brocas area o thecerebral cortex leads to loss o the ability to generate speech, and Wernicke demonstrated that damage toa neighbouring area, now named aer him, leads to a loss o ability to understand language.


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Similarly, it is clear that damage to the rontal lobes o the cerebral cortex canproduce specifc impairments o human behaviour.20 Individuals with damage tothe orbitorontal cortex, or instance, lack social judgement, have limited insightinto their own behaviour and are compromised in their ability to empathize withother people.

Yet not all human behaviour is so easily localized to speciic regions othe brain. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the biological basis omuch human behaviour will be exceedingly diicult to understand even i thismechanistic paradigm is undamentally correct. he question thereore is: whatdierence does the current revolution in biology make? Does it really open upradically new possibilities and capabilities or manipulation?

he principles listed in Neuropsychiatry and Behavioural Neuroscience

include, in addition to the inluence o both genetic and environmental actors,the idea that neuropsychiatric disorders typically relect disruption o a systemor circuit, and urther that disturbances in transmitters or transmitter systemshave speciic associated neuropsychiatric symptoms. How well do such claimsstand up to evidence rom recent research?

Signals are conveyed within the cells o the nervous system the neu-rons by electrical means, but they are conveyed between neurons mostly bychemical means. During the last century a wide range o these so-called chemi-cal neurotransmitters (ligands) were gradually discovered, along with the spe-

cialized receptors that they aect when released.21 Neurons that produce di-erent neurotransmitters are involved in dierent circuits within the brain,and or those who study mental illnesses like depression a particular group oneuromodulatory transmitters are o particular interest. Neurons with thesetransmitters dopamine, noradrenaline, serotonin, or example are locatedin lower, more ancient parts o the brain and, rather than having precise lim-ited connections to other neurons, have very diuse connections, which suggestthey have widespread eects in the body.

In 2003 the journal Science, as its Breakthrough o the year eatured a

study o dark energy and dark matter that gave us a frm age or the universe anda precise speed o expansion. Te runner-up was the study o mental illness,22 and

20 Te rontal lobes occupy about a third o the total cortical volume, are amongst the latest o ourphylogenetic gains and are one o the last o the brain regions to develop in each individual. As withlanguage, it is reasonable to suggest that they mediate characteristic human behaviours. Damage tothis part o the cortex produces three behavioural syndromes. Which is maniest depends on the siteo damage: an orbitorontal syndrome, characterized by disinhibition and impulsiveness; a dorsolateralprerontal syndrome, maniested primarily by executive dysunction, and a medial rontal syndromeeaturing apathy and akinesia.

21 When an electrical impulse reaches the end o the long projection, or axon, o a neuron, it causes therelease o neurotransmitter molecules which then cross the small gap, or synaptic cle, to the next celland lock on to the relevant receptors on that cell. When they do this, changes take place within theaected second cell which can either enhance the likelihood o an electrical impulse being generatedin that neuron (excitation) or make it less likely (inhibition). Various mechanisms clear the transmitterchemical rom the synapse so that its eect is transient. Usually it is either destroyed by enzymes in thesynaptic cle, or taken back up into the secreting cell by membrane transporter proteins, and re-used.

22 Anon, Breakthrough o the year: Te runners-up, Science, No. 302, 2003, pp. 20392040.


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specifcally mentioned was an article in Science in July o that year.23 he articlewas entitled Inluence o lie stress on depression: Moderation by a polymor-phism on the 5-H gene. A polymorphism is a slight natural variation in aparticular gene, and the 5-H gene is the gene which encodes the transporterprotein that removes serotonin (5-H) rom the synapse. In the past, many peo-ple believed that whilst a ew devastating mental illnesses such as Huntingdonsdisease were caused by malunctions in single genes, the vast majority werecaused by the combined actions o many genes with small eects thus makingcausal elucidations very diicult. However, the study on depression concludedby stating: We speculate that some multiactorial disorders, instead o result-ing rom variations in many genes o small eect, may result rom variations inewer genes whose eects are conditional on exposure to environmental risks.24

In short, i one considers both the genetics and the environmental experience,some mental illnesses may soon be clearly understood with our new knowledgeo the genome.

he polymorphism in the 5H gene concerned the structure o thepromoter. his region determines how eiciently the gene is expressed, andthereore the amount o protein produced. here are two dierent orms (alle-les) o the promoter the long orm allows more expression o the genethan the short orm. hus the long orm would mean that there was moretransporter protein, and presumably more precise synaptic action (as the sero-

tonin would be more rapidly removed back into the pre-synaptic neuron). Weeach carry two copies o the gene, so it is possible to separate people into threegroups on this basis. We each have either two long orms o the promoter, twoshort orms, or one o each. O course, the researchers had good reasons orsuspecting that this gene might be involved in depression, because one classo drugs used eectively in treating depression act by inhibiting serotoninreuptake.

he researchers conducted a study o a cohort o 1,037 children inNew Zealand who had been regularly studied since birth, ninety-six per cent

o whom were still being studied at age 26. Many aspects o their lives could bestudied, or example stressul lie events occurring between their twenty-irstand twenty-sixth birthdays could be careully catalogued or each individual.hese events included employment, inance, housing, health and relationshipsas types o stressor. Members o the group were also assessed or the occurrenceo depression over the year rom their twenty-ith birthday. he results romassessing the interaction o the dierent alleles o the 5-H gene and lie stres-sors were very clear-cut. As the authors reported, [i]ndividuals with one ortwo copies o the short allele o the 5-H promoter polymorphism exhibited

more depressive symptoms, diagnosable depression, and suicidality in relationto stressul lie events than individuals homozygous or the long allele [i.e. with

23 Avshalom Caspi et al., Inuence o lie stress on depression: Moderation by a polymorphism in the5-H gene, Science, No. 301, 2003, pp. 386-389.

24 Ibid.


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o people with social phobia showed that when put under stress, those withthe short allele had a stronger response in the right amygdala.28 It concluded:the present results support a genetically determined link between serotonergicunctions, anxiety proneness and a brain region central or emotional experi-ence and processing. he mechanistic details o how the system dysunctionarises are being worked out in animal models.29

As this example clearly demonstrates, our understanding o the brain andhuman behaviour is reaching the level at which precise manipulation or benefcialreasons is becoming increasingly easible. Yet such inormation might also poten-tially be used or malign purposes, or example to induce anxiety disorders.

Intentions

Te question that remains is whether anyone would wish to misuse such inorma-tion to create new biochemical weapons. As the genomics revolution proceeds, wecan obviously no longer maintain a dierentiation between chemical and biologi-cal weapons and have to view these as a continuous biochemical threat spectrum,with the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and oxin WeaponsConvention (CWC and BWC) overlapping in their coverage o mid-spectrumagents such as toxins and bioregulators. Lethal chemical weapons such as thenerve gases which attack the acetylcholine neurotransmitter system are com-

pletely prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but it is ar rom clearwhether all countries would agree that so-called non-lethal chemical weaponsare outlawed as well. As was pointed out at the time the Convention was negoti-ated, there is an ambiguity at the heart o the text caused by the peaceul purposesexemption or so-called law enorcement chemical agents: [i]s the Conventionreally to be read as allowing any non-Schedule 1 toxic chemical or precursor to bedeveloped, produced, weaponised, stockpiled or traded, so long as it is said to beor law enorcement purposes?30 One would hope not, because such a loopholewould allow the development o new, undisclosed, chemical agents. Furthermore,

whilst no such loophole exists in the Biological and oxin Weapons Convention,it is reasonable to ask how well this weak convention lacking both an organi-zation and any eective verifcation system will stand up to the current waveo scientifc and technological change and the opportunities oered thereby tomilitary and police orces around the world.

Much o the recent military interest in chemical agents that aect thebrain has ocused on incapacitating chemicals. An incapacitating chemical may

28 omas Furmark et al., Serotonin transporter polymorphism related to amygdala excitability andsymptom severity in patients with social phobia, Neuroscience Letters, Vol. 362, 2004, pp. 189-192.

29 See Christina S. Barr et al., Rearing conditions and rh5-HLPR interact to inuence limbic-hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis response to stress in inant macaques, Biol. Psychiatry, Vol. 55,2004, pp. 733738. Moreover, the serotonin transporter is not the only gene or which this new imaginggenomics approach is producing such results; see Ahmad R. Hariri, and Daniel R. Weinberger, Imaginggenomics, British Medical Bulletin, Vol. 65, 2003, pp. 259-270.

30 Editorial, New technologies and the loophole in the Convention, Chemical Weapons ConventionBulletin, Vol. 23, 1990, pp. 1-2.


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be defned as an agent which produces a disabling condition that persists orhours to days aer exposure to the agent.31 Specifcally, the term has come tomean those agents that are highly potent and able to produce their eects by alter-ing the higher regulatory activity o the central nervous system. As a recent NAOtechnical report on uture peace enorcement operations noted,32 incapacitatingchemicals could act on [t]he central nervous system by calmatives, dissociativeagents, equilibrium agents. We are obviously, thereore, not discussing traditionalriot-control agents here.

Tere is a long history o State interest in such chemical agents. In theUnited Kingdom, or example, substantial studies were made at Porton Down dur-ing the 1950s and 1960s o glycollates (which bind to one subcategory o acetylcho-line receptors). Te US also sought an incapacitating chemical capability, and or a

while produced and stockpiled the delirium-inducing glycollate BZ.33 At that timecurrent knowledge o the neuroreceptor sub-types in the brain was not available, soit is unlikely that any agents o adequate specifcity were developed. Te use o anopiate rom the entanyl amily to break the Moscow theatre siege in 200234 suggestscontinuing Russian interest. Although some 120 people died, it might be arguedthat the use o such an agent acilitated the release o 700 other people.

Evidence o an ongoing US military interest in new non-lethal chemi-cal agents is apparent. A university group known to be closely linked to the USJoint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, or example, produced a report in 2000

entitled he Advantages and Limitations o Calmatives or Use as a Non-Lethalechnique,35 which listed a variety o receptor sub-types o potential interest astargets or such new agents. his inding was hardly surprising given the historyo US research on such agents,36 and the United States is not the only country tohave recently worked on them.37

he recent search or new non-lethal chemicals has taken place, ocourse, against a background o very rapid and intense civil research on agentsaecting the brain.38 Yet military interest is already directed towards the next

31 Graham Cooper and Paul Rice, (eds.), Special issue chemical casualties: Centrally acting incapacitants,Journal o the Royal Army Medical Corps, Vol. 148 (4), 2001, pp. 388391.

32 Research and echnology Organization, Non-Lethal Weapons and Future Peace Enorcement Operations,R-SAS-040, North Atlantic reaty Organization, November 2004.

33 Martin Furmanski and Malcolm R. Dando, Midspectrum incapacitant programs, in M. Wheelis,L. Rosza and M. Dando, Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons rom 1945 to the Present. Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 236251.

34 Robin Coupland, Incapacitating chemical weapons: A year aer the Moscow theatre siege, Te Lancet,Vol. 362, 2003, p. 1346.

35 Joan M. Lakoski et al., Te Advantages and Limitations o Calmatives or Use as a Non-Lethal echnique,Applied Research Laboratory, College o Medicine, Pennsylvania State University, 2000. According tothe report, the researchers identifed several drug classes (e.g. alpha2-adrenoreceptor agonists) and

individual drugs (...dexmedetomidine) ound appropriate or immediate consideration as non-lethal[agents] involving e.g. unconsciousness or calming.36 Malcolm R. Dando, Te Danger to the Chemical Weapons Convention rom Incapacitating Chemicals, First

CWC Review Conerence, Paper No. 4, University o Bradord, March 2003.37 A Survey o Biological and Biochemical Weapons Related Research Activities in France, Country Study

No. 2, Sunshine Project, November 2004.38 Michael Williams et al., Same brain, new decade: Challenges in CNS drug discovery in the postgenomic,

postproteomic era,Annual Reports in Medicinal Chemistry, Vol. 36, 2001 pp. 110.


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generation o agents. A 2004 US Broad Area Announcement stated the objectiveas ollows:39

he Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) is soliciting propos-als or research, development, integration, and demonstration o next-generation non-lethal weapons (NLW) and capabilities...

Amongst eorts requested were:

Studies/Analyses to address technology-speciic legal/treaty/public accept-ability issues associated with: (1) extended duration incapacitation (...) and(3) precision long-range engagement o threats...

In addition to drugs causing calming or unconsciousness, compounds on

the horizon with potential as military agents include noradrenaline antagonistssuch as propranolol to cause selective memory loss, cholecystokinin B agonists tocause panic attacks, and substance P agonists to induce depression. Te questionthus is not so much when these capabilities will arise because arise they cer-tainly will but what purposes will those with such capabilities pursue.

Implications

he above analysis sketches the current status o mechanistic neuroscience, and

suggests that in the near uture a suiciently detailed understanding o brainunction will be gained to allow greatly expanded intervention or benign, ormalign, purposes. We have also shown that there is continuing military inter-est in the weapons potential o emerging agents. We now return to our origi-nal question: What will the near and mid-term uture be like i the gatheringmomentum or the militarization o biology is not stemmed?

Present potentialities

O course, military utility will go beyond weapons to perormance-enhancingagents or use by ones own troops. Amphetamines have long been used to extendalertness, and manipulation o the sleep/wake cycle is currently used to enhancethe perormance o air crews (and probably special orces teams) on long mis-sions. But as a recent National Academies report40 noted, within a ew decadeswe will have perormance enhancement o troops which will almost certainlybe produced by the use o diverse pharmaceutical compounds, and will extendto a range o physiological systems well beyond the sleep cycle. Reduction oear and pain, and increase o aggression, hostility, physical capabilities and

alertness could signiicantly enhance soldier perormance, but might markedly

39 Broad Area Announcement, Non-Lethal Weapons Science and echnology: Applied Research andechnology Development Eorts, M67854-05-R-5009, 2004, Contracts Home Page, US Marine Corps.

40 National Research Council, Opportunities in Biotechnology or Future Army Operations, NationalAcademies Press, Washington, DC, 2001.


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increase the requency o violations o humanitarian law. For example, increas-ing a persons aggressiveness and hostility in conlict situations is hardly likelyto enhance restraint and respect or legal prohibitions on violence.

Given the kinds o operations other than war that are the increas-ingly common pattern o military engagement, we will also probably see sol-diers armed not only with traditional lethal weapons, but also with a range onon-lethal weapons acoustic, electromagnetic and chemical. Among thechemical weapons will be traditional riot control agents such as CS (tear gas)and OC (pepper spray), as well as various pharmaceutical compounds thatcause unconsciousness, paralysis or delirium at very low doses. Whether thetraditional laws o war or instance, protection o civilians and o soldiershors de combat will withstand these changed circumstances is unsure.41

Certainly the historical record gives little comort, as the major military use onon-lethal chemical compounds has traditionally been to ampliy lethal orce,not to replace it. In Vietnam, or instance, the US used approximately 10,000tons o CS. he purported use was or humanitarian purposes, or situationsin which combatants and non-combatants were intermixed, or where exten-sive property damage would result rom attacking the enemy in urban environ-ments. However, a 1973 Army report42 reviewed ater-action reports on the useo CS, and ound no record o humanitarian use.

Currently in Iraq, the US is using acoustic beam weapons to lush snip-

ers rom cover, who are then killed.43 And in the previously mentioned exampleo the Moscow siege, Chechen hostage-takers rendered comatose by the en-tanyl derivative were shot dead.44 It is credible that novel agents would indsimilar military uses, and that these non-lethal agents would oten be used toincrease the lethality o other weapons, rather than to replace them.

here is also a serious potential or misuse o pharmaceuticals duringinterrogation.45 During the Cold War the CIA, or example, sought substancesthat would change personality and thus induce increased dependence on others.46he recent abuses o prisoners under interrogation by US orces in the ater-

math o the second Gul War remind us that even democratic countries withlong traditions o support or humanitarian laws may act unlawully whenit appears to be vital to security. Accounts claiming orced medication with

41 David P. Fidler, Non-lethal weapons and international law: Tree perspectives on the uture,Medicine,Confict and Survival, Vol. 17, 2000, pp. 194200.

42 Paul L. Howard, echnical Report: Operational Aspects o Agent CS, Deseret est Center, Fort Douglas,Utah, April 1973, DC-FR-S700M. Te principal use o CS was or terrain denial (persistent CS wasapplied in enormous amounts on the Ho Chi Minh rail, and around the perimeter o isolated US fre-bases). Te most common combat use was to drive enemy troops rom cover to increase their vulnerability

to lethal fre, and to break combat when US troops were ambushed.43 Bryan Bender, US testing nonlethal weapons arsenal or use in Iraq, Boston Globe, 5 August 2005.44 John Hart, Frida Kuhlau and Jacqueline Simon, Chemical and biological weapons developments and

arms control, Chapter 16, in SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,Oxord University Press, Oxord, 2003, pp. 645682.

45 Mark Bowden, Te dark art o interrogation,Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 292, October 2003, pp. 5176.46 Julian P. Perry-Robinson, Disabling Chemical Weapons: A Documented Chronology o Events, 1945-2003,

Harvard Sussex Program, University o Sussex, 2003, pp. 89.


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psychoactive drugs have come rom detainees released rom US custody, 47and detainee medical records have been made available to interrogators.48Progress in understanding the biological basis or repression49 may allow theselective deletion o speciic memories, which could not only protect sensitiveinormation rom unriendly interrogation but also protect interrogators romeective oversight.

orturers in all countries will have a greatly expanded repertoire ocapabilities. Non-lethal police devices such as electric batons and OC spraysare now widely used or torture, and there is no reason to think that uturedevices and chemicals will not be similarly used.50 In the hands o the sophis-ticated torturer or the interrogator willing to use torture to gain inormation,chemical agents will oer the ability to induce at will panic, depression, psy-

chosis, delirium and extreme pain and to oer instant relie as well, or eveneuphoria.

Even greater might be the danger o such capabilities in the hands odictators to quell dissent. In addition to expanding the ability o dictatorships touse torture to gain inormation during interrogations, the possibility may existo paciying entire populations through additives to ood or water.

O course, anything developed or the use o States is likely to becomereadily accessible to criminals and terrorist groups, who may be able to usethem as eectively as States, but or dierent purposes. Tey may even fnd these

weapons more suited to their purposes than to the purposes o States. States areconstrained by their own laws and by their international treaty commitments;criminals and terrorist groups partake in none o these constraints. Tere is thuspotential or them to use these weapons with disproportionate eect.

his brie review o potential misuses o pharmaceutical compounds asweapons may seem ar-etched, but our review o the state o the art suggeststhey are only a slight extrapolation rom known neuropharmacology. he capa-bilities seem to be nearly upon us, and we know that the militaries and justicedepartments o several nations are keenly interested. As we have noted, Russia

has already used an incapacitating chemical as a weapon in the 2002 Moscowhostage rescue, and the US has unded much exploratory research. Other coun-tries are certainly interested as well. Clearly at least some, perhaps most, o thecapabilities we outline above are within reach, or will be in a matter o only aew years. And equally clearly, they will be used or military purposes unlessthere is active intervention o governments to prevent the development o phar-maceutical weapons.

47 James Meek, People the law orgot, Te Guardian, 3 December 2003, available at (visited 24 August 2005).48 P. Slevin and J. Stephens, Detainees medical fles shared: Guantanamo interrogators access criticized,

Washington Post, 10 June 2004, A01.49 Michael C. Anderson et. al., Neural systems underlying the suppression o unwanted memories, Science,

Vol. 303, 2004, pp. 232235.50 Te Pain Merchants: Security Equipment and Its Use in orture and Other Ill-reatment. Amnesty

International, London, 2 December 2003.


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Future potentialities

I we look to a longer term, even more ar-reaching manipulations o humanbeings are discernable. Work, or instance, on direct brain-computer interacesin primates51 has shown that animals can learn to control a robotic arm throughelectrodes connected to individual neurons not previously used or similar pur-poses. In other words, they can learn to ire speciic neurons at will, which canin turn control an external device. his may lead to major breakthroughs inthe management o patients with permanent spinal cord injuries, but it mayalso ultimately allow direct mental control o military equipment, and perhapseven remote control o human beings. Already insects and rodents have beenwired to allow investigators to remotely control their movements, overridingany endogenous intentions.52 Evidently such capabilities are a long way o, butit is not too soon to start anticipating the possible malign outcomes o suchresearch.

hus, we see the near-term uture (10-20 years) possibly includingmilitaries whose troops will go into action with chemically heightened aggres-siveness and resistance to ear, pain and atigue. heir memories o atrocitiescommitted will be chemically erased in ater-action brieings. hey will beequipped with a range o weapons, including chemicals that incapacitate theiropponents, who may then be executed in cold blood. Civilians will be targeted

with incapacitating chemicals when they get in the way, and many will die ooverdoses or secondary eects. Civilians in occupied territories will be paciiedby chemicals included in ood distributions (and civilians at home may alsobe so paciied). Enemy captives, and civilians suspected o collaboration, willbe treated with psychoactive chemicals to extract inormation, including theuse o devastatingly eective chemical torture when necessary. he chemicalcompounds will be rapidly metabolized and will leave no orensic trace. In thisdire uture scenario, many ragile democracies will have yielded to totalitarianrule, whose governments repress any dissent with brutal eectiveness, aided

by chemical paciication o entire populations, use o incapacitating agents orcrowd control and capture o dissident leaders, and use o chemicals or tor-ture and interrogation o dissidents. A worldwide criminal underworld will beusing similar technologies to deal with both victims and competitors. erroristgroups worldwide will be inding requent use or the orce-ampliying eectso chemical agents.

Since the uture possibilities become very diicult to discern with anyconidence and cannot be deined at this point (unlike the near-term possibili-ties above, which we can discern with more clarity), we oer a ew speculations

only to hint at what is likely to be possible in the long term. We can imagine,however, that in the longer term (50 years?), soldiers could become wired or

51 Jose M. Carmena et al., Learning to control a brain-machine interace or reaching and grasping byprimates, PLoS Biology, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2003, pp. 116.

52 Ben Harder, Scientists drive rats by remote control, National Geographic News, 1 May 2002.


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rapid and direct communication with headquarters, and to control powerulmilitary drones by their thoughts. hey could be triggered remotely to enterspeciically programmed behaviour patterns evasive, suicidal, berserk, etc.heir memories and convictions would be subject to alteration and erasure.

We would like to hope that this is not the world we shall leave to ourchildren, but we are not particularly sanguine. Human history gives amplegrounds or pessimism about our ability to prevent widespread exploitation othe manipulative, hostile and malign possibilities that the emerging technolo-gies will bring within reach.

Responses

What we are suggesting here is that the biological, medical (and legal) com-munities should ace the near certainty that unless active steps are taken toprevent it, biology will become the next major military technology, and thatneuroscience and by implication much o the rest o modern biology willbecome highly vulnerable to use or abuse in entirely unintended, but clearlyoreseeable, ways. We know o no major technology with military utility thathas not been vigorously exploited or hostile purposes, and there is no reason tothink that the revolution in biology will not be similarly bent to military ends.

O course, anticipating such an eventuality, and dealing eectively with it, aretwo very dierent things. We see three major generic strategies or attemptingto contain the malign applications o biology.

he irst would be what we would describe as the ree-marketapproach.53 In essence, this approach accepts that the knowledge needed orbenign applications is the same as or malign ones, and posits that there isessentially no way to prevent the development o the capabilities we have out-lined. his approach recommends that we let the market drive the technology,and trust to sel-interest to restrict the malign applications. We are sceptical that

this will work; certainly it hasnt worked that way or any previous technology,probably in large part because the development o hostile applications o newtechnologies is largely done by governments behind closed doors, with non-competitive unding, with little public oversight or policy advice, and with verylarge inancial beneits to many.

Another approach would be the neo-Luddite one to attempt to haltthe biological revolution in its tracks, or at least give pause to it, beore it pro-duces any more problems or society. his too seems unworkable to us; thereare simply too many constituencies dependent on and anticipating the benignapplications that are promised by biology. Furthermore, stopping the progress obiology would require that all countries with an active biomedical research com-munity and pharmaceutical industry come to the same conclusion. Obviouslythis is no solution, as desirable as it might be to some.

53 Robert Carlson, Te pace and prolieration o biological technologies, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism,Vol. 1, 2003, pp. 203214.


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his leaves, as the only viable option or controlling the malign applica-tions o biology, a middle road o imposed national and international regula-tion o biological research and o military development. his would build onlong-standing norms against the hostile use o chemistry and biology and onan existing international treaty regime including the 1925 Geneva Protocol,the 1972 Biological and oxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 ChemicalWeapons Convention. It would, however, require greatly enhanced transpar-ency in biodeence and chemical deence, and in research in areas o concern.54Moreover, whilst we have concentrated here on the military because it is mostlikely to have the resources needed to eect the disquieting changes outlinedabove, it is obvious that once the process is under way many more dangers couldarise. Many alliances are thereore conceivable with those who have misgivings

about the potential threats to international humanitarian law and human rightsin general. Yet the approach we support would require biologists themselves tobecome much more aware o, and concerned about, the misuses o their science.Tese are issues that ew in the biological or medical communities have even beenconscious o, at least since the anti-biological warare activism o microbiologicalsocieties in the 1960s. A major change is thereore necessary in the culture o thebiomedical sciences. Failing this, the wholesale militarization o biology will be anintegral part o the continuing revolution in modern biology.

Fortunately, those concerned do not have to start rom scratch. he

aoresaid three treaties eectively outlaw the development, production, stock-piling or use o all biological and chemical weapons, lethal or incapacitat-ing. Nonetheless, there are loopholes (or instance, or law enorcement), andthere are ambiguities; together, these provide countries determined to developnew biochemical weapons with a legal opportunity to take at least the irststeps. Given the potential o these new weapons to expand military optionsand the interest in them shown mainly by the most powerul States, manyarms controllers ear that the international legal regime banning such weaponsmay crumble. Concerned scientists do not have to invent a new arms control

regime, but they will need to bring their expertise to bear on strengtheningthe existing regime and the norms enshrined in it against the hostile use obiology and chemistry.

Biomedical scientists in particular could become active, through theirproessional societies or individually, in eorts to implement systems o over-sight, such as the recommendations o a recent report rom the US NationalResearch Council.55 Te frst tentative steps to implementation have beentaken in the US by the establishment o the National Science Advisory Boardor Biosecurity,56 but the system will have to become much more intrusive and

international and will have to eectively include military laboratories beore

54 Mark Wheelis, and Malcolm R. Dando, Back to bioweapons?, Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2003, pp. 4046.

55 National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age o errorism, National Academies Press,Washington DC, 2004.

56 See (visited 24 August 2005).


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it will be an eective constraint.57 Another important opportunity is oeredby the current international interest in codes o conduct or bioscientists,58which may help to prevent the misuse o the lie sciences or hostile purposes.houghtul input rom scientiic societies and national academies o sciencecould be quite inluential in the outcome o these discussions.

In the end, it is likely that whether biology becomes an oensive mili-tary technology in the coming decades will depend to a signiicant degree onwhether scientists become actively involved in legal discussions, and on theadvice they give to policy makers.59 It is to be hoped that the issues raised in thispaper will receive the attention o the scientiic community that they urgentlydeserve, and that scientists will join the arms control, diplomatic, and humani-tarian law communities to explore mechanisms to protect humanity rom the

earsome potential o abuse o the technologies they are developing, while pre-serving the beneicial applications.

57 Elisa D. Harris and John D Steinbrunner, Controlling dangerous pathogens, Issues in Science andechnology Online, spring 2003, pp. 74-78.

58 For relevant developments related to codes o conduct see: (visited 24 August 2005).

59 Robin Coupland, and Kobi-Renee Leins, Science and prohibited weapons, Science, Vol. 308, 2005,p. 1841.


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London

From beginning o Sep-tember 1940 to May 1941,the Lutwae systemati-cally bombed British cit-ies in order to demoralizethe enemy. he pictureshows the underground oLondon transormed intoa shelter during the battle

or England.

Dresden

Te city o Dresden onFebruary 14th, 1945.It was never possible todetermine the exact numbero deaths. Some historians othe time estimated 400,000deaths, which turned out

to be a gross exaggera-tion. oday, it is generallyaccepted by historians andby the city o Dresden thatapproximately 35,000 peo-ple died, 25,000 o whichhave been identifed.


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Mustard gas

Eects o mustard gason a patient picked up bya Norwegian Red Crossambulance during the Aby-ssinian war o 1935-1936.

ICRCPhotolibrary

Gas used during theFirst World War

British soldiers blinded bygas in April 1918.Non-lethal tearing agentswould be sent over to getsoldiers to remove their gasmasks thereby making them

more vulnerable to a laterattack with one o the moredreaded gas such as mustardgas, or asphyxiant gases.

ICRCPhotolibrary


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Sarin gas attack onTokyos subway system

Sarin gas attack on okyossubway system in 1995 bythe Japanese religious sect,Aum Shinriko.

Military gear worn toprotect against sarin

Sarin is a colorless, odour-less, tasteless, human-made chemical warareagent. he picture shows

the military gear worn toprotect against sarin (USArmy).

neurobiology and biological warfare

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