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m an s a ct io n f ro m the external necessity ofcoercion or constraint; or does it consist in aman s beingable to choosewhateverhe chooses,freely rather than necessarily? Is. e v er y a c t ofthe will necessarily determined or are someacts ofthe vinacts of free choice?

Are certain human institutions, such as thefamily and th e state, necessary ?Are men compelled to live socially or can they choose thesqlitary life? If domestic and political societyare necessary, are the \vays in which they areorganized also necessary, or are such things asmonogamy in the family and monarchy in thestate contingent? Are such things as war, slavery, poverty, and,crime necessary features ofhuman socIety, or are they the resulr:ofcircumstances which are contingent and., vhichcantherefore be remedied?

These questions indicate the range of subjectil1atters in which issues are raised concerningthe necessary and the contingent. They alsoindicate that the other ideas to which necessityand contingency have relevance are too manifold to permit an enumeration of all the otherchapters in which some aspect of necessity andcontingency is discussed. This chapter stands tothe others as a k in d of summary of the theme

of necessi ty and contingency. It asse1l1bles inone place the various topics, problems, or subject .matters \vhich traditionally engage theh u ma n m in d w it h t h at theme.

Tw o chapters alone demand specific mention as, .in a sense, being concerned wi th ideasthat seem to beinseparable from the notions ofnecessity and contingency.. They are F T an dC H N C E Though they stand opposed t ooneanother as the necessary to the contingent,they do no t cover every application of thisopposition. They are largely concerned withnecessity and contingency in the realm ofchange, in the causation of the events of na-

apter I: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY

HE basic nleaning of the words, necessityand contingency is made ,known to us byact that we can subs t itute for them theiar, \vordsmust and 1nay Is there any. behichmust exist? asks the same questionoes anything exist of necessity? Are all

s of the sort which, mayor maynot exist,they divided into thosewhich mustexist

hose \vhich mayor may not exist? meansm e as, Is everything contingent in bedosome things exisrnecessarilyand someently?

e great issues which involve the opposi hetvveen necessity and con tingencyare

erned with more than questions aboutor existence. They also deal with cause

feet, judgmentand reasoning, happeningsents, the actions and decisions .ofmenn history and social inst i tut ions. In eachthe problem is formulated by such ques-as: , Doeseverything which happens in

e or history happen necessarily? Is everygcontingent? Or are some events necessaryothers contingent? Is the relation betweene,and effect a necessary connection, o r d o

causes produce their effects contingently?re there some propositions vvhich the mind

affirm because their truth is necessary?re all propositions such that they mayornot be t rue, our affirrnation or denial ofbeing contingent upon factors which li e

de the propositions then1selves? In reasondoes the conclusionalways follow by necesfrom the premises i f i t follo vs at all? Andall conclusions \vnich follow necessarily

their premises necessarilytrue, or maybe necessary truths and some contingent?

re men necessi tated in all their acts, or areain actions contingent upon th e exerciseheir will and in, thi s sense f ree? Does huliberty consist merely i n t he freedom of a

D : W E Y. Nature a nd I t s G oo d, A C on ve rs aIn The Influence Darwin on Philosophy

. E'xperience and Nature, CH 3-7 9BRIDGMAN. The Logic o f Modern Physics, CEDDINGTON. The Nature ~ t h ePhysical World LENZEN. The Nature Physical T h e o r y P A R . ~L E v y - B R U H L . Primitives and the SupernaturalSANTAYANA. Reason in Comn10n Sense,CH 3-5 . Scepticisn1 and nimal Faith, CH 22 . . The Genteel Tradition at Bay, CH 2- 3MAIUTAIN. The Degrees KnotJ Jledge Cl i 3LOVEJOY. The Great Chain Being, CH 10

COLLINGV100D. The Idea NaturePLANCK. The Unity of the PhysicalUniverse

A Survey Physics . .. The Philosophy Physics, CH 2

WHITEHEAD. The Concept Nature, C H I - 2 - . Process and Reality, PART. II CII 3-4 . Adventures o f Ideas,cH 7-8 . Modes o f Thought, LECT VII-VII ISHERRINGTON. Man on His Nature, I - I I XIIWOODBRIDGE. n Essay on NatureKELSEN. Society and NatureCASSIRER. Substance and Function, PART I I C R The Myth the State, PART II (9)VO N WEIZSACKER.The History Nature

250

SCHOPENHAUER. T he Wor ld as TVill andldea VOLI I I SUP cn 23

EMERSON. NatureWHEWELL. The PhilOsophy the Inductive Sciences,

VOL I B K X CH 3THOREAU. A fVeek on the Concord and Merrimack

Rivers . UTaldenTYNDALL. The Belfast AddressL O T Z E . Microcosmos, BK I CH 1 - 2 ; B K I V CH 1-3-- . - . Logic; BK II CH 8 . i\letaphysics, BK II CH 7-8C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, V OL V I

par 88-101,395-4 2 7NIETZSCHE. The Will to Power, BK I II (2)FRAZER. The Golden Bough,PART I CH 3-6; PART

V I I C H 13BRADLEY. Appearance and Reall y, BK I CH 1 1 ~ 2 ;

BK II CH 1 3 - 1 5 22

WA R D . Naturalism and 1 gnosticisI11ROYCE. T he Wor ld a n d t he I nd iv id ua l, SERIES II

(5)C. READ. The Metaphysics NatureBERGSON. Creative Evolution, CH B . R u s S E L L . Philosophical Essays, clI 2HENDERSON. The Order o f Nature


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T HE G RE AT IDEAS CHAPTER 61: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY52

t ur e o r t he happenings of history. They do notdeal, at least no t directly, \vith necessity andcontingencyin being or existence, i n t ho ug h tor knb\vledge, i n h u ma n acts an d social institutions.

THE NECESSARY AND t he c on ti ng en t d o no tseem to be opposed in exactly the saIne wayin each of the four areas-namely, being,change, t ho u gh t , a n d act ion-in which they

raise basic issues.In the sphere of human action, for example,

writers like I Iobbes Locke, and Hume substitute t h e n o ti o n of liberty for contingency asthe opposite of necessity. Th e meaning of necessity alters in consequence. Liberty, according to these authors, implies the absence no t ofall necessity, bu t only of external necessity inthe form of compulsion. An internal necessity,they think, is quite compatible with completefreedom.

Hume therefore dismisses the supposed conflict between l iber ty and necessity as groundless. B y liberty, he wri te s, we can onlymean a power acting or not acting, accordingto the determinations the will; that is, if wechoose to remain at rest, we may; if we chooseto move, we also may. No w this hypotheticalliberty is universally allowed to belong toeveryone who is not a prisoner and in chains Liberty, whenopposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same t h in g w i th chance; \vhichis universally allowed to have no existence.

Similarly, L,ocke defines liberty as a m an spower t o do or forbear doing any particularaction, according as i ts doing or forbearancehas the actual preference in the mind, which is

the same thing as to say, according as he himselfwills it. Liberty in this sense, he adds, belongsnot to th e will, the acts of which are necessit at ed b y t he ir causes, b ut to t he m an \tvho isunder no external necessity, in the form ofcompulsion, to d o w ha t is c o nt ra r y t o his willo r t o refrainfrom doing whathe wills.

Hobbes seelns to go even further along th esame line of thought. I-Iolding that liberty isdestroyed only by external impediments toact ion, he uses necessi ty in a sense whichmakes it consistent vvith liberty, or inseparablef rom i t. fhe act ions which men voluntar i lydo, he says, because they proceed from their

\vill,proceed from liberty; and yet, becauseeact of man s will, and every desire, and intion, proceeds from some cause, and thatanother cause, in a continual chain (whoselink is in the hand o f Go d, t he first 0causes), they proceed from necessity.

Yet if what I-Iobbes means by externalpedilnents represents the same nullificaof liberty which others cal l compulsion

restraint, t h en t h er e is at least one meaof necessity which stands opposed to libeE n um e ra t in g t h e meanings of necessarAristotle lists as one sense t he cOlnpulsorcompulsion, i.e., that which impedes or teto hinder, that which is contrary to impulpurpose or t o t h e m o v e me n t \vhich accowith purpose and with reasoning. I t i s irelated sense that Plato opposes necessitin telligence. Necessi ty represents for him tresistant factors i n n a tu r e which the minma n or G od m us t overcome, or persuaclgive way, if reason or purpose is to prevail incoming to be of anything. In this sense,cessity likechance is opposed to purpose.Bnecessi ty and blind chance both excludeoperation of final causes; both exclude thesibility that the events of nature are diretoward an end.

WE SEEM TO HAVE f ou nd a lm os t u nl vagreement o n t he p oi nt that there is onein which necessity conflicts with liberty.this agreement does not affect th e issue wheliberty is more than freedom from extecoercion. There are those, l ike Aquinas,think that man s will is free in its acts of cwith regard to par ticu lar contingent mea

Aquinas agrees that what is called necessitcoercion is a l together repugnant to thew:Th e same act cannot be absolutely coercevoluntary. Bu t the question is whethewill s acts are necessarily determined bycaopera ting wi t ~ the sphere of the will i tse

Aq uinas names two modes of necessi ty operate within the sphere of the will and restits freedom. On e is the natura l necessityth e will should desire an ult imate end, suth e complete good or happiness. If a manany object at all as the ul t imate goal of hihe cannot will anything o t he r o r less thanwhich can sat is fy a ll h is natural desires.

er necessi ty is that which concerns th e usehose means\vhich are absolutely indispen

condit ions for reaching th e e nd beinght. This may be an absolute or a conditionecessity. When. t he e nd is itself necessary. happiness), \vhatevermeans are necessaryeta necessitate the will absolutely. \Vhen aain end is not necessary, bu t has beenfreelyted e.g., a certain destination), and \vhenone means is available e.g. one mode of

spartation), then it becomes necessary . tose that means. Bu t this necessity is connal since it remains in force on ly o n t he

clition that \ve continue to have a cer ta inin view-an end \ve can relinquish at an y

e as freely as \ve adopted it.ccording to Aquinas , thi s l eaves a greaty acts of the willwhich are i n n o way neces

ted: those in which there is no necessarynection between the means anda givenend,those in which a g iven means is necessaryon the condition that a cer ta in end is

ht. If the end need not be sought, thenwill is .free not to choose th e means of

eying it ; and if, \vhen t h e e n d is necessarilyht, al ternat ive means are available, thenwill is free to choose one rather than anr.

According to this theory, liberty consists ineabsence of internal as well as external. ne

ity. Fur thermore , l iber ty seems to b e re positively to contingency, insofar as freeofchoice depends on a contingent connec-

n between means an d ends, or u po n th etingent, i.e., the conditional? character ofend. On the other hand, . those who hold

t the wi ll is never free [roln internal neces-

insist that t he a ct of choice, even \vithpect to contingent means, is always caused.being caused is equiva lent to being detered-which seems to the view of Hobbes,

eke and Hume-then whether or no t weow ViThat causes a particular choice, ou r wills

so determined that we c ou ld no t havesen other\vise.

E PROBLElvl OF the freedom of the will ination t o t he causes which determine i ts actsonsidered in the chapter on \VILL. The fore

ing discussion suffices here for the purpose ofrowing lig ht o n th e meaning of necessity.

253If nowwe shiftfrom humanact ion to the realmof becoming, change, or motion, \ve face th equestion of the relation between necessity andcausation in i ts most general form.

In the realm of na t ur e t he alternatives tonecessity are referred to as chance an d as contingency. Th e significance of these alternatives depends on the theory of causation. According to one opinion, every effect isnecessarily d et er mi n ed b y i ts causes, a nd e ve rycause necessarilyproduces certain effects. Giventhe causal chain of past even t5 leading up to th epresent, every f ut u re e v en t is necessarily determined. Nothing that ever happens couldhappen otherwise. Nothing happens contingently or by chance. This theory of causation isaccordingly a doctrine of universal necessity orabsolute determinism i n t he realin of change.

I n nature, writes Spinoza, there is nothing contingent, bu t a ll things a re determinedfrom the necessi t y o f the divine na ture to exista n d a c t in a certain manner. Though nothingwhich exists or happens is contingent, G od

alone exists from the necessity of His own nat ur e a nd acts alone from the necessity of Hisown nature. Th e divine necessity is thereforedifferent from the necessity of everything elsewhich follows from the divine nature. One isthe necessity of freedoln or self-determination,th e other the necessity of compulsion, or determination by another. T ha t thing is calledfree, says Spinoza, which exi sts f ro m t henecessity of i ts own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone. That thing, onthe other hand, is called necessary, or rathercompelled, which b y a n ot h er is determined toexistence and action in a fixed and prescribed

anner.I-Iume s statement that there is n o such

thing as Chance i n t he world, \vould appear toagree with Spinoza s denial of contingency. Bu tHume also seenlS to deny the percept ion of an ynecessary connection bet\veen cause an d effect.This is no t to say that events happen \vithoutcause, bu t only that o ur ignorance of the realcause of a n y e v en t ha s t he san1e influence onthe unders tanding as if nothing were necessarily determined by its causes.

\Ve are never able, I-Iullle thinks, t o discover an y power or necessary connexion, anyquali ty, \vhich binds the effect to t he cause,


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As WE HAVE SEEN those who discuss necessityand contingency in the domain of human actsand naturalevents seem to construe these l ~ternatives differently, according as they conceive liberty and chance in terms of differenttheories of.causation ...With regard to being orreal existence, however,there seems to. ,be acommon understanding of th e alternatives,even among those who do not agree that Godalone is a necessary being because t he y t h in kthat this world is also determined to exist as anecessary consequence of God s existence.

In the preceding discussions, one meaning ofcontingency has repeatedly appeared. Th e contingent is that which can be otherwise. Thatwhich cannot be otherwise is necessarily as itis, writes Aristotle, an d f rom thi s sense of'necessary' all its other meanings are somehowderived. This insight is sometimes expressedby the s tatement that the opposite of the necessary is th e impossible, whereas the contingen t -which is neither necessary no r impossible-includes contrary possibilities.

In logical analysiswhat is called the modal-

CHAPTER 61: NECESSITY A N D C O NT I N GE N C Y 255

cannot be objects of scientific knowledge. But,according to Aquinas, contingent things canbe considered in tw o ways: either as contingentor as con ta in ing some element of necessity,since every contingent thing has in it somethingnecessary; for example, that Socrates runs is initselfcontingent; bu t the relation ofrunning tomotion is necessary, for it is necessary tha tSocrates moves if he runs.

Th e contingency that Socrates,, m y oim ynot run does not alter the hypothetical necessity that i fhe runs,he must move. In it s concern \vith contingent things, natural science isconcerned only with such hypothetical necessities. Unlike physics, other sciences may dealwith absolutely necessary things. That theob:jects of mathematicsare of this sort seems to bean opinion shared by James a n d K a nt , Hurrieand Descartes, PIa t o a nd .Aristotle. :But theydo not agree o n w he th er th e necessities ofmathematics belong to reality or have onlyideal existence, i.e. w he t he r t h ey. exist. apartfrom or only in the human mind. This issue isconnected with another major issue concerning

necessi ty and contingency; namely, whetherany reality has necessary existence.

bly does not seem toA,quinas to be i ntent with the realcontlngency of some. He explains that whoever know s agent effect in its causes only, has merelyjectural knowledge o f it . B ut Go dall contingent things not only as they

their causes, but also as each one of themallvin itself Hence it is manifest thatg ~ tthingsare infallibly known by God,

uch as they aresubject to th e divine sightif presentiality; ye t they are future cont things in relation to their own causes.hasa bearing on the difference between

n and divine apprehension of future cori-t things. Things reduced to actuality in

Aquinas declares, ar e known by us sucely in t im e, b ut b y G od t he y a re k no wnrnity, which is above time. Whence to uscannot be certain, sinceweknow.;futuregen t things only as contingent futures;eyare certain t o G od alone, Whose un-

anding is in e terni ty above time. Just ashegoes along the road does not see those whoafter him; whereas he who sees th e whole

from a height sees at once allthose t r v l ~n i t . I-Ience, Aquinas continues, whatwn by us must be necessary, even as it is

elf; for what is in itselfa future contingentot be known by us. Bu t what is known bymust be necessary according to the mode

hich it is subject to the divine knowledgebut not absolutely as considered in itser causes. It does no t follow, therefore,everything k no wn b y o d m us t necessarily

for that statement, according to Aquinas, refer to t h e t h in g or t o t he saying. If itrs to th e thing, it is divided and false; fo rsense is, Everything which o d knows is

essary If understood of the saying, it is comite and t rue, for the sense is, This proposi t ha t w hi ch i s k no wn b y o d is is neces- ith regard t o h um a n knowledge, Aquinas

kes another distinction in answering thestion w he t he r m a n can have scientific ortain knowledge of contingent things. If, asstode seems to hold, the objects of knowle are necessary, no t contingent things, thenrealm of contingency belongs to opinion,

jecture, or probability. Insofar as the parJar events of nature are contingent, they

Th e issue concerning contingency inthus. seems to be m or e s ha rp ly s ta tethe re i s no reference . t o o ur knowledgnorance of causes. On this issue, AristoSpinoza appear to be ~ a r e c l e a r 1 y o p pone another than Hume is to either.

If things do not ' take place of necessievent, according to Aristotle, mighteasily not happen as happen; for theof the word 'fortuitous ' with regard t

e nt o r future events is that realitY'is ss t i tuted that it may issue in e i ther of twosite d i r e c t i o n s . ~ F o r e x a m p l ea s e a ~ f i g heither take place tomorrow or not, but itnecessarytha t..it should i take place tomoneither is it necessary that it should notplace, y e t i t is necessary that i t either:shoushould no t t ake p lace tomorrow. ,lfh.Aristotle holds that one of the two protions in slJch instances must be true' another false, he also insists tha t wecannodeterminately, that:this or that is false,must leave the alternative undecided. ,

.Aristotle's' view with regard to proposabout future particulareventsis tha t ou r ments cannot beeither true or false, 11cause of insufficien knowledge: on our. part,because future p ar ti cu la rs ar e i n t hem salways contingent. Nothing in thenatulithi: ngso r causes.-:..-existent in th e past or pre.;....-necessarilydetermines them tohappen.will occur only if independent causeshappcoincide. Since these causes are iJ.?dependenot detetmined tb combina tion by the irt u r e s ~ t h ecoincidence will be a m at techance, n ot o f necessity.

This theory of can tingency in the real

change-involving an affirmation of theexistence of contingent events---.;raisesplems for the theologianconcerningGod's knedge and will. Does th e fact that nothing:pens contrary to God s will imply that whathappens happens necessarily? Aquinas anst ha t G od wills some things to be d on e nsar ily, some con tingen tly Therefore,some effects, He has attached necessary cathat cannot fail; b ut to others defectiblecontingent causes, from which arise contineffects it being His\vill that t heyshhappen contingently.

Similarly,the fact that God knows all tni

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and renders th e one an infallible consequenceof the other. e One event follows another;bu t we never can observe any t ie betweenthem. They seem conjoined bu t never connected. Ou r idea, therefore,. of necessity and causat ion ar ises ent i re ly f rom th e uniformity oh servablein t h ~ p r t i o n s6f nature, wheresimilar objectsare constantly conjoined together, and th e mind is determined by custom toinfertheone from the'appearance of the other.

These two circumstances form th e whole ofthat necessity, which we ascribe to mat ter. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects,and the consequent inference from one to th eo th er , we h av e n o n ot io n of any necessity orconnexion.

Bu t ,the question remains w he th e r i n theorder of nature itself particular events are necessarily determined or happen contingently.The fact that we m ay b e ignorant of real necessities does not, as Humeseems to admit,imply their non-existence. Our saying itjs onlyprobable that th e sun will r ise tomorrow mayre ec t u r inadequa te knowledge of causesrather thana real indeterminacy in the order ofnature. On the other hand, to say as Humedoes that chance has no place in nature,maymean only tha t nothing exists without a causeof its existence, rather than that whateverhappens is necessarily determined by its causes.

As INDICATED IN th e chapter on CHANCE twothings must bedistinguished here: the absolutely uncaused-the spontaneous or f o r t t J i t o u s ~and th e contingently caused, o r t h at which depends up r the coincidence of a number ofindependent causes. A given condition may be

necessary to produce a cer ta in resul t, as, fo rexample, oxygen may be necessary for combustion. Bu t by itself it may no t be sufficient forthe production of that effect. If th e maxim, nothing exi st s \vi thou t a cause o f i ts existence, requires a cause or causes adequate toproduce the effect, then the maxim is equival e nt t o the principle of sufficient reason. Whenever tV/O or more causes, each of which may benecessary, are not sufficient in separation, theexistence of the effect depends upon their combination; and the e ffec t is contingent if therequired combination of causes is itself not necessarily caused.


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259

PAGEUTLINE OF TOPICS

61 N E C E S S I ~ Y A N DCONTINGENCYCHAPTER

The meaning of necessity and contingency: the possible and the impossible

Necessary and contingent being or existence . Th e inde endent or unconditioned as the n e c e ~ s n l yeXIstent: the uncaused

a tr- sed. the identi t y o f essence and eXistenceor se cau , . . h hI . of logical and

2b. Th e arguinent for the ,existence of a necessa ry being . t e p ro emontological neceSSIty

Mutability in relation to necessity in being: : . ~ h enecessary and contingent with respect to properties, accidents, and modes

. . h l m of change: chance and determinismN cessi ty and conungency In t e r e a . . e

a. Th e distinction between thde ehssential a nd t he accidental cause: th e contmg

ent

J effect; contingency an c ance . . . . . . . . ... . . . . t s absolute and hypothetical or co ll dltlonal

b The necessIty of c o ~ t n ~ e n t b e v e f f i t or material and flna10r formal causesnecessi ty ; neceSSita Han y e C l e n . . .

f . .n th.e. phen.omenal order: real indetermInacy or

3c. The grounds 0 .. conungency Iignorance of causes

.t and contingency in the realm of t h o u g h t . .4 Necessl y he domain of knowledge, the contingent as the object of opm-4a . Th e ~ e c e s s r y,astt doubt and probability; necessary truths

Ion: certaIn y ,4b Practical necessity as a cause of belief .

c Th e truth of judgments concerning future contingents . .4 . . h b . f mathemattcs and In mathe-

dMathematical necessity: neceSSIty 1n t e o Jects 04 rnatical reasoning

4 ecessi ty and con tin.gency in logical analysis . .

. . , . d nts modal 0ppositton(1) Th e modality of propOSItiOnS or JU gm e .. . \ .(2) Modality in reasoning: the logical n e c e s s ~ t yof mferenqe; the necessityand, . contingency of premises and conclusIons

Necessitvand contingency in human Ffe and society . 1 L . ~t and necessity i n h um an conduct: the voluntary and the compu.sorysa 1 er Y f . f d il l

(I) Th e necessitation o f t h e ,,,ill:.the range 0 ItS ree o. . (2) Categorical and.hy,?othetical imperatives as expressmg necessary and con

tingent obhgatlons .

(3)Hunlan freedom as knowledge or acceptance of neceSSIty . .

. f h rms and Institutions 1 and s tat e t he c on ti ng en cy 0 t e lr 0Sb Th e neceSSIty 0 amI y .. . l 1

. 1 t to the natural and convent lona In awse Necessity and conttngency In rea. Ion . .. bOlO f 1 poverty war o r c n meSd Th e necessity or inevita 1Ity o s avery,

se Economic necessities or luxuries

sf Necessity and contingency in history

i.e. as requI rIng a cause out side . Hiorder to exist. Kant, for example,aclm.existence must beincluded in the conceGod as ensrealissimum the most realafeet being. Bu t h e d e ~ i e sthat th e real exof the object so conceived is impliecllogical necessity of the conception itself

This amounts to sayingthat it is possia beingwe cannot conceive except a-seXl

not to exist. Aquinas seems to make tHecriticafpoint when he says that even iFone understood b y t he word God somthan which nothing greater can beconcand therefore a .being necessarilyexistinit would not follow that he understanclwhat th e word signifies actually exists, btlmen tall y.

Stated in its most general form, the pris whether that which is inconceivablehuman mind is impossible in reality; or wllthat which is logically necessary, or neein though t,is also necessary in fact or exisHowever that issue is resolved, it tlll.l

noted that among the so-called pdemonstrations of God s exi st ence , o rmen ts from the existence of certain effethe existence of their cause, one mode 0soning turns upon the distinction betweent ingent and necessary being.

contingent beings exist (as it is evthey do, from the mutabil i ty and perishaof physical things), and i eachcontingentis by definition incapable of ca Qsing itsexistence, and i one contingent beingcause the existence of another, and ithing which exists must have a causeexistence, either in i tsel f or in another;

from all these premises it would seem to that a necessary being exists.

Here the conclusion may follow with 1necessity from the premises, bu t whethenecessarily true depends upon the truthpremises. That in turn seems to dependthe understanding of wha t i t means fotthing to becontingent or necessary in beimayalso depend on whether o r n o t t he r eing escapes Kan t s criticism of all a posarguments for the existence of a necessaring, namely, that such reasoning alwa,lplicitly contains the ontological argumentis thereby invalidated.

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ON E OTHER TRADITIONAL issue is raised by theconception o f G od as a necessary being; or,more strictly, as the onlynecessary being in thesense of having a nature whichinvolves existence. It is formed by opposite views of -thevalidity of the so-called ontological or apriori argument for God s existence.

Both Descartes and Spinoza argue , l ikeAnse lm a nd o th er s before t he m, tha t sinceGod cannot be conceived as not existing, it isimpossible in fact for God no t to exist . Thosewh o reject such reasoning do no t deny t ha t i tis unintelligible or self-contradictory to thinkof God as merely possible ra ther than necessary,

accrue to Him from them, it follows that Hiswilling things apart from Himself is n o t s o ~lutely necessary. As for the particularfeaturesof this world, Aquinas says that since Goddoes n o t a c t from natural necessi ty no r fromawill that is naturally or from necessity determined to the things which exist, it followst ha t i n no way at all is th e present course ofevents.produced by God from any necessity, So

that other things could noth p p e n ~

. . .vVherefore, we tTIustsimply say that- God cando other things. than those He has done/Other, and even better,worIdsthan thi s a repossible, for G od could make other things, oradd something to the present creation; andthen there would be another andabet teruniverse.

No r does the Christian theologian admit thatth e divine nature is subject t o a ny necessity.HWe do no t pti t the life of God or the, foreknowledge of God uncler necessity, writesAugustine, i f we should say that it is n e c e s ~sary t ha t G od shouldlive forever; and f o r e ~

know all things; as neither is His powerdiminished when\ve say t ha t H e cannot die or fallin to error-for. this is. in such a way impossibleto Him, that if it were possible for Him, Hewould be of less power. Bu t assuredly He isrightly called omnipotent , though He cannei ther die nor fall into error Fo r He is calledomnipotent on account of f l is doing what Hewills, no t on account of His suffering w ha t H ewills not; for if that should befall him, Hewould by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore,He cannot do some things.for t h e v e ry reasont ha t H e is omnipotent.


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THE GREAT IDEAS

3c. Th e grounds of contingency in the phen o me n al o r de r : r e al i n de t er m in a cy. orignorance; of causes . ,

8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretqtion, CH 9 28a-29d Physics, BK I I, eH 4 ~ 6 \ ~ l 2 . ~ - ~ 7 5 a MemoryandReminiscence, CH 2 [452a3o-PI] 694b

19 AQUINAS: Summa The )logica, PART I, Q 1 4,A 13 86d-88c; Q I9 ,A 8 Il6a-d; Q 22 A 4131e-132b; Q 86, A 3 463b-d

23 HOBBES: Leviathan,. PART IV, 272b SPINOZA:Ethics, PART l PROP 33, SCHOL I

367c-d; PART II , PROP 2 -31 384b-38Se espPROP 3 I , CORqL. 385e; .PROP 44 3891;>t390a;PART III ., 395a-d; DEF, 1-2 395d; ,VROP 1-3396a-398c; PART IV, DEF3-4424a

35 H U M E Human Understanding SECT VI 469d470d; SECT VIII, DIV 67 480c-481a; DIV 74484a-e

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-172c Intro.M etaphysic Morals, 387a-d Judgement, 555a-d;564a-e

46 HEGEL: Philosophy Right; PART II , par 118,43a; PART III, pa r 324, 107b

49 DARWIN: Origin Species, 37e-d; 65 a /Descent Man, 593d

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I , 646e647b

53 JAMES: Psychology, 3 77b; 8 51 b e sp [ fn I]54 FREUD: General Introduction, 454b-e

to 3c CHAPTER 61: NECESSITY. AND CONTINGENCY 2635 BERKELEY: HUlnan Knowledge, SECT 93 431h; [6.39bS-:-642b4] 1 6 1 d ~ 1 6 5 desp[639b24-64QaIO]

SECT 106 433c-d 162a-b, [642aI-I5] 165a-b, [642a30-b41165e-d;n U M E Human Understanding, S:ECT v1469d- BK II, CH I [646b28-647blol170d-171d; BK470d; SECT VIII 478b:-487a III, CH 2 [663b2I-664aI2] 191b-d; CB: 9t672ai=-MONTESQUIEU: ,Spirit ofLaws BI 1, la -b 241200d-201a ;BKlv, CH 5 [680b3-68Ia4]KANT: Pure Reason, 45b-c; 72e-85desp 74b- 2 10 d- 21 Ie / Generation i4nimals, BK IV,76c, 82a-83b; 140p,d-143a; 144a-145e; 153a; CH [767b5-IS] 309a; BK V,CHI [77saI5-b20]171b-172e /P rac t i ca l /Reason, ; 3 3 1 e ~ ~ 3 3 a/ 320a-321a; CH 8 [7S9bl-21] 331a,c Politics,Judgement, 566a-b BK I, CH2 [1252b30-36] 446a-b

6 HEGEL: Philosophy o f History, INTRO, 160e- 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God;BK XXII,. CH 24,190b 610c-611b

1 TOLSTOY: War and Peace EPILOGUE 675a- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PART I, Q 19,

696d passimA

3, ANS an d REP I 110b-111c;A

7, :REP 43 JAMES: Psychology, 823a-825a passim 114d-115d;-A 8, REP 1-2 116a-d;Q 23, A 6,4 FREUD: General Introduction, 454b-e;592a-b REP 3 13.7.d-138e;Q 86, A 3 463b-d

21 DANTE: Divine . C o m ~ d yP A R ~ D I S E x v n[1345] 132b-e

3 BACON : Advancelnent Learning, 45a.:..46ae s p 5 c _

SPINOZA:Ethics, PART I, PROP 16-17 362a363e; PROP 21--23 364a-365a; Pl;tOI? 26-29365b-366e; PROP. 33-36 367b 369b; PART II,DEF 5373h,c;PART IV,DEF 3 424a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 140b,d-143a; 164a-171a;179c-:18}lc Fund. p rin .. MetaphysicofMorals,2 6 2 a ~ 2 7 Q desp 263a;.264q., 265e-267a; 285e286a ]udgement, 491c-492b; 5 5 0 a ~ S 5 1 a e ;553c-555a; 5S7c-558b; 564a: -e ; 581a-582e;584e-d

46 HEGEL: Philosophy H i s t o r y n ~ T R q 1 5 8 a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 563a-:-b;

EPILOGUE I, 6 5 0 b ~ ;EPILOGUE. II , 679b-e

. The necessity of.contingent even ts: absolute an d hypothetical or conditionalnecessity; necessitation by efficient ormaterial an d final or formal causes

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II ; cH9277b-2Z8a,c Generation and Corruption, BK II , CH I I439c,441a,e /. Metaphysics,BK IV, CH 5 [IOIO a6--25] 52ge-d; BK V, CH 5 [IOI5a20-26] 535e;[IOISb3-6] 535d; BK VII, CH 8 [I033a24-bI9]556b-d; CH 9 [Io34b8-19] 557d-S58a; BK IX,CH 8 [I049b35-I05oa3l 575c-d; BK X, CH 10.586c-d; BK XI,CH 6 [I063aI7-28] 591b-e /Soul, BK II , CH 8 [420bI6-23] 652a; BK III,CH 12-13 667a-668d / Sleep, CH 2 [45SbI328] 698b-e

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts o f Ani1nals, BK I, CH I

. The dis tinc tion be tween the essential an dthe accidental cause: the contingenteffect; contingency an d chance

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455a-456a; 465d-466a8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, ,CR 5 [I88a32-b26]

263d-264a; BK II , CH 3 6 271a-275a; CH 8[I99a34-bI2] 276e-d Metaphysics, 13K V, CH 2[ I O I 3 b 3 4 - I O I 4 ~ ]534a; CH 5 535e-53()a; cn 30547a-d;BK XI,CH 8 59;3a-d

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SEART IV, 27,.203LSPINOZA: Ethics, PART I PROP 16, COROL 2

362a; PROP 33, SCHOL. I 36,7c-d; I?ARTIV,pE r 3 424a

5 BUME : Human Understanding, SECT VIII,DIV 67 480c-481a; DIV 74 484a S73aBK XI, CH 8 593a-d; BK XII, c:Ei 3 [I0 7oa4599b

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts Animals, BK I, CH[640aIO_b5] 162b-163a / Ethics, BK III CH[II12 aI8-3 2] 3 5 ~ a - b ;BK X, CH J [iI 73 b427d / Rhetorzc, BK I, CH 10 [13 69ajl612e-d

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature Things, BK 1[10134] 13e-d; BK II [184-37] 17b-19a; [10106 3] 28b-e; BK v [55-58] 61d; [3 0665a; [416-431] 66e-d

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IX , ~ E C T28 29294a; SECT 39 295a

17 PLOTINUS : Third Ennead, TR I 7 8 a ~ 8 2 b ;II , CH I 82e / Fourth Ennead, TR I I I CH150e-d; TR IV, CH 33 176b-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QA 13 86d-88e; Q 1 9, A 3 1IOb-l1le; A8 116aQ 22, A 2 128d-130d; A 4 131e -132b;QA 6 1 37 d- 13 8e ; Q 25, A 3, REP 4 145b-14A 4 147a-d; Q 8 6, A 3 463b-d; Q 1 03 , A I ,3 528b-529a; AA 7-8 533b-534b; Q 115, AANS 591d-592d

30 BACON: Advancement Learning, 45b-e31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 55a-56a31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 7 355b; AXIO

355d; PROP 17, COROL 2362b; PROP 26365b-366e;PROP 32-33 367a-369a; PROP36 369a-b;PART II, PROP 13 377d-3LEMMA 3, COROL 378d-379a; PROP 48 39PART III, 395a-d; PART IV, PROP 2-4 425a APPENDIX, I-II 447a-b

262

(2. Necessary an d contingent being or existence.2c. Mutability in relation to necessity inbeing.)

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I Q 2,A .3 12 e-14a ; Q 10, A 5 44b-45e; Q 14, A 13,ANS and REP I 86d-88e;Q 19, A 3, REP 4-5110b-111e; A 8116a-d; Q 4 4, A I, REP 2 238b239a; Q 5 0, A 5 esp REP 3 274b-275a; Q 63,A I REP 2 325e-326e; Q 66, A 2 345d-347b.Q 86, A 3 463 b- d

20 AQUINAS: Sumlna Theologica, PART III SUPPL,Q 9 1, A 2 l 01 7e -1 02 0c

21 DANTE: Dit/ine Comedy, PARADISE, XIII [5287l 126 a- b

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d /Medi-tations, III, 86b; 87b-8Be; IV, 89 b / Objectionsand Replies, 113e-114a; AXIOM X 132b; PROPIII, 133a; 158b-162a

31 SPINOZA: Ethics,PART 1, D EF 1-2 355a; DEF6-8 355 b-e; PROP 6-8. 356b-35 7d ; PROP II - 13358b-359d; PROP 17 362b-363c;PROP 20,COROL 2 364a; -PROP 24-29 365a-366e; PROP33 3q7b-369a; PART II, AXIOM I 373e

42 KANT: Pure Reason, .74b-76e46 HEGEL: Philosophy History, INTRO, 156d

157e

2d. Th e n e c e ~ s a r yan d cont ingentwi th respec tto properties, accidents, an d modes

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 244b-246e8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I ,CHI3[32b4- 14] 48b-e / Posterior An alytics, BK I, CH 4100a-101b / Topics, BK V,CHI 178b d-179b

bCH 3 [13 1 19-37] 182b-e; BK VI,CH 14 [ISla32- b2 ] 206b-c / Physics, BK I; CH 3 [I86bI930] 26

b1d; CH 4 [I88a5-I3] 263b; BK II, CH

I [192 35-39] 269a; BK VII, CH 3 [24 6b3-9]32ge-d / Metaphysics, BKV, CH 30 547ad; BK VI, CH 2:-3 548e-549d; BK VII, CH 12561b-562a; BK X, CH 9 5 8 6a-e ; BK XI , CH 8593a-d; BK X IV, CH 6 625d-626d esp [ I0 93 b7- 22 ] 626e-d

12 LUCRETIUS : Nature Things, BK I [449-4 82 ]6e-7a

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3 , A 4 ,ANS 1 6d -1 7e ; A 6 1 8c -1 9a ; Q 9, A 2 , ANs 3ge40d; Q 5 4, A 3 , REP 2 286e-287b; Q 77, A I,REP 5 39ge-401b; A 6, ANS 404e-405e; Q 86,A 3 463b-d; Q 101, A I REP I 522e-523a;PART I-n, Q A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 7 651 d655a p ass im; Q 10, A I REP 2 662d-663d;Q 18 , A 3, REP 2 69Sd-696b

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II , Q 72,A 5, ANS 115a-116b; PART III, Q 2, A 2 , ANS711d-712d

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BKII , APH 33161b-d; APH 36-.37 164a-16ge

31 DESCARTES : Objections and Replies,. 152d;231a-b

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 4- 5 355b; PROP10, SCHOL 358a-h; PROP 15, D E M O N s T 3 6 0 a ~


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5e. Economic necessities or luxuriesApOCRYPHA: Ecclesia ticus, 29 :21 ~ D OT , Ec

clesiasticus, 29 :275 EURIPIDES: Phoenician iMaidens [550 554]

382d7 PLATO: Republic,BK II, 316e -319a; BKVII I ,

409d-410c / Crtias 479d8,ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH 2 [II8 a6-r6]

164d-165a9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 8 [I256b27-39]

450c-d; CH 9 [I257b30-I2S-saI81451d-452b;BK VII, CH 5 [1326b26-381 530d-531a; CR 13[I33Ib39-I332a2] 536e

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a-37b/ l\1arcus Cato,285c-d Aristides;..Marcus Cato; 291 b ~ 2 9 2 b

15 TACITUS: Annals, BKII, 31a-b19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II , Q 2,

A I, ANS and REP 3 615d-616e20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I I I I Q

32, A 6 545b-546b25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 110b-c;131b-132a; 216e

218a pass im; 489b-490e27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT II , SC Iy [263

274] 261e; ACT III, SCIV [27-36] 264e31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, APPENDIX , XXVIII

XXIX 450a PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 9ia--94a

The necessity or inevitability of slavery,poverty, war, or crime

SARISTOPHANES: Peace [I06I-1I14l538a-539a/ Plutus [4154)19] 633d-636dTHUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian Plar, BK III,427d-428a; 436d-437dPLATO: Republic, BK II, 316e-319a / Laws,BK I, 640d-641aARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 5-6 447d449b

EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 19, 125c-d8 AUGUSTINE: City o f God, BK III, CR 10 172d

173e; BK XIX, CR 5,514a-b; CH 7 515a-c;cHIS 521a-eAQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 9 2, AI, REP 2 488d-489d; Q 9 6, A 4 512d-S13eAQUINAS: Summa Theologica , PART I I I Q 94,A 5, REP 3 224d-225d

3 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH III, Se; CH XIV, 21b;OR XXI, 32a-d

Necessity an d contingency in. relation tothe na tura l an d conventional in law

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 7 [ I I 3 4 b I 8 ~ I I 3 5 a4] 382e-d

8 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions, BK I I I ,pa r 15 17 a -b ;par 17 17d-18aAQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II , Q 94,AA 5-6 224d-226b; Q 95, A 2, ANsand REP3 227c-228c; A 4 229b-230e; Q 9 6, A I 2 30c231c; Q 97, A I, REP I 236a-d; A 4, REP 3238b-239b; Q 99, AA 3- 4 247a-248dHOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 95d-96a; PART II115b-e; 1 31 a- c; 1 34 e; 1 3 6d - 13 7 a; 138a-b;142a-e; 163d-164a

1 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2435b-436a

5 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 10--1227b-28a; CH Xl,SECT 13555d-56bMONTESQUIEU: Spirt t o f Laws, BK .1, l e -d ;BK XV, 109b-ll0a,; BK XXVI, 2I9d-:-221eROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK II , 399b-cKANT: Science o f Right, 426b-429a esp 426b-cFEDERALIST: NUMBER 25, 91b-d; NUMBER 41,133a-b; NUMBER 43, 143b-eMILL: Utilitarianism, 470d-471bHEGEL: Philosophy o f Right, PART III, pa r 14555b-e; pa r 214 71a-c; ADDITIONS, 94 132b; 134138b-c

to 5e C H A P T E R 61: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 267 BOSWELL:]ohnson, 102a-b; 120a-e; 125e-d HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 76d ; 94b-e ; PART6 HEGEL: Philosophy o Right, PART III, pa r 182 II , 141a-b; 157a

64a; pa r 264-267 8 4a -b ; p ar 270 84d-89c; 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I,ADDITIONS, 116 135c-d; 162 143b-144e / 30d-41aPhilosophy o History, INTRa, 170e-171e; 173a- MILTON: Paradise Lost,uK XI [384-897] 307b-175e; PART II, 262a-e 318b

9 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 579b-:-581c 5 LOCKE: Civt l Government, CH 2-5d-28e; CHo MARX: Capital,241e-d III,SECT 17 28d-29a; CHIV 29d-:-30b; CH xv ,o MARX-ENGELS: Conzmunst Manifesto, SECT 172 65b-e

421c-d; 427b-428a 6 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 154b-155b54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 781d- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK x, 6Ib,d-

782d 62b; BK XV, l 09b- l l0a ; 110d- l l l e38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 356c-357a; 357c-358b

/ Social Contract, BKI, 388b-c; 389a-390d 9 SMITH: Wealth o Nations, BK v, 309a,..c42 KANT: Sct ence o Right, 457a-458a,e / judge

ment, 586a-587a4 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 3- 7 33b-44e. passim,

esp NUMBER6, 39a; NUMBER 23-24 85a.:.8ge;NUMBER 2 8, 9 6c ;N UM BE R 3 4 , 110a-d; lUMBER 41, .132c;..135a; NUMBER 43, 141d

4 MILL: Representative Govern1nent, 339c-340c/ Utilitarianism, 452a- b

44 BOSWELL: johnson, 301d; 304e46 HEGEL:Phlosophy a/Right, PART III, pa r

333-334109b-c jPhlosophy offlistory, PARTII, 273c

50 MARX: C a p i t a l 2 8 3 b ~ e ;3 3 b ~ 3 7 eesp 303d30Sa, 307a-c; 315c-321b esp 319a-321b

50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto,419b,d-:-420e; 4 2 5 ~ ;.428a- b54 FREUD: War and Death, 755 b-7 5 7a .passim,

esp 755 b-e; 766c-d / Cvilization and ItsDiscontents, .787a-788d

5b. Th e necessity of family an d state: the cotingency of their forms an d institutio

7 PLATO: Republic, BK II, 311b-312b; 316c-319BK v, 361b-c

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, Clf 2 445b-44BK III, CH 6 [I278bI5-29] 475d-476a

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature o Things, BK V [101102 7] 74b-e

18 AUGUSTINE: City o God, BKXIX, CR 14

520a-523a19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QA I 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c;QA 1516d-517e

20 .l\QUINAS: ~ u m m aTheologica, PART I-II,QA 4 ,ANS 229b-230e; 10 5, A 4, ANs31S321a

HOBBEs: Leviathan, PART I, 84c-86b; 8687a; 91a :b; 96a-b; PART II , 99a-lOla; PART273a-b

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 462d-463a31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 18, SOH

429a-d; PROP 35, COROL 1- -2 433e-d; PROP 3SCHOL 2 435b-436a; APPENDIX 447a-450d

MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [3 64 -4-240a-241b

PASCAL: Pensees 304 227b-228a; 30622835 LOCKE : Toleration, 16a-e I Civil Govern

~ H I I ,S E CT 1 3- 15 2 8 a- e ; CH VI 36a-42a pSlm; CH VII, SECT 77-83 42b-43e; eH IX 554 d

6 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART I, 29b-30a 6 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b;

410a-411a38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit o Laws, BK I , 2a-3

BK XXIII, 187 d-188a38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 367b / Soc

Contract, BK I, 387b,d-392a 9 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309a-c4 KANT: Science o Right, 418d; 433c-434a.4 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [1- 2311 MILL: Representative Government, 327b

332d passim / Utilitarianism, 460a-461c

266 THE GREAT I i\S Sa(l) t 5a.Liberty an d necessity in human conduct: the 298a, 307d-314d I Pref. Metaphysical

voluntary and,the cotnpulsory.) 1nents o f Ethcs 373d / Intro. Metaphysi5a 1) Th e necessitation of the will: t he r a ng e Morals, 386b-387a,c; 388b-c; 390b,d-3

of i t s f reedom 392b-393a / Science o Right, 397e-39416b-417b / judgef1ent, 571e-572a; 595a-

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 4-5 359a-361a 60Sd-606b [ fn 2]12 EPICTETUS : Discourses 105a-245a,e esp BK I, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy o Rght PART II , par 13

CH I IOSa-l06e, CH 18 124a-J25a, CH 2 9 1 3 4d - 135 46b-47d; ADDITIONS, 84 129bI38a, BK II, CH 5 142c-144a, CH 10 148e-lS0a,CH 23 170a-172d, BK I II , CR 2 177c-178d, 5a 3 H u m a n f r ee d on l as knowledgeot aCH 10 185d-187a, CH 14 189c-190a, CH 18 ceptance of necessity192a-e, BK IV, CH I 213a-223d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 12 118

12 AURELIUS: M e d i t a t i o n s 2 5 3 a ~ 3 1 0 desp BK II, 120b; BK IV, CH I 213a-223d; CH 4 225a.-22SECT 16 259a, BK v, SECT 19 272a, BK VI, 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP 6453d-454SECT 16275b-d, SECT22 276a, BK VII, SECT 16 46 HEGEL: Philosophy o Right, INTRO,par 8-280d ,BK VIII, SECT r6 - I 7 286d, SECT. 28 14e-17e esp pa r IS 16a-b, pa r 21 I7a-e; 287e, SECT 48 28ge, BK x, SECT 3 4 3 5 3 0 1 a ~ b III, pa r 144-145 55b-e; ADDITIONS, 12 118aBK XII, SECT.3 3 0 7 b ~ d 93--94 132a-b; 159 l 42d Philosophy of

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK V, CH 1-10 tory, INTRO, l70c-171e207d-:216e . esp CH 10 215e-216c; BK X I ICH 6, 346a

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, . PART I, Q 18,A.3 ANS 106b-I07e; Q 1 9, A 3, ANS 110b-lIle;A 10, ANS and REP 2 117d-l18b; Q 6 0, A A 2 ~ 3311a-312b; Q 62, A 8323e-324a; Q 8 2 ,A A 1 - 2431d-433e; Q 83, A I 436d-438a; A 2, ANS438a-d; PART I-II , Q I, A 5 613a-614a; Q 5,A 4, ANS an d REP 2 639a-640b;A 8, REP 2642d-643d; Q 10 662d-666a,e; Q I 3 A A 3 6674e-677b; Q 1 7, A 5, REP3 68ge-690b; A 6,ANS 690b-d

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII[1-75] 79d-80e; XXI [4--72] 85b-d

HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 165c31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IIl\ SOb / Objec

tions and Replies, AXIOM VII 132a; 141d; 215d216a ; 228e

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 17 362b-363cesp SCHOL, 363a.: .e;PRoP32 367a-b;PART II,PROP 48--49 391a 394d

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,SECT 12 180d-181a; SECT 5 9 193d- 1 94a

4 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-I65eesp 164b-e;234e-236a esp 2 3 5e - d; 2 3 6d - 23 7 a / Fund.Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-b; 25ge260e; 264d-265b; 265e-267d esp 266e-267d;

268b; 286a-287d / Practical Reason, 296a-d;325d-326b / judgement, 595a-d46 HEGEL: Philosophy o Right, INTRO, pa r 8-21

14c-17e; PART II, pa r 118 42d-43b; ADDITIONS,90130b-d

53 JAMES: PJych 0 logy, 2 91 a- 29 5a e sp 2 91 a- b,293a;388a;821b-822b

Sa(2). Categorical an d hypothet ical imperat iv es a s expressing. necessary an d cont ingent obl iga t ions

4 KANT: Pure Reason, 1 9 0c -d ; 2 3 6d - 23 7 a /Fund. Print Metaphysic of Morals 253a-287desp 253d-254d, 260a 2 61 d, 2 63 a- c, 264d2 6 8d , 2 7 2a - b, 2 76 b -2 7 7a , 2 7 7d - 27 9 d, 281e282d I Practical Reason, 297a-314d esp 297a-


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ADDITIONAL READINGS

I.

II.

CHAPTER 61: NECESSITY AN D CONTINGENCY 269

The opposition betvveen necessity a nd l ib er ty i n t he sphere of human life an d history, seeCAUSE 3; FATE 2 - 3, S - 6; HISTORY 4 a I) ; LIBERTY IC, 4a ; NATURE 2f, 3C(2);.P.RUDENCE4a; WEALTH I I; WILL sa 1)-sa 4), SC, 6a, 7 h ; a n d for the related problem of divine providence i n r el at io n t o h u m a n freedom, see FATE 4; GOD7 b ; HISTORY sa; LIBERTY sa-sb;WILL 7c.

The necessary an d contingent, or t h e n a tural a n d t h e conven tional, with respect t o t h e familya nd t he state, an d also in language an d la\v, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION I ; FAMILY I;JUSTICE loa; LAW 4f , se ; NATURE 2b, sc ; PUNISHlYIENT 4C; STATE 3b-3c.

The consideration of the inevitability or necessity of certain social institutions or phenomena,such as slavery, poverty, or war, see LAW 4h ; NATURE Sb; OPPOSITION sc ; SLAVERY 2, 3;

WAR AN D PEACE 7; WEALTH 9g, lob.Another discussion of th e distinction of the necessary, th e possible, a nd t he p ro ba bl e i n

poetry, see POETRY 8a 2).

AS. Summa Contra Gentiles, BK II, CH 29-3 I;III, CH 64- 83. A Treat ise Human Nature, BK I, PART III,

XIV; BK II , PART III, SECT IIntroduction to Logic, IX

. Science Logic, VOL I, BK II,SECT I I I , CH 2ILL. .ASystern Logic, BK III, CH 17; BK VI,

2

AMES. T he DilemmaTVill to Believe

Listed below are works no t included in Great Books the Western. r l d ~bu t relevant t o t h eidea and topics with which this chapter deals. These \vorks are dIVIded Into two groups:

I Works by au thors represented in this collection.II. Works by authors no t represented in this collection.

For t he da te , place; a nd o t he r facts concerning the pl blication of the \vorks c i t ed,consu l tthe Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

J PRIESTLEY and PRICE. A Free Discussion theDoctrine Materialism and Philosophical Neces-sity

T.REID. Essays onthe IntellectualPowers Man , VI,

CH 5-6 . .VOLTAIRE. Necessary-NecessIty,. Power-OmnIp-

otence, in A Philosophical Dictionary . CandideGOD\VIN. An Enquiry Concerning Political justice,

BK IV, CH 5-6of Determini sm, in SCHOPENHAUER. On the Fourfold Root the Prin-

ciple SuJficient Reason . . . ..LAPLACE. A Philosophical Essay on ProbabtltuesWUE\VELL. On the Philosophy Discovery, CH 29

RUS. Letterto Menoeceus BOUTROUX. The Contingency the Laws Natureo. De Fato (On Fate) BRADLEY. Ethical Studies, I

LM OF CANTERBURY. De Potestateet [ m p o t e n t i a ~ . The Principles Logic, BK I, CH 7sibilitate et Impossibilitate; Necessitate et Liber- C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL VI, par 35--65

BERGSON. Time and Free fVillBRIDGMAN r TheLogic Modern Physics, ClI 4DEWEY. The Quest fo r CertaintyI-IEISENBERG. The PhysicalPrinciples the Quantum

TheoryKONINCK. Le problente de l indeterminismeBLANSHARD. Th e Nature Thought, CH 28 :-32MARITAIN. Scholasticisnt and Politics, CH vWEISS. Nature and Man CH IHARTSHORNE. The Divine Relativity

ONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART II ,2

z. Disputationes Aletaphysicae, XIX, XXVIII-X, XXXI 14) I z. Philosophical rvor/\s, 28 ~ e ~ t e ron

essity and Contingency), 34 (Tlte Prtnctples ture and Grace)Monadology, par 33-37

TLER. The f1nalogy Religion, PART I, CH 6

300b-c / Delnosthenes, 9 8 ~ 9 9 a/ 1Brutus, 814d-815c

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 49c; BK VI, 9/ Histories, BK II, 232d-233a

18 A.UGUSTINE: City WGod, BK I, PREF 129CH 36 149c-d; BK II, CH 2 -3 150c-151c;nCH 33 206c-d; BK V, CH I 207d-208c; c26 216c-230a,c; BK xv, CH I 397b,d-3982 1 2 2 415b-416c; BK XVIII, CH 1 2 472473d

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VU[6y._ 10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [ 5 2 1 2 9 ] 77b-78a

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH VI, 9a-b; ClI x3Sa-36b

26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT IV, SC I[21 5- 22 4] 590d

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 609b-c; 630b41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 590a-b46 HEGEL: Philosophy Right, PART III,

340 -3 60 110b-114a,c / Philosophy l-listINTRO, 156c-190b esp 156d-170b; 190b-20PART I, 241d-242b; PART II, 274a-275a; 2282d; 283d-284a,c; PART III, 285a-b; 3301c; PART IV, 368d-369a,c

50 MARX: Capital, 6d ; 7b-c; lOb-lId; 174-a378b-d

5 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Alaniftsto, 42422c passim; 425a-b

51 TOLSTOY: War a n d Peace, BK III, 143a.,.c

IX, 342a-344b; BK.X, 389a.,.391c; BK XI, -

472b; BK XIII 563a-587d; BK XIV, 588a609a-613d; BK XV, 618b-621b; 626dEPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE n 6696d

54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 8802a / New Introductory Lectures, 882b passim, esp 882c-d

T H E G RE AT IDE AS68

( 5. Necessity alld contingel1cy i n h u ma n life an dsociety. 5 e Econolnic necessities or Itlxuries.)

35 LOCKE: CivilGovernment, CH v 30b-36a passim38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit Laws BK VII , 44a;

BK XIII, 96a38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 327c-328a; 337b;

3 50 a- c; 3 52 a- 35 3c ; 3 64 a- b; 365c-366b /Social Contract, BK I, 393d-394b

39 SMITH: Wealth Nations, BK I, 27b-37b passim; 63a-b ; 70a-71d ;74d-75b ; BK III, 163c164c; BK v, 383c-d

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall c41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 451d-4:52a42 KANT: Judgement, 586b43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 30, 102a-b43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 470d-4 71 b44 BOS\VELL:Johnson, 124d-125a; 389d-390a46 HEGEL: Philosophy Right, PART III, par 190

191 6 6 a- b ; p a r 195 66d-67a; pa r 203 68a-c;ADDITIONS, 12 0 136b-c/ Philosophy History,INTRO, 193b-c; PART II , 267a-b

50 MARX: Capital, 16c-17a; 81a-d; 88c; 112a-b;218d-219a; 253b-254b; 261c-262a; 280d-283cesp 282d-283b; 292c-296a esp 293c-294a

Sf. Necessity an d contingency in history

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I,21d-22a; BK IX,291b-c

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK IV,462a-b

7 PLATO: Laws BK IV, 679a-c8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII , CH 8 [10 74 b

IJ-13] 605a14 PLUTARCH: Romulus 18d; 20b-c / Timoleon

195a-213d esp 2 01 a- 20 3b / Philopoemen,

For: Matters re levant to th e distinction between necessary and contingent being, see BEING7b 3); CHANGE ISC; ETERNITY3, 4b ; GOD 2b, 4a; an d for the application of this distineto properties, accidents, an d modes, see BEING 7b S)-7b 6),8c-8e; NATURE la I).

Matters relevant to the distinction be t \veen necessi ty a nd c on ti ng en cy i n th e realmchange, see CAUSE I - I a ; CHANCE la, 2a; FATE 3; NATURE 3C(I).

Other discussions of th e distinction between knowledge and opinion, and of the differebetweencer ta in tyand probabi li ty, see CHANCE 4; JUDGl\fENT3, 9; I NOWLEDGE 4b , d ~6d 2); OPINION I , 3 b; TRUTH 2e; WILL 3 b I).

Th e moral certainty of th e things in which it is practically necessary to believe, see GO DIMMORTALITY 3a; METAPHYSICS 2d; WILL Sb 4).

Other discussions of the t r u th o f propositions about future contingents, see TIME 6f; LR3b(2).

Necessity an d contingency in .logical analysis an d in mathematical reasoning, see J U D G ~6c; MATHEMATICS IC; OPPOSITION Id 2); PRINCIPLE 2b 2), 5; REASONING 3d ; ~3b 3)-3 c , 7a .

CROSS REFERENCES

necessity and contingency

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