nc-ipma 2018 annual conferencencipma.onefireplace.com/resources/documents/title vii, ada,...

NC-IPMA 2018 Annual Conference

• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964• LBGT and Racial Issues• Americans with Disabilities Act Update• Family and Medical Leave Act Update• North Carolina Workers’ Compensation

Act Update


TODAY’S TOPICS

Title VII and other federal and state laws prohibitemployment discrimination based on race, color, sex,religion, age, and national origin.


EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYUPDATES AND DEVELOPMENTS

:


Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender “LGBT” Rights

The EEOC adopted its current StrategicEnforcement Plan (SEP) in December of 2012,which includes "coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexualand transgender individuals under Title VII's sexdiscrimination provisions" as a top EEOCenforcement priority.


EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

Same Sex Marriage


EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYLGBT

Same sex marriage is now legal in all50 states.



The foundation for the application of Title VII totransgender persons was laid in the United States SupremeCourt ruling in the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,490 U.S. 228 (1989).

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).



Sex discrimination includes discriminationbased on “sex stereotyping,” or a person’sperceived nonconformity with genderstereotypes.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).



Gradually, federal courts began to apply the samerationale to claims of discrimination based ongender identity.

Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).



Examples of LGBT Discrimination

• Firing based on employee’s plans to make transition• Harassing employees for not being “manly enough”• Failure to refer to transgender employee as “she” or

“her” when requested• Expressing beliefs that men should only date women or

that women should only marry men• Negative job action because employee did not conform

to employer’s gender-based expectations



In Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, a City firefighter withGender Identity Disorder began developing a feminineappearance, which caused the firefighter’s co-workers tomake lewd comments to the firefighter.




The firefighter informed his superior that hiseventual goal was to have a complete physicaltransformation from male to female.




The firefighter’s superiors devised a plan to forcethe firefighter to undergo extensivepsychological evaluation and then terminatehis employment if he refused to cooperate.




The Sixth Circuit held that the firefighter properlyalleged a claim for sex discrimination becausehe suffered an adverse employment action due tohis gender nonconforming behavior, constitutingillegal sex stereotyping under Title VII.




In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th

Cir. 2005), the plaintiff was a male-to-femaletranssexual police officer who was living as a malewhile on duty but often lived as a woman off duty.

Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).



The plaintiff had a reputation throughout thepolice department as a homosexual, bisexual orcross-dresser.




After showing up to work with lipstick, archedeyebrows, and a French manicure, the plaintiff wastreated differently and was placed in a specialtraining program with other officers.




The plaintiff was subsequently demoted, eventhough another officer scored lower than theplaintiff on his exams in the program and didnot suffer adverse employment consequences.




The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff sufficientlypled a Title VII sex discrimination case byalleging that his failure to conform to sex stereotypesconcerning how a man should look and behave wasthe driving force behind his superiors’ actions.





EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., LLC, 731 F.3d 444.


The increasing volume of Title VII gender identitycourt dispositions recently led to a case in theUnited States District Court for the Eastern Districtof North Carolina.

Lewis v. High Point Regional Health System, 79 F.Supp.3d 588 (E.D.N.C. 2015).



In Lewis v. High Point Regional Health System, theCourt held that a transgender employee’sallegations that she was subjected to genderdiscrimination by her employer due to hertransgender status were sufficient to allege a TitleVII claim against the employer.




Ms. Lewis, whom is anatomically male butidentifies with the female gender, claimed that shewas interviewed for three positions by theDefendant hospital, faced ridicule for hertransgender status, and was subsequentlynot hired for any of the positions for which sheinterviewed.




The hospital argued that Ms. Lewis’ claim wasactually one for discrimination based on sexualorientation, which is not covered by Title VII.




The Court agreed with the hospital that sexualorientation is not a protected class under TitleVII, but rejected the hospital’s contention thatthe claim fell under sexual orientation.





Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 2018 WL 1040820.


In controversy are “bathroom bills,” such as NorthCarolina’s HB2, or policies which require, in thecontext of gender segregated bathrooms,individuals to use the restroom designated for theindividual’s biological sex as denoted on theindividual’s birth certificate.



While litigation in these cases has fallen underTitle IX, courts look to Title VII case law inanalyzing Title IX discrimination claims.



In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Bd., 822F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), a transgender high school studentin Virginia challenged a School Board policy requiringstudents to use the restroom consistent with their birthsex, rather than their gender identity.



The Fourth Circuit noted that Title VII case law providesguidance, but relied most heavily on Department ofEducation directives in striking down the School Boardpolicy.



The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, but rather than ruling on the case based on itsmerits, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded thecase to the Fourth Circuit in light of new guidanceissued by the Trump Administration.



Therefore, the legality of such laws andpolicies under Title VII and Title IX is still inquestion.



TITLE VII RACE


In April 2010, the EEOC settled a lawsuit againstProfessional Building Systems, a North Carolinaconstruction company, for $118,000 and significantnon-monetary relief.

EEOC v. Professional Building Systems of North Carolina, LLC, Civil Action No. 1:09-cv-00617 (M.D.N.C. April 2010).


EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYRACE

The EEOC identified racial harassment of atleast 12 African American employees,including use of the “N word” and the word“boy” and photos of the KKK.

EEOC v. Professional Building Systems of North Carolina, LLC, Civil Action No. 1:09-cv-00617 (M.D.N.C. April 2010).



Chicago janitorial services provider agreed to pay $3million to approximately 550 rejected African-American job applicants under a four-year consentdecree, settling the EEOC's allegations of race andnational origin discrimination in recruitment and hiring.

EEOC v. Scrub Inc., No. 09 C 4228 (N.D. Ill. consent decree entered Nov. 9, 2010).



The EEOC alleged that the provider had recruitedthrough media directed at Eastern Europeanimmigrants and Hispanics and hired peoplefrom those groups over African Americans.

EEOC v. Scrub Inc., No. 09 C 4228 (N.D. Ill. consent decree entered Nov. 9, 2010).



The provider also agreed to:• extensive changes in its employment policies;• engage in active recruitment of African American

employees;• hire previously rejected Black applicants;• implement training on discrimination and retaliation;

and• hire an outside monitor to review compliance with the

decree.EEOC v. Scrub Inc., No. 09 C 4228 (N.D. Ill. consent decree entered Nov. 9, 2010).



A more novel issue has recently arisen whenemployers intentionally take race-based actions inorder to avoid disparate impact liability.



In Ricci v. Destefano, the City of New Haven, CTused objective examinations in order to identifythe candidates best qualified for promotion in itsfire department.

Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. at 559 (2009).



When the results of such an exam to fill vacantlieutenant and captain positions showed thatwhite candidates had outperformed minoritycandidates, a rancorous public debate ensued.




The City threw out the results based on thestatistical racial disparity.




White and Hispanic firefighters who passed theexams but were denied a chance at promotions by theCity's refusal to certify the test results, sued the City andrespondent officials, alleging that discarding the test resultsdiscriminated against them based on their race in violationof Title VII.




The city argued that it could have faced Title VII liabilityfor adopting a practice having a disparate impact onminority firefighters.




The Supreme Court held that before an employer canengage in intentional discrimination for the assertedpurpose of avoiding unintentional disparate impact, theemployer must have a strong basis in evidence tobelieve it will be subject to disparate-impactliability if it fails to take race-conscious action.




City officials lacked a strong basis in evidence tobelieve that examinations were not job-related andconsistent with business necessity.




City officials lacked a strong basis in evidence tobelieve there existed equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative to the use ofexaminations that served city's needs.




AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

(“ADA”)

The ADA is a federal civil rights law whichprotects individuals with disabilities.



The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminatingagainst a qualified individual with a disability in regardto:

• Hiring• Job application procedures• Advancement• Discharge of employees• Compensation• Job Training• Other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment



“Qualified Individual” is defined as anindividual with a disability, who with orwithout reasonable accommodation, canperform the essential functions of a job heor she holds or wants.

Both employees and applicants are covered.



An individual with a disability is:

• A person who has a physical or mental conditionwhich substantially limits one or more major lifeactivities (including working);

• A person who has a record of such condition; or• A person who is perceived to have a condition

described above.



An employer must make a reasonable accommodation for aqualified applicant or employee with a disability unless doing so willcause the employer an undue hardship or cause a direct threat tothe safety of the employee/applicant or others.



Duty to Accommodate

Reasonable Accommodations May Include:

• Part-time work schedules

• Reassignment to vacant position

• Providing equipment or physical modifications to the workplace

• Modifying application, testing or training documents

• Providing qualified readers or interpreters



Accommodations which would cause anundue burden on the employer are notrequired.

Undue burden is usually measured byexpense and resources necessary tomake the accommodation.



Leave may be a reasonable accommodation, as longas the leave has at least an approximate end date.

Indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation.

Myers vs. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995).



Employers should hold employees with disabilities tothe same performance standards as otheremployees.



• No specific request for accommodation is requiredfrom the employee, if employer has actual orconstructive knowledge of need foraccommodation.

• Employee does not have to specifically mentionthe ADA or use the word accommodation or othermagic words.


Recognizing a Request for Accommodation

So, what’s the difference betweena reasonable accommodation andlight duty?

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND LIGHT DUTY


Answer: Light duty is usuallytemporary and may involveremoval of one or more of a job’sessential functions.



Recent legal changes to employer’sobligation to provide light duty



Employers are under an existing obligation toprovide light duty as an accommodation foremployees covered by the Americans withDisabilities Act (“ADA”) with need for atemporary accommodation.



Changes are prompted by recentlegal interpretation of PregnancyDiscrimination Act (“PDA”).



Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).


PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT


Pregnancy is not a disability underthe ADA.



In the past, the 4th Circuit has heldthat pregnant employees who didnot have an ADA disability were notentitled to light duty.


The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978provides that discrimination based onpregnancy, childbirth, or related medicalconditions is a form of gender/sexdiscrimination prohibited by Title VII.



If an employee is physically unable to perform herjob because of her pregnancy-related condition,the employer must treat her in the same mannerwith respect to access to benefits as it treats othersimilarly-situated, non-pregnant employees.



If the employer provides light duty work asa benefit to non-pregnant employees with awork-related injury, the employer must grantlight duty to similarly situated pregnantemployees.



Recent Guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”)




Employers may be required to makepregnancy-related accommodations orprovide pregnancy-related light dutyassignments.


EEOC Guidance

Employers are required to provide light dutyto pregnant employees if light duty isprovided to others.



FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (“FMLA”)




FMLA requires covered employers toallow at least 12 weeks of unpaidleave per year for eligible employeesfor certain qualifying events.



An eligible employee is one who:

•has been employed for at least 12 months,

•has worked for at least 1250 hours during the 12 months immediately preceding the beginning of leave, and

•is employed at a worksite with 50 or more employees within 75 miles.



Managers Should be Able to Recognize a Qualifying Event



FMLA leave may be taken for:

• the care of a spouse, child or parent with a serious medical condition; or

• the employee’s own serious medical condition that makes them unable to perform the functions of their job.



Serious Health Condition

What is a serious health condition?

Any physical or mental condition requiring:

•“Inpatient care”: overnight stay in a medical care facility; or




Any physical or mental condition requiring:

“Continuous treatment” by a health careprovider:

Incapacity lasting more than threeconsecutive calendar days requiringtwo or more visits to a health careprovider; or



Serious Health ConditionAny physical or mental condition requiring:

“Continuous treatment” by a health careprovider:

Incapacity lasting more than threeconsecutive calendar days requiring oneor more visits to a health care providerAND requiring continuing medicaltreatment.




Chronic Conditions

May also include chronic conditions thatcontinue over an extended period. Theseconditions may be episodic, requiring only“periodic treatment.”



Serious Health ConditionExamples of Serious Health Conditions

•Incapacity due to pregnancy•Heart attack or heart conditions requiring surgery•Most cancers•Back conditions requiring extensive therapy or surgery•Spinal injuries•Pneumonia•Severe arthritis•Miscarriages, complications or illness related to pregnancy•Alzheimer’s disease•Clinical depression



FMLA leave may be taken for:

Childbirth

Adoption

Foster care



Both mother and father are entitled to 12 weeks of leave to be with their newborn child.



Military Family Leave



Military leave includes both:

Active Duty Leave and

Caregiver Leave



Notice/Certification Requirements

It is the responsibility of the employer todesignate the leave as FMLA qualifying;no “magic words” are required.



How to Recognize a Qualifying Event

•Knowledge of employee’s overnight hospitalization•Employee’s absence of three or more full days (or knowledge ofemployee’s incapacity of three or more full days) or knowledge ofemployee’s serious health condition•Knowledge of employee’s or employee’s spouse’s pregnancy•Knowledge of employee’s family member’s serious health condition•Knowledge of needs associated with military family member’sdeployment overseas•Knowledge of illness or injury of military family member

Intermittent Leave and Reduced Schedules

Permitted if “medically necessary” which means when the medical need for leave is best accommodated through intermittent leave.

The employee must also make a reasonable effort to schedule medical treatment so as not to unduly disrupt business.



The Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act also have non-discrimination/retaliation

provisions.


Employment At Will


Avoiding Discrimination and Retaliation Claims


DOCUMENT! DOCUMENT! DOCUMENT!

Preventing AbuseAbsences



An employee who is typically scheduled to workfrom 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. takes intermittentFMLA leave every day at 10:00 a.m. to havephysical therapy. The employee’s absence isdisruptive to the department’s operation. Canthe supervisor do anything to address thesituation?


Yes. The supervisor may request that theemployee schedule the treatments at a timewhich is less disruptive to the department.


Policies may require thatemployees must advise theemployer that they will be absentfor FMLA reasons.

FMLA CALL-IN PROCEDURES


An example would be an instructionthat employees calling in arerequired to identify that leaveneeded is “for my approved FMLAleave.”



When an employee indicates the need for anFMLA-related absence, the manager speaking withthe employee may ask: “Is the leave related toyour own medical condition or the condition of afamily member (spouse, child, or parent)?”



Leave for employee’s own illness

1) Is this leave needed for approved FMLA leave?

2) Are you scheduled to see a doctor today?

3) If you are scheduled to see a doctor, when did you make that appointment?

4) Will you be able to work for any part of the day?

5) When do you anticipate returning to work?

FMLA CALL-IN INQUIRY


Leave for family member’s illness

1) If the leave is for your family member, are you scheduled to provide transportation to a doctor’s appointment?

2) If you are not scheduled to provide transportation to a doctor’s appointment, why is the leave needed?

3) Will you be able to work for any part of the day?

4) When do you anticipate returning to work?



An employee is required to respond toreasonable inquiries and failure to do somay result in denial of FMLA protection.



Recertification may be requested more frequently thanotherwise permitted by the FMLA when:

• the employee requests an extension of leave;

• circumstances described by the previous certification havechanged significantly (e.g., the duration of the illness, thenature of the illness, complications); or

• the employer receives information that casts doubt upon thecontinuing validity of the certification.


Recertification


SUSPECTED ABUSE OF FMLA

An employee on intermittent FMLA leave misses work for three Mondays and four Fridays during a two month period.

What, if anything can the supervisor do?


Recertification may be requested. A pattern of Friday/Monday absencescan constitute “information that casts doubt upon the employee’s statedreason for the absence” thus supporting an employer’s request for re-certification.

Suspected Abuse



A recertification more frequently than every 30days could thus be justified, for example, if amedical certification indicated the need forintermittent leave for one or two days a monthdue to migraine headaches, and the employeetook such leave every Thursday and Friday(the last two days of the employee’s workweek).FMLA 2004-2-A.



The FMLA does not prohibit an employer from including arecord of an employee’s absences along with the medicalcertification form for the health care provider’s considerationin determining the employee’s likely period of futureabsences. Nor does the FMLA prohibit an employer fromasking, as part of the recertification process, whether thelikely duration and frequency of the employee’s incapacitydue to the chronic condition is limited to Mondays andFridays.

FMLA 2004-2-A.



NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

ACT


Events Covered

Employees are entitled to benefits if, while engaged inactivities for the benefit of their employer, they sufferan injury by accident, a specific traumaticincident resulting in a hernia or back injury or anoccupational disease.

NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT

Introduction


Injury by Accident

An accident is defined as an interruption of the regularwork routine and the introduction of unusualcircumstances (such as a fall, trip, slip or other unusualevent or activity) likely to result in unexpected results orconsequences.


Introduction


Specific Traumatic Incident

A specific traumatic incident as defined by our Appellate Courtsincludes back injuries that occur during normal work activities. Whileit was originally required that the incident occur at a judiciallycognizable time, that requirement has been somewhat eroded bythe Appellate Courts over time.

However, injuries that occur gradually over long periods of time arenot specific traumatic incidents.


Introduction


Occupational Illnesses

Diseases are covered if they are due to (caused by or significantlycontributed to) causes and conditions which arecharacteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade,occupation or employment.

Diseases are not covered if they are an ordinary disease of lifeto which the general public is equally exposed outside ofemployment.


Introduction


PROTECTING AND PUTTING NORTH CAROLINA BACK TO WORK ACT

JUNE 24, 2011



(for claims arising after June 24, 2011)A claim can be successfully denied if the employer is able to prove that in the course of entering into the employment relationship:

• the employee knowingly and willfully made a false representation about his physical condition;

• the employer relied upon the false representation(s) by the employee and the reliance was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to hire the employee; and

• there was a causal connection between the false representation and the injury or occupational disease.


Pre-Employment Misrepresentation


The Protecting and Putting North CarolinaBack to Work Act provides employers withgreater access to medical information.


NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS’COMPENSATION ACTReasonable access to medical information

N. C. Gen. Stat. §97-25.6 was written in response to Salaam v. N.C.Dept. of Transp., 122 N.C. App. 83, 468 S.E.2d 536 (1996), whichbarred all ex parte communications with treating physicians,handicapping an employer’s ability to direct medical treatment andpreventing the exchange of medical information necessary to theproper administration of an employee’s claim.


NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS’COMPENSATION ACT

Reasonable access to medical information

Reasonable access to medical informationPreviously, non-consensual communications betweenmedical providers and employers or insurers wereprohibited, except for the limited medical statusquestionnaire, inhibiting the employer’s ability to gatherpertinent medical information.

See N. C. Gen. Stat. §97-25.6.




Reasonable access to medical informationNow, medical records may be obtainedwithout express authorization or release aslong as the records are related to the claimor injury.





Written communication to the health care provider to obtain relevantinformation not available in the employee’s medical records isallowed without the express authorization of the employee. However,the written communication must be contemporaneously provided tothe employee, as well as any response received from the health careprovider, within 10 days of receipt.





Reasonable access to medical informationWritten communication (cont’d)

The employer may request the following information:

• the diagnosis of the employee’s condition;• the appropriate course of treatment;• the anticipated time that the employee will be out of work;• the relationship, if any, of the employee’s condition to the employment;





Reasonable access to medical informationWritten communication (cont’d)

The employer may request the following information:

• work restrictions resulting from the condition;• the kind of work for which the employee may be eligible;• the anticipated time the employee will be restricted; and• any permanent impairment resulting from the condition.





Reasonable access to medical information• Oral communication with the authorized physician to obtainrelevant medical information not contained in the writtencommunication is allowed.

• The employee must be provided an opportunity to participatein the communication.

• If unable to participate, the employee must be provided with awritten summary of the communication within 10 days.





Reasonable access to medical informationAn employer may submit additional relevantmedical information not already contained inthe employee’s medical records (i.e.,surveillance, prior medical records of which thedoctor may not be aware, etc.) to the authorizedphysician.




Return to Work



Return to Work

Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI):

When an individual has completed the “healing period.”



Suitable Employment



Promoting Attendance: Suitable Employment

Pre-MMI Return to Work Issues(for claims arising after June 24, 2011)

• Employee may be returned to a modified job that is within the employee’s work restrictions

• Includes rehabilitation or other non-competitive employment

• Must be approved by the employee’s authorized treating health care provider

• “Make-work” can be suitable


NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS’COMPENSATION UPDATES

The Parsons Presumption

All future medical treatment related to a proven Workers'Compensation injury is presumed to have arisen from that injury. Thisshifts the burden from the injured worker back to the employer toproduce evidence that the new medical treatment is not related to thisinjury.

Presumptions applies to both accepted and adjudicated cases.

Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540, 485 S.E.2d 867 (1997).



Expansion of the Parsons Presumption

The North Carolina Supreme Court held “an admission ofcompensability ... entitles an employee to a presumption thatadditional medical treatment is causally related to his compensableinjury.”

Wilkes expanded the Parsons presumption to include all conditionsand treatment, not just those which have been accepted oradjudicated.

Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 369 N.C. 730, 799 S.E.2d 838 (June 2017).



Expansion of the Parsons Presumption

This ruling forced employers to prove that seeminglyunrelated conditions were in fact not caused by a workplace accident if previously accepted or determinedcompensable by the Industrial Commission.

Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 369 N.C. 730, 799 S.E.2d 838 (June 2017).




Employee falls at work and sustains injury to knee. Employer acceptsthe accident as compensable and provides medical treatment forknee. Plaintiff later requests treatment for anxiety, claiming that hedeveloped the condition as a result of the accident. As original injurywas accepted, employer has initial burden to put forth evidence thatemployee’s anxiety was not related to the fall.




On July 20, 2017 the General Assembly ratified Session Law 2017-124which amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-82(b) to limit the impact of theWilkes decision.

The revisions establish that an employer’s acceptance of thecompensability of a specific injury on a Form 60 shall not extend theParsons presumption to injuries and conditions other than thosespecifically listed on the Form 60.



What is a Prescription and How Can I Get One?

Plaintiff sustained severe burns while working at employer’s paperplant. Defendants accepted the injury as compensable and providedPlaintiff with extensive treatment at the UNC Burn Center in ChapelHill. Plaintiff’s wife took a leave of absence from her job to stay withhim during recovery. Plaintiff’s wife was not compensated for the careand services she provided during this recovery.

Plaintiff’s wife returned to work but arranged an alternate workschedule so she could continue to provide care.

Thompson v. Int’l Paper Co., ___ N.C. App. ___, 795 S.E. 2d 615 (January 2017).




Plaintiff’s treating physician testified at his deposition that plaintiffwould require some level of attendant care for the rest of his life, butadmitted that he had never provided a written prescription forattendant care.

The Commission determined that plaintiff was not entitled toattendant care as his authorized treating physician did not provide acorresponding written prescription.





Issue raised is whether plaintiff was entitled toattendant care in the absence of a writtenprescription.




Yes. “Medical compensation” which an employer must provide, isdefined by the Workers’ Compensation Act as medical … services,including, but not limited to, attendant care services prescribed by ahealth care provider … and other treatment … as may reasonably berequired to effect a cure or give relief and … will tend to lessen theperiod of [the employee’s] disability[.] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19).





The Court of Appeals noted that N.C.G.S. § 97-2(19) was amended torequire a prescription for attendant care services. However, becausethere is no definition in the Workers’ Compensation Act for the term“prescription” or “prescribe,” the Court determined there was norequirement that the prescription be in writing. Plaintiff’sphysicians clearly stated he would require some attendantcare for the rest of his life, and this was sufficient.



Tully v. City of Wilmington, March 2, 2018


WEDNESDAYTitle VII, ADA, FMLA, WC Updatehttps://www.surveymonkey.com/r/WedUpdate


https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/WedUpdate

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND ATTENTION

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nc-ipma 2018 annual conferencencipma.onefireplace.com/resources/documents/title vii, ada,...

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