nato-russia security challenges in the aftermath of ukraine

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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies

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NATORussia security challenges in the aftermathof Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea securityand beyond

Sharyl Cross

To cite this article: Sharyl Cross (2015) NATORussia security challenges in the aftermath ofUkraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond, Southeast European and Black SeaStudies, 15:2, 151-177, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017

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NATORussia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraineconict: managing Black Sea security and beyond

Sharyl Crossa,b*

aKozmetsky Center, St Edwards University, 3001 South Congress Avenue, Austin, TX78704, USA; bKennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

Washington, DC, USA

(Received 23 March 2015; accepted 31 March 2015)

NATOs relationship with the Soviet Union and then Russia has been central todening the European regional and global security conguration for decades.This article explores the potential consequences of the Ukrainian conict for thecurrent and future NATORussia relationship. The analysis focuses on deningspecic challenges and risks for NATO and Russia in managing the evolvingsecurity environment of the Black Sea region. The author offers an assessmentof the potential for future NATORussia clashes or cooperation in the BlackSea, and for broader regional and global security. Some recommendations aresuggested for managing the future NATORussia relationship during this periodof heightened uncertainty and risk.

Keywords: NATO; Russia; Ukraine; Black Sea; Sevastopol

Men will not put up with terrible conditions like these for the sake of a cross or anhonor, or because they have been threatened: there must be another, higher motiva-tion. This motivation is a feeling that surfaces only rarely in the Russian, but lies dee-ply embedded in his soul a love of his native land. Only now do the stories of theearly days of the siege of Sevastopol, when there were no fortications, no troops,when there was no physical possibility of holding the town & there was neverthelessnot the slightest doubt that it would be kept from the enemy of the days whenKornilov, that hero worthy of ancient Greece, would say as he inspected his troops:We will die, men, rather than surrender Sebastopol, & when our Russian soldiers,unversed in phrasemongering would answer: We will die! Hurrah!-only now do thestories of those days cease to be beautiful historic legend and become a reality, afact. You will suddenly have a clear and vivid awareness that those men you have justseen are the very same heroes who in those difcult days did not allow their spirits tosink but rather felt them rise as they joyfully prepared to die, not for the town but fortheir native land. Long will Russia bear the imposing traces of this epic ofSebastopol, the hero of which was the Russian people. (Tolstoy 1855/1986)

Nikolai Tolstoy, serving as an ofcer in the Russian Army in the Crimean War. (TheSebastopol Sketches, December 1855)

Introduction

The relationship between NATO and the former Soviet Union and now Russia hasbeen at the centre of European and international politics for over 60 years. Manfred

*Email: [email protected]

2015 Taylor & Francis

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2015Vol. 15, No. 2, 151177, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017

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Woerner signalled a clear change in the EastWest relationship in response totransformation in the former Soviet bloc during the rst ever visit of a NATOSecretary General to Moscow in 1990: The time for confrontation is over. Thehostility of mistrust of the past must be buried. We see your country, and othercountries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization, no longer as adversaries butas partners (NATO 1990).

Despite these overtures, NATO and Russia have not been able to achieve thestated intention of forging a partnership. Russias sensitivity regarding the enlarge-ment of the NATO Alliance has been a consistent source of serious tension.Although few might have anticipated the deterioration of the European/Eurasiansecurity environment that we have witnessed as a result of the Ukrainian conict,in many respects, Russias clash with the West over Ukraine might have beenanticipated.

Regrettably, despite all the changes and new opportunities that were created asa result of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, NATOnations and the Russian Federation still remained very much locked into a percep-tual mindset of a bifurcated Europe. While many in the international securitycommunity attempted to move the frame of reference to new realities and buildinga common European security community among nations with signicant sharedinterests, there were also those who continued to frame and amplify issues in termsof the great game or contest among the West and Russia. Therefore, rather thanfostering a collaborative security community in which nations in the Balkans,Caucasus or Central Asia could maintain and develop ties both with the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, these countries were positioned so as to have tomake a choice either the West or Russia.

The tensions between Russia and the West have culminated in the current crisisin Ukraine, which threatens not only to devastate the society, but also to unravel allprogress achieved in building greater peace and security in Europe and the worldsince the end of the Cold War. The recent annexation of Crimea and intervention insupport of separatist groups in the East represent a desire of the Russian leadershipand society to re-assert Russias role in protecting perceived interests and challeng-ing United States and Western inuence among their close neighbours.

Moscows behaviour with respect to Ukraine has elicited strong objection in theWest. At the Wales Summit of September 2014, the 28 members of the NATO Alli-ance issued the statement suggesting that Russias aggressive actions againstUkraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and atpeace (NATO 2014) and also afrming that NATO nations condemn in thestrongest terms Russias escalating illegal military intervention in Ukraine (NATO 2014). NATOs Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted in January 2015that: Crimea has been annexed-borders have been changed by use of force -for therst time since the Second World War. And we see that Russia is destabilizingUkraine and supporting the separatists in eastern Ukraine (NATO 2015a).Alexander Vershbow, NATOs Deputy Secretary General, described the conse-quences of Russias action for the international security environment in Oslo in2015, noting that

To the East, Russia has torn up the international rule book. It has returned to astrategy of power politics. It threatens not just Ukraine, but European and global secu-rity more generally Russias aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident,

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but a game changer in European security. It reects an evolving pattern of behaviorthat has been emerging for several years (NATO 2015b)

Russias recent actions in Ukraine have resulted in sanctions from the West andrepositioning of United States (US) and NATO forces and resources in Europeaimed to reassure allies. Experts in the US, Russia and Europe warn that we havemoved into a new Cold War or even potential Hot War with the RussianFederation since the rules of the game during the current period of conict are farmore ambiguous than during the decades of the Cold War.

Building NATORussia security collaboration: interests, opportunities andperpetual tensions

The NATORussia relationship has been central in the evolution of Russias rela-tionship with the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. George F. Kennan,principle architect of Americas post-Second World War containment strategy, hadpredicted in 1997 that Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error ofAmerican policy in the Cold War era (Kennan 1997). Kennan warned that Such a decision may be expectedto impel Russian foreign policy in directionsdecidedly not to our liking (Kennan 1997). Indeed, perhaps there has been nosingle greater irritant in Russias post-Cold War relationship with Western countriesthan the issue of NATOs continued existence, enlargement, increasing relevanceand success. Because of Moscows confrontational relationship with NATO duringthe decades of the Cold War, the growth of the NATO Alliance closer to the terri-tory of the Russian Federation has tended to be perceived as a deliberate strategyto encircle or weaken Russia. The fact that nations of Eastern and Central Europe/Georgia and Ukraine frequently justied interest in pursuing membership in NATOwith the aim of seeking protection from Russia only strengthened that perceptionof NATOs intentions in Moscow.

There has been a pattern in the United StatesRussian relationship largely inu-enced by NATO issues characterizing each presidential transition. Initially, both BillClinton and Boris Yeltsin, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, and Barack Obamaand Dmitry Medvedev pledged commitment to develop strategic partnership, butinevitably clashes of interests thwarted the realization of this objective.1

While Clinton and Yeltsin had expressed the desire for USRussia partnershipand even friendship, two major issues involving NATO were central during thedecade of the 1990s, leading to more sobering appraisals of prospects for realizingthese strategic partnership aspirations. Despite US/NATO attempts to downplayRussias opposition to NATO enlargement, every Russian President has expressedsustained objections to expanding the Alliance. Former Soviet President, MikhailGorbachev, made the point (conrmed in an interview with the author) that he hada gentlemens agreement with ofcials of the rst George H.W. Bush Administra-tion that removal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and German unicationwould not be followed by NATO expansion.2 As early as 1994, Russias PresidentBoris Yeltsin warned of a Cold Peace falling over Europe, stating that plans forexpanding NATO would create new divisions and sow seeds of distrust.3

The Kosovo air war was the second critical factor that deated the initial highexpectations for building Russias cooperation with NATO. While Russian peace-keepers had been successfully deployed to serve alongside NATO forces in former

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Yugoslavia, Moscows traditional interests in the Balkan region and historic ties toOrthodox Serbs created differing views on sources of conict in the region andpositions regarding appropriate responses to the implosion of former Yugoslavia.Russians tended to conclude that NATO enlargement and the NATO Kosovo airwar demonstrated that Western countries would take advantage of Russias transi-tional domestic turmoil and weakness. Following the Kosovo war, Russian ofcialforeign and security documents reected reassessment of the potential for coopera-tion with Western nations. Russias rst Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 was decid-edly pro-Western, stating that Russia and the West possess common understandingof the main values of world civilization and common interests (Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Russian Federation 1993), while Russias National Security Conceptissued in 2000 noted that NATOs transition to the practice of using military forceoutside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction coulddestabilize the entire global strategic situation.4

NATO and Russia had initially established the Permanent Joint Council (PJC)to manage consultations and security collaboration, but the PJC was dissolved dur-ing the period of greatest strain over the Kosovo conict. In the aftermath of theKosovo war in February 2000, during the visit of NATOs Secretary General LordGeorge Robertson to Moscow, a joint statement was issued with Russias PresidentVladimir Putin agreeing to re-establish NATORussia dialogue on a wide range ofsecurity issues (NATO 2000, 20). In May 2002, the NATORussia Council (NRC)was established, providing for Russian participation in consultative decision-makingfrom the outset with the then 19 NATO member countries, rather than after a deci-sion had been reached as in the prior PJC arrangement. Thus, while Russia wouldnot have a veto over NATO actions, Moscow could be assured a place at the tableand active role in the decision-making process from the point of initial deliberationfor any Alliance action.

Until the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, NATO and Russia resumedcooperation in addressing several critical security issues and to develop an exten-sive range of practical security collaboration in the areas of military-to-militaryexchanges, counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, maritime security, airspaceinitiatives, cyber security, crisis management, civil emergency planning and more.However, although most in Moscow considered the mechanisms for consultation inthe NRC to constitute a signicant improvement over the prior PJC arrangement,still NATO and Russia had by no means reached the full potential for security col-laboration. Russians continued to complain that they would never accept juniorpartner status in NATO and to resist NATO enlargement.

George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin established a positive personal rapport atthe outset. One might remember George W. Bush making the famous comment dur-ing his rst meeting with the Russian leader in Slovenia in 2001 indicating he hadlooked into Vladimir Putins soul and found him to be straightforward and that hecould be trusted. However, differences over continued NATO enlargement, recogni-tion of Kosovos independence, the Iraq War and missile defence culminated inRussias intervention in Georgia and concern about new Cold War at the conclu-sion of the Bush presidency.

Vladimir Putins posture toward NATO became increasingly combative in thelatter stage of his rst presidency. At the Munich conference in 2007, Putin chargedthat it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with themodernization of the Alliance itself or ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary,

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it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust (Putin2007). After failing to comply with the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe(CFE) Treaty requiring Russia to withdraw forces from Moldova and Georgia,Putin announced in July 2007 that Moscow would no longer participate in the CFETreaty which had been regulating the deployment of troops and weapons systemsin Europe since 1990. The NATORussia relationship was further strained by thepossibility of fast-track or eventual NATO membership for neighbouring nations onRussias borders, Georgia and Ukraine. Russia had also opposed recognition ofKosovos independence, and would later claim that independence on the partof South Ossetia and Abkhazia held greater historical legitimacy than in the case ofKosovo. In 2008, Putins successor, Dmitry Medvedev, would advance a newEuropean Security Treaty proposal suggesting Russias complete dissatisfactionwith the current European security architecture (Ofce of the President of theRussian Federation 2008).

Russias incursion into Georgia in August 2008 shocked Western ofcials andprompted a fundamental reassessment of Moscows intentions toward neighbouringnations and the wider international community. In response to the Russo-GeorgianWar of August 2008, the NRC was temporarily suspended. NATO condemned thedecision of the Russian Federation to extend recognition to South Ossetia andAbkhazia. In the immediate aftermath of the Georgian military intervention, circum-stances between Russia and the West had led several specialists of the American,European and Russian academic communities to argue that it was obvious that anew Cold War had developed or would inevitably dene the US/EuropeanRussianrelationship.

By January 2009, when Barack Obama assumed the Presidency, the state ofUSRussian relations was more strained than at any period during Russias post-Soviet experience. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, US VicePresident Joseph Biden pronounced early on that the new Administration sought topress the reset button with Moscow, suggesting there are many areas where theUnited States can and should be working together with Russia.5 One of the majorobjectives in the Declaration of Alliance Security issued at NATOs 60th Anniver-sary in 2009 aimed to build a strong and cooperative relationship with the RussianFederation (NATO 2009a).

In May 2009, NATO Allied Ministers formally resumed the NRC. Theyagreed to use the NRC as a forum for dialogue with Russia on all issues, toinclude areas where they agree to disagree with a view toward resolving prob-lems and building practical cooperation. NATO and Russia would not agree onthe issue of recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Allies assured that theoption of Georgian membership in NATO remained open, but also signalled thatthe timetable for Georgian accession into NATO would not be immediate orfast-track.

Shortly after assuming responsibility as NATOs Secretary General in September2009, Anders Fogh Rasmussen delivered his rst speech in Russia at Moscow StateInstitute of International Relations (MGIMO) entitled NATO and Russia, partnersfor the future (NATO 2009b). Rasmussen stressed that he had been committedfrom the rst day in his position as NATO Secretary General and Chair of theNRC to work toward transforming the NATORussia relationship into a truestrategic partnership (NATO 2009b). Secretary General Rasmussen advanced athree-point strategy for improving NATORussia relations concentrating on


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enhancing practical security cooperation, building condence and trust, andundertaking joint review of common twenty-rst-century security challenges.

In June 2010, following bilateral meetings held in Washington, PresidentBarrack Obama suggested that he and Russias President Dmitry Medvedev hadsucceeded in resetting the USRussian relationship.6 Obama noted that the twoleaders discussed issues of disagreement to include Moscows conict withGeorgia, and at the same time pledged to broaden cooperation in other criticalareas. Signicantly, in a period of only a few months, the United States and Russiasucceeded in concluding a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreeing tomutual reductions and inspections. In addition, Russia had agreed to provide NATOcritical transit support in Afghanistan which would later include access through theUlyanovsk base on Russian soil.

Russias then President Dmitry Medvedev expressed commitment to worktogether with NATO members toward creating a modernized partnership. Whileconsultations in the NRC had been suspended in the aftermath of the GeorgianWar, the exchanges were resumed with both parties emphasizing that the NRC mustremain operative even in times of serious tension to ensure continued exchange ofinformation and problem-solving. In November 2012, NATO and Russia completedthe Joint Review of Twenty First Century Common Security Challenges that furtherdened the extensive range of shared security challenges faced by NATO andRussia, and identied priorities for deepening cooperation in counterterrorism andother areas.

Representing agreement on the part of all 28 members, the NATO StrategicConcept issued in 2010 explicitly afrmed that the allies want to see a truestrategic partnership between NATO and Russia (NATO 2010). The documentconrmed further that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined , andthat NATO poses no threat to Russia, and a strong and constructive part-nership based on mutual condence, transparency, and predictability can best serveour security (NATO 2010).

Although the re-set appeared to reverse the downward spiral in US/NATORussia relationship, differences again emerged. Despite initial expectations that suc-cessfully concluding an agreement on European missile defence could serve as agame changer shifting the USRussia relationship to a genuine strategic partner-ship, the United States/NATO nations and Russia remained deadlocked in failingto reach an agreement. Russias President Dmitry Medvedev had initially proposeda sector approach whereby Russia would be responsible for intercepting missilesover Russias territory bound for NATO nations. The Obama administration rejectedthe proposal outright noting that NATO could never rely on non-NATO countriesto include Russia for protecting the security of Alliance members. The UnitedStates and NATO would insist on retaining responsibility for managing the inter-ception of missiles that might be targeted at the territories of NATO members.Moscow insisted that they would reject any proposal disrupting the current deter-rence regime or that NATOs interceptors might be targeted today or in the futureat Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles limiting the capacity to respond to arst strike. After failing to make progress in overcoming differences on missiledefence, the Moscow leadership threatened to respond with measures, includingplacing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad to counter the deployment of NATOballistic missile defence assets.

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Russias parliamentary and presidential elections in 20112012 were also asource of tension. Many in Western nations and among Russias intellectuals weredismayed at a political process that appeared to fall far short of standards forEuropean-style democratic practice. Suppression of protest movements and storm-ing the homes and conscating money and equipment of opposition leaders under-mined the legitimacy of Russias political process. The lack of a strong organizedopposition virtually ensured Putins return to the presidency with the potential thathe would serve for two more six-year terms. Signicant differences between theUnited States, NATO and Russia were evident in the response to the Arab Springand the conicts, especially in reacting to the implosion in Libya and Syria.Moscow tended to favour stability and the status quo in the region, while theUnited States and NATO have been more inclined to commit force in support ofregime change. There were concerns among Moscows leadership that mass move-ments fuelled by social media as in North Africa and the Middle East might promptsimilar upheavals to Russias south or even within the territory of the RussianFederation. Other points of friction in the USRussia relationship including theimposition of the Magnitsky Act and Edward Snowden issue also tended to impedethe initial progress of the re-set.

Immediately prior to Moscows intervention in Ukraine, there was a perceptionthat the Obama administration was turning attention away from Russia. Anymomentum to move past an initial re-set appeared to stall. NATOs enlargement,out-of-area missions and the perceptions of US dominance of the NATO agendahad continued to present a sustained source of difculty for Moscow over thedecades since the end of the Cold War.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin might have anticipated that the UnitedStates and Russia would emerge from the Cold War as two leading or hegemonicpowers in world politics that could cooperate in addressing major internationalsecurity challenges. Instead of two leading powers working in the interest of worldsecurity, Russia found its status and inuence considerably diminished. NATOsintervention in former Yugoslavia left the perception in Moscow that their views orobjections would not be taken seriously among the United States and its Westernallies. As a historic European power and major superpower during the decades ofthe Cold War, this state of reduced status and inuence was unacceptable for theMoscow foreign policy community. Gorbachev and Yeltsin came to be perceivedamong many in Russia as having compromised Russias interests with the West.Historian of the Russian Academy of Sciences Henry A. Tromenko perhaps bestcaptured the sentiment in an interview with the author in Moscow in 1995, stating:How many compromises has our nation made in foreign and security policy sinceGorbachev introduced reforms? And how many compromises has your countrymade in response? Not one. And now NATO will expand 7

The desire to restore Russias great power status or to avoid being relegated toa position of weakness as in the 1990s has been a major priority for Russias for-eign policy community during the PutinMedevdev tandem leadership. Presidentialstatements and ofcial foreign policy documents have called to reassert a strongand self-condent Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation2007; Ofce of the President of the Russian Federation 2014). The Russiannational identity is largely based on a perpetual great power image and a specialdestiny in the world unique to Russias culture and experience (Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2008b, 2013). There have been consistent


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suggestions that the current global power balance featuring US dominance willnot advance Russias interests, and Moscow has sought to formalize strategicpartnerships with China and other nations to balance US power and to promotetransition of the international community to a multipolar world order featuring sev-eral poles of inuence (Valdai Club 2014). The Moscow leadership emphasizesthat critical decisions in the international sphere must be made on a collectivebasis, rather than by unipolar decision-making authority (Valdai Club 2013,2014).

Putin appears to be determined to assert Russias inuence in playing a criticalrole in regional conicts as was evident in Moscows proposed diplomatic settle-ment temporarily preventing the imposition of US military action against of theregime of Bashar al Assad in Syria in 2013. Syria hosts the only Russian militarybase outside the CIS at the port of Tartus, and military sales between the countrieshave been signicant. Russia and China have held to a position of non-interferencein Syrian internal affairs, while the United States and other NATO nations haveperiodically called for the use of force prompted by the objective of ending thehuman rights abuses of Bashar al-Assads regime.

Vladimir Putin and many in the Moscow foreign policy community and societyhave had difculty coming to terms with the loss of empire resulting from the dis-mantling of the Soviet Union. As Igor A. Zevelev has observed, the UnitedKingdom possessed a distant empire, but the Soviet Union was an empire whereno borders divided Russia from its neighbours (Zevelev 2008 cited in Cross 2009,220). At the same time, Putins widely cited statement of 2005 that the collapse ofthe Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth centuryshould not imply that his intention was to reconstitute the empire. While not seek-ing to reconquer Ukraine or other nations of the former Soviet Union, Moscowdoes want to make sure that regimes are instituted and sustained in these societiesthat will present no harm to Russias interests. Moscow tends to assume a postureof entitlement in its so-called zone of privileged interests, and has not been ableto deal with Georgia or Ukraine (or other neighbours) as genuinely sovereignnations deserving status of complete autonomy from Russian inuence and control.Moscows Foreign Policy Concept issued in July 2008 established the pretext forRussias intrusion in post-Soviet neighbouring nations by including a reference toprotecting Russians living outside its borders, a provision signalling a prelude forintervention in Georgia and later Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation 2008a). In commenting on the Ukrainian conict, Russian For-eign Minister Sergei Lavrov afrmed this commitment, noting that an attack onRussian citizens is an attack on the Russian Federation, perhaps suggesting thatMoscows intervention following Ukraine, in the Baltics (particularly in Estonia orLatvia with signicant Russian populations) or elsewhere, could not be ruled out.8

The concept of Novorossiya has been invoked by Vladimir Putin establishing abasis for Moscow to carve out an alternative pillar to Western inuence in theinternational community. In describing Russias interests in Ukraine, Putin madethe point in 2014 that: I would like to remind you that what was calledNovorossiya back in the tsarist days Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson,Nikolayev and Odessa were not part of Ukraine back thenThe center of theterritory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost thoseterritories for various reasons, but the people remained (Taylor 2014). Putin andhis colleagues make clear that Russia must establish a democracy and foreign

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policy orientation consistent with Russias traditions, culture and moral values.Traditional Russian cultural values are often contrasted with the decadence of theWest in contemporary Russian society and media. Moscows national narrative hasbeen directed for several years toward presenting Western society as the other.Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov have also suggested that Russias foreign policyshould be guided by religious values. The concept of the Russkiy Mir (RussianWorld) refers to Russian citizens and the Russian diaspora based on the RussianOrthodox faith, common historical memory and values. The relationship betweenthe Kremlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Orthodox Church has becomemuch closer under Putins leadership. In his 2013 speech to the Valdai forum,Vladimir Putin states: We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic community areactually rejecting their roots, including Christian values that constitute the basis ofWestern civilization. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities (Cathey 2013; Curanovic 2015; Valdai Club 2013). Russias policy in Ukraineis thus depicted as not only important for securing national interests, but alsoreecting the (Christian) moral obligation to assist those in need and in terms of acivilizational clash between traditional Russian cultural and religious values andnihilistic materialism and lack of commitment to moral heritage in the West(Cathey 2013; Curanovic 2015; Valdai Club 2013).

Vladimir Putins popularity within Russia is largely explained as a result of theperception that he is willing to stand rm in support of Russias interests in dealingwith the West. Russia has come to resemble a modern Czarist regime in Putinssecond term. Putins deance of the West on Ukraine has only enhanced his sup-port at home, and to appear to compromise Moscows interests on Ukraine could infact unleash an erosion of domestic support for Putins leadership.

Uncertainty regarding Russias future political development and lack of claritywith respect to Russias desire for either integration with the Western securitycommunity or rather strategic independence has been a major barrier to deepeningNATORussia security collaboration. Russias statements and actions were ambigu-ous in viewing NATO as both bloc threat and at the same time, potential part-ner. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation issued in 2010 includedamong main external military dangers

the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law,and to move the military infrastructure of NATO members closer to the borders of theRussian Federation

and at the same time the document lists the development of relationswithother intergovernmental organizations (the European Union and NATO) underthe heading main tasks to deter and prevent military conict. Clearly, Putinsreturn to the presidency in 2012 was accompanied by greater distancing from theWest, preference for strengthening Russias reliance on structures perceived asalternatives to NATO, such as the CSTO collective security organization andEurasian Union, and building stronger ties with China and the BRIC nations.Moscows current leadership calls for establishing strategic alternatives to Westernintegration and practices for managing security. However, even in the aftermath ofthe initial repercussions and mutual reprisals resulting from the conict in Ukraine,the new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation issued in December 2014 still


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leaves open the possibility of a dialogue of equals with the West. Many analystsmade an issue of the description of NATO and NATO enlargement in the 2014Military Doctrine as a danger or threat, but such references concerning NATOappeared in the previous iteration. The new 2014 Military Doctrine does emphasizethe need for non-bloc models, and presents a more threatening description of theglobal security environment than the prior version.

Despite the fact that the United States/NATO nations and Russia have differentstrategic visions and objectives, Russias cooperation remains critical for Europeanand global security. Nations of the NATO Alliance share a vast array of commonsecurity interests which are also of highest priority for the Russian Federation fortoday and in the decades ahead, such as arms control, weapons of mass destruction,proliferation, countering violent extremism and terrorism, preventing escalation ofregional conicts apart from the European continent and more. Russia can be apotential spoiler, signicantly damaging NATO interests, and the risk of confronta-tion between NATO and Russia has reached the greatest level since the collapse ofthe USSR as a result of the crisis in Ukraine. Russias vast territory and geographicreach adjoining Europe, the Middle East and Asia makes the nation a major playerfor regional and global security. Russia retains a nuclear arsenal rivaling that of theUnited States, and combined gas/oil resources as a leading global net energy expor-ter. Russias status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council with vetoauthority, and membership in other major international organizations provides thecapacity for exerting considerable inuence in shaping the world security agendaand determining vital collective security responses. NATOs resources and capabili-ties are not innite, and thinking more about how to ensure the constructivedevelopment of US/NATO relationships with both Russia and China and otheremerging powers as well as out-of-area international organizations that might shareresponsibilities and costs in global security is only reasonable. NATO nations havecertainly recognized the importance of Russia to European and global security, andthus managing this relationship has presented among the most serious challengesfor the Alliance.

The NATO leadership had hoped that establishing the unique NATORussiapartnership might provide a basis for constructive security collaboration, even withMoscows objections to NATO enlargement and allied out-of-area missions.NATOs intention has and remains to establish a reliable security partnership withRussia. However, Moscow has never been able to overcome the perception ofNATO as a military bloc poised against Russia, and they do not view NATO as theproper organization to ensure adequate representation of Russias interests in majorEuropean, Eurasian and global security spheres. In March 2000, Vladimir Putin sur-prised the audience when asked about joining NATO, when he responded why not?9 but only of the basis of equal of partnership 10 Putin has consistentlysuggested the Russia would work with NATO, but only from a position of strengthor on an equal basis.

Battle for the future of Ukraine

Tensions between NATO and Russia have reached an unprecedented scale as aresult of the recent conict in Ukraine and Russias annexation of Crimea. Thestruggle in Ukraine over developing closer ties with the European Union or theCustoms Union brought the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in

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February 2014, opening a power vacuum for the pro-Western Euromaidan move-ment to move to the forefront of Ukrainian politics. The involvement of externalpowers, the United States, European nations and Russia taking sides in the conicthas led to an implosion of the nation dividing Ukraine in an EastWest civil war.

NATO reacted by suspending all practical civilian and military cooperation withRussia, though political channels of communication have remained open. At theWales Summit in September 2014, NATO announced the creation of a RapidReaction Force to reassure allies and as President Barack Obama said to serve asa signal to Russia to avoid any future potential aggression similar to the ongoingghting in Ukraine 11 The allies demanded that Russia stop and withdraw itsforces from Ukraine and that Russia must use its inuence with the sepa-ratists to de-escalate the situation and to take concrete steps to allow for a politicaland a diplomatic solution which respects Ukraines sovereignty, territorial integrity,and internationally recognized borders (NATO 2014).

The United States and its NATO allies have repositioned equipment and forcesin the Baltics, East-Central Europe and the Black Sea region. Additional multina-tional exercises among NATO allies and plans for military training are underwayfor Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to enhance capacity to work alongside NATOforces as well as to provide for their own defence. In June 2014, the US Congressauthorized President Obama to advance the European Reassurance Initiative, pro-viding for additional US troop rotations and presence across Europe, but especiallyon the territory of newer NATO allies.12 This initiative authorized funding for air,land, and naval exercises involving US forces in collaboration with NATO alliesand partners in Europe and Eurasia. This funding initiative supports US EuropeanCommands Operation Atlantic Resolve directed toward afrming US commitmentto collective security among NATO allies and partners in Europe in response toRussias intervention in Ukraine.13

The Obama Administration together with members of the European Union haveimposed harsh sanctions on the Russian Federation in response to Russias beha-viour in Ukraine, and the United States Congress has pressured the US President toprovide lethal military aid to the government in Kiev to assist in countering thethreat posed by separatist groups receiving support from Russia in Eastern Ukraine.Particularly in the United States, Vladimir Putin has been widely demonized in thepublic and media as a result of actions in Ukraine with former US Secretary ofState Hillary Clinton comparing the Russian leader to Adolf Hitler. The movementof United States forces in Europe is intended to bolster capacity in the event offurther attempted encroachments from Moscow among NATO nations.

At the same time, outrage among European nations over Moscows violation ofUkrainian sovereignty notwithstanding, statements among NATO allies haveemphasized that they still continue to believe that a partnership between NATOand Russia based on respect for international law would be of strategic value (NATO 2014). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg afrmed again in early2015 that We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship withRussia, including reciprocal condence building and transparency measures Hecontinued:

We have for many years worked together with Russia in ghting terrorism. And ter-rorism is a threat and a problem for many countries, including Russia. And thats thereason why we still strive for a more cooperative and constructive relationship with


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Russia. Because we think it is important that Russia-which is our biggest neighbor inEurope-and NATO are able to work together on important issues, like for instance,ghting terror (NATO 2015a)

NATO Ambassador Vershbow also afrmed:

We do not seek confrontation with Russia. And neither are we looking for regimechange. What we do want is for Moscow to change its behavior; to abide by the verygood rules that Russia itself once subscribed to; & to return to the spirit ofcooperation (NATO 2015a)

Much of the academic and policy analysis on the Ukraine crisis tends to focus onoffering assessments of the importance of Ukraine for Russia and the West.Moscow ofcials frequently refer to the existential importance of Ukraine forRussia, and in contrast, some suggest that Ukraine is insignicant for the UnitedStates. Neither of these descriptions is quite accurate. Ukraine is clearly of funda-mental strategic and economic importance for Russia, and of considerablegeostrategic and economic interest certainly for Europe and to a lesser extent(though surely not insignicant) for the United States.

Ukraine, the second largest nation in Europe, has rich agricultural land andsignicant hydro-carbons and mineral resources. The nation holds Europes thirdlargest shale gas elds, and Ukraine has been a main transit route for Russiannatural gas provided to Europe. The location of Ukraine at the Black Sea alsosignicantly enhances the geostrategic signicance of the nation.

For Russia, Ukraine holds a much higher importance than either Kosovo orGeorgia. Given the cultural-religious heritage of Kievan Rus, Ukraine has beenviewed historically as a part of Russia. Russias former Permanent Representativeto NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, explained Moscows objection to Ukraines membershipin NATO stating that Ukraine was in fact the Mother of Russia, and that separa-tion from Ukraine could never be accepted.14 Reecting on the return of Crimea toRussia, Vladimir Putin afrmed: We have always believed in Russia that Russianand Ukrainian are one people.15

If one should doubt the historic signicance ascribed to Crimea and Sevastopolfor Russia, the observations offered in 1855 during the period of the Crimean Warof the then young ofcer Leo Tolstoy at the outset of this article afrms that thearea would always remain a priority for Russia. In a speech marking the oneyearanniversary of the signing of the treaty with Crimea, Putin praised the patriotismand support the Russian people had shown for Crimean Sevastopol return to hisnative shores, and stated that We are talking about the historical origins of thesources of our spirituality and statehood and the importance to link genera-tions and times, as did much of our historic ancestors for our country 16 TheSevastopol port and Crimea have been depicted in Russian literature and culture asrepresenting a central theater in the Crimean War and the Second World War forthe display of Russian military glory and valour. Crimea had been part of Russiafrom the time of the establishment of the naval base under Catherine the Great in1783 until Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federa-tion of Socialist Republics to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Kramer2014). Sevastopol provides Russia ice-free port access year round, and the meansto project maritime and other military and commercial assets into the Balkans,Mediterranean and the Middle East. The lease accord Russia signed on the Black

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Sea port with Ukraine in 1997 was set to expire in 2017, but Ukraines formerPresident Viktor Yanukovich had offered an extension of the lease to 2042. Therehave been periodic disputes between Ukraine and Russia over the past several yearsregarding terms of implementation of the prior agreement. With the ouster ofYanukovich, Moscows determination to draw a line with respect to Ukraine mustbe largely motivated by the desire to maintain control of the Black Sea port andeet.

Since Ukraines independence in 1992, a number of factors have continued toplace strain on the RussiaUkraine relationship. The historical memories andnational identity within Ukraine remain torn between the West and East alongethnic Ukrainian and Russian allegiances and Catholic and Orthodox afliations.In the past, the Western and Central territories of Ukraine had been tied to theHapsburg Monarchy, Poland, and Lithuania, while the North Black Sea and East-ern regions were more closely aligned with Russia. Today, disputes still existover the place of Kievan Rus with respect to the historical development of theUkrainian nation and Russia. The legacy of the Soviet empire still inuences thebilateral relationship between contemporary Russia and Ukraine, and Ukrainesenergy dependence on Russia has continued to leave Kiev vulnerable toMoscows leverage. The protection of the rights of ethnic Russians (17% ofUkraines population) residing in Ukraine and the majority Russian population inCrimea has been a major issue between Kiev and Moscow. Alleged Westerninvolvement in Ukraine and Georgia during the coloured revolutions, andMoscows apprehensions about these neighbouring countries moving closer toNATO and the European Union have been central sources of tension. Ukrainesformer pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovichs initial rejection of the EUaccession agreement in favour of supporting Moscows Customs Union triggeredthe current conict in February 2014.

Ukraine faces tremendous challenges ahead as the nation suffers endemicproblems lacking viable and legitimate institutions and capacity for effective gover-nance. Excessive state control, corruption and pervasive cronyism have continuedto inuence the political and economic systems in Ukraine since independence.Even prior to the devastation resulting from the current implosion of the country,Ukraine suffered budget decits, hyperination, and comparably low GNP ($3960in 2013), with a standard of living below that of several neighbouring nations inEurope and Eurasia possessing far fewer resources than Ukraine. The nation facesserious challenges in meeting the scal demands necessary for economic recovery.Long-term investment (in terms of decades) in political, security and economiccapacity building will be necessary to develop the institutional structures and tradi-tions necessary for Ukraines growth. The challenges of recovery and future growthwill only be magnied by the losses incurred as result of conict on Ukraines soil,and the difculties compounded in the country because of competing views amongmajor external powers regarding the future of the nation. Perhaps most important,the Ukrainian people must determine whether differences among various groupscan be reconciled and minority relationships can be protected in some type of fed-eral structure once again uniting the Eastern and Western areas of the country.Whether those who identify with the Ukrainian language and historical narrativeand allegiance toward Europe can coexist alongside those who prefer to more clo-sely align with a Russian-led cultural and geostrategic world in the aftermath ofsuch a violent struggle remains to be seen. Absent reconciliation within the country


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and well-orchestrated sustained provisions of support from the outside, Ukrainecould remain locked in a prolonged frozen conict leaving the beleaguered nationin a state of uncertainty with little hope for progress.

Black Sea case: risks and challenges

Maintaining access to the port city of Sevastopol and security of the Black SeaFleet constitute the primary strategic source of the current conict betweenUkraine and Russia. As a result of Russias annexation of Crimea and the war inUkraine, the Black Sea region has again become a theatre of heightening tensionand risk between NATO and Russia. The Black Sea has always served as a criti-cal centre for the mix of commerce and cultures of Europe, the Middle East, andAsia, and has been prone to regional conict involving leading external powers.Historically, the region was controlled by ancient Greece and Rome, theByzantine and Ottoman empires, Czarist Russia, and by the Soviet Union. Russiaclashed with European powers and Ottoman Turks over securing control in theBlack Sea region during the Crimean War 18531856. The current mix of the sixBlack Sea littoral nations, including NATO members Bulgaria, Romania andTurkey together with Russia and conict-ridden Ukraine and Georgia creates anenvironment potentially ripe for becoming a serious regional ashpoint.

Russias annexation of Crimea, seizure of the Ukrainian eet and plans for fur-ther upgrading and expanding military presence in the region has altered the priorbalance of power in the Black Sea area.17 Russia intends to construct a new navalbase at Novorossiysk by 2016, and to deploy additional warships and submarinesto the area.18 In December 2014, Russias Ministry of Defense announced that 80new warships would be added to the Black Sea Fleet by 2020.19 Even prior to theCrimean War, Moscow had been implementing upgrades of the Black Sea Fleet.20

Moscow signed an agreement with Abkhazia in 2014 to enhance military ties andfurther strengthen control over the Eastern Black Sea.21 The Russian Ministry ofDefence has announced plans to modernize the Crimea Belbek airbase includinghousing modern SU-27 aircraft, SU-30 ghter bombers, MIG-29 ghters, andTU-22 long-range bombers.22 Russia is deploying additional ground units to thearea with the most sophisticated equipment and weaponry.23 Reports suggest thatMoscow intends to divert the prior funding allocation for leasing the area fromUkraine to upgrade and expand its military forces positioned in the region. Analystshave observed that the combined navies of Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia are nomatch for Russias naval presence in the region. With the second most powerfulmilitary force among NATO nations, Turkeys naval presence is more substantial,but not sufcient alone to challenge Russias regional naval capacity.

The Black Sea is also critical for NATO and Euro-Atlantic security. Theregion includes not only NATO member nations and partners, but also othercountries that aspire to NATO membership. Strides have been made over the pastfew decades to enhance regional security cooperation, democratic transition andsecurity sector reform. NATO nations require unfettered access to the Black Searegion for ensuring security in the Balkans and Middle East. The region iscritical for NATOs communication and access in Afghanistan for managing thepost-war transition. Securing regional energy infrastructure through the Black Searegion is vital for meeting Europes energy needs (Baran and Smith 2007;

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Triantaphyllou 2007). Prior regional cooperation in combatting piracy, search andrescue, and counterterrorism initiatives among NATO nations, to include Russia,and the Black Sea regional neighbours have also been signicant.

In November 2014, NATOs Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, USGeneral Philip Breedlove, warned that Russias military assets being installed inCrimea could bring an effect on almost the entire Black Sea region 24

NATO nations have stepped up activity in the Black Sea in response to Russiasactions in Ukraine and the region. Although there are provisions established bythe Montreaux Convention of 1936 restricting the passage of warships of outsidecountries to 21 days in the Black Sea area, the United States and NATO part-ners have managed to extend rotations of vessels through the region by basingin NATO regional nations and combining assets.25 Operation Atlantic Resolvelaunched by NATO in 2014 to reassure allies of maintaining security in light ofRussian intervention in Ukraine included among several tasks the deployment ofArleigh Burke class destroyer USS Truxton to the Black Sea in March 2014,involving participation in exercises with the Romanian and Bulgarian navalforces (Pellerin 2015; US Department of Defense 2014). The USS Vella Gulf,USS Taylor, and USS Donald Cook have also conducted operations in the BlackSea since the Crimean annexation.26 By summer 2014, both NATO nations andRussia were holding exercises in the Black Sea region.27 Exercise Sea Breeze14 brought together US forces with NATO allies and partner nations aimed toenhance interoperability and cooperation in the Black Sea region.28 The exer-cises involved ships from the United States, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy,Romania and Turkey, along with naval patrol planes, from the United Statesand Turkey. In turn, Russia also conducted exercises during the same periodinvolving 20 ships and 20 aircraft including SU-24 ghters with a scenariodirected toward the destruction of enemy ships in the sea and organization ofair defense of naval groups and coastal infrastructure.29

Russian ofcials have complained that there have been NATO violations ofthe 21-day limit stipulated in the Montreaux Convention (Demirtas 2014).Russias Military Doctrine of December 2014 cites ballistic missile defence assetsin Romania and the rotation of NATO naval ships in the Black Sea as externalrisks.30 In turn, NATO ofcials have expressed concerns about Russias deploy-ment of anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems from the Crimean peninsula. Moscowclaims that they are forced to develop counter-measures in response to increasedNATO presence in Black Sea.31 NATO plans to continue to stage persistent jointexercises and rotations in the Black Sea to respond to Moscows efforts toincrease its regional strategic presence. In early March 2015, Vladimir Putinsuggested that Moscow could deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea if deemednecessary.32

During the period of the recent conict over Crimea and Ukraine, there havebeen some reported encounters between NATO military warships and Russianaircraft. In April 2014, a Russian Sukhoi SU-24 made 12 passes at Navydestroyer USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea (Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014). Itwas reported that the Russian SU-24 came within 1000 yards of the Americanship, at an altitude of 500 feet above sea level (Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014).Problems with the Aegis system detecting the aircraft in this instance generatedconcerns about Russian capacity to disrupt or interfere with these systems(Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014). Black Sea buzzes were reported again in


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September 2014 when the Canadian frigate Toronto was overown by twoRussian Sukhoi SU-24s and an Antonov AN-26 transport plane.33 In bothinstances, Russians acknowledged the presence of aircraft in the area, but deniedthe low-altitude yovers. The Russian yovers were described by US andCanadian military ofcers as unnecessarily provocative, unprofessional andentailing risks for escalating tensions. Military accounts suggest that theseinstances have occurred more frequently than reported in the press. Althoughthese incidents appear to have been nothing more than the desire to demonstratepresence, the possibility for accidents or mishaps particularly in areas of regionaldispute or hostilities where additional forces are being deployed could provokeserious responses with the potential of escalation.

Turkey holds the greatest capacity among littoral Black Sea nations for chal-lenging Russias growing military presence in the region. Russia and Turkey have ahistory of rivalry in the Black Sea region. Turkey joined other NATO membernations in expressing opposition to Crimeas secession, and Ankara has ties andconcerns regarding the treatment of the minority community of Crimean Tatars. Atthe same time, Russia and Turkey might share a certain afnity as a result of beingmarginalized from the European community in certain respects. For example, writ-ing in the Turkish source Analist Magazine, Russias former Foreign Minister IgorIvanov recently offered the observation that:

The prospect of full Turkish membership to EU remains elusive no wonder that inboth our countries many intellectuals, politicians and opinion makers are now thinkingabout alternative futures for Russia and Turkey the two nations with their richhistories, great cultures, economic potentials and geopolitical ambitions can hardlyaccept the position of being nothing more but a part of the European periphery (Ivanov 2015).34

Ankara currently depends on Russia for 60% of its energy supplies and approxi-mately 40 billion in annual trade. In December 2014, Russia and Turkey signed anagreement to construct a pipeline across the Black Sea to replace Russias previousSouth Stream agreement with Bulgaria. Under the terms of this agreement, Turkeywill receive a 6% discount on Russias natural gas, though the project will still bedifcult to complete and entail substantial costs. During the discussions over sign-ing the agreement, Russias President Vladimir Putin referred to Turkey as a strate-gic partner (De Waal 2014; Ofce of the President of the Russian Federation2015). Prior, regional Turkish security initiatives among the six Black Sea littoralnations aimed toward condence building and enhancing security including BlackSea Naval Force (BLACKSEAFOR) established in 2001, and Operation Black SeaHarmony 2004 might be jeopardized as a result of Russias actions in Ukraine. TheUnited States had also supported these efforts as a means for building greater trans-parency, predictability and security in the region. Maintaining the work of regionalcooperative forums in security and commerce during this difcult period in whichMoscow participates such as the projects of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation(BSEC) zone will be important.35 Given Turkeys inuence in the Black Sea region,membership in NATO and interests with respect to the Russian Federation, thecountry might be positioned to exert signicant inuence toward containing orpotentially mitigating the tendency toward escalating tensions in the Black Searegion.

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Stakes and risks for NATORussia, suggestions for strategy (cautious long-term management and selective engagement versus isolation or confrontation)

In reecting on developments between the United States, NATO and Russia sinceRussias independence, one can identify critical mistakes with potentially tremen-dous signicance for international security. First, perhaps most signicant, thetendency remained to insist that a choice must be made for new democracies inEurope and Eurasia to either seek deeper integration in the Euro-Atlantic securitycommunity or to rely on Russia and the emerging structures of the Eurasian Unionto the East. The fact is that there should never have been a need for newly indepen-dent nations of Europe and Eurasia to make a choice between East and West.There is no reason that these middle-size (Ukraine) and smaller nations (Georgia),and others should not pursue closer security and economic integration both withthe Euro-Atlantic community (NATO, EU and others) and with Russia. Thesenations require stability and peace in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security envi-ronments as an essential prerequisite for meeting the vast demands and challengesrequired to support continued productive development in the decades ahead. Thefact that these countries have been positioned to declare allegiance to one side orthe other has been detrimental to their societies, and for the entire contemporaryEuro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. It would be important to makeevery possible effort to promote an environment in which these countries can pur-sue productive engagements toward both the West and Russia without sufferingadverse consequences to their respective interests. Given the current state of divi-sion, it will be no easy task to shift the zero-sum narrative enforcing the belief thata gain for one side excludes the other, but we must recognize that this lingeringEastWest mindset has been counterproductive in every respect.

Second, expectations regarding United States, NATO and Russia partnershiphave been unrealistically high. In areas where the focus was directed toward build-ing practical forms of security cooperation, there were successes and overallprogress. However, in holding single issues in which obvious differences exist interms of priorities and interests such as missile defence up as a game changer orhinging the entire relationship with Russia on a single issue, disappointments inevi-tably developed when there was a failure to meet expectations. Both the West andRussia should have been more cautious in placing too much emphasis on any oneissue as a test for the relationship. The United StatesNATO and Russia relation-ship should be managed in the context of a broad-ranging security agenda so thatno single conict or difference can derail the bilateral and multilateral agenda,where so many critical security interests are at stake for all parties.

The United States and NATO nations and Russia have not been able to reachagreement on forming a post-Cold War European security community that wouldsatisfy Moscows expectations for status and inuence consistent with Russiastraditional role in Europe. Dmitry Medvedevs European Security Treaty proposaladvanced in 2008 was an attempt to open dialogue on options, but never accom-plished more than some preliminary review in Western nations. Given Russias sig-nicance in European security, it was important for Western nations to strivetoward meeting Moscows desire for securing an appropriate role in the Europeansecurity institutions and community. Rather, as indicated, Moscow came to believethat they would be in a position of continually sacricing Russias interests with


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the West, and that existing security structures in Europe were not suited toadvancing Russias fundamental interests.

The United States narrative of Cold War triumphalism, often neglecting to offerany credit at all to Mikhail Gorbachev and the Russian side in contributing to theend of the Cold War, only fuelled the view that Russia lost with the collapse of theSoviet Union. At the same time, if Medvedevs proposal for a new European secu-rity architecture was initially intended to suggest that NATO should be replaced ordismantled, this was certainly an unreasonable expectation. Nevertheless, bothNATO nations and Russia might have been well served by devoting greater focusand creativity to exploring all possible means for adjusting current structures andpractices to more suitably incorporate post-Soviet Russia in a way that would becommensurate with Russias place and capacity in the European securitycommunity.

A common European security community to include Russia only makes senseas a means of enhancing the security and quality of life for all of Europe andbeyond. The problem was anticipating dramatic results to materialize immediatelywithout recognizing the long-term commitment to developing institutional ties andreliable networks with Russia that would be required. Perhaps bolder innovativemeasures were needed earlier on to demonstrate serious intention and resolve onthe part of the United States, Europe and NATO allies to include Russia in theEuropean security community. A large-scale commitment such as the Marshall Planwas probably not possible or even necessary for Russia following the collapse ofthe USSR, but there are countless other ways that United States and Europeanallies might have signalled greater willingness to support Russia as an equalplayer with respect to the European and wider international security institutions andissues.

At this point, it is difcult to be optimistic regarding the future of the US/NATORussia relationship. While Democrats and Republicans in the United States agree onalmost nothing, both sides can nd common ground when it comes to expressing out-rage, dissatisfaction and complete lack of trust regarding Russia and Russias currentleadership. President Barrack Obamas re-set policy is now widely deemed a failure,and in the worst case, depicted as a strategy of appeasement.

In Russia, Putin has the support of his population to stay the current coursewith respect to Ukraine. Again, Putins domestic approval rating exceeding 80% isat least in part explained by the perception in the Russian public that they have aleader who will stand rm in Russias interests, especially with respect to theUnited States. It would be a mistake to underestimate the resolve of the Russianpublic in tolerating the pain of United States and EU-imposed sanctions. As a soci-ety, they have endured much in the past, and the Russian public is more likely toaccept such material hardships, rather than yield to pressures that seem unjustiedor even discriminatory.

The Ukrainian conict also makes quite obvious the serious differences of view-points that divide Europe and Russia. Europes condemnation of Russias annexa-tion of Crimea as a breach of international law and a threat to the security of theinternational order contrasts sharply with Moscows description of Crimeas referen-dum as a reection of the will of the people claiming that Kosovos independenceconstituted more of a violation of international law. Russian ofcials and mediatend to emphasize the role of the Fascist fringe in the anti-Yanukovich opposition,and neglect to acknowledge the core focus of the Euromaidan movement prompted

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to support the ouster of the corrupt Viktor Yanukovich because he stood as animpediment to Ukraines deeper productive integration with the Euro-Atlanticcommunity.

Throughout the past two decades since Russias independence, there wereefforts toward opening credible lines of communication, but there was a lack ofsufcient appreciation of the critical need for promoting wider Western engagementwith Russias foreign policy community and society. Prior conferences heldbetween NATO and partner universities in Russia provided excellent means forreaching the Russian foreign policy community and next generation to betterexplain US and NATO intentions and policies. While few minds might have beenchanged as a result of these discussions, still such open forums for exchangingviews can contribute to overcoming misunderstanding and distortions. As a resultlargely of media efforts, many in the Russian public today believe that the UnitedStates seeks to undermine or even destroy Russia. NATO members and Moscowmight have considered the bold measure of instituting a NATORussia DefenceCollege following Russias independence to provide channels to facilitate routinediscussion and collaboration between NATO and Russian military institutions. Thelimited exchanges that were permitted in professional military education betweenNATO nations and Russia at least helped to open some lines of communication.Without sufcient dialogue, it was very easy for misconceptions about Westernintentions to prevail throughout Russias defense community.

Given the prior tensions between Russia and NATO and the West over Kosovo,Georgia, and NATO enlargement, in many ways, the conict over Ukraine was pre-dictable. However, few anticipated that the United States/NATO relationship withRussia would deteriorate so dramatically. Both Russia and the West are preparingfor a long period of strained relationship, and there is not likely to be muchopportunity for reversing this chill for many years to come if ever. In retrospect, itmay be that the period since the early 1990s represented only a brief juncture whena NATORussia partnership might have been possible, but that any opportunity forre-dening the post-Soviet relationship with Russia on a more positive reciprocalbasis has been lost at least for the foreseeable future, if not indenitely.

It is imperative to exercise caution in the current circumstances. Every effortshould be made to avoid the acceleration of the drift toward further confrontation.The potential costs and risks ahead are quite signicant for all sides. Managementof the crisis in Ukraine will have signicant and lasting implications in shaping thegeopolitical and security environment in Europe and beyond for years to come.

All sides should recognize that there is no future ahead for Ukraine withoutMoscows cooperation. There have been thousands of civilian and military casu-alties since the outbreak of war in Ukraine.36 Every possible measure should bepursued to limit further loss of life and the catastrophic humanitarian consequencesof the conict. Supplying additional lethal arms to Ukraine will only worsen thesituation, and potentially lead to a widening escalation of conict. The recent con-clusion of the Minsk II ceasere agreement brokered among German ChancellorAngela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande, and Russian and UkrainianPresidents Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroschenko provides some foundation forsecuring peace, but all rests with the implementation of the terms of the agreementin Ukraine, especially in the besieged regions of the Eastern areas of the country.The Russian leadership and media have touted the agreement as a successful initia-tive on the part of the Russian leader with his German, French and Ukrainian


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counterparts in the absence of United States presence. In this respect, Putin hasnow established signicant stakes in successful implementation of the agreement,but it remains to be seen whether he can exercise sufcient inuence on the leader-ship of the Peoples Republic of Donetsk and pro-Russian separatist forces inEastern Ukraine toward achieving a cessation of the conict.

NATO, and especially the United States foreign policy community, mustdene major interests with respect to Russia and long-term desired end-states forboth Russia and Ukraine. Especially among the US foreign policy community,there has been an absence of focus on dening core American interests withrespect to Russia, and how specic policy measures are likely to advance effortsin achieving those objectives. The calls of vocal US Senators for war withRussia or the demonization of Vladimir Putin overwhelmingly dominate themedia and even much of the discussion among experts. In fact, the re-set wasnot a complete failure, but re-set could never represent more than a temporarytransition, and there was no clear strategy advanced to follow the initial period.A long term well-crafted pragmatic strategy that NATO and European partnerscan support toward a desirable end-state with the Russian Federation is sorelyneeded.

One might revisit the wisdom of the decision to enlarge NATO, and there werecertainly costs in terms of the NATORussia relationship. However, there is nodoubt that NATO and the potential of the NATORussia relationship will remain acritical factor in regional and wider global security in the decades ahead. NATOhas managed to successfully transition from an exclusively collective defenceinstitution to a collective security organization suited to respond to critical emergingtransnational security challenges. The recent enlargement of the Alliance and newpartnership relationships have only strengthened the diversity of the organizationand thereby capacity for engaging nations of Europe, Eurasia and beyond.

Largely due to images from the past, Moscow cant appreciate the practical con-tributions that NATO has made to support the implementation of complex and dif-cult reforms in the aspiring new member nations over the past several years. NATOand the EU provided the associations and assistance to emerging democracies ofthe Baltics, Central and South Eastern Europe, and Eurasia that no other agentswere in a position to offer. When the newly independent countries of the formerWarsaw Pact faced the difcult tasks of building democratic societies and defencetransformation, they turned by choice (not force) to the institutions and communi-ties of the Euro-Atlantic community for consultation and resources in introducingdramatic security sector and democratic reforms.

There will continue to be nancial challenges for the United States and allNATO members, but this also creates incentive for greater and even more efcientcooperation and collaboration. Notwithstanding the pivot to Asia, the Ukraineconict only further underscores the importance for the United States to remainengaged in Europe. The United States must fully appreciate the importance of ourlong-standing partnerships in Europe, and continue to devote attention andresources to maintaining these relationships which should be even more critical inwhat promises to be a very turbulent security environment of the future. The demo-cratic partnerships of the transatlantic community provide a foundational baseneeded for safeguarding interests and security for the United States, Europe, andthe broader world community.

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It would be a mistake for the United States and Europe to attempt to isolateRussia. The plunging of the rouble and potential economic meltdown in Russia isonly likely to have wider economic and security consequences in the West.Moscow cant fully offset difculties in the relationship with the West by turningto China, India, Brazil and other nations, but rather Western partners remain criticalfor Russia in meeting long-range economic development needs. The best hope forRussias gradual (again in terms of decades) evolution toward a more democraticsociety is by sustaining and enhancing associations and networks with democraticnations of Europe and the transatlantic community.

It should be understood that it is unrealistic and counterproductive to believethat the West would be capable of orchestrating regime change in Russia. The vul-nerability of Russias political system stems from the fact that control rests exces-sively in one individual Vladimir Putin. However, criticism and pressure from theWest is only likely to further enhance the popularity of the Russian leader. VladimirPutin does not represent the most extreme anti-Western force within contemporaryRussian politics. The alternatives could bring an even more anti-Western orientationto the Kremlin, and the democratic liberal opposition in Russia presently lackssufcient support or a single strong personality that could challenge Putin.

The United States and NATO would be better served to pursue a well-coordi-nated strategy of long-term management of selective engagement with the RussianFederation, rather than implementing measures that would further isolate Russiafrom the West or lead to renewed confrontation. The developments surrounding theconict in Ukraine have not changed the fact that the United States, NATO andRussia share common interests with respect to a range of critical security areas.The threat posed by the global violent extremist networks of ISIS, Al Qaeda andafliates constitute a grave threat to humanity and it would be so much better if theUnited States, NATO and Russia could cooperate to counter such challenges, ratherthan diverting resources in a resurgent EastWest struggle. There is a need toremain exible and responsive in order to effectively meet the inevitable andunanticipated challenges and threats that are sure to emerge in a dynamic securityenvironment of unprecedented complexity. Strong networks enlisting a diversity ofnational partners become more integral than ever to successfully meeting emergingtransnational security challenges. The United States, European nations and Russiawould all stand to benet by working to build the mechanisms and culture of secu-rity cooperation necessary to manage the daunting challenges of the twenty-rstcentury security environment. Continuing to seek to engage Russia in security col-laboration, rather than exclusion from the Western security community, over a per-iod of decades provides the best hope for building trust and long-term constructiveties. All our communication channels should leave open the possibility of continu-ing to develop the common transatlantic and European security community for thetwenty-rst century.

Since the period of the outbreak of conict in Ukraine in February 2014, it hasbeen particularly important for the United States and Europe to maintain a uniedresponse toward Russia. The United States was able to generate support for sanc-tions against Russia, but several Western nations would not welcome US supply oflethal military assistance to Ukraine, potentially risk escalating and widening theconict. Although there was initial agreement on the sanctions regime againstRussia, there is evidence of potential division ahead. Poland, the Baltic nations andthe UK remain rmly in support of sanctions against Russia, while other European


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nations may be less willing to support this course. German Chancellor AngelaMerkel has signalled that the sanctions could be reversed if the ceasere brokeredin Minsk can be secured. To the extent that the West can project consistency inmaintaining the relationship with Russia, there is less opportunity for Moscow toexploit differences.

NATO must be very clear about what the Alliance would be prepared to do insupport of members in response to Russias actions. One of the factors that mighthave contributed to prompting the conict in Georgia was signalling that theGeorge W. Bush Administration could be prepared to offer military support or evento confront Russia in defence of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Thismight have emboldened the Georgian President who chose to interpret communica-tion from Washington in ways that contributed to precipitating the conict. In theend, there were limits to support the United States would be prepared to render toa non-NATO member bordering the Russian Federation.

It is important that the NATO Alliance provide clear indication both in commu-nications and actions regarding the circumstances under which Article V would beinvoked. Russian incursions into the territory of a NATO country Poland, Romania,Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, crosses a different threshold than threats to Georgia orUkraine. Russias new form of hybrid warfare combining cyber, media, and heavyreliance on local contacts that has characterized the involvement in Ukraine in sup-port of pro-Russian separatists raises serious questions for the NATO Allianceabout actions that actually would constitute an attack on a NATO member nation.For example, how might Russia leverage ties with Russian communities in theBaltic nations short of outright deployment of forces and where would such activitycross the line prompting a NATO response?

Providing reassurances regarding NATO resolve to protect apprehensive allies,particularly those new members with historic fears of Russia, is of course neces-sary. Steps such as Operation Atlantic Resolve increasing continuous land, air andsea presence in Europe reinforcing NATOs Article V readiness and sending a clearsignal to Russia are important. At the same time, there is a delicate balance to man-age increased presence while not risking further escalation or provocation. Thereshould be no ambiguity that any Russian intrusion against NATO allied memberswould be countered by collective NATO reaction. Moscow is not likely to directlyconfront NATO in the Black Sea or elsewhere or undertake actions that might pro-voke an Article V response.

It is critical that the United States/Europe, NATO and Russia maintain openlines of communication during this period to avoid misperception and misunder-standing that can provoke dangerous responses. Again, while there were well-estab-lished rules during the Cold War, the current security arena is in state of disruptionand uncertainty, where the potential for miscalculation, accidents, and escalation ofconict with unintended consequences for all sides is surely possible. The fact thatthe PJC and NRC were both suspended during the Kosovo (1999) and Georgian(2008) conicts was cause for concern regarding the reliability of these channels.The NRC might provide a valuable mechanism for maintaining communicationlines with Russia during this tense period. At a minimum, both NATO and Russiashould keep lines of communication and consultation open in the NRC and throughbilateral military-to-military channels to manage future differences, conicts or evencrisis situations.

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In March 2015, Vladimir Putin disclosed that he was prepared to place Russiasnuclear forces on alert to ensure the annexation of Crimea (Smith-Spark,Eshchenko, and Burrows 2015).37 Since the Ukrainian conict, Russian aircrafthave repeatedly violated European airspace, at times causing close encounters withcommercial ights (Quinlivan 2014).38 Again, during a period of escalating ten-sions and heightened uncertainty, all sides must exercise caution and refrain fromactions that might be misinterpreted or unnecessarily provocative. The UnitedStates, Europe, and Russia should avoid unpredictable behaviour or violations ofstandards for regulating transit in the air and sea that could incite a damagingreaction or accident.

All should realize that Ukraine is not a viable candidate for NATO membershipat this time. Even prior to Russias destabilizing intervention, Ukrainian societywas divided on NATO membership, and the nation had not made sufcient pro-gress in political or defence transformation to make the country a qualied candi-date for NATO membership in the immediate future. Together with the EuropeanUnion, NATO can still be an important source of support in the context of theNATOUkraine partnership to encourage Ukraines continued progress ondemocratic reform and defence transformation, economic reform, implementing fur-ther measures to counter corruption and to encourage national reconciliation andprotection of minority rights.

It is important that NATO not allow Russias action in Ukraine to jeopardizeprogress for aspiring NATO member nations. While Moscow must be realisticabout the relationship of NATO to Ukraine, it is also important for Russia not toexpect to hold a veto authority over the future of nations which elect to undertakethe rigorous measures to meet the criteria for NATO membership and if broad sup-port for membership exists in these societies. There are many reasons that a nationmight seek membership in NATO aside from the motivation to secure protectionfrom Russia. The support that members of the Alliance can provide in offeringexperience in democratic and defence reform, and sharing security capacities isinvaluable particularly for smaller and middle-level powers with competingdevelopmental needs. It could be quite detrimental for the future of aspiring NATOmember nations in the Balkans (Montenegro, and others) should the threat ofprompting reprisals from Russia prevent these countries from advancing towardintegration in the institutional structures of the Euro-Atlantic community.

A nal point on the Black Sea region, NATO and the littoral nations of theBlack Sea region would be wise not to lose sight of the progress that has beenmade over the past two decades in enhancing regional collaboration and coopera-tion to ensure security of this critical area. Again, during this period of heighteningtension and increasing military presence in the region, the danger for escalatingconict surely exists. Every effort should be made on the part of NATO andnations of the region to maintain clear communication, and to attempt to sustainefforts and resources toward continuing to promote regional security and economicgrowth of the Black Sea region. Without cooperation of all parties of the region, toinclude Russia, resources are likely to be dissipated and the risk of accidents orconfrontation could entail scenarios that would not be advantageous to any countryof the region.

The United States/NATO relationship with Russia has not developed so as tomaximize the potential for productive security collaboration over the past twodecades. The United States, Europe and Russia have not achieved what those


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statesmen that deserve credit for bringing the dramatic end to the Cold War mighthave hoped. We have not managed to overcome the decit of trust, and the linger-ing images of the divisions of the Cold War still remain very much xed in theframe of reference for so many in our foreign policy communities, media andsocieties. Unfortunately, there has been a failure to fully appreciate the opportunitycreated by the opening offered at the beginning of the decade of 1990. At the sametime, Russia has moved much closer to Europe and the West in many respects, andNATO and Russia have managed to cooperate in a number of critical securityareas. The United States, European nations, NATO and Russia do not have to befriends or even partners. During the period of the Cold War, the United States,Western European powers and Russia managed to cooperate in areas of criticalshared security interest such as arms control. The stakes in the relationship betweenthe NATO allies and Russia are potentially enormous, and this relationship canshape the future security architecture and landscape in Europe, Eurasia and thewider global community for decades ahead. No one should underestimate the chal-lenges and difculties in repairing the damage created as a result of the recent warin Ukraine, but all efforts must be devoted to avoiding a further deterioration of thesituation and circumstances in ways that none of us would desire.

Disclosure statementNo potential conict of interest was reported by

nato-russia security challenges in the aftermath of ukraine

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