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NATO Partnerships and the Arab Spring:Achievements and Perspectives for the 2012Chicago Summitby Ib Foi

transatlantIc PersPectIves 1

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University


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Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) serves as a

national and international focal point and resource center for multi-

disciplinary research on issues relating to transatlantic security.

The Center provides recommendations to senior U.S. and inter-

national government and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

officials, publishes its research, and conducts a broad range of out-

reach activities to inform the broader U.S. national and transatlantic

security community.

CTSS develops and conducts education and orientation programs

for U.S. and allied military officers, government civilians, and interna-

tional partners on issues relating to NATO and transatlantic security

and defense. In partnership with both U.S. and international govern-

ments and with academic and private sector institutions engaged in

transatlantic security issues, the Center builds robust and mutually

beneficial relationships.

Cover: Chicago Skyline from Lake Michigan

Photo by Esben Ehrenskjold


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Center or ransatlantic Security StudiesInstitute or National Strategic Studiesransatlantic Perspectives, No. 1

National Deense University PressWashington, D.C.December 2011

By Isabelle Franois

NAO Partnerships and the Arab Spring:Achievements and Perspectives or the

2012 Chicago Summit


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For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please go to the

National Defense University Web site at: www.ndu.edu/inss.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely thoseo the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views o the Deense Department or anyother agency o the Federal Government. Cleared or public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions o this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that astandard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy o reprintsor reviews.

First printing, December 2011


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Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Building on the Achievements o the Lisbon Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Preparing or the 2012 Chicago Summit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

NAO Looking South? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

NAO Partnerships and the South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chicago 2012: Libya and the Summit Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27


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NATO Partnerships and the Arab Spring

Executive Summary

In November 2010, heads o state and government at the Lisbon Summit called or astreamlining o North Atlantic reaty Organization (NAO) partnerships. In early 2011, the

Alliance developed a more exible and ecient partnership policy. It did so in accordance with

the Lisbon tasking, and prepared simultaneously or a new mission, with contributions rom

several partner countries, as events unolded in Libya. Tese developments involved signicant

NAO consultation with partner countries.

Tis July 2011 paper highlights the synergy between the new policy and NAOs response

to the Libyan crisis. It points to some o the challenges acing the Alliance in the context o Op-

eration Unifed Protector, and in urther developing NAO partnerships with countries south

o the Mediterranean. Te paper, written well beore ast-moving political and military eventssignicantly altered the situation in Libya, oers recommendations in preparation or the next

NAO summit so as to make best use o Alliance partnerships i the Allies decide to build on

the Libyan operation and develop a new strategic direction in the ace o the tumultuous politi-

cal transition in the Arab world south o the Mediterranean.


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Transatlantic Perspectives, No. 1

Building on the Achievements o the Lisbon Summit

Six months prior to the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, a group o experts chaired byMadeleine Albright provided an independent report entitled NAO 2020: Assured Security; Dy-

namic Engagement to the NAO Secretary-General.1 Tis report was developed in response

to the Secretary-Generals expressed desire to consult prior to launching the internal drafing

process o the 2010 Strategic Concept within NAO. Te Alliance was struck by the importance

devoted to NAO partnerships in the report. In turn, the Strategic Concept raised the prole o

partnerships by elevating cooperative security to the level o essential core tasks or the Alli-

anceone o the three tasks alongside collective security and crisis management.2 NAO heads

o state and government at the Lisbon Summit, while adopting the Strategic Concept, also de-

voted particular attention to partnerships in their own Summit Declaration.3 Tey reiterated thecommitment to developing political dialogue and practical cooperation with NAO partners,

and directed the North Atlantic Council to develop a more ecient and exible partnership

policy in time or the April 2011 Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin.4

On April 15, 2011, in Berlin, NAO Foreign Ministers endorsed the new partnership policy

developed and agreed with partners.5 In essence, this policy document provided or increased

exibility in using NAO partnership tools and mechanisms now at the disposal o all partners

beyond those o Partnership or Peace.6 It also allowed or increased consultation in exible or-

mats potentially available to all NAO partners, and possibly other signicant interlocutors on

issues o common concerns. Finally, it provided or a more structured role or partner countriescontributing to NAO-led operations. Tis came at a time when partners rom the south were

closely consulted in the context o Operation Unifed Protector.

In developing the Lisbon agenda, Allies had not anticipated the dramatic events that were

to unold in the southern rim o the Mediterranean, sweeping countries rom Egypt to Libya in

the spring o 2011. A wind o political change led to regional upheaval and ultimately to armed

conict, resulting in a new NAO-led operation in the particular case o Libya. In responding

to the Libyan crisis, NAO, ollowing its March 27 decision,7 immediately reached out to all o

its partners ormally in an extended ormat beyond the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and,

inormally, through quiet diplomacy between the leadership o NAO and partner representa-tives. NAO was particularly interested in the contribution and support rom its Arab partners.8

In this context, the Alliance relied on its existing partnership rameworks with countries o the

Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)9 and those o the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)10 or the

Persian Gul region, which had ofen been criticized in the past or a lack o vision and limited


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concrete results in the area o deense cooperation ailing to bind these partners to the Alli-

ance.11 And yet these partnerships proved most useul as Allies needed to consult quickly and

decisively to gain the necessary political and military support to engage eectively in the region

as it deployed Operation Unifed Protector.12 Te Alliance thus rearmed the importance o its

partnerships in practice, as it was nalizing its new partnership policy.In the light o events and the so-called Arab Spring, some already argue that there may be

scope or increased NAO interest in the south, and possible new demands in the near uture

rom its southern partners.13 NAOs new engagement in the south was certainly not a political

design rom the Lisbon Summit; it was the result o unoreseen circumstances, quickly met by

Figure 1. NAO Partnerships

Source: Government Accountability Oce (GAO),NATO Partnerships: DOD Needs to Assess U.S.

Assistance in Response to the Partnership for Peace Program, GAO-10-1015 (Washington, DC: GAO,September 2010), 25.


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NAOs ability to respond to new political-military requirements in the ace o events unold-

ing in a region where the Alliance counted a number o well-established relations. Interest-

ingly enough, developments on the ground and NAOs ability to reach out to partners in thecontext o Operation Unifed Protectorreinorced the objective o the Lisbon Summit, which

called or a more ecient and exible partnership policy, streamlining partnership tools and

mechanisms, opening them to all, and enhancing consultation mechanisms. Tese new policy

developments might become o particular relevance to partners o the Gul region and MD.

One should, however, resist the temptation to interpret recent Allies engagement in the

region as the prime result o a new direction in NAOs partnerships. In act, such a decision

would likely be divisive within the Alliance.14 I anything, these events have provided the context

or reinorcing the validity o a longstanding commitment to partnership within the Alliance, its

signicance in the context o NAO-led operations, along with the necessity to preserve someo its core principles, such as that o specicity when it comes to various partnerships.

In developing increased eciency and exibility or the uture o NAO partnerships,

while consulting with partners on their roles and contributions in the particular case o Opera-

tion Unifed Protector, Allies were reminded o two longstanding premises o partnership: rst,

NAO operations cannot be conceived without the contributions o partners; and, second, each

region and partnership has its own dynamic and requires a tailored approach.

Preparing or the 2012 Chicago Summit

While some partners will be invited to join the International Security Assistance Forcemeeting as troop-contributing nations to the NAO-led operation in Aghanistan, others will

be in attendance or specic meetings that may also take place in the context o this summitbe

it a meeting o the NAO-Russia Council, a meeting o the NAO-Ukraine Commission, or

a meeting o the NAO-Georgia Council. All partner heads o state and government may be

gathered in a meeting o the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council with their allied counterparts.

Alternativelyor perhaps in additionas oreseen in Lisbon, and in accordance with the Lis-

bon Declaration,15 a larger number o heads o state and government, possibly rom BRICS

(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Arica) countries could conceivably join the summit as

signicant interlocutors in todays security environment.It is too early to tell who will be invited to the NAO Summit and what will be on the

agenda o the various meetings. Nonetheless, it is sae to assume that the NAO-led operation

in Libya and its consequences on NAO partnerships could generate widespread interest and

loom large in the summit preparations. Moreover, the Chicago Summit will take place back-to-


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back with the Group o Eight (G8) Summit. In the context o the G8 event, there may be a meet-

ing o the G8 + 5, which would bring Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Arica around

the G8 table. BRICS representatives, thereore, could be present in the United States at the timeo the NAO Summit and could conceivably be invited to join a big tent event to discuss the

lessons learned rom the Libyan crisis and exchange views with Allies on potential common

security challenges emanating rom the southern shore o the Mediterranean.

Tis paper presents the case or hosting a big tent meeting in Chicago, bringing NAO

partners along with new interlocutors rom countries to organizations, which may have an in-

terest in discussing with NAO its current commitment to Libya and exchange views on peace

and stability in North Arica and the Gul region in the wake o the Arab Spring. At the same

time, the paper points to some serious challenges acing both the Alliance internally, as well as

NAO partnerships, in developing such an agenda based on Operation Unifed ProtectorandNAOs potential role beyond the Libyan crisis. While the paper recognizes the benet o a

more ecient and exible partnership policy developed in the wake o the Lisbon Summit,

and the possibility to build on these achievements to enhance relations with countries rom the

MD and the ICI, it cautions against the pitalls o a new strategic direction which would take

NAO arther south,16 and stresses the need to reach out to other signicant security interlocu-

tors, i it is to develop a balanced role south o the Mediterranean.

NAO Looking South?

Te Challenge o Maintaining Consensus

NAOs engagement in Libya, despite its sound legal and political basis, has aced sig-

nicant challenges in terms o internal cohesion and external pressure on the Alliance. While

the current mandate or the NAO-led operation in Libya has been renewed until the end o

September 2011,17 dierent political interests within the Alliance in the ace o the Libyan con-

ict have proven particularly challenging. From the early days o consultations within NAO,

prior to the March 27 decision to launch Operation Unifed Protector, dierences o approach

and diverging political interests on the part o various Allies, notably France, Germany, and

urkey, did not escape the media.18 Again in June, consensus was challenged immediatelyollowing the meeting o NAO Deense Ministers, which reiterated the Alliances agreement

to stay the course and keep up the pressure until NAO goals were achieved.19 Days afer the

NAO meeting on June 22, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini called or an immediate

suspension o the campaign in the ace o civilian casualties in the wake o NAO airstrikes to


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diplomatic search or a political settlement. Moreover, it has had to rely on bilateral eorts rom

some o its member states and on broader eorts rom the international community. A postconict

settlement among various Libyan entities may be reached prior to the Chicago Summit. However,its sustainability and the ollow-on reconstruction in Libya will most likely remain on the agenda o

the international community, with a likely yet undened supporting role or NAO in this transi-

tion process well beyond the summit. In this context, a big tent meeting in Chicago would provide

Allies with an opportunity to review NAOs role and strategy in Libya and oer a broader orum

to exchange views on lessons learned rom Operation Unifed Protectorinvolving key interlocutors

in the eld o security who voted in support o the United Nations Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR) 1973, yet not necessarily in support o the NAO-led operation as it unolded. Reaching

out to these countries will also provide an opportunity to look beyond the NAO-led operation

into uture support to the broader eort o the international community, as it may be called upon tosupport the NC in its transition eorts toward reconstruction in this war-torn society.

Working oward a Comprehensive Approach

ransition to a successul political settlement has always been a thorny issue in crisis man-

agement. NAO has ofen argued in the context o its operations that a military solution alone

does not suce to manage todays complex crises and operations, and has urged the interna-

tional community to work together toward a comprehensive approach to addressing current

operations and reconstructions eorts.25 Te NAO-led Operation Unifed Protector showed

progress in terms o NAOs partnership with other international and regional organizations.Recent institutional gains in developing the political will and working out mechanisms or con-

sultation between organizations proved most useul. While it was still resh and habits o con-

sultation had not yet set in, the NAO Secretary-General was able to quickly establish contacts

with his counterparts and engage in high diplomacy in the context o the NAO March 27 deci-

sion to take on the whole military operation in Libya in implementation o UNSCR 1973. With-

in hours and over the rst ew days, contacts were established with the UN, EU, Arab League,

Arican Union, Gul Cooperation Council, and others such as the Oce or the Coordination

o Humanitarian Aairs at the highest level. Tis was handled in the spirit o a comprehensive

approach requiring all actors to contribute in a concerted eort, based on a shared sense oresponsibility, openness and determination and taking into account their respective strengths,

mandate and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.26

In terms o NAOs comprehensive approach, much progress has been achieved at the

leadership level. In the context o the Libyan crisis, heads o international organizations quickly


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shared inormation and reached out to each other in times o emergency, bringing the value-

added o each organization to bear in search o a political settlement. Tat said, as the Libyan

case will likely show, the shif rom a military operation to political settlement as well as recon-struction eorts remains a challenge, and will require constant and thorough eorts to integrate

the necessary action, coordination, and transition rom military to civilian eorts.

Te Libyan case has already demonstrated the challenge in mobilizing and preparing or

postconict leadership beyond the NAO-led operation. Te NAO Secretary-General at the

June NAO meeting o Deense Ministers called on the international community, the Libyan

contact group, and other civilian organizations to start investing in this transition.27 Te ulti-

mate challenge that Operation Unifed Protectorwill likely show in the months to come will lie

in the transition rom an operational environment to that o a reconstruction phase. o that

end, it will continue to be important or NAO to develop new capabilities and mechanisms toreach out to civilians and the private sector.

Peacetime eorts on the part o NAO strategic commanders (Supreme Allied Command-

er Europe and Supreme Allied Commander ransormation) should be pursued, thereby en-

hancing allied capabilities to respond to crises and urther operationalize the concept o a com-

prehensive approach. Tese eorts include integrating training and education and developing

the necessary modules/packages to deploy military orces, humanitarian relie assistance, and

other civilian contributions, including capabilities rom the private sector to ensure smoother

transition to postconict eorts.

Dierent political interests rom one international organization to another will remain andcontinue to create challenges in terms o partnership between organizations. At the same time,

these diverging interests may enrich the international community by providing additional op-

tions in developing a necessary political settlement to a particular crisis. While diversity is chal-

lenging when building consensus, it may prove to be an asset in terms o political settlement.

Te Libyan crisis may benet, or instance, rom the dierences o approach in the Arican

Union and Gul Cooperation Council. Te ormer was originally amenable to nding a political

settlement, which included Qadha, while the latter was more inclined to search or a solution

that excluded the challenged leader and his entourage. Te Libyan crisis and its outcome will

ultimately have an impact or both Arabs and Aricans alike. Arica has traditionally been aplace or long debates in search o consensus, where everyone has a voice and has to be heard.

One can build on this tradition.

In that context, a big tent event in Chicago that brings the relevant organizations and in-

terested parties (beyond well-established partners and troop contributors) would oer a useul


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orum to enhance dialogue toward sustaining a much needed political settlement on the ground

in Libya. Moreover, it would position NAO as an important player among many, and put in

context the Alliances decision to intervene militarily in Libya on March 27, addressing the con-cerns o those who see in NAOs decision a desire to expand south.

NAO Partnerships and the South

Reaching Beyond Existing Membership Within Partnership Frameworks

he political and military support o Arab and Arican countries beyond the partner-

ship relations that bind NAO to its MD and ICI partners will be crucial. here is currently

a clear divide between the 11 countries in North Arica and the Gul region that have es-

tablished relations with NAO and those who did not join these rameworks. Oppositionto NAO-led operation in the region rom countries outside o the NAO partnership

rameworks, such as Oman, will need to be taken into consideration in order to develop a

balanced approach to the NAO-led operation in Libya. It is worth noting that Libya itsel

was not among NAOs 11 partners south o the Mediterranean. As in the case o Iraq and

Aghanistan, it is likely that NAO will eventually look to develop a long-term partner-

ship with Libya beyond Operation Uniied Protector. here may be scope or engaging in

a dialogue with countries that may have rerained rom or opposed partnership with the

Alliance until now, but that cannot be excluded rom NAOs involvement in the region i

the Alliance has to develop a balanced approach to developments in North Arica and theGul region.

Tere is also a clear divide among the 11 NAO partners rom the south, which has

proved challenging at timesnotwithstanding the act that existing rameworks were most

useul in the early days o the crisis as NAO decided to deploy Operation Unifed Protector.

Indeed, dierences o opinion were quickly apparent among Arican and Arab partners with

countries o the Gul considering the Libyan crisis an Arab issue rather than an Arican

one. Tese dierences were mirrored in the approach o the Arican Union to the Libyan

crisis compared to that o the Gul Cooperation Council. Te region south o the Medi-

terranean is ar rom homogeneous. In act, the MD and ICI have not resulted in vibrantcooperative rameworks in the past, in part due to their lack o common purpose and com-

mon approach to security challenges. Internal divisions within these groups o countries and

between NAO partners and neighboring countries harboring misgivings vis--vis NAO

recall the limits o these partnerships.28 Tat said, some representatives rom the Gul region


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(ICI partners) during consultations with NAO in the early days o Operation Unifed Pro-

tectorwere quick to point out the need to gain Arican support. Tus, enhanced and inclu-

sive political dialogue may have to be urther developed as the Alliance considers a broadercooperative role in the region.

While there may be scope or enhancing political dialogue and reaching out beyond the

membership o MD and ICI in search or broader common understandings between NAO

and partners south o the Mediterranean, practical cooperation with these countries may still be

challenging in the near term. First, as already mentioned, the MD and ICI have yielded limited

results in terms o practical cooperation. Te Arab Spring may have changed the political real-

ity or a number o NAO partners in the region and may ultimately aect partners interest in

what NAO has to oer to assist them in the ace o political changes in their societies, but they

are not yet demandeurs. Second, practical cooperation may not be as important as politicaldialogue in the immediate afermath o Operation Unifed Protector. A broader exchange o

views in search o common understandings may become more relevant, as exchanging inor-

mation, building trust, and assessing risks and threats as perceived by dierent parties will be

required to assist countries in dening how to best address the Arab Spring and search or com-

mon responses to common challenges.

Challenges and Opportunities o Specifc Partnerships in Addressing Politicalransition in Countries South o the Mediterranean

Beyond political dialogue, practical cooperation will always be an option i required. Overthe past 15 years, NAO has accumulated considerable experience in assisting partners o Cen-

tral and Eastern Europe in their deense-related transormation agendas. Te Alliance could

easily draw on its tools and mechanisms. It could draw, or instance, rom its Individual Part-

nership Action Plan to assist a partner interested in creating its own deense within a democrat-

ic system o checks and balances that has a modern administration and accountable planning,

budgeting, and resources management. NAO could also draw rom its Planning and Review

Process to assist a partner in modernizing its armed orces, building the necessary capabilities

or deense transormation, allowing or a transer o best practices in the area o deense plan-

ning and budgeting, possibly assisting also in the demilitarization o some o the security sec-tor administrations, and developing modern personnel management systems.

Trough partnership, NAO has developed expertise over the years, promoted good prac-

tices in civilian control and oversight o the military, and addressed issues o corruption in

the security sector, notably through its Building Integrity Initiative. Partnering with nongov-


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ernmental organizations, such as ransparency International, NAO experts are able to pro-

vide assistance in developing transparency, accountability, and integrity in the security sector,

thereby assisting in the development o good governance. It should be noted that this type oassistancebased on a shared interest in good governance rather than on democratic values

that originally bound Allies to their partners o Central and Eastern Europemight be a more

appropriate base or uture cooperative projects with partners south o the Mediterranean.

Perhaps even more relevant or NAOs southern partners in the long term, the Alliance has

devoted signicant eorts to training and education programs. Tese programs provide partners

with required assistance rom proessional educators to develop their cadres in the armed orces,

thereby assisting in the design o their own curriculum to teach their military and security orces.

At times, NAO also provided simple expertise to a particular group o countries, such as the

South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP), avoring a process ownedand directed by a group o countries rather than negotiated with individual partners.

Countries o North Arica and the Gul region, however, are not Central and Eastern Eu-

rope. Tey are not bound by a common objective to join the Alliance. Tere is no need or

NAO to assist North Arican or Gul countries in preparing or membership. Tere is not even

the indirect incentive o EU membership toward which NAO could contribute. But there is

potentially a useul contribution that NAO could make to Arican and Arab partner countries:

helping them build their own capacities. A specic demand rom a partner country or regional

organization would have to be orthcoming. It should not be excluded that countries in North

Arica and the Gul region decide to ocus in the uture on their own regional means and abilityto deal with a particular crisis.29

In the short term, Arab countries acing political transition rom North Arica to the Gul

region are unlikely to be rushing to NAO or a miraculous transition package. Governments

acing uprisings and challenges to their authority will be conronted rst and oremost by socio-

economic realities. Neighboring countries will be aected by migration ux and potential reu-

gee crises as uprisings persist. Calls on the international community or assistance to transition

governments would likely be in the socioeconomic sphere, addressing organizations such as the

International Monetary Fund and World Bank, UN agencies, Arican Development Bank, or

European Union. Assistance in civilian institution-building to ace elections, the independenceo the judiciary and legislatures, along with calls to ensure border security, will likely be given

priority over deense and security reorm.

NAO may still have a particular role to play beyond the NAO-led operation in the near

term as it prepares or the Chicago Summit. It could enhance political dialogue by reaching out


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broadly to pave the way or possible practical cooperation in the long run, assuming there is an

interest south o the Mediterranean to partner with NAO beyond Operation Unifed Protector.

Te operation in Libya will likely have ar-reaching consequences on the Alliances ability todevelop a genuine partnership with countries o North Arica and the Gul region. While it is

too early to draw conclusions on the consequences o the operation, one can saely assume that

an inclusive dialogue will be necessary to explain NAO to North Aricans and to populations

in the Gul region in order to nurture political contacts at the highest levels. In the wake o Op-

eration Unifed Protector, NAO will have to reach out more broadly to countries in the region

beyond its MD and ICI partners, as one does not win many hearts through air strikes even in

the case o a successul outcome.

Despite 15 to 20 years o NAO partnerships in various regionsin North Arica, the

Gul region, Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, even reaching beyond to partnersaround the globethe Alliance has not dispelled longstanding misperceptions about its

roles and policies in todays security environment, at times even prompting questions about

its raison dtre 20 years afer the end o the Cold War. In many ways, NAOs image south o

the Mediterranean is close to the perception prevailing in Russia and essentially plagued by a

undamental lack o trust.

Practical cooperation with skeptical partners has not yielded mutual understanding. De-

spite concrete programs o courses, training, exercises, and visits over the years aimed at mil-

itary-to-military cooperation, political dialogue has lagged behind with these partners alling

short o developing common views and addressing dierences o threat perceptions. Skepticismhas hampered some partners in developing the necessary trust or cooperation to take root.

As NAO prepares or the Chicago Summit and looks beyond the 2012 horizon, the task in

partnership will be to seek and develop relations with countries that may not want to embrace

NAO yet, but who still recognize that the Alliance is a key player in todays security envi-

ronment. Tese countries may be prepared to develop a partnership with NAO in search o

common approaches to common challenges despite major dierences on undamental issues,

basically agreeing to disagree on some issues while cooperating on others. Te NAO-Russia

partnership may oer some insights into this type o partnership.

In the context o the Libyan crisis, and irrespective o the NAO-Russia so-called strategicpartnership, the Russian position has been critical o allied eorts in Operation Unifed Protec-

tor, with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin comparing the operation to medieval crusades.30 Te

Russian president, or his part, showed some moderation in his comments recalling publicly

that the military operation was sanctioned by the international community and aimed at pro-


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tecting civilians rom Qadha-led orces.31 However, as time went by and casualties started to

make the headlines, Russia stressed the importance o an immediate ceasere and engaged in

mediation in search o national reconciliation in Libya, nominating its own special envoy o theRussian president or the region, Mikhail Margelov. Recognizing the legitimacy o UNSCR 1973

and the political and operational support o a number o countries in North Arica and the Gul

region, Russian leadership was hard pressed to orceully criticize NAO. Nonetheless, Foreign

Minister Sergey Lavrov gave an interview to Bloomberg June 1 in which he did not shy away

rom accusing Western powers o misusing all necessary means in the context o UNSCR

1973, stating that they were going ar beyond the declared goal and the purposes o the resolu-

tion, and beyond the original request o the Arab League.32

One could have argued, however, that as the international community was looking or a

negotiated settlement, the Russian government was well positioned to contribute to these eorts,33with an approach similar to the Arican Union aimed at mediating between rebel orces and the

Qadha regime, balancing between ripoli and Benghazi to ensure territorial integrity and a na-

tional solution. According to Minister Lavrov, Russian mediation was in act mandated or at least

sanctioned by the G8 Summit in France at the end o May 2011, responding to an appeal rom

President Nicolas Sarkozy, President Barack Obama, and other summit participants.34 Moreover,

despite dierences in views, the NAO-Russia Council has discussed the Libyan crisis, and during

the recent NAO Secretary-General visit to Russia on July 4, 2011, President Dmitry Medvedev

hosted a meeting between the Secretary-General and President Jacob Zuma o South Arica to

discuss the Libyan crisis.35 More recently, during his visit to Washington in July 2011, MinisterLavrov suggested to his American host to seek and include Chinese views on the Libyan crisis.

While the idea o a negotiated settlement in Libya ailed, there is still a broad interna-

tional interest in a sustainable nal settlement to the Libyan crisis, which paves the way to a

secure and stable Libya. Afer a settlement, Libya can resume its oil production and engage

in reconstruction. Te Chicago Summit oers an occasion to reach out to countries that may

not have been invited to NAO summits beore, but that may share with the Alliance a com-

mon interest today in stability and security south o the Mediterranean. Based on this com-

mon interest, NAO would eectively be reaching out to countries that may not share allied

values but whose dierent perspectives around the summit table might help the Alliance tocontribute eectively to enhanced security and stability. As Allies prepare to draw lessons

rom Operation Unifed Protectorand exchange views with their partners, reaching out to

signicant interlocutors in the security eld and broadening political dialogue may be in the

interest o Allies and partners alike.


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Chicago 2012: Libya and the Summit Agenda

At the upcoming NAO Summit, the agenda will be dominated by the concern over alliedresources at a time o deense spending cuts and the need to protect core Alliance capabilities in

the ace o budgetary constraints. Given the preoccupations o the host country in an election

year, the overall theme o the NAO Summit will likely go more in the direction o protecting

rather than expanding. Te summit does not have to be an inward looking event, however,

mainly ocused on NAO internal business. NAO-led operations will gure prominently on

the agenda, and a large number o partners and other signicant interlocutors in todays secu-

rity environment may join Allies in Chicago.

Smart Deense

It is expected that one o the key themes will be smart deense,36 a concept coined by the

NAO Secretary-General in an attempt to identiy capability areas where NAO Allies needed

to keep investing and work multinationally to mitigate the decline in deense spending, and

thus address some o the concerns raised last June by the outgoing U.S. Secretary o Deense

Robert Gates.37 NAO-led operations, and Operation Unifed Protector in particular, are not

irrelevant to the current NAO capability debate. First, as outlined by the Secretary-General,

the NAO-led operation in Libya has shown that in addition to rontline capabilities, such as

ghter-bombers and warships, so-called enablers, such as surveillance and reueling aircraf, as

well as drones, are critical parts o any modern operation.38 As the price o military equipmentrises and deense budgets decline, the Allies will have to identiy what they can do jointly at a

lower cost and more eciently.

Second, Operation Unifed Protectorhas woken up the Alliance to the act that the United

States may not always take the lead in uture NAO-led operations. Washington is acing its

own budgetary challenges, and burden-sharing within the Alliance seems more relevant than

ever. Tis will likely push the debate on European contributions to security to the ore and

into the public domain. Te issue could trigger a divisive debate, insoar as European deense

spending cuts may aect Europes ability to take care o crises even at its periphery, and turn

the United States slowly but surely away rom the original transatlantic bargain at the heart oNAO, given American taxpayers unlikely support or what might be perceived as unequal

burden-sharing in Euro-Atlantic security.

Tat said, Operation Unifed Protectorhas pointed to an alternative to this gloomy sce-

nario. It may come to symbolize American success in convincing its Allies that Europeans had


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to take a greater share o the burden and assume greater responsibility or security in Europes

periphery. Operation Unifed Protectorhas also served as a reminder that NAO is the only

organization with the command and control ability to take over such a complex operation, evenallowing the United States to play a pivotal but supporting role. Despite regular press reports on

the lack o sucient strike capabilities, the Alliance was still the only organization willing and

able to respond swifly to the military requirements in Libya and sustain the operation to date.

It has been argued that the operation was sustained by only a small number o Allies (eight)

with a ew partners. However, American assets and capabilities made available to European Al-

lies were critical. One might argue that rather than a shortage o capabilities, Allies might suer

more rom political rather than military constraints. Ensuring the necessary political will rom

capitals to support NAO-led operations and to create consensus may be as challenging in the

uture as maintaining military capabilities, especially at a time o budget cuts.In light o these considerations at the heart o NAOs decisionmaking and ability to act

militarily, one might wonder whether the NAO-led operation in Libya could seriously lead to

similar missions in the near uture. First, the Arab Spring seems to point to more unrest loom-

ing rom Arab countries in transition rom Egypt to Yemen and Syria to name but a ew. Social

media are replete with exchanges on this issue. It also testies to considerable uneasiness on the

part o the populations with the ongoing transition process in their countries, ofen pointing to

ear o violence as a more likely outcome than peaceul transition. Would NAO be prepared to

intervene militarily elsewhere in the region based on what has so ar been perceived as a NAO

success in Libya? For those who thought once again that NAO intervention in Libya wouldbe limited and quick, lessons rom the past 10 to 15 years have not registered. Te diculties

encountered in search o a political settlement in Libya point to the challenge acing any uture

military intervention in countries in the midst o political transition: it is easier to get in than to

get out. Te one constant in contemporary complex operations lies in their unpredictability and

the need or maximum exibility in terms o international response.

Some analysts have argued logically that the European Union should prepare to lead

peacekeeping eorts in a post-Qadha Libya and take an operational role in its periphery in

support o its Common Security and Deense Policy ambitions. 39 A UN-authorized EU orce

to be deployed or 4 to 6 months would be an option according to these analysts and wouldgive the UN time to set up its own orce. However, no one seems to volunteer on the part o the

EU, and it may well be that the next crisis lands on NAOs desk in the absence o alternatives

despite clear statements rom Allies that there is no intention and no plan or deploying ground

troops to Libya. Tat said, many had predicted that Aghanistan was likely to be the last NAO


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the Allies or use the same approach in addressing international security challenges, but who repre-

sent interests rom the broader international community and, as such, may contribute signicantly

to security challenges coming rom North Arica and the Gul region.In the context o the Arab Spring, smart partnerships would argue or reaching out rst to

countries in North Arica and the Gul region that have not yet shown any interest in joining the

MD or ICI but that may nd an interest in joining a broader dialogue in support o Arab countries

acing political transition in an eort to avert military intervention.42 Second, smart partnerships

would pursue new cooperative avenues in bringing NAO and the EU closer together in an e-

ort to help Arab countries transitioning toward new political systems and reorm their security

sectors, should there be an interest on the part o these challenged governments to reach out to

Western institutions to assist in their reorm process.43 Tird, smart partnerships in the wake o

the Libyan crisis could open the way to a broader political dialogue with emerging powers, whichmight share an interest in a peaceul settlement o the Libyan crisis, and would welcome an op-

portunity to contribute to a broader security dialogue on security and stability talks in the region.

Finally, as NAO considers its strategic interests south o the Mediterranean and how to

make best use o existing partnerships in support o allied contributions to peace and stability

in North Arica and the Gul region, a broad dialogue with emerging powers would be essential

to inorm the Alliance on broader issues o signicance when dealing with the region. NAO

would have to tread careully in light o signicant shifs and new power games at play in the

Gul, which will only increase in the wake o American withdrawal rom Iraq. Power games

between Arabs and Persians in the region, with Irans potential inuence on Shiite uprisings (aswas the case in Bahrain recently), give a whole new dimension to explosive situations in vari-

ous countries rom Yemen to Syria, not to orget continued unrest in countries such as Egypt

and others in North Arica. As NAO establishes new relationships in the southern rim o the

Mediterranean, Irans regional role and inuence cannot be ignored and will call on the Alli-

ance to be open to transparent consultations with its partners in the region and to dialogue on

prolieration and missile deense as potential areas o common interest.

Moreover, the potential role o urkey as it asserts itsel as a regional power will inuence

NAO policy and direction with regard to the southern rim o the Mediterranean, especially in

the light o American withdrawal rom Iraq and limited, albeit pivotal American engagementin Libya. Tat said, southern Allies may have an interest in being proactive in the ace o desta-

bilizing political transition in Arab countries, but may preer to address this challenge through

bilateral relations or possibly through the European Union, as was the case in the recent past.

Addressing security issues emanating rom the southern rim o the Mediterranean bilaterally


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might help avoid any divisive debate within the Alliance between northern and southern Al-

lies given the likely diverging interests and threat perceptions between them. Moreover, Allies

would thus avoid a dicult debate on prioritization within partnerships as additional undingwould be required to urther develop southern partnerships, possibly at the expense o eastern

and other partnerships. However, bilateral relations may not be the most ecient way to assist

political transition in Arab countries. Moreover, what would that say about NAOs ability to

respond to current threats and challenges? What would it say about the relevance o multilater-

alism to address todays most pressing security challenges?

o recall the words o the group o experts in their report NAO 2020 issued a year ago,

NAO is acing a New Era o Partnerships.44 o stay relevant in todays security environment,

the Alliance has to engage with potential new partners and with emerging powers associating

them to a broad dialogue in search or political settlement o disputes, which are likely to im-pact them as much as Allies, and engage them on issues related to new threats and challenges.

Potential areas o common interest include the Libyan crisis, energy security, prolieration, and

missile deense to name but a ew. NAO does not need a ormal partnership arrangement to

generate a productive working dialogue with emerging powers and potential new partners. It

does, however, need to take advantage o opportunities or dialogue, such as the upcoming

NAO Summit in Chicago, as well as opportunities or collaboration when they arise. 45 Te

Peoples Republic o China, or instance, has participated alongside units rom allied countries

in the course o UN peace operations and antipiracy patrols around the Gul o Aden already.

Some countries in Central and South Asia have a major stake in maintaining stability in theMiddle East and North Arica, which is known in China as West Asia. Tere is sucient exi-

bility within NAO partnerships policy, tools, and mechanisms to allow or their participation,

be it on an ad hoc basis or making use o exible ormats to develop both political dialogue and

military-to-military cooperation through a variable geometry approach. Te real question is

whether there will be political will to engage on their part and sucient eort on the part o

Allies to reach out to countries who may not share the same values as those o the Alliance and

its current partners.

As the United States prepares to host the next NAO summit, back-to-back with the G8

Summit, it may consider ways to enrich the transatlantic partnership embodied in NAO andreach out to emerging powers in an eort to bring together America, Europe, and Asia in a

broader security dialogue to address common challenges and develop common responses. Tis

would be particularly relevant at a time when the American public and Congress seem to ocus

increasingly beyond Europe. Te NAO-led operation in Libya could be an opportunity to de-


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velop such a broader security dialogue, as productive relationships with other countries and or-

ganizations will continue to enable NAO to be better inormed, more capable, better prepared,

and smarter at what it does. Te postCold War era created an opportunity or NAO to reachout to ormer adversaries as they indicated an interest in partnering with the Alliance. odays

emerging powers and emerging security challenges present NAO with new opportunities or

reaching out beyond its comort zone, beyond those who think alike and share the same values.

Allies will have to remain outward-looking and show increased exibility to meet the security

challenges o the 21st century.


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Notes

1 North Atlantic reaty Organization (NAO), NAO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engage-

ment(Brussels: NAO Public Diplomacy Division, May 2010), available at .2 NAO, Active Engagement, Modern Deence, November 19, 2010, 2, para. 4, available at

.3 NAO, Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010, available at .4 Ibid., para. 27.5 NAO, Active Engagement in Cooperative Security: A More Ecient and Flex-

ible Partnership Policy, April 15, 2011, available at .6 Since the early days o NAO partnerships in 1994 with the creation o Partnership or Peace

(PP), a distinction has been made between Partners, on the one hand, reerring to countries who

ormally joined PP and have been sitting in the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation council rom Northern,

Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia at a later stage, and partners, on

the other hand, reerring to all other countries who cooperated with NAO in looser ormats, such as

the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, rom North Arica to the Middle

East. Over the years, NAO also reached out to countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area contributing

to allied missions, ofen reerred to as operational partners but also as partners across the globe

eectively partnering with NAO outside any ormal partnership arrangement such as PP. Tese part-

ners rom Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the Republic o Korea pledging troops and committing

nancial contributions to NAO-led operations were not only partners o need, but also partners o

values as well-established democracies. In Berlin, Allies opted or a more exible approach to partner-ships where the distinction between partners and Partners is slowly ading away. While the specicity

o each partnership should remain politically signicant, NAO will be able to manage partnership re-

sources according to new political priorities as they emerge and reach out beyond current partnerships,

no longer limited by the bureaucratic constraints o ormal and inormal rameworks o cooperation. In

this paper, the termpartneris used to reer to all NAO partners irrespective o their rameworks. All

partners are yet qualied by their geographical origins.7 Following the popular uprising that began in Benghazi on February 17, 2011, the United Na-

tions Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1970 and reerred the situation in Libya to the In-

ternational Criminal Court (ICC). Te UNSCR instituted an arms embargo, roze the personal assets o

Libyas leaders, and imposed a travel ban on senior gures. NAO stepped up its surveillance operations

in the Central Mediterranean. NAO Deense Ministers met on March 10 and supported the SupremeAllied Commander Europe decision to have Alliance ships move to the same area to boost the monitor-

ing eorts. On March 17, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing member states and regional

organizations to take, inter alia, all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya. NAO members

immediately ollowed the UN call by launching a NAO-led operation to enorce the arms embargo

against Libya, and began enorcing the embargo on March 23. In addition, on March 24, NAO decided


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to enorce the UN-mandated no-y zone over Libya given the UNSCR call or a ban on all ights except

those or humanitarian and aid purposes to avoid air attacks rom Libyan authorities perpetrated on

civilians inside the country. Finally, on March 27, Allies agreed to take on the whole military operation

in Libya under UNSCR 1973, taking over rom a coalition led by the United States, France, and the

United Kingdom, which had intervened militarily in the early days o the Libyan crisis. Te purpose o

the NAO-led Operation Unifed Protectorhas served to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas

under threat o attack. It was decided that the Alliance would implement all military aspects o the UN

resolution. NAO eectively took action as part o the broad international eort and immediately indi-

cated its desire to work with its partners in the region.8 It should be emphasized that the NAO-led operation gained the necessary legitimacy rst

through UNSCR 1973, which provided a sound legal basis, and second, through the support o the

Arab League, which gave the necessary political support within the region or NAO to ultimately take

the decision to intervene militarily. Without the support o the Arab League, the UNSC might not have

been able to avoid the veto o some o its members. Furthermore, Allies would have been hard pressed

to intervene in the region without support among Arab countries. Building on this original support

rom the Arab League, NAO was able to reach out to countries in the region and consult as it deployed

Operation Unifed Protector, making best use o its own partnership mechanisms in the region.9 Te Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) ramework was developed and agreed in 1994 and counts

today seven countries bordering the Mediterranean who decided to enter into a partnership with

NAO: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and unisia. Jordan joined in late 1995 and

Algeria only in 2000.10 Te Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) ramework was launched in 2004 at the Istanbul

Summit and counts our Gul countries. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar joined the ICI in 2004, and the

United Arab Emirates joined in 2005.11 Te ICI and MD had ofen been criticized or moving slowly in the area o deense-military

cooperation, avoring instead public diplomacy projects and thus characterized as a diplomatic talking

shop. See Helle Malmvig, From a Diplomatic alking Shop to a Powerul Partnership? NAOs Medi-

terranean Dialogue and the Democratisation o the Middle East, Danish Institute or International

Studies Brie, May 2004. From the onset, these rameworks o cooperation were mainly supported by

Italy and Spain within the Alliance, both supportive o a broader role or NAO in the ace o security

challenges coming rom the South. See Domenico Corcione, New Risks and Roles in NAOs Southern

Region, NAOs Sixteen Nations, no. 93 (1993), 3739.12 wo countries in the region were able to contribute militarily to Operation Unifed Protec-

tor, Qatar and UAE, while Jordan provided sta and analytical support. Other partners such as Sweden

also contributed militarily to the operation. Malta provided signicant support to NAO or the air and

naval operations.13 Te NAO Secretary-General delivered a speech on June 16, 2011, in the Spanish Senate

where he stated that Tese changes were totally unexpected. And they were momentous. Tey bring

new responsibilities or NAO. And they bring new hope or millions o people. In this speech, the

Secretary-General argues or increased cooperation with southern partners in the area o practical

cooperation and political dialogue. See . It is also


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interesting to note that or his part, the Russian representative to NAO, Ambassador Dimitry Rogozin,

has interpreted the recent events and the NAO-led operation in Libya as the beginning o NAOs

expansion to the south. Tis may actually be a sign that Russia will nally sofen its position vis--vis

NAO enlargement eastward. It may also indicate yet another area o discord whereby Moscow will

now direct its criticism o the Alliance toward NAOs approach to security in its southern dimension.14 In 1994, MD was ushered in by some Allies who were somewhat uneasy about NAO mov-

ing east. Te Alliance traditionally had little interest south o the Mediterranean, which was lef to bilat-

eral relations between countries on both sides. In act, a number o Allies were leery o any possibilities

to see NAO dragged into the Arab-Israeli conict. See Gareth Winrow, Dialogue with the Mediterra-

nean: Te Role o NAOs Mediterranean Dialogue (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), 4468.15Te NAO heads o state and government in Lisbon have agreed to urther enhance our existing

partnerships and to develop new ones with interested countries and organizations (NAO, Lisbon Summit

Declaration, para. 2). Moreover, in paragraph 25, it is stated that NAOs relationships with other partners

across the globe are expanding and deepening, reecting common goals in the area o security. While in

paragraph 26, the declaration calls to better engage with our partners across the globe who contribute signi-

icantly to security, and reach out to relevant partners to build trust, increase transparency and develop practi-

cal cooperation. Finally, the declaration in the same paragraph calls on Allies to develop exible ormats

to discuss security challenges with our partners and enhance existing ora or political dialogue. Tis was

essentially language aimed at reaching out to countries outside o existing NAO partnership rameworks

and seeking to engage signicant contributors to securitycountries that some have also called signicant

security interlocutors. Unable at this stage to develop consensus around the identity o these countries, one

ofen sees in speeches and various documents a couple o countries regularly listed as examples: China, India,

and South Arica. At times, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Arica are also mentioned inormally.16 In this paper, the term south is ofen used in a generic sense without precise geographical

delineation. It reers to the broad region extending rom North Arica, where NAO already counts

seven partners, to the Gul region, where NAO has established relations with our partner countries.

Te paper avoids reerring to the Middle East given the sensitivities within the Alliance to any potential

NAO role in the Middle East peace process (see note 14). Tis constitutes one o the inherent limits o

NAOs potential role south o the Mediterranean.17 On June 8, 2011, NAO Deense Ministers have extended Operation Unied Protector or

a urther 90 days rom 27 June. See NAO, Statement on Libya, 8 June 2011, available at .18 See Split in Nato over Libya mission, March 22, 2011, available at ; David Brunnstrom, NAO still split on taking over Libya operation, March 23, 2011, available

at ; Steven Lee Myers and David D. Kirkpatrick, Allies are split on goal and exit strat-

egy in Libya, TeNew York imes, March 25, 2011, available at .19 On April 14, Foreign Ministers in Berlin agreed to three goals yet unachieved and justiying

the renewed mandate by Deense Ministers on June 8: that the Libyan regime cease attacks on civilians;


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that the regime withdrew its orces to bases; and that immediate, ull, and sae unhindered humanitar-

ian access was achieved. Tese goals actually reiterated what was already in UNSCR 1970 and 1973.20 Libya: NAO chie vows to continue war dispite [sic] split over it, June 23, 2011, available

at .21 Te German Marshall Fund explains the positions o some allied countries in Libya through

public opinion support. See Coordinate the Means but Not the EndsJustiying U.S. and European

Intervention in Libya, available at .22 On March 29 at the initiative o the British Foreign Secretary, the London Conerence took

place and gathered 40 Foreign Ministers and representatives rom key regional organizations and lead-

ers. Te London Conerence marked an important step with the decision that the North Atlantic Coun-

cil would provide executive political direction to NAO operations. It marked also the establishment

o the Libyan Contact Group, which was to provide the overall political direction and leadership on

behal o the international community. Tis was the orum or coordination o the overall international

response to Libya and met or the rst time in Doha, Qatar, on April 13.23 Te opposition movement to Qadhathe rebels also known as the ransitional National

Council (NC)has been recognized by an increasing number o countries as the legitimate represen-

tation o the Libyan people. Te international community remains cautious, however, in its support.

A lack o trust preventing ull-scale support toward the NC lingers and stems rom existing elements

within the council with prior connections to the Qadha regime and other elements harboring po-

tential jihadist ideals. Without a viable opposition, however, able to saeguard territorial integrity and

represent the whole o Libya, the international community would be hard pressed to support a nal

settlement. Caution was recently heightened in the ace o obvious splits within the NC and unclear

linkages with the Qadha orces in the context o the recent murder o NC General Abdel Fattah

Younes. See M.S., Libyas rebel orces: Bad news rom Benghazi, July 29, 2011, available at . Tere is however no alternative to the

NC to deliver the necessary political transition today in post-Qadha Libya. Nonetheless, the inter-

national community is yet to see a legitimate and unied opposition to take Libya orward beyond the

current transition period.24 On May 16, 2011, the International Criminal Court prosecutor asked the judges o the court

to issue arrest warrants or three suspects or crimes against humanity, including Qadha. Seeking an

exit strategy or Qadha and his entourage has not been made any easier by this indictment, which

has lef him with little options and motivation to consider any negotiated settlement. See George

Friedman, Libya and the problem with Te Hague, July 11, 2011, available at .25 At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NAO heads o state and government endorsed a set

o pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NAOs contribution to a comprehensive approach.

Te idea was to enhance Alliance contribution to civil-military cooperation in delivering stabilization

and reconstruction to countries marred by conicts and acing considerable challenges in coordinat-

ing the eorts rom the international community involved in crisis management. Building on earlier


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24


eorts at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NAO heads o state and government in their declaration (para,

2) decided to enhance NAOs contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management, as

part o the international communitys eort and to improve NAOs ability to deliver stabilization and

reconstruction eects. o that end, they agreed to orm an appropriate but modest civilian capability

to interace more eectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management.

See NAO, Lisbon Summit Declaration, para. 9.26 Ibid., para. 8.27 On June 8, 2011, at his press conerence ollowing the meeting o NAO Deense Ministers

with non-NAO contributing nations to Operation Unifed Protector, the Secretary-General stated, We

agreed that the time has come to plan or the day afer the conict. Qaddas history, it is no longer a ques-

tion o i he goes, but when he goes. It may take weeks, but it could happen tomorrow. And when he goes

the international community has to be ready. Let me make it clear. We do not see a leading role or NAO

in Libya once this crisis is over. But we are ready to engage with other international and regional organiza-

tions to ensure a smooth transition. Available at .28 For insights on the various developments within MD and ICI over the past 15 years and their

inherent limits, see Vivien Pertusot, NAO Partnerships: Shaking Hands or Shaking the System?Focus

Strategique no. 31 (Paris: IFRI Security Studies Center, May 2011), 2022.29 While NAO agreed to intervene in Libya, the crisis in Bahrain was dealt with dierently.

Te wind o changewhich swept notably unisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria engul-

ing the whole regionin the past ew months prompted the Saudi-led Gul Cooperation Council to

intervene militarily in mid-March at the request o the Bahraini royal amily. Te uprising on the island

shook the Arab monarchies o the Persian Gul, who reached out and multiplied demarches and quiet

diplomacy to inorm the international community and to seek help in addressing the challenges acing

the Bahraini regime. Te region was at risk o acing Shia-led movements possibly exploited by Iran

and thereby threatening the whole Eastern Arabia and Saudi Arabias oil rich eastern province. See Te

Greater Game in Bahrain, June 29, 2011, available at . Tis intervention showed that military capabilities and resources could be

sucient to address crises rom within the region. Future crises may thereore be dealt rom within the

region. In that context, there may be scope or NAO to provide assistance in building capability rather

than intervening militarily.30 See Putin likens Libya air strikes to crusades, March 21, 2011, available at .31 See Medvedev: Putins Statement on Libya Inadmissible, March 21, 2011, available at

.32

Full transcript o Sergey Lavrov interview, June 1, 2011, available at .

33 Russia Chess Match in Libya, June 15, 2011, available at .34 Lavrov interview. Among the G8 countries at the Deauville Summit, Russia was apparently

the only player keeping contacts with both ripoli and Benghazi.


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35 See reerence to this meeting at .36 In NAO, smart deensea concept presented at the Munich Security Conerence on Febru-

ary 4, 2011aims at building security or less money by working together and being more exible, so as

to spend better knowing that Allies will not be spending more in the short term. See NAO Secretary-

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Keynote Speech, Building security in an age o austerity, available at

.37 Robert M. Gates, Te Future o NAO, June 10, 2010, available at .38 NAO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NAO afer Libya, June 29, 2011, avail-

able at .39 John E. Herbst and Leo G. Michel, Why the EU should patrol Libya, European Voice, July

14, 2011, 9.40 Rasmussen, NAO afer Libya.41 China dispatched a military vessel and planes to the region to evacuate its citizens, while

Russia sent a presidential envoy in a mediating eort to broker a political settlement in Libya.42 NAO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NAO and the Mediterranean: Te

Changes Ahead, June 16, 2011, available at .43 Te NAO Secretary-General argues or closer European UnionNAO cooperation in this

regard. See Rasmussen, NAO afer Libya.44 NAO, NAO 2020:Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, 10.45 It may be that in the context o the Chicago Summit, the ocus o attention on NAO-led

missions will be exclusively and purposely on Aghanistan and that the Allies, including the host nation,

will rerain rom adding yet another meeting or Operation Unifed Protector. Tis should still present

an opportunity to reach out to emerging powers in the context o Aghanistan post-transition.


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About the Author

Dr. Isabelle Franois is a Distinguished Senior Visiting Research Fellow in the Center orransatlantic Security Studies, Institute or National Strategic Studies, at the National Deense

University. She served previously at North Atlantic reaty Organization (NAO) Headquarters

as Head o Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership. From 1998 to 2011, she held various

positions on the NAO International Sta, including Director o NAO Inormation Oce in

Moscow (20042009). She received the Medal o Excellence rom the NAO Secretary-General

in 2007 or a signicant public diplomacy eventthe 2006 NAO-Russia Rallyorganized in

the Russian Federation. She has worked within the Alliance on a range o issues dealing with

NAO partnerships and outreach policy. Beore joining the Alliance, she served at the De-

partment o National Deence (DND) rom 1993 to 1998 in the Policy Group, both within theNAO Directorate (19961998) and Directorate o Strategic Analysis (19931996), where she

published extensively on deense issues related to Arica and Europe. She then took a more

operational assignment as part o the team in charge o drafing the 1994 Canadian Deense

White Paper. Dr. Franois holds a Law Degree rom Universit de Paris XII (France) and is a

graduate o Carleton University (MA) in Ottawa, Ontario, and Universit de Montral (Ph.D.)

in Qubec.


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Nonresident Subject Matter Experts

AMBASSADOR ROBERT HUNTER

Director

MR. LAWRENCE CHALMER

Deputy Director

MR. MARk DUCASSE

Research Fellow, Contractor

MR. ULF HAEUSSLER

Visiting Senior Research Fellow

DR. ISABELLE FRANOIS

Distinguished Research Fellow, Contractor

MS. AMANDA LOWE

Program Assistant

MS. kATHRYN MOSS

Outreach Coordinator, Contractor

MS. ALICE NING

Program Manager, Contractor

MR. STEFANO SANTAMATO

Senior Research Fellow, Contractor

MR. BRETT SWANEY

Program Assistant

DR. CHARLES BARRY

Senior Research Fellow, Contractor

MR. MICHAEL DURkEEDistinguished Research Fellow, Contractor

MR. PETER FLORY


DR. RICHARD kUGLER


MR. JACk SEGAL


MR. STAN SLOANSenior Research Fellow, Contractor

MR. BRUCE WEINROD


For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm.


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