national report presented by mexican united states to ... · iaea international atomic energy...

National Report presented by Mexican United States to

fulfil the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

Period 2001-2003

September 2004

MEXICAN UNITED STATES NATIONAL REPORT

I N D E X

I INDEX II ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS III INTRODUCTION/ ELABORATION AND SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL

REPORT

National Policy Nuclear Program in Mexico National Report

ARTICLE 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 6.1 Nuclear Installations in the Mexican United States 6.2 Main Activities to Enhance Safety Carried Out from 1998 to 2003 6.3 First Review Meeting Commitments 6.4 Second Review Meeting Commitments 6.5 Directives Related to the National Reports Prescribed by the CSN

INFCIRC/572/REV. 2 6.6 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 7. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 7.1 Introduction 7.2 National Requirements and Provisions 7.3 Regulatory Authority 7.4 Licensing Process 7.5 Assessment System and Regulatory Inspections 7.6 Assurance of Compliance with Suspension, Modification and Revocation

Measures 7.7 Laws, Regulations and Requirements Related to Nuclear Safety 7.8 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 7.8.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous

National Report 7.8.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report 7.8.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 7.9 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations

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ARTICLE 8. REGULATORY BODY 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Attributions and Responsibilities 8.2.1 Interrelation of the Regulatory Body with other Entities of the Nuclear

Sector 8.3 Regulatory Body Organisation 8.4 Human Resources 8.4.1 Training of Personnel of the Regulatory Body 8.4.2 Financial Resources 8.5 Internal Quality Assurance in the Regulatory Body 8.6 Results from the IRRT Mission to the Regulatory Body 8.7 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 8.7.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous


Covered by the Next National Report 8.7.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 8.8 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER 9.1 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 10. PRIORITY TO SAFETY 10.1 Introduction and Safety Policies 10.2 Safety Culture and Good Practises 10.3 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 10.3.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous


Covered by the Next National Report 10.3.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 10.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 11. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES 11.1 Financial Resources 11.1.1 Financial Resources for CNSNS 11.1.2 Financial Resources for CFE

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11.2 Human Resources 11.2.1 CNSNS Human Resources 11.2.2 CFE/GCN Human Resources 11.3 Training and Retraining Program 11.3.1 Initial Training Program 11.3.2 Retraining Program 11.4 Funds for Radwaste Disposal and Decommissioning 11.5 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 11.5.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous


Covered by the Next National Report 11.5.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 11.6 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 12. HUMAN FACTORS 12.1 Background 12.2 Current Situation 12.3 Further Steps Contributing To Prevent Human Error and Improve Man-

Machine Interaction 12.4 The Role of the Regulatory Body in Reducing Events Caused by Human

Factors 12.5 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 12.5.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous


Covered by the Next National Report 12.5.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 12.6 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 13. QUALITY ASSURANCE 13.1 Quality Assurance Policies 13.2 Quality Assurance Plan During Construction Stage 13.3 Quality Assurance Plan During Operational Stage 13.3.1 Periodic Evaluation of the Adequacy of the Quality Assurance Plan during

the Operational Stage 13.3.2 Audits and Surveillance’s 13.3.3 Corrective Actions 13.3.4 Procurement of Parts and Components 13.4 Reportability 13.5 Other Quality Assurance Programs 13.6 Regulatory Body Activities at Nuclear Installations

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13.7 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 13.7.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous


Covered by the Next National Report 13.7.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 13.8 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 14. ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Safety Assessment – Construction Stage 14.2.1 LVNPS Internal Audits/Inspections 14.2.2 CNSNS Regulatory Activities 14.2.3 External Assessments 14.2.4 Pre-Operational Test Program 14.3 Safety Assessment – Operation Stage 14.3.1 Evaluations/Inspections by LVNPS Organisations 14.3.2 External Evaluations/Verifications to LVNPS 14.4 Safety Assessment - Actions for Continuous Improvement 14.5 New Fuel Designs for Laguna Verde NPP 14.5.1 Historical Conformation of LVNPS core 14.5.2 Licensing of New Core Configurations 14.5.3 Problems Originated in LVNPS Core 14.6 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) 14.6.1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Level 1 14.6.2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Level 2 14.6.3 Application of Risk Informed Regulation 14.7 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 14.7.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous


Covered by the Next National Report 14.7.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 14.8 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 15. RADIATION PROTECTION 15.1 Introduction 15.2 Dose Limitation System 15.3 Radiological Protection at LVNPS 15.3.1 Radiological Protection Program 15.3.2 Environmental Radiological Impact

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15.4 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the Previous National Report

15.4.1 Achievements and Changes Registered in the Safety Related Activities since the Preparation of the Previous National Report

15.4.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be Covered by the Next National Report

15.4.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 15.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 16. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 16.1 LVNPS Emergency Plans 16.1.1 Regulatory Aspects 16.1.2 Emergency Response Organisation 16.1.3 Emergency Assessment Actions 16.1.4 Installations and Emergency Equipment 16.1.5 Emergency Plan Activation Exercises/Drills 16.2 Measures for Informing the Public in Relation to Emergency Preparedness 16.3 Interaction with Neighbouring States 16.4 Regulatory Body Activities 16.5 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 16.5.1 Achievements and Changes Registered in the Safety Related Activities

since the Preparation of the Previous National Report 16.5.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report 16.5.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 16.6 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 17. SITING 17.1 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 18. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 18.1 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ARTICLE 19. OPERATION 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Administration and Management Criteria 19.2.1 Construction Stage 19.2.2 Operation Stage

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19.3 LVNPS Safety Analysis and Start Up Program 19.3.1 Safety Analysis 19.3.2 Start Up Program 19.3.3 Regulatory Body Activities 19.4 LVNPS Safety Analysis at Operational Stage 19.5 Use of Approved Procedures 19.6 Procedures for Anticipated Operational Incidents and Accidents 19.7 Technical Support Services during Installation’s Lifetime 19.8 Notification of Incidents 19.9 Operational Experience 19.9.1 Internal Operational Experience 19.9.2 External Operational Experience 19.9.3 Regulatory Body Activities 19.10 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems 19.10.1 Liquid Waste Treatment 19.10.2 Gaseous Waste Treatment 19.10.3 Solid Waste Treatment 19.10.4 Spend Fuel Storage 19.10.5 Radioactive Waste Production-Reduction Program 19.11 Ageing Management and Plant Life Extension 19.12 LVNPS-1 & 2 Performance Indicators (PI) 19.13 Activities, Achievements and Concerns on Safety Enhancement 19.13.1 Achievements and Changes Registered in the Safety Related Activities

since the Preparation of the Previous National Report 19.13.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report 19.13.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions 19.14 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with Convention Obligations ANNEX I List of Current Nuclear Installations ANNEX II National Report presented by Mexican United States to fulfil the

obligations of the Convention on Nuclear safety. Period 1998-2000

ANNEX III United States of Mexico National Report, presented to fulfil the

requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety” presented during the First Review Meeting. April 1999

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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

DEFINITION

ADDER Radioactive Waste Defintive Storage (Almacén Definitivo de Desechos Radiactivos)

ALARA As Low As Reasonable Achievable APRM Average Power Range Monitor ARTS Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Technical Specification ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASSET Assessment of Safety Significance Event Team ATP In Plant Temporal Storage (Almacén Temporal en la Planta) ATS Wet Waste In Site Temporal Storage (Almacén Temporal de

Desechos Húmedos en el Sitio) ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram BOP Balance of Plant BWR Boiling Water Reactor CCAC Re-Use Parts Collecting Centre and Decontaminated Oils Storage

(Centro de Acopio de Partes Reusables y Almacén de Aceites Contaminados)

CENACE Energy Control National Center (Centro Nacional de Control de Energía)

CFE Federal Commission of Electricity (Comisión Federal de Electricidad)CFR Code of Federal Regulations CIRO Independent Operations Review Committee (Comité Independiente

de Revisión de Operaciones) CLV Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station or LVNPS (Central

Nucleoléctrica Laguna Verde) CNSNS National Commission of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards (Comisión

Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias) CR´s Meeting Center (Centro de Reunión) CROS Site Operations Review Committee (Comité de Revisión de

Operaciones en el Sitio) CSN Convention on Nuclear Safety (Convención sobre Seguridad

Nuclear)

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DEFINITION

DC Direct Current Power DDRSS Dry Solid Radwaste Storage (Depósito de Desecho Radiactivo

Sólido Seco) ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems ESPEC Design Specifications (Especificaciones de Diseño) ETO Technical Specifications for Operation (Especificaciones Técnicas de

Operación) FPCC Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup FT Task Force (Fuerza de Tarea) GCN Nuclear Power Plant Management (Gerencia de Centrales

Nucleoléctricas) GE General Electric GEV State Government of Veracruz (Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz) HIC High Integrity Containers HPCS High Pressure Core Spray System IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency INES International Nuclear Event Scale INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IPE Individual Plant Examination IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events IRM Intermediate Range Monitor IRRT International Regulatory Review Team IRS Incident Reporting System ISO International Organization for Standardization Km Kilometers KV Kilovolts LERF Large Early Release Frequency LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPCI Low Pressure Core Injection LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray LVNPS Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station (same as Central

Nucleoeléctrica Laguna Verde, CLV)

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DEFINITION

MEOD Maximum Extended Operation Domain MSR´s Main Steam Heaters MVA Megavolts Ampere MWe Electrical Megawatts MWt Thermal Megawatts NCCW Nuclear Closed Cooling Water System NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NOM Mexican Official Standard (Norma Oficial Mexicana) NPP Nuclear Power Plant NSW Nuclear Service Water OECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development OSART Operational Safety Assessment Review Team PAC Corrective Action Program (Programa de Acción Correctiva) PCP Process Control Program (Programa de Control de Proceso) PCPA Set Point Change Package (Paquete de Cambio de Punto de Ajuste)PEI Internal Emergency Plan (Plan de Emergencia Interna) PERC Component Replacement Evaluation Package (Paquete de

Evaluación de Reemplazo de Componente) PERE External Radiological Emergency Plan (Plan de Emergencia

Radiológico Externo) PFP Preventive Federal Police (Policía Federal Preventiva) PGCO Quality Assurance Plan for Operation (Plan de Garantía de Calidad

de Operación) PI Performance Indicator PM Modification Package (Paquete de Modificación) PMDT Technical Documentary Modification Package (Paquete de

Modificación Documental Técnica) PMM Minor Modification Package (Paquete de Modificación Menor) PMMD Documentary Minor Documentation Package (Paquete de

Modificación Menor Documental) PMRC Component Replacement Modification Package (Paquete de

Modificación por Reemplazo de Componente)

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DEFINITION

PMS Software Modification Package (Paquete de Modificación de Software)

PRNM Power Range Neutron Monitor PROC Procedures (Procedimientos) PSA Probabilistic Safety Analysis PTN Nominal Thermal Power (Potencia Térmica Nominal) PyD Jumper and Disconnection (Puente y Desconexión) RAW Risk Achievement Worth RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System RHR Residual Heat Removal System Ro Outage for Fuel Reloading ROP Reactor Oversight Process RRC Reactor Recirculation Core System RRW Risk Reduction Worth SBO Station Black Out SAT Systematic Approach to Training SCRAM Sudden Control Rod Action Movement SCT Secretariat of Communications and Transportation (Secretaría de

Comunicaciones y Transportes) SENER Secretariat of Energy SEDENA Secretariat of Defence (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional) SEGOB Secretariat of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación) SM-AM Secretariat of the Navy (Secretaría de Marina y Armada de México) SMT Temporary Modification Request (Solicitud de Modificación

Temporal) SPCI Fire Protection System (Sistema de Protección Contra Incendio) SPDS Safety Parameter Display System SRNM Startup Range Neutron Monitor SRM Source Range Monitor SS Secretariat of Health (Secretaría de Salud) STAR Stop, Think, Act and Review Sv Sievert

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DEFINITION

TEDE Total Effective Dosis Equivalent TUV TÜV ANLAGENTECHNIK GMBH U Unit UIIS Independent Safety Engineering Unit (Unidad Independiente de

Ingeniería de Seguridad) USA United States of America USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission VARIOS Miscellaneous Documents (Varios) WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

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INTRODUCTION

ELABORATION AND SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL REPORT National Policy The national policy regarding nuclear activities is shaped in the Regulatory Law of the Constitutional Article 27 on Nuclear Matters and has as a principle that nuclear energy will only have peaceful uses and nuclear and radiological safety, as well as physicall security, will be primordial in all the activities related to nuclear energy and will prevail in all stages of installation life: siting, design, construction, tests, operation, modification, definitive closing and the dismantling. Nuclear Program in Mexico The Comisión Federal de Electricidad – CFE (Federal Commission of Electricity), have not included among its projects for the following years, the construction of a new nuclear installation fo electric power generation purposes. National Report In compliancy with Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety the present document summarizes the measures adopted in the period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2003, in relation with the unique nuclear installation in Mexico (for the purposes of the Convention): the Central Laguna Verde – CLV (Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station, LVNPS) with their two units. The description of this installation and some of its main characteristics are given in Annex I of this National Report. This report is organized following the structure of the 19 articles of the Convention and includes, as annexes; the original report as well as its first revision, which were presented and discussed in the First and Second Review Meetings of the Contracting Parties, held in Vienna on April 1999 and 2002, respectively. This report was prepared attending to instructions from the Secretaría de Energía - SENER (Secretariat of Energy), by the Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias - CNSNS (National Commission on Nuclear Safety and Safeguards), Mexican Regulatory Body in nuclear matters, acting as general coordinator, and the Gerencia de Centrales Nucleoeléctricas – GCN (Nuclear Power Plant Management) of the Comisión Federal de Electricidad – CFE (Federal Commission of Electricity) responsible for the safe operation of LVNPS.

III-1 Period 2001-2003


With this document and the annexes that are integral part of the report, the Mexican Government plainly recognizes its commitment to continue applying all basic principles of nuclear safety, radiological safety and physical security to Mexican nuclear installations in order to maintain and improve their safety level. Safety evaluations carried out by internal and external organizations to all LVNPS life stages are described in this document which do not indicate the existence of any adverse conditions for its safe operation. Therefore, in opinion of the Mexican State, it can be concluded that fundamental obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety continue being fulfilled. Information to the Public This National Report, the previous corresponding to 1st and 2nd Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the related questions and answers formulated by the contracting parties, are public documents, in accomplishment with the “Federal Law of Transparency and Access to the Government Public Information” that entered in vigor in June 12, 2002 as well as the recommendations from the same Convention contained in the document INFCIRC/572/Rev. 2 of September 2002. NOTE: This document was originally written in Spanish. Should inconsistency or

doubt, exist, reader must be guided by the Spanish version.

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ARTICLE 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 6.1 NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS IN THE MEXICAN UNITED STATES In Mexico exists, for the purposes of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, one nuclear installation: Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station (LVNPS) with two Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) type units and a gross electric power of 675 MWe each. This installation is located in the State of Veracruz, in the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, 75 kilometers to the north of Veracruz City. The main characteristics of Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 are described in Annex I. This nuclear installation was originally declared in the First National Report (See Annex III) presented to fulfill the commitments of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. During the period 2001-2003 covered by this National Report no new nuclear facilities are reported additional to the above mentioned. 6.2 MAIN ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT TO ENHANCE SAFETY IN THE

PERIOD FROM 1998 TO 2003 The information provided in this section should be considered additional and complementary to that provided in the Second National Report (Annex II). Since 1998 LVNPS has implemented a program to deal with and solve the most relevant safety issues; this program is effective from 1998 to 2006 and pursues five objectives: Safety, Environment, Generation, Human Resources and Costs. The Nuclear Power Plant Management (GCN) has declared the enhancement of Nuclear Safety as the most important of these objectives. The topics covered by this program, among others, follows: 1. Collective dose reduction (in progress, see Article 15 of this National Report). 2. Intergranular stress corrosion cracking control (in progress, see Article 19 of this

National Report). 3. Replacement of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) suction strainers to

avoid plugging (implemented). 4. Improvement of reactor pressure vessel instrumentation to avoid degasification

problem during reactor pressure vessel depressurization (implemented).

6-1 Period 2001-2003


5. Installation of an automatic detection and suppression system for core instabilities (already installed in Unit 2 and currently in testing phase, implementation completed in Unit 1 during the 10th Refueling Outage, on May 2004).

6. Low Voltage Second Level Protection (implemented). 7. Replacement of improved isolation valves for the discharge in the Reactor

Recirculation Core System, RRC (implemented). During the period covered by this National Report, operator staff reviewed the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) Level 1, incorporating plant specific data in it, and the PSA Level 2. Also the Risk Management process, required by the 10 CFR 50.65 paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule, was implemented by developing a risk monitor. As a result of the PSA Level 1 analysis, and as an example of improvements to safety carried out, a design change to low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves actuation logic was made which helped to reduce the contribution of the interphase Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in 84%. 6.3 FIRST REVIEW MEETING COMMITMENTS Table 6.1 shows the state of solution to recommendations arisen during the First Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties held in Vienna, Austria in 1999. 6.4 SECOND REVIEW MEETING COMMITMENTS Table 6.2 shows answers to observations included in Annex V of the IAEA document CNS-RM-2002/02 related to the Second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties, held in Vienna, Austria, in April 15-26, 2002. Only those observations requiring information from contracting parties were included. 6.5 DIRECTIVES RELATED TO THE NATIONAL REPORTS PRESCRIBED

BY THE CSN INFCIRC/572/REV. 2 Table 6.3 shows how directives given in the IAEA Document Informative INFCIRC/572/Rev. are fulfilled.

6-2 Period 2001-2003


6.6 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION OBLIGATIONS

Based on the general description given in this Article and other conforming this National Report, to satisfy the obligations derived from the Convention on Nuclear Safety, it is shown that laws, regulations and means for the adequate surveillance and supervision by a Regulatory Body independent from utilities, are in place in Mexican United States, which ensures that operation of Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station does not represent any undue risk to public health or safety, nor to the environment. Regarding specific fulfillment with obligations from Convention on Nuclear Safety, improvements attained in the period covered by this National Report are described in the subsequent Articles. It can be concluded from the existing objective evidence summarized in this National Report, that Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station meets a comparable level of safety to that of similar type of plants located in countries with greater nuclear experience. Up to now, there are no conditions that could be identified as adverse to a safe operation and therefore, there is no plan to anticipate the installation’s shutdown prior to the completion of its lifetime.

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Table 6.1 Commitments from the First Review Meeting

No. Recommendation Solution

1 Independence of Regulatory Body

In the period covered by this National Report there is no progress in achieving the effective independence of the Regulatory Body. However, as it is shown in this National Report, current situation does not compromise the effectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory activities because CNSNS is a semi-autonomous organism of the Mexican government who has enough authority on all the concerns related with nuclear and radiological safety

2 Safety Improvement Programs

Programs and activities carried out by CNSNS and CFE to improve safety are described in the following sections of this National Report:

Main current safety issues, 6.2

Safety Culture, 10.2

CFE/ GCN Human, 11.2.2

Other actions contributing to prevent human errors and improve man machine interaction, 12.3

The role of the Regulatory Body in reducing events caused by human factor, 12.4

Periodic evaluation of PGCO (Quality Assurance Plan for Operation) adequacy, 13.3.1

Regulatory Body activities, 13.6

Safety assessment, Operational stage, 14.3

Safety assessment, actions for its continuous improvement, 14.4

Radioactive waste production- Reduction program, 19.10.5

3 Containment Efficiency Refer to the section 19.9.1.1 of this National Report

4 Probabilistic Safety Analysis

Refer to the following sections of this National Report:

Main current safety issues, 6.2

Other actions contributing to prevent human errors and improve man machine interaction, 12.3

Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA), 14.6

5 Collective Dose and Radiological Effluents

Refer to the section 15.3.1 Radiological Protection Program of this National Report

6 Emergency Preparedness

Refer to the section 16.1.5 Emergency Plan Activation Exercises / Drills, of this National Report

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Table 6.2 Commitments from the Second Review Meeting

Observation Topic Section of the Report where it is

solved

20 In the future reports should provide more information on new legislative frameworks and regulations or the modifications to those existing.

7.7, 15.4.2

23 Some organizations of technical support carry out evaluations on behalf of the Regulatory Body, how is this support obtained without conflict of interests

8.2.1

24 Due to nuclear programs stagnation or reduction, qualified personnel are retiring. Provide information on how the necessary personnel competency and motivation in maintained for the regulation and safe exploitation of the nuclear facilities

8.4, 8.4.1, 8.7.1

25 Progress in the independence “de facto” and “de jure” of the Regulatory Body

See point 1 of Table 6.1

26 Pay more attention on improvements in human and financial resources of the Regulatory Body

8.4.2, 8.7.1, 8.7.2

27 Provide experience gained on the use of PSA as a support to regulatory activities or inspection, indicators for surveillance of safety. Advantages and limitations of the system used, prescriptive or some less prescriptive

14.3.2.1.b),14.6, 14.6.1, 14.6.2, 14.6.3, 14.7.1

31 Provide information on bilateral and multilateral international cooperation among Regulatory Bodies

8.2.1

32 Reviews carried out by homologous from other countries. International cooperation as a way to share common experiences and exchange information. Maintaining and increasing competence of Regulatory Bodies

8.2.1, 8.6

33 Provide more information on quality management systems in the Regulatory Body

8.5

34 In order to contribute to establish a Regulatory Body with the characteristics of independence, competence and credibility; National Reports, and answers and questions arisen from the Review Meetings should be made public

Introduction

38 Provide more information on those events in nuclear facilities considered important

19.9.1

39 Active management of safety and with a vision of maintaining and improving safety, and improving safety culture. Supervision of the quality of safety management and the safety culture

10.2

40 Improvements on the containment safety, capacity and stagnancy 19.9.1.1

42 Details and actual experience on the administration of severe accidents and the improvement of the containment to deal with this type of accidents

14.6.2

44 Situation of programs for safety improvement See point 2 of the Table

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Observation Topic Section of the Report where it is

solved 6.1

50 Information on the use of Probabilistic Safety Analysis 14.6, 14.6.1, 14.6.2, 14.6.3

57 Updating of the evolution of the trends in occupational doses and emissions to the environment, and on the on-line exchange of surveillance data

15.3.1, 15.3.2

61 Improvements to emergency preparedness, including the results of national and international exercises / drills

16.1.5, 16.3

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Table 6.3 Directives Related to the National Reports Prescribed by the CSN INFCIRC/572/REV. 2

Article Directive Section of

the Report where it is

solved

Introduction National policy on nuclear safety activities, description of nuclear programs, and general exposition of safety concerns

Introduction

Introduction List of the nuclear facilities in service Annex I

6 List of existent nuclear facilities Annex I

6 List of facilities where corrective actions are considered, according to Articles 10 to 19

6.6

6 Description of safety assessments and results 14.2, 14.3

6 Description of programs and actions taken for safety improvement See point 2 of the Table 6.1

6 Position of the contracting party to continue the exploitation of the nuclear installation

6.6

7 Description of the national legislative and regulatory framework 7.2 to 7.7

7 Summary of laws, regulations and requirements of the licensing process, inspection and evaluation; as well the procedure to assure the fulfillment of the regulations for safety

7.2, 7.6, 7.7

8 Description of mandate and functions of Regulatory Body 8.1

8 Basic document which establishes the authority and responsibilities of Regulator Body

8.2

8 Organization and structure of the Regulatory Body 8.3

8 Position of the Regulatory Body in the government structure 8.2

8 Relation of the Regulatory Body with the organizations in charge of the development and the use of the nuclear energy

8.2.1

9 Description of the main responsibilities of the holder of a license 9.1

9 Description of means used by the Regulatory Body to make sure that the licensee assumes his prime responsibility on safety

9.1

10 Principles that emphasize the absolute priority of safety. Principles of priority of the safety relatives to the Regulatory Body, designers, constructors, operators and the holder of the license, as well as the relatives to: Safety policy, safety culture, commitments to attain the safety, regulatory control, activities and voluntary good practices

10.1, 10.2

11 Financial and human resources of licensee / applicant available to give support to the nuclear installation along its life

11.1.2, 11.2.2

11 Financing for safety improvements made to nuclear installation during their exploitation

11.1

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Article Directive Section of the Report where it is

solved

11 Financial and humans resources provisions for the final closure and management of radioactive waste

11.4

11 Norms, regulations and pro resources for the qualification, training, the re-training of personnel , including training in simulators in all the activities related the safety for each installation

11.1, 11.1.2

12 Methods to prevent, detect and correct the human errors, including the analysis of this errors, man-machine interphase, operational aspects and feedback of experience

12.3

12 Management and organization issues 12.3

12 Rolls of the Regulatory Body and licensee regarding professional performance issues

12.3, 12.4

13 Quality Assurance Policy 13.1

13 Quality Assurance programs related to all the aspects of the safety along the life of the nuclear installation

13.2, 13.3

13 Methods used in the application and evaluation of Quality Assurance programs

13.3.1, 13.3.2, 13.3.3, 13.3.4, 13.4

13 Activities of regulatory control 13.6

14 Licensing procedure, safety analysis reports in the different stages of projects related to a nuclear installation

7.4, 17.1

14 Summary of essential generic results of permanent observation and periodic evaluations of safety of the nuclear facilities using deterministic and probabilistic analysis methods, as applicable

14.8

14 Verification programs (preventive maintenance, in-service inspection of main components, evaluation of aging processes, etc.)

14.3.2.1.b), 19.11

14 Activities of regulatory control 14.3.2.1

15 Summary of laws, regulations and requirements on radiological protection applied to nuclear facilities

15.1

15 Application of the laws, regulations and national requirements related to the protection radiological, including data on: dose limits, fulfillment with the requirements for emission of radioactive material, measures adopted to guarantee that exposures are maintained ALARA, environmental radiological surveillance, activities of regulatory control

15.2, 15.3, 15.3.1, 15.3.2, 15.3.3

16 Outline of laws, regulations and requirements related to the preparation for in site and out site emergencies

16.1.1

16 Provisions for emergency preparedness, including the roll of the Regulatory Body and other organizations, emergency classification, national general emergency plan, in site and out site nuclear emergency plans, including supporting organizations and systems, means to inform the public about the emergency preparedness in the vicinities of the nuclear installation

16.1.2, 16.1.3, 16.2, 16.4

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solved

16 Training and exercises / drills 16.1.5

16 International Agreements, including those concerted with neighboring countries, as adequate

16.3

17 Description of licensing procedure, including a summary of the laws, regulations and national requirements for nuclear installations sitting , evaluation criteria for site factors that influence safety, evaluation criteria for environmental and local population impact of the nuclear installation

7.4, 17.1

17 Requirements for the application of the mentioned criteria 17.1

17 Activities oriented to maintain the acceptability of the nuclear installation safety, taking into account site dependent factors

17.1

17 International agreements, including those concerted with neighboring countries, as necessary

16.3

18 Description of licensing procedure, including a summary of laws, regulations and national requirements for the design and construction of nuclear facilities

7.4, 17.1, 18.1

18 Application of the concept “Defense in Depth” according to the principle of the existence of several protection levels, in particular the integrity of barriers, considering internal and external events

18.1

18 Accident prevention and mitigation 18.1

18 Provisions for the adoption of proven technologies by the experience or verified by tests or analysis

18.1

18 Requirements for a reliable, stable and controllable exploitation, with special consideration to human factors and man-machine interaction

18.1

19 Description of licensing procedure, including a summary of the laws, regulations and national requirements related to the exploitation of nuclear facilities

7.4, 17.1, 19.1

19 Description of the measures adopted by the Contracting Party to fulfill the obligations derived from Article 19 of the Convention

19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 19.5, 19.6, 19.7, 19.8, 19.9, 19.10, 19.11, 19.12, 19.13, 19.14

From the 7 to the 19

Achievements and changes in safety related activities since the previous National Report

7.8.1, 8.7.1, 9.1, 10.3.1, 11.5.1, 12.5.1, 13.7.1, 14.7.1, 15.4.1, 16.5.1, 17.1, 18.1, 19.13.1

6-9 Period 2001-2003



solved


Future safety related activities and programs for the period to be covered by the next National Report

7.8.2, 8.7.2, 9.1, 10.3.2, 11.5.2, 12.5.2, 13.7.2, 14.7.2, 15.4.2, 16.5.2, 17.1, 18.1, 19.13.2


Safety concerns and foreseen actions 7.8.3, 8.7.3, 9.1, 10.3.3, 11.5.3, 12.5.3, 13.7.3, 14.7.3, 15.4.3, 16.5.3, 17.1, 18.1, 19.13.3

6-10 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 7. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 7.1 INTRODUCTION This article presents a summary of Legislative and Regulatory Framework that supports regulatory activities carried out by CNSNS during the period 2001-2003 according to its mission of regulating activities in nuclear installations to assure that they are executed safely and protecting the workers and public health, as well the environment. 7.2 NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROVISIONS The legislative and regulatory framework, that sustains the principles and obligations derived from the Convention on Nuclear Safety, is based in the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States from which a series of laws, regulations and standards are derived. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution establishes that nuclear energy must be only used for peaceful applications and that only the State can utilize nuclear fuels for nuclear power generation. Until December 2003, closure date for the information included in this Report, the fundamental regulatory framework has not changed; CNSNS is the Regulatory Body on nuclear matters, with authority over the activities carried out by the users of nuclear and radioactive material in industry and medical applications as well, excepting X-ray apparatus for diagnosis whose safe use is regulated by Secretariat of Health. 7.3 REGULATORY AUTHORITY Authority and responsibilities of regulatory body have not changed, so the information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 7.3). 7.4 LICENSING PROCESS Licensing process for nuclear installations has not changed, so the information included in the First National Report remains valid (See Annex I, section 7.4).

7-1 Period 2001-2003


7.5 ASSESSMENT SYSTEM AND REGULATORY INSPECTIONS The Regulatory Body Assessment System has not changed, so the information provided in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 7.5) nevertheless, it can be pointed out that the annual assessment program is designed considering the commitments and regulatory requirements, the anticipated design modifications, programmed refuel outages, and licensee projects as well. Results from the evaluations carried out by the Regulator Body are described in section 14.3.2.1.B of this National Report. As a result of the recommendations and suggestions made by IAEA-IRRT Mission on January, 2001 (see the Second National Report, Annex II, section 8.6), inspection process has had the following modifications: • A coordinator for inspection activities for LVNPS was designated. This

coordinator is in charge of supervising the inspection planning and verifies its performance, every six months, to feedback the inspection program.

• The inspections program is developed according to the IAEA Safety Guide 50-

SG-G4, on biennial basis, considering the impact that inspected areas have on safety. The main areas inspected during LVNPS operational stage are: Operation, Radiological Protection, Maintenance, Engineering, Emergency Preparedness, Quality Assurance, Supervisors Performance and Organization.

• CNSNS inspections were reclassified in: planned (announced and un-

announced), unplanned, reactive and augmented. Regulatory body inspections results are described in section 14.3.2.1.B of this National Report. 7.6 ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH SUSPENSION, MODIFICATION

AND REVOCATION MEASURES Concerning to the assurance of compliance with suspension, modification and revocation measures has not changed, so the information that was included in the First National Report remains valid (See Annex III, section 7.6). However, in order to enhance and make more transparent and effective his enforcement system, the Regulatory Body is developing an Enforcement Policy Project and its corresponding procedure with emphasis on the fulfilment of regulatory requirements and promoting licensee detection of non-compliances. (See section 9.3 of this National Report).

7-2 Period 2001-2003


7.7 LAWS, REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO NUCLEAR SAFETY

In general terms, laws, regulations and requirements related to nuclear safety have not changed, so the information described in the First National Report remains valid (See Annex III, section 7.7); however, in addition those already mentioned, during the period 2001-2003 the following norms were issued: Official Mexican Standard NOM-036-NUCL-2001 “Requirements for installations

for treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste” Official Mexican Standard NOM-012-NUCL-2002 “Requirements and calibration

of ionising radiation monitors”. (It supersedes : NOM-012-NUCL-1995) Official Mexican Standard NOM-008-NUCL-2003 “Radioactive contamination

control”. (It supersedes: NOM-008-NUCL-1994). Official Mexican Standard NOM-039-NUCL-2003 “Specifications for the

exemption of ionising radiation sources and practices for their use” Table 7.1 a shows a summary of applicable Mexican Official Norms for nuclear facilities. As explained in Section 7.7 of the First National Report (Annex III) the current regulatory framework in Mexico corresponds to the country of origin of the reactor, which in this case is the USA regulatory framework. Therefore, in this period CNSNS established a project to development the General Rules Book for Nuclear Installations in order to implement a national regulatory system for nuclear safety. 7.8 ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCERNS ON SAFETY

ENHANCEMENT 7.8.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the

Previous National Report During the period covered in this National Report, the fundamental regulatory framework has not been modified; however, the Regulatory Body launched projects related to: • Development of an Enforcement Policy and procedure, to facilitate and make

transparent its application in the assurance of compliance with suspension, modification and revocation measures (See section 7.6 of this National Report)

• Development of General Rules Book for Nuclear Installations, to provide a

national regulatory framework (See section 7.7 of this National Report)

7-3 Period 2001-2003


• Review of the current General Rules Book on Radiological Safety, to make it

consistent with IAEA documents (See section 15.4.1 of this National Report) Additionally, four Mexican Official Norms on the radiological field, applicable to nuclear facilities were issued, (See section 7.7 of this National Report). 7.8.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report In the period covered by this National Report and the corresponding period to the next Report, the Regulatory Body will continue the development of the Enforcement Policy and The General Rules Book for Nuclear Installations (See section 7.8.1 of this National Report). It will also continue the development and adoption of Nuclear Installation Performance Indicators with the purpose of analysing the inspection program and provide feedback. Moreover it will continue the review of the General Rules Book for Radiological Safety will continue to make it consistent with the IAEA basic norms (section 15.4.1 of this National Report). 7.8.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Regarding the legislative and regulatory framework, the Mexican Regulatory Body considers that there are no safety issue of concern, so it is not necessary to implement preventive or corrective measure. 7.9 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS As showed in the preceding sections, the Mexican United States has a legislative and regulatory framework that adequately regulates safety of nuclear installations. The legislative and regulatory framework includes provisions for the establishment and application of: i) National safety requirements and regulations; including those related to the

implementation of International Treaties and Conventions;

ii) A system for granting licenses and renewals for nuclear installations as well as the prohibition for the exploitation of a nuclear installation without a license;

7-4 Period 2001-2003


iii) A regulatory evaluation and inspection system for nuclear installations to verify compliance with applicable regulations and conditions stipulated in their licenses;

iv) Measures to ensure compliance with applicable regulations and conditions

stipulated in licenses, including license suspension and modification or revocation.

Based on the information submitted in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional information included in this National Report, it can be concluded that the obligations of the Article 7 of the CSN are fully satisfied.

7-5 Period 2001-2003


Table 7.1 Summary of Mexican Official Norms Applicable to Nuclear Facilities

Norm Title Publication date

NOM-001-NUCL-1994 DOSE EQUIVALENT CALCULATION FACTORS Feb-6, 1996

NOM-002-NUCL-1994 LEAK AND TIGHTNESS TESTS FOR SEALED SOURCES Feb-23, 1996

NOM-004-NUCL-1994 CLASSIFICATION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE Mar-4, 1996

NOM-005-NUCL-1994 ANNUAL RADIONUCLIDE INCORPORATION LIMITS (LAI) AND DERIVED

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR (CDA) FOR OCCUPATIONALLY EXPOSED PERSONNEL

Feb-16, 1996

NOM-006-NUCL-1994 CRITERIA FOR THE APPLICATION OF ANNUAL INCORPORATION LIMITS FOR CRITICAL PUBLIC GROUPS Feb-20, 1996

NOM-008-NUCL-2003 Version 1994.

Canceled RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION CONTROL Dec-29, 2003

NOM-012-NUCL-2002 Version 1995.

Canceled

REQUIREMENTS AND CALIBRATION OF IONISING RADIATION MONITORS Jun-19, 2002

NOM-018-NUCL-1995 METHODS TO DETERMINE ACTIVITY CONCENTRATION AND TOTAL ACTIVITY IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE PACKAGES Aug-12, 1996

NOM-019-NUCL-1995 REQUIREMENTS FOR LOW LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE PACKAGES FOR THEIR DEFINITIVE STORAGE NEAR THE SURFACE Aug-14, 1996

NOM-021-NUCL-1996 LIXIVIATION TESTS FOR SOLIDIFIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE SPECIMENS Aug-4, 1997

NOM-024-NUCL-1995 REQUIREMENTS AND CALIBRATION OF DIRECT READING DOSIMETERS Aug-5, 1997

NOM-026-NUCL-1999 MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM OCCUPATIONALLY EXPOSED PERSONAL TO IONISING RADIATION Jul-5, 1999

NOM-028-NUCL-1996 RADIOACTIVE WASTE HANDLING IN RADIOACTIVE FACILITIES THAT USE OPEN SOURCES Dec-22, 1998

NOM-031-NUCL-1999 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING OF THE OCCUPATIONALLY EXPOSED PERSONAL TO IONISING RADIATIONS Dec-28, 1999

7-6 Period 2001-2003


Norm Title Publication date

NOM-034-NUCL-2000SELECTION, QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF OCCUPATIONALLY EXPOSED PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR POWER

PLANTS Sep-4, 2000

NOM-035-NUCL-2000 LIMITS FOR CONSIDERING A SOLID RESIDUE AS RADIOACTIVE WASTE May-19, 2000

NOM-036-NUCL-2001 REQUIREMENTS FOR FACILITIES FOR TREATMENT AND CONDITIONING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE Sep-26, 2001

7-7 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 8. REGULATORY BODY 8.1 INTRODUCTION CNSNS is the Mexican Regulatory Body, as described in the First National Report (See Annex III in its section 8.1), and its mission is: To ensure that activities involving nuclear materials, radioactive materials and ionising radiation sources are carried out for peaceful uses only and with maximum public and environment safety, considering the current technological advances. Information presented in this Article is complementary that included in corresponding sections of the First National Report (Annex III). 8.2 ATTRIBUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Authority and responsibilities of the Mexican Regulatory Body have not changed so the information provided in the First National Report remains valid (See Annex III in its section 8.2). 8.2.1 Interrelation of the Regulatory Body with other Entities of the Nuclear

Sector Interrelation of the Regulatory Body with other entities of international and national nuclear sector has not changed, so the information described in the First National Report remains valid (See Annex III, section 8.2.1). To answer observations from the 2nd Review Meeting of the Contracting Parts, regarding technical support organizations that have carried out evaluations for the Regulatory Body, it can be pointed out that: relation between CNSNS and these organizations has not caused any conflict of interests, they have executed their activities with a high sense of responsibility and ethics, respecting the confidentiality of the information and contracts with them include clauses to assure that. Activities and projects during the period 2001-2003 CNSNS has initiated the revision of its processes in order to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. In an effort to improving its efficiency the Regulatory Body has initiated two projects: • Implementation of a Quality Management System based on ISO 9000-2000, and • Implementation of a Systematic Approach to Training for its personnel

8-1 Period 2001-2003


The objective of the first project is to update the Quality Assurance System, currently used by CNSNS. Even though the certification of the Regulatory Body is not the objective in the short term, the project now in course, will implement this system in compliance with that standard. The first stage of this project includes the revision of inspection, assessment and authorization processes, and subsequent stages will include the revision of the enforcement and operators licensing processes. The use of indicators, as part of this project as well as, for the periodic analysis of CNSNS performance has been started in order to feedback the results into activities planning. The second project, also in course, is reviewing the training process of CNSNS personnel according the methodology developed by IAEA in order to cover the recommended knowledge and skills. At present, training and retraining programs are being developed. CNSNS has initiated, with the purpose of improving its effectiveness, the development of an enforcement policy and procedures, to make them more effective and transparent in case of licensee non-compliances with regulation or violations. Also, the use of indicators has begun for the periodic analysis of the LVNPS performance with the purpose of taking the necessary regulatory actions and to include them within the strategic plan of CNSNS. With the aim of maintaining an independent analysis capacity for the review and evaluation of analyses submitted by licensee, CNSNS develops or contracts or participates in research projects such as: • SCADAPSIM Development and Training International Program, administrated

by Innovative Software Systems Inc. with the objective of developing, improving and validating the SCDAPSIM Code, a nuclear plant analyzer based on SCDAP/RELAP5 code.

• Development of a nuclear data-base for CM-PRESTO code for three-dimensional analysis of burnup.

• Implementation of improved TRAC Code version 2000 to CNSNS operating system.

• Development of a nonlinear model for the analysis of instabilities in BWR. 8.3 REGULATORY BODY ORGANISATION CNSNS current organization structure is shown at the Figure 8.1 and supersedes to the Figure 8.2 of the First National Report (Annex III) and the Figure 8.1 of the Second National Report (Annex II).

8-2 Period 2001-2003


The position occupied by CNSNS in the Federal Government and the Emergency Committee have not been modified, so the remaining figures included in the First National Report continues valid (See Annex III, Article 8). 8.4 HUMAN RESOURCES During the period 2001-2003, Mexican Regulatory Body experienced a reduction of 16.4% in its total technical personnel. Currently, CNSNS technical staff distributes as follows:

NUMBER %

Specialised Personnel, Sub-Professional Technicians or equivalent.

8 9.2

Professionals with a Bachelor’s Degree or equivalent

60 69.0

Professionals with a Master’s Degree or equivalent

17 19.5

Professionals with a Ph. D. 2 2.3

TOTAL 87 100.0 This reduction has been caused by the Program of Optional Separation launched by the Federal Administration. It has forced the optimization of the human resources in order to reduce the impact on regulatory activities. Although inspection activities to nuclear installations have maintained its level of activity, CNSNS has been forced to postpone projects such as the development of the General Rules Book for Nuclear Installations or reduce the pace in other projects, as the implementation of the Quality Management System based on ISO 9000-2000 and the implementation of a Systematic Approach to Training for its personnel. 8.4.1.1 Training of Regulatory Body Staff As previously mentioned, CNSNS has initiated a revision of its training process using the Systematic Approach to Training recommended by the IAEA in the document TECDOC-1254 "Training the Staff of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear Facilities: A Competency Framework ". Currently, definition of the knowledge and skills required for the evaluation and inspecting personnel is being developed. Even though this revision is still in course, qualification of CNSNS has been maintained by attending the following courses: Boiling Water Reactors Technology, Nuclear Power Plants Engineering, Nuclear Safety, Radiological Safety, Physical

8-3 Period 2001-2003


Security, Environmental Qualification, Electrical Engineering, Non-destructive Test, Structural Integrity, Safety Culture, Quality Management, etc., as well as courses on administration and management as, Leadership and Projects Administration. On the other hand, CNSNS staff has attended courses with the objective of strengthening its capacity to develop and apply Probabilistic Safety Analysis techniques for safety evaluation of nuclear and radioactive installations, and the incorporation of their results and conclusions to regulatory framework. CNSNS has also qualified its personnel in transient and accidents analysis techniques attending courses of modeling and calculation of multi-phase flow, and in the analysis and simulation of severe accidents progression for LVNPS, which will allow the evaluation of the severe accidents management guides when CFE submits them. 8.4.2 Financial Resources In 2003 the financial resources of CNSNS were $ 78,000,000 of pesos, approximately $ 7,000,000 dollars from United States of America. CNSNS has applied about 6% of its annual budget, to research, development and technical support. Section 8.2.1 of this National Report describes the activities to which these funds were oriented during the period 2001-2003. In addition, during the period of this National Report, CNSNS generated an annual income for the Federal Government of approximately $ 800,000 dollars of the United States of America, from licensing fees (new, renewal and modification) of radioactive installations, from transportation, export and import of radioactive material permits, and fines imposed for violation to the applicable requirements. 8.5 INTERNAL QUALITY ASSURANCE IN THE REGULATORY BODY During the second half of 2003, CNSNS started the implementation of a Quality Management System based on ISO 9000-2000 standard which objective is to update the system currently in place. The analysis of inspection and evaluation processes has already begun and their flow charts were finished in order to include them in the new Quality Management Manual which is planned to be finished by the end of 2004. Subsequent Stages of the project will analyze the processes for application of enforcement actions in the case of non-compliances or violations to regulations, the process of licensing of operators and the process of development of standards and guides.

8-4 Period 2001-2003


8.6 RESULTS FROM THE IRRT MISSION TO THE REGULATORY BODY Regarding to the results of the IAEA International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) Mission to the Regulatory Body, the information described in the Second National Report corresponding to period 1998-2000, is still valid (See Annex II, section 8.6). 8.7 ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCERNS ON SAFETY


Previous National Report During the period of this National Report, safety level in nuclear installations has been maintained. Regulatory Body activities have been focused, in addition of the daily activities of inspection and evaluation, to the development of a national regulation and the improvement of its processes with the purpose of enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. 8.7.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report CNSNS has initiated the development of a strategic plan to fulfill its mission in a more efficient and effective way. Projects that integrate this plan have been briefly described in previous sections of this Article. In addition to these projects, the Regulatory Body will start during the 2004 the analysis of its regulatory decision-making process, in order to take into account the information provided from the Probabilistic Safety Analyses and performance of operating organization and the systems, structures and components. 8.7.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Regarding the obligations established in this Article, the Mexican Regulatory Body considers that there are no safety issues of concern; nevertheless, as pointed out in section 8.4 of this National Report, an aspect that requires to be addressed is the reduction in of CNSNS technical staff; it is of the highest priority to initiate actions to maintain the competence of its personnel and design mechanisms to provide CNSNS with enough flexibility to hire new personnel that substitutes those retiring and to give an impulse to those projects and processes improvements described in this Article. 8.8 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS As described in this Article, CNSNS is a semi-autonomous federal organism depending from the Secretariat of Energy and designated as the National Regulatory

8-5 Period 2001-2003


Body in nuclear safety matters and responsible for the enforcement of the regulatory framework described in Article 7 of this National Report. It has adequate authority, competence, financial and human resources to fulfil its responsibilities as conferred by Regulatory Law of the Constitutional Article 27. However, it is important to point out the above mentioned problems regarding Regulatory Body human resources that might become a significant safety issue. Therefore, based on the information submitted in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional included in this National Report, it can be concluded that the obligations established in Article 8 of the CSN are fully satisfied.

8-6 Period 2001-2003


8-7 Period 2001-2003

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS (CNSNS) SECRETARIAT

OF ENERGY

ADVISORY COUNCIL

GENERAL

DIRECTOR CNSNS

EMERGENCY

COMMITTEE TECHNICAL

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLLER

DEPARTMENT OF

INTERNAL AUDIT AND CONTROL AND EVAL.

DEPARTMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMPLAINTS

DEPARTMENT

OF INTERNATIONAL AND LEGAL AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF TECH, REGULATIONS AND

SERVICES

DIVISION OF NUCLEARSAFETY

DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY

DIVISION OF FINANCESAND ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF

TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF

ASSESSMENT DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION AND

SERVICES

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONAL VERIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF RADIOACTIVE

INSTALLATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF PROCEDURES AND

REGULATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND

RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY AREA OF SYSTEMS AREA OF CERTIF.

AND OPERATION AREA OF OPERA- TIONAL ANALYSIS

AREA OF ANALYSISAND METHODS

AREA OF SAFEGUARDS

AREA OF REGULA- TIONS AND TRAINING

AREA OF TRANSIENTSAND ACCIDENTS

AREA OF RADIOLOG. IMPACT AND EMERGENCY

AREA OF RISK MANAGEMENT

AREA OF ENGINEERING

AREA OF MEDICALAPPLICATIONS AND

RESEARCH

AREA OF RADIOCHEMISTRY

AREA OF SECURITY AREA OF DOCUMENT CENTRE

AREA OF PERFORM. VERIFICATION

AREA OF RADIOLOGICAL REGULATIONS

AREA OF QUALITY

VERIFICATION AREA OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION

SYSTEMS

AREA OF OPERATIONALEXPERIENCE

AREA OF INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS

AREA OF RELEVANT INSTALLATIONS

AREA OF LAGUNA

VERDE RESIDENCEAREA OF ELECTRONICS

AND DOSIMETRY

FIGURE 8.1


ARTICLE 9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER 9.1 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS Licensee responsibility and the actions taken by the Regulatory Body to enforce Licensee’s responsibilities fulfilment have not changed. Therefore, based on information presented in the First and Second National Report, it can be concluded that the obligations established in Article 9 of the CSN are fulfilled.

9-1 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 10. PRIORITY TO SAFETY 10.1 INTRODUCTION AND SAFETY POLICIES Safety policies, leading criteria in nuclear safety and strategies to prevent and control the nuclear material mobility, have not changed, so it maintains valid the information described in the First National Report (See Annex III in its section 10.1). 10.2 SAFETY CULTURE AND GOOD PRACTICES Information provided in this section should be considered additional and complementary to provided in the Second National Report (Annex II). The CFE Nuclear Power Management (GCN) re-focused its policy to emphasize that nuclear safety is of higher priority than power production. This was clearly established in the organization Mission issued in November 1999 and currently in force : “Having safety as the highest priority, generate electricity by nuclear means with quality and minimum cost, sustained in our personnel's continuous self-improvement and deep respect to environment”. Another important action was the establishment of the Safety Culture Program developed in August 1998 that, among other things, it divulged this Mission and radically modified the previous policy that privileged power generation. Good practices adopted by Nuclear Plant Management (GCN) to improve safety culture in its organization, some of them pointed out by the Operational Safety Assessment Review Team (OSART) in its last visit, are listed below. 1. Nuclear Power Plant Management (GCN) Strategic Planning The Nuclear Plant Management (GCN) has implemented a Recovery and Development Plan 2003-2006, where in a structured and organized way, visualizes a series of actions that will allow improving its activities, fomenting a corporate culture based on values and establishes that its main purpose is to fulfil the Mission and its key four objectives, among which Safety stands out, besides Reliability, Performance and Cost. This Plan is focused to: a) To take actions in line with GCN priority key objective, that safety has the

highest priority in any GCN decision making.

10-1 Period 2001-2003


b) To maintain LVNPS safety and reliable operation for the personnel, installation and organization performance improvement, in the short and medium term.

c) To define the initiatives, action plans, projects and specific performance

indicators, short term resources, in the eight defined main focus areas related to the eight Safety Culture principles in the following way:

GCN STRATEGIC PLAN FOCUS AREAS

SAFETY CULTURE PRINCIPLES

Leadership and Management Leaders demonstrate commitment with safety Communication and teamwork Everyone in the organization is responsible for

nuclear safety A methodology “what happens if” is cultivated

Resources Decisions making reflects safety first principle Human performance Confidence permeates organization

Nuclear matters are recognized as different A methodology “what happens if” is cultivated Nuclear safety is continuously analysed

Self-assessment and corrective action

The organizational learning is well accepted

Condition and plant reliability Decision making reflects safety first principle Reduction of generation losses

Decision making reflects safety first principle

Dose reduction Nuclear safety is continuously analysed Nuclear matters are recognized as different

d) To define the process to be used by GCN to assess team and personal

performance improvement, creating a professional atmosphere that promotes personnel accountability.

e) To provide the bases to reach a World Class sustained performance level, in the

medium term. f) To serve as communication medium to all GCN personnel, for transmitting in a

clear, timely and efficient way, the short term performance expectations and goals for personnel, equipment, processes and all the organization for the achievement of GCN objectives and goals.

Personnel involvement to all levels and starting with the members of the Management Group, is promoted assigning each of the above mentioned focus areas

10-2 Period 2001-2003


to a Manager who must manage and fulfil the expected results through the establishment of initiatives to improve processes, programs, projects, action plans and indicators. 2. Safety Culture Seminars The Objective of the seminaries is to strengthen Safety Culture by means of: • The high respect to the nuclear technology

• Knowing and understanding of the Defence in Depth Concept

• Fostering the development and implementation of Good Practices All GCN personnel have attended these seminars including Managers. Moreover, Good Practices adoption has been reinforced by the adoption of the Good Behaviour Manual for Operation Personnel used by Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, USA. 3. Survey to Measure Safety Culture Level As part of the seminars a survey was applied to determine Safety Culture level. Results of these surveys coincide with the improvement areas detected during the 1999 WANO Peer-Review and point out diverse improvement areas which have been attended as follows: • A strong leadership and a proactive attitude of GCN Managers toward Safety

Culture (review of the strategic planning considering the safety principle as a fundamental factor to achieve a high performance level).

• Giving the highest priority and importance to actions reinforcing Safety Culture.

• Active participation of Area Heads and Supervisors in Safety Culture reinforcing activities.

• Application of Human Performance improvement tools which importance in prevention of events has been recognized.

• Application of a methodology for conservative decisions making for the LVNPS operation.

4. Safety Culture Performance Indicators Through GCN INTRANET, all CFE personnel have access to indicators directly related to Safety Culture. Currently, the CFE is completing these indicators set including others that show aspects of Safety Culture in a more direct way. To achieve this, it is applied the managerial procedure “Safety Performance Indicators”.

10-3 Period 2001-2003


With the OIEA technical assistance, Nuclear Power Plant Management of CFE is working in the integration of this new indicators set. 5. Assessment of the LVNPS Personnel Perception on Safety Culture The surveys that CFE has applied since 1998, includes now a brief questionnaire with the purpose of measuring the LVNPS personnel perception level regarding Safety Culture. This has allowed reassigning resources to those areas that require improvement; and has been useful as a mean to verify the effectiveness of actions taken. Improvements achieved up to date are related mainly to the following actions: • A better activities planning

• Effective supervision of personnel and their activities

• Teamwork and communication

• Training

• Attitude change of Managers and Supervisors

• Application human performance improvement tools 6. Implementation and Continuous Improvement of Safety Culture Several actions have been taken in order to maintain a continuous improvement in Safety Culture aspects, some of them follows: • Safety Culture Policy, edition 2000

• Collective Radiological Dose reduction goal during LVNPS outages

• Application of STAR (Stop, Think, Act, Review) cycle in maintenance and operation routine activities

• Application of conservative decisions

• Integration of improvement teams

• Human Performance Fundaments training course for all GCN personnel

• Application of procedures to assign priority to activities

• Conformation of a special group for Root-Cause Analysis

• Directive from Plant Manager (GCN) to responsible of plant radiological safety to stop any unsafe job

• Application of the concept STAR (Stop, Think, Act, Review) to induce a self-questioning attitude in plant personnel

10-4 Period 2001-2003


10.3 ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCERNS ON SAFETY


Previous National Report In the period covered by this National Report, safety polices, leading criteria in nuclear safety, strategies to prevent and to control the mobility of the nuclear material and continuous practise of Safety Culture in LVNPS have not changed. In particular, CFE/GCN highlights the following achievements (See section 10.2 of this National Report): • Launching out of the Recovery and Development Plan

• Development and application of a managerial procedure to determine Safety Performance Indicators

• Application of procedures for activities priorization 10.3.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report For the period that will be covered by next National Report, CFE /GCN will develop the following activities: Implementation by the Nuclear Plant Management (GCN) of a Processes Based

Management System Integration of Quality Management, environmental protection and industrial

safety systems, which includes nuclear and radiological safety, physical security and safeguards

10.3.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Concerning priority to safety, it considers that there are no safety issues of concern, so it is not necessary to implement preventive or corrective measures.

10-5 Period 2001-2003



During this period, the regulatory body and LVNPS management activities show their commitment to maintain nuclear safety as an overriding priority over any other concept. Therefore, based on the information submitted in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional presented in this National Report, it can be concluded that the obligations established in Article 10 of CSN are fulfilled.

10-6 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 11. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES 11.1 FINANCIAL RESOURCES As declared in the First National Report (Annex III) necessary funds for Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant operation come from the Federal Resources and they do not depend on the direct sales of the electricity produced. Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) is a government owned company and budget assigned must be applied in an adequate and transparent way. Inside CFE budget, the LVNPS investment and operation expenses are privileged with compared to other Mexican power generating installations. This is partly a result of requirements imposed by the Mexican Regulatory Body. 11.1.1 Financial Resources for CNSNS Annually, CNSNS, as a semi-autonomous unit from the Secretariat of Energy, elaborates through its Division of Finances and Administration, its budget based on the specific needs identified by Divisions, departments and areas that conform it. 11.1.2 Financial Resources for CFE Regarding financial resources for CFE information included in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 11.1.2). 11.2 HUMAN RESOURCES 11.2.1 CNSNS Human Resources Section 8.4 of this National Report presents the information regarding to human resources at CNSNS. 11.2.2 CFE/GCN Human Resources CFE Nuclear Plant Management (GCN) work force is 1,361 permanent employees, to December 2003. 11.2.2.1 CFE Organisational Structure Currently, the CFE organization holds with a General Director and 5 Directors: Projects and Financial Investment, Finances, Administration, Operations and Modernization and Structural Change. This new organization substitutes the one

11-1 Period 2001-2003


presented in the Second National Report to fulfill the requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Annex II). The Figure 11.1 shows the current structure of CFE. Production

In 1990 Unit 1 of Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station started commercial operation with 654 MWe. In 1995 the second unit of Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station started in commercial operation to contribute with 654 additional MWe. Nowadays, both units of LVNPS have been uprated in 5%, and each one produces 682.44 MWe. Installed effective total capacity of the CFE is currently 43,727 MWe and LVNPS contribution is 3.12%:

SOURCE TYPE INSTALLED CAPACITY

(MWe)

PERCENTAGE

(%)

THERMOELECTRIC 29,421.36 67.28

HYDROELECTRIC 9,379.82 21.45

COAL 2,600.00 5.95

NUCLEAR 1,364.88 3.12

GEOTHERMAL 959.50 2.19

EOLIC 2.18 0.01

T O T A L 43,726.74 100.00 Transmission and Transformation

In 2003, the national interconnected system had 41,241 Km. of transmission lines with voltages of 400, 230, 161 and 150 Kilovolts (KV), 43,617 Km of sub-transmission lines in voltages of 138, 115, 85 and 69 KW and 537,204 Km of distribution lines in levels of 34.5, 23, 13.8, 6.6, 4.16 and 2.4 KW. In total, in that year it had 658,062 Km of transmission lines, sub-transmission and distribution at national level.

11-2 Period 2001-2003


Also in 2003, transformation capacity was 162,775 MVA; 76.8% from this corresponds to transmission substations and the remaining 23.2% to distribution substations. To fulfill this responsibility, the Manager of Nuclear Power Plant Management (GCN) has the support of the organization shown in the Figure 11.2, which indicates lines of authority and communication among the organizations that form this Division. This new organization modifies to that reported in the Second National Report (Annex II) and it is result of a processes review for resources optimization. This organization is in charge since the second semester of 2003 and maintains the purpose of providing independence between production and technical support areas, including the training center. The support services and engineering support to LVNPS Operation organization, for LVNPS Units 1 & 2 lifetime are the Vice-Managers of Services and Engineering responsibility, respectively. Engineering personnel possess the qualification, experience and necessary knowledge to carry out his functions. For the personnel's qualification the requirements of the standard ANSI/ANS 3.1-1981 “Selection, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants” were applied before October 2000. However, in November 2000, the requirements of the Mexican Official Norm NOM-NUCL-034-2000 are applied “Selection, Qualification and Training Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants staff”. In addition to technical support organization, the Nuclear Plant Management (GCN) has the Nuclear Safety Vice-Management (which is conformed by Departments of Licensing, Quality Assurance, Quality Control, Operating Verification and Operational Experience, Environmental Engineering and Industrial Safety) which it is independent of Production organization and is responsible for audit functions, surveillance and independent reviews to all exploitation, maintenance and support services activities. 11.2.2.3 General Superintendence of Operation (Plant Management) The General Superintendent of Operation reports to the Manager of GCN. He is in charged of LVNPS operation and maintenance and is directly responsible to comply with and maintain the License of Operation of the LVNPS Units 1 & 2 and Radiological Protection and ALARA programs. The main functional areas under direct supervision of the General Superintendent of Operation are: Production, Maintenance, Work Management, Radiological Protection, Reactor Engineering, Refueling and Physical Security (See Figure 11.2 of this National Report).

11-3 Period 2001-2003


11.2.2.4 Production Vice-Management The Vice-Manager of Production reports to the General Superintendent of Operation. He is in charged of the LVNPS operation and control. The main functional areas under direct supervision of Vice-Manager of Production are: Operation U-1, Operation U-2 and Chemical Engineering (See Figure 11.2 of this National Report). The line of authority and emission of special temporal orders during contingencies is the following: a) Superintendent of Production b) Heads of Operation (U1 and U2) c) Shift Supervisor (U1 and U2) As reported in the First National Report (Annex III), the Operation Groups are assigned, for Unit 1 and Unit 2, based on shift roles. The personnel are not shared between units (except yard personnel); however, they could be completely transferred if previous training requirements are satisfied. There are 6 shifts groups per unit to cover the 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and an allowance for the Continuous Retraining Program, vacations and incidentals that could occur. 11.2.2.5 Maintenance Vice-Management The Vice-Manager of Maintenance reports to General Superintendent of Operation. He is responsible of the preventive and corrective maintenance activities and modifications to LVNPS related to Mechanic, Electric, Instrumentation and Control and Civil disciplines; as well as the development and implementation of Inspection in Service and Spare Parts programs. The main functional areas under direct supervision of the Vice-Manager of Maintenance are: Mechanical Maintenance, Electric Maintenance, Instrumentation and Control Maintenance, Construction Support, Technical Assistance for Maintenance and Special Programs (See Figure 11.2 of this National Report). 11.2.2.6 Services Vice-Management The Vice-Manager of Services reports to the GCN Manager. He has the responsibility of providing support services, day by day, to the General Superintendent of Operation in the areas of training, computer systems, communications and infrastructure. To fulfill this responsibility, he has the support of the areas of Training, Computer Systems, Communications and Infrastructure (See Figure 11.2 of this National Report).

11-4 Period 2001-2003


Regarding training, Services Vice-Management has the support of Training Center Head, who is responsible for planning, coordinating and executing the training programs for LVNPS licensed and non-licensed personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of simulator’s hardware and software. 11.2.2.7 Engineering Vice-Management The Vice-Manager of Engineering reports to the GCN Manager. He has the responsibility of providing engineering support to General Superintendent of Operation, as well as to the Vice-Managers of Services and Nuclear Safety. Moreover he is responsible for maintaining LVNPS Design Engineering Bases, Configuration Control, Modifications Program, Investment Protection (equipment and components aging program) and Radwaste Disposal. To fulfill these responsibilities, the Vice-Manager of Engineering has the following departments: Design Engineering, Systems Engineering, Technical Management, Site Engineering and Radwaste Final Disposal (See Figure 11.2 of this National Report). 11.2.2.8 Nuclear Safety Vice-Management The Vice-Manager of Nuclear Safety reports to GCN Manager. He is responsible of executing reviews and audits to all safety related activities or covered by Quality Assurance Program. The review and audit program has de objectives of reviewing important changes proposed to systems or procedures, tests and experiments, assuring that safety significant events are investigated and corrected immediately, reducing the probability of recurrence, and detecting unnoticed tendencies. Furthermore he is responsible for the implementation of the LVNPS Environmental Monitoring Program. To fulfill these responsibilities, Vice-Manager of Nuclear Safety has the support of the areas of Quality Assurance, Quality Control, Licensing, Operative Verification and Operational Experience, Environmental Engineering and Industrial Safety (See Figure 11.2 of this National Report). 11.2.2.9 Review and Assessment Committees To carry out the review of operational safety related activities, the review program has been developed at three levels. The first one at LVNPS operation level: Site Operations Review Committee (CROS). Second, to corporate level: Independent Operations Review Committee (CIRO) and the third, as an independent from GCN self-assessment: Independent Safety Engineering Unit (UIIS). The CROS, integrated by Production, Maintenance, Services, Engineering and Nuclear Safety personnel, carries out a review of operations activities and advises LVNPS General Superintendent of Operation. The CIRO, integrated by Vice-Managers that are not directly responsible for LVNPS operation, operates as an independent review group that carries out reviews and assessments and audits.

11-5 Period 2001-2003


Additionally, in a routinely basis, Quality Assurance organization formulates and executes an audits/surveillances program to verify compliance with the Operation Quality Assurance Program (See Article 13 of this National Report). Site Operations Review Committee (CROS)

The CROS is a committee chaired by LVNPS General Superintendent of Operation, having as Vice-President the Vice-Manager of Production and following members the Heads of: Training Center, Operation U1, Operation U2, Reactor Engineering, Technical Assistance for Maintenance, Systems Engineering, Radiological Protection, Work & Administrative Assistant, Quality Control, Site Engineering, Instrumentation and Control Maintenance, and Operating Verification and Operational Experience. This last one acts as Secretary. Their responsibilities are described in the corresponding paragraph of the First National Report (Annex III). Independent Operations Review Committee (CIRO)

The Independent Operations Review Committee (CIRO) is a committee chaired by the GCN Manager. The permanent members of this Committee are: General Superintendent of Operation, Vice-Manager of Engineering, Vice-Manager of Production, Vice-Manager of Services, Vice-Manager of Nuclear Safety, Vice-Manager of Maintenance, Head of Independent Safety Engineering Unit, Head of Quality Assurance and the Head of Licensing. CIRO delegates in the Quality Assurance Department the execution of audits, excepting those applicable to the Physical Security, which are carried out by Licensing Department. CIRO carries out review and independent audit of activities in areas reported in the First National Report (Annex III). Independent Safety Engineering Unit (UIIS)

The functions, responsibilities and communication lines of the Independent Safety Engineering Unit are the same that were described in the Second National Report (Annex II). 11.2 TRAINING AND RETRAINING PROGRAM The training and retraining program has not changed so the information submitted in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 11.3).

11-6 Period 2001-2003


11.3.1 Initial Training Program The initial training program has not changed so the information submitted in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 11.3.1). 11.3.1.1 Training of Licensed Personnel The training of licensed personnel has not changed so the information submitted in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 11.3.1.1). 11.3.1.2 Training of Non-Licensed Personnel The training of non-licensed personnel has not changed so the information submitted in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 11.3.1.2). 11.3.2 Retraining Program 11.3.2.1 Licensed Personnel Essentially there are no changes in the information provided in the First and Second National Report (Annex II and III); however, it is necessary to point out that at the beginning of second semester of 2000, Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) began to be applied to Operation training programs, and up to date, all the required areas have concluded the Analysis and Design phases. 11.3.2.2 Non-Licensed Personnel There are no changes regarding Non-licensed Personnel, so it is valid the information presented in the First National Report (See Annex III in its section 11.3.2.2). 11.3.2.3 Substitution Program There are no changes in the Substitution Program, information presented in the First National Report remains valid (See Annex III, section 11.3.2.3). 11.4 FUNDS FOR RADWASTE DISPOSAL AND DECOMMISSIONING CNSNS has established specific requirements in the current Licenses for Commercial Operation of the LVNPS Units 1 & 2. These requirements provide the basis for the solution of two very important issues: the radioactive waste and decommissioning:

11-7 Period 2001-2003

“3. LVNPS must develop and submit to CNSNS strategic plans for definitive storage of medium and low level radioactive waste or the temporary solution


options to the need for storage space. Additionally it must have an installation specially dedicated to equipment decontamination and segregation of radioactive material.”

“4. The CFE-LVNPS should develop a strategy and the financial mechanisms to

guarantee that it will have the necessary and enough financial resources to carry out the decommissioning (no matter what option is chosen) of the installation at the end of its life.”

Regarding the Requirement No. 3, CFE along with the secretariat of Energy, has established a program to define the National Policy for Radwaste disposal, and to analyze the modification of the Regulatory Law of the Constitutional Article 27 on Nuclear Matters. Furthermore, Mexico has had IAEA advice for the fulfillment of the International Convention on Spent Fuel Safety Management and the Convention on Radwaste Safety Management Regarding the Requirement No. 4, LVNPS in coordination with CFE Accounting Management is integrating a fund for financing Units 1 and 2 decommissioning and for the safe radwaste management. This fund is based on an integrated charge to production costs of $0.001 USA dollars / KWh, (Review at April 12 2000) and adjusted to the date of commercial operation start up of the two Units (1990 for the U1 and 1995 for the U2). Also, CFE proposed to the CNSNS as Decommissioning Preventive Plan for LVNPS Units 1 and 2, the SAFSTOR Procedure established in the NUREG-6174. This procedure is defined in five stages: a. Planning, regulatory review, engineering, preparation for reactor final

shutdown. b. Unit deactivation, preparation for decommissioning. c. Reactor spent fuel removal (last reactor core) to the spent fuel pool,

maintaining the core in this pool for a cooling period of 5 to 6 years, after that, the spent fuel should be transferred to an independent storage.

d. Extended period of safe storage of the waste coming from the Reactor Building conventional areas for a 30 to 60 years period.

e. At the end of the Storage License, dismantlement and decontamination of the reactor systems and components are carried out and radwaste is safely managed until their final disposal.

11-8 Period 2001-2003


11.5 ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCERNS ON SAFETY ENHANCEMENT

11.5.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the

Previous National Report In the period covered by this National Report, from the point of view of human and financial resources, CFE and GCN (LVNPS operating entity) organizations have had the following achievements and changes: • Organization.- As a result of a processes review for the resources

optimization, CFE organization was restructured (see Section 11.2.2.2 of this National Report).

• Training.- Radiological Protection, Chemistry, Engineering, Operation, Training and Maintenance supervisors have participated in WANO Seminars for Professional Development. Also, three seminars have been imparted by WANO in LVNPS with international participation of supervisors from other nuclear power stations. These seminars have helped to reinforce the Nuclear Safety concepts, Conservative Decisions and Operational Decisions Making.

Regarding the Regulatory Body, for the period that includes this National Report, the achievements and changes related to this topic are described in section 8.7.1 of this National Report. 11.5.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report In LVNPS, by the middle of 2003 the purchase of a new simulator for operator training with a higher physical and functional fidelity was authorized. According to program, the new simulator will be ready for training in the beginning of the third trimester of 2005. Concerning the Regulatory Body, in the period covered by this National Report and the corresponding to the next report, the future activities and foreseen or proposed programs relative to this topic are described in the section 8.7.2 of this National Report. 11.5.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Concerning to this article, the Mexican Regulatory Body considers that there are no safety issues of concern, so it is not necessary to implement preventive or corrective measures.

11-9 Period 2001-2003



Based on information provided in previous sections, it can be concluded obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to assure enough financial resources that allow the preservation and continuous improvement of the nuclear facilities, as well as training and personnel's permanent development, assuring a high level of quality and facilities and in the human resources qualification updating to guarantee a safely operation.. Therefore, based on the information submitted in the First and Second National Report, and the additional presented in this National Report, it can be concluded that obligations established in Article 11 of the CSN are fulfilled.

11-10 Period 2001-2003


11-11 Period 2001-2003

GENERAL DIRECTOR

Director of Projects andFinancial Investment Director of Finances Director of

Administration Director of OperationDirector for Modernization

and Structural Change

Vice-Director ofGeneration

Vice-Director ofDistribution

Vice- irector ofConstruction

Head of NPPManagement

Vice-Director ofTransmission,

Transforming andControl

Vice-Directorof Planning

TechnicalVice-Director

FIGURE 11.1

FEDERAL COMMISSION OF ELECTRICITY (CFE)CFE ORGANIZATION CHART AND NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DIVISION

D


11-12 Period 2001-2003

NPP MANAGEMENT Independent Operation ReviewCommittee (CIRO)

Independent Safety EngineeringGroup (GIIS)

Legal Department

General Superintendence ofOperation

ProductionVice-Management

MaintenanceVice-Management

Nuclear SafetyVice-Management

EngineeringVice-Management

AdministrativeVice-Management

Operation U-1

Operation U-2

Mechanical Maintenance

Construction Support

Instrumentation andControl Maintenance

Electrical Maintenance

Work Management

SiteOperations

ReviewCommittee

(CROS)

Quality Assurance

OperatingVerification and

OperationalExperience

Licensing

Quality Control

Design Engineering

Site Engineering

TechnicalManagement

Radwaste FinalDisposal

Systems Engineering

Supplies

Accounting

Work &Administrative

Services

Technical &Administrative

Assistant

FinancialAssistant

Technical Assistance forMaintenance

Special Programs

RadiologicalProtection

ReactorEngineering

Refueling

PhysicallSecurity

Industrial Safety

EnvironmentalEngineering

ServicesVice-

Management

Training

ComputerSystems

Infrastructure

Communications

ChemicalEngineering

FIGURE 11.2

FEDERAL COMMISSION OF ELECTRICITY (CFE)NPP MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION CHART

Nuclear Fuel Management


ARTICLE 12. HUMAN FACTORS 12.1 BACKGROUND This section has not changed so the information that was submitted in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 12.1). 12.2 CURRENT SITUATION The information provided in this section should be considered additional and complementary to provided in the First and Second National Report (See Annex II and III in its section 12.2). Currently, CFE Nuclear Plant Management (GCN) has implemented the Recovery and Development Plan, that it is the main strategy for improvement of Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station (LVNPS) performance. Expectations and performance goals for personnel, equipment, processes and organizations of GCN are established in this plan. This plan includes eight Main Focus Areas: 1.- Leadership and management 2.- Communication and teamwork 3.- Resources 4.- Human performance 5.- Self-assessment and corrective action 6.- Condition of materials and plant reliability 7.- Reduction of generation losses 8.- Dose optimization Regarding the Program for Alarms Reduction of the Main Control Room in both LVNPS units, this issue arose from the start-up test stage in LVNPS due to configuration problems reveled by mal-functioning alarms. This reduction program was developed with the objective of reaching a “Black Board” condition. Within the period of this National Report, the most part of the activities have been concluded by the application of preventive maintenance actions and modifications to the original design.

12-1 Period 2001-2003


12.3 FURTHER STEPS CONTRIBUTING TO PREVENT HUMAN ERROR AND IMPROVE MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION

The information provided in this section should be considered additional and complementary to presented in the First and Second National Report (See Annex II and III, section 12.3). Paying special attention to the Focus Area No. 4 Human performance, mentioned in the section 12.2 of this National Report; the application of tools to prevent errors, is the approach used by GCN for man-machine interaction, processes, teamwork and training improvement. To approach this Focus Area, several specific initiatives have been developed which are conceived to attend to management processes, programs, procedures and all GCN organization performance. Among these initiatives is important to point out the following: • Quality culture improvement

• Personnel's performance improvement

• Improvement of personnel's health and safety at work

• Development, communication and implementation of Human Performance program

• Development, communication and implementation of strategies for Safety Culture improvement

• To continue with the integration of the Computer Systems to GCN database To give more attention to issues of human performance and errors prevention in Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station (LVNPS), the Coordination of Human Performance was created to promote knowledge in Human Performance Fundamentals and their application to power plant activities, sustained in the proactive attitude to prevent errors, with a safe and reliable performance as the main objective. Regarding the operative helps pointed out in the Second National Report (Annex II in their section 12.3), the following information is an update:

• Currently, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is included in simulator training in transient and emergency scenarios.

• During 1999 and up to date, more than 993 people of different functional areas of GCN organization and in particular from LVNPS (Operation, Maintenance and Support Engineering), have attended the initial course on the Human Performance Principles (INPO / WANO Course on Fundamentals of Human

12-2 Period 2001-2003


Performance for Errors and Incidents Prevention in Nuclear Power Plants). Additionally, main control room personnel of both LVNPS units have been trained in conservative decision making. Since 2003, more than 625 operation and maintenance personnel have attended the retraining course in Human Performance Principles. This course is focused to the use of tools to prevent errors and events (among others: three ways communication, pre-work meeting, peer-review, self-verification).

12.4 THE ROLE OF THE REGULATORY BODY IN REDUCING EVENTS

CAUSED BY HUMAN FACTORS. Essentially there are no changes in the information provided in the First and Second National Report (See Annex II and III in their section 12.4); however, the following additional information is provided. A) New Simulator

Within the period of this National Report, the Regulatory Body required the licensee to update his simulator to reflect current operational conditions of both LVNPS units.

B) Alarms Cleaning Program

This program was a requirement of the Regulatory Body and within the period of this National Report, under CNSNS regulatory actions, the major activities of this program have been concluded with the application of preventive maintenance actions and modifications to the original design.



Previous National Report Within the period of this National Report the following achievements and changes can be mentioned: • The use of tools for errors prevention has been increased, especially among

LVNPS operation groups who carry out their practices in a routine way at the Control Rooms and the simulator.

12-3 Period 2001-2003


• Additionally to the SPDS, Risks Monitor was installed in LVNPS Control Rooms of both units and simulator, to assess the real or potential changes of Core Damage Probability under configuration changes.

• A new simulator is being purchased for LVNPS. It will include tools for the development of severe accidents and three-dimensional core and primary containment models.

• Regarding the Alarms Cleaning Program, the major activities of this program have been finished; therefore it is considered that this will reduce the probability of events related to human factors.

12.5.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report Within the period of the next National Report: • Implementation of GCN/CFE Recovery and Development Plan will continue as the

main strategy for Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station (LVNPS) performance improvement (Section 12.2 of this National Report).

• During 2004, reinforcement of the use of human performance tools in all LVNPS areas will continue, especially for safety related activities. (e. g. pre-work interdisciplinary meetings).

• In particular, the Regulatory Body is planning to initiate the assessment of the organization and management impact in LVNPS safety, trough the development of a systematic methodology that allows an objective assessment of this topic.

12.5.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Regarding human factors, Regulatory Body considers the following concerns: • LVNPS substitution program of obsolete instrumentation.

• Absence of personnel dedicated to human factors and instrumentation and control in the Regulatory Body, as a result of personnel reduction (See section 8.4 of this National Report).

On the other hand, aging of LVNPS labor force is also a concern. It is foreseen that in the period from 2004 to 2010, approximately 477 workers will retire (directive, specialized technicians and administrative personnel). Due to the fact that there is only one nuclear plant in the country; there are a low number of students in the few universities and technological institutions that offer nuclear engineering programs. Since 2003, LVNPS has begun an intensive program of recruitment and selection to prepare and qualify personnel to replace those retiring.

12-4 Period 2001-2003


12.6 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS As shown in previous sections, the consideration of Human Factors through the execution of a detailed review of the control room, modifications, implementation of a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), development and implementation of symptom based emergency procedures, the program for alarm cleaning and the practise of tasks on the simulator as well as the inclusion of operational experience on human errors and the results of surveillance and inspection activities performed by CNSNS, it can be stated that Human Factors for LVNPS has been taken into account from its design, during routine operation and during the eventual occurrence of transients and operational incidents. Therefore, based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional submitted in this National Report, it can be concluded that the obligations of the Article 12 of the CSN are fulfilled.

12-5 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 13. QUALITY ASSURANCE 13.1 QUALITY ASSURANCE POLICIES Quality Assurance Policies have not changed, so information included in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 13.1). 13.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN DURING CONSTRUCTION STAGE Information regarding Quality Assurance during the Construction Stage has not changed, so the information included in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 13.2). 13.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN DURING OPERATIONAL STAGE Information concerning the Quality Assurance during the Operational Stage has not changed, so the information included in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 13.3). 13.3.1 Periodic Evaluation of the Adequacy of the Quality Assurance Plan

during the Operational Stage Information provided on the Periodic Evaluation of the Adequacy of the Quality Assurance Plan in Operation Stage has not changed, so the information included in the Second National Report is still valid (Annex II, section 13.3.1). 13.3.2 Audits and Surveillance’s Information on Audits and Surveillances has not change, so information included in the First and Second National Report remains valid (See Annex III and II in its section 13.3.2). 13.3.3 Corrective Actions Information regarding corrective actions has not changed so information included in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 13.3.3). However, it is necessary to highlight the next: Currently, the LVNPS is working on the implementation of an integrated corrective action system, the Corrective Action Program (PAC), similar to those used in several USA power plants. This program will require some changes in LVNPS strategies and

13-1 Period 2001-2003


working methods, and will control all corrective actions to so called conditions adverse to quality. 13.3.4 Procurement of Parts and Components Information provided on Procurement of Parts and Components has not changed, so information included in the Second National Report remains valid. (See Annex II, section 13.3.4). 13.4 REPORTABILITY The information concerning reportability has not changed so information included in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 13.4). 13.5 OTHER QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMS Information concerning other quality assurance programs has not changed so the information included in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 13.5). 13.6 REGULATORY BODY ACTIVITIES IN THE NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS The CNSNS has evaluated and approved, before its implementation, each construction and operation Quality Assurance Plan revisions issued by LVNPS. During the period of this report, modifications to Quality Assurance Plan Revision 8A, particularly those related with the organizational changes and with a new definition of management procedures have been submitted to CNSNS. Also, CNSNS inspections to activities related to LVNPS Quality Assurance have reported findings that are important for Quality Assurance System improvement among them are the detection of the following problems: • Low efficiency of the Corrective Action System resulting in a high number of non

executed corrective actions and frequent delays. CNSNS is now following this issue and LVNPS is implementing a corrective action program (see Section 13.3.3 above).

• Inadequate control of corrective actions for deficiencies detected in the

CFE/GCN Engineering organization. This issue has been solved. • Low priority was given to deficiencies detected by the Independent Safety

Engineering Unit (UIIS). This issue is now solved.

13-2 Period 2001-2003




Previous National Report Within the period of this National Report, the achievements are the following: During 2003, LVNPS achieved the certification with the Official Mexican Norm

NMX-CC-9001-IMNC-2000 that is equivalent with the norm ISO 9001:2000 (See section 13.5 of this National Report).


Covered by the Next National Report Within the period of the next National Report, problems detected by the Regulatory Body through its inspection program(See section 13.6 of this National Report) will receive special attention, until their definitive resolution; routine inspections to activities related to LVNPS Quality Assurance Program will be maintained, including those inspections to suppliers and contractors. Also, special attention will be given to the implementation of the new corrective action system denominated Corrective Action Program (PAC). 13.7.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions As pointed out earlier a problem detected by the Regulatory Body during this period is the low efficiency of Corrective Action System, resulting in delays in corrective actions application. Currently, LVNPS is implementating of an integrated Corrective Action System, denominated Corrective Action Program (PAC), which will require changes in its strategies and work methods (See section 13.3.3 of this National Report). The Regulatory Body is evaluating these changes and the fulfillment with regulations, and will pay special attention in its implementation process. 13.8 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS As it is described in previous sections of this Article, the implementation of the Quality Assurance Programs is a requirement that has been requested, applied and inspected for all activities important to safety since the early stages of design, construction, start up tests and operation of LVNPS Units-1 & 2.

13-3 Period 2001-2003


During the period of this National Report and in order to fulfil the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Mexican Regulatory Body (CNSNS) has evaluated the modifications submitted by CFE / Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant to the Quality Assurance Plan. Additionally, CNSNS has assessed the Adequacy of the Quality Assurance Operation Plan and has found that these activities are adequate and fulfil the applicable standards and regulations. Therefore, based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional submitted in this National Report, it can be concluded that obligations stated in Article 13 of the CSN are fulfilled.

13-4 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 14. ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY 14.1 INTRODUCTION This Article describes safety evaluations and verifications carried out by regulatory body and other external organizations to LVNPS. Safety evaluations using probabilistic techniques are also described. Activities for installation safety improvements resulting from these safety evaluations and verifications are also included in this Article. Regarding the regulatory framework related with this Article, this has not changed so the information that was established in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 14.1). 14.2 SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CONSTRUCTION STAGE The First National Report (See Annex III) presents the methodology followed by CNSNS for the assessment of activities before and during LVNPS construction stage. 14.2.1 LVNPS Internal Audits/Inspections Information regarding Laguna Verde NPP internal audits and inspection has not changed, so information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 14.2.1). 14.2.2 CNSNS Regulatory Activities Information regarding CNSNS regulatory activities has not changed so information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III. section 14.2.2). 14.2.3 External Assessments Information regarding the external assessments in LVNPS has not changed so information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 14.2.3). 14.2.4 Pre-operational Test Program Information regarding the pre-operational test program in Laguna Verde NPP has not changed so information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 14.2.4).

14-1 Period 2001-2003


14.3 SAFETY ASSESSMENT, OPERATION STAGE 14.3.1 Evaluations/Surveillance by LVNPS Organisations The information regarding evaluations / surveillance by LVNPS organizations has not changed so the information that was established in the First and Second National Report is still valid (See Annex III and II in its section 14.3.1). In this National Report the Figures 14.1 and 14.2 are updated. This show a summary of evaluations carry out by LVNPS-1 & 2 since the beginning of commercial operation up to December 2003 for the following type of modifications: PM- Modification Package PMM- Minor Modification Package PMMD- Minor Documental Modification Package PERC- Component Replacement Evaluation Package PMDT- Technical Documentary Modification Package PCPA- Set Point Change Package PyD- Jumper and Disconnection PROC- Procedures PMRC- Component Replacement Modification Package SMT- Temporary Modification Request ESPEC- Design Specifications PMS Software Modification Package VARIOS Miscellaneous Documents 14.3.2 External Evaluations/Verifications to LVNPS 14.3.2.1 External Evaluations/Verifications Performed by CNSNS A) Start-up Tests Information regarding start-up testing in LVNPS has not changed so the information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 14.3.2.1 A). B) Commercial Operation The activities that CNSNS carries out to assure that LVNPS operation does not represent an undue risk to the safety and health of the public are: Evaluation, Inspection, Licensing of Nuclear Facilities and Application of Enforcement Measures.

14-2 Period 2001-2003


Evaluation:

The main evaluation activities follow:

• Changes to License conditions

• Design changes to systems, structure and components important to safety

• Design changes that implies un-reviewed safety issue

• Changes to Technical Specifications

• Exemptions to regulation

• Licensing of reactor cores for each fuel cycle

• Assessment of Event Reports that are reportable to Regulatory Body

• Licensing of reactor operators

• Changes to Quality Assurance Plan

Follow up evaluations

• Results of Pump & Valve Operability Programs under ASME Code, Section XI and submittals for exemption to fulfil this code

• Results of In-Service Inspection Programs under ASME, Section XI, and submittals for exemption to fulfil this code (Repairing, Code Cases, etc.)

• Assessment of activities for control and mitigation of ageing (Maintenance of Environmental Qualification, Corrosion, Irradiation, Water Chemistry, etc)

• Assessment of the applicability of Internal and External Operational Experience

• Review, development, and implementation of new regulations Detailed evaluations have been carried out in the period 2001-2003 of issues relevant to nuclear safety. Examples of these, follows: a) Operative Flexibilities: Maximum Extended Operation Domain (MEOD) and

Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Technical Specifications (ARTS).

b) Modification of level instrumentation condensing cameras of reactor pressure vessel.

14-3 Period 2001-2003


c) Jet pumps reduced flow, and beams replacement d) Instrumentation Environmental Qualification e) Elimination of Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) steam condensation

mode Main evaluation effort, in the period 2001-2003, has been focused to issue a) above, requiring the evaluation of the Application for a License Change, to modify the range of total flow through the core from (87-107) % to (81 -107) %. This evaluation included among others: transient analysis, over pressure protection of the reactor vessel, thermal-hydraulics stability, emergency systems performance and Technical Specifications for Operation. CNSNS is preparing the Safety Evaluation Report and the corresponding Technical Opinion, which will be submitted to the Secretariat of Energy. Inspection: In order to verify the fulfilment with the license requirements and commitments contracted by the CFE, the CNSNS carries out a program of inspections that it is elaborated in a biennial base taking into account the impact in the safety that the inspected areas have according to the settled down in the IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-G4 and the performance that LVNPS areas have had during the evaluated periods. As pointed out in the section 7.5 of this National Report, inspections were reclassified in: planned (announced and not announced), unplanned, reactive and augmented. Additionally to the planned inspections, there are two Resident Inspectors, one for each LVNPS unit to verify in a routinely way the fulfilment to conditions and requirements of the nuclear safety. The main inspected areas during the LVNPS operation stage are: Operation, Radiological Safety, Maintenance, Engineering, Emergency Preparedness, Quality Assurance and Personnel Supervisor Performance. Also, special inspections are carried out (unplanned, reactive and augmented) in response to uncommon situations or events. In the period covered by this National Report, the main events that required this type of inspections were: • Release of liquid outside of LVNPS Unit 1 buildings, due to a leak of the

contribution/rejection piping of the Condensed Storage Tank from/to the Condenser.

• Automatic Trip of LVNPS Unit 1 and inoperability of the RCIC during 365 days.

14-4 Period 2001-2003


• Updating of LVNPS simulator computer platform, to follow up implementation of the core and primary containment models, for severe accidents simulation during training sessions for Licensed Personnel

• Change of the nuclear instrumentation to the Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM), and follow up to installation and functional tests

Additionally to the above mentioned, CNSNS have carried out risk-based inspections. See section 14.6.3 of this National Report.

On the other hand, CNSNS is in the stage of adopting and adapting the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) developed by USNRC. This process possesses the advantages that it focuses the inspections in areas of higher potential risk, allows applying higher regulatory attention in areas with performance problems, combines the results of inspection findings with the use of performance indicators, and reduces the regulatory burden. In this period 2001-2003 this project is in the initial stage with the adoption of the performance indicators. 14.3.2.2 External Assessments Performed by Others The information provided in this paragraph should be considered additional and complementary to included in the Second National Report (Annex II). Within the period from December 3 to 20, 2002, a second evaluation to LVNPS as level III member was carried out by WANO AC for the same areas evaluated in 1999, identifying strengths and improvement areas as a result. Action plans was assigned to each of these improvement areas and have been included in LVNPS Strategic Plan. A third evaluation to LVNPS as Level III member of WANO AC has been programmed to take place in December 2004. Regarding the findings and observations of the Independent Audit carried out by the TÜV Company from November 2000 to January 2001. CFE has solved and closed 82% of them by December 2003; solutions are in process for the remaining findings and observations. The most relevant of these is the development of the new simulator, the construction of which is planned to end in the second trimester of 2005. 14.4 SAFETY ASSESSMENT, ACTIONS FOR ITS CONTINUOUS

IMPROVEMENT A Regulatory Body activity for safety continuous improvement is the follow up of issues which relevance requires special licensee attention. These issues have been established as regulatory requirements for both LVNPS units.

14-5 Period 2001-2003


Status of these requirements follows: • Assessment of the fulfilment with the ALARA objectives. In 2003 CNSNS

required the implementation of the revised 10 CFR Part 20, “Standards for Protection Against Radiation”.

• Simulator fidelity and reliability. Monthly meetings have been held between CNSNS and CFE personnel to review scenarios and training programs. As a definite solution CFE has planned to have a new simulator in the first semester of 2005.

• Development of a strategic plan for the definitive storage of radioactive wastes of low and medium level, and construction of a decontamination storage. CFE proposed a strategic plan to solve this requirement and provide an optional solution for temporal waste storage. This plan includes the construction of the Radioactive Waste Definitive Storage (ADDER). In the meantime, CFE has adopted an optional solution (temporal) consisting in the construction of the Re-Useable Parts Collecting Centre and Contaminated Oils Storage (CCAC), as well as the enlargement of Wet Waste Temporal Storage (ATS) which have been submitted for CNSNS licensing. Regarding to Decontamination Storage, CFE proposed a general description of construction project. Detailed information will be submitted to CNSNS.

• Financial mechanisms for decommissioning. CFE submitted the Preventive Preliminary Plan for LVNPS Units 1 & 2 decommissioning

• External Radiological Emergency Plan (PERE). An integrated exercise was carried out during April 2002, obtaining a satisfactory result from the general viewpoint. Observations made on certain areas were solved by the application of corrective actions.

• Alarm cleaning program. CFE has solved the majority of this concern by the application of preventive maintenance actions and with modifications to original design, and only one alarm is pending.

• Equipment Environmental Qualification. CFE is giving permanent attention to this concern under CNSNS follow up to actions taken by CFE to maintain environmental qualification. Deficiencies detected by CNSNS are now being solved by CFE.

• Quality List for the safety related equipment and components. This issue was solved by CFE under CNSNS follow up the actions carried out by CFE.

• Verification of the operability of motor operated valves and local leak criterion for check valves. Operability of motor operated valves is continuously attended by CFE under CNSNS follow up. Regarding check valves leak criterion, solution submitted by CFE has been evaluated acceptable by CNSNS.

• Implementation of Maintenance Rule. Maintenance Rule has been implemented and currently, after each operating cycle, systems categorization is updated depending on its performance. CNSNS periodically verifies this activity

14-6 Period 2001-2003


• Preventive maintenance program and its modifications resulting from the activities during fuel reloading shutdown. This issue is continuously attended by CFE.

• Completion of administrative procedures implementation and operating procedures review. This issue was closed and CFE will continue attending to it in a biennial base.

• Procedures development including the participation of the Reactor Engineering Group. This concern was solved by CFE. CNSNS inspects periodically this program.

• Configuration control. This issue is continuously attended by CFE and inspected by CNSNS.

• Water Chemistry Improvement Program. This issue is continuously attended by CFE and submits periodic reportsfor CNSNS evaluation.

• Loose Parts Monitoring System effectiveness analysis. CFE carried out and submitted for CNSNS evaluation, an analysis of this issue demonstrating that this system was not necessary since there are other systems within the LVNPS reactor coolant pressure boundary more effective for the loose parts monitoring. CNSNS evaluated this analysis acceptable.

• Individual Plant Examination completion including a Probabilistic Safety Analysis Level 2. CFE submitted the corresponding report and CNSNS evaluated it acceptable.

• Creation of a Root Caused Analysis Team. A special team was created for the analysis of Licensee Event Reports in LVNPS. However, recently CFE created a new team in its new organization. This new team will be submitted to CNSNS.

• Safety Culture elements strengthening emphasising conservative decision-making and strict procedures observation. See section 10.2 of this National Report. On the regulatory side, CNSNS is planning to include organization performance aspects into its inspection program.

• Reduction of adverse to quality conditions. CFE will implement a “Corrective Action Program”, under the follow up of CNSNS.

• Follow up of individual and collective radiological doses, personnel contamination, generation of solid dry waste, unplanned exposition to radiation during refuelling outages. This concern is solved by CFE in a periodic base because it is permanent. During this period CNSNS has given pursuit in order to verify the fulfilment with this requirement.

14-7 Period 2001-2003


14.5 NEW FUEL DESIGNS FOR LAGUNA VERDE NPP 14.5.1 Historical Conformation of LVNPS Core The information provided in this paragraph should consider additional and complementary to the proportionated one in the Second National Report (Annex II). GE 12 (10X10) fuel type was introduced to reactor core for LVNPS Unit 1 operation Cycles 8 to 10 (September 1999 to April 2004), resulting in mixed core again as in past cycles. LVNPS Unit 2 had the same situation appeared in LVNPS Cycles 5 to 7 (June 2000 to October 2004). However, from Cycle 11 for Unit 1, and Cycle 8 for Unit 2, there will be only GE 12 fuel type in LVNPS reactor cores. 14.5.2 Licensing of New Core Configurations The information concerning to the licensing of new core configurations has not changed, so information presented in the Second National Report (See Annex II) remains valid. 14.5.3 Problems Originated in LVNPS Core A) Power Oscillations Within the period of this National Report, power oscillations have not occurred at LVNPS. During refuelling outage for Cycle 7 of LVNPS Unit 2, CFE implemented one of the solution options proposed by BWR Owners Group consisting in a stability monitor. This monitor is now in testing stage. It is planned to implement this system for LVNPS Unit 1, during refuelling outage for Cycle 11 (May 2004), and tests will be carried out during that cycle. B) Fuel Failures (Leakages) Eight fuel bundles with some failed fuel rod have been detected in LVNPS Unit 1, seven of them (GE9B) are stored in the spent fuel pool. One GE12 fuel bundle was re-built and currently is inside reactor core and it is planned to be removed to spent fuel pool during the 11th Refuelling Outage. Fuel rod removed from this bundle has been stored in spent fuel pool inside a special container. Five fuel bundles with some failed fuel rod have been detected in LVNPS Unit 2, two of them (GE9B) are stored in the spent fuel pool. One of them was re-built and reinserted to the reactor core. The other three fuels bundles (GE9B) are stored in the spent fuel pool.

14-8 Period 2001-2003


In all the cases, a root-cause analysis was carried out, covering visual inspections, eddy current tests, ultrasonic test, etc. The identified cause for the failed fuel rods is the intrusion of very small materials to primary circuit of reactor core cooling water. A special program for materials intrusion control was put in place during maintenance and refuelling outages activities. 14.6 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS (PSA) The scope of the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant PSA Level 1 and 2 is the analysis of severe accident sequences, including only internally initiated events that could result in core damage, loss of containment stagnancy and fission product releases. Internal flooding is included, as part of the Individual Plant Examination requirements, as well. Evaluation of externally initiated events (i.e. internal fires, high winds/tornado, transportation accidents, external floods and earthquakes) are not included in the PSA Level 1 and 2 for LVNPS. However, in the short term the Regulatory Body will formally requested to CFE to submit an IPEEE (Individual Plant Examination for External Events). The main conclusion of PSA Level 1 and 2 for Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant is that the biggest contributions to core damage frequency are lost offsite power accidents with different time durations, followed by loss of coolant accidents outside the containment, and subsequently lost of balance of plant initiators. The possibility of successful containment venting and the core cooling after containment failure have reduced the importance of the loss of long term heat removal accidents originally found to be important in WASH-1400. Accident sequence with the highest contribution to core damage frequency is a loss of offsite power with failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator Division I, and subsequent failure of the High Pressure Core Spray System, failure of opportune depressurization and failure of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) due to battery consumption. 14.6.1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Level 1 Since the PSA model was initially developed when the LVNPS Unit 1 started commercial operation, there was no operational experience to incorporate in the PSA model, so it was not possible to use plant specific data in the first PSA. However, once this study was approved by the CNSNS, LVNPS was requested to update the analysis, incorporating those modifications to plant design and operation, made since the date the study was frozen until the last refueling outage, and including data of failed components and systems, and frequencies of plant specific initiators events.

14-9 Period 2001-2003


Among approximately 3000 Modification Packages implemented in LVNPS (from 1994 to the closing date of this National Report), 18 were identified with possible direct impact on assumptions and models of PSA Level 1. Among the total of the implemented modifications, those with impact on the dominant accident sequences were included in the study. For example: interconnection of Fire Protection System (SPCI) with the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR), and the change of electrical supply of the primary containment emergency vent, which affect scenarios of loss of off-site power, as well as changes to safety related systems, and even those modifications related with the condition 5% Power Uprate licensed in December 1999. Gathering of reliability / availability data since 1998 has had multiple uses. For example, to fulfill the requirement of Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65); however, now in particular these data have been used in the PSA. The incorporation of specific failure data was carried out by using Bayesian Analysis, to calculate the new failure rates of equipments and components as well as the frequency of initiators events. PSA Level 1 uses the test intervals of the surveillances established in the Technical Specifications for Operation (ETO´s) for obtaining the failure rates. Information of Internal Operational Experience LVNPS is used (including External Operational Experience) for the determination of frequency of initiators events. Using updated event and failure trees models, representing the current design and operational characteristics of LVNPS, as well as with the failure data and frequencies of plant specific initiators events, the contribution of the different types of scenarios was obtained, which are summarized next:

CONTRIBUTION CHART PER SCENERY TYPE

SCENERY CONTRIBUTION

Total Loss of Alternate Current (SBO) Phase 2 56.00%



Interphase LOCA (Outside the Containment) 10.00%

Anticipated Transients Without SCRAM (ATWS)

2.70%

Loss of BOP (Transients) 1.80%

Total Loss of External Power with success of one Diesel Generator

1.70%

14-10 Period 2001-2003


SCENERY CONTRIBUTION

Loss of Both DC Divisions 0.90%

Loss of NSW 0.70%

Loss of NCCW 0.70%

Large LOCA 0.30%

Intermediate LOCA 0.20% Results of Level 1 PSA have shown that core damage frequency is 6.06X10-05 reactor-year, which is similar to that obtained by the international community for this type of reactors. As examples of the safety improvements performed as result of the PSA study, the following can be mentioned: 1. Training of plant personnel on diesel generators manual startup, as well as other

recoveries from common failures of these equipments, and implementation and observance of a contingency plan for the recovery of external power.

2. Modification of the interlock for opening of LPCI and LPCS injection valves, from

a differential pressure signal through the valve to a reactor vessel low pressure signal, which has a decrease impact on interphase LOCA scenarios. It can be pointed out that this improvement has been implemented already at LVNPS under CNSNS previous evaluation and approval.

3. Development and installation of a Risk Monitor, which uses the PSA Level 1

model on EOOS software. This monitor is a supporting tool for Plant Configuration Control trough a control of risk increment due to activities of Planned or Corrective Maintenance and surveillances causing unavailability of the function of significant to safety systems. This activity is of character regulator and it is established in the 10CFR50.65 paragraph (a)(4) of the Rule of Maintenance.

In addition to these physical improvements, an extensive participation of operations, engineering, maintenance and training personnel in PSA tasks has taken place. This has resulted in the dissemination of PSA insights into key plant activities and procedures.

14-11 Period 2001-2003


14.6.2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Level 2 PSA Level 2 was developed initially as part of of the Individual Exam Plant Examination (IPE), and later an update of this study was required (Rev. 2) as part of the requirements of License modification (derived from an 5% increase in power ). IPE objective was the determination of the source term and containment response in the event of a severe accident occurrence. This study has been used for the determination of the Large Early Release Frequency (LERF). In order to evaluate the containment response during a severe accident, LVNPS containment was analysed, showing several favourable design characteristics, such as its structural capacity, its specific volumetric capacity and its seismic design. The MAAP Code was the main tool used for LVNPS’ Individual Plant Examination to model severe accident phenomenology occurring within the vessel and containment and to determine the off-site release of fission products. From the PSA level 2, it was obtained an accident release frequency value of 2.3 E-5 per year, based on considering a truncate frequency value of 1.0 E-7 that results in an 88.99% of contributing sequences. This release frequency value, which must be recalculated using the updated the PSA Level1, corresponds to all containment failure modes; taking into account the magnitude of the release (high, medium, low and low-low and not relevant), and the time after containment failure (early, intermediate and late). Results from PSA Level 2 Revision 2 showed that the four more contributing release categories are:

• Scenarios with release of High magnitude and Intermediate release time (H/I)

with 58.2% contribution

• Scenarios where Primary Containment remains Intact (I) with 19.2% contribution

• Scenarios with release of High magnitude and Late release time (H/L) with 8.9% contribution

• Scenarios with Low release in Intermediate release time (L/I) with 9.0% contribution

An explanation of the previous release categories refers to the following: • Releases of High magnitude (H): more than 10% of the initial inventory of fission

products, measured as a percentage of the Cesium -Iodine

• Releases of Low magnitude (L): means a value lower than 1% of the initial inventory of fission products

14-12 Period 2001-2003


• Intermediate release time (I): means that the beginning of the first release occurs between 6 and 24 hours

• Late release time (L): means that the first liberation would happen after 24 hours Regarding the programs to expand PSA scope, differences between both LVNPS units have been identified and submitted to CNSNS, who carried out a detailed review of them. These differences were incorporated to LVNPS Unit 1 model in order to generate a specific PSA for Unit 2, which was reviewed and approved by CNSNS. Regarding the analysis of external events and in order to have a more complete PSA, the Regulatory Body studies the feasibility to request the utility, in the short term, an Individual Plant Examination for External Events. Nevertheless, LVNPS has developed an internal flooding probabilistic safety analysis for both units, which CNSNS evaluation is in the final stage. There are some efforts of the Regulatory Body to analyze the risk associated to LVNPS operation under low power and shutdown conditions. This is due to international experience has demonstrated that in those conditions, risk increase is significant. Finally, the updating of PSA model for Unit 1, or the its differences with Unit 2, within six months following the conclusion of the corresponding reloading outage, has been established as regulatory requirement. 14.6.3 Application of Risk Informed Regulation Based on the knowledge and results of LVNPS 1 & 2 Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and the application of Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), it has started the implementation of Risk Informed Regulation. The scope of the application of the Maintenance Rule (systems and structures covered by the Rule) was determined by using risk importance defined by the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) and measures of Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) and Risk Achievement Worth (RAW). Plant Configuration Control has been implemented in the LVNPS. This means the control of risk increments caused by important to safety systems that are put out of service, due to planned or corrective maintenances, or surveillances. This Risk Management, required by the paragraph (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65, is carried out by means of a computerized system (Risk Monitor), and is based in the PSA Level 1. This Risk Monitor is used by operators and for planning activities, as well. Currently, Monitor is under the review of the Regulatory Body.

Risk Monitor is used for risk calculation during plant operation at nominal power. For shutdown conditions, the determination of configurations is applied based on Defence in Depth analysis following the limits of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) from USA.

14-13 Period 2001-2003


On the other hand, Regulatory Body developed the Risk Based Inspection Guides, as an additional tool for its inspectors for inspection activities improvement. This results in an optimization of resources, an improvement in the planning of activities and a reorientation of the inspection efforts. These Guides are based on NUREG/CR-5006 “PRA Applications Program for Inspection at Oconne Unit 3” and they are constituted by a series of organized charts to system and component level, hierarchized by importance to risk reduction in LVNPS operation. These guides have been applied to inspect the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) and the Emergency Generators Diesel. 14.7 ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCERNS ON SAFETY


Previous National Report In particular, the Regulatory Body has: • Started the phase of adoption and adaptation of the USNRC Reactor Oversight

Process, ROP

• Carried out inspections using risk information to focus their activities on the most important LVNPS systems, from the point of view risk

As a result of the study of LVNPS Probabilistic Safety Analysis, the following improvements have been identified (See section 14.6 of this National Report): • Risk reduction for interphase LOCA scenario, due to the modification of the

actuation logic of the injection valve of the Low Pressure ECCS

• Development and implementation of the Risk Monitor

• Training of plant personnel on the diesel generators manual startup and observance of contingency plan for external power recovery

Nuclear instrumentation of the LVNPS has suffered the following changes: • Nuclear instrumentation of both units has been updated. The updating in Unit 2,

included the installation of a thermalhydraulic instability monitor, currently in testing phase

14-14 Period 2001-2003


14.7.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be Covered by the Next National Report

In the period covered by this National Report and the corresponding to the next report: The Regulatory Body will continue: • Attending to recommendations made by IRRT Mission for the inspection process

• Adoption and adaptation of the USNRC Reactor Oversight Process and application of Inspection Guides using risk information

Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station: • For December 2004, it has been programmed the 3rd Evaluation of LVNPS as

Level III, by WANO AC

• Unit 1 analogical instrumentation associated to the APRM's will be replaced by identical instrumentation implemented in the LVNPS Unit 2

14.7.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Safety evaluation and verification activities by external and internal organizations to the LVNPS, have not detected any safety issue of concern, so implementation of any corrective or preventive action is not required. 14.8 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS As described in this article, the National Law and regulations adopted and imposed to LVNPS have provided appropriate means for detailed and systematic safety assessment by the Regulatory Body. Results of these assessments allowed the issuance of the corresponding construction and pre-operational test permits and later, the granting of LVNPS-1 & 2 operation licenses. Furthermore, the Operation License requires the execution of periodic safety assessments to ensure LVNPS updating to the light of operational experience and any other new and significant information on safety matters, which may arise during LVNPS’ lifetime. Besides, In-Service Inspection and Test programs for structures and components as well as the Maintenance of the Environmental Qualification of mechanical, electrical and instrumentation equipment important to safety, verify that the physical condition of nuclear installations and their operation is maintained in accordance with its design,

14-15 Period 2001-2003


applicable national requirements as well as limits and conditions specified in the Technical Specifications for Operation. Based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, as well as additional included in this National Report, it can be concluded that obligations of the Article 14 of the CSN are fulfilled.

14-16 Period 2001-2003


50.59 EVALUATIONS ACCUMULATED LVNPS-1

COMMERCIAL OPERATION - 2003

977

472

614

452

889

188

753

502

13

365

7

140

594

220

848

229

44 28 17 026

0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0020 0 0 20

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

PM PMM PMMD PERC PMDT PCPA PyD PROC PMRC SMT ESPEC VARIOS

DOCUMENTS

AM

OU

NT

Evaluations FSAR Tech. Spec.

FIGURE 14-1

50.59 EVALUATIONS ACCUMULATED LVNPS-2COMMERCIAL OPERATION - 2003

307 300

539

300

614

160

702

197

276

82

135

202

159

1736

138

43

0 0 0 1 01617

0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 50

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

PM PMM PMMD PERC PMDT PCPA PyD PROC PMS PBAS SMT VARIOS

DOCUMENTS

AM

OU

NT

Evaluations FSAR Tech. Spec.

FIGURE 14-2

14-17 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 15. RADIATION PROTECTION 15.1 INTRODUCTION The spirit of the Regulatory Law of the Constitutional Article 27 on Nuclear Matters as well as the General Rules Book on Radiological Safety and the norms emanated from these documents, is to maintain the protection of its employees, the population, their property and the environment as the focus of its attention, establishing that nuclear and radiological safety is an overriding priority for all activities involving the use of nuclear energy. Since the construction of LVNPS was decided, due to the lack of national regulations in that moment, it was required that this facility had to comply with regulations of reactor supplier country. This implied that fulfillment with version of the 10 CFR 20 effective in that moment in USA was imposed explicitly, however in that moment this code was not consistent with ICRP-26. Later on, in 1988 was issued the General Rules Book on Radiological Safety was issued, which is consistent with the ICRP-26 and the current 10 CFR 20. For such a reason, in the period that comprises the present National Report, LVNPS organization is in process to adequate its procedures and controls to comply with this regulation. 15.2 DOSE LIMITATION SYSTEM At the closing date of the present National Report there is no change regarding with the dose limitation system applied in Mexico, for this reason the considerations indicated in the First and Second National Report (Annex III and II) continue being valid; however, in order to further clarify this topic, the first paragraph of section 15.2 of the First National Report is replaced by the information of Article 7 of the General Rules Book on Radiological Safety (issued on November 22, 1988, which is consistent with the ICRP-26) where the dose limitation system foundations are established. 15.3 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION AT LVNPS The essential means for the radiological dose control in the LVNPS have not changed from those provided at the First National Report (Annex III) to satisfy the Convention on Nuclear Safety obligations. However, procedures improvement, planning system consolidation, gradual adoption by personnel of a deeper safety culture and a substantial reduction of the radioactive source term, have given as result a clear downward trend in collective dose, independently of other remarkable improvements in the Radiological Protection.

15-1 Period 2001-2003


15.3.1 Radiological Protection Program The main purpose of the Radiological Protection Program is to establish procedures and practices that in conjunction with the design, generates the radiological protection characteristics required to maintain the radiation exposure dose of personnel working within the site As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). In order to fulfill the ALARA criteria in all the activities carried out at LVNPS, a Group for Radiological Analysis has been officially setup to analyze, evaluate control and optimize radiation exposure of the personnel at their working areas. This group is conformed by a team of analysts coming from the organization itself and is under the responsibility of the Radiation Protection Manager. A historical summary of the collective dose for both units of LVNPS and the individual exposure average and personnel maximum values are shown in Table 15.1 and Figures 15.1.a/b and 15.2, for LVNPS Unit 1 and 2, respectively. As for individual dose, while the Total Effective Dose Equivalent of (TEDE) imposed by the Regulatory Body is 50 mSv/year. Since 2003 LVNPS adopted an administrative limit of 20 mSv/year. The fulfillment of this limit can also be observed in Table 15.1.

TABLE 15.1

COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL RADIATION DOSE SUMMARY

Collective Annual Dose(person Sv)

Annual Dose Per MW(person Sv/MW) Individual Dose (mSv)

Year

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 1 Unit 2 Hi (avg) Hi (max)

1990 1.34435 0.0466 1.1610 10.07 1991 5.14748 0.0106 2.0520 1992 5.44015 0.0122 2.4510 20.30 1993 1.96603 0.0035 1.7460 20.59 1994 6.02126 0.0125 2.4020 19.92 1995 4.93073 0.99740 0.0100 0.0025 2.7510 24.75 1996 12.51806 3.63899 0.0288 0.0078 5.4270 37.97 1997 1.94839 2.55289 0.0031 0.0045 2.1140 18.76

1998 5.95528 3.58329 0.0113 0.0067 3.3650 31.72 1999 6.20219 1.13318 0.0117 0.0019 2.1700 21.54 2000 1.33760 4.31730 0.0025 0.0110 2.5800 23.02 2001 3.97322 2.60831 0.0080 0.0052 2.9251 26.75

15-2 Period 2001-2003


Collective Annual Dose(person Sv)

Annual Dose Per MW(person Sv/MW) Individual Dose (mSv)

Year

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 1 Unit 2 Hi (avg) Hi (max)

2002 2.89238 0.54009 0.0058 0.0009 2.1062 17.95 2003 0.66160 3.15420 0.0010 0.0057 1.9926 18.52

TOTAL 60.33872 22.52565 15.3.1.1 Reduction of Collective Doses As is deduced from Table 15.1, in 1996 for a total period for both units of LVNPS of 6 months of refueling outage, an average maximum collective dose of 8.07 men-Sv/year unit was observed. This motivated that the Regulatory Body required CFE an investigation of the causes and to adopt the necessary corrective actions to avoid the anomalies recurrence. The analysis and evaluation, as well as the proposal for corrective actions, was conducted by an Ad Hoc multidisciplinary committee establishing the goal of reducing collective doses in LVNPS Units 1 & 2, in the middle and long term, to a level comparable to those of the international BWR industry. The Reduction Program of Colective Dose was planned in two phases: Phase I comprised essentially the identification and quantification of the radioactive source term, followed by the establishment and implementation of actions to minimize it (and consequently the exposure rate reduction). The source term was identified and quantified in the second quarter of 1997; the means to reduce the source term were implemented between May 1997 and March 2000. Phase II, currently in progress, is related to actions for management performance, planning, and safety culture improvement at all GCN levels, including personnel training and qualification and any mechanism addressed to minimize time spent by personnel in Radiation Controlled Areas of the LVNPS. a) Phase I Results a.1) Source Term Identification and Quantification

Field isotopic analysis showed that 80% of the exposure was due to the isotope Co-60 which coming out from neutronic activation of Co-59 present in a proportion of 50 to 60 % in stellite alloy components from to the primary coolant system. It was determined that Co-59 results from the corrosion and erosion of the following components, in the approximate quantities that are also showed:

15-3 Period 2001-2003


Source of Co-59 LVNPS-1 (gr/ year) LVNPS-2 (gr/year) Low pressure turbine blades 319.30 319.30

Valves internals 139.62 155.59

Reactor internals 63.92 46.92

Piping impurities 5.5 5.5 a.2) Corrective Actions

Based on the analysis results a decision was taken to establish the control and reduction of sources of Co-60 by the following strategies and actions:

Status Strategies Action

LVNPS-1

LVNPS-2

Replacement of stellite components by no-stellite components to reduce Co presence

Substitution as required for maintenance, mal-function, or obsolescence reasons

Since 1997

Since 1997

Reduction of the amount of Co entering the reactor

Installation of mechanical filters downstream the main condenser

May 1997

March 1998

Reduction of the residence time of Co in the reactor

Installation of system for zinc injection.

May 1998

August 1998

Reduction of Co-60 produced, that has been deposed on internals of components

Chemical decontamination of the recirculation loops and other components

May 1998

Nov 1998

Reduction of Fe in excess entering to the vessel reactor due to erosion of main steam heaters (MSR´s) internals

Installation of stainless steel covers inside main steam heaters (MSR´s)

May 1998

April 2000

Gradual reduction of the Co-60, and deposited on reactor vessel internals

Crud extraction from reactor vessel during refueling outages

Each outage since 1997

Each outage since 1997

Massive reduction of the Co-60 deposited on reactor vessel, LVNPS-U2

Crud massive extraction from vessel reactor during the LVNPS Unit 2, 5th refueling outage

N/A March 2000

15-4 Period 2001-2003


Additionally, the following control exposure actions have been taken or are in progress:

Action Status Installation of semi permanent shielding Partially implemented.

In progress

Installation of hydrolyzing ports to FPCC piping cleaning In feasibility analysis

Hot spot removal program In continue process

Addition of noble metals when H2 is injected > 2004 Planned and approved

a.3) Results obtained at the end of 2003

• Strategies and actions in order to reduce source term have shown their effectiveness and both LVNPS units were classified in 2003 between the best North America BWR´s group, regarding Cobalt concentration in reactor water (Figure 15.3).

• The LVNPS BRAC index constitutes another example of this effectiveness: for 2003 it was 2.18 mGy/h for Unit 2, i. e. the same order of magnitude than the median of the index for the USA BWR´s (2.24 mGy/h); and 1.06 mGy/h for Unit 1, it means less than half of the median mentioned before.

• The collective dose also has been significantly reduced, but not in the same proportion than source term. This is, in general, because LVNPS processes require the personnel presence in radiation fields during longer periods than in the rest of the BWR´s, being this factor the one that determines that LVNPS actually is not in an advantageous position with respect the source term. This constitutes an improvement area which work is in progress and depends of more universal factors such as: broader promotion of personnel ALARA culture, planning process optimization, specialized training on some areas, equipment renewal and the use of more modern tools.

• Table 15.1 shows the historical collective dose reduction trend for both LVNPS units in a separate way.

• Figures 15.1.a and 15.1.b show the collective dose historical data for each LVNPS unit in a monthly base.

• The collective dose decreasing trend may be observed in a global way for both LVNPS units in Figure 15.2. This Figure shows the average collective dose per year and for unit, and a projection until 2011.

15-5 Period 2001-2003


b) Phase II and Long Term Expectations Phase II is the consolidation stage of the LVNPS radiological protection related with collective dose reduction and depends, as pointed out before, essentially on the optimization of time spent by personnel in radiation fields, which in turn depends on actions in progress at LVNPS in order to optimize other processes: • Personnel reduction in field: resize of the working staff, higher automation,

more effective and modern tools • Work planning process improvement • Reinforcement of field supervision • Increase use of remote control and communication devices • Enhancement of radiation workers ALARA culture and performance

15.3.2 Environmental Radiological Impact Since LVNPS pre-operational stage (9 or 12 years before LVNPS commercial operation) information related to environmental radiation monitoring has been collected. This information has been obtained from monitoring and sampling systems of LVNPS Environmental Engineering Laboratory. The historical results of this direct environmental monitoring can be observed in Figures 15.4 and 15.5 noting that levels remain at the same order than existed in the pre-operational stage. As a reference detection of events not related to LVNPS occurred during this stage and contributed to background increase, can be mentioned. Regarding the radiological impact to general population, which is calculated from LVNPS effluents according with the models established by Technical Specifications, in all cases the result is a small fraction of the corresponding limits as can be noticed in the following figures: Figure 15.6.- Annual Liquid Releases Historical Data (LVNPS Units 1 and 2)

Figure 15.7.- Annual Gaseous Releases Historical Data (LVNPS Unit 1) – Noble Gases

Figure 15.8.- Annual Gaseous Releases Historical Data (LVNPS Unit 2) - Noble Gases

Figure 15.9.- Annual Gaseous Releases Historical Data (LVNPS Unit 1) - Tritium, Particles and Iodine

Figure 15.10.- Annual Gaseous Releases Historical Data (LVNPS Unit 2) - Tritium, Particles and Iodine

As it is shown in Figure 15.6, since 1996 the annual liquid releases doses have diminished considerably mainly due to an improvement on the management of water

15-6 Period 2001-2003


reuse, having substantial reduced liquid releases. In Figures 15.7 to 15.10 can also be noticed that since 1996, a remarkable reduction trend in population dose due to gaseous effluents. 15.3.2.1 Environmental Radiological Surveillance Program at LVNPS LVNPS has an Environmental Radiological Surveillance Program that ensures a permanent continues surveillance on the impact to the environment during normal operation: Laguna Verde Environmental Surveillance more relevant aspects follows: a) Atmospheric Releases

• External radiation, air 32 sampling stations

• Inhalation, air 16 sampling stations

• Radiation deposition on soil, food chain 18 sampling stations

b) Liquid Releases

• Sea water at the discharge channel, marine biota, invertebrates, crabs, sargasso, marine sediment and beach sand sediment 21 sampling stations

• Fresh underground water 3 sampling stations The conclusions are the following:

• The limit concentrations established in LVNPS Technical Specifications have never been exceeded by any sample or in average.

• Since the limit concentrations were not exceeded and the exposures measured using TLD remained under the preoperational values, it can be stated that none member of the general public exceeded the limits for public due to emissions from the plant.

• The total beta activity detected during 2003 shows the same pattern as in previous years. Since 1978, the variations observed up to date are of the same order of the variations during the previous years.

• The results of the Environmental Surveillance Program demonstrate that the population living in the neighborhood of the plant does not increase their radiation doses due to the operation of Laguna Verde, or at least such increase

15-7 Period 2001-2003


is not perceptible despite the very low detection limits reached in 2003.

• The only artificial radionuclides that have been present with a relatively high frequency in the samples are Sr-90 and Cs-137. However, these radionuclides have been present in the environment of Laguna Verde site even before the startup of the plant, and were originated from nuclear weapons tests having reached Laguna Verde latitude through the “fallout” mechanism. So, their presence is not due to the operation of Laguna Verde, and they show a tendency to diminish slowly due to its half-life.

• During this period, 2001-20003 some radionuclides were detected due to the operation of LVNPS, they are Zn-65, Mn-54 and Co-60 with very small concentrations.

15.3.3 Regulatory Body Radiological Protection Verification Regarding to Regulatory Body Radiological Protection Verification it has not changed, so the information described en the First and Second National Report stays valid (See Annex III and II, section 15.3.3). 15.4 ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCERNS ON SAFETY


Previous National Report The Radiological Protection Program of LVNPS has given the following results (See section 15.3.1 of this National Report): • In 2003, both units of LVNPS were classified between the best North America

BWR´s, in Cobalt concentration in reactor water

• The collective dose has diminished in a significant way The Environmental Radiological Surveillance Program has given the following results (See section 15.3.2 of this National Report): • Annual doses to population for liquid releases continue showing a reduction

trend due to the enhancement of administration of water reuse

• The reduction trend in dose to population due to gaseous effluents continues. On the other hand, in 2002 the review process of the General Rules Book on Radiological Safety started, with the objective to make it consistent with IAEA Safety Collection document No. 115 “International Basic Safety Standards for Protection

15-8 Period 2001-2003


Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources”, as well as the Mexican Official Norms described in section 7.7 of this National Report. This revised version will include the experience gained by the application of the regulations currently in force. 15.4.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report Within the period covered by the Next National Report, the foreseen activities by CFE at LVNPS are the following: • Reduce time spent by personnel in areas with radiation and consolidate

collective dose reduction to competitive levels, based on the achievements in radioactive source term reduction and through a bigger promotion of personnel ALARA culture, planning process optimization, specialized training in some areas, re-equipment of some LVNPS systems and the use of more modern tools, will be looked to reduce personnel time at radioactive areas and in this way consolidate a collective doses reduction at competitive levels.

• Reduction of compactable solid waste volume (super-compacting). The Regulatory Body will continue with the revision of the General Rules Book on Radiological Safety. 15.4.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions The Regulatory Body considers that a concern regarding LVNPS operation is to reach and maintain the collective dose indicator at levels similar to the average values obtained internationally by nuclear power plants similar to LVNPS. CNSNS has paying special attention to this issue and required to CFE take actions solve it. CFE has put in place actions described in this article under the follow up of CNSNS. 15.5 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS The information presented in this Article shows that up to now, no occupational exposed personnel has exceeded the specified regulatory limits and that radioactive material releases and the resulting doses have remained below the corresponding regulatory limits. Therefore, based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional included in this National Report, it can be concluded that the obligations of the Article 15 of the CSN are fulfilled.

15-9 Period 2001-2003


FIGURE 15.1.a

COLLECTIVE ANNUAL DOSE HISTORICAL DATA (LVNPS UNIT 1)JANUARY 1989 - DECEMBER 2003

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Ene

-89

Ene

-90

Ene

-91

Ene

-92

Ene

-93

Ene

-94

Ene

-95

Ene

-96

Ene

-97

Ene

-98

Ene

-99

Ene

-00

Ene

-01

Ene

-02

Ene

-03

lti

o (r

s/

RO-01RO-02

RO-03

RO-04

RO-05

RO-06

RO-07

RO-09

RO-08

C

olec

ve

D

se

em

-p

ero

nm

ont

h)

Jan-

89

Jan-

90

Jan-

91

Jan-

92

Jan-

93

Jan-

94

Jan-

95

Jan-

96

Jan-

97

Jan-

98

Jan-

99

Jan-

00

Jan-

01

Jan-

02

Jan-

03

15-10 Period 2001-2003


FIGURE 15.1.b

COLLECTIVE ANNUAL DOSE HISTORICAL DATA (LVNPS UNIT 2)JANUARY 1995 - DECEMBER 2003

0

50

100

150

200

250

Ene

-95

Ene

-96

Ene

-97

Ene

-98

Ene

-99

Ene

-00

Ene

-01

Col

lect

ive

Dos

e (r

em-p

erso

n/m

onth

).

RO-01RO-02

RO-03

RO-04

RO

Jan-

95

Jan-

96

Jan-

97

Jan-

98

Jan-

99

Jan-

00

Jan-

01

15-11

Ene

-02

Ene

-03

-05

RO-06

Jan-

02

Jan-

03

Period 2001-2003


15-12 Period 2001-2003

0

1 0 0

2 0 0

3 0 0

4 0 0

5 0 0

6 0 0

7 0 0

8 0 0

9 0 0

1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0

Figure 15.2 LVNPS: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTION OF COLLECTIVE DOSE MEAN BY YEAR AND

PER UNIT (Sv-Person / year-Unit)

HISTORICAL PROJECTED

*PROJECTION 2004

(-) YEARS WITHOUT REFUELING OUTAGES * YEARS WITH TWO REFUELING OUTAGES

PROJECTION 2005, 2006

* PEAK 2007

* CONSOLIDATION 2008-2009 **

*(-)

(-)


Figure 15.3

Co-60 Concentration in water reactor for BWR units in North America 2nd Trimester 2003 (GE)

15-13 Period

Average Values in BWR Water Reactor 2003

LVN

PS

1

LVN

PS

2

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

PLANT IDENTIFICATION

Con

cent

ratio

n (µ

Ci/K

g)

Co60(s)

Co60(i)

2001-2003


15-14 Period 2001-2003

Figure 15.4

Integrated monthly average of total ß activity in airAugust 1978 to December 2004

0

50

100

150

200

250

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Time

fCi/m

3

Nuclear armament detonation fallout

Tech. Spec. Limit

Statistical Confidence Level (95%)Chernobyl

Chichonal

Preoperational Stage Operational Stage

U-1 OperationJuly 1990

U-2 OperationApril 1995


Figure 15.5

ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION LEVELS IN THE PROXIMITIES OF LVNPSMONTHLY AVERAGE OF 30 MONITORING STATIONS

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

YEAR

mR

/yea

r

U-1 OperationJuly 1990

U-2 OperationApril 1995

Preoperational Stage

+2s

-2s

Operational Stage

15-15 Period 2001-2003


15-16 Period 2001-2003

Figure 15.6 ANNUAL LIQUID RELEASES HISTORICAL DATA

(LVNPS UNIT 1 & 2)

5.09E-01 4.82E-016.11E-01

2.25E-013.43E-01

7.42E-01

1.92E-02 1.11E-02 2.21E-02 1.75E-02 1.00E-02 1.29E-03 8.74E-04 1.26E-030.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Dos

e [m

rem

]

Technical Specifications Limit: 3 mrem


15-17 Period 2001-2003

FIGURE 15.7

ANNUAL GASEOUS RELEASES HISTORICAL DATA (LVNPS UNIT 1)NOBLE GASES

3.34E-015.86E-02 7.94E-02 1.46E-02 6.71E-03 5.27E-02 6.46E-02 2.73E-02 5.47E-03 1.35E-01 2.67E-02 5.83E-03 3.25E-02 1.65E-02

0

3

6

9

12

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Dos

e [m

rad]

Technical Specifications Limit: 10 mrad


15-18 Period 2001-2003

FIGURE 15.8

ANNUAL GASEOUS RELEASES HISTORICAL DATA (LVNPS UNIT 2)NOBLE GASES

1.73E-02 1.79E-02 3.93E-03 1.54E-03 1.65E-02 7.75E-03 1.56E-03 5.24E-04 6.81E-080

3

6

9

12

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Dos

e [m

rad]

Technical Specifications Limit: 10 mrad


15-19 Period 2001-2003

FIGURE 15.9

ANNUAL GASEOUS RELEASES HISTORICAL DATA (LVNPS UNIT 1)IODINE, PARTICLES AND TRITIUM

7.02E-026.91E-01 6.24E-01 4.51E-01 5.95E-01 3.94E-01

1.16E+004.88E-01 7.79E-01

2.13E-01 1.24E-01 1.57E-01 3.02E-01 2.17E-010

3

6

9

12

15

18

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Dos

e [m

rem

]



15-20 Period 2001-2003

FIGURE 15.10ANNUAL GASEOUS RELEASES HISTORICAL DATA (LVNPS UNIT 2)

IODINE, PARTICLES AND TRITIUM

8.14E-03 2.25E-01 4.53E-01 2.60E-01 1.65E-01 1.57E-01 3.78E-01 1.30E-01 8.75E-02 1.92E-010

3

6

9

12

15

18

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Dos

e [m

rem

]



ARTICLE 16. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 16.1 LVNPS EMERGENCY PLANS 16.1.1 Regulatory Aspects The regulatory framework of this Article has not changed, so the information presented in the First and Second National Report is still valid (See Annex III and II in its section 16.1.1). 16.1.2 Emergency Response Organisation The Emergency Response Organization has not changed, so it information presented in the First and Second National Report (See Annex III and II in its section 16.1.2). Internal Emergency Plan (PEI) The Internal Emergency Plan has not changed, information presented in the Second National Report (See Annex II in its section 16.1.2). Concerning to the facilities that compose the Internal Emergency Plan, the names were modified or facilities were added as is show in the following way:

• Technical Support, Centre

• Main Control Room,

• Operational Support Centre,

• Dose Projection Centre,

• Accidents Evaluation Centre,

• Damages Control Centre,

• Radiological Control Centre,

• Medical Assistance Centre,

• Environmental Monitoring Centre,

• Central Station of Alarms,

• Decontamination and First Aids Station, and

• Post-accident Sampling Station The Plan contemplates the existence of the following materials and equipment:

16-1 Period 2001-2003


• Clothes for personal protection,

• Equipment for respiratory protection,

• Radiation monitors,

• Contamination monitors,

• High volume air monitors,

• Dosimetry Digital / Sounder,

• Primary and alternate communications systems,

• Plant alarm systems (Fire, Emergency and Evacuation),

• Medical Unit of Intensive Care,

• Fire fighting truck,

• Unit of Environmental Monitoring,

• Autobus for personnel transportation and

• Potassium iodine for Radiological Prophylaxis External Radiological Emergency Plan (PERE) The External Radiological Emergency Plan has not changed, information presented in the Second National Report (See Annex II, section 16.1.2), with exception of responsibilities matrix of the External Radiological Emergency Plan (PERE), Table 16.1, which is updated for the period 2001-2003. 16.1.3 Emergency Assessment Actions The Emergency Assessment Actions has not changed, so information presented in the First and Second National Report (Annex III and II, section 16.1.3) is still valid. 16.1.4 Installations and Emergency Equipment The information related with the installations and emergency equipment has not changed so information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 16.1.4). 16.1.5 Emergency Plan Activation Exercises/Drills To verify the suitability and validity of the preparation for a radiological emergency in LVNPS, during the period 2001-2003 several Emergency Plan drills, either internal or external have been carried out. These are described in the next sections.

16-2 Period 2001-2003


16.1.5.1 Internal Emergency Plan Exercises and Drills The following table shows the exercises and drills that have been carried out from the year 2001 to 2003.

YEAR CONCEPT

2001 2002 2003

Emergency notification 3 7 4

Fire protection 64 77 45

First medical aids 1 1 4

Monitoring and decontamination 1 1 4

Environmental monitoring 2 1 2

Dose projection 2 4 2

Post-Accident Sampling 2 1 4

Accident evaluation (Plant status and conditions) 1 1 1

PEI-FT-82 2 1 1

Damages control 1 1

Accounting and evacuation 1 3 16.1.5.2 External Emergency Plan Exercises and Drills The following table shows the exercises and drills that have been carried out from 2001 to 2003:

YEAR CONCEPT

2001 2002 2003

Monitoring, classification and decontamination of evacuees 1 3 6

Notification to Control Head 1 2 2

Monitoring and decontamination of equipment and vehicles 1 3 6

Shelters activation 2 1 3

Off-site environmental monitoring 1 1 1

16-3 Period 2001-2003


YEAR CONCEPT

2001 2002 2003

Exposure and Environmental Laboratory operation control 0 1 2

Dose calculation 1 0 2

Accident assessment, technical analysis and protection actions 2 0 1

Administrative building evacuation 1 0 1

Communications 1 2 0

Logistic Support 2 0 2

Cabinet Exercise PEI/PERE 1 1 0

CNSNS Verification of the Integrated Exercise PEI / PERE CFE response 1 0 0

In site counting, transport and evacuation of CR´s 2 1 1

Total 17 15 27 16.2 MEASURES FOR INFORMING THE PUBLIC IN RELATION TO

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS The information provided in this paragraph should consider additional and complementary to the established in the First and Second National Report (Annex II and III). • The fundamental objective of community workshops was to assure that

information for protection actions application was clear and understandable for via Plume Zone inhabitants.

Statistics of the community workshops imparted during 2003.

Workshops 57

Communities 106

Participants 3,510

16-4 Period 2001-2003


16.3 INTERACTION WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES The information related with the interaction with neighbouring states has not changed so information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 16.3). 16.4 REGULATORY BODY ACTIVITIES The activities and responsibilities of the Regulatory Body in the emergency plans have not changed, so the information presented in the First and Second National Report remains valid (See Annex III and II, section 16.4). However, the following additional information is presented. Internal Emergency Plan As result of the Commendable Practices for the Working Group in OECD Inspection Practices during the inspections to LVNPS Internal Emergency Plan, it was decided to carry out a series of drills to certain technical areas and to the organization in general, to verify the viability of the programs, equipment readiness and communications. As result of these inspections it has found the next: • After working hours, personnel of Emergency Response Organization did not

comply with the response time required in the applicable regulation.

• The emergency response personnel were not enough skilled to use respiratory protection equipment.

• Some procedures were not validated.

• Bad communication between the areas made it difficult to fulfil exercises objectives.

This caused a closer follow up from regulatory body trough increasing inspection frequency to responsible area until the solution of deficiencies detected. An inspection is now programmed at the beginning of 2004 to verify that these deficiencies have been corrected.

16-5 Period 2001-2003


16.5 ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCERNS ON SAFETY ENHANCEMENT

16.5.1 Achievements and Changes in Safety Related Activities since the

Previous National Report In the period covered by this National Report, the following achievements and changes are reported in Emergency Plans. External Radiological Emergency Plan a) Start up of the Central Digital System for the Primary Operative Network of the

External Radiological Emergency Plan with four stations to assure a minimum coverage of 80 Km around LVNPS.

b) Increment of personnel number to FT-82 response task force, to assure effective response 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and to make the necessary turnover.

c) Partial pavement of the alternating evacuation routes, that permits to decrease evacuation time of the population in necessary case.

d) Construction of a freeway in Federal Highway No. 180, span “Cardel-La Mancha”, which is the main access to LVNPS.

Internal Emergency Plan a) It has been adopted and implemented the Dose Limitation System based on the

Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) for emergency situations. Also the criteria for decisions making in the application of protection measures has been updated.

b) The regulatory requirement of NUREG-0654, Section J.5 of having counted and identified missing personnel within 30 min. after event initiation has been fulfilled.

On the other hand, the Regulatory Body has found some deficiencies in the Internal Emergency Plan, that licensee is now solving (See section 16.4 of this National Report). 16.5.2 Future Safety Related Activities and Programs for the Period to be

Covered by the Next National Report In the period covered by this National Report and the corresponding to the next report, for the emergency plans the next future activities are provided.

16-6 Period 2001-2003


External Radiological Emergency Plan a) Design and acquisition of the first stage of the Speaker System to notify an

emergency condition to the workers and population in a radius of 5 Km around LVNPS.

Internal Emergency Plan a) Analysis and implementation of EPA-400 regarding Dose Equivalent Limits

during emergencies for the emergency response personnel. b) Implementation of actions and program to give fulfillment to the Regulatory

Requirement of NUREG-0654, Section N.1.b, with requiring that all personnel belonging to Emergency Response Organization must participate in a drill at least once in a 5 years period.

As a result of the regulatory inspections to PERE and PEI, the Regulatory Body will maintain an increased inspection frequency on these plans and its basic aspects as the drills, training and execution. In particular, regarding the Internal Emergency Plan, the Regulatory Body will verify that CFE gives solution to deficiencies detected. 16.5.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Regarding the Internal Emergency Plan, safety issues that are object of preoccupation of the Regulatory Body and actions that are being taken are described in section 16.4 of this Article. As result of the enlargement and construction of the Federal Highway No. 180 and changes in its route, CFE considers that emergency facilities will be affected. These facilities will be relocated in next three years. However, in this period CFE has designed strategies to assure an opportune and efficient response. 16.6 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS Based on the information presented in this article it can be shown that

• Inter-institutional structures with an appropriate infrastructure to minimize the

consequences to population in case of radiological emergency in LVNPS, is maintained

• Integral and activity-specific periodic exercises for all and each response activities to a radiological emergency are carried out.

16-7 Period 2001-2003


• The CNSNS carries out the necessary assessment and surveillance activities on this issue.

Based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional one included in this National Report, it can be concluded that obligations of the Article 16 of the CSN are fulfilled.

16-8 Period 2001-2003


TABLE16.1 MATRIX OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EXTERNAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN

R E S P O N S E

F.T.-81 F.T.-82 F.T.-83 F.T.-84 F.T.-85 F.T.-86 F.T.-87 F.T.-88 ACTIVITIES

SEGOB CFE SCT SEDENA SM-AM SS GEV PFP

1.Command and Control X X X X X X X X

2. Notification to the Head of Control X

3. Accident Assessment X

4. Dose Calculation X

5. Environmental Monitoring X

6. Protection Action Assessment X

7. Notification to population O X

8. Information to the public X O X

9. Communications X O O

10. Network Operation X X X X X X X X

11. Control of Road, Air and Maritime Traffic O X X

12. Control of Air Traffic X

13. Control of Traffic X

14. Transportation X O O X

15. Evacuation O X X O O

16. Radiological Prophylaxis O O O X O O

17. Rescue X X

18. Monitoring, Classification and

Decontamination of People Evacuated

X

O

X

19. General Medical Attention X X

20. Specialized Medical Attention X X

21. Transportation of Injured People X X X

22. Control of Exposure X X X X X X X X

23. Shelters Activation X X

24. Equipment and Vehicles Decontamination X X X

25. Safety and Surveillance X X O

26. Attention to Victims O O X

27. Control of Food and Water O X

X - RESPONSIBLE O – CO- RESPONSIBLE

16-9 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 17. SITING 17.1 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS The regulatory aspects, design basis and the consequences to the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station (LVNPS) surroundings due to operation, have not changed. Therefore, based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, it can be concluded that obligations of the Article 17 of the CSN are fulfilled.

17-1 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 18. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 18.1 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS The regulatory and design aspects, the implementation of defence in depth philosophy, the design criteria and structure, system and component classification, the proved validity of Laguna Verde Nuclear Station (LVNPS) design and construction have not changed. Therefore, based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, it can be concluded that obligations of the Article 18 of the CSN are fulfilled.

18-1 Period 2001-2003


ARTICLE 19. OPERATION 19.1 INTRODUCTION In general, the legal framework related to operation has not changed from presented in the First National Report (See Annex III), however this framework has been increased with the publication of several Mexican Official Norms (NOM). See section 7.7 of this National Report. 19.2 ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT CRITERIA The administration and management criteria used in LVNPS have not changed so information described in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 19.2). 19.2.1 Construction Stage The administration and management criteria used in the construction stage of LVNPS have not changed so information presented in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 19.2.1). 19.2.2 Operation Stage The information provided on the administration and management criteria in the Operation Stage has not changed, so information included in the First National Report remains valid (Annex III, section 19.2.2). 19.3 LVNPS SAFETY ANALYSIS AND START UP PROGRAM 19.3.1 Safety Analysis The information related to the safety analysis is still the same, information presented in the First and Second National Report is still valid (See Annex III and II in its section 19.3.1). 19.3.2 Start Up Program Information regarding the start up program of the LVNPS Units 1 & 2 has not changed, so information presented in the First National Report remains valid (See Annex III in its section 19.3.2). Concerning the 5% Power Uprate testing, information included in the Second National Report is still valid (See Annex II in its section 19.3.2).

19-1 Period 2001-2003


19.3.3 Regulatory Body Activities Information respect to the Regulatory Body activities in the Start-Up Program of the LVNPS 1 and 2 has not changed, so information provided in the First National Report remains valid (Annex III, section 19.3.3). Regarding Regulator Body activities in the 5% Power Uprate Testing Program, information included in the Second National Report continues being valid. (See Annex II in its section 19.3.3). 19.4 SAFETY ANALYSIS DURING OPERATIVE STAGE AT LVNPS This topic from the internal (CFE) and external (CNSNS and others) point of view is addressed in detail in section 14.3.1 and 14.3.2 of this National Report. 19.5 USE OF APPROVED PROCEDURES The information related to the use of approved procedures in LVNPS has not change so the information described in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 19.4). 19.6 PROCEDURES FOR ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS AND

ACCIDENTS Information related to procedures for anticipated operational incidents and accidents in LVNPS has not changed so information described in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 19.5). 19.7 TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES DURING THE INSTALLATION’S

LIFETIME The information related to the technical support services for LVNPS has not changed so information described in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 19.6). 19.8 NOTIFICATION OF INCIDENTS Information related to the notification of incidents at LVNPS has not changed so the information described in the First and Second National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 19.7 and Annex II in its section 19.8).

19-2 Period 2001-2003


As an update, in the Figure 19.1 the Notifications of Reportable Events are shown from some previous years to the beginning of commercial operation in the LVNPS (1988 for LVNPS Unit 1 and 1994 for LVNPS Unit 2) until the closing year of this report, December 2003. 19.9 OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 19.9.1 Internal Operational Experience In general, the information related to the specific program for internal operational experience review and the analysis of events is the same, so information described in the First and Second National Report is still valid (See Annex III, section 19.8.1 and Annex II, section 19.9.1). As update, the figure 19.2 shows the Internal Events Reports from 1997 to December 2003 in LVNPS. In the period 2001-2003, the most important events that have been presented in LVNPS were the following. • On March 27, 2002, with LVNPS Unit 1 operating at full power, during a LOCA-

LOOP periodic test of the Diesel Generator III, the pump of the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) failed to start due to a failure in a closing circuit component of the main switch. The cause was the ineffectiveness of corrective actions applied to a previous similar event.

• On February 7, 2002, with LVNPS Unit 2 operating at full power, during a periodic test application was found that the differential pressure between jet pump diffuser and the lower core plenum, did not comply with the established acceptance criteria for two jet pumps causing an unbalanced flow with the adjacent jet pumps. Technical Specification do not requires plant shutdown in this case, however CNSNS required CFE to analyze the problem. This analysis indicated that reactor could operate with an unbalance of 25 and 17 % for affected jet pumps. Nevertheless CNSNS required maintaining a continuous surveillance on affected jet pumps and the submittal of periodic reports on problem status.

• On November 11, 2003 the LVNPS Unit 2 operation personnel began a non-planned shutdown because an increasing leakage rate within primary containment drywell. Leakage was located on an isolation valve of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) common to both loops of this system. The immediate action was to isolate this line which caused a lost of the normal function of shutdown cooling, forcing to make an alignment for cooling with the main condenser as an alternate shutdown cooling method.

• On July 12, 2002, in LVNPS Unit 1 injection valve of the Reactor Core Isolation

19-3 Period 2001-2003


Cooling System (RCIC) failed to open during a turbine trip event. The cause of this failure was an erroneous wiring in the start up circuit of the motor of the valve during the maintenance and tests carried out by a contractor. The High Pressure Cooling Spray System (HPCS) operated to maintain the level of coolant in the reactor vessel. Regulatory body event investigation revealed that this problem could be discovered during system surveillance test. Investigation also revealed a set of human performance problems that caused the turbine trip. Based on this investigation license of operator responsible during the surveillance test was suspended and shift staff was reprimanded.

• On August 16, 2003 a leakage was detected on the piping connecting LVNPS Unit 1 Main Condenser to the Condensed Storage Tank located outside Reactor Building. Shift personnel isolated manually the leakage and carried out inspection, removal and evaluation activities of the contaminated material. CFE emitted a report where it was determined that there were not environmental radiological consequences due to the low activity of the dispersed material. The cause was a localized corrosion and a quality control failure during LVNPS Unit 1 construction. Due to this the Regulatory Body required the examination of all piping in similar situation.

19.9.1.1 Containment Performance Regarding the containment testing program, their requirements and acceptance criteria have not changed, so information described in the Second National Report remains valid (See Annex II in its section 19.9.1.1). As an update, Figure 19.3 shows the primary containment performance (Integrated Leakage Rate Test) for both LVNPS units from 1984 to 2003. 19.9.2 External Operational Experience Relative to the External Operational Experience in LVNPS has not changed, so information described in the First and Second National Report continues being valid (Annex III, section 19.8.2 and Annex II, section 19.9.2). 19.9.3 Regulatory Body Activities The CNSNS review event reports submitted by LVNPS compliance with regulations established. When an event important or of special interest to safety occurs , CNSNS carries out a depth evaluation and investigation of its causes, impact on safety, the existence of recurrent events and, when required, question or impose the scope of the corrective actions, and/or the deadline for its conclusion. CNSNS also analyzes if the event relevance requires a special inspection. For the analysis of reportable events, CNSNS develops statistics to determine trends on the event type, root cause, recurrences, etc. in order to define if, as result of these,

19-4 Period 2001-2003


some regulatory action is required. Events that required special attention from Regulatory Body within the period of this National Report are described in section 19.9.1. On the other hand, CNSNS have continuously participating in the NEA Incident Reporting System (IRS) and in the IAEA International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), in order to share the operational experience of the nuclear Mexican facility with countries members of the international community, as well as to acquire and implement their experience in Mexico. 19.10 RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS The information presented in the following section has the objective of adding useful data, as well as updating data presented in the First and Second National Report (Annex III and II). 19.10.1 Liquid Radwaste System The collected liquid radwaste come from different sources. Based on this they are classified as: equipment, floor, regenerating and chemical, detergents and laundry and, miscellaneous drains. They are treated trough a batch process, maintaining a surveillance and control of its chemical quality by sampling analysis and: • For re-use purposes, the compliance with established chemical parameters is

according to LVNPS own procedures

• When it will be released, its radioactive material content is analyzed to assure that any discharge is As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) fulfilling the requirements specified in 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 50, including the design dose objective specified in 10 CFR 50 Appendix I

Currently and with the objective of continuous improvement, a new treatment system denominated Inverse Osmosis is being implemented for high conductivity liquids that will service to both LVNPS units. With this CFE seeks: • Increasing the re-use rate to values higher than 98%

• Reducing dose to critical organ (gastrointestinal tract). from effluents release to less than 0.001 mR/year. This is to 10,000 times less than the limits of Technical Specifications for Operation

• Reducing solid waste generation to less than 80 cubic meter/year per LVNPS unit

• Reducing treatment costs

19-5 Period 2001-2003


It has estimated to have the new system in operation during the third trimester of 2005. 19.10.2 Gaseous Waste Treatment The information related to the Gaseous Waste Treatment at LVNPS has not changed so information described in the First National Report is still valid (See Annex III in its section 19.9.2). 19.10.3 Solid Waste Treatment This subsystem is designed to collect and process wet and dry waste generated at LVNPS, in order to confine them in a safe and reliable way inside appropriate containers for its later isolation, being able to be contained in steel drums or in High Integrity Containers made of high density polyethylene. The solid waste processing is controlled by LVNPS Process Control Program (PCP), to fulfill the requirements specified in Technical Specifications for Operation, 10 CFR 61 and in the Mexican Official Norm NOM-019-NUCL-1995 (See section 7.7 of this National Report). Wet waste may be treated by following processes: a.- Extrusion with asphalt, resulting in a homogeneous solid monolith inside a drum

and free of water b.- Cementation resulting, in a homogeneous solid concrete monolith inside a drum

and free of water c.- Cyclic drain inside a high integrity container where the content of free of water is

reduced to less than 1% in volume The dry waste treatment can be carried out by: a.- Hydraulic compression for those compactable with reduction factors 4:1 b.- Direct pack for those non-compactable Sources of wet solid waste are: spent ionic exchange resins, sludge from phase separators, chemical concentrates from laboratory wastes, regenerating and decontamination solutions. Sources of dry solid waste are: cartridge filters, clothes, paper, plastics, thermal insulators, sand, granulated metal and contaminated replacement components. In LVNPS Unit 1, drums and High Integrity Containers (HIC) with processed waste are stored initially in the decay area, inside the Radwaste Building and later are

19-6 Period 2001-2003


transported to the In Site Temporal Storage (ATS). In LVNPS Unit 2, HIC containing processed waste are transported immediately to the ATS. These containers with processed waste are handled by remote means. The high polyethylene integrity containers and the steel drums are manufactured with radiation, structural and corrosion resistance, and in according with the seismic design and Quality Assurance requirements for their definitive storage. LVNPS has three solid waste temporary storage areas: 1.- Plant Temporal Storage (ATP) inside the Radwaste Building, with storage

capacity for wet and dry waste HIC´s and steel drums of 55 gallons for two years of operation

2.- In Site Temporal Storage (ATS) outside the double fence, but inside the site, to store wet waste HIC´s and drums of 55 gallons, with appropriate capacity for 15 years of LVNPS (both units) operation

3.- Dry Solid Radwaste Storage (DDRSS) outside the double fence, but inside the site, to store dry waste drums of 55 gallons, with an appropriate capacity for 15 years of operation

During the LVNPS Unit 1 startup and with the definitive storage absent, it was decided to design and build a Wet Waste In Site Temporal Storage (ATS), for the low and medium level waste. This was licensed as storage area extension of the Radwaste Treatment Building. This installation was built in 1991, with initial storage capacity for 5 years of both units operation for waste original design production. Based on the policy for LVNPS waste reduction, improvements were carried out in the waste production process, as well as the storage area redistribution and adaptation that have resulted in a storage capacity increase until the year 2005. Also to give enough capacity for dry waste storage, in 1993 it was habilitated and licensed a dry waste storage or DDRSS, which has capacity until 2005. To extend the storage capacity of this deposit in next two years, CFE will use a volume reduction service for compactable solids, estimating to reduce a processed current volume from 1,310 m3 to approximately 400 m3, which will have an integrated impact on the processed total volume for LVNPS Unit of 10 m3 less per year approximately. Once implemented, LVNPS will have, on the mean, approximately 60 m3 per unit. With the objective of continuous improvement, CFE is in process to incorporate a new wet solids treatment system. This system is a dryer / granulator and will service both LVNPS units and will substitute the extruders-evaporators that have operated for 15 years. Also, their technology will increase the waste final rate from 1 to 4. With these actions CFE seeks to maintain a reliable waste solidification and reduce wet solids volume to reach goals for solids to values less than 70 m3/year per LVNPS Unit. It is

19-7 Period 2001-2003


estimated to have the new system in operation at the end of the year 2005. Reactor tools and unusable reactor components, such as control rod spent blades, failed fuel rods, etc. are stored in the Spent Fuel Pool (See section 19.10.4 of this National Report). 19.10.4 Spent Fuel Storage The information related to the Spent Fuel Storage has not changed, so the information described in the First National Report continues being valid (See Annex III in its section 19.9.4). 19.10.5 Radioactive Waste Production-Reduction Program The information provided in this paragraph should consider additional and complementary to provided in the First National Report (See Annex III in its section 19.9.5). In relation with LVNPS radwaste generation minimizing processes, several strategies are being putting in place, some of them are: • Increase in the liquid waste treatment processes efficiency in order to increase

water re-use, diminishing the liquid effluents discharges

• Degradable materials utilization made out of a special polymer of polivinyl-alcohol to substitute, mainly, cotton materials of radiological protection clothes and decontamination accessories, which can be dissolved totally in hot water reducing considerably solid waste volume to be treated. Because decontaminated cotton materials have become the biggest contributor to generation of compactable solid waste stored in the DRSS, their substitution for soluble materials will contribute to reduce the generation of this type of waste.

• Efficient segregation of non-compactable solid radwaste (metallic waste) through decontamination processes, cut and grinding. It is being considered in to implement a decontamination process using chemical agents’.

• Reinforcement in the personnel's awareness for the optimization of protection accessories use and work effective times, with the purpose of using the minimum required of these accessories

• Improvement of wet solid waste drying processes

• Optimization of the use of accessories for radiation protection that consists on the effective dose equivalent assessment in function of the protection accessories optimization that could reduce worker's efficiency in areas with radiation. This point is applied for dose reduction and support to waste generation reduction purposes

19-8 Period 2001-2003


19.11 AGING MANAGEMENT AND PLANT LIFE EXTENSION The information on Aging Management and Plant Extension has not changed, so the information presented in the Second National Report continues being valid (See Annex II in its section 19.11), with exception of the Hydrogen Injection and Noble Metals systems which were reprogrammed to be implemented during the 11th Refueling Outage of Unit 1 (September 2005) and for 8th Refueling Outage of Unit 2 (April 2006). 19.12 LVNPS-1 & 2 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (PI´s) Among these indicators those related to safety and reliability are considered, which are used by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) as way for collecting and operational experience exchange. LVNPS Units 1 & 2 applies them as a means for performance comparison with other similar power stations and to emulate the best international practices.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

OF LVNPS-1 & 2 (2003)

INDICATOR (PI)

UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

LVNPS-1

LVNPS-2

WANO GOAL FOR THE YEAR

2003

NUCLEAR SAFETY

RHR System

Unavailability

% 0.00043 0.01481 0.020

Diesel Generator

Unavailability

% 0.0000 0.0000 0.025

High-pressure Injection System Unavailability

% 0.00417 0.01053 0.025

Automatic SCRAM’s X

7,000 Critical Hours

Number 0 0 1

Chemistry Index Number 1.02 1.01 1.1

Collective Exposure to

Radiation

Rem-Man 66.336 315.49 120

19-9 Period 2001-2003


INDICATOR (PI)

UNIT OF MEASUREMENT

LVNPS-1

LVNPS-2

WANO GOAL FOR THE YEAR

2003

RELIABILITY

Unplanned Capacity Loss

% 1.68 4.38 2.00



Previous National Report Within the period of this National Report, and regarding radwaste treatment in LVNPS (Section 19.10 of this National Report) the following achievements can be mentioned: • Dose reduction for liquids release in a factor of 10 with compared with the last

triennium, staying with factor of 1,000 times less than Technical Specifications for Operation (ETO´s) limit

• Increase of re-use percentage in 8% respect to the last triennium, staying a 88% average, resulting in less liquid discharges

• Maintaining doses for noble gases releases with a factor of 25,000 times less then Technical Specifications for Operations (ETO´s) limit


Covered by the Next National Report In the period covered by this National Report and the corresponding to the next report, LVNPS will carry out the following activities concerning radwaste treatment: • Installation of a advanced high conductivity liquids treatment system (osmosis

inverse and ultra filtration) to diminish the dose for liquids release and to reach a factor of 10,000 times less then Technical Specifications for Operation (ETO´s) limits, as well as to increase the water re-use to 98% of the total water processed. CFE estimates this system to be operating at the end of September 2005 (See section 19.10.1 of this National Report)

• Installation of a new drying system for concentrated wet solid waste to diminish the processed waste volume to values less than 70 m3 by LVNPS Unit. With this system a final radwaste rate 1 to 1 will be reached. CFE estimates to start its operation at the end of 2005 or at the beginning of 2006 (See section 19.10.3 of

19-10 Period 2001-2003


this National Report)

• Reprocessing by super compressing of compacted dry waste, with a reduction factor 3 to 1 reducing current volume from 1,310 m3 to 400 m3. CFE estimates to complete this activity in second trimester of 2005 (See section 19.10.3 of this National Report)

Also, CFE will submit to CNSNS the adoption of the option “B” of Appendix J of the 10 CFR 50 for Primary Containment tests which will contribute to reduce dose to maintenance personnel. 19.13.3 Safety Concerns and Foreseen Actions Concerning LVNPS exploitation, the licensee as the Mexican Regulatory Body consider that there are no safety issues of concern, so it is not necessary to implement preventive or corrective measures. 19.14 EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTION

OBLIGATIONS Based on the information presented in the First and Second National Report, as well as the additional one included in this National Report, it can be concluded that obligations of Article 19 of the CSN are fulfilled.

19-11 Period 2001-2003

MEXICAN UNITED STATES NACIONAL REPORT

19-12 Period 2001-2003

19

84

73

55

66

37 36

19

4448

2628 28 30

48

30

59

52

35 35

68

4954

42

35

25

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

NOTIFICATION OF REPORTABLE EVENTS / YEARLVNPS UNIT 1 AND 2

U-1 19 84 73 55 66 37 36 44 26 28 48 59 35 68 54 35

U-2 19 48 28 30 30 52 35 49 42 25

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

g

NU

MB

ER

FIGURE 19.1

81

66

143

89 85

7080 77

175

86

102

46

104

63

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

NU

MB

ER

INTERNAL EVENTS / YEAR LVNPS UNIT 1 AND 2

U-1 81 143 85 80 175 102 104

U-2 66 89 70 77 86 46 63

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

g

FIGURE 19.2

MEXICAN UNITED STATES NACIONAL REPORT

19-13 Period 2001-2003

INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE TEST OF LVNPS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

300

325

350

1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004

YEAR

% m

ass/

day

Preoperational Test

Unit 1

Unit 2

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

FIGURE 19.3


ANNEX I

LIST OF CURRENT NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

AI-1 Period 2001-2003


Name Laguna Verde Unit 1 Laguna Verde Unit 2 Number of license CNLV-1/1 CNLV-2/1

PRIS Code MX-1 MX-2

Type BWR BWR

Thermal Power MWt 2027 2027

Net Capacity MWe 682.44 682.44

Operator CFE CFE

NSSS Supplier General Electric General Electric

Cooling Open, Gulf of Mexico Open, Gulf of Mexico

Start of construction October 1, 1976 June 1, 1977

First critically November 8, 1988 September 6, 1994

Grid connection April 13, 1989 November 11, 1994

Commercial Operation July 24, 1990 April 10, 1995

Expiration of license July 24, 2020 April 10, 2025

AI-2 Period 2001-2003


CONTENTS

INDEX ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS INTRODUCTION / ELABORATION AND SCOPE OF NATIONAL REPORT ARTICLE 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 6.1 Nuclear Installations in the Mexican United States 6.2 Main Activities Performed from 1998 to 2000 in order to Enhance Safety 6.3 First Review Meeting Commitments 6.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 7. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 7.1 Introduction 7.2 National Requirements and Provisions 7.3 Regulatory Authority 7.4 Licensing Process 7.5 Assessment System and Regulatory Inspections 7.6 Assurance of Compliance with Suspension, Modification and Revocation

Measures 7.7 Laws, Regulations and Requirements Related to Nuclear Safety 7.8 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 8. REGULATORY BODY 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Attributions and Responsibilities 8.3 Regulatory Body Organisation 8.4 Human Resources 8.4.1 Training of Personnel of the Regulatory Body 8.4.2 Financial Resources 8.5 Internal Quality Assurance in the Regulatory Body 8.6 Results from the IRRT Mission to the Regulatory Body 8.7 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSEE 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Responsibility of the Licensee

I-1 Period 1998-2000


9.3 Measures adopted by the Regulatory Body to Ensure the Fulfilment of the Licensee’s Responsibilities

9.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 10. PRIORITY TO SAFETY 10.1 Introduction and Safety Policies 10.2 Safety Culture and Good Practises 10.3 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 11. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES 11.1 Financial Resources 11.1.1 Financial Resources for CNSNS 11.1.2 Financial Resources for CFE 11.2 Human Resources 11.2.1 Human Resources for CNSNS 11.2.2 Human Resources for CFE/GCN 11.3 Training and Retraining Program 11.3.1 Initial Training Program 11.3.2 Retraining Program 11.4 Funds for Handling LVNPS Radioactive Disposal and Decommissioning 11.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 12. HUMAN FACTORS 12.1 Background 12.2 Current Situation 12.3 Further Steps Contributing To Prevent Human Error and Improve Man-

Machine Interaction 12.4 The Role of the Regulatory Body in Reducing Events Caused by Human

Factors 12.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 13. QUALITY ASSURANCE 13.1 Quality Assurance Policies 13.2 Quality Assurance Plan During the Construction Stage 13.3 Quality Assurance Plan During the Operation Stage 13.3.1 Periodic Evaluation of the Adequacy of the Quality Assurance Operation

Plan 13.3.2 Audits and Surveillance’s 13.3.3 Corrective Actions 13.3.4 Procurement of Parts and Components 13.4 Reportability 13.5 Other Quality Assurance Programs

I-2 Period 1998-2000


13.6 Regulatory Body Activities at Nuclear Installations 13.7 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 14. SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND INSPECTION 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Safety Assessment – Construction Stage 14.2.1 LVNPS Internal Audits/Inspections 14.2.2 Regulatory Activities Performed by CNSNS 14.2.3 External Assessments 14.2.4 Pre-Operational Test Program 14.3 Safety Assessment – Operation Stage 14.3.1 Evaluations/Inspections by LVNPS Organisations 14.3.2 External Evaluations/Verifications to LVNPS 14.4 Safety Assessment - Actions for Continuous Improvement 14.5 New Fuel Designs for Laguna Verde NPP 14.5.1 Historical Conformation of LVNPS core 14.5.2 Licensing of New Core Configurations 14.5.3 Problems Originated in LVNPS Core 14.6 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) 14.6.1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Level 1 14.6.2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Level 2 14.6.3 Application of Risk Informed Regulation 14.7 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 15. RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION 15.1 Introduction 15.2 Dose Limitation System 15.3 LVNPS Radiological Protection 15.3.1 Radiological Protection Program 15.3.2 Environmental Radiological Impact 15.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 16. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 16.1 LVNPS Emergency Plans 16.1.1 Regulatory Aspects 16.1.2 Emergency Response Organisation 16.1.3 Emergency Assessment Actions 16.1.4 Installations and emergency Equipment 16.1.5 Emergency Plan Activation Exercises/Drills 16.2 Measures for Informing the Public in Relation to Emergency Preparedness 16.3 Interaction with Neighbouring States 16.4 Regulatory Body Activities 16.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations

I-3 Period 1998-2000


ARTICLE 17. SITING 17.1 Regulatory Aspects 17.2 Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station Site 17.2.1 Design Basis as Regards to LVNPS-1 & 2 Siting 17.2.2 Effect of the Seismic Events on LVNPS 17.3 Consequences to the LVNPS Surround Due To Operation 17.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 18. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 18.1 Regulatory Aspects 18.2 Design Aspects 18.3 Implementation of the Philosophy of Defence In Depth 18.4 LVNPS Design Criteria and Structure, System and Component

Classification 18.4.1 General Design Criteria 18.4.2 Safety Design Criteria 18.4.3 LVNPS Structure, System and Component Classification 18.5 Proved Validity of LVNPS 1 & 2 Design and Construction 18.6 CNSNS Activities 18.7 Reliable Operation 18.8 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 19. OPERATION 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Administration and Management Criteria 19.2.1 Construction Stage 19.2.2 Operation Stage 19.3 LVNPS Safety Analysis and Start Up Program 19.3.1 Safety Analysis 19.3.2 Start Up Program 19.3.3 Regulatory Body Activities 19.4 LVNPS safety Analysis at Operational Stage 19.5 Use of Approved Procedures 19.6 Procedures for Operational Incidents Predicted and Accidents 19.7 Technical Support Services during Installation’s Lifetime 19.8 Notification of Incidents 19.9 Operational Experience 19.9.1 Internal Operational Experience 19.9.2 External Operational Experience 19.9.3 Regulatory Body Activities 19.10 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems 19.10.1 Liquid Waste Treatment

I-4 Period 1998-2000


19.10.2 Gaseous Waste Treatment 19.10.3 Solid Waste Treatment 19.10.4 Spend Fuel Storage 19.10.5 Radioactive Waste Production-Reduction Program 19.11 Ageing Management and Plant Life Extension 19.12 LVNPS-1 & 2 Performance Indicators (PI) 19.13 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ANNEX I “United States of Mexico National Report, presented to fulfil the

requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety” presented during the First Review Meeting. April 1999.”

ANNEX II “Quality Assurance Manual for CNSNS” Spanish Version only.

I-5 Period 1998-2000


CONTENTS

INDEX ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS INTRODUCTION AND ELABORATION OF NATIONAL REPORT ARTICLE 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 6.1 Nuclear Installations in the Mexican United States 6.2 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 7. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 7.1 Introduction 7.2 National Requirements and Provisions 7.3 Regulatory Authority 7.4 Licensing Process 7.5 Assessment System and Regulatory Inspections 7.6 Assurance of Compliance with Suspension, Modification and

Revocation Measures 7.7 Laws, Regulations and Requirements Related to Nuclear Safety 7.7.1 Compendium of the National Legislative Framework 7.8 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 8. REGULATORY BODY 8.1 Introduction 8.1.1 Historical Evolution of the Regulatory Body 8.2 Attributions and Responsibilities 8.2.1 Interrelation of the Regulatory Body with other Entities of the Nuclear

Sector 8.3 Regulatory Body Organisation 8.4 Human Resources 8.4.1 Training of Personnel of the Regulatory Body 8.4.2 Financial Resources 8.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations

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ARTICLE 9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSEE 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Responsibility of the Licensee 9.3 Measures adopted by the Regulatory Body to Ensure the Fulfilment of

the Licensee’s Responsibilities 9.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 10. PRIORITY TO SAFETY 10.1 Introduction and Safety Policies 10.2 Safety Culture and Good Practises 10.3 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 11. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES 11.1 Financial Resources 11.1.1 Financial Resources for CNSNS 11.1.2 Financial Resources for CFE 11.2 Human Resources 11.2.1 Human Resources for CNSNS 11.2.2 Human Resources for CFE/GCN 11.3 Training and Retraining Program 11.3.1 Initial Training Program 11.3.2 Retraining Program 11.4 Funds for Handling LVNPS Radioactive Disposal and Decommissioning 11.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 12. HUMAN FACTORS 12.1 Background 12.2 Current Situation 12.3 Further Steps Contributing To Prevent Human Error and Improve Man-

Machine Interaction 12.4 The Role of the Regulatory Body in Reducing Events Caused by

Human Factors 12.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 13. QUALITY ASSURANCE 13.1 Quality Assurance Policies

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13.2 Quality Assurance Plan During the Construction Stage 13.3 Quality Assurance Plan During the Operation Stage 13.3.1 Periodic Evaluation of the Adequacy of the Quality Assurance

Operation Plan 13.3.2 Audits and Surveillance’s 13.3.3 Corrective Actions 13.3.4 Procurement of Parts and Components 13.4 Reportability 13.5 Other Quality Assurance Programs 13.6 Regulatory Body Activities 13.7 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 14. SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND INSPECTION 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Safety Assessment – Construction Stage 14.2.1 LVNPS Internal Audits/Inspections 14.2.2 Regulatory Activities Performed by CNSNS 14.2.3 External Assessments 14.2.4 Pre-Operational Test Program 14.3 Safety Assessment – Operation Stage 14.3.1 Evaluations/Inspections by LVNPS Organisations 14.3.2 External Evaluations/Verifications to LVNPS 14.4 Safety Assessment - Actions for Continuous Improvement 14.5 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) 14.6 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 15. RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION 15.1 Introduction 15.2 Dose Limitation System 15.3 LVNPS Radiological Protection 15.3.1 Radiological Protection Program 15.3.2 Environmental Radiological Impact 15.3.3 Regulatory Body Radiological Protection Verification 15.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 16. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 16.1 LVNPS Emergency Plans 16.1.1 Regulatory Aspects 16.1.2 Emergency Response Organisation 16.1.3 Emergency Assessment Actions

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16.1.4 Installations and emergency Equipment 16.1.5 Emergency Plan Activation Exercises/Drills 16.2 Measures for Informing the Public in Relation to Emergency

Preparedness 16.3 Interaction with Neighbouring States 16.4 Regulatory Body Activities 16.5 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 17. SITING 17.1 Regulatory Aspects 17.2 Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station Site 17.2.1 Design Basis as Regards to LVNPS-1 & 2 Siting 17.3 Consequences to the LVNPS Surround Due To Operation 17.4 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 18. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 18.1 Regulatory Aspects 18.2 Design Aspects 18.3 Implementation of the Philosophy of Defence In Depth 18.4 LVNPS Design Criteria and Structure, System and Component

Classification 18.4.1 General Design Criteria 18.4.2 Safety Design Criteria 18.4.3 LVNPS Structure, System and Component Classification 18.5 Proved Validity of LVNPS 1 & 2 Design and Construction 18.6 CNSNS Activities 18.7 Reliable Operation 18.8 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations ARTICLE 19. OPERATION 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Administration and Management Criteria 19.2.1 Construction Stage 19.2.2 Operation Stage 19.3 LVNPS Safety Analysis and Start Up Program 19.3.1 Safety Analysis 19.3.2 Start Up Program 19.3.3 Regulatory Body Activities 19.4 Use of Approved Procedures 19.5 Procedures for Operational Incidents Predicted and Accidents

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19.6 Technical Support Services during Installation’s Lifetime 19.7 Notification of Incidents 19.8 Operational Experience 19.8.1 Internal Operational Experience 19.8.2 External Operational Experience 19.8.3 Regulatory Body Activities 19.9 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems 19.9.1 Liquid Waste Treatment 19.9.2 Gaseous Waste Treatment 19.9.3 Solid Waste Treatment 19.9.4 Spend Fuel Storage 19.9.5 Radioactive Waste Production-Reduction Program 19.10 LVNPS-1 & 2 Performance Indicators (PI´s) 19.11 Evaluation of the Level of Compliance with the Convention Obligations APPENDIX “Legislative and Regulatory Framework by which the Safety of

Nuclear Installations is Ruled in the Mexican United States” ANNEX I “The Regulatory Law of the Constitutional Article 27 on

Nuclear Matters” (English version) ANNEX II “Law of Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages”

(Spanish version) ANNEX III “The General Regulations on Radiological Safety”

(Spanish version) ANNEX IV “Safety Rules, Standards and Guides of the Country of Origin

of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)”

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