national grid corporation cbaa case no. l-135- 2016 of …
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Republic of the Philippines
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS 7th Floor, EDPC Bldg., BSP Complex,
Roxas Blvd., Manila
NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION CBAA CASE NO. L-135- 2016
OF THE PHILIPPINES, LBAA Case Nos. 2015-001
Petitioner-Appellant, City of Muntinlupa
-versus-
THE LOCAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS, CITY OF
MUNTINLUPA
Appellee,
-and-
ANASTACIO L. MINOZA, in his
capacity as ICO, City Treasurer
of Muntinlupa, and HERMINIO
DELA CRUZ, in his official
capacity as the City Assessor of
Muntinlupa,
Respondents-Appellees.
x-----------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
Submitted for Resolution by this Board is the Petitioner-
Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration praying for
reconsideration of the 27 November 2017 Resolution in the
above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board, hereby
Resolves to DISMISS the case for failure of Petitioner-
Appellant to perfect an appeal on time.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner-Appellant received a copy of the said
Resolution on 12 December 2017. On 05 January 2018, this
Board received through registered mail Petitioner-Appellant’s
Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2017
(“Motion”).
On 20 July 2018, this Board issued a Notice giving
Respondents-Appellees ten (10) days from receipt of the
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
R E S O L U T I O N
Page 2 of 28
Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration to file their
Comment/Opposition. On 05 September 2018, Respondents-
Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion to Admit Comment and
Comment/Opposition dated 13 August 2018 (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration) were received by this Board.
On 08 October 2018, this Board received Petitioner-
Appellant’s Opposition (To Respondents-Appellees’
Manifestation with Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition
dated 04 September 2018). Subsequently, on 09 November
2018, copy of Respondents-Appellees’ Reply (Re: Petitioner-
Appellant`s Opposition to Respondents-Appellees’
Manifestation with Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition
dated 04 September 2018) was received by this Board.
Subsequently on 21 November 2018, Petitioner-Appellant’s
Rejoinder (To Respondent-Appellees’ Reply dated 25 October
2018) was received by this Board.
Petitioner-Appellant moves for reconsideration of the
Resolution issued by this Board and to deny Respondents-
Appellees’ Motion to Admit/Comment Opposition to Petitioner-
Appellant`s Motion.
I. Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion For Reconsideration
In the instant motion, Petitioner-Appellant stated the
following arguments:
1. The ruling in NPC vs. Benguet is not applicable in the
instant case based on the following:
a. In NPC v. Benguet, the applicable rules of procedure
in the filing of appeal is the 1996 Rules of Procedure
before the LBAA (1996 Rules) issued by this Board;
while in the present case, the applicable rules of
procedure is the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules
of Procedure before the LBAA and the CBAA (2013
Rules) which was also issued by this Board;
b. In NPC v. Benguet, the 1996 Rules does not have a
specific provision for the aggrieved party to file a
motion for reconsideration; while in the instant case,
the 2013 Rules includes a provision on the filing of a
motion for reconsideration;
i. Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1996 Rules simply
provides:
“Section 1. Period of Appeal; Where to Appeal;
How Appeal Taken. – Any party aggrieved by the
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decision, order or resolution of the Local Board
may appeal to the Central Board within the period
and in the manner prescribed under Rule IV of the
Rules of Procedure before the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.”
ii. Rule IV of the Rules of Procedure before the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals provides:
“Section 2. Who may appeal; when to appeal; -
Any party in a case before the Local Board who
feels aggrieved by the decision, resolution or order
of the said Local Board may, within thirty (30) days
from and after receipt of the said decision,
resolution or order, appeal to the Central Board.”
iii. On the other hand, the 2013 Rules provides:
“(c) The party or parties aggrieved by the decision
or final resolution of a Local Board concerned may,
within thirty (30) days from notice of said decision
or final resolution, appeal to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.”(Section 5, Rule III, LBAA
Rules)
“SEC. 6. Motion for Reconsideration – Within the
period for perfecting an appeal from the decision,
resolution or final order of the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals, the aggrieved party may file
a motion for reconsideration, after serving the
adverse party with a copy thereof: Provided, That
only one such motion shall be allowed.” (Rule III,
LBAA Rules)
c. In NPC vs. Benguet, there was no reason for the
Supreme Court to apply the fresh period rule after the
denial of the motion for reconsideration because the
rules of procedure at that time does not provide for
filing such motion, and limits the period for the filing of
appeal within thirty (30) days from and after receipt of
the said decision, resolution or order issued by the
LBAA. After the denial of NPC`s motion for
reconsideration, NPC had only the remaining period
of the thirty (30) days to file its appeal before the
CBAA. Thus, there exists a valid reason for the non-
application of the Neypes ruling (Fresh Period
Doctrine) which the Supreme Court held to be
applicable to judicial proceedings.
d. The situation in the instant case is very much different.
The 2013 Rules not only allows the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, but also allows the filing of the
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appeal before this Board within thirty (30) days from
notice of the decision or final resolution issued by the
LBAA.
e. The inclusion of the words “or final resolution” is crucial
as clearly explained by the Supreme Court in the
Neypes case, to wit:
“Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be
taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. A final judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it.
It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order
or judgment that dismisses an action. xxx
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their
notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of
the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should,
as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the
above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the
final order, which we already determined to refer
to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a
new trial or reconsideration.” (Emphasis supplied).
f. The 2013 Rules on appeal should be construed
similarly that is, the appeal may be filed by Petitioner
NGCP within 30 days from receipt of the notice of the
decision or 30 days from receipt of the final order
which is the order denying the omnibus motion for
reconsideration that was received by Petitioner NGCP
on 10 March 2016.
g. On the non-applicability of the Neypes ruling or fresh
period doctrine in the instant case, being an
administrative action, there is a need to distinguish the
cases cited in NPC vs. Benguet with the instant case.
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i. In the case of Julieta Panolino v. Joshepine L.
Tajala, G.R. No. 183616, 29 June 2010 (Panolino v.
Tajala) , the Neypes rule was not applied because
appeal from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary is governed by
Section 1 of the Administrative Order (AO) No. 87,
Series of 1990 which provides:
“SECTION 1. Perfection of Appeals.
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law or
executive order, appeals from the
decisions/orders of the DENR Regional Offices
shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of a copy of the decision/order
complained of by the party adversely
affected, by filing with the Regional Office
which adjudicated the case a notice of
appeal, serving copies thereof upon the
prevailing party and the Office of the
Secretary, and paying the required fees.
(b) If a motion for reconsideration of the
decision/order of the Regional Office is filed
and such motion for reconsideration is denied,
the movant shall have the right to perfect his
appeal during the remainder of the period for
appeal, reckoned from receipt of the
resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed
on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall
have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution of reversal within which to perfect his
appeal.
(c) The Regional office shall, upon perfection of
the appeal, transmit the records of the case to
the Office of the Secretary with each page
numbered consecutively and initialed by the
custodian of the records.
Xxx
“SECTION 6. Applicability of the Rules of Court. The
Rules of Court shall apply when not inconsistent with
the provisions hereof. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the Supreme Court held:
“Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature
involving an appeal from the decision or order of the
DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such
appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of
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Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier
quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion
for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect
his appeal “during the remainder of the period of
appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of
denial;” whereas if the decision is reversed, the
adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his
appeal.”
ii. Likewise, in the case of San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders
and Development Group, Inc. v. Ma. Cristina F.
Bayang1, involving an appeal from the decision of
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President, the Supreme Court did not apply the “fresh
period rule” in Neypes because the rules and
regulations governing appeals from decisions of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution
No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Par. 2 Section1 of
Administrative Order No.18, series of 1987. Thus, the
Supreme Court also held:
“Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No.
765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and
regulations governing appeals from decisions of
the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President, pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice
to the Board and the other party, appeal a
decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners to the Office of the President
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in
accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18
Series of 1987.
The pendency of the motion for
reconsideration shall suspend the running of the
period of appeal to the Office of the President.
Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987,
provides that in case the aggrieved party files a
motion for reconsideration from an adverse
decision of any agency/office, the said party has
the only remaining balance of the prescriptive
period within which to appeal, reckoned from
receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her
motion for reconsideration.
1 G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015.
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Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the
present case, we find that the CA correctly
affirmed the OP in dismissing the petitioners'
appeal for having been filed out of time.”
h. Based on the foregoing, it is aptly observed that, in
not applying the Neypes ruling in the cited cases, the
Supreme Court took into consideration the applicable
provisions of the rules of procedure of the concerned
administrative agencies. It did not rule simply on the
basis that the cases involved are administrative, and
not judicial in nature.
i. Thus, it is safe to conclude that, where the rules of
procedure adopted by a particular body or agency
specifically include a provision depriving the
aggrieved party fresh period of appeal in case of
denial of his/her motion for reconsideration; or there is
no provision specifically allowing or there is no such
provision that tends to allow the application of fresh
period rule; then , the Neypes rule would not apply as
it is applicable only in judicial proceedings and not to
administrative proceedings. These situations are best
illustrated in the cases of Patalino v. Tajala, San Jose
Builders v. Bayang and NPC vs. Benguet.
j. Stated otherwise, the Neypes rule would apply even
in administrative proceedings if the rules adopted by
the concerned agency contain a provision allowing
the application of fresh period rule. Such a situation
applies to the case of Petitioner-Appellant NGCP.
2. According to Petitioner-Appellant the 2013
Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA
and the CBAA issued by this Board allows the fresh period rule,
that is NGCP may file its appeal before this Board within a
period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the LBAA final order on
18 August 2016 denying its Motion for Reconsideration. To
support this allegation, Petitioner-Appellant averred that:
a. A reading of all the other relevant provisions of the
2013 Rules, specifically so when it allows the filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration, would readily lead to the
likely conclusion that fresh period is allowed;
b. To reiterate the inclusion of the words “or final
resolution” in Section 5 (c) Rule III of the LBAA Rules is
very important as it led Petitioner-Appellant NGCP to
reasonably believe that it could file its appeal to this
Honorable Board within thirty (30) days from notice of
said decision or final resolution issued by the Appellee-
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LBAA, the final resolution being the denial of its Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration by the LBAA;
c. Equally significant to mention is the inclusion on Motion
for Reconsideration and the words “or final resolution” in
the 2013 Rules which were absent or not included in the
1996 Rules. The adoption of said provisions in the 2013
Rules clearly indicates inclusion or allowance in the Rules
of the fresh period rule;
d. With the adoption of the Supreme Court of the
Neypes ruling, the same already formed part of the Rules
of Court. As such, said rule has been adopted by the
2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules as provided under Section 3,
Rule 1, to wit:
“SEC. 3. In the absence of any applicable
provision in these Rules, the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines may,
whenever practicable and convenient in the
interest of expeditious dispensation of justice, be
applied by analogy or in a suppletory character
and effect.”
e. The application of the Neypes ruling is not inconsistent
with the provisions of the 2013 Rules. In fact, it clarifies
and supplements the 2013 Rules providing clearer
guidance to parties in the expeditious and inexpensive
settlement of their cases.
3. Petitioner-Appellant argued that in filing the Motion for
Reconsideration, Petitioner NGCP was merely following the
provisions of the rules promulgated by this Board and should
not be penalized for doing so, otherwise, it would be unfair and
would constitute denial of due process. Petitioner-Appellant
further stated the following explanations:
a. In filing its Motion for Consideration before the
Appellee- LBAA and the subsequent appeal to this
Honorable Board, Petitioner-Appellant simply complied
with the provisions of Section 5 (c) and Section 6 of Rule
III of the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of
Procedures before the LBAA and the CBAA issued by no
less than this Board;
b. The 2013 Rules, as discussed above, allows an
aggrieved party to file a Motion for Reconsideration
within thirty (30) day period for perfecting an appeal
and to file its subsequent appeal in case of denial of the
motion for reconsideration within the same period
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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reckoned from receipt of final resolution denying the
same;
c. Applying paragraph (c) of Section 5, Rule III of the
Rules, the Order of Appellee LBAA dated 22 July 2016
received by Petitioner-Appellant NGCP on 18 August
2016 is considered as the Final Resolution where an
aggrieved party, such as Petitioner-Appellant NGCP,
may appeal to the CBAA within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof;
d. Therefore, the Memorandum of Appeal filed by
Petitioner-Appellant on 16 September 2016 before this
Honorable Board assailing the Decision dated 21
December 2015 and Order dated 22 July 2016 issued by
Appellee LBAA is within the thirty (30) day period for
perfecting an appeal before this Honorable Board;
e. It must be stressed that Petitioner NGCP should not be
faulted and penalized with dismissal of its appeal for
merely relying on the very Rules of Procedure
promulgated and adopted by this Honorable Board
pursuant to Section 230 of the Local Government Code.
f. The Rules are clear and allow the suppletory and
application of the Rules of Court in the absence of any
applicable provision “whenever practicable and
convenient in the interest of expeditious dispensation of
justice”;
g. Hence, the 2013 Rules of Procedure promulgated and
adopted by this Honorable Board allow the application
of the fresh period rule in the Neypes case unlike in the
cases of Patalino vs. Tajala, San Jose Builders v. Bayang
and NPC vs. Benguet;
h. For this Honorable Board, after issuing and adopting
such Rules of Procedure in 2013, to now deny the
applicability of the fresh period rule without taking into
consideration the factual and legal circumstances
peculiar to the instant case pending before it, would be
unfair and cause injustice on the part of Petitioner-
Appellant who relied on such Rules;
i. Certainly, the dismissal of Petitioner NGCP`s appeal for
relying on and following the Rules of Procedure issued by
this Board would be an injustice which is tantamount to
denial of due process on its part;
j. In the interest of substantial justice and due process,
Petitioner-Appellant NGCP respectfully submits that the
appeal should be given due course by this Honorable
Board based on the provisions of the 2013 Consolidated
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and Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA and
CBAA, for the following reasons:
a. The Rules do not include a specific provision
disallowing a fresh period rule;
b. The Rules allow suppletory application (Section
3-Rule1) of the Rules of Curt which include the
Neypes doctrine;
c. The Rules allow liberal construction to promote
their objectives and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action relative to
assessment of real property and collection real
property taxes. (Section 2, Rule I);
d. The Rules do not adhere technical rules
applicable in judicial proceedings (Section 5(b)
Rule III) ;
k. In the case of Heirs of Victoriana Villagracia v.
Equitable Banking Corporation2 , the Supreme Court
held:
“However, in the instant case, we are of the view
that the ends of justice will be better served if it is
determined on the merits, after full opportunity is
given to all parties for ventilation of their causes
and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. It is far better to dispose
of the case on the merits, which is a primordial
end, rather than on a technicality that may result
in injustice. While it is desirable that the Rules of
Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be
too strict with procedural lapses that do not really
impair the proper administration of justice.
The rules are intended to ensure the proper
and orderly conduct of litigation because of
the higher objective they seek, which is the
attainment of justice and the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. In Republic v.
Imperial [362 Phil. 466], the Court, through Mr.
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., stressed that
the filing of the appellant's brief in appeals is
not a jurisdictional requirement. But an appeal
may be dismissed by the CA on grounds
enumerated under Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. The Court has the power to relax or
suspend the rules or to except a case from their
operation when compelling reasons so warrant,
or when the purpose of justice requires it.”
2 G.R. No. 136972, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 60.
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4. Petitioner-Appellant stated that the rules of procedure
should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice. To
defend its position Petitioner-Appellant declared the following:
a. Settled is the rule that the right to appeal, being
merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the
manner prescribed by law, such as the Consolidated
and Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA and
CBAA. As consistently held by the Supreme Court, non-
observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and
failure to offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-
compliance is fatal to one`s cause. Nonetheless, it is
equally true that, in proceedings before administrative
bodies, the general rule has always been liberality.
b. Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in
administrative cases is not required by law3.
Administrative rules of procedure should be construed
liberally in order to promote their object to assist the
parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses4.
c. As a matter fact, this Honorable Board in the 2013
Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedure before the
LBAA and the CBAA, adopts and applies liberal
construction of the rules, to wit:
“SEC. 2. Construction – These Rules shall be liberally
construed to promote their objectives and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action relative to the
assessment of real property and collection of real
property taxes.” (emphasis ours)
d. In the case of Emelie L. Besaga vs. Spouses Felipe
Acosta and Luzviminda Acosta and Digna Matalag
Coching G. R. No. 194061, 20 April 2015 (Besaga vs.
Acosta), wherein Acosta, instead of filing a Notice of
Appeal to the DENR Regional Executive Director, filed a
Memorandum of Appeal to the DENR Secretary and
paid the appeal fee beyond the 15 day period violating
Section 1 (a) of DENR Department Administrative Order
No. 87 series of 1990, which requires the filing of a Notice
of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee within the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court categorically
and clearly explained the nature of administrative rules
of procedure as follows:
3 Barcelona vs. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 05, 2014. 4 Ibid.
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“It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a
statutory privilege, should be exercised in the
manner prescribed by law. This has been
consistently held in relation to non-observance by
a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to
offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-
compliance.
Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before
administrative bodies the general rule has always
been liberality.
Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in
administrative cases is not required by law.28
Administrative rules of procedure should be
construed liberally in order to promote their object
to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective
claims and defenses. xxx
The liberality of procedure in administrative actions,
however, is subject to limitations imposed by the
requirements of due process.
Administrative due process means reasonable
opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor:
“The observance of fairness in the conduct of
any investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process. The essence of due
process is to be heard, and, as applied to
administrative proceedings, this means a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary, and technical
rules of procedure are not strictly applied.”
e. Petitioner-Appellant added that further in the case of
Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine
Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.5, the Supreme Court held:
“It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are
mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of
justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the primary objective of the
rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite
justice. Technicalities should never be used to
5 G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013. 710 SCRA 474, 482.
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defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities, x x x. This is especially true with
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as
the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of
procedure.”
f. With all due respect, this Honorable Board should have
liberally construed the rules so as not to defeat the
substantive rights of Petitioner-Appellant NGCP
considering that there is already a case decided by the
Supreme Court regarding its exemption from payment of
real property taxes in the case of National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines vs. Ofelia M. Oliva, G.R.
No. 213157 and Ofelia M. Oliva vs. National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 21358 (sic) (NPC
vs. Oliva case) which already became final and
executory.
g. In Besaga vs. Acosta6, in upholding liberal construction
in administrative cases, the Supreme Court examined
whether the errors breached due process so as to call for
the strict application of the administrative procedures. In
said case, according to Petitioner-Appellant the
Supreme Court found no violation of due process as the
procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to
petitioner and the Supreme Court held that:
“First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to
sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply
Section l(a) of DAO No. 87 may violate the respondent
spouses right to due process as this would result to a
denial of their right to appeal.xxx
Between strict construction of administrative rules of
procedure for their own sake and their liberal
application in order to enhance fair trials and
expedite justice, we uphold the latter. After all,
administrative rules of procedure do not operate in a
vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy and
inexpensive resolution of disputes before
administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply
these rules in a manner that would give effect rather
than defeat their intended purpose.” (emphasis ours)
h. In the instant case, Petitioner-Appellant NGCP`s
reliance on the Rules issued by this Board in filing its
appeal before this Board did not violate the right of
Respondent-Appellee City Assessor to due process.
Petitioner-Appellant paid the corresponding docket fees
6 Ibid.
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and furnished Respondent-Appellee copies of the
Memorandum of Appeal and all the pleadings and
documents required by this Board to be submitted;
i. In short, Respondent-Appellee was given all the
chances and opportunities to ventilate its position before
this Board and participated in very stage of the
administrative proceeding and her right to be heard was
not compromised. Thus, there being no violation of
Respondent-Appellee`s right to due process, there is
enough room to apply the liberal construction of the
Rules;
j. On the other hand, strict application of the LBAA and
CBAA rules would result to a denial of Petitioner-
Appellant`s right to appeal as guaranteed by the Rules.
k. Petitioner-Appellant NGCP is not unmindful of equally
important decisions7 of the Supreme Court as cited by
this Honorable Board that the failure to perfect an
appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality but it is jurisdictional. However, we appeal to
this Honorable Board to take into consideration the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case at bar as
discussed above, as compared with the cited cases
wherein the laws of procedure relied upon are clear
and not subject of conflicting interpretations;
5. Petitioner-Appellant alleged that assuming this Board
would rule in favor of Petitioner-Appellant NGCP and acquire
jurisdiction over the instant case, Petitioner-Appellant NGCP
respectfully submits that the subject properties should be
declared as exempt from payment of real property tax
pursuant to its franchise, R.A. 9511 and based on the following:
a. Section 9 of R.A. No.9511 clearly provides that NGCP is
exempt from the payment of real property tax on
properties used in connection with its franchise;
b. Said exemption of NGCP from payment of real
property taxes on properties used in connection with its
franchise was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case
of National Grid Corporation of the Philippines vs. Ofelia
M. Oliva, G.R. No. 213157 and Ofelia M. Oliva vs.
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No.
21358 (sic) The Supreme Court, through Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, categorically held:
“NGCP took control of the subject properties in 2009.
Although laws on real property taxes are prescribed
7 National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Lorenzo L. Laohoo, et.al. G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009
and Marcos V. Prieto vs. CA, et.al, G.R. No. 158597, June 18, 2012.
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by the Local Government Code, it is imperative to
examine the applicable tax provisions in NGCP’s
franchise.
Section 9 of RA 9511 provides that NGCP shall pay "a
franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all
gross receipts derived by the Grantee from its
operation under this franchise." This franchise tax is "in
lieu of income tax and any and all taxes, duties, fees
and charges of any kind, nature or description
levied, established or collected by any authority
whatsoever, local or national, on its franchise, rights,
privileges, receipts, revenues and profits, and on
properties used in connection with its franchise, from
which taxes, duties and charges, the Grantee is
hereby expressly exempted.
It is very clear that NGCP's payment of franchise tax
exempts it from payment of real property taxes on
properties used in connection with its franchise.
However, NGCP's tax exempt status on real property
due to the "in lieu of all taxes" clause is qualified:
NGCP shall be liable to pay the same tax as other
corporations on real estate, buildings and personal
property exclusive of their franchise. The phrase
"exclusive of this franchise" means that real estate,
buildings, and personal property used in the exercise
of the franchise are not subjet to the same tax as
other corporations.
The CBAA should determine whether the subject
properties are properties used in connection with
NGCP's franchise. If the subject properties are used in
connection with NGCP's franchise, then NGCP is
exempt from paying real property taxes on the
subject properties.”
c. The aforesaid decision of the Honorable Supreme
Court has already become final and executory ;
d. Considering that the properties involved are used as
right of way for the Binan-Muntinlupa 230kV Transmission
Line and by their very nature and purpose necessary for
the operation and maintennace of the NGCP`s power
transmission business which is the subject matter of its
franchise, the same should be declared as exempt from
payment of real property tax.
Petitioner-Appellant prayed that the Resolution of this
Board dated 27 November 2017 be reconsidered and set aside
and new one rendered:
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
R E S O L U T I O N
Page 16 of 28
1. Declaring that Petitioner-Appellant NGCP filed its
appeal before this Board within the reglementary
period as provided in the 2013 Consolidated and
Revised Rules of Procedures before the LBAA and
CBAA;
2. Reversing and setting aside the Decision and Order
of Respondent-Appellee LBAA dated 21 December
2015 and 18 August 2016, respectively;
3. Declaring subject properties as Exempt from payment
of RPTs
In the Assessment Roll and in the Tax Declarations;
and
4. Ordering the refund of Php 161,241.17, the amount
paid by NGCP under protest.
II. Respondents-Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion
Respondents-Appellees averred that on 3 August 2018
Respondents-Appellees received the Order dated 20 July 2018,
requiring respondents to file their Comment to Appellant`s
Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated November 27,
2017. Respondents-Appellees manifested that they complied
with the Order of the Board by submitting their Comment on 13
August 2018. However, Respondents-Appellees inadvertently
addressed the Comment to a case, docketed as CBAA Case
No. L-127 entitled “National Power Corporation vs. Local Board
of Assessment” (sic) which was previously being presided by this
Board and which Respondent City of Muntinlupa was a party.
Respondents-Appellees stated that on 24 August 2018, copies
of the Comment/Opposition were sent back to them. Hence,
Respondents-Appellees are submitting their Comment to the
Motion for Reconsideration containing the same allegations in
the motion previously sent, except for the case title and docket
number. Respondents-Appellees are asking for the kind
indulgence of this Board to admit the same.
III. Respondents-Appellees` Comment/Opposition (Re:
Motion for Reconsideration)
Respondents-Appellees argued that contrary to
Appellant`s contentions, the fresh period rules do not apply to
quasi-judicial agencies. Respondents-Appellees cited the case
of Judith Yu vs. Hon. Sta. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979,
February 9, 2011, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled the
applicability of the fresh-period rule and states that:
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 17 of 28
“In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil
cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which
to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of
15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural
rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified
and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the
Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
According to Respondents-Appellees, the Honorable
Supreme Court categorically stated that the fresh-period rule
only applied to the technical rules before the Courts of Justice
applying Rule 40, 42, 43 and 45. Respondents-Appellees argued
that Appellant`s declaration that the fresh-period rules also
applies to quasi-judicial agencies is bereft of merit.
Respondents-Appellees stated that it must be emphasized
that though the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated the
fresh-period rule, the same does not apply to all Court
proceedings before the Courts of Justice as penned in the
case of Nilo Pates vs. Comelec, GR. No. 184915, June 30, 2009,
where the Honorable Supreme Court provided that the fresh-
period rules does not apply to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 18 of 28
“Thus, as a matter of law, our ruling of November
11, 2008 to dismiss the petition for late filing cannot but
be correct. This ruling is not without its precedent; we
have previously ordered a similar dismissal in the earlier
case of Domingo v. Commission on Elections. The Court,
too, has countless times in the past stressed that the Rules
of Court must be followed. Thus, we had this to say
in Fortich v. Corona:
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated
with utmost respect and due regard since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution
of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The
requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed
in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons
shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their before
all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies," the
adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that
a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice. There have been some
instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the
application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation and
application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to
only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
As emphasized above, exceptional circumstances
or compelling reasons may have existed in the past
when we either suspended the operation of the Rules or
exempted a particular case from their application. But,
these instances were the exceptions rather than the
rule, and we invariably took this course of action only
upon a meritorious plea for the liberal construction of the
Rules of Court based on attendant exceptional
circumstances. These uncommon exceptions allowed us
to maintain the stability of our rulings, while allowing for
the unusual cases when the dictates of justice demand
a correspondingly different treatment.
Under this unique nature of the exceptions, a party
asking for the suspension of the Rules of Court comes to
us with the heavy burden of proving that he deserves to
be accorded exceptional treatment. Every plea for a
liberal construction of the Rules must at least be
accompanied by an explanation of why the party-
litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a
justification for the requested liberal construction.
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 19 of 28
Significantly, the petitioner presented no
exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to
warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his
petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late. Other
than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience,
he did not explain why we should adopt and apply the
fresh period rule to an election case.
To us, the petitioners omissions are fatal, as his
motion does not provide us any reason specific to his
case why we should act as he advocates.”
Respondents-Appellees argued that the foregoing rulings
made by the Honorable Supreme Court to the effect that the
fresh-period rule is an exception rather than a rule and that its
application is not all encompassing that warrant its application
to all technical rules of Courts of Justice and quasi-judicial
agencies. Respondents-Appellees concluded that the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals properly dismissed the Appeal of
Appellant due to failure to timely file its appeal and to
appreciate the fresh period rule.
Respondents-Appellees prayed that the Motion for
Reconsideration filed By Appellant be dismissed for utter lack of
merit.
IV. Petitioner-Appellant`s Opposition (To Respondent-
Appellees` Manifestation with Motion to Admit
Comment/Opposition dated 04 September 2018)
Petitioner-Appellant stated that under Section 13, Rule IV
of the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedure
before the LBAA and CBAA8 (“CBAA and LBAA Rules”), which
was likewise stated in the Notice of Decision dated 01
December 2017 issued by this Honorable Board, an opposition
to the motion for reconsideration may be made within 10 days
from receipt of the motion, to wit:
“SEC. 13. Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration – The
adverse party may, within ten (10) days from receipt of
a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration, file an
Opposition thereto. Failure to do so shall render the
motion deemed submitted for resolution.”
Petitioner-Appellant argued that on 27 December 2017,
NGCP filed its Motion for Reconsideration, and the same was
sent to Respondents-Appellees and their counsel on 27
8 Now 2nd Paragraph of Section 13(sic), Rule IV of the 2016 Consolidated and Revised Rules of
Procedures before the LBAA and CBAA.
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 20 of 28
December 2018 (sic). Petitioner-Appellant added that based
on the foregoing, Respondent-Appellees’ Manifestation with
Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition to NGCP’s Motion for
Reconsideration should be denied considering that it was filed
beyond the ten (10) day period to file their comment.
Petitioner-Appellant cited the case of Producers Bank of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17,
2002, 381 SCRA 185, 192., which states:
“The general rule is that a client is bound by the act of
the counsel, including even mistakes in the realm of
procedural technique.”
Petitioner-Appellant stated the following jurisprudence:
“In the case of Muller vs. Muller (G. R. No. 149615, 29
August 2006, the Supreme Court points out that a litigant
who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must with clean hands. The same is a
frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the
principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue9. It is elementary
that he who comes to court must do so with clean
hands10
Petitioner-Appellant averred that in the present case,
Respondents-Appellees claim that NGCP’s Motion for
Reconsideration should be dismissed on ground of technicality
for failure of NGCP to timely file the appeal. Petitioner-
Appellant added that, however, Respondents-Appellees
themselves are seeking from this Honorable Board, in their
motion, to consider admitting their opposition/comment to
NGCP’s Motion for Reconsideration for failure to comply within
the period to file their comment due to mistake.
Petitioner-Appellant argued that it is but inequitable or
unfair to allow the admission of Respondents-Appellees’
opposition/comment (to NGCP’s motion for reconsideration)
questioning the timeliness of NGCP’s appeal when
Respondent-Appellees themselves failed to comply with the
period within which to file a comment under the CBAA and
LBAA Rules. Petitioner-Appellant concluded that the
Respondents-Appellees’ motion should be denied.
9 University of the Philippines vs. Catungal, Jr. 338 Phil 728,743-744 (1997). 10 Dequito vs. Llamas, G.R. No. L-28090, September 4, 1975, 66 SCRA 504, 510; Camporedondo vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999, 312 SC RA 47,48.
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 21 of 28
Petitioner-Appellant NGCP takes exception to the
arguments raised by the Respondent-Appellees as the cases of
Judith Yu vs. Hon. Sta. Rosa Samson-Tatad and Nilo Pates vs.
Comelec which they cited do not squarely apply in the instant
case. According to Petitioner-Appellant, the aforementioned
cases cited by Respondents-Appellees are not applicable for
the following reasons:
i. In the case of Yu vs. Tatad, a criminal case which is
covered by the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court
applied the fresh period rule. Notwithstanding that the
instant case is an administrative case, the fresh period
rule should also be applied as the CBAA and LBAA
Rules allow a 30-day period from notice of decision or
final resolution issued by the Appellee-LBAA to file an
appeal to this Board. Moreover, the CBAA and LBAA
Rules may be summarized as follows:
a. The CBAA and LBAA Rules do not include a
specific provision disallowing the fresh period
rule;
b. The CBAA and LBAA Rules allow suppletory
application (Section 3-Rule 1) of the Rules of
Court which include Neypes doctrine or fresh
period rule;
c. The CBAA and LBAA Rules allow liberal
construction of the LBAA and CBAA Rules (
Section 2, Rule I);
d. The CBAA and LBAA Rules do not adhere to
technical rules applicable in judicial
proceedings (Section 5 (b) Rule III).
ii. In the case of Pates vs. COMELEC, an election case, it
is not applicable to the instant case for the following
reasons:
a. In Pates vs. COMELEC, the petition was dismissed
because Section 3, Rules 64 of the Rules of Court
provides that petitions for certiorari from decisions
or rulings of the COMELEC en banc has a period of
30 days from notice of the said decision or ruling,
with the intervening period used for the filing of any
motion for reconsideration deductible from the
originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh
period); while in the instant case, Sec.6, Rule III and
Par. C, Sec. 5 Rule III of the CBAA and LBAA Rules
provide the guidelines on the filing of a motion for
reconsideration and appeal to CBAA.
1. Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court simply
provides:
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 22 of 28
“SEC. 3 Time to file petition. — The petition shall
be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to
be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration of said judgment or final
order or resolution, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file
the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event, reckoned from notice of denial.”
(emphasis ours)
2. On the other hand, the CBAA and LBAA Rules
provide:
“(c) The party or parties aggrieved by the
decision or final resolution of a Local board
concerned may, within thirty (30) days from
notice of said decision or final resolution, appeal
to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.”
(Section 5, Rule III, LBAA Rules)
“Section. 6. Motion for Reconsideration – Within
the period for perfecting an appeal from the
decision, resolution or final order of the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals , the aggrieved
party may file a motion for reconsideration, after
serving the adverse party with a copy thereof:
Provided, That only one such motion shall be
allowed.” (Rule III, LBAA Rules)
b. In Pates vs. COMELEC, it is specifically provided in
Section 3, Rules 64 of the Rules of Court that in case
a motion for reconsideration was filed, the period
used in filing the same should be deducted from
the 30-day period within which to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 64. Thus, there exists a valid
reason for the non-application of the Neypes ruling
(Fresh Period Doctrine) since the period to file
petition for certiorari was specifically stated under
Section 3, Rules 64 Rules of Court.
c. The situation in the instant case is very much
different. The CBAA and LBAA Rules allow not only
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, but also
allow the filing of the appeal before this Honorable
Board within (30) days from notice of the decision
or final resolution issued by the LBAA. There was no
provision on the deductibility of the period to
appeal once a motion for reconsideration was
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
R E S O L U T I O N
Page 23 of 28
filed by the aggrieved party and the Rules
specifically allow the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner-Appellant prayed that Respondents-Appellees’
Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition to NGCP`s Motion for
Reconsideration be denied for utter lack of merit and that
Respondents-Appellees’ Opposition/Comment be expunged
from the records of this case. Petitioner-Appellant further
prayed that the Resolution of this Board dated 27 November
2017 be reconsidered and set aside, and a new one rendered:
1. Declaring that Petitioner-Appellant NGCP filed its
appeal within the reglementary period as provided in
the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of
Procedures before the LBAA and CBAA;
2. Reversing and setting aside the Decision and Order
of Respondent-Appellee LBAA dated 21 December
2015 and 18 August 2016;
3. Declaring subject properties as Exempt from payment
of RPTs
In the Assessment Roll and in the Tax Declarations;
and
4. Ordering the refund of Php 161,241.17, the amount
paid by NGCP under protest.
V. Respondents-Appellees’ REPLY (Re: Petitioner’s Opposition
(To Respondent-Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion to Admit
Comment/Opposition dated 04 September 2018)
Respondents-Appellees averred that they timely filed their
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration based on the
following arguments:
1. The filing of Opposition by Appellees to the
Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration was by way of
compliance to a Notice dated July 20,2018 requiring
Appellees to file its Comment/Opposition to the
Motion for Reconsideration within a period of ten (10)
days from receipt thereof;
2. The Notice was received by Appellee on August 3,
2018 and on August 13, 2018 a Comment/Opposition
was filed within the rgelementary period given by the
Honorable Board.
Respondents-Appellees likewise asserted that Supreme
Court Neypes ruling on fresh period rule does not apply to
administrative cases. Respondents further invoked the case of
San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Dev. Corp., Inc., et.al, vs. Maria
Cristina Banya, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015, where the
Supreme Court ruled that issue on applicability of fresh period
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
R E S O L U T I O N
Page 24 of 28
rule in administrative cases. Hence, it is settled that the “fresh
period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not
to administrative appeals.
Respondent finally invoked the case of Panolino vs. Tajala,
G.R. No. 183616, June 29, 2010, the High court also resolved the
similar issue of whether the “fresh period rule” applies to an
appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional
office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is administrative
in nature. The Supreme Court held that the “fresh period rule”
only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
procedure.
Respondents-Appellees quoted the fresh period rule in
Neypes ruling:
“To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule
40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to
the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
Xxx
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision
in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40
(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule
42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules
cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature
involving an appeal from the decision or order of the
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
R E S O L U T I O N
Page 25 of 28
DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal
is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order
No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly
provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied,
the movant shall perfect his appeal "during the
remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the
decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day
period to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a
decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP,
is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh
period rule" in Neypes does not apply.”
Respondents-Appellees, relying on the aforecited
Supreme Court rulings prayed that the Motion for
Reconsideration be denied for utter lack of merit.
VI. Petiioner-Appellant’s REJOINDER (To Respondent
Appellees’ Reply dated 25 October 2018)
Petitioner-Appellant, by way of Rejoinder adoped its
arguments in the Opposition that the ruling in the case of NPC
vs. Benguest does not apply in the instant case on the ground
that the 2013 Consolidated and Revised Rules of Procedures
before the LBAA and the CBAA allows the fresh period of 30
days. Petitioner-Appellant added that it is merely following
the rules promulgated by the CBAA and should not be
penalized in doing so as this would constitute denial of due
process; and that the Rules of procedure should be liberally
construed to promote social justice.
Petitioner-Appellant alleged that in a similar CBAA case
entitled NGCP vs. LBAA of Batangas City and Guadalupe
Judy Tumambing docketed as CBAA Case No. L-133-2016,
where the same issue on the timeliness of filing of an appeal
before the CBAA was being raised, this Board already ruled
that the 2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules of Procedures allowed a
fresh period of 30 days to file an appeal from the motion of
reconsideration. This Board resolved the issue in favor of
Petitioner-Appellant and ruled in favor of timeliness of the
appeal. Petitioner-Appellant reiterated the prayer stated in
their Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition on
Respondents-Appellees` Manifestation and Motion.
RULINGS OF THE BOARD
On Respondents-Appellees’ Manifestation with Motion to Admit
Comment/Opposition
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 26 of 28
A perusal and comparison between Respondents-
Appellees’ Comment/Oppositions both dated 13 August 2018
which were received by this Board on 23 August 2018 and 05
September 2018, respectively show that the arguments stated
therein are exactly the same except the case title and docket
number. Furthermore, the same issues in the instant case were
discussed in the body of the pleading, while the cited case title
involved different issues. Hence, Respondents-Appellees’
inadvertence in addressing their pleading into another case,
was a mere inadvertence. In the interest of substantial justice,
Respondents-Appellee’s Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition
is hereby GRANTED.
On Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration
After thorough evaluation of the arguments of the
parties, this Board finds Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion impressed
with merit as regards the timeliness of its appeal.
When the instant case was filed in 16 September 2016,
the applicable rules of procedure is the 2013 Consolidated and
Revised Rules of Procedure before the Local Boards of
Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals (2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules of Procedure). On the
other hand, the applicable rules of procedure in the “ National
Power Corporation vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Benguet, the
Provincial Assessor of Benguet, the Municipal Treasurer of
Itogon, Benguet and the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, Benguet,
G.R. No. 209303, 14 Novemebr 2016 (NPC vs. Benguet, et.al
case) is the 1996 Rules of Procedure before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and the 1996 Rules of Procedure before
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. A thorough
evaluation of Rules show that there were significant differences
between the two rules which are pertinent to the issue at hand.
The following are the relevant provisions:
1996 LBAA Rules of Procedure:
RULE VIII
APPEALS TO THE CENTRAL BOARD
Section 1. Period of Appeal; Where to Appeal; How
Appeal Taken. – Any party aggrieved by the decision,
order or resolution of the Local Board may appeal to the
Central Board within the period and in the manner
prescribed under Rule IV of the Rules of Procedure before
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 27 of 28
1996 CBAA Rules of Procedure:
RULE IV
APPEAL
“Section 2. Who may appeal; when to appeal; -Any
party in a case before the Local Board who feels
aggrieved by the decision, resolution or order of the said
Local board may, within thirty (30) days from and after
receipt of the said decision, resolution or order, appeal
to the Central Board.”
2013 LBAA and CBAA Rules of Procedure:
RULE III
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE
LOCAL BOARDS OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS
SEC. 5. Action by the Local Boards of Assessment
Appeals –
xxx
(c) The party or parties aggrieved by the decision or final
resolution of a Local Board concerned may, within thirty
(30) days from notice of said decision or final resolution,
appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
SEC.6. Motion for Reconsideration – Within the period for
perfecting an appeal from the decision, resolution or
final order of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, the
aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration,
after serving the adverse party with a copy thereof:
Provided, That only one such motion shall be allowed.
In view of the foregoing, this Board hereby sets aside its
resolution as regards the application of the NPC vs. Benguet
et.al case on the ground that the former Rules of Procedure of
the LBAA did not provide a provision for filing of Motion for
Reconsideration, which is now present in the 2013 Rules of
Procedure applicable in the instant case.
As applied in the instant case, Petitioner-Appellant filed its
Appeal on December 27, 2017 within thirty (30) days from
receipt on December 12, 2017 of the Resolution of their Motion
for Reconsideration, which can be considered as the final
resolution. This Board agrees that Petitioner-Appellant is just
following the rules of procedure which was in effect at the time
of filing of the instant case.
CBAA CASE NO. L-135-2016
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Page 28 of 28
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED, and this Board further resolves:
1. To take cognizance of the instant case for the Appeal
being filed within the reglementary period; and
2. To continue the proceedings of this case and set the
case for preliminary conference.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, 10 December 2018.
MANUEL DE JESUS SIAYNGCO
Chairperson
(on leave)
RAMON A. I. BANTA SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO
Member Member