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Good ID: What’s tech got to do with it?
Nairobi Workshop Summary Report
The #GoodID initiative is a series of workshops and online engagement for constructive debate
and development of new, future-facing ID norms, intended to strengthen standards and tools to
build better identification systems that work for everyone. The Good ID workshops, a series of
three, are a constructive exercise to advance the digital identity conversation, and part of the
#GoodID movement.
This is a summary report of the second workshop that does not contain any attributable quotes,
because the workshops are held under Chatham House Rule. This workshop was held in
Nairobi on April 25, 2019 and follows the flow of the day, with the exception of the commitments
participants made at the end of the day (see Annex 3 for the workshop agenda) which are
brought up earlier in the report. The workshop focused on technology for Good ID and explored
the role of technology characteristics in advancing digital ID systems that uphold transparency,
accountability, individual privacy, inclusion, data protection, and user control.
The first workshop in the series, held at the Shorenstein Center, Harvard University in February
2019, explored the role of policy for Good ID (workshop report is here). The third workshop, to
be held in Bangkok in July 2019, will focus on practices for Good ID — exploring the behaviors
that support privacy, inclusion, user value, user control, and security. These workshops aim to
refresh the conversation around ID in the digital age through a focus on the characteristics that
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make or allow for “good digital IDs,” rather than attempting to establish one foolproof solution or
series of solutions, or even defining what makes a “bad ID.” #GoodID is a conversation to
advance trust-building practices like transparency and accountability, as well as design features
like privacy, inclusion, user value and control, and security. The workshops are part of the Good
ID dialogues, an Omidyar Network initiative for constructive debate and development of new
future-facing ID norms, and co-organized by Caribou Digital and facilitated by Robin Pharaoh.
What is Good ID?
This program of workshops and online conversations helps advance digital identity standards
that empower and safeguard people. To start the discussion in Nairobi, Omidyar Network
introduced its evolving normative framework of Good ID, distinguished by five policy and
technology design features: (1) inclusive, (2) offers user-value, and embedded with (3) privacy,
(4) security, and (5) user control and support by trust-building practices including transparency
and accountability.
In reaction to this prompt—and in the spirit of Hemingway’s six-word novel—, participants wrote
their own definitions of what Good ID would look like in Kenya in 10 words or less. Examples
include:
“Offers me value and keeps me safe.”
“Trusted, secure, and inclusive identity for physical and digital world.”
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“One governed by a civil society approved law(s) and accountable.”
“I exist. I am recognized. I am included.”
On the whole, workshop participants indicated that Good ID should ensure user value and
agency, safeguard user privacy, support portability, be consultative and accountable, and reflect
the complexity of human identity. A full list of participants’ 10-word definitions the sentences
produced can be found in Annex 1.
Taking action for #GoodID
Digital ID was a salient topic in Kenya at the time of the workshop; on April 2, the government
introduced the National Integrated Identity Management System (NIIMS), popularly referred to
as Huduma Namba, meaning “government service number”. Discussions throughout the day
weres both passionate and substantive, reflecting personal experience, insight, and knowledge.
At the end of the workshop, participants translated these discussions into personal, concrete
commitments to advance #GoodID. Building on the day’s conversations, participants reflected
on their own roles to identify the actions they could take to accelerate the Good ID movement
across Kenya.
In the words of one participant: “..building a movement. That’s what this is.” And of another:
“Success would be to start the conversation, not to end it here.”
Others committed to increasing awareness of good ID and the #GoodID movement through
their networks and to influence specific institutions and policymakers. There was also a strong
commitment to “localize” concepts and ideas, such as the commitment “to help develop a local
understanding of ‘digital ID’.”
The various commitments were made in the form of public pledges to the group. A full list of the
pledges can be found in Annex 2.
Mapping digital ID systems in Kenya and
exploring the technology advantages and trade-
offs
The workshop continued by considering the digital identity systems and related technologies
present in Kenya, exploring benefits and trade-offs. To frame the discussion as encompassing
diverse categories of identity systems,1 three speakers presented examples of self-asserted
(Smile Identity), de facto (mobile phone numbers—GSMA), and issued identities (national
identity—Huduma Namba).
1 See here for Omidyar Networks perspective on digital identity and three types of identity systems.
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Conversation starter: self-asserted ID
In contrast to the means of identity provided by external parties, in the digital era we also create
our own identities or personas, choosing how to portray ourselves and the claims we make, in
the digital world. Self-asserted identity is a broad and somewhat fluid category that includes
self-sovereign, self-managed, and self-attested identities—all of which are used to describe an
ID that people themselves assert or create. Examples of the self-asserted digital identities
discussed include social media platforms like Twitter, digital avatars, identity management
platforms such as Smile Identity, and digital wallets enabling services such as blockchain-based
identity services for refugees. There was also discussion about identification through platforms,
such as SWVL (an Egyptian app similar to Uber, used for ride sharing in Kenya). The benefits of
self-asserted identity management through a service, such as Smile Identity, were ease of use
and authentication without credentials. Trade-offs were that the system doesn’t always work, it
makes individuals always identifiable, and individuals’ ability to revoke the credential is limited.
The discussion of these three identities—issued, de facto, and self-asserted—prompted
recognition of the diversity of identification systems and the implications of each. At a structural
level, participants raised concerns about the ability of smaller, emerging economies to negotiate
and bargain with large, multinational firms like Facebook, and others. At an individual level,
there was a sense from participants that “once you give your phone number [to do a
transaction], it’s like the wild west” with no protections or privacy. In both cases, participants
raised concerns about systems’ and users’ increasing reliance on de facto IDs.
Conversation starter: de facto ID
De facto identities or attributes are also created for us when we engage in the digital economy,
and these can be used to identify us, either through our own self-assertions or through the
assessments of third-party algorithms (see Footnote 1). Examples of de facto identification that
participants referenced included mobile phone records, mobile betting accounts such as
SportPesa, mobile money services such as M-Pesa, identification through biometric data points
such as UnifyID and DiscoveryHealth, and credit score providers such as Branch, Tala, and
Pezesha. Participants detailed several benefits, including the value of finance and credit access
enabled through analysis of mobile usage behavior. Trade-offs included privacy invasion
through targeted advertising and surveillance and the rise of associated bad outcomes such as
increased gambling and/or debt. Further, as one participant put it: “they don’t always work, and
when there are errors, you can always be identified but you can’t opt-out.”
Conversation starter: Issued ID
There are both public sector and private sector identity providers. However, participants focused
on examples of state issued identity, including the national ID, passport, alien card, refugee
card, birth certificate, death certificate, National Social Security Fund (NSSF) card, National
Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) card, employer ID, marriage certificate, Kenya Revenue
Authority (KRA) pin, drivers licence, National Education Management Information System
(NEMIS), and voter ID card.
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Kenya’s national ID was described by one participant in generational terms—first as a system of
control by colonial powers, then as a travel document in a post-colonial state, and finally as a
digital national identity system linked to the widespread adoption of M-Pesa and the broader
digital era. The discussant suggested that national digital IDs are necessary to increase
financial inclusion and because “we can’t miss the 4th industrial revolution.”
The benefits that participants identified were ease of access (national ID and driver's licenses),
trust in the system (for drivers licenses), and universal coverage and access. Reflecting current
debates about Kenya’s Huduma Namba, participants responded that the new system had been
“snuck in,” with some saying that “the government is not trustworthy” and that it “has more value
for government than for people.” The trade-offs were seen largely as “the possibility of data
mining, risk of surveillance, misuse of data, [and] high possibility of hacking.” Participants also
highlighted the lack of transparency over how data was used, particularly the fear of data
misuse by senior officials and frontline bureaucrats.
Building Good ID technologies
In the afternoon—building on the mapping of identity systems, technologies and their benefits
and trade-offs—participants focused on specific technologies, described Good ID scenarios,
and identified concrete steps required to improve the digital identification ecosystem in Kenya.
Participants divided into small groups to work through four categories of identity technology
spanning the three types of identity systems that had emerged from the morning’s discussion.
They identified the current state of each technology as well as steps that could be taken to
realize a Good ID scenario and mitigate a negative scenario. The four categories of technology
were: (1) centralized database technologies, using Kenyan government issued ID as case
studies, (2) mobile-based technologies, (3) decentralized ledger technologies, (4) and biometric
technologies.
Reviewing and improving centralized database technologies
Participants described how the centralized database technologies used in Kenya could be
improved through the use of decentralized cloud technologies, greater standardization of
technologies and systems, and increased public awareness of and transparency in how such
systems are used.
The main institutions using centralized ID technologies in Kenya today, according to this
group of participants, include the Integrated Population Registration Services (IPRS), the
Integrated Election and Boundary Commission (IEBC), the National Education Management
Information System (NEMIS), mobile operators, the financial services sector, credit reference
bureaus (CRBs), and individual citizens in accessing these systems. Participants described the
current state of databases in Kenya as being decentralized and isolated, and pointed out that
there was “a lack of education, too much corruption, and bad regulation.” These databases were
also viewed as being often discriminatory, error prone, and hard to fix.
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The main elements missing, thus preventing Good ID in Kenya, included data protection
rights and laws, public education and public participation in decisions, standardization of all
registration laws, and confidence in lawmakers. Two innovations identified as being helpful in
addressing these issues were (1) learnings from India’s national ID scheme Aadhaar, and (2) ID
technologies that strengthen individual control over data, such as digital credential wallets like
DigiLocker. Beyond these, there was a general sense of a need for “more political will to secure
data, [and] social norms/education.”
Good issued identity systems in Kenya, according to participants, would be characterized by
new laws supporting these systems in upholding privacy, inclusion, transparency, security, and
user control. Digital identity infrastructure would receive greater investment and there would be
stronger political will for data protection. There would be a wider public understanding of what
good digital identity systems look like, and demand for this to be upheld. An alternative
scenario, in which principles of Good ID are not upheld, would lead to greater centralization,
either absent or not upheld data protections, increased marginalization, and the use of digital ID
systems as security regimes.
Reviewing and improving mobile technologies
The mobile technologies in use in Kenya today, according to the participants in this small group,
included mobile money services, geo-location services, and messaging services. Central to the
use of mobile technologies in identification systems were multi-factor verification and the use of
mobile numbers as an identifier. Participants identified mobile financial services as the primary
users of these technologies.
The current status of mobile technologies in Kenya was described by participants as
providing a default digital identity, with some, though not all, phone numbers already linked to
national identities. Participants expressed concern about who was accessing their data,
including the national government—with one saying “I am concerned that intelligence and
government is listening, but government just says it’s regulated and ‘we do it only for security
purposes’.”
Challenges to mobile technologies enabling Good ID in Kenya, according to participants,
included a lack of clarity about where identity actually lies (on the SIM or on the phone?) with
resulting policy and governance confusion. Participants also discussed connectivity and access
barriers, as well as the need for stronger regulations: “clear rules that everyone is aware of and
what it means for them.” There was also discussion around accountability for institutions
through greater transparency and protection for individuals through greater use of encryption
technologies. This was seen to be especially so in a context in which, according to some
participants, many popular apps seem to be no more than surveillance tools, logging users
movements for app publishers benefits. A concrete (and illustrative) proposal was for a
transparency application, that would inform you every time your data was accessed, and by
whom.
The group discussed how mobile technologies could enable Good ID in the form of a
government-backed digital identity that enabled individuals to deny or allow access to their data
on a need-to-know basis. This scenario also included limits on the amount of data collected in
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order to avoid a “Big Brother” surveillance state—and a private sector that proactively positioned
itself around privacy protection, with one participant saying “look at Apple, that proactively
positions [itself] on privacy.”
Reviewing and improving decentralized ledger technologies
Decentralized ledger technologies (DLTs) use independent computers to record, share, and
synchronize transactions in their respective electronic ledgers (instead of keeping data
centralized as in a traditional ledger).2 As identified by participants, the DLT’s present in Kenya
included consensus algorithms, verifiable claims, digital identifiers (DIDs), and digital signatures
(encryption). The main issues participants pointed to with these technologies is that, because
they are so new, most people do not know the technologies’ benefits and challenges. There was
also general recognition that discussions about decentralized technologies focused more on the
complex, underlying technologies than on the need to provide simple, comprehensible models
to potential users and stakeholders.
The use of decentralized technologies in Kenya was recognized by participants as “being in
its infancy.” Two examples of decentralized technologies in Kenya discussed were UTU
Technologies and BitPesa. UTU Technologies provide a trust platform to increase confidence in
service providers, from home help to e-commerce platforms. BitPesa is a digital foreign
exchange and payment platform that uses blockchain technologies. Participants suggested that
the critical, but currently missing, elements necessary to increase the adoption of decentralized
technologies in Kenya were (1) appeal and arbitration processes, (2) a compelling articulation of
economic incentives for decentralized data, and (3) credentials.
The current status of decentralized technologies in Kenya, according to participants in this
small group, was described as one in which siloed, proprietary systems are only applied as a
single part of digital pilots. A Good ID scenario was described as one in which an open-
standards-based architecture enables wider interoperability between systems. To achieve this,
actors need to focus on building “a functioning ecosystem, not just a firm.” More specifically,
there is a need to focus on education around the potential for decentralized technologies,
articulation of the economic incentives, engagement with the wider stakeholder community, and
state support, which together would lead to a wider functioning ecosystem at scale. Without
these steps, there was a sense that “a donor-funded pilot would be followed by a donor-funded
pilot followed by a venture capital-funded pilot,” would inevitably lead to proprietary systems that
will never reach scale.
Reviewing and improving biometric technologies
Participants identified fingerprint, face, iris, voice, DNA, and gait-based biometrics as the main
biometric technologies in Kenya. The central problems with these technologies, according to
this group, were that they were not reliable, they cannot be revoked, requiring network access
could limit utility, and device limitations could lead (inadvertantly) to discrimination.
2 See the World Bank for definition here
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The participants’ suggestions for improvement included modular products with incremental
improvements (since the cheapest “off-the-shelf” solutions were often designed for the majority
at the expense of minority needs); systems that draw on multiple alternative identifiers to
increase reliability; partnership with mobile network operators to increase the quality of access,
as well as building systems that work offline and do not rely on smartphones; tokenization of
identity to limit data distribution; and, finally, careful selection of vendors to ensure that systems
are built on technologies that enable Good ID–while avoiding vendors, systems, and
technologies that enabled unauthorized data sharing and access.
The main use of biometric technologies in Kenya, according to the participants in this group,
was access control—for example in workplaces, gyms, immigration, smartphone authentication,
accessing credit services, and, more recently, the use of voice to authenticate with Safaricom.
Key steps to mitigate harmful uses of these technologies included: limiting biometric data
collection, limiting to specific use cases, and tailoring international standards to the Kenyan
context. The participants also recommended strengthening data localization to limit
unauthorized data access and the development of low-tech alternatives to biometrics, enabling
the provision of the same services through means that protect privacy.
The current status of biometric use in Kenya was described as being primarily in national
security and for economic growth, but this was accompanied by a lack of knowledge among the
public of their options and routes to protect their identity and their rights. A Good ID scenario
was described as being one in which there are greater opportunities for self-asserted identity
with biometrics, increased use of multi-factor authentication, efforts towards data minimization
and auditing of both data use and algorithms. Critical steps to achieve this include strengthening
data protection laws and designing tech that provides new solutions while meeting individual
needs and demands. Without these efforts, a dystopian scenario could arise in which there is
increased surveillance, identity theft, the accumulation of geopolitical power by non-Africans,
and exploitation from data mining. At present the current technological trajectory is at risk of (1)
excluding solutions from, and market share for, Africans and (2) amplifying existing cultural and
social tensions, according to participants.
Miscellaneous themes and related discussions
Certain themes emerged during discussions throughout the workshop in relation to the specific
roles of different stakeholders in the development of digital ID (national and other forms) in
Kenya.
Trust in, and transparency of, data-driven companies in Kenya. On the positive side, data
driven companies, especially those using local technology, are seen as vibrant and
entrepreneurial, and local technology companies, in particular, are viewed as a source of pride.
This entrepreneurial sector was also regarded as a panacea to government inaction and
intractability, as well as a necessary part of the conversation around changing norms in Kenya
going forward. GDPR compliance was also seen to be driving some level of accountability, and
prompting a pause for thought at the leadership level of data-driven companies. On the negative
side, participants cited concerns about the possible exploitation of weak data-protection laws
and potential for the leveraging of personal data without consent (e.g., Swivl, Tala, etc.). The
participants also expressed concerns about data management, specifically the storing of
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personal data without due care and the export of data value outside of Kenya (i.e., loss of
economic value and sovereignty).
Trust in, and transparency of, government in Kenya. Government was often described as
either not providing adequate or appropriate channels for civil society institutions and residents
to engage in the development of the Kenyan national ID. The Kenyan government was also
described as having immovable vested interests when it comes to ID and data regulation/law.
Asas one participant stated, “the Haduma Namba may now be ‘too big to fail’.” These interests
were generally believed to reflect the interests of the majority, perhaps blind to the potential for
problems caused by ignoring the plight of the minority. There was also a widespread sense of
the government as corruptible, with particular suspicion around the maintenance of poor data
protection laws. There was also a general sense of lax attitudes toward the sharing of
government data, which is allowing data-aggregation and wealth generation by private sector
interests.
Despite these concerns, government was seen as critical to the success of Good ID and as a
necessary player in the conversation around good data more generally. Indeed, government
was seen as leading on ID (in the sense that it is clearly committed to the development of a
national digital ID), putting it perhaps in the same bracket as India and Estonia in terms of
shaping the international debate around digital ID. And yet it is not seen as being a leader when
it comes to thinking about the longer-term implications of data and identity technologies.
The level of influence that civil society can have in Kenya. There was a sense that the
space for civil society to be heard in national conversations was declining. Although the third
sector is eager to contribute to the national conversation around data, and ID, as a mediator
between the population and government, participants felt third sector actors often lack sufficient
knowledge and/or tools to effectively represent the populace on this issue.
Level of participation in the conversation by ordinary residents. There was a sense among
some participants that the general public are ambivalent about the exploitation of personal data
and lack awareness of the issues that surround digital identity. The point was also made that the
history of identity in Kenya suggests that it is not acceptable for the population to be unaware of
what is happening because the consequences could be profound. Consequently, greater digital
ID and data literacy is essential. Indeed, there were many rumors and questions about digital ID
in Kenya that people indicated were influencing adoption and perceptions about these systems
and technologies. These questions included: Why do they need to be digital? Does this
credential replace all of the cards I have in my wallet? Who is funding this project? The court
said digital ID can't be mandatory yet, but I am being told it's a requirement for several
services—which is true? Is this a de facto census?
Future scenarios: There was some disagreement over whether the government (and national
ID) is a necessary issuer or can/will be bypassed by rapid data agglomeration in the private
sector. The convenience argument for universal or interoperable ID was represented as
particularly strong in Kenya due to the tangible inconvenience of the current state of
identification in the country. Future scenarios mentioned during the day included:
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● De facto identities consolidated around, say, mobile phone numbers, might solve the
perceived ID problem in Kenya (more swiftly than a universal Haduma number),
especially given the extant M-Pesa spine.
● The Haduma number could catalyze the emergence of a ubiquitous mobile-driven
identity by consolidating government datasets and making them available to, say,
Safaricom.
● The regulatory stance towards data could change in such a way that it radically alters
the ability of the mobile network operators to collect and use strong identity data. The
national ID would then emerges as the strongest form of identity.
The Way Forward: Good ID in Kenya
At the end of the day, participants shared what might have been missing from our discussion
and whether other issues, discussions, or stakeholders should be included going forward.
Participants identified the following:
Defining Good: Participants emphasized the need for further clarity and understanding around
what “good” looks like in practice, around complex technologies, and what each might mean to
the “underserved.” Key to this was an urgent need to create a clear value proposition for Good
ID in Kenya and a larger pool of ethically-focused Kenyan ID providers.
A holistic” approach: There was a sense that the Good ID conversation would benefit
conversations outside of its immediate application to the Huduma Namba as well as a need to
balance discussions of technology with discussions of sociology, politics, and power: “The issue
of ID needs a hybrid approach.” There was also recognition of the need to consider complex
emerging technologies—for example new/unique identities arising from artificial intelligence (AI):
“Ethical AI and ethical machine decision making, then, is perhaps another layer on top of Good
ID?”
An inclusive approach: participants emphasized the need to include a wider diversity of
stakeholders, particularly the youth and grassroots organizations, in collaborative forums that
also include bankers, government, civil society, researchers, and technologists. Additionally,
there were questions about how to take these conversations both to the people making
decisions for Kenyans (i.e., government) and to residents themselves. One participant asked, in
relation to the future development of identification technologies, “Are we sitting ducks?”,
reflecting a widespread sense of the need for individuals to exercise greater control over the
technologies on which digital futures will be built. This question, highlighting the importance of
individuals obtaining both value and protection from systems commonly designed by the state
and large businesses, animated the full spectrum of commitments that participants made to
activate and grow the Good ID movement in Kenya:
Other commitments made by participants:
- Continuous ongoing research into the “appropriate use” of ID
- Looking for ways to ask hard questions and promote similar discussions with new and
different stakeholders
- Use my platforms and those at my disposal to stimulate conversations around Good ID
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- Secure the participation of my organization in the development and implementation of
Good ID strategy for Kenya
- To educate myself and others on the technologies discussed today and their
implications/effects, impacts, and improvements
- To help educate the public about digital identity through social media and word of mouth
- Learn from people who are setting the ID destination and share that learning with others
- Share ideas and perspectives from this group with the African Union, UNECA, World
Bank, Smart Africa, and others to inform the continent’s digital ID/digital economy
strategy, including building in the participants’ perspectives to capacity building training
for ID issuers
- On a personal level, to understand the Huduma number and attend the next session,
and to include the perspectives of young people
- To help develop a local understanding of “digital ID”
- Contribute to the Good ID movement by offering diverse views and influencing policy
and tech that promotes a more inclusive, open, and transparent ID
- To host more data locally or with ethical hosts internationally
- To educate the public as to why this matters and to combat tech solutions to tech
problems
- Participate, plan, and moderate conversations on Good ID locally
- Convene a series of Good ID sessions with policymakers, regulators, and solutions-
providers
- To build, proof, and preach Good ID technologies
- Help to articulate what interoperability looks like
- To engage decision-makers in industry and government to learn more about Good ID
and to educate the public through media
- To become an informed, eloquent advocate for Good ID
- Write (about Good ID)
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Annex 1: Defining the Good Kenyan ID System
- “It should be inclusive, private, and well-secured”
- “It really IS my ID”
- “Future-proofed to protect and empower people in the long run”
- “It’s my ID, and it’s secured within a consultative legal mandate”
- “Owned by me, used by everyone, with my permission. Yay!!”
- “Trusted, secure, and inclusive identity for physical and digital world”
- “Without bias, used well, and secured”
- “One governed by a civil society approved law(s) and accountable.”
- “Inclusive, secure, and enhances user privacy”
- “Easily accessible, secure, universal, digital, and eliminates redundancies”
- “A simple, functional and universally-accepted ID”
- “Recognition, agency, benefit, protection for me, everyone, generations to come.”
- “Functional, easy to use and acquire, secure, versatile, and accessible. “
- “The flow of the river impacts everyone”
- “Data is secure and consent-based use of data”
- “Inclusive, secure, accessible, easy to get, and data-protected.”
- “A system designed by Kenyans to meet all Kenyans’ needs and rights”
- “I exist. I am recognized. I am included.”
- “Universally acceptable, and consolidates all important information.“
- “A reliable, accessible, secure, versatile, system”
- “An ID that can be used when and where a person wants”
- “Offers me value and keeps me safe”
- “Weightless, secure, and ability to authenticate”
- “A convenient, inclusive system that provides value in a secure environment”
- “Functional, universal, easy to use and acquire, secure. I give permission.”
- “My life. My information. My rights. My benefit. My choice.’
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Annex 2: Pledges
- Continuous ongoing research into Good ID
- Looking for ways to ask hard questions and promote similar discussions with new and
different stakeholders
- Use my platforms and those at my disposal to stimulate conversations around Good ID
- Secure the participation of my organization in the development and implementation of
Good ID strategy for Kenya
- To educate myself and others on the technologies discussed today and their
implications/effects and impacts and improvements
- To help educate the public about digital identity through social media and word of mouth
- Learn from people who are setting the ID destination and share that learning with others
- Share ideas, perspectives with African Union, UNECA, World Bank, Smart Africa to
inform their Pan-African digital ID / digital economy strategy, including capacity building
for issuers.
- On a personal level, to understand the Huduma Namba and to attend the next session,
and to include the perspectives of young people.
- To help develop a local understanding of “digital ID”
- Contribute to the Good ID movement by offering diverse views and influencing policy
and tech that promotes a more inclusive, open, and transparent ID
- To host more data locally, or with ethical hosts internationally
- To educate the public as to why this matters and to combat tech solutions to tech
problems
- Participate, plan, and moderate conversations on Good ID locally
- Convene a series of Good ID sessions with policymakers, regulators, and solutions-
providers
- To build, proof, and preach Good ID technologies
- Help to articulate what interoperability looks like
- I pledge to support more meetings among this group
- I commit to engage decision-makers in industry and government to learn more about
Good ID and to educate the public through media
- To become an informed, eloquent advocate for Good ID
- Write (about Good ID)
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Annex 3: Agenda
09:00 Arrival and Registration
● Introductions and framing Good ID
Morning Session - 1:
● The role of technology in a digital identity ecosystem
● The status of Digital ID and case studies in Kenya, East Africa, and across the continent
Morning Session - 2:
● The emerging perspectives on the risks and opportunities of digital identity technology
● Tensions and trade-offs in different stakeholders' goals
● The innovations needed to achieve Good ID
12:30 Lunch Afternoon Session - 1:
● Prototyping Good ID technologies and designing for the future Afternoon Session - 2:
● The path forward, together, toward Good ID 15:20 Reflections and close