Conflict Analysis of the Education Sector in Rakhine State for the UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy in Conflict Affected

Countries Programme

UNICEF Education Section, Myanmar

Randall Salm, consultant

April 2014

ii

Table of Contents Acronyms .............................................................................................................................. iii

Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................1

Methodology ...............................................................................................................................5

Rakhine State Conflict Analysis ..................................................................................................7

Positions, Interests and Needs Analysis ...................................................................................8

Conflict driver analysis............................................................................................................9

Root causes ....................................................................................................................... 10

Conflict drivers.................................................................................................................. 11

Conflict mitigators and opportunities ................................................................................. 12

Conflict triggers ................................................................................................................ 13

Rakhine State background issues ........................................................................................... 13

Religion............................................................................................................................. 13

Social and political issues .................................................................................................. 15

Economic and geographical issues ..................................................................................... 16

Local Conflict Resolution Mechanisms ............................................................................. 17

Reintegration ..................................................................................................................... 19

Conflict Analysis Conclusions ............................................................................................... 19

Conflict resolution priorities .............................................................................................. 21

Rakhine State Education Sector Analysis .................................................................................. 22

National and Rakhine State education data ............................................................................ 22

Education challenges in Rakhine State .................................................................................. 25

Extremely low quality of education throughout Rakhine State ........................................... 25

Ineffective government education administration in Rakhine State .................................... 28

Curriculum and teaching practices marginalize minority groups ........................................ 30

Rakhine State education analysis conclusions ........................................................................ 31

Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 33

Time frames and feasible interventions .................................................................................. 35

Conflict sensitivity issues ...................................................................................................... 35

Theory of change for Rakhine State PBEA programme recommendations ............................ 39

Research recommendations ................................................................................................... 40

Appendices ............................................................................................................................... 42

Appendix A: ToR for education sector conflict analysis ........................................................ 42

Appendix B: Conflict Analysis Focus Group and Interview List ............................................ 43

References ................................................................................................................................ 44

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Acronyms

3W – who is doing what where data

BAJ - Bridge Asia Japan

CCCM - camp coordination and camp management

CESR - Comprehensive Education Sector Review

ECCD – early childhood care and development

EU – European Union

HS – high school

ICG – International Crisis Group

IDP – internally displaced persons

INGO – international non-governmental organization

MICS – multiple indicator cluster survey

MS – middle school

NFMSE – non-formal middle school education

NFPE – non-formal primary education

NGO - non-governmental organization

OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PBEA - Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme

PS – primary school

RNDP – Rakhine Nationalities Development Party

SAVE – Save the Children Myanmar

SEO – state education officer

TEO – township education officer

TLS – temporary learning spaces

UN – United Nations

1

Executive Summary

The current conflict situation in Myanmar is one of both opportunity and risk, with numerous

political, economic and social actions taking place by the national government, non-government

actors, opposition groups and civil society in support of peace (McGrew, et al, 2013).

Meanwhile, challenges exist due to lack of development, natural disasters, inter-communal

conflict, poverty, inequality, and power struggles. In this context education can serve multiple

purposes. If designed and implemented correctly, education can promote peaceful, constructive

intergroup interaction, build the human capital needed for economic development, provide space

for child protection and, and assist in larger peacebuilding efforts. Conversely, if not done well,

education can exacerbate conflict and solidify inequitable social, political and economic

structures.

The purpose of this study is to identify causes and drivers of the conflicts in Rakhine State, so as

to guide education sector interventions for peacebuilding in Rakhine State. As such, it focuses

on two main areas: a) broader social, political, economic factors (conflict drivers) and intergroup

conflict within Rakhine State; and b) challenges and opportunities within the education sector in

Rakhine State. The purpose of addressing both areas is to identify what broader social, political

and economic factors of intergroup conflict affect the education sector, and which of these

factors (or conflict drivers) can be impacted or leveraged by the education sector to support

peaceful resolution of local conflicts and broader peacebuilding efforts. To a lesser extent, this

study also examines conflict drivers of national conflicts that are pertinent in Rakhine State. The

objective is to identify conflict drivers that can be mitigated or transformed by education sector

interventions through UNICEF’s Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme.

The methodology used secondary sources and expert interviews for the desk review,

complemented by interviews and focus groups with local stakeholders in Yangon, and Sittwe,

Pauktaw, Mrauk Oo and Minbya, Rakhine State in January and February, 2014. Rakhine State

stakeholders included IDPs and host communities in or near 13 IDP camps in Sittwe, Pauktaw,

Mrauk Oo and Minbya, as well as Rakhine government teachers, Muslim IDP camp teachers,

Rakhine rice farmers, a Rakhine rice trader, the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, the

State Education Officer (SEO), Mrauk Oo and Minbya township education officers (TEO), and

various INGOs and UN agencies working in Rakhine State. Meetings in Yangon involved the

education in emergencies sector committee, an informal group of conflict advisers, the Myanmar

Peace Center, Bridge Asia Japan, Plan International, and the International School of Yangon.

Multiple feedback sessions were held in Sittwe and Yangon with various stakeholder groups.

Issues of existing conflict dynamics, conflict sensitivity and cultural norms impacted data

collection, and therefore, the strength of findings.

For efficiency, this study summarizes the conflict root causes, drivers, triggers and mitigators

identified in four recent Rakhine State studies which addressed education (Save the Children

2013; Rakhine State Inquiry Report 2013; McGrew et al 2013; Roos 2013). The main parties in

the Rakhine State conflict are the Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic groups, with Burmese political

leaders influencing relations between the Rakhine and Rohingya.

2

The root causes of conflict include: historically embedded pattern of social stratification

and discrimination; ethnic identity and ethno-political dynamics; widespread socio-

economic deprivation, with far-reaching poverty and unemployment; and perceptions of

conspiracies by some groups to gain control of land, resources, and political power,

driven by populist rhetoric.

The conflict drivers include: mutual fear and distrust between Rakhine and Rohingya;

Rakhine perceptions of unequal provision of humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya;

Rohingya disempowerment; lack of government control and protection; resource issues

of land, aid, and mega-project development; changing local power dynamics; non-

existent local conflict resolution mechanisms and inter-group dialogue; and polarization

of religious views and narrative.

The conflict mitigators include: potential government leadership on security and

development issues; the 1982 Citizenship Law to address citizenship issues; and past

history of economic interdependence between groups; strong interest by the Rohingya in

reconciliation; upcoming OCHA stakeholder analysis; potential for using youth for

intergroup cooperation; and strengthening of traditional conflict resolution.

Conflict triggers include: political reform leading to increased social mobilizations; the

March 2014 Rakhine State census; political or populist opportunism; new social media

technologies; and perceptions of inequitable international assistance.

Additional analysis of religious, social, ethnic, economic, local conflict resolution and Rakhine

and Rohingya reintegration issues is provided. In general these conflict drivers show increasing

conflict escalation, minimal interest in reconciliation and substantial structural problems that

impede short term solutions. Many of the problems are deeply embedded in political, social,

economic and cultural structures and institutions, making change difficult. Few efforts are being

made now to create agreements and normalization. An analysis of Rohingya, Rakhine and

national government positions, interests, needs and power is provided.

Critical analysis of the inter-communal Rakhine State violence requires examination of which

groups have been harmed the most, which groups have generated most of the violence and

Rakhine statements of unequal treatment. A variety of reports show that most of the vict ims

have been Rohingya, as measured by deaths, injuries, houses and businesses destroyed.

However, official reports document Rohingya violence against the Rakhine much more than the

violence committed by the Rakhine (Rakhine Commission Report 2013). The frequent and

highly organized protests by Rakhine in Sittwe and other local towns demonstrates systematic

planning by Rakhine ethnic leaders. Rakhine leaders in effect are responsible for promoting

mistrust of the Rohingya and instigating most of the violence in Rakhine State.

Existing conflict dynamics could lead to conflict escalation. RNDP and Rakhine civil society are

increasing calls for removal of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and non-

governmental organizations (NGOs). If INGOs leave, basic food and security provision will be

stopped, leading to increased demands by internally displaced persons (IDPs) for food security

and basic needs. Also, Rakhine extremists may feel empowered following recent protests and

political events within the state, which may lead to additional provocations or attacks against

Muslims. Government disregard of Rakhine propaganda, protests and provocations may also

embolden Rakhine extremists. Elections in November 2015 have created political stagnation.

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Most parties believe that the government will do nothing before the elections. Finally, census

data collection and reporting will continue to create tensions. Some Rakhine are concerned that

reliable demographic data will show a much larger percentage of Muslims in Rakhine State,

which supports Rakhine beliefs of Muslim hegemonic conspiracies.

There is strong support among international organizations, like the United Nations and EU, for

conflict resolution and peacemaking efforts that move Rakhine and Muslim groups toward

reconciliation (Long 2014). Similar to other studies, this study recommends that the main

priorities for conflict resolution efforts be to:

a) initiate and expand dialogue between the Rakhine and Rohingya as quickly as possible to

reduce conflict escalation and permit all groups to express their grievances,

b) identify the shared and unique interests and needs of the Rakhine and Rohingya,

c) identify spaces or opportunities for intergroup cooperation, such as around education and

schools as zones for peace.

The education sector analysis findings identify specific challenges and opportunities in three

broad areas.

A summary of current Rakhine State education data and dynamics show huge needs in primary

and secondary education. In Rakhine State only 64 percent of children age 5 are attending

primary school, the primary school net attendance ratio is only 76 percent, and secondary school

net attendance ratio is only 31 percent, primary school completion rate in Rakhine State is only

32 percent, and the girl to boy ratio of 0.94 at the primary level and 0.85 at the secondary level

(Myanmar MICS 2011). The literacy rate for women age 15-24 in Rakhine State is 55 percent

and birth registration is completed for only 59 percent of the population (Myanmar MICS 2011).

On many education indicators, Rakhine State is the lowest in Myanmar. While the overall

quality of education in Rakhine State is low compared to the rest of the country and global

standards, it is even lower for Muslim children in Rakhine State. There are significant

differences in the quality of education to children who attend government schools versus

Rohingya children who attend schools in the IDP camps or in northern Rakhine State. Schools

attended by Muslim children lack government teachers and the full range of learning materials.

IDP camp schools have much shorter schools days. Education policies have discriminated

systematically against minorities since independence.

Rakhine State education sector challenges include:

1. Extremely low quality of education throughout Rakhine State

There are similar, yet different challenges for government schools and IDP camp schools.

Similar needs include low primary school (PS), middle school (MS) and high school (HS)

enrollment, completion and learning rates, additional school buildings, school supplies for

teachers and students, under age children in grade 1. Education needs unique to the IDP camps

include more teachers, longer school day, and Burmese language training for Rohingya pre-

school children. There is a need to improve the perception of fairness in provision of education

services to all groups (McGrew, et al 2013; Rogers and Munn 2013). Related opportunities

include new school building designs and possible partnerships, non-formal primary education

(NFPE) and non-formal middle school education (NFMSE) curriculum development, Rakhine

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political leadership support for education, and savings from reshuffled teachers.

2. Need improved government education administration in Rakhine State

Challenges include limited SEO and TEO planning and administrative capacity; poor

communication between village, township and state offices; poor data management; lower status

groups feel they do not have power to resolve education problems; teacher effectiveness and

accountability; low status and pay for teachers; ineffective, rigid teaching methods and limited

teacher training; and limited local teacher training sites. Opportunities include increasing

democratic openness in Myanmar and more space for civil society engagement, current

education sector reform processes, use of school committees to support teaching and learning,

upcoming SEO training for volunteer teachers, feasible mechanisms for gathering school data,

and vocational-tech policy changes.

3. Curriculum and teaching practices marginalize minority religions groups

Challenges include education policy and teacher biases against non-Buddhist religions and ethnic

minorities, lack of accommodation of minority beliefs, authoritarian teaching practices, Burmese

and minority language teaching, and unfamiliarity of students and teachers with democratic

processes. Opportunities include opening of Myanmar to democratic processes leading to

opportunity for education on multi-cultural societies, non-violent civic processes and civil

society participation, the Comprehensive Education Sector Review, lessons from past teacher

training, and national discussions on language and education.

This study’s recommendations respond to Rakhine State education sector findings. Here we

summarize education sector intervention priorities and several strategic issues. More explanation

and justification for these findings are found in this report.

The education priorities proposed here are prioritized by the impact the issues have on

peacebuilding: a) addressing the underlying causes of conflict, such as inequalities, b) targeting

key populations that are jointly affected by education and conflict, such as adolescents and

youth, and c) building long term change and capacity for peaceful interpersonal and intergroup

relations. The education priorities proposed in this study include:

a) improving the quality of primary education for Muslim children in the IDP camps and

northern Rakhine State (reduced class sizes, longer school days, additional subjects,

active learning),

b) improving middle and high school education in the Sittwe area townships for both

Rakhine and Muslim children (higher enrollment and completion rates),

c) increasing peace education, tolerance and diversity curriculum for all grade levels

(improved knowledge, skills and abilities for teachers and students),

d) improving state, township and village education administration capacity (data

management and teacher supervision).

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Methodology

The scope of this conflict analysis of the education sector in Rakhine State, Myanmar covers

three main areas: broader national conflict dynamics; Rakhine State conflict dynamics; and

Rakhine State education sector challenges. This study’s Terms of Reference can be found in

Appendix A. The focus narrows to specific conflict drivers and potential responses for

peacebuilding in the education sector for Rakhine State, which was chosen at an early stage of

the PBEA programme planning due to increased tensions and violence between local groups.

UNICEF is working on education mainly in 9 of the 17 townships in Rakhine State.

The methodology for this conflict analysis process involved the following steps:

1. Initial clarification of scope of analysis with key UNICEF staff. This included a draft

conflict map of issues, parties, data needed, possible solutions, potential ethical or

methodological issues, and agreement on the general process.

2. Desk review of relevant studies and data, development of data collection tools and

stakeholder identification.

a. Resources include past studies of the broader Myanmar conflict, national and

Rakhine State education sector analysis, and education data such as UNICEF

MICS.

b. Based on the desk review and key informants, data collection needs were

determined and tools developed, such as interview questionnaires. National and

local informants were identified, including children, youth, parents, teachers,

community leaders, education administrators, NGO staff, and governmental staff.

3. Data collection via interviews and focus groups in Yangon, and in Sittwe, Pauktaw,

Mrauk Oo, and Minbya townships. Whenever possible, data collection was

disaggregated by gender, age, geography, ethnicity and religion, although very little

disaggregated data was found. The Rakhine State field study was conducted from

February 1 to 15, 2014.

4. Feedback mechanisms of initial findings and further interviews. Initial findings in

Rakhine State were presented to Rakhine State stakeholders for feedback prior to leaving

Sittwe, and to national stakeholders, especially education in emergency and conflict

advisers groups. Additional interviews conducted with key Rakhine stakeholders.

5. Development of draft and final report.

The selection of interview and focus group participants in Rakhine State attempted to provide a

representative cross-section of key groups in Rakhine State mainly using convenience sampling,

with snowball sampling to a lesser extent. Initial target group planning focused mainly on

Muslim IDPs, given the significant education and basic needs challenges faced by Muslims IDPs

in Rakhine State. To a lesser extent Rakhine IDPs were also targeted in the initial planning.

Later a broader representation of Rakhine political leaders, farmers and traders were also

included to gather information on Rakhine ethnic attitudes and interests. However, this report

recognizes that such sampling was not fully representative of all possible Rakhine State conflict

and education stakeholders.

Rakhine State interviews and focus groups included IDPs and host communities from 13 camps

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in Sittwe, Pauktaw, Mrauk Oo and Minbya, of which 11 were Muslim and 3 were Rakhine or

Chin (this disproportionate number reflects the much larger number of Muslim IDPs in Rakhine

State). Focus groups or interviews were also held with Muslim IDP camp teachers, Rakhine

State public primary school teachers (Rakhine ethnic group), Rakhine rice farmers, a Rakhine

rice trader, the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), the State Education Officer,

township education officers from Mrauk Oo and Minbya, and various INGOs and UN agencies

working on education or humanitarian aid in Rakhine State. Meetings in Yangon involved

groups working on education in emergencies, an informal group of conflict advisers, the

Myanmar Peace Center, Bridge Asia Japan (BAJ), and the International School of Yangon. A

list of all focus groups and interviews conducted in this study is included in Appendix B.

A semi-structured interview questionnaire was used, which evolved as data were obtained and

further challenges and issues arose. The questions and focus of each meeting depended on the

nature of each group and their role and interests in Rakhine State. Transcripts were made based

on written notes of all meetings, and analyzed periodically to identify trends and research gaps.

Issues of existing conflict dynamics, conflict sensitivity and cultural norms impacted data

collection, and therefore, the strength of findings. Prior to the Rakhine State field visit, several

violent events had taken place in northern Rakhine State which escalated tensions between the

Rakhine and Muslim populations, especially the more extremist sub-groups. While conducting

the field visit to Rakhine State, local Rakhine ethnic group actors led a large protest in Sittwe and

threatened UN and international NGOs, calling for their removal within seven days; a similar

protest occurred in Mrauk Oo during the visit. The Sittwe protest forced all UNICEF staff to

stay in the office for one day. The heightened tensions in area thus limited the types of

stakeholders who could be interviewed and the nature of questions asked during the interviews,

reflecting and responding to concerns about conflict sensitivity.

Similarly, access to women, youth and children in Rakhine State were limited due to the control

exercised by village elders and men, although attempts were made to have more control over

focus groups with women, children and youth. Focus groups in Rakhine, Chin and Muslim

villages close to IDP camps, and in the Muslim IDP camps, were overtly affected by village

elder control over who attended the focus groups and less visibly by their strong presence in the

interview area. While manageable group sizes of 10-12 participants were requested, often 30 to

50 participants would attend the focus groups. In some meetings with children, youth or women,

Muslim male village elders controlled the discussion and answered many of the questions.

Muslim and Chin children, youth and women seemed reticent to respond to questions in this fish-

bowl like context.

While sampling and data collection challenges are acknowledged in this study, the validity is

best supported by similarities with other conflict analyses and triangulation with secondary

sources on both the ethnic conflict and education sector dynamics.

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Rakhine State Conflict Analysis

In this section, we summarize the main parties to the conflict (Rohingya, Rakhine and Burmese),

the positions, interests and needs of those parties, root causes and conflict drivers of this conflict,

background issues for the conflict in Rakhine State, such as religion, social, ethnic, economic,

and geographical matters, and conflict resolution and reintegration concerns. We end with

conclusions for the analysis of the Rakhine State conflict. While most of this analysis is focused

on dynamics with the state, pertinent national dynamics are also discussed.

The main parties in the Rakhine State conflict are the Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic groups, with

Burmese political leaders influencing relations between the Rakhine and Rohingya. The size of

the Rakhine and Rohingya groups is in contention, in part due to the lack of an accurate, recent

census. Official 2011 government figures have a total Rakhine State population of 3,338,669

people, with 2,333,670 Rakhine Buddhists (70%) and 968,218 Muslims (29%).1 Most Muslims

in Rakhine State are Rohingya, with other smaller Muslim groups like the Kaman who have

citizenship rights. However, Selth (2010) notes that 70% of the Rakhine State population was

Rohingya already in 1992, with rapid Rohingya growth in recent decades. Most Rakhine and

Burmese are Buddhist, while the Rohingya are Muslim.

UNICEF’s Rakhine State priority areas are the 11 townships of Sittwe, Pauk Taw, Myebon,

Minbya, Mrauk Oo, Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun, Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and

Kyaukphyu. This study recognizes that there are significantly different conflict dynamics among

the 11 priority townships, with the existence of large, mainly Muslim IDP populations around the

Sittwe area, while in Maungdaw and Buthidaung the Muslim populations are the majority group

and not displaced, just under tight curfew and travel restrictions.

The Rakhine have more power within the state, with well-established political parties and control

over trade within the state, although most Rakhine are still very poor (Rakhine Commission

Report 2013). A small number of Rakhine, about 3,500, have been displaced by the recent

conflict. The Rakhine own most farms and businesses in the state (personal interviews 2014).

The Rakhine are concerned about the growing Rohingya population, which some Rakhine

believe to be part of a Rohingya conspiracy to gain political power (McGrew 2013; Kipgen

2013). While the Rakhine have a strong ethnic identity, they build that cohesive identity by

mistakenly blaming the Rohingya for their problems, instead of criticizing the national

government, which holds more responsibility for Rakhine marginalization (Roos 2013).

The Rohingya have very little power politically. The Rohingya in Myanmar lack identifiable

leaders. Due to inter-communal violence since 2012 about 140,000 Rohingya have been

confined to IDP camps in the general area around Sittwe and an additional 600,000 in northern

Rakhine State have travel and trade restrictions (UN OCHA Rakhine Response Plan 2013).

Most Rohingya are day laborers or small farmers (Rakhine Commission Report 2013; personal

interviews 2014). The Rohingya have immigrated into Rakhine State over the last several

centuries, and many lack citizenship and other basic human rights (McGrew 2013; Kipgen 2013;

1 “In 2011, the administrative data recorded a total population of 3,338,669 in Rakhine State, comprising 2,333,670

Buddhists, 968,218 Muslims, 25,206 Christians, 8,670 Hindus and 2,905 Animists. (Rakhine Commission Report

2013:3)

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Walton 2013). The lack of citizenship prohibits land ownership and the right to travel (Rakhine

Commission Report 2013). Both Myanmar and Bangladesh limit rights to the Rohingya,

although they have historically lived in the Myanmar-Bangladesh frontier region (Kipgen 2013;

Walton 2013). The absence of a strong Rohingya ethnic identity appears to be one of the

underlying causes of the conflict, given the confusion over where Rohingya belong and their

disenfranchised status.

Most senior government positions in Rakhine State are held by Burmese aligned with the

national government or Tatmadaw, who have the most decision making power. Government

decision making is highly centralized, with state officials deferring to national leaders on major

issues (Interagency Stakeholder Analysis 2013; McGrew et al 2013). For many Burmese, the

national identity is exclusively aligned with the Burman ethnic identity, marginalizing all

minority ethnic groups. The practice of Burmanization exists, which entails the promotion of the

Burmese culture at the expense of minority cultures, through policies on development, language,

education, and citizenship (Walton 2013), such as the refusal to use the term Rohingya instead of

Bengali (International Crisis Group 2013).

Positions, interests and needs analysis

Analysis of positions, interests, needs and power of the three key parties involved, the Burmese-

led national government, Rakhine ethnic group leadership, and Rohingya ethnic group

leadership, shows space for agreement and cooperation in underlying interests and needs, but

widely divergent positions and power.

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Table 1: Positions, Interests and Needs of Rohingya, Rakhine and Burmese Stakeholder

Positions

(What They Say They Need) Interests

(What They Really Want) Needs

(What They Must Have) Power

(Control/Influence)

Rohingya

community2

Security and safety.

To be able to return to their

homes.

End to restrictions on

movement, marriage,

education.

End to discrimination and

divide and rule tactics.

Political representation.

Elimination of military

dictatorship.

Citizenship and equal

rights.

Economic

opportunities.

Education and

healthcare.

Peaceful co-existence

with other groups.

Self-determination

within federal system.

Justice and rule of law.

Security

Belonging and group

identity

Full development –

economic, education,

health, social,

cultural, etc.

Livelihoods

Human rights and

freedom of

movement.

Very little

power.

Support by

UN/INGOs.

Potential future

electoral power

if granted voting

rights.

Rakhine community

3

To make Muslims leave Rakhine State or keep

separate from Rakhine

people.

Solidarity of Arakan people.

Elimination of military

dictatorship.

Political equality and self-

determination within federal

system.

Peaceful co-existence.

Strong Arakan culture.

Alliance with other groups to overcome Burmese

oppression.

National reconciliation.

Political equality and self-determination

within federal system.

Peaceful co-existence

with other groups.

Alliance with other

non-Burmese groups

leading to national

union.

Resilient Arakan

cultural identity.

Social and economic

development.

Security Belonging and group

identity

Political equality with

other national races.

Full human

development –

economic, education,

health, social,

cultural, etc.

Livelihoods

State wide but micro-level

control over

trade, business,

media, education

social services,

and daily life.

Influence over

Rakhine

population for

political

purposes.

Influence over Rohingya travel

and rights.

National

government/

Burmese

leadership4

No recognition of term

Rohingya.

Restrictions on Rohingya.

Too early to start dialogue

and reconciliation.

Provide humanitarian aid.

Improve security, law

enforcement, and public

administration.

No distractions or

violent conflict in

Rakhine State.

Limited investment in

Rakhine State.

Avoidance of

Rohingya issue.

Maintenance and/or

expansion of power.

Political support from

(or minimal conflict

with) Rakhine ethnic

and political groups.

Complete

control over

finance,

government

policy and

institutions.

Conflict driver analysis

Common conflict driver analysis involves the identification of: a) root or structural causes of the

conflict, which are generally long term and deeply imbedded social, political or economic

institutions that create grievances, marginalization and inequality; b) intermediate dynamics,

including drivers which can escalate the conflict and mitigators that can de-escalate the conflict,

2 Sources: Rohingya League for Democracy website; Arakan Rohingya National Organization website; Arakan

Rohingya Union website; 3 Sources: Rakhine Nationalities Development Party interviews; Rakhine State government interviews; McGrew et

al 2013. 4 Sources: Kipgen 2013; McGrew et al 2013; UN OCHA Interagency stakeholder analysis 2013.

10

and c) conflict triggers, which are relatively immediate events or dynamics that can rapidly

escalate the conflict. For efficiency and to build on recent past research, this study summarizes

the conflict drivers identified in four recent Rakhine State studies which addressed education.

Education in Rakhine: Next Steps for the Sector (DRAFT 3). Yangon, Myanmar: Save the

Children, 2013.

Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State. Republic of the

Union of Myanmar, 2013. 22 Jan. 2014.

McGrew, L., S. Gray, and T. Langis, 2013. Peace and Development Conflict Sensitivity

Analysis. Yangon, Myanmar: United Nations Country Team, Myanmar, 2013.

Roos, Josefine. Conflict Assessment in Rakhine State. Yangon, Myanmar, 2013.

Due to general consensus on underlying issues in the Rakhine State conflict and repetition of

root causes, drivers, triggers and mitigators across these four reports, specific citations for these

reports are not included in this next section. Only other sources are cited here.

Root causes

Historically embedded pattern of social stratification leads to systematic discrimination and

marginalization throughout Rakhine society. The Burmese ethnic group is at the top, Rakhine

ethnic group in the middle, and Muslims (especially the Rohingya) at the bottom. Social

practices and policies, such as restrictions on citizenship and movement, systematically lead to

inequitable distribution of power, prestige and resources across groups. Social mobility for the

lowest groups, the Rohingya, has been and is extremely restricted by Rakhine and Burmese

groups. Many Rakhine see the Rakhine-Rohingya relationship as one of master versus servant,

which is mirrored on the national level by a belief among some Burmese of the Burmese as a

master race (Walton 2013).

Ethnic identity and ethno-political dynamics, mainly by the Rakhine, influence intergroup

conflict. Occasional political conflicts between Rakhine and Rohingya since World War II,

when each group supported different sides (International Crisis Group 2013), although

cooperative behavior between the groups has occurred over the past several centuries. Both

Rakhine and Rohingya groups have sought political autonomy from the national government

periodically over the last century.

Politically, the Rakhine seek more power versus the Burmese, and the Rohingya seek more

power versus both Rakhine and Burmese. Rakhine seek greater autonomy, resource sharing, and

other rights, but were excluded from 1947 Panglong conference and current peace processes.

Rakhine extremists see ethnic identity as critical for survival. Rakhine political parties are

currently maneuvering for the 2015 elections, and are concerned about the growing Rohingya

population, in part due to electoral consequences (Kipgen 2013). Rohingya political interests

evolve around citizenship, economic development and civil rights. Most Rohingya have been in

Rakhine State for 3-4 generations, and it is their permanent home (Sittwe personal interviews).

The Burmese implemented divide and rule strategies, providing some benefits to Rakhine at the

expense of the Rohingya.

11

Religion is a primary factor in group identity and mobilization. While Burmese leaders argue

that this conflict is not about religion, Buddhist monks have led or strongly advocated for

limitations on Rohingya rights, including denial of citizenship, removal to other countries, and

restrictions on travel, polygamy and family size (Kipgen 2013). For example, most Arakan

Liberation Party leaders were monks who have called for anti-Muslim policies (International

Crisis Group 2013). The national 969 movement led by Buddhist monks has increased activism

and support in Rakhine State, calling for boycotts of Muslim goods and services. Hence,

although religion is not purportedly in conflict (Buddhists and Muslims deny that they

discriminate against other religions), the conflict breaks down along religious lines. Ethnic

identity is widely seen as a conflict driver, as the Rakhine and Rohingya push for legitimacy and

group status (Kipgen 2013).

Widespread socio-economic deprivation, with extensive poverty, unemployment and low pay.

Socio-economically, high levels of poverty exist for many Myanmar households, with 44 percent

poverty state wide (UN OCHA Rakhine Response Plan 2013). Average Rakhine State family

income was Kyat 42,000, with northern families and the Rohingya making less money. Recent

conflict increased unemployment for both Rakhine and Rohingya workers, with Rohingya losing

more income and having to pay higher costs for goods due to trade boycotts by the Rakhine.

These issues are exacerbated by: absence of government infrastructure development; problems in

health care, education, and communication systems; geographic isolation and poor transportation

systems; unequal resource distribution; and marginalization of women and girls within male-

dominated societies.

The lack of rights for the Rohingya create severe marginalization. Inequitable laws exist on

citizenship, voting rights, birth registration, travel and family size for Rohingya. The Rohingya

are barred by the 1982 Citizenship law from citizenship, and many lack identity papers.

Opposing Rakhine groups view Rohingya citizenship as a political threat, given the large

numbers that could vote against Rakhine interests. Citizenship status is a major issue for many

people in Myanmar, as 47 percent of households the southeast Myanmar were unable to provide

citizenship papers (Changing Realities 2012; Border Consortium 2013). There is a need for

comprehensive citizenship law reform to address the needs of all groups.

Conflict drivers

Specific conflict drivers which can escalate the conflict in Rakhine State include:

Mutual distrust and fear between the Rakhine and Rohingya.5 The level of distrust by the

Rakhine appears much higher than that of the Rohingya (Sittwe personal interviews).

Many Rakhine believe in Muslims conspiracies to gain control of land, resources, and

political power. The Rohingya distrust Rakhine extremists. Both Rakhine and Muslim

socialization practices teach inter-group hatred and distrust, and reinforce negative

stereotypes of out-groups. Poor education practices limit critical thinking about populist

messages and stereotypes. Perceptions exist of external influence by international

organizations.

5 “Root causes of the lack of trust may relate to a history of human rights violations, impunity for such abuses and

lack of accountability, broken agreements and fear of losing positions in government and parliament. Lack of trust in

state institutions is also a consequence of lack of access to justice, because mechanisms to hold wrongdoers

accountable are not fully functioning.” (McGrew, et al, 2013:43)

12

Rakhine perceive unequal provision of humanitarian assistance to Muslims. Widespread

Rakhine perceptions of preferential treatment to the Rohingya people by the UN/INGOs

and that Rakhine needs are equally as great as those of the Rohingya (Rogers and Munn

2013). Local Rakhine villagers have blocked access to Muslim IDP camps by other

Rakhine who are interested in trade (Sittwe and Mrauk Oo cases), forcing UNICEF to

first give aid to local Rakhine villages.

The Rohingya feel extremely disempowered. When problems arise, such as with police

or security forces, they feel there is no one who can help them. Lack of communication

systems for transmitting Muslim needs to government leaders. Existing government

policies on Rohingya citizenship and freedom of movement create significant barriers for

the Rohingya to become an independent, self-sustaining community.

Lack of government control and protection. Some local people believe corruption has

provided benefits to the opposing ethnic group. Lack of trust in the government to

provide justice for grievances. Dominance of military and police, yet ineffective policing

and security in most of Rakhine State. Police often discriminate against or harass

Muslim families in the camps. Sometimes police guarding camps drink and then increase

abuse of IDPs. Major potential for crises when Rohingya respond aggressively to such

police abuses (Sittwe personal interviews).

Resource issues of land, aid, and mega-project development generate conflict. Benefits

are seen to disproportionately profit Burmese and Rakhine groups.

Changing local power dynamics, with new leaders emerging and old leaders being lost.

Muslim groups have few available secular or religious leaders. Limited inter-group

religious dialogue between leaders. Government leaders consistently state it is too early

to resolve religious conflict and have not taken initial steps for trust building or dialogue.

People look to government for solutions, but government leadership is lacking.

Polarization of religious views and narrative. Increasing propaganda by extremists.

Transparent, participatory processes have been hindered, as civil society groups note that

the national government’s authoritarian culture blocks open democratic processes

(Changing Realities 2012; International Crisis Group 2013).

Biased or poor media reporting magnifies propaganda and rumors, and entrenches beliefs

of inter-communal threats. Media reports are inaccurate and/or inflammatory, often

escalating fears and conflict (Sittwe personal interviews).

Conflict mitigators and opportunities

Conflict dynamics which can reduce or de-escalate the conflict in Rakhine State include:

Government leadership on security and development issues could reduce tensions and

distrust. A comprehensive, multi-sectoral development response that addresses

employment and survival needs would de-escalate some conflict issues.

Implementation of the 1982 Citizenship Law would satisfy some groups, although current

citizenship legal standards do not fulfill fundamental rights for marginalized groups such

as the Rohingya. Both Rakhine and Rohingya leaders called for implementation of the

1982 Citizenship Law (Sittwe personal interviews). In September 2012 the Immigration

Minister stated that Rohingya families that have been in Myanmar for at least two

generations can apply for citizenship (Rakhine State Crisis Efforts).

Past history of economic interdependence between groups, such as in fishing, agriculture

and trade, could be rebuilt. Some trade still exists, along with economic support by

13

individual Rakhine for old Muslim friends. In Northern Rakhine State where Muslims

make up a larger portion of overall population, more intergroup relations existed in the

past, and may continue at present.

Most Rohingya are interested in returning to their original communities or a permanent

settlement, and rebuilding relations and trade with Rakhine. Rohingya also express

interest in having their children enrolled in mixed schools, provided safety and peaceful

relations exist. Such interests may reflect the relative power imbalance between groups

and extremely poor quality of life in the IDP camps and under travel restrictions.

OCHA is finishing a comprehensive Rakhine State stakeholder analysis, which should

help to understand key issues for promoting dialogue between groups.

There is potential (and risk) for involving youth in promoting peace and reconciliation.

SAVE is doing rumor management training with youth.

Traditional local conflict resolution processes involve direct negotiation, which is usually

successful, and conciliation/arbitration by village elders for escalated conflicts,

emphasizing relationships over resources. In some cases, village elders have resolved

inter-village conflicts

Conflict triggers

Conflict triggers which can rapidly escalate the conflict in Rakhine State include:

Political reform may enable increased mobilizations based on social, economic or

political grievances. Given the lack of response by national, state and township

governments to expressed grievances, such mobilizations may lead to increased

frustration and violence.

The March 2014 Rakhine State census may trigger conflict, given Rakhine concerns of

Muslim demographic expansion.

Political or populist opportunism, whereby extremist groups use rhetoric to increase

antagonisms and instigate protests, such as after isolated criminal acts that are

unaddressed by the government.

Increased Rakhine rhetoric and extremist propaganda. Some Rakhine community leaders

have increased rhetoric and divisive language (OCHA Rakhine Response Plan 2013;

Rogers and Munn 2013).

New social media technologies may enable more rapid mobilizations.

International assistance that may be perceived as being inequitably distributed to various

groups.

Rakhine State background issues

Religion

Religious conflict exists at both national and Rakhine State levels through anti-Muslim

propaganda. Even though Buddhism has non-violence principles, Buddhist monks have been

behind inter-group violence and ethno-nationalist movements, and members of armed opposition

groups (International Crisis Group 2013). Religion is a primary characteristic of national

identity, as evidenced by the common phrase “To be Burman is to be Buddhist” (Walton 2013:7)

and government efforts to convert minority religious groups to Buddhism (Walton 2013).

Muslim immigration into Myanmar has occurred in waves, starting in the 14th

century. The

Rohingya are the largest group of Muslims in Myanmar, arriving between the 16th and 19

th

14

centuries (Selth 2010). National government discrimination against religious minorities

institutionalize anti-Muslim dynamics: barring construction or repairs of mosques by Rohingya

in Rakhine State; denial of National Registration Cards and Foreigner Registration Cards to

Rohingya; denial of access to secondary education and diplomas upon completion of studies;

prohibitions against civil service positions or residing in certain parts of Rakhine State; and

requiring government permission to marry, have more than a certain number of children, and

travel (International Religious Freedom Report 2012).

Some evidence points to influence from the national 969 movement on attitudes of local Rakhine

religious, political and business leaders.6 The role of extremist Buddhist monks has been

identified as major influence on conflict escalation and violence between Buddhists and Muslims

in Myanmar.

The “969” movement, led by prominent monks including Wirathu and

Wimala, has been particularly vocal in its extremist rhetoric, including making

wild claims of a Muslim plot to take over the country, jihadi infiltrators and of

schemes to pay Muslims for marrying and converting Buddhist women. It also

encourages Buddhists to boycott Muslim businesses, and has been a leading

voice for the adoption of a law to restrict inter-faith marriage. (International

Crisis Group 2013: 17)

The populist message by the 969 movement has gained support from many Buddhist Burmans.

It has been spread using a variety of methods, often as a Buddhist solidarity campaign (ICG

2013). Thus some supporters see it as strengthening their religion, not discriminating against

Muslims. The 969 movement has received considerable support from political and religious

leaders, with few people willing to criticize it openly, even if they disagree with it in private

(ICG 2013). There is a need for prominent monks to speak out against this discrimination and

violence (ICG 2013). Some local Rakhine businesses display the 969 symbol. Rakhine

Buddhist monks create sophisticated anti-Muslim social media propaganda (Internews report

2014). Arguments by Rakhine Nationalities Development Party leaders are similar to 969

movement beliefs (Sittwe personal interviews).

Resolving the religious conflict between Buddhists and Muslims may be very difficult. “The

more likely, and in many ways more disturbing possibility, is that this violence is not driven by

any master plan, but instead reflects deep societal divisions and hatred that were at least partially

suppressed in the authoritarian past. Addressing this is one of the key challenges the country now

faces; there are no simple solutions.” (ICG 2013: 20) While the national government has been

urging restraint at times, stating that there is zero tolerance for anti-Muslim violence, and

improving the security response (ICG 2013), the recent protests have been well-organized and

frequently lead to violence, providing some evidence of a master plan, as will be discussed later.

Specific recommendations for resolving the religious conflict include improving police

responses, making police forces representative of local communities, developing early warning

systems, condemnation of extremist rhetoric by all leaders, media training and action to provide

fair reporting on cross-cultural issues, improved access by humanitarian workers to vulnerable

6 It is uncertain which group influences the other group more, the 969 movement or Rakhine anti-Muslim leaders.

15

populations, leveraging recent examples of peaceful resolutions to similar crises, and building of

inter-religious linkages and relationships (ICG 2013). As ICG noted, “intercommunal linkages

can be important in mitigating violence, and also that promoting a greater understanding of the

cost of violence among communities could be a useful step.” (2013:23). However, deeper

analysis of preferential treatment for Burmese Buddhists and systematic exclusion of religious

minorities point toward the need for fundamental structural changes between the Buddhist and

minority religions.

Social and political issues

Social stratification is very high in Myanmar, with a small group having most economic

opportunities and others having few opportunities (Leone 2006). This stratification can be

viewed as a ‘dominator’ society (Tin 2008). Myanmar has a long history of ethnic conflict since

the early 1960s, although peaceful inter-ethnic relations have existed as well. Widespread

fatigue with the war exists among the broader population (Zaw Oo, 2005; McGrew, et al, 2013).

As many as 135 ethnic groups7 exist in Myanmar, with the largest being Burmese (60 to 70

percent), followed by Shan, Karen, Kachin and other ethnic groups (Walton 2013). In early

Myanmar history ethnic identity may have been more fluid, with individuals being able to shift

ethnic identities (Pillai 2000), although ethnic identities have become more solidified in recent

times (Walton 2013). In Myanmar ethnicity is more closely related to politics while identity is

more closely related to cultural customs, beliefs and institutions (Pillai 2000).

Burmese ethnic group privileges exist in a number of areas: the demand that Myanmar national

identity be based primarily on Burmese ethnic identity, with minorities being forced to

accommodate; limited citizenship for non-Burmese ethnic groups, along with suspicions of

disloyalty for minorities by the majority; educational language policy that marginalizes minority

ethnic group histories; and an unawareness among Burmese democratic opposition groups of

their relative privilege compared to minority groups (Walton 2013). Efforts to maintain a pure

Burmese ethnicity among Myanmar’s leaders has led to ostracism of those who marry outside

the Burmese ethnic group or led to more nationalistic behavior to prove Burmese loyalty (Pillai

2000). These social and political dynamics underlie the current inter-communal conflict in

Myanmar. However, one study argues that most intergroup conflict in Myanmar is not about

ethnicity, with no ethnic riots since the 1950s; instead most conflict is between Buddhist and

Muslim religious groups, since the former view Muslims as “hostile aliens” (Zaw Oo 2004:11).

History plays a role in ethnic group relations and discrimination in Myanmar. The British

military policy favored minority groups at the expense of the Burmese ethnic group. Burmese

ethnic identity became solidified against other ethnic groups, leading to a confluence of Burmese

ethnic identity with Burmese nationalism (Walton 2013). Alienation of ethnic minorities was a

common feature under early Burmese political rule after independence, with Burmese leaders

acting as master race (Walton 2013; ICG 2013). Widespread acts of violence by the Burmese

military/Tatmadaw against ethnic minorities were common from the 1940s through the 1990s

(Walton 2013; Pillai 2000; ICG 2013). The strong, negative out-group attitudes between

minorities and Burmese were slightly reduced following the 1988 student protests when large

numbers of Burmese students traveled to minority areas and worked closely with minority

7 There is considerable criticism of the ethnic classification in Burma by the British. Many question the number of

ethnic groups in Myanmar and the ability of individuals to move across ethnic groups (Walton 2013; Pillai Nd).

16

groups. Post-1988 minority group perceptions appear to be more neutral toward Burmese and

more strongly negative toward the military (Zaw Oo 2004). This historical and political analysis

of ethnic identity formation and relations in Myanmar highlights the complexity of generating

solutions to ethnic group conflicts, given the institutionalization of discrimination based on

ethnicity and unspoken cultural beliefs that underlie ethnic antagonisms. It also highlights the

benefits that can arise, such as reduced stereotypes and improved inter-group relations, when

certain groups, such as youth, reach out across ethnic lines and build social relations.

Relations between the Burmese majority, Arakan ethnic group and Rohingya Muslims have

often been conflictive (ICG 2013). Occasional mob attacks against Muslims have taken place

throughout Myanmar since the 1930s, with several major attacks since 1983 with many people

killed and considerable destruction of Muslim mosques, homes and businesses (ICG 2013). The

“Rohingya are discriminated both at societal and institutional levels whilst even the opposition

coalitions do not include the Rohingya organizations in their membership. The Rohingya’s

official approaches to join the opposition coalitions were turned down several times. Both social

and political exclusions make the group distant from the pro-democracy coalitions.” (Zaw Oo

2004:8-9) As ICG notes “Many of the underlying prejudices, the forms of hate speech, and the

way the violence has been conducted have been very similar over the decades, and have emerged

again in the latest wave of violence.” (2013:3). Historically, the Arakan-Rohingya tensions have

existed for decades, with the Arakan and Burmese ethnic groups supporting the Japanese during

World War II while the Rohingya supported the British (ICG 2013). Government operations

against illegal immigration in 1977 targeted Rohingya, forcing 200,000 to flee to Bangladesh,

and in 1991 military incursions and restrictions created more poverty and displacement (ICG

2013). One of the main federations of Rohingya, the Arakan Rohingya National Organization,

seeks self-determination and autonomy within the larger Myanmar Union (Zaw Oo 2004).

Social mobilizations have both positive and negative potential. Positively, mobilizations, rallies

and protests may enable Myanmar ethnic groups to satisfy their interests and reduce frustrations.

Negatively, such protests can be manipulated by racial groups to create further conflict and

violence (Zaw Oo 2004).

Economic and geographical issues

Potential economic conflict drivers exist. Resource conflict may underlie many of the ethnic

conflicts within Myanmar, although trade between groups does occur (Leone and Giannini 2005;

Pillai 2000). Large amounts of natural resources move through underground economy (Pillai

2000) and more generally, the benefits from natural resources go to a few wealthy people or the

Tatmadaw (Leone and Giannini 2005). Specific problems arising over natural resources include

land tenure, environmental degradation, land confiscation and displacement (Border Consortium

2013). Unequal resource distribution may generate more violent conflict in Myanmar (Zaw Oo,

2004). The rich are perceived by the poor to have received their gains through government

connections (Leone 2006). Relative deprivation theory hypothesizes that poor Myanmar people

feel frustrated when they see the relative wealth of others, which then generates animosity and

eventually overt conflict (Leone 2006). Globalization may impact Myanmar conflict, with

external forces influencing trade, finance, human rights, development aid and democratic

processes (Leone 2006).

17

Geography plays a role in ethnic group formation and conflict, as isolation due to terrain limits

inter-group interaction and promotes ethno-centric dynamics (Pillai 2000). It is also relevant in

terms of access for people from villages to larger towns for education, health care or government

administrative purposes. A recent study in the eastern part of Myanmar found most people travel

by foot or motorbike due to the local road conditions and travel to larger towns took more than

one hour for 72 percent of the population (Border Consortium 2013). Rural parents noted the

problems of distance for getting children to schools (Sittwe personal interviews).

Local conflict resolution mechanisms

Conflict-specific analysis provides insight on various issues. Conflict transformation generally

entails resolving the underlying causes of deep-rooted conflicts and changing the structures and

institutions that support such causes. Some argue that meeting the needs of local communities is

necessary to resolve issues of trust with the national government. Zaw Oo (2004) notes that

relative deprivation, structural violence and human needs theories8 explain the Myanmar conflict

well, with the primary causes being identity needs and resource distribution.

Recommendations from the Rakhine Commission Report provide guidance on how conflict

resolution can play a role in supporting the rule of law and larger peacebuilding efforts, yet

minority advocates must confirm that existing laws and policies do not provide the foundation

for systematic discrimination and marginalization of minority groups (Rakhine Commission

Report 2013). Broader issues may impede intergroup conflict resolution mechanisms. “On-

going intra/inter-minority conflicts are reinforced by three factors: lack of problem-solving

mechanisms and practice among opposition groups, lack of proper attention from the opposition

coalitions to consider the seriousness of the inter/intra-minority conflicts, and political ambitions

of conflict-management programs and administrators that utilize resources to build influence

among the groups.” Zaw Oo 2004:12). Conflict management interventions prior to 2004 were

criticized as providing unequal resources and treatment to the various parties in conflict, and

grassroots minorities lack both specific conflict resolution skills and visions of how

reconciliation can take place. Future interventions must be more active in intergroup and intra-

group conflicts and politically neutral, yet empower grassroots participation through capacity

building. Active, local intervention teams are needed, not external professionals (Zaw Oo 2004).

Furthermore, Zaw Oo (2004) found that interest in reconciliation by minority and pro-democracy

groups was lacking, with many demanding truth and justice first. Similar anti-reconciliation

dynamics exist for the Arakan and Rohingya groups, with few opportunities for reconciliation

and significant barriers (Zaw Oo 2004).

Traditional or cultural mechanisms for resolving conflict can be a valuable tool for larger

peacebuilding. An eastern Myanmar study found that in 73 percent of villages the local village

leaders administered justice, in 22 percent a combination of governmental and ethnic group

8 Relative deprivation is defined here as the discrepancy between a groups expectations and actual capacity or status; such discrepancy can lead to frustration and conflict. Structural violence refers to conditions where social structures

or institutions prevent people from meeting their basic needs (Galtung 1990). Human needs are defined here as

things that people require for survival or full development; examples include Maslow’s (1954) needs hierarchy

(physiological, safety, social, esteem and self-actualization) or Galton’s (1990) four basic needs of identity, security,

freedom and welfare.

18

judicial mechanisms exist, and in 3 percent police resolved disputes (Border Consortium 2013).

“While village leaders are the main mechanism for resolving disputes and managing community

affairs, their capacities are increasingly stretched. Non-state armed groups have differing

degrees of institutional support for local governance, but this affiliation can also induce negative

repercussions from government officials.” (Border Consortium 2013:23). Muslim focus group

participants in this study noted that most conflicts were resolved directly between the individuals

in conflict. In more difficult cases, the conflicts were taken to village elders who resolved the

disputes (Sittwe personal interviews).

Local, cultural conflict resolution practices in Myanmar are primarily based on the respected

insider model, which involves respected, local third parties with established relationships to the

parties in conflict (Leone and Giannini 2005). Often these respected insiders are local elders,

religious leaders, teachers, etc. These respected insiders use informal methods, a mixture of

conciliation and arbitration, often involving listening and fact finding, to clarify the problem and

then provide solutions. Such solutions usually seek to repair the relationships as much as resolve

the specific conflict issues (Leone and Giannini 2005). While the final decision of respected

insiders may be biased and unacceptable to some of the conflicting parties, often they are

followed “out of deference, social pressure, or fear.” (Leone and Giannini 2005:3)

The respected insider process may vary. One monk described his three rules as “1) openly tell

feelings, 2) believe each other, and 3) forgive.” (Leone and Giannini 2005:6). In another

example from Shan State: “If people from two different ethnic groups were involved in a

conflict, their traditional leaders met first to negotiate and try to compromise. The traditional

leaders are very old men who know the customs. When one dies, a relative take his place. They

solve conflicts by asking questions, checking faces—are people satisfied or not? If not, they ask

again, talk in separate groups or one by one. In between talking with the people in the conflict,

the leaders meet each other, and then talk as a big group again. It can take two weeks.” (Leone

and Giannini 2005:11).

The norm of using the respected insider model for resolving conflicts in Myanmar raises

questions about how ordinary people to resolve their own conflicts peacefully. Do people

generally negotiate directly, avoid conflicts (leading to the need for the third party), or use some

other method? If direct negotiation does take place, how does it take place, and how effective is

it usually? Are there different negotiation forms and processes among the different ethnic

groups? If so, how does inter-group negotiation take place? Findings from village focus groups

in this study found that individuals did negotiate directly and usually successfully, but more

systematic research is needed. Leone and Giannini (2005) argue for the need to rebuild

traditional community conflict resolution mechanisms such as the respected insider model, but

how to do that is uncertain. UNESCO’s peace education project in Northern Rakhine State

attempts to rebuild such systems (UNESCO Initiates Peace Educaion Project 2013).

The availability of respected, third party insider conflict resolvers can be problematic. Leone

and Giannini (2005) found that when respected insiders were not available, direct negotiations

were often not successful. The armed conflicts have removed many traditional leaders from

local roles. In cases of identity-based conflicts between ethnic or religious groups, no respected

third parties may exist (Leone and Giannini 2005). In some cases in Myanmar, military leaders

19

have attempted to take over the traditional role of respected insider, leading to ineffective

solutions to such conflicts (Leone and Giannini 2005).

Reintegration

Reintegration is a priority identified by several studies, but require a range of interventions, such

as inclusive conflict resolution mechanisms, positive interactions and trust building, before it is

peacefully feasible. Rakhine fear Muslims too much and show little interest in reconciliation or

reducing rhetoric at present. Rakhine anti-Muslim rhetoric is widespread and rarely questioned

by the Rakhine grassroots population. Various reports find that the current segregation is

necessary until security is improved. However, reintegration is critical for the medium term.

The government must create the conditions for inter-communal reintegration, through dialogue,

positive interactions and trust building as well as addressing underlying causes of the conflict,

including Rohingya human rights issues and Rakhine political and identity grievances

(International Crisis Group 2013; OCHA Rakhine Response Plan 2013). Resolving the lack of

development and economic needs are important for both Rakhine and Rohingya groups.

Conflict resolution processes must ensure that community leaders represent the real interests of

their communities, instead of using inflammatory rhetoric to create further conflict within the

state. Together with government leadership, humanitarian and development organizations need

to address the full range of needs that exist, including security, reconciliation and ethnic group

dignity (OCHA Rakhine Response Plan 2013). Focus groups and interviews found that most

Rakhine are interested in continued segregation of the Muslim and Rakhine communities, and

are against school reintegration. Many schools are segregated and those that are integrated are

at risk of escalated conflict. State government and Rakhine political leaders and grassroots

believe that it is too early to attempt reintegration of segregated schools. As can be seen, a wide

range of interventions are needed to promote safe and sustainable reintegration of Rakhine and

Rohingya populations, including acknowledging the grievances of all parties, security, human

rights, livelihoods and economic development, trust and government leadership. The national

and state governments must play a key role for reintegration, managing a process that is

perceived to be legitimate by all parties and producing concrete results in the short and medium

terms.

Conflict Analysis Conclusions

In general these conflict drivers show increasing conflict escalation, minimal interest in

reconciliation and substantial structural problems that impede short term solutions. The overt

conflict in Rakhine State is between Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic groups, while the latent

conflict is between the central government and both Rakhine and Rohingya groups. Considering

a conflict escalation model, the Rakhine-Rohingya conflict has been polarized for at least two

years, with occasional episodes of violence. The past history over the last 80 years has included

occasional conflict and violence, mainly Rakhine and Burmese against Rohingya (McGrew

2013). Many of the problems of marginalization of the Rakhine and Rohingya are deeply

embedded in political, social, economic and cultural structures and institutions, making change

difficult. Few efforts are being made now to create agreements and normalization.

Critical analysis of the inter-communal Rakhine State violence since 2012 requires examination

of which groups have been harmed the most, which groups have generated most of the violence

20

and Rakhine statements of unequal treatment. A variety of reports show that most of the victims

have been Rohingya, including deaths, injuries, houses and businesses destroyed. Only 3,500

Rakhine have been displaced as compared to 140,000 Muslims displaced and 600,000 under

tight travel restrictions (UN OCHA Rakhine Response Plan 2013; Kipgen 2013). However,

official reports document Rohingya violence against the Rakhine much more than the violence

committed by the Rakhine (Rakhine Commission Report 2013). The frequent and highly

organized protests by Rakhine in Sittwe and other local towns demonstrates systematic planning

by Rakhine ethnic leaders. While these protests have various stated purposes, such as rejection

of the use of the term Rohingya on census forms or blocking of aid to Rohingya (Protests erupt

in Rakhine March 20, 2014; mobs attack offices of the UN March 27, 2014), the frequency of

protests and violence against Rohingya or aid groups highlights the fact that these are planned

and organized by Rakhine leaders who condone the use of violence. Rakhine leaders in effect

are responsible for promoting mistrust of the Rohingya and instigating violence.9 The ethnic

conflict may be manipulated by some parties for business or political purposes (McGrew et al

2013).

A number of major conflict triggers in Rakhine State could escalate the existing conflict. RNDP

and Rakhine civil society are increasing calls for removal of INGOS and NGOs. If INGOs

leave, basic food and security provision will be stopped, leading to increased demands by IDPs

for food security and basic needs. Also, Rakhine extremists may feel empowered following

recent protests and political events within the state, which may lead to additional provocations or

attacks against Muslims. Government disregard of Rakhine propaganda, protests and

provocations may also embolden Rakhine extremists. Secondly, elections in November 2015

have created political stagnation. Promises to provide citizenship to the Rohingya by the Union

Solidarity and Development Party in the 2010 election were see as an effort to reduce Rakhine

political power, and raised tensions further (ICG 2013). Most parties believe that the

government will do nothing before the elections, which means at least 18 months of limited work

on dialogue and conflict resolution between Rakhine and Muslim groups, and broader

development. Strong advocacy is needed by the United Nations and INGOs to maintain

continuous work prior to the elections. Finally, census data collection and reporting will

continue to create tensions. Some Rakhine are concerned that reliable demographic data will

show a much larger percentage of Muslims in Rakhine State, which supports Rakhine beliefs of

Muslim hegemonic conspiracies. It must be noted here that while direct observation during the

field visit to Rakhine IDP camps seemed to show large Muslim families, CCCM and 3W data10

find that average household size is only about 5.1 in the IDP camps. Such data means that the

difference between Rakhine and Muslim family is minimal (<1.5 persons per household). This

9 “ In late September 2012 in Sittwe, in what was billed as the biggest ever public meeting of ethnic Rakhine,

delegates laid out an ultra-nationalist manifesto approving, among other things, resolutions supporting the formation

of armed local militias, enforcement of citizenship laws, removal of Rohingya villages, and the reclamation of land

that had been “lost” to them. The conference objected to the plans to reunite communities, issue national identity

cards to Rohingya, and the establishment of a liaison office of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in

Yangon.” (International Crisis Group 2013:8). The lack of an effective government response for providing security presents space for this Rakhine extremism. Both state and national officials blamed Malteser International staff for

taking the Burmese flag and causing the riot, instead of placing responsibility on Rakhine leaders and protesters for

the violence and damage. 10 3W data is education data collected by the education in emergencies sector committee. See Save the Children or

UNICEF education staff for access to this data.

21

refutes extremist arguments of a huge demographic expansion by Muslims and could inform UN

communication strategy.

There is strong support among international organizations, like the United Nations and EU,11

for

conflict resolution and peacemaking efforts that move Rakhine and Muslim groups toward

reconciliation (Long 2014). The Myanmar Peace Center recently formed a Center for Diversity

and Reconciliation in Rakhine State to lead Rakhine State conflict resolution efforts. Specific

actions are needed that jointly identify larger needs (i.e. development), build trust, and manage

escalating conflicts; diminish rumors and respond to inflammatory media (InterNews 2014;

Rogers and Munn 2013; OCHA Rakhine Response Plan 2013); improve security and justice, and

resolve common crimes; make small steps towards building relationships, such as supervised

market days for Muslim families and intergroup youth sports activities. Any inter-group

development, infrastructure, economic or social activities should include plans for managing

emerging conflicts (UNDP cash for work project lessons learned).

Conflict resolution priorities

Based on the previous analysis and in line with recommendations from other conflict resolution

organizations, the main priorities for conflict resolution efforts are to:

a) initiate and expand dialogue between the Rakhine and Rohingya as quickly as possible to

reduce conflict escalation and permit all groups to express their grievances,

b) identify the shared and unique interests and needs of the Rakhine and Rohingya,

c) identify spaces or opportunities for intergroup cooperation, such as around education and

schools as zones for peace.

11 In February 2014 the EU ambassador highlighted the immediate need for government facilitation of dialogue,

intergroup economic relationship building, lifting of travel restrictions, better UN/INGO communication of

humanitarian aid criteria, and implementation of the Government’s Comprehensive Strategy and Action Plan for

Rakhine State (Long 2014). The Comprehensive Strategy and Action Plan could not be found during this study.

22

Rakhine State Education Sector Analysis

While the overall quality of education in Rakhine State is low compared to the rest of the country

and global standards, it is extremely low for Muslim children in IDP camps and northern

Rakhine State. There are significant differences in the provision of education to children who

attend Rakhine State government schools versus Muslim children who attend schools in the IDP

camps or in northern Rakhine State, since the conflict escalated in June 2012. Schools attended

by Muslim children lack government teachers and the full range of learning materials. IDP camp

schools have much shorter schools days. When possible, the unique education needs of Muslim

children are identified in this section.

Education policies have discriminated systematically against minorities since independence.

After 1962, the primary language after fourth grade in all schools was Burmese, education

spending was disproportionately less in ethnic states, and non-Burmese language educational

materials were severely restricted or manipulated (Walton 2013). Being forced to learn the

majority group language marginalizes minority groups and limits their ability to fully develop.

Government textbook revisions in the 1990s also reinforce Burmese identity as the national

identity, while marginalizing ethnic group identities (Walton 2013). Significant efforts to

improve the quality of education in Myanmar are occurring through the Comprehensive

Education Sector Review (CESR), which is currently working on Phase II of the review. Phase I

was a rapid assessment of the education sector to identify major trends in education throughout

the country and important data gaps, which require additional data collection, to be done in the

In-Depth Analysis of Phase II. The overall goal of the CESR is to improve human capital in

support of social and economic development. Phase III consists of the development of the

Education Sector Plan (ToR Myanmar Comprehensive Education Sector Review 2012).

National and Rakhine State education data

Of the 2,714 government schools in Rakhine State in 2012, 205 were in urban areas and 2,509

were in rural areas. There were 84 monastic schools and 105 madrassahs (Rakhine Education

Response Plan 2014). This study does not address education challenges in monastic or

madrassah schools.

Nationally large numbers of children are out of school, including at primary, middle and high

school levels (CESR Phase I report 2013). Education participation rates are critical for

understanding the role of education for peacebuilding. Below is data on indicators of education

participation and success for the 2009-2010 school period, which show that Rakhine State

education levels are significantly below national averages (Myanmar MICS 2011).

23

Table 2: Schooling and birth registration data

Indicator National data Rakhine State data

Preschool attendance, ages 36-59 months 22.9%12

5.4%

Primary school attendance for children age 5 74.4%13

63.9%

Primary school net attendance ratio 89.8% males

90.6% females

90.2% total

78.0% males

73.7% females

75.8% total

Secondary school net attendance ratio 58.0% males

58.6% females

58.3% total

33.3% males

28.4% females

30.9% total

Secondary school age children attending primary

school

13.0% males

10.9% females

11.9% total

18.1% males

14.2% females

16.2% total

Net primary school completion rate 51.2% males

57.1% females

54.2% total

31.7% total

Ratio of girls to boys attending primary education 1.01 0.94

Ratio of girls to boys attending secondary education 1.01 0.85

Literacy for women age 15-24 87.8% 54.6%

Birth registration completed 72.4% 59.2%

Source: (Myanmar MICS 2011)

It should also be noted that additional variables identify more at risk groups; for example, with

primary school net attendance national data, while the national average is 90.2 percent, in

families where the mother has no education, such levels decrease to only 72.6 percent, and in the

poorest quintile of households decrease to only 81.4 percent. These data are more problematic

when looking at secondary school enrollment data: 58.3 percent of all secondary students

nationally are enrolled, while only 28.2 percent of the poorest quintile, 31.2 percent of those

whose mothers had no education, and 52.0 percent of those living in rural areas (Myanmar MICS

2011). Such findings argue for targeted interventions for certain families, whether based on

rural/urban, mother’s education, income or other feasible criteria.

Regarding gender parity, at the national level similar levels of girls and boys are attending school

(gender parity ratio of 1.01). However, in Rakhine State girls are at a disadvantage with a girl to

boy ratio of 0.94 at the primary level and 0.85 at the secondary level, meaning fewer girls than

boys are attending school (Myanmar MICS 2011). The lowest literacy rates for women in the

country is in Rakhine, at 54.6 percent. Nationally poverty, living in rural areas and lower levels

of education for the mother are strongly correlated with higher female illiteracy. It is important

to note that fully 25 percent of girls nationally who completed primary education are still

illiterate (Myanmar MICS 2011).

National level primary and secondary education dropout rates are worthwhile to examine given

12 Little difference between boys (22.6 percent) versus girls (23.2 percent). 13 No difference between boys and girls.

24

the argument that access to quality education can provide a peace dividend towards the larger

peacebuilding effort. For the school year ending 2009, 25.2 percent of children in grades 1 – 5

had dropped out, including 27.8 percent of boys and 22.5 percent of girls (Education For All

Global Monitoring Report 2012). Such high drop rates would reinforce the need for

interventions to increase completion of primary education for all children, preferably targeting

reasons why such children are removed from school, whether due to school costs, distance to

school, need for children to work to support family income, etc.

One problem that affects education enrollment is the lack of official birth records for children.

Birth registration provides insight as to the reasons that parents may not have completed

important tasks for their children’s development. In Rakhine State for example, 59.2 percent of

children had birth registrations and 5.1 percent of parents didn’t know if their children were

registered. Parent explanations for why their children’s births were not registered include costs

too much (13.6 percent), must travel too far (9.2 percent), didn’t know child should be registered

(53.9 percent), and didn’t know where to register the birth (11.9 percent) (Myanmar MICS

2011). Such findings highlight the need for parental education on important tasks for their

children’s development, whether related to health, legal registration, or education, as well as the

need for removal of structural barriers, whether distance to government offices and costs.

Studies identify widespread neglect of education by all levels of government (Border Consortium

2013). Problems exist between government curricula and curricula which supports local ethnic

identities. In the eastern part of Myanmar, government curricula is the most common, followed

by ethnic group curricula, use of both curricula simultaneously, and non-formal or religious

curricula (Border Consortium 2013). Access to middle and secondary schools is limited due to

cost, transportation and distance. Government teachers’ inability to speak local languages

throughout Myanmar limits support of ethnic identity development (Border Consortium 2013),

with similar issues in other states and with Rohingya in Rakhine State.

Given the hierarchical relations in Myanmar, the potential for dialogue and discussion between

teachers and students may be difficult, unless significant changes take place within the school

(Tin 2008). However, “Teachers have great potential to act as agents of change.” (Tin

2008:115), if they can move away from conservative, traditional beliefs and embrace new

teaching methods and goals, such as mutual respect and tolerance (Tin 2008). Teacher

accountability, roles, selection and pay have been identified as important factors for improving

education (Tin 2008). Some teachers are providing sub-standard learning to children and then

charging their students for private lessons to meet examination requirements (Sittwe personal

interviews). Prior to the 1960s, the Burmese education system included curriculum on civics,

ethics and good citizenship (Tin 2008). Tin (2008) argues there is a need for curriculum and

teaching on ethics, honesty, trust, liberal and humanistic values and ideals, and more egalitarian

social relationships. The Education Sector Study, completed in 1992, led to some changes, but

not enough according to some parties (Tin 2008). Within the education system, traditional rote

learning, with memorization of facts, is still the norm, with little success in education reforms

towards analytical and creative thinking (Tin 2008).

One of the key issues is curriculum reform, moving away from factual knowledge and rote

learning to analytical, creative thinking and open discussion (Tin 2008; Wilson and Skidmore

25

2008). Critical education reform should also consider the rural, agrarian nature of society,

focusing on content needed by agriculture and forestry sectors, and providing flexibility with

scheduling to reduce school absences and dropout due to harvesting demands (Tin 2008). Given

the broader development needs in Myanmar in industry and construction sectors, effective

vocational education is also needed in those areas (Tin 2008). Literacy and basic education is

needed for large parts of the Myanmar population. Effective literacy efforts exist, such as

UNDP’s Community Learning Centres (Tin 2008)

According to CESR Phase I data, Rakhine State education was near the bottom for Myanmar

across several 2010-2011 indicators; overall school completion rate of 31.7 percent; net primary

enrollment rate of 71.4 percent; 2.9 percent of basic education schools offer pre-school classes,

with a reduction the previous year’s 3.3 percent; and the highest primary education student-

teacher ratio in Myanmar. The CESR Phase I report cited the need for additional MS and HS in

Rakhine State. It is important to examine student-teachers ratios by demographic group within

Rakhine State, since official figures put the number at between 30 and 40 students per teacher

(CESR Phase I report 2013), while observation of class sizes in IDP camps showed much higher

ratios.

The UN Country Team Report identified a number of conflict driver issues that directly relate to

education. Insightful comments include the high value of education among the people of

Myanmar; considerable work on multilingual and peace education that can be leveraged; the

comprehensive education sector review has considerable potential for removing institutionalized

biases against ethnic minorities; interest in expanding peace education forums, staff and

participatory development processes; and the need for both language and history curriculum

changes to be more equitable for minorities (McGrew et al 2013).

Education challenges in Rakhine State

Extremely low quality of education throughout Rakhine State

There are similar, yet different challenges for government schools and IDP camp schools.

Similar needs include low PS, MS and HS enrollment, completion and learning rates, additional

school buildings, school supplies for teachers and students, under age children in grade 1.

Education needs unique to the IDP camps include more teachers, longer school day, and

Burmese language training for Rohingya pre-school children. There is a need to improve the

perception of fairness in provision of education services to all groups (McGrew, et al 2013;

Rogers and Munn 2013). Related opportunities include new school building designs and

possible partnerships, NFPE and NFMSE curriculum development, Rakhine political leadership

support for education, and savings from reshuffled teachers.

Low enrollment, completion and learning rates

As noted previously, large numbers of middle and high school students, and to a lesser extent

primary students, are not in school in Rakhine State. While state and township education

officers cite only 3 percent dropout rates, the primary school net attendance ratio is only 76

percent and secondary school net attendance ratio is only 31 percent. Only 32 percent of primary

school students complete their primary education. Standards of learning are low as well, with

many students still illiterate. Enrollment, completion and learning standards are especially

problematic for children in IDP camps, although accurate data is lacking. IDP camp children

26

have only 2 to 3 hours of class time per day, with only two subjects, mathematics and Burmese

(personal interviews; education in emergency sector committee). Further research is needed on

how poverty impacts school attendance both primary and secondary levels, and how possible

interventions, such as cash for school attendance, would impact the poverty-education problem.

Lack of school space

Township education officers and community members expressed the need for additional school

space in government-managed communities. State Education Officer (SEO) and Township

Education Officer (TEO) rebuilding timeframes are too slow to provide adequate space for

learning in the short term. In the IDP camps run by UNICEF and INGOs, most Temporary

Learning Spaces (TLS) are operational, but some require repairs after only one year and

additional learning space is needed in some camps. Currently up to 125 students study in TLS’s

designed for 50 students (15x30 ft.). More TLS are needed, with a more robust design that can

withstand monsoon weather.14

Lack of school materials for children and teaching materials

Focus groups identified the need for school materials. About 24,000 primary school (PS) and

19,000 middle school (MS) students in the IDP camps in the seven townships around Sittwe need

materials, given that IDP families have little income. Most IDP camp schools and some

government schools lack blackboards, chalk, maps, and other important teaching materials.

Township education officers also noted the need for school materials for poor children.

Lack of trained teachers in IDP camps and Muslim restricted areas

Shortage of IDP camp teachers (see SAVE report 2013). In some cases, there are over 220

primary children per IDP camp teacher, while government schools have about 25-40 students per

teacher. There are very few MS or HS teachers in the IDP camps. Additional PS and MS

teachers are needed in the IDPs camps.15

Critical questions include: are enough qualified

teachers available in the camps? Should the government pay some of IDP camp teacher salaries?

Middle and high school issues

As noted previously, low MS and HS attendance and lack of access to MS and HS classes are

significant problems. There is an urgent need to improve MS and HS attendance throughout the

state. For example, in Minbya Township government schools there is a 28.6 percent school

attendance rate for MS students and 5.4 percent rate for HS students.16

In the Sittwe area IDP

camps there are approximately 19,000 MS and 14,500 HS students who have not attended school

in almost two years, according to 3W data. There is a lack of accessible middle and high

schools, with parents complaining about the distance students have to travel to access schools,

over very poor roads and during monsoon weather; high school students often have to go to

boarding schools due to the distance to high schools, which exacerbates problems for poor

families. The provision of IDP camp HS classes is further complicated by the lack of teachers

14 Due to continuously changing TLS management and numbers of children in each camp, this study does not provide a specific recommendation on how many TLS to build, instead it defers to education in emergencies 3W

data. 15 As with TLS’s, this study defers to 3W data for specific numbers of teachers needed. 16 These data depend on local township education officer data. Some additional children may be attending schools

in other areas and not counted in these estimates, but it is believed that those numbers are fairly low.

27

qualified to teach HS level classes. MS and HS students in both government and IDP camp

schools need either non-formal MS education (NFME) to get them back to grade level, or regular

middle and high school classes to keep them near grade level and limit further learning gaps.

This requires a significant effort starting with a comprehensive needs assessment based on

reliable school age child lists, and provision of essential space, teachers and school supplies.

Gender issues

As noted previously, girls have lower enrollment rates in primary and secondary schools, and

much lower literacy rates, even for girls who are in school. Boys have higher primary school

dropout rates than girls. Safety issues exist for high school girls who must attend boarding

houses because there are no high schools near their villages.

Under age children in Grade 1

Some Rakhine and Muslim parents demand to put their under-age children in Grade 1. With the

lack of birth records to validate children’s ages, teachers are placed in a difficult position of

accepting children who utilize limited space and materials, and teaching children who are not

developed sufficiently for Grade 1, or creating conflict with parents if those children are denied

access to school. Solutions may include strict implementation of enrollment age limits, possibly

with village administrator support, provision of ECCD classes for children ages 3-5, and reliable

birth registration. Children who do not speak Rakhine or Burmese at home are in need of

Rakhine/Burmese language acquisition to improve their ability to learn from the Burmese

curriculum.

Specific opportunities related to quality of education include:

School building needs assessments, and permanent school and TLS designs. Save the

Children and UNICEF have more robust TLS designs. School construction may support

income generation. Bridge Asia Japan (BAJ) has a permanent school design that is

cyclone proof for US$30,000-70,000 per building, accommodating 60 to 250 students,

and semi-permanent residence building design that could be used for TLS. SEO and

TEOs have school building improvement plans which identify priorities for school

buildings replacement.

BAJ has a plan for building 100 new schools in Rakhine State by 2017, based on a school

building needs assessment done with township education officers. Ten BAJ schools were

completed by February 2014 in Sittwe, Pauk Taw, Ponna Gyun, Kyauk Taw, and Mrauk

Oo townships (Opening the Second Sittwe Office n.d.; BAJ interviews). Benefits of BAJ

construction process include income generation, on the job training, positive intergroup

interactions, and sturdy design. BAJ has discussed additional school building with Dept.

of Education in Nay Pyi Taw and Ministry of Border Affairs.

NFPE and non-formal middle school education (NFMSE) exists for leveling students

who are behind grade level. NFMSE curriculum was being developed in mid-2013 by

the Department of Myanmar Education Research Bureau with support from UNESCO

(Equivalency Programme 2013; Save the Children report 2013). More research is needed

on how many Rakhine and Rohingya MS and HS students need NFPE, and best

mechanisms for implementing NFPE and NFMSE in the Rakhine State context. The

CESR Phase I report notes that no official NFE policy exists.

28

Rakhine political leadership support the right to quality education for all children,

improved teacher training, increased teacher pay and accountability, and civic education

(RNDP interviews).

Due to reshuffling of govt. teachers in conflict areas, it is possible that extra Rakhine

teachers or teacher budgets are available (SAVE report). If government teachers cannot

be assigned to Muslim areas, need to assess a) where the teachers are, and b) what is

happening to the unused SEO and TEO funds for teachers who resigned.17

Ineffective government education administration in Rakhine State

Challenges include limited SEO and TEO planning capacity; poor communication between

village, township and state offices; poor data management; lower status groups feel they do not

have power to resolve education problems; teacher effectiveness and accountability; low status

and pay for teachers; ineffective, rigid teaching methods and limited teacher training; and limited

local teacher training sites. Opportunities include increasing democratic openness in Myanmar

and more space for civil society engagement, current education sector reform processes, use of

school committees to support teaching and learning, upcoming SEO training for volunteer

teachers, feasible mechanisms for gathering school data, and vocational-tech policy changes.

Administrative and planning issues

Township education officers have limited budgets, yet must manage teachers across as many as a

hundred villages with limited communication and transportation resources. There are no

effective communication mechanisms about local village problems from the village to the

township level. Villagers and teachers at several IDP camps and villages reported complaints

that should be dealt with by township education officers or administrators, but the villagers were

not aware of any way to report such issues to local officials. SEO and TEOs lack information

about local issues. Basic education data, such as school age child lists, and computer systems

are lacking for administration and planning at the township level. Given the past history of the

authoritarian government, lower status groups often believe that they are powerless to make

changes without higher status approval: villagers and teachers can’t act without township

approval; township administrators can’t act without state approval; state officials can’t act

without national approval.

School data issues

Lack of reliable data on dropout and out of school rates, especially for middle and high school.18

Analysis of enrollment rates in one township shows there is a 29 percent school attendance rate

for MS and 5.4 percent for HS students. This analysis conflicts with SEO and TEOs dropout

rates, which are only 3% to 5% (SEO and TEO interviews). There is a need for data and lists for

school age children, enrollment, drop out, behind age grade, and never attended children; and a

17 Using 3W data, there are a total of 57,500 PS, MS and HS students who were displaced in the townships around

the Sittwe area, the vast majority of whom are Muslims who no longer receive classes by government teachers.

Assuming class sizes of 40 students per teacher (CESR Phase I data = 41:1), that means approximately 1,440

teachers may have been moved or resigned following the conflict. This is equivalent of about K$1.4 billion (US$1.4 million) per year. This has significant budget implications, and provides an argument for advocating for

government fulfillment of educational responsibilities regarding paying for teachers in the Muslim IDP camps. 18 Analysis of one township data (Minbya: 26,300 PS, 6,000 MS, and 564 HS students) is representative of data

problems: assuming stable birth rates, for primary level (5 grades) there are an average of 5,250 students per grade

level. By extrapolation there should be about 21,000 MS students (not 6,000) and 10,500 HS students (not 564).

29

need to improve grade and level (PS, MS and HS) completion rates.

Teacher issues

Teacher effectiveness and accountability are lacking. Focus group members stated that teachers

only showing up a few days a week, yet expect full pay. Lack of respect for teaching profession

among public. Lack of civil society involvement in education planning and accountability.

Government and IDP teacher social status and pay are low. Government teachers are paid

K$80,000-110,000 per month (SEO interview) and IDP camp teachers K$50,000 (UNICEF

Sittwe interviews). From interviews Rakhine political leaders stated that reasonable teacher

salaries would be about K$200,000 per month and IDP camp teachers requested salaries

increases to K$60,000 per month.

Teaching methods

Ineffective, rigid teaching methods and limited teacher training are common (Lall 2008; Lorch

2008). Numerous interviews noted that most government teachers still use rote learning

methods. IDP camp teachers lack effective teaching skills and methods (Lorch 2008). Most

existing IDP PS teachers have only a Grade 6 to 9 education, and only had a six day basic

training in 2013. Teachers lack skills for teaching creative and analytical thinking (Lorch 2008).

All IDP teachers need additional 1-2 month training before school starts in June 2014 and

government teachers need in-service training on active learning and NFPE.

Teacher and vocational-technical training facilities

Lack of teacher and vocational-technical training facilities in Rakhine State. Only one teacher

training facility exists in Kyaukpyu (UNICEF Sittwe interviews). There is a lack of vocational/

technical training facilities for critical job skills (IT, communication, trade, agriculture, fishing,

mechanics, carpentry, construction, etc.) in Rakhine State.

Specific opportunities related government education administration include:

The opening of Myanmar government to democratic reforms provides a space to build

capacity for effective, transparent, local decision making whenever possible. Governing

systems must decentralize as quickly as feasible, including budget authority, with

increased local decision making power and communication between village, township

and state -levels.

Education sector reforms open space for building capacity and systems of village,

township and state education officers for completion of their basic functions (e.g. school

age child lists, teacher accountability and teacher training). Provision of a few

computers, software and IT training to SEO and TEOs could improve school

administration and data management.

Local school committees can play a critical civil society role in improving education

services, but must have a limited scope so as to not disrupt learning. Key tasks could

include supporting student lists and attendance, monitoring teacher accountability,

resolving emerging conflicts, and monitoring building maintenance.

State Education Officer (SEO) is planning a one month training during summer 2014 for

volunteer government teachers in basic teaching skills, which could be adapted for IDP

camp teachers. Muslim IDP camp teachers are interested in additional training.

30

On teacher accountability there may be valid reasons for teachers missing school, such as

security, village isolation, and poor transportation. Need to reduce barriers so teachers

can make it to school. Advocate for SEO and TEO solutions, such as staff houses in

local villages, and teacher accountability to ensure teachers are in classrooms and quality

learning.

Based on recommendations by the Minbya TEO, TEOs can request village head masters

and administrators to compile lists of all school aged children. Data should include

child’s name, age, current grade level, whether behind grade level, if currently enrolled,

and reasons for being out of school.

The national government passed a new Apprenticeship Law, emphasizing standardized,

realistic job training, which can guide vocational-technical training center development.

The CESR is addressing vocational and technical education policy issues, but additional

policy work and coordination with industry is needed, followed by sufficient resources to

expand the sector (CESR Phase I report 2013).

Curriculum and teaching practices marginalize minority groups

Challenges include education policy and teacher biases against non-Buddhist religions and ethnic

minorities, lack of accommodation of minority beliefs, authoritarian teaching practices, Burmese

and minority language teaching, and unfamiliarity of students and teachers with democratic

processes. Opportunities include opening of Myanmar to democratic processes leading to

opportunity for education on multi-cultural societies, non-violent civic processes and civil

society participation, the Comprehensive Education Sector Review, lessons from past teacher

training, and national discussions on language and education.

Education policy

Education policy is biased against non-Buddhist religions and ethnic minorities.19

In one case in

Mrauk Oo, Muslim children tore down the Buddha’s picture and refused to say the national

anthem. Teachers believed that official rules required obedience to Buddhism and stating of

national anthem, and felt disrespect. The Muslim students were punished and intergroup conflict

escalated. No efforts were made by teachers to accommodate different religions or ethnicities.

“Buddhist doctrine remains part of the state-mandated curriculum in all government-run

elementary schools.” (Burma 2012 International Religious Freedom Report 2013:4).

Rakhine teacher attitudes

Rakhine teacher attitudes are sometimes biased against Muslim or other minority groups (Wilson

and Skidmore 2008). Teachers use authoritarian models (Lorch 2008). “Students at these

schools can opt out of instruction in Buddhism and sometimes do, but all are required to recite a

Buddhist prayer daily. Some schools or teachers may allow Muslim students to leave the

classroom during this recitation, but there does not appear to be a centrally mandated exemption

for non-Buddhist students.” (Burma 2012 International Religious Freedom Report 2013:4)

Language and education issues

19 Buddhism is a key part of the official curriculum in government PS. All students are required to daily recite a

Buddhist prayer. Teachers have the choice of allowing non-Buddhist students to opt out of Buddhist religious

lessons. Importation of Bibles and Qur’ans in indigenous languages is prohibited. (International Religious Freedom

Report 2011, 2012)

31

Problem of official teaching language and ethnic minority language. Most Rohingya children

first learn Burmese/Rakhine in Grade 1, and full Burmese/Rakhine language acquisition can take

until Grade 3 or 4, impacting learning effectiveness. Rohingya written language use is not

widespread, and has various forms, with Rohingya mullahs using Arabic in madrasahs.

Children and youth lack awareness of democratic processes and benefits of multi-cultural

societies. Local Rakhine leaders requested curriculum based on global examples of tolerance

and intergroup cooperation.

Relevant opportunities include:

Opening of Myanmar to democratic processes generates need for education on multi-

ethnic and multi-religious societies, non-violent civic processes and civil society

participation. Many Rakhine and Rohingya leaders agree on the need for civic education

and religious tolerance (Sittwe personal interviews). SEO and TEOs expressed interest in

civic education training for teachers in April/May 2014.

Opportunity for teacher training on civic education, and ethnic and religious tolerance

and diversity. Religious tolerance activities could include peace principles from all five

religions that exist in Rakhine State: Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Confucianism and

Hinduism.

UNESCO started a peace education project in northern Rakhine State in 2013 through

participatory civic dialogue processes that promotes intercultural awareness and peaceful

co-existence (UNESCO Initiates Peace Education Project 2013). SAVE has peace

education curriculum in Burmese. Plan International is looking for funding for a peace

education project in Rakhine State.

The Comprehensive Education Sector Review has been in process since October 2012,

with the Phase II analysis of education challenges due in March 2014. Further analysis of

discriminatory education policies and practices, and advocacy on non-discriminatory

education policies would be timely.

Past efforts to improve teaching methods, such as active learning, have been tried.

Lessons learned from those experiences could be used to make systemic changes now to

teacher attitudes and practices.

Considerable work is being done at the national level on educational language challenges.

Most Rakhine State curriculum and learning materials are in Burmese. Burmese and

Rakhine languages have similar writing, but slightly different pronunciation. Rakhine

teachers read Burmese materials and teach in Burmese/Rakhine. Muslim IDP camp

teachers adapt Burmese materials into Rohingya, sometimes with help from government

teachers. Need further national level advocacy to allow curriculum development in

minority languages such as Rakhine and Rohingya, so as to support ethnic group identity.

Rakhine State education analysis conclusions

Regarding segregated or reintegrated schools, it is too early to start reintegration. Hostility,

mistrust and fear between the two groups is too strong. From a conflict sensitivity perspective,

the risk of increased violence is very high if any attempt to reintegrate schools is done soon, as it

is very likely that Rakhine extremist groups would protest and encourage more violence. Given

past history of inequitable government service provision and discrimination against Muslims

(Lorch 2008; Lwin 2000), separate schools would likely lead to unequal provision of services

32

and entrenching unequal education policies. However, segregated schools may be in the best

interest of Muslim children in the short term (International Crisis Group 2013). In response to

concerns that improving education services for Muslim IDP children will lead to entrenched

segregation, a few comments are needed. While it may do so, the larger question of segregated-

reintegrated schools appears to be more contingent on other factors, such as political solutions to

Rakhine and Muslim grievances and larger intergroup conflict escalation and cooperation.

Second, adolescents and youth are a time bomb waiting to happen. While minimal data exist to

direct corroborate this viewpoint, the situation for both Rakhine and Muslim adolescents and

youth from ages 13 to 24 is very problematic. Rakhine youth are exposed to extremely radical

views on Muslims, which argue for expulsion of Muslims or extreme limitations on their

freedoms, such as citizenship, movement, family size, etc. Rakhine youth also have limited

education and capacity for critical analysis of media and populist rhetoric, and many are

unemployed or earning very little money, creating widespread economic frustration. Such

radicalization and frustrations can easily lead to justifications for violence against Muslims. For

Rohingya youth, large numbers (about 180,000 youth between ages 13 and 24)20

are isolated in

camps with little to do and no hopes for the future. Muslim university students have had classes

cancelled for two years. This study found more polarization and radicalization among Rakhine

than Rohingya youth, although such findings are more anecdotal than systematic. More research

is needed on Rakhine and Muslim youth attitudes, beliefs, interests and needs.

The education priorities proposed here are prioritized by the impact the issues have on

peacebuilding: a) addressing the underlying causes of conflict, such as inequalities, b) targeting

key populations that are jointly affected by education and conflict, such as adolescents and

youth, and c) building long term change and capacity for peaceful interpersonal and intergroup

relations. The education priorities proposed in this study include:

e) improving the quality of primary education for Muslim children in the IDP camps and

northern Rakhine State (reduced class sizes, longer school days, additional subjects,

active learning),

f) improving middle and high school education in the Sittwe area townships for both

Rakhine and Muslim children (higher enrollment and completion rates),

g) increasing peace education, tolerance and diversity curriculum for all grade levels

(improved knowledge, skills and abilities for teachers and students),

h) improving state, township and village education administration capacity (data

management and teacher supervision).

20 Using UNICEF Myanmar (2011) total population and ages 6-17 data estimates, finds that 22.45% of total

population is between ages 6 and 17. Assuming stable birth rates, the Muslim youth population between ages 13

and 24 should be a similar percentage. Total Muslims in IDP camps in Rakhine State (800,000) x 22.45% =

179,600. Actual numbers may be higher if Muslim families have higher birth rates than average Myanmar families.

33

Recommendations

The recommendations follow from the study’s scope of work and focus on education and

peacebuilding in Rakhine State. The principal recommendations here are organized along the

findings identified in the conflict and education analysis. We prioritize these interventions,

explore several strategic issues, and include a draft logic model to clarify assumptions and

linkages between problems and proposed solutions.

As noted, the main priorities for conflict resolution efforts are to:

a) initiate and expand dialogue between the Rakhine and Rohingya as quickly as possible to

reduce conflict escalation and permit all groups to express their grievances,

b) identify the shared and unique interests and needs of the Rakhine and Rohingya,

c) identify spaces or opportunities for intergroup cooperation, such as around education and

schools as zones for peace.

As noted previously, the education priorities proposed in this study include:

a) improving the quality of primary education for Muslim children in the IDP camps and

northern Rakhine State (reduced class sizes, longer school days, additional subjects,

active learning),

b) improving middle and high school education in the Sittwe area townships for both

Rakhine and Muslim children (higher enrollment and completion rates),

c) increasing peace education, tolerance and diversity curriculum for all grade levels

(improved knowledge, skills and abilities for teachers and students),

d) improving state, township and village education administration capacity (data

management and teacher supervision).

Depending on how interventions are framed and what outcomes are sought, it is believed that

significant change can be accomplished on these priorities in the short and medium term.

First, whenever possible, interventions should be designed and implemented for the entire

Rakhine State education sector, meaning equally relevant for Rakhine and Muslim populations,

or government schools and IDP camp schools. While minor differences may exist in the

challenges and potential solutions, the fact that similar problems exist across the whole education

sector is important for programming and political reasons. Interventions to improve the quality

of education should be equally done in Rakhine government schools as well as IDP camp

schools. UNICEF education interventions in Rakhine State should be presented as providing

benefits to all Rakhine people, including Rakhine ethnic people and minorities such as the

Rohingya. This responds to the widely documented problem of Rakhine perceptions of unfair

provision of resources to Muslim IDPs.

Second, one priority is improving the quality of education in the IDP camps (class size, teacher

training, class time and number of subjects being taught). A basic assumption of the Rakhine

Strategic Response Plan is that “for reasons of feasibility, entrenching segregation and

substituting government services” the current minimum education package of only two to three

34

class hours per day, with two courses, Burmese language and mathematics, should not be

expanded. We argue that given the expectation that solutions to school reintegration will not

occur within the next year, it is necessary to improve the quality of education as much as feasibly

possible, so that IDP camp children are not left further behind. Benefits of improving IDP camp

educational services include keeping the displaced Muslim students as close to grade level as

possible, which limits later catch up work that will need to be done; and expanding school

services increases activities for IDP children, thereby providing structure and child protection.

Third, there is a need to simultaneously improve education and increase government leadership

on conflict resolution, dialogue, and educational issues in Rakhine State. Any school

reintegration and relationship building efforts must be accompanied by conflict resolution and

early warning mechanisms. Within this context, UNICEF and partners should advocate for

schools and children to be seen as zones of peace, so as to ensure children’s safe and full

development. A sub-component of zones of peace could be increasing support for those schools

that are still integrated and gradual reintegration of schools in villages interested in intergroup

cooperation.

Fourth, as recommended by the Rakhine Strategic Response Plan, this study agrees that a strong

advocacy plan is needed with the government. Such advocacy with the government should a)

encourage increased or improved government management of all education services in Rakhine

State, including IDP camp education affairs; b) urge acknowledgement of education sector

responsibilities, such as school building provision and payment of IDP camp teacher salaries; c)

advocate for more participative, transparent, representative governing systems to enable

participation of marginalized groups in sectoral planning processes; and d) demand action on

dialogue and reconciliation between Rakhine and Muslim groups. If done well, such

participative conflict resolution and governing processes will improve public perceptions in the

effectiveness and legitimacy of the government and meet local needs and interests, both key

aspects of effective peacebuilding. Government fulfillment of educational responsibilities also

minimizes the substitution of government services by the UN and INGOs.

Fifth, the purpose and prioritization of ECCD needs to be critically assessed in terms of

peacebuilding. The Rakhine Strategic Response Plan argues that ECCD promotes child

protection and longterm stability. This study agrees that the child protection function is evident

and worthwhile, but the main purpose of ECCD should be to better prepare pre-school students

for Grade 1. Nonetheless, significant investment in ECCD from a PBEA perspective cannot be

logically supported, given that none of the major conflict drivers directly relate to young

children.

Sixth, Burmese and minority language issues create a dilemma. While simplifying the issue

considerable, supporting minority language development enhances ethnic identity while

supporting a standardized language (Burmese) provides a platform for intergroup communication

and economic development. However, this issue is very difficult to resolve politically and

programmatically. This study defers to a broader discussion that is taking place on the issue, but

generally supports Nyein (Shalom) Foundation's policy recommendation (email 02/13/14).

These recommendations include starting bilingual instruction (ethnic language plus Myanmar

language) in kindergarten, and having 60 percent of basic education curriculum designed by the

35

Ministry of Education in Burmese, while 40 percent should be developed by the local ethnic

group in their native language. This recommendation recognizes the additional effort and cost

for having multiple ethnic language curriculums in Myanmar, where as many as 100 different

languages are spoken, and therefore urges ethnic language curriculum development only for the

largest ethnic groups (e.g. group size is > 1 million). This study advises that history and

geography curriculum be developed in the ethnic languages to address cultural biases found in

Burmese history curricula, leaving other topics to be taught in Burmese.

Time frames and feasible interventions

A number of the above recommendations are considered priorities and feasible short term

interventions, which can be either completed or significantly advanced in the next two years.

These include completing or improving schools buildings, school supplies, student supplies, IDP

camp teacher numbers, MS and HS attendance, SEO and TEO personnel and data management,

government teacher training on active learning, IDP camp teacher training on basic teaching

methods, IDP camp teacher pay, civic education and religious tolerance curriculum design and

teacher training on such curriculum, youth engagement and activities, and intergroup dialogue.

While some of these activities may take more than two years to fully complete, significant results

should be feasible within two years.

Conflict sensitivity issues

This section summarizes overall conflict context that UNICEF Myanmar is working in and

identifies several potential interactions between recommended interventions and the broader

context (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012). The following context summary reflects the

best information available from the various Rakhine State conflict studies and this study’s field

visit, yet contains a number of assumptions which need to be continuously tested and revised.

Given the hidden nature of Rakhine interests and the lack of a centralized Rohingya leadership

within Rakhine State, current validation of these assumptions is difficult to ascertain.

In the conflict analysis section, the main parties, issues and conflict dynamics have been

identified. It should be noted that the broader conflict context is one in which the national

government is slowly transitioning from a highly centralized military dictatorship to a more open

democratic government. In this context the Tatmadaw military still has considerable power and

resources, decision making is centralized within the national government, participatory processes

are lacking, civil society has little capacity or space for participation, poverty is widespread, and

basic infrastructure is limited. While most of the ethnic groups that have been fighting the

central government for decades are negotiating peace terms, Rakhine ethnic group leaders have

been excluded from the national peace process, limiting possible political, economic and social

benefits from that process. This national context significantly impacts political, economic and

social conditions within Rakhine State.

As noted earlier, Rakhine ethnic leaders have been demanding increased political autonomy,

more economic development, revenue sharing from natural resource extraction, and protection of

their social identity and culture. While most of these demands by the Rakhine have been voiced

to the national government, little change has taken place. Burmese and/or former military

leaders still control the Rakhine State government. The lack of positive change may have

36

increased Rakhine frustrations, and be the driver behind recent Rakhine protests. The main

group for concern from a conflict sensitivity lens is the Rakhine, given their more significant

power within the Rakhine State. Since the Rohingya have little power, they are of less concern,

although if conditions worsen significantly, such as the termination of food or medical aid, or

increased attacks occur on Muslim populations by the Rakhine, then it is possible that the

Rohingya will resort to widespread attacks on local Rakhine populations. Alienation of

Rohingya youth are of special concern, as noted in the conflict analysis section.

The conflict resolution and education sector recommendations proposed in this conflict analysis

carry a number of risks. The full range of interventions run the risk of manipulation by Rakhine

ethnic leaders, in so far as they can interpret any of these interventions as providing preferential

treatment to the Rohingya (or reducing their power in other ways) and respond by developing

propaganda and protests to counter the interventions. In general, this analysis recommends

building dialogue with Rakhine ethnic leaders to ascertain their positions on possible

interventions, so as to gain Rakhine support for possible interventions. It also recommends

significant education outputs that directly benefit the Rakhine community so they can see the

rewards of cooperation with the PBEA programme. However, recognizing that information is

power, sharing programme information with the Rakhine leadership early creates the risk of the

group manipulating that information for their own purposes.

Various actions can be taken to mitigate conflict risks during PBEA programme implementation.

For the Rohingya, identifying and empowering leaders within the local communities to better

represent the members of their ethnic group will improve participatory, decision making within

the group, leading to greater public support for agreed-upon interventions. For the Rakhine, it is

important to listen to the grievances of the more extremist members of the group, but also to

increase support for and involvement of more moderate leaders within the group. The recently

published OCHA stakeholder analysis may provide insight on moderate and extremist Rakhine

leaders. This report does not assess risks for specific recommendations proposed here, but urges

UNICEF Myanmar to assess such risks once specific intervention strategies are selected.

Conflict sensitivity concerns were considered during the implementation of this conflict analysis

of the education sector in Rakhine State and in the determination of PBEA programme

recommendations. This assessment was sensitive to existing conflict dynamics by modifying the

language used in interview and focus group questions so as to no escalate tensions further. For

example, assessment language attempted to avoid the terms peace, conflict resolution and

reconciliation, instead using intergroup harmony or cooperation. Actions were taken to not raise

expectations from this assessment, with both Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic groups. While it is

acknowledged that the Rohingya had greater unmet needs at the time of this assessment, a range

of participants from both Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic groups were interviewed to attempt to

show impartiality and listen to grievances and interests of all parties. Power relations were

considered, such as during meetings with Rohingya women in their patriarchal society and with

Rakhine political leaders.

37

Table 3: UNICEF Rakhine State PBEA recommendation logic model Inputs Activities Outputs Intermediate Outcomes Longterm Outcomes

Building materials,

labor

School building construction New school buildings Improved learning and

critical thinking.

Rakhine and Muslim

perceptions that their

needs are being met.

Increased social and

human capital.

Improved

employment

possibilities and

workforce skills.

School supplies Provision of school supplies to poor schools Teachers have materials needed to teach

Student supplies Provision of school supplies to poor

students

Students have materials needed to learn

Teachers Hiring and training of IDP camp teachers Additional teachers in IDP camp

classrooms.

TEO and head teacher

staff time, teachers,

school space

Identifying out of school secondary

students. Increasing secondary attendance

and completion rates. Gender support.

Hiring and training of MS and HS teachers.

Increased attendance and completion of

MS and HS by both girls and boys.

Productive use of time by

adolescents and youth.

Student capacity building.

Research, organizational

trainers

Assessment of SEO, TEO, teacher and civil society communication and problems.

Stakeholder training on communication and

administration.

Improved SEO, TEO and school committee skills to manage education

services.

Improved teacher accountability.

Improved transparency and accountability of

education planning.

Improved government

administration of

schools.

Greater community

support for education.

Improved focus of

education on needs of

local communities.

Improved community

respect for teachers.

Increased social and

human capital.

Research, computers,

IT training

Provide computers to SEO and TEOs. Train

staff usage. Design and implement school

data management policies

Improved data on school age children,

never attended children, drop outs,

completion and enrollments.

Increased student

enrollment and

completion rates.

Teacher trainers,

curricula on active

learning, NFPE, basic

teaching methods

Design or adapt and get approval for teacher

training curricula. Training of trainers.

Follow-up to ensure teacher usage of new

methods and materials.

Teachers training and have practical

teaching activities which they can use

with their students.

Improved teaching

methods by teachers.

Funding, policy Implement increased pay for teachers Higher government and IDP camp

teacher salaries.

Improved teachers quality

of life and self-esteem.

Building materials,

funding, policy

Change policy on teacher and vo-tech

training facilities to expand sites.

Build 5-6 training sites in Rakhine State.

Increased number of teacher training and

vo-tech training facilities throughout

state.

More students taking and

completing teacher and

vo-tech training.

Research, curriculum design and advocacy

on teaching practices,

and curriculum.

Research in policy curriculum, and teaching practices on religion and ethnicity.

Advocacy for more participatory teaching

policy. Curriculum design and

implementation.

Teacher training.

Curriculum on peace education, life skills, civic education, and ethnic and

religious tolerance. Practical activities to

promote inter-group cooperation among

students.

Increased teacher and student knowledge about

civic responsibilities and

benefits of multi-religious

and multi-cultural

societies.

38

Inputs Activities Outputs Intermediate Outcomes Longterm Outcomes

Intergroup conflict

resolution resources

Support govt. leadership on conflict

resolution process. Support provision of

conflict resolution expertise.

Increased dialogue between groups.

Resolution of specific grievances.

Govt. legitimacy.

Reduced tensions and

rhetoric between groups.

Space for peaceful

intergroup relationships.

Improved intergroup

relations between

Rakhine and

Muslims.

Intergroup conflict

resolution resources

Negotiate schools as zone of peace and

slowly move towards reintegrated schools.

Include conflict resolution mechanisms on

all UNICEF activities.

Agreements on safety around schools

and children.

More stability in school

environments.

Peaceful intergroup

interactions.

Improved education

services and learning. Improved relations

between groups.

Sustainable,

participatory

development.

Improved, stable

relationships between

Rohingya and

Rakhine.

Media expertise Implement media strategy to reduce rhetoric and improve balanced reporting.

Reduced rhetoric. More accurate reporting.

Better informed society.

Conflict resolution

and organizational

and resources

Empower Rakhine and Muslim groups to

voice and resolve development needs.

Rohingya and Rakhine express needs to

govt.

Participatory processes

established. Satisfaction

of group needs.

Advocacy on

Rohingya citizenship.

Seek permanent solution to Rohingya

citizenship and human rights issues.

Improved policies on Rohingya. Better quality of life for

Rohingya.

Youth training and

group facilitation

Identify and meet needs of youth. Involve

youth in civic, peace and media efforts.

Increased, positive youth community

participation.

Youth commitment to

communities and peaceful

intergroup relations.

39

Theory of change for Rakhine State PBEA programme recommendations

Equitable, peaceful

social relations.

Equitable resolution of

grievances and conflicts.

Resolution of underlying

grievances.

Improved media reporting

Improved minority rights

Opportunities and space

for peaceful intergroup

relationships

Improved dialogue and

conflict resolution

Improved infrastructure

in Rakhine schools

Improved human

capital

Improved student

learning and quality of

education Improved management

of education and student

data.

Improved teacher

teaching capacity

Improved knowledge of

civic responsibilities,

and benefits of diversity.

Changed attitudes on

intergroup relations.

Rakhine, Rohingya and

youth empowerment. Expanded curriculum on

tolerance and diversity

Increased student

enrollment and

completion rates

40

Several basic assumptions underlie these theories of change.

Theory 1: improved quality of education, education administration and teaching practices lead to

improved student learning and more structured social environments for children provide safe and

secure spaces for child development. These interventions directly address the problems of

existing education policy and practices that often discriminate against certain groups, and create

barriers for school access and completion for large numbers of children. Improved learning

positively impacts children and youth self-esteem and attitudes about future opportunities, and

builds human capital for sustainable, peaceful social relationships and economic development.

Theory 2: building government administrative capacity and promoting participatory government

planning processes increases legitimacy of the government and meets the needs of local people.

Theory 3: life skills, civic education, and religious and ethnic tolerance and diversity curriculum

and teacher training address the knowledge, attitudes, behaviors and skills children and youth

need be individually and collectively successful. This training directly addresses fears, mistrust

and stereotypes between groups. Life skills directly build intra-personal and interpersonal social,

health, and economic skills. Civic education builds community decision making and planning

skills. Religious and ethnic tolerance and diversity education breaks down stereotypes and

promotes factual, positive attributes of other cultures. Attitudinal and behavioral changes in

children and youth will lead to some changes in parent attitudes and behavior, and provide the

environment for future, positive, intergroup relations and community development.

Theory 4: conflict resolution mechanisms directly address immediate grievances of Rakhine and

Muslim groups, and provide safe space for intergroup dialogue and interactions. Conflict

resolution mechanisms can reduce tensions and propaganda in the short term, and facilitate

participatory planning for equitable, sustainable development. These mechanisms will increase

communication, respect and trust between groups.

Research recommendations

The following section summarizes recommendations for research based on this assessment.

Baseline assessment. Covers school infrastructure; government education administration

capacity; teacher attitudes, practices and skills; children and youth attitudes, interests, and

skills; adult attitudes, interests, and skills; and conflict dynamics and conflict resolution

processes.

Children and youth attitudes, interests, and skills. Specific issues include self-esteem,

intergroup attitudes and relationships, intergroup conflict and reconciliation, negotiation

skills, educational challenges and goals, and career interests. Factors influencing children

being out of school or not completing HS should be explored. Methodology should use

systematic survey sampling techniques. Population should include all Rakhine State

children and youth, ages 5 to 24.

Adult attitudes, interests, and skills. Specific issues include intergroup attitudes and

relationships, intergroup conflict and reconciliation, negotiation skills, income levels and

sources, career interests, and educational challenges for self and/or children. Factors

influencing children being out of school or not completing HS should be explored.

41

Methodology should use systematic survey sampling techniques. Population should

include all Rakhine adults over age 25.

Key Rohingya and Rakhine stakeholder attitudes on intergroup cooperation and

reconciliation. Specific issues include grievances, positions, interests, needs, and power;

interest in conflict escalation or reconciliation; proposed processes for dialogue and trust

building; acceptable third party facilitators; and government leadership of conflict

resolution processes.

42

Appendices

Appendix A: ToR for education sector conflict analysis

Purpose of the Assignment

Consultancy to provide support to UNICEF Myanmar in:

Conducting the conflict analysis process in Rakhine State with a focus on education (all

levels).

Proposing a design/intervention for the whole Rakhine State education programme and

peacebuilding based on the Rakhine conflict analysis.

Work Assignment

1. Identity and map out existing conflict analyses that may have been conducted by

UNICEF, as part of inter-agency planning process, by multi-lateral/bi-lateral donors or

any other agency or institution; map out peacebuilding-relevant policies, strategies and

frameworks.

2. Conduct a comprehensive desk study of existing education documents (e.g. education

sector reform process) and conflict analysis documents; assess peacebuilding relevance

and identify gaps.

3. In collaboration with the CO Education programme team, identify and liaise with key

stakeholders to be consulted in Rakhine Education conflict analysis.

4. Design a comprehensive education conflict analysis process.

5. Provide support to all aspects of the implementation of the conflict analysis process;

organizational, logistical and substantial; support and/or lead consultations, facilitate

workshops, focus group discussions; and interviews; document all consultations.

6. Draft a comprehensive conflict and analysis report based on consultation held and as a

basis for the programme design; include potential education-for-peacebuilding

contributions that could be facilitated by other sectors.

7. Verify findings the conflict analysis results through verification workshops with different

stakeholder groups.

8. Recommend programme design/interventions to support the whole Rakhine State

education and peacebuilding.

9. Present findings to key stakeholders.

43

Appendix B: Conflict Analysis Focus Group and Interview List

Rakhine State interviews and focus groups

Interviews

State Education Officer meeting. Sittwe.

Deputy Township Education Officer. Mrauk Oo

Deputy Township Education Officer. Minbya

Sittwe Rakhine rice trader who used to use Muslim laborers.

Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, 3 central committee members

Save the Children Sittwe education specialist and child protection specialist.

Lutheran World Service - Finn Church Aid education specialist.

UNICEF Sittwe education team members

UN Development Program Sittwe, social cohesion officer

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sittwe, community services officer.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Sittwe, humanitarian affairs officer.

Focus groups

Public primary school. Mrauk Oo. 1 head teacher and 8 female teachers, Rakhine ethnic group.

Set Yo Kya IDP camp. Sittwe. About 7 Rakhine community leaders

Chrit Taung IDP camp. Minbya. 25 women and 10 children age 6-10, Rakhine host village

Tha Htay Gone IDP camp. Minbya. About 15 women and 5 men Chin host village

Khaung Doke Khar IDP camp. Sittwe. About 15 Rohingya community leaders

Dar Paing IDP camp. Sittwe. About 25 Rohingya community leaders

Say Tha Mar Gie IDP camp. Sittwe. About 20 Muslim community leaders

Ta Chaung IDP camp. Sittwe. About 20 Muslim community leaders and camp committee

Hgnet Chaung IDP camp. Pauktaw. About 25 Muslim IDP camp leaders

A Nauk Ywe IDP camp. Pauktaw. About 25-30 Muslim IDP camp leaders

Sambale IDP camp. Minbya. About 10 Muslim IDP women

Sin Htoo Tan IDP camp. Minbya. About 50 Muslim IDP youth, ages 12 to 18, boys and girls.

Pa Rein IDP camp. Mrauk Oo. Over 50 children plus many adults, Muslim IDP village.

Yai Thay IDP camp. Mrauk Oo. Village elders, Muslim IDP camp.

Rural Sittwe. 8 adults – 3 men and 5 women, Rakhine rice farmers who use Muslim laborers

Yangon Interviews and meetings

UNICEF education section chief

UNICEF education officer

UNICEF education and M & E specialist

UNICEF peacebuilding and education consultant

UN Office of resident Coordinator

Myanmar education in emergencies sector committee meeting

Conflict advisors group meetings

Myanmar Peace Center, ceasefire negotiation program director

Bridge Asia Japan country representative

International School of Yangon, social studies teacher

Stephen Gray, conflict advisor

Josefine Roos, conflict advisor

John Badgley, political scientist

44

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