Muslims in France: A Multilevel Analysis

Arthur Kaufman

George Washington University

Advisor: Michael J. Sodaro, Ph.D.

15th Claremont-UC Undergraduate Conference on the European Union

April 6 and 7, 2017

Scripps College, Claremont California

Muslims in France: A Multilevel Analysis

Abstract

Following the recent wave of Islamic-related terrorism and Muslim migration, Europe

has been forced to confront deep problems regarding identity and the place of Muslims in its

society. The integration of Muslims into the European community is imperative to states’ social

cohesion and stability, especially as these pressures continue to intensify. France is an ideal case

study to examine this issue, since it has incurred the deadliest and most recent attacks, and has

the highest proportion of Muslims in Western Europe. Investigating France’s attempts to handle

the issues surrounding Muslims would reveal interesting insights into the state of Muslim

integration in France and, more broadly, Europe.

To this end, this paper seeks to explain how French governments since 2005 have tried to

integrate Muslims in France, deal with immigration and terrorism, and cooperate with or diverge

from the EU and other Member States on these issues. It tests two hypotheses in a unique

multilevel analysis to determine whether France has addressed problems surrounding Muslims

using a more national, unilateral approach or a more international, multilateral approach. The

research hypothesis is that national and domestic factors in France – such as cultural, economic,

political, and educational differences between Muslims and the majority of the French

population, attitudes of alienation regarding Muslims in social and political spheres, and acts of

Islamic-related terrorism – have resulted in a preference for national, unilateral approaches to

addressing this issue. The alternative hypothesis is that international factors – such as France’s

common interest with EU Member States in addressing immigration and refugee issues and in

combating terrorism in Europe – have prompted French governments to cooperate with the EU

and Member States in implementing common immigration and counterterrorism policies at both

supranational and intergovernmental levels.

The paper concludes that evidence supports both hypotheses. France has produced

policies that reflect a national approach to these issues, often marginalizing Muslims and

complicating their integration into society. However, France has also pursued an international

approach by working with the EU and Member States to implement policy, reflecting the

influence of foreign actors on issues surrounding Muslims in Europe.

Keywords: France, Muslims, Integration.

1

Muslim Integration in France: A Multilevel Analysis

I. Hypotheses

With the recent wave of Islamic-related terrorist attacks across Europe and the growing

population of Muslims on the continent, there has been a renewed interest in the topic of

Muslims in Europe and their place in the European community. France provides an excellent

case study for an investigation into this topic, as it has suffered several of the most recent,

intense attacks and the percent of its population that is Muslim is the largest in Western Europe.i

An analysis of Muslim integration into France would reveal interesting insights into the state of

Muslims in both France and the greater European community.

The first main wave of Muslim emigration to France occurred during the 1950s and

1960s, mostly from the former colonies of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and also from sub-

Saharan Africa. As more and more of these immigrants settled in France, the number of Muslims

born in France increased. Today, while the French government does not collect official

information on religious affiliation, various estimations show that the Muslim population in

France ranges from about five million to seven million (almost equal to that of Germany, which

holds the greatest number in Europe)ii and represents from about seven to ten percent of the total

population (more than any other European country, except Bulgaria).iiiiv The Muslim population

in France is composed of legal immigrants, legal citizens, and illegal aliens – but for the purpose

of this paper I will refer broadly to the Muslim population in France as “Muslims” unless

otherwise noted.

Generally, this paper will examine (1) the social status of France’s Muslim community,

i.e., the extent of Muslim integration into French society, (2) recent acts of Islamic-related

terrorism in France, and (3) the international and domestic implications of these phenomena. It

2

will revolve around the French state’s policies towards the country’s Muslims since 2005.

Specifically, it will investigate the measures that the government has undertaken in order to

integrate France’s Muslims, to deal with immigration and terrorism, and to cooperate (or not)

with the European Union and/or other Member States on these issues.

This paper will test two hypotheses that seek to explain French government policies

towards Muslims: one will focus on national and domestic factors, and the other will focus on

international factors. The research hypothesis is that national and domestic factors in France have

resulted in a preference for national approaches to dealing with problems arising from France’s

Muslims. This hypothesis will assess religious and cultural differences between Muslims and the

majority of the French population, economic disadvantages in Muslim communities, low levels

of education among Muslims, low levels of political participation among Muslims, alienation in

the attitudes of both Muslims and the majority of the French population, the expression of such

alienation through political leaders and their parties, and acts of terrorism in France that are

related to Islam. Here, the independent variable is the national and domestic factors, and the

dependent variable is French governments’ (national and unilateral) policies towards Muslims.

The alternative hypothesis is that international factors have prompted French

governments to cooperate with the EU and other Member States in implementing common

immigration and counterterrorism policies at both supranational and intergovernmental levels.

This hypothesis will analyze France’s common interest with other EU Member States in

addressing immigration and refugee issues, from Muslim countries in particular, and to combat

terrorism in Europe, with its ties to Islam and the Middle East. Here, the independent variable is

these international factors, and the dependent variable is French governments’ (cooperative and

multilateral) policies towards Muslims.

3

In addition to revealing a more clear view of the state of Muslims in France, i.e. in their

integration into French society, this study essentially seeks to determine whether French policies

towards Muslims are primarily a result of national and domestic factors, as suggested by the

research hypothesis, or whether they are actually a product of international factors, as proposed

by the alternative hypothesis. As we shall see, key individuals like Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy

and Francois Hollande were very influential in the formation of these policies on both the

national and international levels during their respective terms, and many of their actions still

have a prominent effect on Muslims in France today.

If the research hypothesis is true, then we would expect the evidence to show the

following. First, cultural factors, such as religion and dress, would make it difficult for Muslims

to assimilate into the larger society. Second, Muslims would experience greater economic

hardships relative to the majority of the French population. Third, Muslims would lag behind the

majority of the French population in education. Fourth, Muslims would have disproportionately

higher rates of incarceration. Fifth, Muslims would have low levels of political participation.

Sixth, Muslims and non-Muslims’ attitudes toward each other would be characterized by

alienation, distrust, and even hostility. Seventh, French government and party leaders would have

voiced negative attitudes towards Muslims. Eighth, French governments would have indicated a

preference for dealing with domestic terrorism mainly through national measures, with little

cooperation with the EU or other Member States. Such evidence would strongly support the idea

that France has dealt with issues concerning its Muslim population in largely unilateral, national

forms, without much influence from exterior bodies.

If the alterative hypothesis is true, then we would expect the evidence to show the

following. First, French leaders would have supported common EU regulations to deal with

4

emigration from outside the EU, prior to the recent wave of refugees seeking asylum in Europe

since 2013. Second, prior to 2013, France would have worked with its EU partners in trying to

control illegal emigration. Third, France would have played an active and positive role in the

Union for the Mediterranean, in part to reduce emigration from the region. Fourth, since the

recent wave of refugees starting in 2013, President Hollande and his government would have

promoted cooperation with the EU and other Member States in formulating approaches to deal

with this issue. Fifth, France would have increasingly cooperated with the EU and other Member

states in coordinating counterterrorism policies since 2015. Such evidence would strongly

support the idea that France has dealt with issues concerning its Muslim population in largely

multilateral, supranational forms, in sync with the EU and its Member States.

II. Literature Review and Sources

There has already been a good deal of literature published that, at least indirectly,

discusses Muslims in Europe, and specifically in France. The bulk of this literature seems to fall

under the headings of historical immigration, societal integration, and the dynamics of

intergovernmental or supranational immigration policy. The overarching theme that links these

topics is a common concern over the effect that a rise in the Muslim population of Europe would

have for Member States, the EU, and the West. Specifically, those who discuss historical

immigration track the history of Islam’s entrance into Europev and extrapolate the trends of

globalization to debate the possibility of a future “Eurabia.”vi Those who discuss societal

integration probe the tensions between diversity and assimilation and their negative

consequences,vii analyze how (Muslim) immigrants change not only their own identities as they

integrate into society but also the national identity of their host country,viii and investigate the

extent and motivations of immigrants’ participation in civic society.ixx Those who discuss

5

intergovernmental or supranational policy evaluate how interaction between states, particularly

through the EU, affects and even shapes immigration policy formation of the Member States, as

the EU both enhances and restricts states’ power in implementing their diverse policy

preferences.xixiixiii

This paper will draw mostly from the second and third of these topics – Muslim

integration into society and the dynamics of intergovernmental or supranational immigration

policy. It will build on the existing discussions in these topics but present a unique case study by

its focus on France. While other studies have concentrated on a wide EU level, broadly sketching

all or several Member States in limited comparisons, this study will provide an in-depth analysis

that confines itself to just France, arguably the most interesting country for this topic. In addition,

it is unique in that it will combine a study of the extent of Muslim integration into French society

with a multi-level analysis of France’s policy towards its Muslims. These unique characteristics

will offer an interesting addition to the existing literature on the rise and place of Muslims in

Europe, and specifically in France.

In addition to the secondary sources mentioned, this paper will examine such primary

sources as the EU’s website, euractiv.com, Le Monde, the Financial Times, the New York Times,

the Guardian, the Pew Research Center, and others.

III. Testing the Research Hypothesis

The first expectation of the research hypothesis is that cultural factors, such as religion

and dress, would make it difficult for Muslims to assimilate into society. It is first worth noting

that the society Muslims are attempting to assimilate into is one defined by a strong tradition of

Republicanism and laïcité which anchors all sides of the French political spectrum to varying

degrees. Republicanism is basically the set of core values defined by a political philosophy

6

loosely derived from Jean-Jacques Rousseau that emphasizes common interests over individual

ones, and it is applied by the state’s institutions in order to ensure uniformity to the ideal of the

model French citizen who is properly prepared to participate in national public life.xiv Laïcité,

based on a 1905 law on the separation of church and state, can be translated as “secularism” and

it refers to the tradition of keeping government separate from religious affairs and religion out of

government policies.xv The rise of Muslims in France poses a challenge to these national ideals,

which plays out in a variety of ways.

The controversy over the appropriate form of dress for Muslims is a good example of

this, particularly in the context of the recent laws banning the Islamic veil and headscarf in

public schools and the burkini on beaches (later overturned). This controversy has only amplified

the differences between Muslims and the general population in France, which does not help

integration. Because of these laws, some Muslims have been expelled from schools and removed

from beaches. Muslims themselves fall on both sides of the debate, which prevents a consensus

from the Muslim population. Recent studies have shown that a minority of Muslims favor

Islamic traditions over French law, with 24% supporting the niqab, the burqa, and polygamy, and

29% claiming that sharia law should be more important than French national law. In addition,

60% declared support for the right to wear a hijab in public schools and institutions, even though

only a third of Muslim women reported wearing it or a desire to wear it if they could.xvi

However, many Islamic feminists argue that Islamic headscarves can symbolize a woman’s

submission to men and that it should have no place in mixed, secular spaces of France’s public

institutions.xvii Opinions are diverse, and the battle goes on; meanwhile, these visible cultural

differences impede a smooth assimilation into society, despite any other similarities Muslims

may share with the general population.

7

The second expectation is that Muslims would experience greater economic hardships

relative to the majority of the French population. This is supported by the fact that there is

documented religious discrimination in France. Statistics indicate that Muslims are two and a

half times less likely to receive a job interview callback than their equal Christian counterparts.

Additionally, second-generation Muslim households in France have lower income compared to

their matched Christian counterparts.xviii Muslims are thus disadvantaged economically from the

start.

The French riots of 2005, which took place mostly in suburbs of high immigrant and

Muslim populations, had their origin in economic problems, like unemployment. Shortly before

the riots, statistics showed that over 40% of youth under the age of thirty from North Africa, sub-

Saharan Africa, and Turkey were unemployed, compared to only 15% of French by birth,xix and

even with college degrees immigrants had double the unemployment rate (16%) than native

French college graduates (8%).xx Even in 2013, the unemployment rate of immigrants was

almost 80% higher than that of non-immigrants, and as Muslims constitute a large portion of

French immigrants, they were affected.xxi Muslim immigrants were thus struggling economically

much more than their native French counterparts, making it more difficult for them to integrate.

The third expectation is that Muslims would lag behind the majority of the French

population in education. This is strongly supported by the following. Data shows that there are

almost 10% more Muslims without a diploma than those in the general population, and as the

level of education increases, the difference between Muslims and the general population

increases dramatically, such that there are almost half as many Muslims who have completed a

secondary degree at university (high school plus four or more years) than those in the general

population.xxii This creates consequences in the professional world, as there are thus 10% fewer

8

Muslims in full-time jobs than those in the general population and roughly 10% more Muslims

who are unemployed.xxiii However, the level of educational achievement typically breaks down

along class lines, which makes it difficult to pinpoint the exact place of religion in results like

these. The government has taken some steps to try to bridge the gap, but all of its measures must,

by law, be taken with reference to class, not religion. Moreover, it has implemented several

affirmative action-like programs in this domain to aid poorer neighborhoods, such as the Priority

Education Zones program, but they do not seem to have much impact on student success

anyway.xxiv Overall, Muslims tend to have a disadvantage in education compared to the general

population.

The fourth expectation is that Muslims would have disproportionately high rates of

incarceration. This is strongly supported by the fact that an incredibly large portion of people

caught in the French criminal justice system are Muslim. A study in one region found that two-

thirds of minors judged in criminal court had a father born abroad (50% from North Africa) and

60% had a mother born abroad, and obviously a large portion of them were Muslim.

xxvii

xxv In the

prisons on urban peripheries, Muslims account for as much as 70% to 80% of inmates, even

though they account for only 15% of urban populations.xxvi In the French penitentiary system as

a whole, Muslims in the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old age group are grossly overrepresented,

making up only 8.5% of that age group in France but 39.9% of all prisoners in that age group. By

contrast, those with a French father account for 75% of that age group in France but only 38.8%

of prisoners in that age group. Similarly, prisoners with a North African father outnumber those

with a French father 9 to 1 in that age group, and 6 to 1 in the thirty- to thirty-nine-year-old age

group. Moreover, racist acts against citizens of North African origin are prosecuted only

extremely rarely in proportion to the number of cases reported. (It is also worth briefly

9

mentioning that many of those who perpetrated terrorist attacks in France were formerly petty

criminals and fell under the influence of radicalism in prison.) Clearly, Muslims are

disproportionately affected by the criminal justice system.

The fifth expectation is that Muslims would have low levels of political participation.

This is supported by the following. A recent study has shown that only one-fourth of Muslim

citizens in France are registered to vote and one-third of those who are registered voted in the

second round of the 2012 presidential elections. Only 50% of Muslims have declared that they

will vote in the 2017 presidential elections (compared to 62% of the general French population),

and 78% of them responded that they would not vote for a Muslim candidate if one presented

himself or herself. However, surprisingly, 47% of them believe that there could be a Muslim

president of France in the future.xxviii Thus, generally, Muslims seem less politically engaged.

Despite this evidence, this expectation is contradicted by the following. There are over

1,500 Muslim organizations in France, most of which are local groups affiliated to national

federations or religious institutions. Some of the main groups include the Union of the Islamic

Organizations of France (UOIF), the National Union of the Muslims of France (FNMF), the

Muslim Institute of the Mosque of Paris, the Organization of Muslims in France (RMF), and the

French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). There are also a number of Muslim youth

organizations that have been more successful at transcending the national and ethnic divides of

the main groups mentioned above and at facilitating religious practice and civic engagement.

These include Union of Muslim Youth, the Young Muslims of France, the Association of

Muslim Students in France, and the Muslim Students of France.xxix

The CFCM is an interesting case. It was established in 2003 under President Sarkozy to

be the main interlocutor to the state and represent all Muslim groups, however, it has been

10

heavily criticized for not adequately representing all of French Muslims and for being a tool for

the state to control Islam in France.

xxxii

xxx The seats on the council are given proportionally

according to a system which benefits groups with greater financial resources, especially those

that receive funding from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Its presidents have been very close

to the state and many in France, including Muslims, have deemed its function

unsuccessful.xxxi

It should be noted that the Muslim community does not actively seek to consolidate a

“Muslim vote” or a “Muslim lobby,” as such an endeavor would pressure Muslims into a

position of power confrontation with the government, and, therefore, instead of organizing to

become a political opposition to the government, Muslim civil society groups try to integrate

themselves into a national and global dynamic that transcends exclusive boundaries. The

popularity of these terms (“Muslim vote” or “Muslim lobby”) seems to be more of a media

fetish, constructed by politicians to more easily address, seduce, or antagonize Muslim electors

for political gain.xxxiii Thus, overall it seems that Muslims have nevertheless pursued integration

through at least some degree of political participation.

The sixth expectation is that Muslims and non-Muslims’ attitudes toward each other

would be characterized by alienation, distrust, and even hostility. This is contradicted by the

following. Studies have shown that the French public has the highest favorability and second-

lowest (only by 1%) un-favorability ratings of Muslims out of all other European countries, at

74% and 27% respectively.xxxiv Surprisingly, even after the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, there

was little backlash against Muslims in French public opinion, and attitudes towards Muslims

became slightly more positive across all sides of the political spectrum.xxxv

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However, this expectation is supported by the following. There was indeed a significant

rise in violence and hate crimes against Muslims after this attack.xxxvi

xxxvii

xxxviii

Also, while Christians

largely identify themselves by their nationality (90%) before their religion, Muslims are split,

with 46% viewing themselves as Muslims before French. Indeed, 53% of the French general

population perceives Muslims as wanting to remain distinct instead of adopting French

customs. However, it must be noted that in all of these polls, the figures for France were

remarkably different than those of other European countries with notable Muslim populations

(Germany, UK, Spain, et al.), which shows that Muslims in France are perhaps relatively more

integrated than their neighbors.

The seventh expectation is that the French government and party leaders would have

voiced negative attitudes towards Muslims. This is supported by the fact that a number of

prominent politicians and their parties have expressed negative views towards Muslims. Most

notably, Marine Le Pen and her National Front party have incredibly restrictive stances towards

Muslims via their immigration policies, such as huge reductions in legal immigration and

automatic immigration rights, tougher citizenship requirements and banning dual nationality for

non-Europeans, and priority to French citizens over foreigners for jobs and social housing.xxxix

The party has consistently spewed blatantly-xenophobic and anti-Muslim rhetoric, from Le Pen

comparing French Muslims praying the streets to Nazis in German-occupied Vichy France, to

demonizing immigrants and Muslims as enemies of French secularism, to insisting that Muslims

“cannot have exactly the same rank” as Catholics in society (quoted by Marion Le Pen, niece of

Marine Le Pen and another leading figure in the party).xl

Even figures from more moderate parties have had a largely negative relationship with

Islam in France. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy of the center-right Republicans party has

12

consistently, and especially recently, used harmful rhetoric towards Muslims when discussing

policy. During his presidential campaign of 2017 he called on France to “wake up,” stating that

“the tyranny of minorities” is “forcing the republic further into retreat each day,” and declaring

France to be a “Christian country.”

xliii

xli In addition, his initiation and handling of the CFCM are

seen by many to be merely a tool for controlling Islam in France instead of genuinely

representing the interests of all Muslims in France.xlii President Francois Hollande of the center-

left Socialist Party has also steered considerably towards the right in his rhetoric and policies

towards Muslims over his tenure. In a recently published book about him, the authors reveal how

he believes that “France has a problem with Islam… [in that] it wants to affirm itself as a religion

of the Republic.” Moreover, his policies such as the states of emergency following the 2015

Paris attack have been harshly criticized by human rights groups for targeting Muslims through

detainment and harassment. In all, politicians do not have an amicable relationship with

Muslims which has not positively helped their integration into society.

However, the government has still taken more friendly stances regarding Muslims, even

if through only indirect methods. Two examples that illustrate this are the supporting of mosques

and Muslim cemeteries. While the state cannot directly subsidize religious organizations,

Muslims have organized cultural organizations that bypass the legal restriction and are thus able

to receive financing from local governments to construct mosques. Still, the caveat to this bit of

evidence is that by helping Muslims create visible places of worship and education, the

government is able to better control them and pressure them towards accepting its Republican

vision of integration. This relates to the government’s strategy with the CFCM.xliv Similarly, two

directives from the Interior Ministry have agreeably authorized local governments to allow “de

facto groupings of Muslims within communal cemeteries.” This measure is warmly received in

13

the Muslim community, but non-Muslims have still complained a good deal about this dangerous

practice of communalism. Regardless, the government historically has shown some evidence of

positive attitudes towards Muslims in France.

The eighth expectation is that French governments would have indicated a preference for

dealing with domestic terrorism mainly through national measures, with little cooperation with

the EU or other Member States. This is supported by the following swift measures that France

took in response to the multiple terrorist incidents of 2015-2016. The government deployed

10,000 soldiers on the streets to guard sensitive sites following the Charlie Hebdo attack, and

following the Nice attack it called up thousands of reservists to boost security and imposed a

state of emergency that is still in effect today (likely to last until at least next May), which

enables authorities to ban protests, carry out home raids, and place suspects under house arrest

without requiring judicial oversight. In addition, the government has given police officers more

legal flexibility to fire on suspects and allowed them to carry their weapons at all times (even

when off-duty). The government has added more security on public transport, announced large

investments of personnel and equipment for intelligence and surveillance departments,

introduced a “French Patriot Act” that gives the government extensive surveillance over citizens,

and attempted to reinforce secularism in schools. It has taken various steps to combat

radicalization by introducing strict legal measures targeting terror suspects, closing jihadist

websites, opening one of twelve new national centers for de-radicalization, launching a “Stop

Jihadism” campaign, introducing de-radicalization programs and measures in prisons (and

increasing surveillance in prisons), and closing mosques and expelling preachers. Furthermore,

the government has carried out bombing missions in the Middle East, particularly targeting ISIS

in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and following the Nice attack Hollande has vowed to increase these

14

missions.xlv These actions all point to a strong national approach to dealing with domestic

terrorism.

The effectiveness of these measures has been questioned by both the Left and the Right,

and no one can agree on the correct response to successfully combat the terrorist threat. Since the

emergency laws, police and security forces have carried out almost 4,000 raids on homes,

accompanied by search and seizures, and have produced only six terrorism-related inquiries, only

one of which led to a prosecution.

xlvii

xlvi Moreover, human rights groups have been particularly

critical of these actions, especially the expanded powers under the state of emergency, and the

response is seen by many as discriminatory and abusive to Muslims. But despite the possible

ineffectiveness, the evidence here points to a national approach to this problem; we will examine

potential evidence to the contrary in the next section.

To summarize the findings for the research hypothesis, we can see that the evidence is

largely consistent with its expectations, although a little bit mixed. Cultural factors like

headscarves and other religious apparel have made it difficult for Muslims to smoothly

assimilate, with ongoing controversies of their place in a Republican, laïc society. Muslims

certainly face greater economic hardships, such as job discrimination, income inequality, and

unemployment. Muslims also lag behind the general population in education at all levels to

varying degrees, and they are disproportionately affected by incarceration at extremely high

rates. Government and party leaders have certainly expressed negative attitudes towards

Muslims, both directly and indirectly, and the government response to domestic terrorism has

been largely through a national approach, although not completely effective nor fair towards

Muslims. However, evidence for Muslim political participation and alienation from the general

15

population is more mixed and perhaps less conclusive. Overall, under the government’s largely

domestic policies, it has been very difficult for Muslims to integrate into French society.

IV. Testing the Alternative Hypothesis

The first expectation of the alternative hypothesis is that French leaders would have

supported common EU regulations to deal with emigration from outside the EU, prior to the

recent wave of refugees seeking asylum in Europe since 2013. At first glance, this seems to be

supported by France’s involvement in the construction of the 2008 EU Pact on Immigration and

Asylum. Throughout his presidential term, during which France held the presidency of the

Council of the EU, Sarkozy focused heavily on immigration issues in domestic and EU policy-

making, and this Pact was largely Sarkozy’s initiative. The idea was to develop a more

comprehensive EU policy on migration and asylum, revolving around common commitments in

the areas of legal migration, illegal migration, border controls, asylum policies, and foreign

countries. Some of the details include integrating the Blue Card proposal, boosting Frontex,

establishing a European Asylum System, cooperating with third countries on development and

migration, and committing to the repatriation of illegal immigrants.xlviii

Additionally, Sarkozy was involved in and supported the Lisbon Treaty and the changes

it brought about, which was also during France’s EU presidency and which include new

measures on immigration. The changes introduced co-decision and qualified majority voting on

regular immigration and a new legal basis for integration measures. This expanded the power of

the European Parliament to address immigration issues. Also, the European Court of Justice was

given full jurisdiction in the field of immigration and asylum.xlix By means of this Pact and the

Lisbon Treaty changes, Sarkozy certainly supported EU methods to deal with emigration.

16

However, the details reveal that in both these documents Member States are still given

most of the control in key decision-making. In the Pact, the text was vague in delineating the

concrete aspects of how Member States would cooperate with each other to implement

repatriation of illegal entrants. Furthermore, such cooperation was agreed to on a basis of a

weakly-defined “mutual responsibility and solidarity,” which called on governments to

systematically assess the impact of their migration policies on other Member States.l Both of

these points reveal the lack of enforcement of the EU in coordinating Member States’ policies.

Moreover, regarding the changes under the Treaty of Lisbon, the text made clear that Member

States still hold a veto for setting the number of migrants entering their territory in search of

employment, which bypasses the powers of both the Parliament and the Council in immigration

policy.li Therefore, France, under Sarkozy, might have engaged in initiatives to cooperate with

the EU and other states in emigration, but it ensured a priority of national above supranational

sovereignty in determining policy.

The second expectation is that prior to 2013 France would have worked with its EU

partners in trying to control illegal immigration. This is supported by France’s participation in

Frontex, EU’s border control agency. Frontex’s role is to promote, coordinate, and develop

European border management by integrating Member States’ border policies into a common

framework to deal with border control issues. A large part of Frontex’s work is dealing with

migration from Africa and the Middle East.lii France’s close geographical location and high

Muslim population make it one of the hotspots for incoming migrants, which has given France

an incentive to work with Frontex in managing migration issues. Indeed, France has consistently

supported Frontex’s operations. It was one of the first Member States at the Council Summit in

April 2015 to agree to provide more planes and boats for rescues under the expansion of

17

Operations Triton and Poseidon when the EU decided to triple Frontex’s budget, and France is

known as one of the primary contributors to Frontex’s programs, like CRATE, the Centralized

Records of Available Technical Equipment for control and surveillance of external borders. This

is notable in that a lot of the concrete contributions to Frontex are performed on a voluntary basis

for Member States.liii In addition, the president of Frontex for the current five-year term is a

Frenchman, Fabrice Leggeri. For the most part, France has had a positive presence in the EU’s

initiatives to address illegal immigration.

The third expectation is that France would have played an active and positive role in the

Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), in part to reduce emigration from the region. Certainly,

there is little doubt that France was active in the UfM. The entire project was basically conceived

by Sarkozy and spearheaded during his presidential campaign in 2007. It was launched at the

Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in 2008 at which Sarkozy managed to gather all but two of

the Heads of State and Government from the 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries. After a

successful initiation establishing the organizational structure and principles of the UfM, France

became one of the co-presidents. Its next meeting, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on

Foreign Affairs, which outlined its concrete projects, was held in Marseilles. France even

managed to retain its UfM co-presidency position after its EU presidency ended, which

prevented three terms of potential new European presidencies.liv France has thus clearly played

an active role in the UfM.

However, two factors must qualify this evidence. First, emigration was only a limited part

of the objectives of the UfM. Its six strategic priority areas do not necessarily highlight

immigration: they are business development, social and civil affairs, higher education and

research, transport and urban development, water and environment, and energy and climate

18

action.lv Second, and more fundamental, the key motivations for Sarkozy’s creation of the UfM

seem to have been more in the realm of personal, career ambitions and French national prestige

than genuine interest to cooperate with European actors on issues. If anything, it was an attempt

to regain some leverage from the EU and from Germany, its main European rival, who was

gaining international influence by leading the accession agreements with northern and eastern

European states during that period. This is shown by Sarkozy’s initial desire to exclude non-

Mediterranean countries (notably EU countries and Germany in particular) and to offer Turkey

an alternative to EU membership – and shown by the fact that both the EU and Turkey objected

to those respective terms.lvilvii Therefore, France’s cooperation with international actors in the

UfM must be assessed with a grain of salt.

The fourth expectation is that, since the recent wave of refugees starting in 2013,

President Hollande and his government would have promoted cooperation with the EU and other

Member States in formulating approaches to deal with this issue. This is supported by France’s

positive role in securing the recent EU-Turkey migration deal this year. France and Germany

were the driving force behind the EU’s negotiations with Turkey, and they managed to organize

an important yet controversial deal to stem refugee flows from Turkey into Europe. Besides the

notable conditions of the one-to-one exchange and the more than three billion euros in aid, a

notable part of the agreement includes reopening chapter 33 of the accession talks. This shows

the extent of France’s interest in working through the EU to deal with the refugee crisis, because

it was France that froze that chapter for Turkey in 2007 and it has taken a hardline stance against

Turkey’s entrance into the EU.lviii In addition, two billion of the three billion in aid will come

from the Member States themselves rather than from the EU directly, therefore France is making

a decent financial sacrifice to work out this issue as well.lix

19

Another example of potential cooperation between France and other EU countries on this

issue is in France’s complex relationship with Germany. Germany has proven to be more open to

accepting refugees than France. Germany has larger state migrant quotas than France and has

approved seven times as many asylum applications than France in 2015.lx In France, the debate

on the refugee crisis is more commonly assessed from a security point of view than from a

humanitarian one, as France has been more affected by terrorism. Accordingly, its actions reflect

this stance, in that Prime Minister Manuel Valls has rejected any relocation of refugees that goes

beyond France’s binding obligations, and the state has increased its security operations to combat

terrorism by its military action in Syria, increased support to EU’s external borders in the

Mediterranean, and deployment of police to Greece as part of the EU-Turkey deal. Some see this

as a cooperative division of labor between France and Germany, with the latter dealing with

Europe’s migrants and the former with Europe’s terrorism. However, many agree that these

actions on the part of the EU and its Member States have been insufficient to adequately address

the refugee crisis, as both of these countries are simply carrying out their national policy

priorities and stalling on a more comprehensive, coordinated, long-term solution.lxi To this

extent, France is indeed working with other Member States, but to a limited degree.

The fifth expectation is that France would have increasingly cooperated with the EU and

other Member States in coordinating counterterrorism policies since 2015. This is supported by

the following. After the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, France requested bilateral

assistance from Member States under article 42.7 of the Treaty of the EU, invoking the article for

the first time. This is a mutual defense clause that requires Member States to provide aid and

assistance relative to each country’s capacities. The fact that France chose to invoke the EU

mechanism rather than the NATO defense clause speaks to, among other things, France’s desire

20

to rally its European allies together in solidarity in order to produce a collective framework of

response.lxii

France has also been heavily involved in Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency.

France is one of the top users and supporters of Europol’s services, from coordination on taking

down online terrorist propaganda to securing UEFA’s EURO 2016 that was hosted in Paris.lxiii

lxvii

lxiv

France’s ministers have consistently visited Europol for briefings, specifically on

counterterrorism.lxvlxvi After the Paris attacks, Europol, France, and Belgium worked together to

establish Taskforce Fraternité, under which the two countries provided Europol with terabytes of

information, which resulted in 800 intelligence leads and over 1,600 leads on suspicious

financial transactions.

In addition, France has been a major player in the coordinated military campaign against

ISIS in the Middle East. France was part of the U.S.-led coalition that started in 2014, and it

hosted the International Conference on Peace and Security in Iraq in 2014 to assemble the

support of more countries.lxviii Since then, it has participated in coordinated air strikes in both

Iraq and Syria, in which it has provided one of the strongest military contributions of all the

members. After the Paris attacks in 2015, France increased their attacks and launched their

largest airstrike of the bombing campaign. President Hollande has vowed to intensify France’s

support in the campaign, announcing the tripling of France’s strike capacity in the region and the

departure of the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean.lxix The carrier

was used as the primary naval strike platform for the coalition and became the flagship of the

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Task Force 50 that leads the operation – the first for a non-

U.S. ship.lxx Clearly, France has been very engaged with other international actors in

coordinating counterterrorism.

21

In relation to the evidence for the eighth expectation of the research hypothesis, the

evidence presented here may seem slightly contradictory. Here, the evidence points to

international measures to coordinate counterterrorism, whereas the evidence there points to

national measures to combat terrorism. However, a closer look at the evidence reveals that the

expectations are not mutually exclusive. France’s state of emergency and the additional domestic

initiatives undertaken are logical responses that support, not undermine, its international

responses to terrorism. More will be said about this in the conclusion.

To summarize the findings of the alternative hypothesis, we can see that the evidence is

largely consistent with the hypothesis, although slightly qualified. Sarkozy has demonstrated

support to common EU regulations to deal with emigration prior to 2013 through his

endorsement of the EU Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the changes of the Lisbon Treaty,

even if Member States still retained most of their autonomy. France has worked with its EU

partners to control illegal immigration through its commitment and support to Frontex. Sarkozy

has definitely played an active role in the UfM, although not exactly with the primary aim of EU

cooperation or of tackling emigration issues. France has in fact cooperated with the EU and

Member States on dealing with the refugee crisis post-2013 through its active role in the EU-

Turkey migration deal and, to a lesser extent, its informal partnership with Germany. Finally,

France has certainly worked with the EU and other actors in coordinating counterterrorism

policies, notably through Europol and its leading role in the military campaign against ISIS.

Thus, under a mostly international approach, France has largely cooperated with the EU and its

international partners in dealing with issues relating to Muslim immigration and terrorism.

V. Conclusions

22

In conclusion, the preponderance of the evidence, overall, is mixed: the evidence largely

supports the research hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis. France has proven to use

national, domestic approaches to deal with issues surrounding Muslims in France which have

often marginalized Muslims and made it difficult for them to integrate into society. At the same

time, France has equally pursued international, multilateral approaches regarding these issues,

which has involved working with the EU, its Member States, and other international actors to

implement policy.

The bottom line is that these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive – if anything, it

makes sense that France has taken a varied strategy to dealing with these problems. Domestic

factors are obviously extremely important because they occur on French soil and are thus

naturally the primary concern of the French government. Simultaneously, foreign factors are also

key variables that affect the state of Muslims in France and thus the French government has an

incentive to engage on an international level, using the support of its allies, to more successfully

address these issues. Thus, France’s domestic and international approaches to problems of

Muslim-related integration, immigration, and terrorism are complementary.

VI. Scenarios

The future for Muslims rests primarily on the following conditions. First, the war on

terrorism. It is very likely that France and its allies will continue to conduct airstrikes on ISIS

with the hope of eventual victory. It is very unlikely that they will succeed anytime soon. The

more lives that are lost in the Middle East – civilian or soldier – the more leverage ISIS gains in

the war, as that would increase both its chances of recruitment and the pressure on the West to

withdraw, and the more migration becomes an issue. This situation does not lighten France’s

problems with Muslims, and if anything it worsens them. If this is the case, it is possible that the

23

French government, under growing pressure to deal with increased terrorism and migration,

resorts to drastic measures to uphold its national security, and, based on the current and historical

context, this would not bode well for Muslims in France.

Second, migration. If by some miracle the flow of migrants to Europe halted or

diminished sharply, France, and Europe more generally, would have a much easier task of

integrating its Muslim populations. There would be less fear of increased crime, terrorism, and a

potential clash of cultures or “Eurabia,” and the government might be able to respond to issues

surrounding Muslims in a more empathetic, inclusive manner. However, this depends heavily on

the shaky EU-Turkey migration deal and whether it is able to successfully plug the inflow

migrants to Europe, amid all of its problems with human rights and unstable politics between

Brussels and Ankara. This also depends on third countries, whose political, economic, and

environmental climate pushes its citizens away and into Europe, which will probably not change

unless their development issues are adequately addressed and ISIS is vanquished. This is very

unlikely to happen. Therefore, a future of high levels of migration is likely to continue and likely

to cause more problems for Muslims in France and in Europe.

VII. Recommendations

With President Hollande’s term coming to a close, the issues surrounding Muslims in

France will have to be addressed by the next president starting in 2017. It should be sufficiently

clear by now that Muslims in France are far from integrated into society and are struggling to do

so. It is imperative for whoever the next president is to rethink the current strategy that the

government has taken towards integration, whether direct or indirect. The current trajectory is

not stable, and continued domestic apathy and foreign aggression will only further marginalize

24

Muslims in France and sustain the cycle of problems. France must reconsider its fundamental

approach.

The key to integration is empathy. If both the government and the general population

continue to treat Muslims as outsiders or as not capable of being truly French, then Muslims will

never be properly integrated into society and they will continue to pose problems for the state.

On the other hand, if France is able to empathize with Muslims’ struggles – whether they be

from terrorism, migration, or just general marginalization – and to see them as people, with a

shared human condition and values that transcend religion or laïcité, then France can begin to

genuinely connect with them and treat them as the equal, fellow citizens that they deserve to be.

This is the long-term solution to France’s problem with Muslim integration, and it must begin

now.

i Conrad Hackett. “5 Facts about the Muslim Population in Europe,” Pew Research Center, 19 July 2016. Web. ii Ibid. Chart 1: “Muslims in EU Countries.” iii Jean-Paul Gourévitch, La croisade islamiste (Paris: Pascale Galodé, 2011), 136 iv “France,” The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013. Web. v Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West (New York: Anchor Books, 2009). vi Patrick Weil, How to be French: Nationality in the Making Since 1789 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). vii John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). viii Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). ix Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). x Patrick Ireland, The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). xi Christina Boswell and Andrew Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2010). xii Christian Joppke, “Transformation of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination Politics in the Netherlands, France and Germany,” World Politics, 59, 2 (January 2007). xiii Martin Schain, “The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union,” The European Journal of International Law, 20, 1 (2009), 93-109. xiv John R. Bowen. Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 11-12.

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xv Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales Laïcité, 2012, accessed 2 December 2016. http://www.cnrtl.fr/lexicographie/laicit%E9? xvi Adam Taylor, “What French Muslims Think about France’s Secular Laws.” The Washington Post, 19 September 2016, accessed 1 December 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/19/what-french-muslims-think-about-frances-secular-laws/?utm_term=.15ae426be99d xvii Rose George, “Ghetto Warrior,” Guardian, 16 July 2006, accessed 1 December 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jul/17/france.politicsphilosophyandsociety xviii Claire Adida, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, “Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in France,” Proceedings on the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 107, no. 52 (December 2010). xix Dominique Andolfalto and others, L’état de la France 2002, (Paris: La Découverte, 2001) xx Glaude and Borrel, “Immigrés et marché du travail.” xxi John Wihbey and Leighton Walter Kille, “France, Islam, Terrorism and the Challenges of integration: Research Roundup,” Journalist’s Resource, 16 November 2015, accessed December 5, 2016. http://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/conflicts/france-muslims-terrorism-integration-research-roundup xxii Poll (1998–2001) by the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique in partnership with the Conseils Régionaux, in Claude Dargent, “Les musulmans déclarés en France: affirmation religieuse, subordination sociale, et progressisme politique,” Cahier du CEVIPOF no. 34 (February 2003). Title: Level of Diploma and Religious Affiliation, Eighteen- to Thirty-Four-Year-Olds. xxiii Poll (1998–2001) by the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique in partnership with the Conseils Régionaux, in Claude Dargent, “Les musulmans déclarés en France: affirmation religieuse, subordination sociale, et progressisme politique,” Cahier du CEVIPOF no. 34 (February 2003). Title: Percent of Muslims and of General Population in Selected Job Categories. xxiv Roland Bénaboua, Francis Kramarz, Corinne Prost, “The French zones d’éducation prioritaire: Much ado about nothing?” Economics of Education Review, 28 (2009), 345–356, accessed 5 December 2016. https://www.princeton.edu/~rbenabou/papers/EcEdRev%20article%202009.pdf xxv Study by Sebastian Roché and Monique Dagnaud, Centre Nationale de la Recherché Scienifique. Reported by Nathalie Guibert in Le Monde, 16 April 2004. xxvi Farhad Khosrokhavar, L’islam dans les prisons, (Paris: Jacob Duvernet, 2004). xxvii Study by Roché and Dagnaud, reported by Guibert in “Selon une étude menée en Isère, deux tiers des mineurs délinquants sont d’origine étrangère,” Polices et sécurités. April 4, 2010, accessed 4 December 2016. https://sebastianroche.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/selon-une-etude-menee-en-isere-deux-tiers-des-mineurs-delinquants-sont-dorigine-etrangere-04072010/ xxviii Study by Hakim El Karoui in Ifop at the Montaigne Institute, reported by Marie-Christine Tabet, “Religion, famille, société : qui sont vraiment les musulmans de France,” Le Journal du Dimanche, 18 September 2016, accessed 4 December 2016. http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Religion/Religion-famille-societe-qui-sont-vraiment-les-musulmans-de-France-810217 xxix Euro-Islam, Muslims in European Politics, accessed 6 December 2016. http://www.euro-islam.info/key-issues/political-representation/ xxx John R. Bowen. Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 60-62. xxxi Euro-Islam, Muslims in European Politics, accessed 6 December 2016. http://www.euro-islam.info/key-issues/political-representation/ xxxii Bernadette Sauvaget, “Les quatre plaies du Conseil du culte musulman,” Libération. 8 February 2015, accessed 6 December 2016. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/02/08/les-quatre-plaies-du-conseil-du-culte-musulman_1198311 xxxiii Jorgen S. Nielsen, “Chapter 6: Political Participation of European Muslims in France and the United Kingdom,” in Muslim Political Participation in Europe, (Edinburg University Press, 2013), 102-126, accessed 6 December 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.3366/j.ctt3fgtcr.9.pdf xxxiv Pew Research Center, Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey, Italians Most Critical of Muslims, 12 May 2014, accessed 7 December 2016. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/05/spring-2014-survey-data/ xxxv Richard Wike, Pew Research Center, Ratings of Muslims Rise in France after Charlie Hebdo, Just as in U.S. after 9/11, 3 June 2015, accessed 7 December 2016. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/03/ratings-of-muslims-in-france-and-us/

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xxxvi Tracy McNicoll, “After Charlie Hebdo Attacks, French Muslims Face Increased Threats,” The Daily Beast. 25 January 2015, accessed 8 December 2016. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/25/after-charlie-hebdo-attacks-french-muslims-face-increased-threats.html xxxvii Pew Research Center, Muslim-Western Tensions Persist: Common Concerns about Islamic Extremism, 21 July 2011, accessed 8 December 2016. http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/ xxxviii Jodie T. Allen, Pew Research Center, The French-Muslim Connection: Is France Doing a Better Job of Integration than Its Critics?, 17 August 2006, accessed 7, December 2016. http://www.pewresearch.org/2006/08/17/the-frenchmuslim-connection/ xxxix Ben Norton, “What Does the Front National Stand for?” France 24, 28 May 2014, accessed 9 December 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20140528-france-national-front-policy-eu xl “Is France going fascist? Extreme-right National Front is now the most popular party,” Salon, 8 December 2015, accessed 9 December 2016. http://www.salon.com/2015/12/08/is_france_going_fascist_extreme_right_national_front_is_now_the_most_popular_party/ xli Tony Cross, “Sarkozy clashes with presidential rival Juppé over Islam in France,” Radio France Internationale, 13 June 2016, accessed 9, December 2016. http://en.rfi.fr/france/20160613-sarkozy-clashes-presidential-rival-juppe-over-islam-france xlii Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010), 124, accessed 3 December 2016. https://books.google.com/books?id=VnivBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA124&lpg=PA124&dq=CFCM+France+criticisms&source=bl&ots=TSb4vO5NcR&sig=hC0lA_6HdyI0YSu-sRmSzKV3vko&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjYyqr92frQAhUEs1QKHVLuB40Q6AEIOjAH#v=onepage&q=CFCM%20France%20criticisms&f=false xliii “Hollande: France has a problem with Islam,” Al Jazeera, 13 October 2016, accessed 9 December 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/hollande-france-problem-islam-161013073501962.html xliv John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 42-43. xlv Ben McPartland, “What Has France Actually Done to Fight Terrorism?” The Local, 19 July 2016, accessed 7 December 2016. http://www.thelocal.fr/20160719/what-has-france-done-to-fight-terrorism xlvi Ramzi Kassem, “France’s Real State of Emergency,” New York Times, 4 August 2016, accessed 7 December 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/opinion/frances-real-state-of-emergency.html xlvii “Backlash: France’s New Hard Line on Terror,” Al Jazeera, 10 March 2016, accessed 9 December 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2016/03/backlash-frances-hard-line-terror-160310080855190.html xlviii “The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum,” EurActiv, 18 September 2008, accessed 21 December 2016. https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/linksdossier/the-european-pact-on-immigration-and-asylum/#ea-accordion-issues xlix Céline Chateau and Rosa Raffaelli, European Parliament, Immigration Policy, November 2016, accessed 12 December 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.3.html l “The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum,” EurActiv, 18 September 2008, accessed 12 December 2016. https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/linksdossier/the-european-pact-on-immigration-and-asylum/#ea-accordion-issues li Céline Chateau and Rosa Raffaelli, European Parliament, Immigration Policy, November 2016, accessed 12 December 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.3.html lii Frontex, Mission and Tasks, accessed 9 December 2016. http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/ liii Frontex, Frontex Executive Director Invited to France, accessed 8 December 2016. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-executive-director-invited-to-france-RZGOGF liv Union for the Mediterranean, History, accessed 8 December 2016. http://ufmsecretariat.org/history/ lv Union for the Mediterranean, Mission, accessed 8 December 2016. http://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/ lvi Honor Mahony, “Merkel criticises Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union plans,” EU Observer, 6 December 2007, accessed 8 December 2016. https://euobserver.com/news/25284

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