multipolarity as the origin and the major challenge...

Víctor M. Mijares GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies

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MULTIPOLARITY AS THE ORIGIN AND THE MAJOR CHALLENGE

FOR THE SOUTH AMERICAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

Víctor M. Mijares

GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies

[email protected]

Abstract

From a neoclassical realist approach, I analyze the conditions that explain the emergence of the South American

Defense Council within the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations), as well as the main

challenges for the regional security governance. The objective of this paper is to show how multipolarity is not only

the birth condition of the UNASUR's SADC, but also how it may affects its future performance, and how it could deal

with this global condition in order to create a regional security governance regime. The SADC is the project leads by

Brazil, devoted to harmonize regional security and defense policies. For the SADC’s original promoters the highest

aspiration was to become into a South American operative alliance able to create favorable conditions for a regime of

regional security governance. However, national defense policies in South American are highly autonomous because

of multipolarity, regional rivalries and domestic constraints, being hard to be integrated in a common defense agenda.

Despite isolated efforts of bilateral or trilateral cooperation, national defense and security issues still being part of

unilateral national prerogatives and even minor powers are reluctant to waive those. The international multipolar

configuration in the early 21st Century is driving the South American countries to objectives beyond their relations

with the United States, but this is also fuelling policies of selective commitment among them, threatening the SADC’s

cohesion, and potentially reducing its real reach on security governance.

Keywords: Multipolarity; Neoclassical Realism; Regional Security Governance; RSCT; South America; South American

Defense Council.

1. Introduction

This working paper is part of an ongoing project about how recent trends on international

polarity affects the regional security governance. It is a study case on South America, focusing in

the UNASUR’s Defense Council (SADC). The main aim of this project is to develop an analytical

framework able to be portable to explain another regional security governance realities, as

single study cases, as well as make possible comparative area studies on the sub-field of

international security. The research does not treat the SADC as a newcomer organization

without history, but as a recent stage in the governance of the Western Hemisphere regional

security mega-complex, specially in the South American security complex. The starting

assumptions are: a) shifts on international polarity—structural changes in the concentration of

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capabilities—does affect states’ autonomy; b) autonomy is a prime goal for all states, but

specially for those secondary and minor regional powers, being global projection the main goal

for major regional powers, and regional control, prestige and primacy the ones for great powers;

and c) structural multipolarity and states’ autonomy pursuit is a potential diminishing

combination for regional security governance in the absence of shared interests, contested

leadership, and common threats.

The study of international security moved its focus from the systemic level, during the bipolar

era, to the regions with the end of Cold War and the rise of subnational and regional conflicts.

This process is capture by the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan & Wæver 2003).

That change in the level of analysis enriched the comprehension on the new patters of conflicts,

and on the emerging subnational and transnational threats. However, the regionalization of the

security studies impoverished the understanding about the links between the systemic, regional

and national—governmental—levels. The over-focus on regional security improved the grasp on

inner-regional processes, but damaged the ability to connect the multilevel dots. In a region as

Latin America the possibility of not see the forest for the trees is a real and problematic issue.

The peril of believe in a “Latin American exceptionalism”—as in any other regional or national

exceptionalism—is to miss the possibility in develop portable theories to explain analogous

cases and/or compare regions. Thus, the main justification for this research is connecting

systemic phenomena with regional security processes.

This paper is divided in two parts: the first one about the research design, and the second

regarding on the study case. The research design section is divided in two: a presentation of the

problem, and a explicit explanation of the research design. In the section devoted to the problem

I present the puzzle on the case, the research question and my hypothesis. In the research design

section I expose the project’s theoretical framework, and the methodology and methods. The

research strategies and the general analytical model are presented in brief. In the case study

section the first appointed issue is the causal condition: global multipolarity. This is defined and

supported with empirical evidence from data analysis. The outcome, the emerge of the SADC as a

regional security governance structure, is presented before the process-tracing section in order

to guide the reader across a causal mechanism that fell into already explained result. In the final

section the preliminary conclusion of the project are presented.

2. The Problem

The regional ideological change theory addresses the foreign policies coincidence in the

construction of new institutions. The main alternative approach is about regional balances in the


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frame of contestation policies (Flemes & Wehner 2012). Both are interesting, as well as non

necessary exclusive explanation. However, both mislead the starting point of structural changes

in global power distribution. That misleading is the reason for the lack of empirical evidence on

world power shifts and its effects. Those changes point toward a most autonomous collective

foreign behavior vis-a-vis great powers—specially in front of the claimed hegemonic great power,

the Unites States. If in a multipolar system, alliances and other forms of multilateral security

cooperation are less prone, what were the structural incentives for the emergence of the SADC,

and which scenarios are more likely in terms of operability and cohesion?

2.1 Research Question

How the systemic, regional and domestic drivers interacted in the formation process of

the SADC under international conditions of multipolarity, and which are the main

challenges that multi-polarization imposes to regional security governance?

2.2 Hypotheses

Power diffusion in the international system brought new opportunities for foreign relations

diversification. Systemic power shifts, rising regional powers and new international security

patterns drove the United States' geostrategic reorientation, being this perceived by key South

American governments as a post-hegemonic stage in the Western hemisphere. That global and

regional scenario carried on foreign and security policy autonomy for South American countries,

gave birth the UNASUR and its Defense Council. However, the same multipolar autonomy could

be the major structural challenge for the regional security governance in mid-term.

3. Research Design

3.1 Theoretical Framework

3.1.1 Neoclassical Realism

Structural realism as a whole is the most challenged theoretical framework in current

international studies. Alternative explanations on international system and foreign policy have

arise in the last three decades, mostly confronting the neorealism structural logic, its positivistic

epistemology and its foundationalism ontology. Due its over-exposition, remains as the most

criticisms target in international relations theory. Nonetheless, none alternative has shown a

more sophisticated principles’ system of explanations. Assuming that the ordering principle of

international system is anarchy, structural realism places power relations—as hierarchy—as the


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main explanatory reason (Waltz 2010). That is why one important feature in neoclassical

realism is the effort in enhance the meaning of national power.

Neoclassical realism is an structural theory designed for foreign policy analysis. It assumes that

states are far from be logic units for external action, even when their governments act as rational

actors in a complicated multilevel decisional environment. Instead of dealing only with the

macro-structure of international politics—as the Waltzian neorealism—neoclassical realism

copes with the interaction between international and domestic politics, accepting the foreign

policy as the contact point. In neoclassical realist explanation, the international structure

remains the prime role as causal condition for the occurrence of outcomes as foreign policy

decisions. However, it takes accounts on intervening inputs originated by domestic political

conditions.

In order to understand international structure, polarity is the key concept. According to

structural realism’s assumptions, international politics’ dynamic is function of power

distribution in term of hard capabilities—demographic, economic and military ones. As a central

concept in the realist thought, national power has been defined for many authors with several

meanings and methods for its assessment (Baldwin 2003). However, the common assumption

about national power is as a function of economic, demographic and military capabilities. In

words of Joe Nye: hard power (Nye 2004). The problem with hard power is its inability for

describe real possibilities and will in power projection. Neoclassical realism partially re-takes

the heritage of A.F.K. Organski (1968) and Ray S. Cline (1977), with the Fareed Zakaria notion of

“state power” (1998). Following that idea, Jeffrey Taliaferro presented his model of “resource-

extraction” and mobilization. Onwards in this paper, I will depict the formulas I used for assess

the national power hierarchy and the shifts in real capabilities concentration—polarity—in the

international system.

3.1.2 Regional Security Complex Theory

With the end of systemic bipolarity, the policy agenda over international security was

fragmented into regional pieces. Regional Security Complex Theory (or simply put as RSCT)

agrees in the fact of security regionalization (Buzan & Wæver 2003). In a geopolitical

environment of power diffusion and multi-polarization, security issues are clustered in regions

defined by security interactions. The range of those interactions runs from the harmony that

characterizes security communities (Deutsch 1957; Adler & Barnett 1998) to the opposite

situation of endemic warfare. The main operative principle of RSCT is strongly linked to space,

since assumes that security concerns travel short distances better than long ones. This principle

draws the lines of security clusters with high levels of internal interdependence. Thus, RSCT is

efficient summary of geopolitical security explanations’ corpus.


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3.1.3 Key Concepts

Autonomy: Freedom of action in foreign policy within the international law and

principles rule. An autonomous foreign policy means disengagement from external

constraints in the pursuit of national interests. Autonomy can be reached by distance,

participation or diversification (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007). Autonomy through

participation and diversification were the dominant trends in the built of SADC.

International Polarity: Distribution of capabilities within the Great Power Subsystem

(GPSs) (Mandsfiel 1993). In this paper, polarity is assess including those states who

concentrate at least half of world power—for the systemic level—or two thirds of any

given regional security complex—for the regional level.

Great Power Subsystem (GPSs): Analytical category to gather in a single group those

states who actually or potentially dominate the international system. Defining the size

and nature of GPSs is the first step to defining international polarity.

Multipolarity: International order with more than three powers within the GPSs.

Multi-polarization: Process of power-poles’ rising in different regional security

complexes.

Diffusion of Power/Power Diffusion: Process of dispersion of relative capabilities of

power across the international system.

Regional Security Governance: Multilateral capacity to rule security issues and cope

with threats in a given regional security complex. The participation of

organizations/corporations besides the states, depend on the nature of every region

(Krahmann 2003; Breslin & Croft 2012; Flemes & Radseck 2012). The main objective of

Regional Security Governance is to institutionalize common strategies for the unification

of regional security agenda.

3.2 Methods

3.2.1 Process-tracing

The development of this research will be conducted by process-tracing, in order to establish

causal chains between structural conditions (power distribution and shifts) and policies. Going

beyond correlations, process-tracing allows the causal exploration, even in structural conditions

based in historical and data-analysis (Beach & Pedersen 2014). Establishing causation is the

major challenge in social sciences, specially when quantitative data gives attractive correlation.

That is why further phases in this research will be more engaged with the so-called “thinking

aloud” methodology.


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In the below linear diagram, the interaction between independent variable (causal condition in

process-tracing jargon), dependent variable (outcome) and the main intervening variable.

Causal Condition

Multipolarity

Outcome

SADC

South American

Presidents’ perception and

power

Intervening Variable

3.2.2 Polarity Assessment

Since hard power has generally been an accepted measure to take a look on the distribution of

capabilities across the international system, I decided to employ the Composite Index of National

Capabilities (CINC), originally developed by Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972)1. The industrial,

demographic and military indicators that conform the CINC2 roughly describe a world hierarchy

who resemblance the perceptions based in observable international influence. The general

formula for CINC calculation is the following:

We must be aware about the limits of CINC. Being a measure of raw capabilities, it is susceptible

to distortions (e.g.: the overestimation of China, India or even Brazil capabilities based in their

vast populations, or the underestimation of Germany, United Kingdom, France and Japan,

powers with less massive potential resources, but with more “demographic quality”). An

alternative measuring strategic in order to correct structural distortions is use the Index of

1 The latest available version of the CINC dataset is V.4, from 1816 to 2007. The data used for this paper is my own update from 2008 to 2013, following the original formula and, as much as I can, the same sources. 2 The CINC puts together, with the same weight, the following indicators in terms of world share: total population of country ratio (TPR); urban population of country ratio (UPR);primary energy consumption ratio (ECR); iron and steel production of country ratio (ISPR); military personnel ratio (MPR); and military expenditure ratio (MER).


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Human Development (HDI), elaborated and published by the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP 2014), as a numerical coefficient. It is also a composite index, but its

indicators are related to people’s conditions. 3 Because the inherent difficulties in the

operationalization of the state power—as the ability for resource extraction and mobilization—I

claim that the best measure of national power must be relate to de availability of a healthy,

prosperous and educated population.4 However, accepting the potential distortions of the CINC, I

used the uncorrected data for historical polarity assessment because the HDI is available only

from 1990.

Taking the idea of Edward Mansfield of concentration as a quantitative measure of polarity in

the great powers subsystem (1993), I took eleven samples of CINC, from 1913 to 2013,

aggregating the values of those first who reached, combined, at least half of world capability. The

results are presented in three ways:

a) Total value of powers who reached, combined, half of world capability: this measure helps to

identify how much power is concentrated in the top of the great power subsystem.

b) Number of great powers: this second indicator is useful in comparative terms from a decade

to another, because show us how many powers are part of the top level of the great power

subsystem.5

c) Mean of capabilities distributed among the number of great powers: presented in a bars

graphic, with a tendency line, is possible to follow the concentration of capabilities by decades in

the last century.

3.2.3 Geopolitical Analysis

Academic regards on geopolitics are largely as theoretical framework than as methodological

tool. However, analysis from special tensions and strategic orientation can be included as a

method to understand major structural displacement as well as foreign/national security

decision-making process. Since Mackinder, the mainstream in geopolitical analysis has been

historically over-focused on Eurasia for obvious material reasons. Anglo-American geopolitical

tradition is more devoted to Mahan lessons on the importance of sea power—for the insular and

quasi-insular situations of the United Kingdom and the United States. Studies on geopolitics of

3 The indexes who conform the HDI are: Life Expectancy Index (LEI); Education Index (EI), as a function of expected and actual year of schooling; and Income Index (II). 4 There is an abundant literature on measures of national power. For a compilation of them see the Karl Hermann Höhn’s University of Hamburg Ph.D. dissertation (2011). 5In this is important to identify which of the states has or has not the competence to project power. Dismissing those who do not have it, make possible to identify the polarity of the system in a particular moment. Power projection is related to economic and soft power, but the ultimate measure is military power projection, in which long-range bombardier, ICBM, nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers and submarines (especially those with nuclear propulsion) are the best markers in the great power subsystem in most of the covered period.


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Western Hemisphere are a few.6 Nevertheless, this article uses the classical geopolitical view to

illustrate how the diffusion of power across the international coincided with a over-

concentration of capabilities in the regional security Asian supercomplex, forcing a geostrategic

reorientation to Asia-Pacific, increasing the perceptions on autonomy for the South American

states.

4. Causal Condition: Global Multipolarity

4.1 Evidence on Power Shifts

In the last twenty years, multipolarity has becoming in an IR truism. Assumed as a self-evident

fact, most authors feel not pressure on demonstrate it with empirical evidence, and almost no

one did that with quantitative data. The problem behind that attitude is not only epistemological,

but also practical, due the lack of precision in trace structural changes in international politics.

As is well know, not all multipolarity systems are equals (Kaplan 2005, Mearsheimer 2001).

They differ from the number of great powers, but also in power concentration. Thus, the number

of states that are part of the great powers subsystem is only half of truth. Follows that train of

thought, I present quantitative evidence of multipolarity and capability concentration in the

great power subsystem since 1913 until 2013.

In the next table are presented the total value of powers who reached, combined, at least half of

world capability and the number of great powers:

Table #1

Year

CINC ≥ Half of

World Total

Capabilities

Top States In the Great Power Subsystem

1913 0,5921345 USA** UKG** RUS* GER*

1923 0,5240146 USA** SVU* CHN

1933 0,5647868 USA* UKG* SVU* CHN

1943 0,6020715 USA** SVU* GER**

1953 0,5793796 USA** SVU** CHN*

1963 0,5378079 USA** SVU** CHN* IND*

1973 0,5507471 USA** SVU** CHN* IND* JPN

6 The most influential works on Wester Hemisphere geopolitics were written long ago by the Dutch-American political scientist Nicholas Spykman in terms less than flattering to Latin America (Furniss 1952).


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1983 0,5265466 USA** SVU** CHN* IND* JPN*

1993 0,5140296 USA** RUS* CHN* IND* JPN* BRA GER

2003 0,5033427 USA** RUS* CHN* IND* JPN* GER*

2013 0,5128115 USA** RUS* CHN* IND* JPN* GER*

*State with relative power projection competence vis-à-vis its regional peers

**State with relative power projection competence vis-à-vis its global peers

According to the data, the concentration of power as capabilities reached its peaks around the

eve of WWI, during WWI and the early stage of Cold War. Naturally, those moments reflect the

war effort of the great powers. The power parity and the principle of mutual assured destruction,

given by the nuclear revolution, settle a tense peace among the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the decolonization processes in Africa and Asia diminished the power of the former

colonial powers, bringing more states to the international system, reducing progressively the

concentration of power. The rises of China, India and the collapse of the Soviet Union also

contributed to that. In the next graph is possible to see the evolution of the concentration of

material capabilities. It shows the mean of capabilities distributed among the number of great

powers:

The presented evidence on power concentration in the international system is eloquent in terms

of my first claim: the multi-polarization—as diffusion of potential power—coincided with the

period of formation of the UNASUR. As well as the highest level of power concentration

0

0,05

0,1

0,15

0,2

0,25

1913 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013

Av

era

ge

Ca

pa

bil

ity

Dis

trib

uti

on

Graph #1 Concentration of Material Capabilities

Rio Pact

SADC

OAS

UNASUR


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corresponded with the foundation of the Rio Pact, the lower level of concentration created the

conditions for the creation of the SADC. The causal mechanisms are rooted in the interaction

among shifts in power distribution and the foreign policy executive perceptions on the

international system, regional realities and domestic own power.

4.2 Geopolitical Dynamics in a Multipolar World

Since the final stage before the Soviet collapse, the United States foreign policy has been driven

by a paramount principle: primacy (Brooks & Wohlforth 2002). For its relative fast ascent to the

superpower status, the US-American values were disseminated worldwide and its interest

reached a global level. Free of major threats on its borders, and being the dominant power in its

region, the United States enjoys a privileged position in human history, being able to attempt a

global approach as a great power (Brzezinski 1997; Mearsheimer 2001). The structural

condition of Eurasian concentration of power and resources, and the conjuncture given by the

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, explain the US-American geostrategic orientation. The

rise of China has been another (and maybe the most) important signal for the progressive

deployment of naval forces on West Pacific after the complicated withdraw operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

Table #2: World Multi-polarization (2008)

Regional Security Complexes

World Power Share

Standard Deviation

Power Concentration

Potential/Actual Dominant Power

Nuclear Power North America 16,8% 0,02910 Very High USA

South America 5,0% 0,00669 Medium BRA COL ARG

Europe 13,7% 0,00601 Medium GMY UKG FRA ITA SPN POL

Post-Soviet 6,2% 0,01026 High RUS UKR

MENA 8,8% 0,00425 Medium TUR IRN SAU EGY IRQ ALG ISR

West Africa 1,7% 0,00113 Low NIG CDI GHA CAO

Southern Africa 2,4% 0,00155 Low SAF DRC ANG TAZ KEN

African Horn 0,7% 0,00170 Low ETH ERI

South Asia 10,0% 0,02666 Very High IND PAK

East Asia 34,7% 0,03651 Very High CHN JPN PRK

The rise of Brazil as a regional power, far to be a worry to Washington, might have been

interpreted as an opportunity for advance towards a structure of Hemispheric security

governance (Mijares 2013). Hitherto, the US-American involvement in the “Plan Colombia”, the

ideological tensions between Colombia and Venezuela during the Uribe and Chávez’s


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presidencies, the dynamics of soft-balancing from secondary regional powers facing up Brazilian

rise (Flemes & Wehner 2012) and the Brazil’s attempt to use the region as a world projection

platform and its own sphere of influence limiting extra-regional powers’ presence (Goodman

2009), undermined a better approach among Washington and Brasilia. The emergence of Brazil

as a potential regional pole was part of a process of multi-polarization in the early 21st century

(see Table #2). But in the case of the South American security complex, three factors diminished

Washington geostrategic attention:

1) A situation of cold peace (Battaglino 2012), that put the region out of the US-American critical

security issues agenda.

2) A non-high (medium) level of power concentration, with the increasing of Colombian

capabilities as a potential balancer and ally, as well as the balancing policies from the rest of the

regional secondary powers.

3) A relatively low share of world total power.

Putting together, the three reasons explain the relative low geostrategic attention of the United

States to South America. On the other hand, the geopolitical conditions of the East Asia regional

security complex, with a massive and very high concentration of power centered in China, sheds

light on the structural motivations to the process of naval presence reinforcement in Asia-Pacific

through the strategy of the “Pivot” to Asia. In the Map #1 the share of power as capabilities is

showed by regional security complex, clearly exposing the most attracting geopolitical regions.

Map #1 World Power Share by Regional Security Complex


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4.3 Power Shifts: Governments’ Perception and Presidential Power

4.3.1 General Perceptions

Often, the connection among the international structure as a whole, and the regional processes

are took too lightly for the area studies scholars. Idiosyncrasies and exceptionalism are granted

in order to sell the uniqueness nature of a region. This misjudge is especially sharp in Latin

America, mainly in security issues, due the long accepted myth of the “peace region”—despite

the evidences showed by David Mares (2001). However, that interaction matters and there is a

correlation along with power shift and foreign policy strategy which causation can be proved. In

the early 90’s, there was an important issue in the road to the SADC: the US geostrategic

reorientation. Two major and related geopolitical facts drove the Washington interest in focus

its energy in the deployment of a strategy for Eurasia: on one hand, the soviet collapse and the

progressive weakening of Russia; and on the other the acceleration of China’s rise.

The American interest on Eurasia was not new, since it was part of his strategic thought within

the Anglo-Saxon heritage. While the US geostrategy followed the Mahan’s view on sea

dominance—in an obvious mimic of the British Empire—the political changes in Eurasia and the

shifts on world power distribution (and concentration) opened new opportunity windows. From

the presence in Eurasian peninsulas, the US moved to the heartland (Brzezinski 1997; Walton

2007). From the offshore balancer position, Washington tried to establish its direct primacy

(Mearsheimer 2001). The goals were take advantage of Russian geopolitical withdraw, and deny

any Chinese influence expansion. The post-September 11th actions confirmed the post-Cold War

geostrategy towards Eurasia. That motion fits in Mearsheimer’s model of great powers’ quest for

hegemony, but also in Paul Kennedy’s explanation on the risk of overexpansion (1987). As the

US geostrategic reorientation pass from security cooperation with ex-soviet states, to two wars

with long scale occupation, and the reinforcement of naval presence in China´s periphery, as the

perceptions of overexpansion, decline and post-hegemony were strengthened in South America.

In Western Hemisphere, the US geostrategic reorientation was interpreted as lack of interest,

but with a practical consequence: the advent of a post-hegemonic era. According to the Latin

American political leaders, could not be an accident that the rise of Brazil within the region, as

well as the rise of extra-regional powers, coincided with the perceived loose of American

influence in the continent. The contestation policy from Venezuela had to be part of the US

decline in Latin America, and especially in the South America hard bone. From mid-90’s the

perception that Brazil could be a rising power in an already born new world order, entered in a

deeper stage when, from the late-90’s on, the hypothesis on American decline in the Western

Hemisphere began to grow. After Vladimir Putin’s formal arrival to power in 2000, the war and

occupation of Afghanistan in 2001-02, the controlled succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao in


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the 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2002, and the war and occupation of Iraq in

2003, the signals of a fading away US influence over South America were clear for many

governments in the region.

4.3.1 Presidential Power

Even when general governments’ perception is a useful analytical tool, a better explanation for

South American foreign/security policies analysis must include the presidentialism as a factor

(Mainwaring 1990). Considering the domestic condition and power of the presidents in Brazil,

Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Peru and Colombia, is possible to understand the favorable

evolution of the region towards the SADC, specially during the crucial period of 2004-2009. The

main regional actor is Brazil, who according to the below typology (Table #2), was the leader of

the regional security governance project. Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva enjoyed a specially favorable

condition for his power as Brazilian president. His high levels of popularity were attached with a

strong coalition, including political parties and industrial sectors. The Brazil’s impressive

performance in the course of the world financial crisis increases the country’s prestige, as well

as improved its president image externally and domestically. The structural condition as a

potential regional dominant power (capabilities), the elite and social cohesion, and the

presidential power gave to Brazil the chance to launch the SADC.

In the cases of promoters, Argentina and Venezuela, the situations were different to Brazil, but in

both cases there were strong presidents. The crucial period coincide with the final phase of the

Néstor Kirchner presidency, and the early one of the presidency of his wife, Cristina Fernández.

The crucial period for the SADC was also the zenith of the Kirchnerismo as the most powerful

faction of the ruling Peronismo. The economic stabilization, despite the world financial crisis, and

the ties with oil rich Venezuela, were important pillars for the presidential power of the “K”.

Meanwhile, in the north of South America, the Chavista hegemony took advantage from the

winning referendum favorable to Chávez, and the boom in international oil prices. The crucial

period of the SADC was the one of highest Venezuela’s projection within and outside the region.

Both promoters combined their structural capabilities with the power of their presidents in

order to increase their autonomy through diversification, as well as through participation,

projecting their own influence while tried to soft-balancing Brazil.

As Argentina and Venezuela were more similar cases as promoters, Chile and Peru were most

different cases as pointers of the regional power scale, at least at the begining. For Chile, the

crucial period was one of stability, president’s popularity, elite and social cohesion. Michelle

Bachelet ruled a stable party system with a great coalition. The general consensus in Chilean

foreign/security policy were take for granted, particularly those related to regional military

transparency and selective regional engagement. Chile is the epitome of autonomy in South


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America. In the case of Peru, the crucial period begun with the Alejandro Toledo’s most stable

stage as Peruvian president, but with a very weak party system. The liberal reforms of Toledo,

and then Alan García, follow the Chilean model of autonomy though diversification in a

multipolar world. Peru’s stability depended on president’s maneuvers, taking advantage from a

weak party system, the re-democratization and the boom of raw materials. Both countries were

interested in a the production of security as a public good, but holding a selective commitment

strategy within the region.

Álvaro Uribe’s Colombia was the challenger. In terms of CINC, Colombia’s power boosted under

Uribe. Of course, in CINC calculation the military factors represent a third. However, the

progress of Colombia as the major secondary regional power is remarkable. The administration

of Uribe was a strong one, with the increasing of military operations against guerrilla forces

(mainly FARC and ELN), the demobilization process of right-wing paramilitary groups (AUC),

and the further strategic cooperation with the US. Uribe gained respect and support for his

warring policy, the recovery and control of vast territories, and the improvement of

macroeconomic variables. He was able to reform the constitution for a immediate reelection,

increasing dramatically the presidential power in a institutionalized country with a strong

political parties system. Even so, the high-cost “Operation Phoenix” over Ecuadorian territory

was combined with the structural power of the rest of the region. Uribe was an strong president

who used the increasing force of a secondary power to challenge a convergence regional

movement. At the end, Colombia dropped its resistance forced by the major regional movement,

but exhibit a sample of the major challenges for the SADC: its cohesion in a multipolar world.

5. The Outcome: The South American Defense Council

5.1 Regional Conditions

The UNASUR’s SADC is the first regional security governance initiative that exclude the US. The

original idea was strongly promoted by Lula’s Brazil and Chávez’s Venezuela, being latter

supported by Kirchner’s Argentina. In 2008 Nelson Jobim, at that time Brazilian minister of

defense, was the main regional political operator and seller of the SADC’s possibility and

geostrategic importance. In a South American tour, with a first stop in Caracas, Jobim talked

openly on a regional alliance without the US, claiming the dissuasive nature of it (Mijares 2009,

6). Brazil’s position fixed with its geopolitical project of influence and prestige as a rising power

(Mearsheimer 2001), motivating it to earn great and major powers recognition and respect,

building a own sphere of influence in its periphery (Goodman, 2009).


15

The original meaning of SADC had not complete and unanimous support. The Brazilian

leadership was a crucial condition, as well as the promotion from two key secondary regional

powers: Argentina and Venezuela. The resistance from Uribe’s Colombia was neutralized by the

moderate position assumed by the secondary regional powers of Chile and Peru. An untold effect

of Santiago and Lima’s moderation can be perceived in the “Declaration of Santiago de Chile” on

March, 2009. Peru, but specially Chile, played the role of pointer of the scale in the South

American geopolitical dynamics. The Declaration lied down in the space between a innocuous

agreement without specific objective, and an alliance with clear deterrence purpose. A

commitment functional enough to give transparency to regional military budgets and tactical

capabilities—a priceless condition for countries engaged in territorial disputes, but also in a

process of liberalization through bilateral free trade agreements, as were precisely Chile and

Peru.

Combining three levels of commitment and three of regional hierarchies, is possible to build a

typology on SADC member’s initial commitment. It is presented in following Table #2:

Table #2

Typology of the SADC Members’ Commitment

Commitment with SADC

% Share of Regional Capabilities

High

75,18%

Medium

12,41%

Low

12,41%

Re

gio

na

l H

iera

rch

y

Regional Power

Leader

BRA

Balancer

Antagonistic

Secondary Regional

Power

Promoter

VEN ARG

Pointer

CHL PER

Challenger

COL

Minor Power

Follower

ECU BOL PAR URU

Free-rider

GUY SUR

Pariah

The above presented typology illustrates in more than a way the intra-regional structural forces

behind the SADC birth. It shows that seven of twelve states were highly committed with the

institutionalization of regional security governance, and eleven of twelve had at least a medium

commitment with the project. Colombia’s resistance was definitely broken after the post-

“Operation Phoenix” diplomatic crisis among Bogota and Quito-Caracas. However, and beyond

that important conjuncture, the Colombian possibilities of truncate the emergence of SADC were

low according with its share of regional capabilities, but also with its regional political isolation


16

at that time. The post-“Operation Phoenix” diplomatic crisis was the break-point to include

Colombia, not to launch the SADC. Further than number of states, a more accurate data in

included: regional power share. With three quarters of regional weigh, those highly commitment

states held the structural leverage to launch the first regional security governance institution

away from the US’ presence and direct influence.

5.2 SADC’s Challenges in a Multipolar World

As this paper claims, the SADC is a regional result of global multipolarity. Thus, even when there

are many national and regional forces in play, the international structure remains and the main

condition to be understood in order to explain how those forces operate. Following the

theoretical logic of a increasing multipolar system, it is possible to foresee a potential

paradoxical effect over the South American security governance structure. The paradox lies on

the fact that the same structural force who lead to national and regional autonomy, has the

potential to fragment the common regional security efforts. The diversification of foreign

relations, the segmentation of regionalism and the regional rivalries under classical logics of

security dilemma, security dilemma of alliances and/or typical antagonism in a mercantilist

international political economy. In a non exhaustive enumeration, I present potential reasons to

be aware about the evolution of the SADC’s performance in mid- to long-term.

5.2.1 Regional Lack of Leadership

“A leader without followers” is the harsh definition given by Andrés Malamud to the Brazil’s

regional foreign policy performance (2011). Since the first evidences about its rise in the early

nineties (see Table #1), Brazilian national debate about what should be grand strategy for

international projection has been a constant. The dilemma on be a great power as the regional

leader or just pass directly to manage global matters regardless Latin American issues, was a

central piece during late Cardoso’s administration and all Lula’s one. At a first look, the regional

perception on multipolarity as a post-hegemony encouraged a more assertive approach to global

prestige through regional leadership, creating its own geopolitical platform without direct

competitors: South America (Gehre Galvão 2009).7 UNASUR, as well as its Defense Council, are

the ultimate achievement of that policy. The effort was about unify in a single geopolitical bloc

the two majors South America’s trade structures, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community

(Hurrell 1995), being one of the major objectives balance the US power (Flemes, Nolte & Wehner

2011), taking advantage of its perceived decline (Rachman 2011).

7 By definition, the Western Hemisphere in an geographic area that coincide with the “defense perimeter” of the US, as well as the “Americas.” On the other hand, Latin America includes Mexico, the biggest Spanish speaking country and the major regional partner of the US. The natural solution, looking at the map, was a long time Brazilian geopolitical aspiration: assume that South America is the world biggest island and Brazil is half of it.


17

But the situation is far from be flattering with Brazil and its regional leadership. The gap in

terms of development models, dimensions and international goals, make difficult an integration

with Brazil as the leading power (Sorj & Fausto 2013). From geostrategic contestation (Flemes &

Wehner 2012) to role perception (Wehner 2014), the South American secondary powers’

policies against a potential Brazilian hegemony respond to the same logic of autonomy quest

behind the multipolar order, in a dynamic and uncoordinated process of deny regional

unipolarity, diminishing the possibility of a hegemonic security order, even accepting a

hierarchical regional one (Garzón Pereira 2013).

5.2.2 Regional Security Segmentation

The formalization of the SADC (2008-2009) was not a smooth process because of the regional

segmentation. That Latin American characteristic has its most striking expression in the

proliferation of regional organizations (Nolte 2013), with a noticeable increment during the

period of acceleration of international power diffusion. According to the main hypothesis in this

working paper, and its theoretical framework, regional segmentation is a primary outcome from

multipolarization as an autonomy prone process. Additionally to the structural forces of

international polarity, FPE’s preferences (material and ideological), and established interest play

a central role in the position assumed by the states. In Table #2 is a typology of commitment to

the SADC’s project. Even when the typology reflects a particular moment—the beginning stage

of the Defense Council—, could be useful to understand its evolution and the South American

challenges in regional security governance performance.

Autonomy and competitiveness are multipolarity’s hallmarks. With the increasing importance of

region as international security main spaces (Buzan & Wæver 2003; Nolte 2010) has a greater

significance, while security is the most delicate concerns of states and it is easily to be related

with autonomy quest and competition (e.g. the security dilemma). The SADC’s

underperformance as regional security governance formal structure can be seen in its

limitations in unify, or at least bring transparency and trust to the regional defense agenda. Jorge

Battaglino correctly argued against the alarmist claims of South American arms races, but his

characterization of the region as one with a “cold peace” (2008) is a signal of security

segmentation, a condition for regional security governance underperformance.

5.2.3 Bi- and Tri-lateralization of Regional Defense Diplomacy

The SADC is constantly invoked in defense agreements,8 nevertheless, the multilateral

agreements are exceptional, and bilateralism and trilateralism in defense diplomacy are

common. In terms of confident building measures, South America presents formal commitments,

8 In the frame of this research project, a database on South American defense agreements is under construction.


18

but with a disappointing praxis. The region has not proper multilateral protocols in four crucial

defense and security areas: 1) collective defense in front of multidimensional threats; 2)

collective security for the restoration of a desired political order in case of violent breakdown or

progressive deterioration of democratic institutions; 3) regional natural disasters’ management,

for the mobilization of resources and knowledge; and 4) cooperative monitoring of natural

resources and sensitive zones (Mijares 2014). This tendency is far to lose strength, first at all,

because of the material reasons—defense and security systems’ incompatibility—, and on the

other hand, because of political matters—geopolitical differences, diverging national interests,

ideological projects, unsolved territorial disputes, regional rivalries, security/alliance dilemmas,

and balancing behavior.

5.2.4 Extra-regional Powers’ Shades

Multipolarity has different meanings across regions. For instance, while in Southeast Asia it

means the rise of China, the ASEAN coordination in a collective balancing policy, and the

increasing of US military presence in that region, in the South America security complex the

effects of power diffusion is near to be the opposite. Multipolarity as a measurable phenomena,

and the post-hegemony as a perceived one, offer opportunities for a widening foreign relations.

The technical capabilities in trade, direct diplomacy, as well as in financial and military

projection, bring new chances for extra-regional cooperation, especially for those secondary and

minor powers.

Despite the perceptions on post-hegemony, the economic, military, diplomatic and cultural

presence of the US in South America is a fact. The superpower is the main foreign investor in the

region, and its military presence remains—even son it was constrained as the first impulse of

the SADC (Mijares 2011). The bilateral security cooperation between Colombia and the US was a

major concern for Brazil and Venezuela. The peace talks in Havana, with the whole change in

regional foreign policy in the Santos’ administration, appeased regional fears, but were not

removed.

As creditor and raw material importer, China’s involvement in South America matched with the

global speeding up in power diffusion and the post-hegemonic perception (Ellis 2009). Playing

the role of off-shore balancer, China take the space as the main extra-regional competitor of the

US (Mearsheimer 2001). Following the patter of balancing policy, Beijing has been more

interested and involved with those countries that fulfil two conditions: 1) raw material

exporters (especially energy); and 2) those who have a contestation policy/rhetoric against the

US. Though China fells the pressure of the US “Asia Pivot” strategy, there is a chance to escalate

its influence in the America’s “backyard,” boosting a competition in which South America could a

be theater of diplomatic and economic clashes (Nolte 2013).


19

Russian presence in Latin American politics is lesser than US and China’s, but is an extra-

regional power able to distress the regional Brazilian project. Russia’s renascence as a aspiring

global player touches the South America’s regional security governance performance in a

sensitive issue: military technology (Flemes & Nolte 2010; Boersner & Haluani 2011; Mijares

2011). The South American weapon acquisition from Russia is concentrated in Venezuela,

although in my typology Caracas has been a promoter of the SADC, as a regional secondary

power highly engaged. This apparent contradiction in call for an alliance-style regional

organization, meanwhile a external military link is establishing, is explained by the multipolar

system’s logic, in which autonomy and balancing are the main goal and behavior, respectively.

6. Conclusions

As a part of an ongoing project, this paper only have preliminary conclusions. The first one is

analytical, regarding the three levels of analysis demanded by the study of international polarity

implications over regional security governance. The connections between international systemic

level (in terms of polarity), regional politics and domestic factors in unavoidable in order to

understand the trends in regional and international security. The international structure

establishes conditions and parameters for foreign/security policies. With differences related to

qualitative skills is strategic intelligence and diplomacy, states respond to shifts of power in the

international system. The regional level can be defined and studied with the RSCT approach. In

practice it means that every region has a particular patter of security and geopolitical interaction.

Here, again, polarity has something to say, because the distribution of material capabilities is the

first step to explain the diplomatic and defense dynamics within a region. The national level is

always problematic for IR. However, employ the principles of neoclassical realism, and

regarding the historical nature of South American domestic political system, it is feasible

understand foreign/security policies though the presidential power. On this regard, comparative

politics has many to teach to IR scholars.

The second preliminary conclusion is theoretical. Autonomy within a formal structure of

regional security governance explains selective multilateral engagement. Under multipolar

conditions states have more chances to increase autonomy. Through participation, the quest for

autonomy is achievable within the rise of regionalism so that to create conditions for

international governance, constraining misbehavior and forcing multilateralism. Nevertheless,

multi-polarization also generates conditions for autonomy through diversification, because

increases potential bilateral relations within and outside the region. That is the main

theoretical—and empirically demonstrable—explanatory reason for a selective engagement.


20

The potential looseness of selective multilateral engagement is the core challenge for regional

security governance in a multipolar world.

The last conclusive point is empirical, and directly related with the case under study, because

multipolarity has a potential paradoxical effect on South American security governance

performance. The principle behind that possible paradox is: as more autonomy the states have,

more they are able to build a regional security governance structure without the US. But the

same autonomy gives them the opportunity to follow their own path, according to national

interest. The key multipolar challenges to the SADC—regional lack of leadership, security

segmentation, bi- and tri-lateralization of regional defense diplomacy, as well as the increasing

presence of extra-regional powers—are directly linked to multipolarity and the process of multi-

polarization. In this, the crucial vector is autonomy. Only by a clear and less ambitious definition

of objectives, as well as with a more assertive Brazilian leadership, could be possible to avoid

the divisive effects of that potential paradox over the regional security governance.

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Annexes

País Chronology of South American Presidents

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

Argentina CM FR/ar ED NK CFK

Bolivia HBS JQ SL CM ER EM

Brazil FHC LdS D.R.B

Chile EF RL MB SP

Colombia AP AUV JMS

Ecuador JM GN LG ap RCE

Guyana JJ BJ DRG

Paraguay LGM ND FL ff HC

Peru AF VP AT AG OH

Surinam JW RV DB

Uruguay JS JB TV JPM

Venezuela RCV

HCF/pc/HCF NM


25

Argentina Bolivia Brasil CM: Carlos Saúl Menem [08.07.89 - 10.12.99] HB: Hugo Banzer [06.08.97 - 07.08.01] FHC: Fernando H. Cardoso [01.01.95 - 31.12.02] FR: Fernando de la Rúa [10.12.99 - 21.12.01] JQ: Jorge Quiroga [07.08.01 - 06.08.02] LdS: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva [01.01.03 - 31.12.10] ar: Adolfo Rodríguez Saá [23.12.01 - 30.12.01] SL: G. Sánchez de Lozada [06.08.02 – 17.10.03] DRB: Dilma Rousseff [01.01.11 - ] ED: Eduardo Duhalde [02.01.02 - 25.05.03] CM: Carlos Mesa [17.10.03 - 09.06.05] NK: Néstor Kirchner [25.05.03 - 10.12.07] ER: Eduardo Rodríguez [09.06.05 - 22.01.06] CFK: Cristina Fernández de K. [10.12.07 - ] EM: Evo Morales [22.01.06 - ] Chile Colombia Ecuador EF: Eduardo Frei R-T. [11.03.94 - 11.03.00] AP: Andrés Pastrana [07.08.98 - 07.08.02] JM: Jamil Mahuad [10.08.98 - 21.01.00] RL: Ricardo Lagos [11.03.00 - 11.03.06] AUV: Álvaro Uribe Vélez [07.08.02 - 07.08.10] GN: Gustavo Noboa [22.01.00 - 15.01.03] MB: Michelle Bachelet [11.03.06 - 11.03.10] JMS: Juan Manuel Santos [07.08.10 - ] LG: Lucio Gutiérrez [15.01.03 - 20.04.05] SP: Sebastián Piñera [11.03.10 - ] ap: Alfredo Palacio [20.04.05 - 14.01.07] RCE: Rafael Correa [15.01.07 - ] Guyana Paraguay Perú JJ: Janet Jagan [19.12.97 - 11.08.99] LGM: L. González Macchi [28.03.99 - 15.08.03] AF: Alberto Fujimori [28.07.90 - 21.11.00] BJ: Bharrat Jagdeo [11.08.99 - 04.12.11] ND: Nicanor Duarte [15.08.03 - 15.08.08] VP: Valentín Paniagua [22.11.00 - 28.07.01] DRG: Donald Ramotar [04.12.11 - ] FL: Fernándo Lugo [15.08.08 - 22.06.12] AT: Alejandro Toledo [28.07.01 - 28.07.06] ff: Federico Franco [22.06.12 - 15.08.13] AL: Alan García [28.07.06 - 28-07.11] OH: Ollanta Humala [28.07.11 - ] Surinam Uruguay Venezuela JW: Jules Wijdenbosch [15.09.96 - 12.08.00] JS: Julio M. Sanguinetti [01.03.95 - 01.03.00] RCV: Rafael Caldera [02.02.94 - 02.02.99] RV: Ronald Venetiaan [12.08.00 - 12.08.10] JB: Jorge Batlle [01.03.00 - 01.03.05] HCF: Hugo Chávez Frías [02.02.99 - 05.03.13] DB: Dési Bouterse [12.08.10 - ] TB: Tabaré Vázquez [01.03.05 - 01.03.10] pc: Pedro Carmona [12.04.02 - 13.04.02] JPM: José Pepe Mujica [01.03.10 - ] NM: Nicolás Maduro [05.03.13 - ]

multipolarity as the origin and the major challenge...

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