msc dissertation 2008 final
TRANSCRIPT
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Is anthropological inquiry better suited to a scientific or a hermeneutic methodological
approach?
Candidate Number: 657880
Master of Science in Social Anthropology 2008
Abstract
Over the last few decades anthropologists have become increasingly divided in their
methodological preferences; those who choose to follow in the footsteps of the natural sciences
aim to formulate causal explanations for cultural phenomena while others opt for hermeneutical
methods entailing the interpretation of meanings which underlie cultural forms. Underpinning
these positions are contentious epistemological issues which have occupied various philosophers
and social scientists over the last three centuries regarding the nature of social phenomena and
the appropriate methods for their analysis. In this paper, I contrast the arguments of two
contemporary philosophers of social science, who have passionately argued in favor of
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humanistic (Winch: 1958) and scientific (Jarvie: 1972) methods respectively. Through an
analysis of their works, I show that scientific explanation plays an indispensable role in social
science, as evidenced by Karl Popper’s method of ‘situational logic’, which Jarvie outlines .
However, building upon Winch’s contentions, I argue that since anthropology largely deals with
phenomena which are either, a) conceptually alien to the analyst or b) metaphysical (e.g.
religion, law, politics), the hermeneutical process of interpreting and ‘understanding’ the
conceptual meanings of social phenomena, which provides the foundation for scientific
explanation, surpasses the latter in significance and ought to be the primary task of
anthropologists.
Introduction
When Eric Wolf (1964:88) suggested that anthropology is perhaps ‘…the most scientific of the
humanities and the most humanistic of the sciences’, he may have captured not only the
discipline’s broad potential but also a susceptibility in its equivocal nature, especially to the
extent that the sciences and humanities are deemed to be theoretically and methodologically
opposed to one another. Over the last few decades, the discipline may have succumbed to what
Lett (1997) terms an ‘identity crisis’ as anthropologists follow divergent paths. A portion of them
have rooted for a more traditional ‘scientific’ methodological approach in line with earlier
anthropological work, entailing the formation and evaluation of logical theories with empirical
data with the aim of forming cross-culturally applicable laws for explaining empirical
phenomena. As a reaction to this treatment of anthropology as if it were analogous to the natural
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sciences, a significant body of anthropologists have emphasized that the unique nature and
objects of anthropological inquiry means that it requires an ‘interpretive’ methodological
approach following the humanistic or heuristic tradition of inquiry. Interpretive anthropologists
criticize attempts to explain social structures and human behavior using analytical theories of
material causality and emphasize descriptive interpretations of the meanings of actions, words
and ideas which lie embedded within cultures.
Underlying these opposed methodological traditions are contentions epistemological and
metaphysical issues, the resolution of which could potentially determine how anthropological
inquiry should be conducted and for what reasons. Thus they have been the subject of heated
debates in academic literature both within anthropology and related disciplines. Since the
interpretive approach has grown exponentially in popularity, there has been a corresponding
trend of scientific minded anthropologists (Keesing 1987; Lett 1991&1997; O’Meara 1989;
Reyna 1994; Carrithers 1990; Kuznar 1997) some of whom have provided lucid evaluations of
both perspectives alongside criticisms of the epistemological assumptions of the interpretive
school which have in turn invited responses from interpretive theorists (Shore 1991; Valeri
1987). Many of the former are concerned with divisions which they feel ‘threaten to tear the
discipline apart’ (Rubel & Rosman 1994: 342) while among the latter, there is a sense in which
the interpretive approach must rightfully displace an outdated ‘positivism’ for there to be
methodological progression. There are however, relatively few studies which impartially
evaluate the methodological rift by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the respective
approaches in order to explore future directions for anthropological analysis or even possibilities
for commensuration. This paper attempts such a broad and dispassionate overview specifically
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by tackling the theoretical issues which lie at the roots of the division and which are crucial for
determining exactly how anthropologists should conduct their inquiries.
The central theoretical question of whether human phenomena can be analyzed and explained
using the scientific methods of the natural sciences has been awarded significant attention in
most of the social sciences as well as in the anthropological debates mentioned above. For many
such as Rabinow (1979:3), the ‘epistemic object of inquiry’ of anthropology as a social science
dealing with human phenomena is wholly distinct from that of the physical sciences and thus
requires a different methodological approach; one adequate to take into account the definition of
humans as ‘suspended in webs of meanings they themselves have spun’ as first argued by Max
Weber (Weber 1968, I, p. 22). This is directly opposed by Roscoe (1995) and O’Meara (1989)
who suggest that human behavior can be explained using generalized scientific laws, though they
emphasize the need for a separation between scientific and metaphysical inquiry. A rigorous
evaluation of the theoretical principles underlying these arguments should make room for a
consideration of the appropriate goals and functions of anthropology and academic inquiry in the
human sciences. It is crucial to understand whether anthropologists can or should aim to produce
a cumulative body of cross-culturally applicable knowledge which offers causal explanations of
the social phenomena of an external knowable world or whether they should direct their energies
to the ‘evocation and interpretation’ of cultures and cultural variability and the ‘understanding’
of the contextual meanings which constitute forms of life or perhaps to focus upon exploring
‘…the character of lived experience’. (Jackson 1989:2) Ultimately, it is the scientific method, its
capacity and its epistemological assumptions, especially with respect to its potential role within
the discipline of anthropology that has been called into question and this paper will attempt to
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address whether it remains of relevance not only in anthropology, but also in contemporary
social science.
While the paper will use anthropological sources to show how theoretical debates have been
incorporated into anthropological discourses to make arguments in favor of either a scientific or
interpretive methodological outlook, the majority of the theoretical points of contention are
considered, as much as is possible, using the work of philosophers of science and social science
for two reasons. Firstly, much of the anthropological literature on this subject is heavily oriented
towards a specific methodological approach, and some of it is strewn with straw men or
totalizing descriptions of the ‘paradigm’ which the authors find disagreeable. Secondly, the
underlying disputes in question are not concerned with anthropological data but rather with a
priori theoretical positions which have been considered in depth in the aforementioned
disciplines. While there is a growing body of anthropologically inclined work of this sort, often
labeled as ‘anthropology of knowledge’, the latter typically hails from interpretive
anthropologists.
The paper is divided into four sections, the first of which charts the origins of both
methodological paradigms in anthropology, evaluating the work of respective theorists and
highlighting the major theoretical differences which set them apart. In order to emphasize
impartiality, anthropological sources from both interpretive and scientific perspectives are used
in every aspect of this overview. The second section deals specifically with the points of
theoretical contention mentioned above, contrasting the perspectives of philosophers of science
Peter Winch (1958) and Ian Jarvie (1972) who have each offered significant contributions to this
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issue, though their respective sympathies lie on opposite ends of the methodological spectrum.
The third section builds upon these arguments using relevant literature and ethnographic or
philosophical examples in order to illustrate and evaluate the epistemological positions presented
in the first part. This is followed by an evaluative and conclusive section which summarizes any
theoretical findings in the context of the methodological divisions in anthropology in order to
determine whether positivistic/scientific and humanistic/interpretive inquiries are
commensurable to any extent and/or whether any particular methodological approach is more
suited for anthropological inquiry.
In this paper, I show that scientific explanation plays an indispensable role in social science, as
evidenced by Karl Popper’s method of ‘situational logic’, which Jarvie outlines (1972: 19-20) .
However, building upon Winch’s contentions, I argue that since anthropology largely deals with
phenomena which are either, a) conceptually alien to the analyst or b) metaphysical (e.g.
religion, law, politics), the hermeneutical process of interpreting and ‘understanding’ the
conceptual meanings of social phenomena which provides the foundations for scientific
explanation surpasses the latter in significance and ought to be the primary task of
anthropologists.
Section 1: Overview of the Anthropological Paradigms
Origins of scientific anthropology
Interpretive theorists such as Holy (1987), trace the roots of the positivistic approach in
anthropology to the use of the comparative method in anthropology, which they suggest provides
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evidence of the first lucid portrayal of the discipline as a natural science. Underpinning the
method were theoretical notions regarding cultures as isolated social systems which, while
eliciting certain clear distinctions had similar social structures which could be compared in order
to form generalized theories explaining similar phenomena in all societies. This method is
thought to have been inherited from Durkheimian ‘comparative sociology’ where descriptions of
social facts would be used in order to formulate and test hypotheses or generalizations, albeit in
anthropology, ethnography would provide the descriptions of exotic cultural systems. Holy notes
that these descriptions of specific societies were sometimes accompanied by larger scale
world-wide statistical comparisons between cultures in order to establish correlations between
phenomena. Examples of these provide further evidence of the methods of the natural sciences
being adopted for anthropological analysis. (1987: 4) During this period, anthropologists
described the process of comparison as the anthropological equivalent of the scientific
experiment while fieldwork allowed the testing of existing generalizations by providing new
observations (Evans-Pritchard 1951: 89-90)
Hobart (1987) agrees that the comparative method epitomized early scientific approaches. Using
the work of Radcliffe-Brown, an early proponent of this approach, he highlights the manner in
which the latter’s work equates comparison with the controlled experimentation of the natural
scientists. The following quote from Radcliffe-Brown serves to elucidate these underlying
methodological assumptions.
“For Social Anthropology the task is to formulate and validate statements about the conditions of
existence of social systems (laws of social statics) and the regularities that are observable in
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social change (laws of social dynamics), This can only be done by the systematic use of the
comparative method…” (Radcliffe-Brown 1958a: 128)
For Radcliffe-Brown then, all social phenomena were subject to natural laws and by the use of
the logical method of induction, as is standard in the natural sciences, it was possible to discover
and prove these general laws (1987: 23-24). Underpinning such a methodology are strict notions
regarding: i) the manner in which the objects of inquiry are conceptualized, ii) theories regarding
the appropriate methods of observation and data analysis iii) the capacity of the scientific method
to formulate and test theories or laws in order to explain societal phenomena iv) the goals of
anthropological inquiry to provide general laws which can explain the ‘conditions of existence of
social systems’ and the ‘regularities that are observable in social change’ (1958a: 128). In Ellen’s
review of ethnographic fieldwork (1984), he takes the second point further by exploring the
manner in which early methods of observation and data analysis were shaped by positivistic
theoretical perspectives. He notes that the tension between observation and experimental results
on the one hand and theory on the other has been resolved in different ways depending upon the
methodological approach one adopts.
In the discipline’s early practice, the technique of participant observation was largely associated
with the structural-functionalist approach which as mentioned above entailed the ‘synchronic
analysis of the interrelations of institutions within the existing socio-cultural whole’ (1984: 17).
Ellen suggests, in line with Holy, that Durkheimian ideology lay behind structural-functionalist
theory and the early use of participant-observation. For Durkheim, the social notions of people
who participate in social life were not important, rather there were certain profound causes or
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underlying social laws which he claimed were ‘unperceived by consciousness’ (Durkheim 1964:
141) These social forces were deemed to be external to the individual and were the determinants
of his/her behavior as well as the rest of social life. Radcliffe-Brown’s work carried this tradition
forward with the aim of forming a natural science of society. In practice however,
Radcliffe-Brown’s method was somewhat unscientific in that he would often use particularistic
descriptions of social life to affirm pre-constructed notions of the regularity of social
relationships. Situational analysts such as Turner were stricter in their interpretations of the
positivistic methodology and concentrated on concrete situations involving social interactions
which would be the main source of analysis and would provide empirical evidence of social
structure. (1984: 20) Importantly, the positivistic paradigm also conceived of anthropology’s
subject matter and data as akin to the data of the natural scientist. Participant observation was the
scientific tool allowing direct observation of social data which was deemed to be information
about the social world acquired through sense experience and as Ellen notes was ‘real, factual
and…had to consist of empirical phenomena which exist somewhere “out there” in the world.’
(1984: 21).
Contemporary Scientific Anthropology
While there are considerable differences in the theoretical approaches that scientific
anthropologists adopt (i.e. from cultural materialism to structuralism to cognitive anthropology),
and while many disagree on a few epistemological issues and especially on whether or not
scientific methods should be scrutinized using philosophical discourse, they all emphasize their
respect for the scientific tradition and the superiority of the scientific method for providing
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information about the empirical world. In addition, they are keen to emphasize that the
foundational characteristics of the method remain the same whether the subject matter is physical
or social. In addition, definitions of scientific anthropology given by anthropologists are usually
abstract and unconcerned with the specifics of anthropological inquiry. Kuznar (1997)
emphasizes three important characteristics of the approach; assumptions of an external knowable
world, an emphasis on the need to evaluate subjective humanly constructed theories with
objective empirical data and the use of the procedural rule which stipulates that a theory’s fit to
all relevant data is the most important factor leading to its acceptance or rejection (1997: 18).
Many have provided concise definitions of what scientific anthropology should entail. O’Meara
(1989) notes as key, the systematic descriptions and classification of objects, events and
processes and the explanation of the latter with theories which ‘employ lawful regularities’ and
which must be testable using publicly observable data (1989: 354). Watson (1976, 1992),
mentions that these theories must, in the social sciences, lead to explanations and predictions of
human cultural behavior (Kuznar 1997: 18). Finally, due to the recent emphasis on reflexive
critiques in anthropology, many scientific anthropologists are keen to highlight the self-critical
nature of scientific inquiry especially evident in the history of anthropology. Thus, Kuznar notes
that theories, data and methods must be continually reevaluated especially in cases where new
theories may better explain the data or when further data from other sources falsifies a theoretical
approach. In fact, the comparative method mentioned above has often been used in anthropology
to reevaluate and criticize once trusted and respected theoretical concepts which were not
cross-culturally applicable. For example, Radcliffe-Brown spent much time refuting
nineteenth-century concepts of unilineal evolution while in turn, many of his successors
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suggested that they could not find cross-cultural evidence of societies organized in accordance
with his structural-functionalist principles (1997: 24).
Assumptions
Underlying the methods and theories of contemporary scientific anthropology are certain
epistemological and ontological assumptions which largely resemble those of the earliest
scientifically-minded anthropologists such as Radcliffe-Brown. While conceptions of the objects
of inquiry are important for consideration of appropriate methods and goals of analysis, even
more elementary are conceptions of the world and of reality and whether or not it can be
apprehended and understood by an observer. Empirical analysis for scientific anthropologists
rests on assumptions of an orderly predictable world which exists externally to the observer who
can observe the world directly or through the use of scientific instruments. Specifically for
anthropologists, this external world consists of social structures and the behavioral patterns of
humans and these natural phenomena can be observed and explained ‘without recourse to
mysterious forces beyond investigation.’ (Bernard 1994b: 168). Scientific anthropologists and
positivistic philosophers of science often debate whether ideas concerning the world are
ontological assumptions (i.e. those concerned with the actual existence of reality and worldly
phenomena) or epistemological (i.e. those concerned with how we come to know and understand
what we observe). Kuznar notes that such considerations of whether or not there may be a true
‘reality’ beneath what we experience are insignificant, especially since science is only concerned
with phenomena which are empirically testable (1997: 29) Thus, while everything we perceive
may be partially constructed by our minds as the philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested, since
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that is the only reality we can experience and the only reality which is empirically testable, it
becomes the appropriate subject of scientific analysis.
More importantly, scientific anthropologists often make allusions to an underlying pure reality
which for an everyday observer is adulterated by cultural and theoretical biases, the state of
empirical knowledge and one’s powers of observation. The aim of science is to escape from
these limitations as much as is possible and draw nearer to an ideal notion of truth. Thus in
anthropology, there is the need to review all the current ethnographic data and theoretical
conceptions regarding an issue in order to determine which ideas and explanations are the most
complementary and therefore provide the most accurate available version of the truth while at the
same time attempting to bypass the perceptions, interpretations, motivations, feelings etc of the
observer which threaten to skew the reality hiding underneath (1997: 30). On the other hand,
science qualifies its discoveries by emphasizing that it is only able to provide the best temporary
explanation of the facts rather than absolute truths and thus remains open to systematic, scientific
revisions. Kuznar notes that in anthropology for example, there has been an effort to establish
whether the ‘!Kung’ are the indigenous people of the Kalahari region where they presently reside
and if so, how long they have lived there. Different anthropologists have provided different
interpretations of the ‘Kung!’ and the reality of their existence which vary tremendously
depending upon many of the factors mentioned above (1997: 28). Underlying all these aims and
goals are certain notions of scientific objectivity which is deemed to be at risk of being veiled by
subjective political, religious and ideological positions to which it is directly opposed. The latter
are about maintaining a normative position regarding the world and science is concerned only
with knowing about the world from a neutral albeit elevated stance. In line with this, since
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metaphysical phenomena are not empirically testable, they are considered to be beyond the
purview of scientific inquiry, although a small group of anthropologists (e.g. Murdock 1980;
Schneider 1965) support the use of empirical evidence to falsify metaphysical statements such as
those regarding the existence of a soul or God (Lett 1997: 52).
Origins of interpretive/humanistic anthropology
While there have been several early anthropological studies which have adopted a humanistic
approach, for example Ruth Benedict’s (1934) ‘Patterns of culture’, the majority of scientific and
interpretive anthropologists would agree that the contemporary surge of anthropological interest
in the interpretive methodological approach truly began with the publication of Clifford Geertz’s
early work and specifically the oft-cited introduction to his ‘The Interpretation of cultures’
published in 1973 in which he claims that the analysis of culture should not be ‘an experimental
science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ (Geertz 1973: 5). While
there are other trends which have accompanied the early development of the interpretive
paradigm and which take anthropology beyond its scientific limits, for example Hyme’s (1972)
call for a literally humanistic anthropology which would be politically and ethically sensitive to
the domination of weaker populations by the world’s hegemonic powers or Asad’s (1973)
descriptions of the implicit association between early anthropology and western colonialism,
since these are not strictly and explicitly dealing with conceptual issues associated with the
interpretive paradigm which might clearly distinguish it from a scientific methodological
approach, they are not of primary concern. Geertz on the other hand, deems his ‘humanistic’
approach as being directly and fundamentally opposed to the underlying tenets of the materialist
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tradition in scientific anthropology and goes on to explain the benefits of the hermeneutical
method as an alternative option for anthropological inquiry.
Geertz emphasizes that in order to interpret the webs of meaning which constitute a culture the
anthropologists must describe and understand the actions and words of individuals through the
use of ‘thick descriptions’. The specific aim of such description is to untangle the contextual
meanings and intentions underlying behavior which may not be apparent through superficial
description. For example, whether an individual is twitching or winking may not be immediately
obvious through simple observation of physical behavior, though a deeper consideration of the
situation may clarify. Furthermore, it is important to have the more general goal of focusing
upon actors and how they shape and are shaped by their culture. In order to achieve these
hermeneutical goals, the anthropological observer must enmesh themselves in a culture,
eventually becoming an ‘insider’ in order to transform his/her perspective and help decode the
complex meanings deeply embedded within the core of the life form. (1973: 3-10)
Geertz conceptualizes his subject matter, i.e. culture as analogous to a text in that both are
constructed and require similar methods for interpretation while the ethnographic writings of the
anthropologist are deemed to be ‘fictions’ (1973: 15) Thus the work of the ethnographer
becomes akin to that of the literary critic though Geertz makes sure to highlight that despite their
constructed nature, ethnographic texts are strongly tied up with real ways of life, i.e. what
‘…people say, what they do, what is done to them…’ (1973: 18). Regarding this latter aspect,
Geertz implies that despite the novel methodology of the interpretive approach, its underlying
goals remain scientific in that it aims to evaluate theories according to ‘systematic modes of
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assessment’ (1973: 24) Ultimately, the ambitions remain empirical in that particular
ethnographic experiences are used to understand the function of meaning in human culture. On
the other hand, rigid scientific methods which aim to ‘codify abstract regularities’ or generalize
across cases are inadequate for such an inquiry which deals with the unpredictability and
complexity of cultural life (1973: 26).
Contemporary Interpretive Anthropology and its assumptions
While contemporary interpretive anthropologists share a good amount of methodological
principles, they also disagree on several fundamental issues, sometimes as significant as whether
interpretive anthropology can aim to form empirical and verifiable laws or explanations of
cultural meanings (in Geertz’ (1973: 27) words ‘to uncover the conceptual structures which
inform our subjects’ acts’) or whether it must devote itself to a reflexive analysis and critique of
ethnographies and thus function as a vehicle for ‘self-reflection and self-growth’ (Marcus and
Fischer 1986: 1) It may be fair to suggest that in many respects what unites the interpretive
tradition are the criticisms which many of its’ members have made against positivistic
methodology and its’ assumptions but especially what is deemed to be the latter’s misguided
quest for naturalistic cross-culturally applicable laws which may explain and predict human
behavior.
Thus Hobart (1987) dealing with the use of the comparative method, criticizes scientific
cross-cultural comparisons of operationally defined variables which whether they are
institutions, beliefs or institutionalized relationships, are deemed to have ‘essences discernable
independent of observers and frames of reference’ despite the fact that the objects of comparison
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are social discourses rather than objective ontological forms (1987: 4). Furthermore, he argues,
there is a general disregard of the extent to which comparison and translation are affected by the
interpretive acts of the analyst where there always exist rival interpretations. Rabinow (1977)
notes that anthropologists are ‘not neutral scientists collecting unambiguous data’ and that the
individuals’ lives that they study are not unconsciously determined by alien social forces. For
Rabinow, the facts of the anthropologist are fictitious and cross-cultural in the sense that they
become objective through the mutual interactions (i.e. questionings, observations and
experiences) of the anthropologist and the people he/she studies (1977: 152).
Holy (1987) adds that since observation is no longer taken for granted as providing objective
information, interpretive theorists have emphasized how the observer ‘has come to know what he
claims to know about a particular society or culture’ and thus the need for adequate descriptions
has replaced the need for sociological generalizations (1987: 7). An interpretive methodological
approach therefore emphasizes the extent to which the anthropologist’s own experiences and
conceptual tools affect the constitution of an ethnographic account. Cross-cultural comparisons
on the other hand are no longer deemed capable of providing the scientific function of theory
testing, rather interpretive approaches are characterized by analytical descriptions of culturally
specific processes of meaning construction. This does not necessarily lead Holy away from
having empirical ambitions. He suggests that interpretive methods of cultural-comparison must
aim to compare similar ‘forms, objects or constructs in two or more cultures with the objective of
elucidating the defining processes through which their meanings are constructed’ in order to
discover underlying ‘cultural logics’. Furthermore, through intra-cultural comparison, one may
compare dissimilar constructs within a society with the aim of discovering similar processes of
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meaning creation which underlie them (1987: 7-10).
Ellen (1984) takes the issue of ethnographic analysis further by exploring what distinguishes it
from natural scientific analysis. He notes that interpretive participant observation is conceived of
differently from the simple positivistic notion of a scientist observing his subject, in that
emphasis is placed on the enmeshing of the observer with his object of study, so much so that
he/she is primarily a participant and only secondarily an observer. In Ellen’s words, this
‘eliminates the distinction between the observer and the observed phenomena’ and thus, through
his/ her ‘socialization into the culture being studied’ the observer can learn the embedded
meanings of social life (1984: 29-30). Many of these reconsiderations are the result of the recent
move in interpretive anthropology away from the field (i.e. a posteriori analysis) and back into
the armchair (i.e. a priori analysis). Phillips (1973: 78) writes that the current crisis in social
science is due to the fact that knowledge of appropriate methodology for anthropological
analysis is dependent upon better knowledge of the anthropological object of analysis (i.e. social
phenomenon). Since the latter can only be achieved by acquiring better methods, interpretive
anthropologists argue that existing data must be reanalyzed and that the theoretical assumptions
of positivistic methodology must be interrogated and adapted to suit inquiry in the social
sciences (Ellen, 1984: 27).
Regarding the anthropologists’ object of study, Barnes (1982) argues that the assumption that
human phenomena are subject to natural laws which one must discover, ignores the
immeasurably complex nature of experience even above language which is complex and rich
enough. For Barnes, there is little in common between physical objects and social events (1982:
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28) Rabinow adds that anthropologists are not dealing with logical epistemic subjects whose
activities may be ‘generalized and understood as context-free operations’ (1979: 4). In the
Critique of Pure reason, Kant notes that the human subject is unique in that through reflection
upon actions, it comes to know itself as a subject in a world which is not only passively
experienced but also actively constituted through one’s intended thoughts and acts. Rabinow
notes that in line with this understanding of human experience, interpretive theorists must
criticize any system of knowledge which reduces human phenomena to ‘a system of categories
defined only in terms of their relations to one another’ (1979: 4). He further notes that
interpretive theorists understand that ‘the web of meaning constitutes human existence to such an
extent that it cannot ever be meaningfully reduced to constitutively prior speech acts, dyadic
relations, or any predefined elements’ (Rabinow 1979: 6)
Another concern of interpretive theorists is the culturally mediated and therefore relative position
of western science. Rabinow is skeptical of absolute perspectives or privileged positions
especially since in his perspective, all intellectual paradigms are historically constituted. He
suggests that the western constitution of reality is ‘exotic’ and that scientific claims to truth are
‘linked to social practices’ (Lett 1997:15) Tyler concurs, suggesting that all historically
constituted rules and criteria for logical and rational analysis are self-affirming and not
necessarily objective ‘guides to action, knowledge, and belief’ and denies that the discourse of
one cultural tradition could ever encompass that of another. (Tyler 1991:80) In addition, Tyler
follows postmodern philosophers of science such as Feyerabend and Quine by further suggesting
that the scientific method is only capable of achieving consensus and affirmation for its
discoveries within the sub-culture of science, which is far removed from its goals of objective
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cross-cultural knowledge (1997: 15). In general however, interpretive theorists do not explicitly
criticize natural science and its’ results. They feel however, that scientific methods and goals are
circumspect when they are thoughtlessly imported for use in the social sciences and regarded as
suitable for acquiring cumulative knowledge of human phenomena without consideration of the
important distinctions which make anthropological analysis radically different to the work of the
scientist in the lab, especially considering the subjective interactions involved in the use of
participant observation.
The aim of the next section is to consider the underlying epistemological arguments
underpinning the most destructive accusation which various interpretive theorists have leveled
against scientific anthropologists in order to assess its’ value. It can be summarized as follows:
Scientific methods are inappropriate for dealing with the subject matter of anthropology
At the root of all social phenomena are reflecting humans who are caught up in webs of meaning
which they themselves have spun. Data from this subject matter is ‘collected’ in a unique manner
which is not analogous to the work of the natural scientist. It involves the grasping of social
meaning through subjective interaction rather than observation of objective facts in the form of
human behavior or social structures.
Section 2: Winch and Jarvie
While many philosophers of science and social science have attempted to explain and elucidate
the unique aspects of social scientific inquiry which distinguish it from natural scientific
explanation (e.g. Taylor 1979; Palmer 1969), the most influential and lucid attempt must be
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Winch’s (1958) ‘The Idea of a Social Science’. In this work, Winch promotes the understanding
of principles which underlie the conduct of human behavior, highlighting its importance above
and beyond the formation of generalizations from behavioral regularities. Throughout the book,
Winch rails against scientific approaches which attempt to search for social ‘logics’ which may
help to explain social phenomena and predict developments. Winch focuses upon J.S. Mill and
his attempts to form a science of any subject matter which displays a sense of regularity, even
when the facts upon which the phenomena depend are difficult to observe. For Mill, sciences
such as Tidology and Meteorology are such examples where the complexity and variability of
the phenomenon in question have made scientific analysis difficult and prediction imprecise.
These phenomenon share aspects such as irregularity, especially across space and time, with
social phenomenon, and the best one could hope for according to Mill are statistical
generalizations concerning the probable outcome of situations which, in the case of human
behavior, would be possible to a greater degree of accuracy when dealing with the ‘collective
conduct of masses’ (18: Book VI). While these probable outcomes do vary somewhat
spatiotemporally, regularities are evidence of an underlying logic which Mill locates in the mind,
exhibited as psychological states which he suggests may or may not correspond to specific
physiological states (1958: 62-65).
Despite Mill’s psychological reductionism which Karl Popper has criticized, Winch has greater
concerns with his conflation of the appropriate logic of explanation required for social and
natural phenomenon which, according to Winch, risks masking the unique nature and aspects of
human behavior which underlie superficial statistical regularities. While Mill feels rightly that
complexity sets human or social phenomena apart from natural ones, he misapprehends what this
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complexity entails. Winch is pointing out that the qualitatively judged regularities of human
behavior belong to a separate and distinct conceptual framework from the one used to judge
physical regularities in natural phenomena. With regards to social phenomena, in order to decide
when two situations are the same, one must understand ‘the kind of activity in the context of
which the question arises’ since the concepts derive from this activity and belong to a particular
form of life. They cannot be imposed by external observers such as social scientists (Winch
1956: 23). The participants understand the rules and requirements for correct performance of this
activity and it is the concepts belonging to this activity which subjectively determine what
constitutes regularity of behavior. To an outside observer, similar bodily movements during a
religious ritual may constitute regularity when in fact an understanding of the ritual may reveal
them to have distinct meanings. On the other hand, when dealing with natural phenomena such
as tides or physical objects, it is the scientific community which forms concepts in the form of
methods and procedures of investigation which it uses to judge what constitutes regularity.
Winch uses the example of a physics experiment dealing with gravity. The experiment will have
certain variables such as the inclination of a plane or the material of the plane, and understanding
the procedure entails understanding these variables and what it would mean for them to ‘varied’
or ‘kept the same’ in distinct experiments (1956: 26-29) These inanimate objects do not in
themselves function in accordance with a conceptual framework but rather a framework is
externally applied. In order to fully appreciate how this applies in the case of analysis in social
science, it is necessary to consider what explanation of human regularities implicitly assumes.
For Winch, complex concepts explaining human behavior may not be intelligible directly to
participants. However, what is important is that the concepts are rooted in understandings of
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contextual ways of life from which they derive. To explain the high rate of divorce in a certain
village using complex alien concepts, one must first understand fully what divorce entails in that
particular cultural form of life before one can go further to offer appropriate explanations. Winch
uses the example of an economic concept of liquidity preference which, although it is not
generally used in everyday business conduct explains how the business man’s behavior brings
about changes in the value of money. Crucially, the concept is logically tied to concepts which
are understood by business men such as ‘money’, ‘markets’ and ‘value’ (1956: 19).
In order to fully evaluate Winch’s arguments, it is necessary to explore two further issues which
his analysis raises. Firstly, there is the question of what lies at the root of human behavior and
regularities or rather what meaningful behavior actually consist of and secondly, the kinds of
explanations and generalizations it would be feasible to offer once this is taken into account. The
first issue is crucial for Winch, since it sums up the most significant aspect of sociological
inquiry, namely to understand the nature of social phenomena by understanding the
understandings of others which allow them or rather give them the capacity to act appropriately
or inappropriately in social life. Thus the philosophical task of epistemology becomes for Winch,
the primary goal of the social sciences. But how do we get from the understandings of others to
their behaviors? The central premise of Winch’s work is that ‘all behavior which is meaningful
(therefore all specifically human behavior) is ipso facto rule-governed’ (1958: 48). This behavior
is far from blind habit in the sense that it is purposeful and goal directed. For Winch, a human
society consists of a whole constituting different kinds of rule-governed behavior. Rule-governed
behavior is contrasted by Winch with animal behavior such as the performance of a trick by a
dog. A dog may learn to do a trick and repeat it regularly in response to a certain stimulus. This
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kind of action is unreflective and does not involve an intentional act or an attempt at performing
the trick correctly. On the occasion that the dog doesn’t manage to perform the trick, there may
perhaps be a conflicting stimulus but it would be senseless to speak of a failed attempt unless we
refer to the dog in an anthropomorphic fashion. On the other hand, for a human to get to work on
time regularly, he must understand what the latter entails and despite varying situations attempt
to follow rules in accordance with his understandings of such concepts as ‘time’, ‘work’ and
‘early’ while also understanding what it means to behave consistently as opposed to
inconsistently. The central point is that once someone has learnt a rule and knows for example
what it means to arrive early to work on a regular basis, he must be able to use these rules and
apply them in varying conditions and situations and this is what makes behavior reflective rather
than blind regurgitation (1958: 56-60).
Despite an emphasis on understanding rule-following behavior, in much of his earlier work,
Winch still assumes that the ultimate task of social science must be the detection and formulation
of human behavioral regularities, albeit with greater regard for the peculiar nature of human
regularities in relation to physical regularities. For Winch, this novel aspect requires a renewed
procedural approach and an abandonment of older explanatory models which apparently do not
take rule-following behavior into account. Perhaps if these models are considered, it may be
possible to understand their weaknesses and how an emphasis on ‘understanding’ may help to
improve their capacity to ‘detect and formulate behavioral regularities’ (1958: 48). Winch’s first
concern is a model which attempts to understand a social institution by ‘observing regularities in
the behavior of its participants’ without understanding the contextual nature of ‘regularity’
(1958: 81). As mentioned earlier, the analyst must understand what regularity ‘means’ in the
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particular context of this institution and in order to do so he must familiarize himself with the
relevant social activities and their meanings. As Winch emphasizes, the analyst of religion ‘must
have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying’ just
as the ‘historian of art must have some aesthetic sense’ (1958: 83). Thus externally related
judgments of regularity from for example common behavioral or physiological states would be
inadequate and that is precisely what Winch censures. It is quite peculiar that Winch uses
examples of certain institutions such as religion and art and in other places refers to ‘love’ rather
than using examples of non-metaphysical rule-following behavior such as driving or
scuba-diving, especially since it is the latter which are usually prone to analyses involving
statistical generalizations. This aspect will be focused in greater depth below.
The second aspect of social scientific explanatory models which Winch criticizes is their
tendency to form predictions from generalizations. For Winch, social predictions are unlike
scientific ones; while it may be possible to predict decisions in certain situations, at the root of all
social phenomena are the intentional decisions of individuals as attempts to apply learnt rules to
novel situations, and an extraordinary situation may lead to a completely unpredictable outcome.
This can be contrasted with the example of a dog’s performance of a trick which relies on a
single stimulus. One can predict that as long as there is no countering stimulus, such as food
nearby, the dog will perform the trick. To offer another example, a mechanic may easily
determine how a slight modification will affect the performance of his machine but a chancellor
will struggle to offer an equally valid prediction of the outcome of a particular economic policy
due to the complex actions and interactions of rule-following individuals. It must be mentioned
however that it would be unusual to find social scientific analyses which attempt to predict the
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outcomes of financial policies or criminal trials with the accuracy that one may use to predict
‘physical’ or ‘natural’ changes. Rather, the concept of ‘liquidity preference’ which Winch lauds
is the kind of prediction which is customary in the social sciences and as described above, it
involves a general explanation of how the value of money may likely be affected by the activities
of business men. (1956: 30-33)
Ian Jarvie is a philosopher of social science who has written much to counter many of Winch’s
arguments while accepting the validity of some of his concerns. His arguments revolve around
the notion that while humans may be complex rule-following individuals, the goal of social
science is not to explain this behavior i.e. conscious action, but rather to explain the unintended
outcomes of human actions; entities such as ‘groups, marriage, morals and knowledge’ which for
Jarvie are products of their actions ‘but not necessarily of their intentions’ (Jarvie 1972: 3) While
novel methods such as hermeneutics may be required for a social science to deal with
understandings at the level of rule following and getting to grips with a person’s psychology in
order to understand an individuals reasons for say declaring war or divorcing his spouse,
explaining why war broke out in a particular situation etc is a different kind of inquiry, one
which can make use of scientific methods. In his major work ‘Concepts and Society’, Jarvie goes
on to outline Karl Popper’s method of situational logic which he feels is an appropriate
explanatory model for such an inquiry. The main function of this model is to weigh up the aims
and goals of individuals alongside their situational context which would include any natural,
social, psychological and ethical circumstances which constitute both means by which
individuals achieve their aims and constraints on those aims. The model assumes that given a
certain context, humans attempt to find the most effective means of achieving their aims or a
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‘logic’ which suits. Jarvie notes that the actor’s ideas, inclinations and proclivities are ‘part of his
situation in a complicated way’ (1972: 4).
A major assumption is that an objective appraisal of the situation by social scientists will reveal
certain favorable means of achieving aims as more effective and thereby rational than others.
This is termed as the ‘logic of the situation’ which Jarvie describes as an empirical description of
the procedure of explanation which goes on in the social sciences’ and is described as ‘a special
case of the deductive analysis of causal explanation in general’ thereby illustrating what is key in
this argument, namely ‘the unity of method in the sciences’ (1972: 4-5). Jarvie goes on to offer a
few examples. In one of these, he uses the method of situational logic in order to explain why in
a particular situation; a driver who is generally cautious causes a major accident by. He notes
that a proper analysis of the situation may reveal that for example the driver was using the
motorway on this occasion when he is more accustomed to city driving. Thus, in order to explain
the collision, one must understand the experience of the driver and the conditions under which
he/she was driving but also the kinds of norms which are respectively involved in city and
motorway driving. This latter aspect is what Winch is so keen to emphasize, specifically the
understanding of what the social and physical act of ‘driving’ entails. In order to fully appreciate
driving conditions, one must perhaps have driven oneself or at least one must fully understand
the social regulations and variable conditions which a driver can potentially meet at any time. In
other words, one must appreciate what the rule-following behavior of driving entails, namely, the
rules an individual must understand and act in accordance with in order to drive successfully. In
fact Jarvie himself suggests that ‘learning about traffic is a model for learning about society’ in
that the latter includes certain customs, institutions and expectations which in accordance with
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Winch, an individual can choose to follow in order to drive successfully or ignore perhaps in
order to willingly crash. (1972: 7)
Section 3: Analysis
There is no need to go any further into Jarvie’s account in order to explore the assumptions of
situational logic regarding how human behavior should be defined or whether all behavior can be
explained by the logic of the situation. There are surely numerous cases when such a method can
be used to explain the unintended outcomes of human actions but there appears to be a set of
assumptions which underlie such explanations involving the understanding
of the relevant social
activities. In sociological analysis dealing with mundane activities such as driving, this latter
process of ‘understanding’ is not immediately obvious and does not even appear as a separate
step in the inquiry. For example, English sociologists analyzing a vehicle collision on a British
road will be most likely have a good understanding of British traffic norms and what the activity
of driving involves. But English anthropologists wishing to explain a similar incident in an
exotic location where the rules of driving are entirely different will first need to spend a good
deal of time in order to become accustomed to this new style of driving. Furthermore, the inquiry
of understanding this new form of driving as a variant of a widespread human activity constitutes
a much more profound scientific activity than explaining a collision. Rather than being the first
step towards explanation of specific events, the understanding of a social phenomenon becomes
in itself a significant task and a distinct kind of analysis, one which is better suited to a
hermeneutical methodology coupled with participant observation where the latter is an efficient
manner of understanding a new ‘rule’ since it involves the actual practice of rule-following.
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This point is elaborated somewhat by philosopher of science Palmer and anthropologists Watson
and Watson-Franke (1975), who emphasize that explanatory models typically tend to ask
questions such as “What is the time?” and “Why did war break out?” in order to get some
information and a segment of a context while hermeneutical understandings of social
phenomenon as understandings of a whole ask more basic and fundamental questions such as
“What is time?” and “What is war?” (1975: 251). The latter model attempts to reflexively
question preunderstandings and remains open to new concepts derived from the phenomena
under analysis while the former model is more conservative in that it sets rigid boundaries of its
own and wants superficial information which suits its own conceptual framework. While Winch
tends to suggest that a consideration of the complexities of rule-following makes social
predictions and causal explanations of human behavior much harder and redundant to a certain
extent, what becomes clear is that while such explanatory models are indeed partially capable of
prediction and explanation, they are thoroughly confined by their own aims.
Of even greater significance is the fact that hermeneutics becomes indispensable when the
subject matter is metaphysical as is often the case in typical anthropological analyses of exotic
cultures although Winch does not fully appreciate this important distinction. Throughout his
work he seems to suggest that whatever the social activity, unless one can grasp an individuals
reasons for behaving in a certain manner, one can never explain his actions and in the same way,
the development of say social institutions must be analyzed by focusing upon individuals and
their intentions, expectations and relations. But as Jarvie (1972) notes, an explanatory model
based upon situational logic is suited to explaining the unintended outcomes of human actions
such as a car accident whilst generally taking into account the kinds of customary, purposeful
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and reflexive (rule-following) behavior which driving entails (1972: 2-7) In a similar manner,
such a model could even attempt to explain what allows a hunter gather tribe to develop into a
complex industrial society through an evaluation of social developments as the unintended
products of human behavior in particular situational contexts. Furthermore, as mentioned above,
Winch appears to support the economic concept of liquidity preference which could be used in
such an explanatory model in order to explain a change in the financial value of a business
institution by associating this causally with the unintended consequences of the behavior of
businessmen. Thus, scientific methods can potentially be used to explain the developments of
non-metaphysical social phenomena through legitimate ethno-scientific analysis, although it is
true that explanations and predictions of social phenomena will never be as accurate as those
dealing with natural or physical phenomena for all the reasons Winch outlines. However,
assuming this is the only appropriate kind of social scientific analysis eschews another kind of
inquiry, namely the understandings of other people’s understanding which becomes especially
significant when the subject matter is metaphysical . While Winch elaborates his descriptions of
rule-following behavior in order to excoriate the status of social science, what he is actually
outlining is a completely distinct methodology; one which legitimately stands alongside
explanatory models such as ‘situational logic’. And in anthropology, this kind of analysis, in the
form of hermeneutics, surpasses ethno-scientific explanation in importance since its’
‘understandings’ determine what kinds of explanatory models will be appropriate for
‘explaining’ not only alien ways of life, but also metaphysical matters such as art, morality,
politics and religion which are central to the appreciation of any culture and which can only be
explained by determining what constitutes ‘rational’ or ‘logical’ behavior within them.
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Nielsen is a philosopher who draws upon Winch’s ideas to elucidate the manner in which
‘verstehen’ analysis allows an analyst to grasp the meanings which metaphysical social
phenomena hold in particular ways of life. He suggests that ethno-scientific explanatory models
often preliminarily judge exotic belief systems to be irrational and therefore dismiss the task of
‘understanding’ in favor of ‘explaining away’ by searching for causal explanations which may
uncover the origins of these phenomena or the ‘psychological needs they satisfy’ (Nielsen 1982:
469). He suggests that a favorable understanding of these phenomena would involve getting to
grips with the contextual rationale for the belief, action or rule-following behavior as Winch is
keen to highlight. This process involves an appreciation of the local ‘rationality’ which underlies
the mode of social life whether it is religion, morality, law, natural science or Azande magical
conceptions. To understand what this appreciation entails we arrive at the central theme of
Winch’s work which Nielsen recalls; namely the understanding of concepts which are possessed
by ‘those engaged in these activities’ (1982: 469).
An example should help to clarify the perils of utilizing a scientific model in order to explain
metaphysical beliefs, something which has plagued anthropological inquiry ever since
Malinowski. In his essay named ‘social science’ Winch counters a proposition of Italian
sociologist and philosopher Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto claims that all human societies contain
culturally specific discourses akin to ideologies which offer pseudo-explanations of social life
but which disguise the reality of the social phenomena by making groundless rationalizations for
pointless activities. Pareto suggests that these activities, ‘ Derivations, ’ are actually the results of
certain universal human sentiments and that the social scientist must attempt to use scientific
techniques in order to uncover the reality which underlies these ideologies i.e. the ‘ residues’ or
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the real nature and causes of the ‘behavior’ which is under analysis (Winch: 1958: 97-100). Thus
while a certain religious group may explain their beliefs by referring to theological texts etc,
these for Pareto would constitute ‘derivations’ while other ‘real’ scientific explanations would
clarify the actual reasons for belief. But unlike Jarvie’s explanatory model, (which takes into
account the concepts or rule-following behavior required for ‘driving on a public road’ in order
to scientifically explain unintended events), this kind of analysis doesn’t attempt to achieve an
understanding of the meanings underlying this exotic social activity by grasping local concepts;
rather it attempts to impose scientific standards of rationality upon an exotic metaphysical social
activity. And if Winch has taught us one thing it is that the concept of societal behavior ‘cannot
be grasped except in terms of the concept of rule following and rule-governed behavior…’
(Winch 1956: 25) Though Pareto probably appreciates that the rule-following behavior
constituting religious belief (as a metaphysical activity) is perhaps not as easy to learn as is the
behavior involved in Jarvie’s driving example. Indeed, Winch reminds us that the analyst of
religion ‘must have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is
studying’ just as the ‘historian of art must have some aesthetic sense’ (1958: 83). As mentioned
above there is something special about art and religion; is this not a call for a ‘metaphysical’
hermeneutics?
Section 4: Conclusion
Verstehen vs. Eklären?
In order to evaluate what kind of methodological approach is appropriate for anthropology
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inquiry, it is first necessary to appreciate one underlying notion which runs throughout the
philosophical discussion in the previous section. Scientific explanation and hermeneutical
interpretation or understanding are not as diametrically opposed to one another as it would seem
to one glancing across the contemporary anthropological literature. In fact, these methodologies
need not even meet each other face to face, since their respective territories are clearly distinct.
However, it is perhaps closer to the boundaries dividing these territories where
misunderstandings have often arisen. This paper has explored theoretical debates regarding the
suitability of these distinct methodologies for the analysis of a variety of social phenomenon,
whilst specifically focusing upon how these methods weigh up in the kinds of analysis which
sets anthropology apart from other social sciences.
In the foregoing discussion, it was made clear that methodologies such as Jarvie’s (1972)
‘situational logic’ are appropriate for explaining social phenomena as the unintended
consequences of human actions through the analysis of the dispositions of a given situational
context but it was also noted that such analyses are confined in their aims in three primary ways.
Firstly, as Watson and Watson-Franke (1975) highlight, by their vary nature, they are only
capable of considering a segment of a social context rather than dealing with a social whole; i.e.
they may attempt to explain a particular incident (such as reasons for war breaking out) but not
the social phenomenon of war as a meaningful social activity. The most profound explanation
would be one dealing with the diachronic development of social phenomenon; perhaps
considering the social evolution of societal institutions. Secondly, as Winch (1958) reiterates,
their considerations and explanations of this segment of a particular social phenomenon must
depend upon understandings of the concepts which belong to this activity. Indeed, Jarvie who is
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usually quite antagonistic towards Winch’s arguments concedes this point by highlighting the
necessity of understanding the entailments of ‘driving a car’ such as customs, institutions and
expectations in order to explain a driving incident (1972: 4). This kind of understanding is
straightforward in an analysis of one’s own society, but typically in anthropological cases, this
would require a separate analysis involving the familiarization of oneself with the
‘rule-following behavior’ of the ‘exotic’ social activity in question.
We can infer from this that in all cases where such an analysis falls short, it is the method of
‘verstehen ’ or understanding which is the missing factor. Needless to say, there are a plethora of
cases when an understanding of relevant concepts can be taken for granted and scientific
methods can offer useful explanations. Winch himself highlights the benefits of a scientific
concept such as liquidity preference commonly used in economics. However, in anthropology,
the emphasis on understanding an alien social activity or culture ‘in it’s own terms’ has proved to
be a profound inquiry’; one large enough to fill up the whole of an anthropologists’ to-do-list.
This is before one considers the third issue constraining the use of scientific methods in
anthropology. Namely that the social phenomenon which usually occupy anthropologists, such
as religion, politics, art, law and morality are metaphysical and any scientific explanation of
them would require one to first appreciate the rationale underlying such activities. It appears that
the majority of anthropologists have taken these considerations into account; as mentioned in the
introduction, the general disciplinary trend has been towards the greater use of hermeneutical
methods and this has been coupled with a critical stance towards the inappropriate use of
scientific methods.
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Anthropological science?
More generally, the goal of this paper was to explore the suitability of employing scientific
methods for the analysis of social phenomenon especially within the context of anthropology, in
order to consider the merits of two opposed methodological positions which divide
anthropologists. It is not of concern here to evaluate the arguments of those most radically
opposed to the use of empirical science in an anthropological context. What is more important is
to use the findings of this paper in order to pinpoint the limits of scientific analysis in
anthropology, in order to thereby consider the value of the hermeneutical arguments advanced in
opposition. As outlined in the first section, the definition of anthropological science proffered by
O’Meara, one of its most ardent followers is as follows: scientific anthropology should aim for
the ‘systematic description and classification of objects, events and processes, and the
explanation of those events and processes by theories that employ lawful regularities’ (1989:
354). In the previous section, it was made clear that the ‘explanation’ of social and therefore
human phenomena is not analogous to the description of physical or natural phenomena,
although as outlined above, this does not render scientific explanation wholly redundant. An
anthropological example may help to illustrate this. As long as an analyst is familiar with the
Kula exchange systems of the Trobriand Islanders, is fully aware of the kinds of rules, customs
etc required to participate successfully in such a system and perhaps has a specific understanding
of how such a system customarily affects the social status of participating members, he/she is
qualified to attempt a scientific explanation of two main kinds. Firstly, one may explore a
specific incident within the context of the social activity; for example one may ask why an
islander has managed to retain all of his Kula valuables while at the same time increasing his/her
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prestige. Secondly, one may attempt a causal explanation of the origins of the exchange system
with an emphasis on the political/religious/economic roles it plays generally in Trobriand
society.
However, each of these inquiries is thoroughly dependent upon an understanding of the exotic
exchange system in question and a grasping of the concepts which belong to it. This is exactly
what anthropologists have historically managed to do by providing meaningful ‘translations’ of
the workings of alien social activities which we can all agree with. In general, this involves an
interpretation of the meanings and logical structures that have been ascribed to social
phenomenon in particular contexts and is the central goal of hermeneutical inquiry. By
describing scientific anthropology as the ‘description…of objects’ and their ‘explanation’,
O’Meara has purposefully neglected the complexities inherent in the process of ‘describing’
human phenomena and it signals that he deems the ‘descriptions’ to be less significant than the
‘explanations’ or at best equal to them. The fact that the definition O’Meara advances could be
directly imported for use in the natural sciences without even a slight alteration is quite telling of
his implicit assumptions.
The conflation between natural and social phenomenon is a common occurrence in scientific
anthropological literature and a good example can be found in a paper by Roscoe (1995) in
which he argues that since our knowledge of natural and physical phenomenon are based upon
the social interpretations of a scientific community, our knowledge of human affairs should
similarly be derived from ‘interpretations’ of the same order through the use of analogous
‘interpretive’ conceptual frameworks (1995: 496). However, a key insight of this paper, as
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elucidated by Winch (1958) has been to contrast the nature of human phenomenon, which
function in accordance with their own conceptual frameworks, with physical phenomenon which
we understand through the external application of our own scientific concepts. In his work,
O’Meara pleas for anthropologists to focus upon the ‘causes’ of human affairs and not delve into
interpretations of their ‘meanings’ and quotes Einstein who had suggested that the aim of science
is not ‘to give a taste of the soup’ (quoted in O’Meara 1989:366). However, this paper has shown
that it is precisely through a ‘taste’ of the social activity in question that anthropologists can even
attempt causal explanations and that ultimately, ‘tasting’ is often such a significant and time
consuming activity, that anthropologists ought to have time for little else afterwards.
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