moving beyond p4p: new payment systems to accelerate value-driven health care

Moving Beyond P4P:New Payment Systems to Accelerate

Value-Driven Health Care

Harold D. MillerStrategic Initiatives Consultant

Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative

February 29, 2008

2© 2007, 2008 Network for Regional Health Improvement, Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative

NRHI: The Network for Regional Health Improvement

• NRHI formed in 2006 to help facilitate health care quality improvement at the regional level, with support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

• Founding members:– Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement– Massachusetts Health Quality Partners– Minnesota Community Measurement– Pacific Business Group on Health– Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative– Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality


Common Concerns of NRHI MembersAbout Payment Systems and P4P

• Payment Systems Impede Quality Improvement– Providers may not be paid at all if they do the right thing– Providers may lose money by reducing errors, infections

• P4P Initiatives Don’t Solve the Basic Problems– Amounts of bonuses and penalties too small to offset

rewards/penalties in the underlying payment system– Focus on documenting processes, rather than achieving

outcomes, in P4P deters innovation and adds administrative burden on providers

– Limitation to measurable processes with standards may divert attention from other processes or outcomes


NRHI Summit: “Creating Payment Systems to Accelerate Value-Driven Health Care” (3/29/07)

Nearly 100 attendees

from all acrossthe country

Intensive4 hour

work sessions

Key paymentreform issuesidentified for

resolution

Sponsors:•Commonwealth Fund•Jewish Healthcare Fdn•California HealthCare Fdn•Robert Wood Johnson Fdn


What the Payment Summit Tackled

• Four Groups of Patients/Conditions:– Care of Major Acute Episodes (heart attack, cancer, trauma, etc.)– Care of Stable Chronic Conditions (diabetes, CHF, COPD, etc.)– Care of Unstable Chronic Conditions (multiple diseases, end-of-life)– Preventive Care/Minor Acute Episodes (immunizations, minor

wounds, etc.)

• Five Categories of Issues:– What method of payment should be used to compensate providers?– Should payments for multiple providers be “bundled” together?– How should the actual level of payment be determined?– What performance standards should be set, and should there be

performance incentives?– Should there be incentives for patients regarding choice of providers

and participation in care?


What are the Choices for Payment Methods?

Fee forService(FFS)

Episodeof Care

Payment(ECP)

Multi-ProviderBundledEpisodeof Care

Payment

Condition-Specific

Capitation

FullCapitation

CONTINUUM OF HEALTHCARE PAYMENT METHODS

PerDiem

Risk: Patient Overtreatment Risk: Patient Undertreatment


What Are the Tradeoffsin Alternative Payment Methods?

Cost

Patient=

Cost

Processx # Processes

Service# ServicesEpisode of Care

x x# Episodes

of CareCondition

x # ConditionsPatient

VARIABLES CONTRIBUTING TO THE COST OF CARE



Cost

Patient=

Cost



x x# Episodes

of CareCondition


- FEE FOR SERVICE -

-- EPISODE OF CARE PAYMENT --

------- CONDITION-SPECIFIC CAPITATION ------------------------------------ FULL CAPITATION -----------------------------

VARIABLES FOR WHICH THE PROVIDER IS AT RISKUNDER ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS

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© 2007, 2008 Network for Regional Health Improvement, Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative


Cost

Patient=

Cost



x x# Episodes

of CareCondition


- FEE FOR SERVICE -

-- EPISODE OF CARE PAYMENT --

------- CONDITION-SPECIFIC CAPITATION ------------------------------------ FULL CAPITATION -----------------------------

VARIABLES FOR WHICH THE PROVIDER IS AT RISKUNDER ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS

INSURANCE RISK

TECHNICAL RISK

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Recommended Approach forPaying for Major Acute Care, Part 1

• Basic Method of Payment– a single “Episode-of-Care Payment” should be made to

cover all of a provider’s services associated with an episode of care for a patient

– the amount should be adjusted for the diagnosis, complexity, and risk of the patient

– the amount should be prospectively defined, but with a retrospective adjustment based on performance

– each provider (hospitals, physicians, home health care agencies, etc.) involved should be paid on this basis

– all costs (facilities, professional services, drugs, medical devices, etc.) should be covered by the payment

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• Bundling of Payments For Multiple Providers– a single payment should be defined that covers the

services provided by ALL of the following:• the hospital and its staff• the physicians involved in the care• post-acute care providers (home health, rehab, etc.)


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• Allocation of Bundled Payments Among Multiple Providers– LONG RUN: groups of providers need to define a single

accountable payee for receiving and allocating the episode-of-care payment among themselves

– SHORT RUN: where no such arrangement has been defined, payers should allocate the payment among providers based on a standard allocation determined when the payment level is established

– INCENTIVES should be created to encourage groups of providers to create joint arrangements for receiving and allocating payments among themselves


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• Restrictions on How Profits/Losses Are Divided– Providers should be free to work out their own

arrangements as to how any profits/losses incurred on a bundled payment should be divided

NOTE: this may require modifications to Stark law


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• Determination of the Base Payment Level– for each combination of diagnosis and patient

complexity/severity, a national, state, or regional collaborative (with representation from payers and providers) should determine a recommended payment level based on a study to estimate the cost of delivering good quality care for that type of patient

– providers should propose their actual price for the episode of care in negotiations with payers

– recommended base payment levels should vary from region-to-region based on cost-of-living differences, but other cost differences (e.g., efficiencies) should be captured by providers in their proposed prices


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• Adjustments in Payment for Providers with Special Characteristics (e.g., Teaching Hospitals)– Base payment levels for episodes of care should not be

adjusted for special characteristics– Separate payments should be made to providers to cover

these costs


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• Payment Adjustments for Outlier Cases– some adjustment should be made for cases where the

level of services (not costs) required for quality care significantly exceeds typical levels

– the adjustment needs to reflect whether improved outcomes are being achieved for higher levels of services

• Payment for Preventable Adverse Events– no payment to providers for additional care needed to

address preventable events or the complications resulting from such events

NOTE: this is much broader than Medicare’s new policy


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• Level of Service/Performance Required to Receive the Base Payment Level– processes considered mandatory (based on evidence) for

patients in a particular diagnosis/severity category should be defined by payers or a collaborative

– providers should only be paid if those mandatory processes are delivered, unless there is clear documentation that the processes are contra-indicated for the patient or if the patient is participating in a formal clinical trial of alternative processes


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• Financial Incentives Beyond Base Payment Level– financial incentives should be provided for those aspects

of care for which the payment system provides inadequate incentives or undesirable disincentives

– e.g., high rates of utilization of services relative to norms


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• Encouraging Patients to Choose High Quality/Low Cost Providers– patients should be given financial incentives/disincentives

by payers (e.g., different co-pays or co-insurance amounts) for using providers with different levels of quality and/or cost


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• Encouraging/Assisting Patients to Adhere to Care Processes That Affect Outcomes or Costs– payers should provide financial incentives to providers;– and payers and providers should provide financial

incentives to patients– to encourage patient adherence with care processes

• Encouraging Providers to Discuss Treatment Options With Patients– payers should provide financial incentives to providers

based on the level of patient involvement in care planning


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• Single payment for episode of care covering:– all services, medications, devices– all providers (hospital, physicians, post-acute care)

• Defined by providers, starting from recommended amt.• Allocated among providers by:

– providers themselves if possible– payers if necessary

• Adjustments in payment for:– performance on outcomes– service outliers, if outcome-beneficial

• No payment:– if mandatory processes are not covered– for additional costs associated with preventable adverse events

• Financial incentives to patients:– to select high-value providers and services– to adhere to care processes affecting outcomes

Summary of Approach forPaying for Major Acute Care

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How the Proposed ApproachImproves on the Current System

• Physicians no longer paid more for longer hospital stays, more procedures, or adverse events

• Hospitals have incentive to prevent adverse events, prevent readmissions, and use the right combination of in-patient and post-acute care

• Physicians and hospitals have incentive to cooperate in optimizing care quality and cost

• Providers have the funding flexibility to use the best combination of facilities and services for max. value

• Patients have an incentive to choose the facility and services that provide the best value (quality + cost)

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Similarities and Differences With Other Systems, Existing & Planned

• Medicare Hospital DRGs– are episode of care payments, adjusted for complexity– but only for a portion of the episode– and only for a single provider

• Prometheus Payment– covers full episode of care and all providers– deals with both integrated and non-integrated providers– but establishes the exact payment amount, rather than

recommending it and allowing providers to self-price in negotiations with payers or to compete for consumers

– and bases full payment on whether all processes used in establishing the payment amount are performed, rather than focusing on outcomes

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Similarities and Differences with Other Systems, Existing and Planned• Geisinger ProvenCareSM

– currently for coronary artery bypass graft surgery; plans to expand to hip replacement, cataract surgery, angioplasty, erythropoietin

– covers any follow-up care needed for avoidable complications within 90 days at no additional charge

– assures 40 care process benchmarks are followed– provider-driven (though started with integrated payer)

• Minnesota Patient Choice (BHCAG)– providers bid on risk-adjusted (total) cost of patient care– patients incur differential costs based on the cost/quality

tier of the provider they select

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Summit Recommendations forEncouraging Implementation

• Pursue Demonstration/Pilot Projects– to learn about unintended consequences– focus on limited, specific conditions that are relatively

homogeneous and where transparency exists– pursue at the regional level to get a range of demos, with

national support

• Rapid Evaluation and Replication of Demos– method of information sharing on demonstrations already

done and underway as well as completed/evaluated

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The Challenges of Getting Cooperation and Critical Mass

Purchaser Payer Provider Patient

PAYMENT REFORM

BENEFITS:

COSTS/RISKS:

Better HealthLower Costs; Lower Worker Absences

Lower Revenues;Upfront Investment in Improved Systems;Fairness of Measurement

Costs of Reworking Systems;Benefits May Accrue to Other Payers

BENEFITS AND COSTS ACCRUE TO DIFFERENT ENTITIES

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Encouraging Implementation, Part 2

• Provide incentives for providers to do tough demos– pay more for demonstrations– pay to offset higher administrative costs– get all payers involved– provide some assurance that this is the direction for the

future, rather than merely tests of possible concepts

• Provide incentives to get payers to the table– competition among payers inhibits multi-payer demos– national payers don’t want local variations– employers/purchasers will need to push for change

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A Lot of Important Details Required to Create Demonstrations

• What is included in an Episode of Care?– The work that Prometheus is doing can provide the

foundation for this, but variations in the actual payment mechanism may be needed

• How can bundled payments be made to fragmented providers?– Elliott Fisher has proposed accountable care

organizations based on hospitals and their referring MDs– Michigan Blue Cross/Blue Shield is encouraging small

physician practices to join together through its Physician Group Incentive Program (which supports quality improvement initiatives and distributes incentive pmts)

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Will Require Fundamental Changes in Payer Approach to Succeed

• Competitive pricing, not payer-defined pricing• Patient choice based on value, instead of P4P

– Payers will not save money if patients do not move to more efficient, higher quality providers

• giving incentive payments (i.e., paying more) to providers who are more efficient defeats the goal of increased efficiency

– Administered pricing systems (i.e., the payer defines the payment) do not generally enable the provider to lower its price on specific services where efficiencies are possible

– There is little incentive for providers to lower their costs and price if they can’t attract more patients, and most payers don’t provide (strong) incentives to patients to use lower-cost, higher value providers

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Encouraging Competitive Pricing:Creating Better Information on Value

• Example: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council Report on Cardiac Care (2005)

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Encouraging Competitive Pricing:Creating Competitive Marketplaces

• Providers need ways to compete for consumers on value

• Some entrepreneurial efforts are emerging, e.g., Carol.com in Minneapolis/St. Paul that is providing a virtual “marketplace” for care choices with prices

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Conclusions from the SummitRegarding Next Steps

• Fundamental changes in payment systems are highly desirable, if not essential, but very difficult

• Regional collaboratives of payers and providers, working in a national network, should take the lead

• Purchasers and clinicians, as well as payers, must be involved in payment system redesign

• Regional demonstrations are the most desirable way to move forward, if most payers participate

• Medicare/Medicaid participation is desirable, but not essential

• Demonstrations should be “budget neutral”

• Capacity of providers to manage and coordinate care also needs to be improved

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Bottom Line: Payment Reform Necessary But Not Sufficient

PaymentReform

ProviderOrganization

QualityImprovement

Initiatives

Cost & Quality

Transparency

For More Information:

Harold D. MillerStrategic Initiatives Consultant, Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative

and President, Future Strategies, LLC320 Ft. Duquesne Boulevard, Suite 20-J

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

[email protected]

(412) 803-3650

www.nrhi.org/summit.html

www.prhi.org

moving beyond p4p: new payment systems to accelerate value-driven health care

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