mountbatten, the royal family, and british influence in post-independence india and burma

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Mountbatten, the royal family, andBritish influence in post-independenceIndia and BurmaS.R. Ashton Dra Institute of Commonwealth Studies , 28 Russell Square, London,WC1B 5DSPublished online: 24 Jan 2007.

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Mountbatten, the Royal Family,and British Influence inPost-Independence India and BurmaS.R. Ashton

One of the unexplored themes in the career of Mountbatten is why more use was not madeof his services in similar contexts in the years after his Indian viceroyalty and governor-

generalship. This article examines his influence in private and unofficial capacities in hisdealings with post-independence India and Burma in the 1960s and early 1970s. In India

it considers Mountbatten’s efforts on behalf of the Indian princes when Indira Gandhi’sgovernment threatened their privy purses and privileges. In Burma it discusses Mountbat-ten’s attempts to persuade Burma to return to the Commonwealth and his influence over

General Ne Win, Burma’s military ruler. Mountbatten was unsuccessful in both cases. Bycontrast in Burma, Princess Alexandra was better placed to represent British interests,

suggesting perhaps that we should look more closely at the role of members of the royalfamily in promoting Britain’s foreign policy.

It is now more than a decade since the revelations providing what many regard as con-

firmation that, despite his constant denials during his lifetime, Lord Mountbatteninterfered with the award of the Punjab Boundary Commission in August 1947 at

the end of his Indian viceroyalty.1 But even before the disclosures, and irrespectiveof the wider historical controversies surrounding his role as India’s last viceroy,

Mountbatten had tarnished his reputation by virtue of his unfortunate propensityto engage in self-aggrandisement when reflecting on his 1947 Indian experience.

This became especially evident after his death (in 1979) when Larry Collins andDominique Lapierre published from New Delhi Mountbatten and the Partition ofIndia (1982). The book reproduced official documents made available by Mountbat-

ten,2 and also included transcripts of the authors’ interviews with Mountbatten fromthe early 1970s, upon which they had drawn in their earlier work, Freedom at Midnight

(1975). Freedom at Midnight was a brash account of independence much admired byMountbatten. In part because of the manner in which the authors’ questions were put,

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Vol. 33, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 73–92

Correspondence to: Dr S.R. Ashton, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 28 Russell Square, London WC1B 5DS.

Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0308-6534 print=1743-9329 online=05=010073–20DOI: 10.1080=0308653042000329021 # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd

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Mountbatten’s responses in the interviews were invariably couched in the first person.

In his own words he appears almost single-handedly to have steered India towardsindependence and partition.

In June 1948, when Mountbatten left India, his reputation on the subcontinent wasmixed. Official circles in Pakistan were bitter. To their suspicions over the Punjabboundary must be added an overall view that Mountbatten had been hostile

towards Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, and biased againstPakistan.3 In India the picture was different, and in neighbouring Burma too, as the

discussion which follows demonstrates. In both countries Mountbatten’s stockstood high. John Strachey, minister for war in Attlee’s government, captured an

important aspect of Mountbatten’s contemporary appeal in December 1950 in thecontext of the gathering emergency in Malaya. What was needed, he suggested, was

a strong and rigorous individual who felt at the same time genuine sympathy ‘withthe new Nationalism of Asia’. Strachey had difficulty thinking of names combiningthese qualities and he could not see beyond Mountbatten. He thought there might

be difficulties and even objections to putting him in charge in Malaya, but he sawlittle hope for Britain in that part of the world ‘unless we can appoint a man of his

stature and background’.4

Part of the answer to a question about why the British government did not make use

of Mountbatten in similar contexts after his Indian career rests with Mountbattenhimself. He was determined to return to the navy. But when his career in the Mediter-

ranean and at the Admiralty was over, and when also his subsequent appointment aschief of defence staff ended, a different picture emerges. As well as heading the Immi-

gration Mission to a number of Commonwealth capitals in 1965, Mountbatten wasconsidered for two other late imperial assignments in the 1960s. First, in November1965 Prime Minister Harold Wilson wanted to send him to Salisbury (Harare)

when Ian Smith declared Rhodesian UDI. The purpose was to demonstrate that thegovernor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, was still the legal authority in Rhodesia, and to

boost his morale by investing him with a KCVO, a personal honour bestowed bythe sovereign. Mountbatten was keen to go and the palace initially supported the

idea before it was abandoned because it was feared the Queen’s position would becompromised if something went wrong. Gibbs was rather less enamoured of the

idea. He questioned if Mountbatten was of sufficient status and asked if someone‘higher up’ could be sent.5 The second position for whichMountbatten was consideredarose in March 1967 when his name was mentioned along with several others to

succeed Sir Richard Turnbull as the last high commissioner for Aden and the Protec-torate of South Arabia, South Yemen at independence in November 1967. This was a

tough assignment. Aden and Southern Arabia were in the grip of a terrorist war fromwhich a Marxist National Liberation Front emerged triumphant. A number of military

personnel were considered for the job, and even Patrick GordonWalker, before it wentto Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, a diplomat with ambassadorial experience in Moscow

and Cairo who was brought out of retirement. Running through the possible namesfor the benefit of the prime minister, George Thomson, minister of state at the

Foreign Office, commented: ‘Finally one comes back to the inevitable suggestion of

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Lord Mountbatten. This is open to the charge that whenever the Government gets into

trouble whether it is prisons or colonies, it calls in Mountbatten. It would also lead toreferences to India [sic] independence.’6 In both contexts, Rhodesia and Aden, these

reactions were hardly ringing endorsements of Mountbatten’s credibility as a lateimperial plenipotentiary. Bearing in mind also he was second choice behind R.A.Butler to head the Immigration Mission, and a picture begins to emerge of Mountbat-

ten as an influence in decline.However, the real test of his credibility to represent Britain overseas, whether infor-

mally on behalf of the government or in a private capacity,7 rests primarily in relationto India and Burma, the countries most closely associated with his name and title. This

article examines his influence in two specific post-independence contexts in the 1960sand early 1970s. First, over India, it considers Mountbatten’s efforts to persuade Indira

Gandhi, the Indian prime minister, to halt her government’s intention to abolish theprivy purses and privileges of the former ruling princes. Second, it examines whetherMountbatten was successful acting on behalf of the Foreign Office in exerting influence

over General Ne Win, Burma’s military ruler, at a time when relations between the twocountries were becoming increasingly strained. The conclusion in both cases is that the

Mountbatten name was not in itself sufficient to influence the actions of the Indianand Burmese governments. By contrast, in the context of relations with Burma

especially, Princess Alexandra, a junior member of the royal family, was betterplaced, not so much to exert greater influence but to ensure strained relations never

led to a complete rupture.

I

As Viceroy Mountbatten’s most significant remark about the princely states appearedin his weekly personal report on 11 July 1947 when he admitted, ‘I have not been ableto grip this States problem before’.8 Britain’s formal position over the states,

announced by the Cabinet Mission in 1946, was that paramountcy would lapsewhen British India gained independence. Rights surrendered by the states would

return to them, the political void being filled by a federal relationship with a successorgovernment or governments, or other unspecified arrangements. A row had ensued in

June 1947 over the actions of Sir Conrad Corfield, political adviser to Mountbatten inhis capacity as crown representative, who interpreted the Cabinet Mission’s statement

as implying the states should have the option of independence. Jawaharlal Nehru,India’s prime minister in waiting, was furious. He told Lord Ismay, Mountbatten’schief of staff, it was bad enough India was to be partitioned; it would be ‘disastrous

if this process went further and resulted in the “balkanisation” of the country’.9

Some commentators have speculated Mountbatten was unconcerned about tackling

the states’ problem so late in the day. They suggest his ego and royal connections madehim confident he would find a solution.10 An alternative and more likely view is that

without a policy of his own, Mountbatten was rescued by V.P. Menon, reforms com-missioner to the Indian government with easy access to the Congress high command,

who suggested the princes might be asked to sign Instruments of Accession

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surrendering authority over defence, external affairs and communications to one of

the two new dominions. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, minister for the states, acceptedthis, on condition Mountbatten handed over ‘a full basket of apples’.11 The viceroy

launched his charm offensive to persuade the princes in a speech to the Chamber ofPrinces on 25 July. Speaking over an hour without notes, he reminded his audiencehe was the kinsman of their king-emperor. His scheme, he told the princes, left

them ‘with all the practical independence that you can possibly use’.12 But they hadto make up their minds quickly; any hesitation and the government’s terms might

be withdrawn. Much arm-twisting followed. In the event, when India and Pakistanbecame independent in August 1947, Mountbatten’s basket of apples was not quite

full. Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagadh and one or two much smaller Kathiawar statesin western India had not signed Instruments of Accession.

Whether the princes had been deceived over their future, and whether Mountbattenwas a knowing or unwitting tool in the hands of Congress politicians, remain two ofthe controversies associated with India’s independence. Events moved rapidly during

his subsequent governor-generalship up to June 1948. By May of that year only 25 sep-arate states survived in their own right. The rest had been integrated into larger units,

first by amalgamating groups of states and then by merging them with provinces.Menon, the architect of the arrangements, worked at a frantic pace, one British official

commenting after a meeting with him that he ‘spoke more like a Fuehrer than everbefore’.13 Sir Terence Shone, high commissioner at New Delhi, suggested it was too

early to say if Menon’s policy would succeed, but if it did, ‘India would be moreunited than ever before in her long history’.14 The view from London was favourable.

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite at the Commonwealth Relations Office commented: ‘Much hasbeen done which we should have been only too glad to do in recent years, had ourhands been a little more free.’ Philip Noel-Baker, Laithwaite’s secretary of state,

agreed: ‘I cannot doubt that, in the twentieth century, the changes made by the Gov-ernment of India were necessary, indeed, inevitable.’15

What Mountbatten thought is less clear but the evidence suggests he had reser-vations. The speed with which Menon acted was dictated in part by concern over

some of the smaller states becoming safe havens for extremist religious groups. Econ-omic considerations were also significant. In a memorandum for the Indian cabinet in

May 1948 Menon argued the three-subject accession was inadequate. New and largerunions were needed to equate the states as early as possible with conditions in neigh-bouring provinces. On a host of subjects such as industrial development, factory legis-

lation, labour welfare, the regulation of mines, and banking and insurancearrangements, Menon suggested the states were far behind the provinces and had a

lot of ground to make up. Mountbatten took his red pen to the margin of the docu-ment and commented at this point, ‘Not in every case’. And at the end of the document

he noted, ‘A preliminary flourish of the big stick.’16

Earlier, in January 1948, Menon asked the governor-general to address a gathering

of 18 rulers of the larger states who had expressed concern about a recent merger of thesmall eastern states into the provinces of Orissa and the Central Provinces. In a per-

formance not dissimilar to his July 1947 address to the Chamber of Princes,

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Mountbatten commended the merger policy. He likened the process to the mediatisa-

tion of his own Grand Duchy of Hesse in Germany by Napoleon in 1806. Small states,he suggested, had no place in Europe 140 years ago. The princes of the small German

states gave up their powers but retained their palaces, private possessions and civil lists.They were a lot better off than the families of the larger states who continued in powerbut were swept away altogether by revolution in Germany in 1918. Some in Mount-

batten’s audience in 1948 were not persuaded. Commenting on the princes’ futureprospects, the Maharaja of Alwar observed, ‘If they wanted to live in Hell they

should not be compelled to live in Paradise.’17 Mountbatten said the princes had tobe realistic and he assured them the princely order was not under threat. However,

in fairness to those who would be affected by mediatisation schemes, the governor-general wanted to give some indication of numbers at a larger gathering of princes

three days later. Menon intervened to stop him. It was ‘out of the question’ for Mount-batten to commit himself. He was instructed to confine himself to broad policy and tosay only, without mentioning names or numbers, that while viable states would con-

tinue, non-viable states would be mediatised. One of the princes seeking clarificationof the position, the Raja of Jawhar, would be one of the first to be ‘gobbled up’.18

In the years after independence the princes adopted a variety of roles, some becom-ing governors of newly created Indian states, others entering politics or the diplomatic

service. They kept their titles and possessions, and were awarded privy purses accord-ing to rank on a sliding scale, the amount diminishing for future generations. All this

was threatened in 1967 when the Indian government of Indira Gandhi announced itsintention to abolish the privy purses, and to do away with the princes’ titles and pri-

vileges. At the time a power struggle was being waged within the ruling Congress Party,which for wider reasons led to a party split in 1969. To prove she was a progressive andto the left of the party bosses from whom she was distancing herself, the prime min-

ister headed a campaign intended to abolish poverty. This became her main platformduring the 1971 election which she won so convincingly. In practice it amounted to

little more than a slogan. But in a climate of nationalising banks and setting limitson ownership of private property, the princes were easy targets.19

Mountbatten had many personal friends within princely families. He had knownthree generations of rulers from the state of Bikaner in Rajasthan, the friendship

dating from his 1921 tour of India with the Prince of Wales. Responding to appealsfor support from, among others, Dr Karni Singh, the Maharaja of Bikaner in 1967,Mountbatten told the Commonwealth Office in July of that year he felt a ‘deep

sense of personal responsibility’.20 As governor-general he had persuaded theprinces to accept the arrangements for their privy purses and privileges, and told

them they could trust the Indian government. Mountbatten realised it would becounter-productive if he acted too publicly. Instead he decided to write to Mrs

Gandhi, impressing on her that the matter reflected on the personal honour ofNehru, her father, and Sardar Patel.

Mountbatten’s draft of his letter was in effect a history lesson. Suggesting India’sreputation was at stake, it offered his own services in an attempt to find an amicable

settlement. To the Commonwealth Office and High Commission in New Delhi the


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draft was too abrupt and read like a lecture.21 Toned down when it was redrafted in

Whitehall, the letter was sent through the High Commission in New Delhi, Mountbat-ten believing it would be opened if it went through the Indian High Commission in

London. John Freeman, the high commissioner, who thought the letter unwise, reluc-tantly agreed. Although it was being made clear the views were personal to Mountbat-ten, Freeman was concerned the Prime Minister’s Office in New Delhi would associate

the High Commission with its contents merely for passing it on.22 Sir Saville Garner,permanent secretary at the Commonwealth Office, tried to reassure the high commis-

sioner, telling him,

the object of the exercise is to persuade Mountbatten to be as reasonable as possibleover his determination (which to some extent I understand) to take a stand. . . . Itwould not I think have helped to have refused Mountbatten’s request – and inany case he is not a particularly easy person to say no to.23

Freeman expressed further reservations when he received another letter fromMountbatten, this time for onward delivery to the Maharaja of Jaipur, another old

princely friend appealing for support. Mountbatten was using the High Commissionas a post office.

Although it became public knowledge in India that Mountbatten had contacted theprime minister and questions about it were raised in the Indian parliament, the letter,

delivered in August 1967, had no effect. It received an acknowledgement only,although an opportunity for Mountbatten to speak personally to Mrs Gandhi later

presented itself when she attended a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferenceat London in January 1969. Before then the High Commission and what was now

the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London had become increasingly anxiousover Mountbatten’s activities. Urged on by Chakravarti Rajagoplachari, a veteran ofthe independence movement now aged 90, who told him in November 1968,

‘India’s integrity is once again in your hands’,24 Mountbatten was becoming bolderin his criticism of the Indian government. In correspondence with the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office he described the behaviour of Yeshwantrao Chavan, theIndian home minister, as ‘monstrous’. Chavan, he said, had been known to him as a

goonda (a hired thug or bully) with a price on his head in 1947.25 Sir MorriceJames, Freeman’s successor in New Delhi, who saw Chavan as a potential prime min-

ister, wanted Mountbatten restrained. Instead he persisted, taking his case to RobertMcNamara, president of the World Bank, and supporting his argument with costs.Privy purse payments to the princes had fallen from £4.25 million in 1951 to £2.5

million in 1968. They were expected to come down to £2 million over the next tenyears, an ‘infinitesimal’ amount according to Mountbatten. He believed the princes

were pawns in a power struggle between Chavan and Moraji Desai, the finance min-ister. McNamara was asked to tackle Desai about the privy purses but not to mention

Mountbatten’s name.26 Whether McNamara acted is not known but Mountbattenrelished his role, telling James in August 1969, ‘I seem to have become the Ombuds-

man for the Indian Princes’.27 Typically, he exaggerated. The most effective campaigner

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was the Maharaja of Dhrangadhra, former ruler of a tiny state in western India who

established and chaired Indian Concord, a princely pressure group.A ray of hope for all those campaigning on behalf of the princes appeared in

December 1970 when the Indian Supreme Court declared the abolition of the privypurses unconstitutional. Mountbatten was elated, telling Charles Curran, director-general of the BBC, India’s prime minister had received ‘a very bloody nose’ in

consequence of ignoring his warnings.28 But the triumph was short-lived. AfterMrs Gandhi’s election victory in March 1971 the court’s judgement was overturned

by a constitutional amendment, conferring on parliament the right to acquire, holdand dispose of property, including the princes’ privy purses. Mountbatten appealed

again to the prime minister, ‘I hope that in your strength you will feel inclined tobe generous to the Princes’,29 but the battle was lost.

As they had done so often in the past, the princes turned to Britain for consolation.In September 1972 the Maharaja of Dhrangadhra asked Mountbatten if Britain wouldcontinue to recognise the titles the princes were about to lose in India. He also asked if

they might have dual nationality, emphasising if it were granted it would not mean amass exodus of princes from India.30 Mountbatten, who had already received a

number of approaches from princes about their prospects of settling in Britain,passed the requests to Buckingham Palace, which in turn sought clarification from

the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The answer to the first of Dhrangadhra’srequests was that the princes’ titles might be acknowledged in private but should

not be used for official purposes. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s own delib-erations revealed the often forgotten anomaly that some of the princes had British

titles. They were the descendants of Duleep Singh of the Punjab, the Prince ofArcot, the surviving daughters of King Thibaw of Burma, and the Prince of Berar, atitle conferred on the heir apparent to the Nizam of Hyderabad since 1936. Dual

nationality was out of the question. India did not recognise it, and an Indiancitizen acquiring the nationality of another country automatically lost Indian citizen-

ship. Financial considerations were also relevant, in terms both of the money theprinces would be required to have as investment in Britain and the Indian govern-

ment’s restrictions on currency withdrawals from India. Finally, there was a newBritish Immigration Act, introduced in 1971, to consider. Like everyone else, the

princes would have to apply for a work permit, a requirement which wouldhardly appeal to their dignity.31 Not a little embittered by the whole experience,Mountbatten’s own feelings on the matter are best expressed in a comment he

made in June 1970: ‘I honestly cannot give any further advice as I am quite andutterly powerless. . . . The whole thing is shaming, inexcusable and disgraceful.’32

II

Apart from Sir Hubert Rance, the last British governor, Mountbatten was the most

popular European political figure in post-independence Burma. When allied forcesunder his South-East Asia Command began the reoccupation of Burma in March

1945, Mountbatten made the momentous decision to recognise Aung San, hitherto


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in Western eyes the leader of a traitor army. Aung San led a Burma National Army to

fight with Japan against allied forces during the war, and had only just signalled hisintention to switch sides. An Anti-Fascist Organisation had been formed in August

1944 as the political wing of the BNA; it became the Anti-Fascist People’s FreedomLeague (AFPFL) at the end of the war. Mountbatten’s recognition of Aung San wascarried in the face of opposition from the cabinet in London and his own civil

affairs officers, many of whom regarded Aung San as an opportunist Burman nation-alist, a treacherous figure, and indeed a war criminal. They aired their concerns at a

meeting with the supreme commander at Rangoon in June 1945. Mountbatten wasunmoved by their arguments. Having decided a handful of officers were attempting

to sabotage his policy, he was watching them carefully and if they stepped out ofline he intended to court martial them.33

Expediency, in the sense of using all available means to end the Burma war quickly,and an intuitive sense that when it was over Britain would have to deploy political aswell as military gestures to reassert control, explain Mountbatten’s decision in relation

to Aung San. He realised recognition would give offence to what he described as ‘themore respectable elements’ in Burma, but he judged this a risk worth taking.

The respectable elements had been inactive; the forces represented by Aung Sanwere the active, politically conscious and organised elements in the country – and

those in a position to cause Britain trouble.34 Some historical verdicts have been criti-cal of Mountbatten in this respect.35 It is suggested he hastened Britain’s eventual evic-

tion from Burma by opening the political door to a radical nationalist movement withthe avowed objective at the end of the war of moving speedily to independence and a

complete break with the British. It also effectively set post-independence Burma on theroad to civil war. Ethnic minorities like the Karens who fought against Japan through-out the war distrusted the AFPFL. Immediately upon independence they took up arms

against the government in Rangoon.The problem with this argument is its failure to address the question of how else

Mountbatten might have acted. There were no obvious alternatives to the forces ledby the AFPFL. The pre-war Burmese political leadership – Mountbatten’s ‘respectable

elements’ – had been discredited; it was too closely associated with a failed regime.Two rival communist factions – the Red and White Flags – posed a threat greater

than the AFPFL. The ethnic minorities were deserving of British gratitude but theywere divided among themselves and hardly in a position to form the nucleus of anational government. And the forces represented by the AFPFL were stronger than

even Mountbatten realised at the time. A new Burma Army was set up in September1945, with contingents from the Patriotic Burmese Forces (formerly the BNA) and the

ethnic minorities. Under the command of a British inspector-general, the new armyhad two deputy inspectors, one each from the PBF and the minorities. Mountbatten

tried to entice Aung San with the position of deputy inspector and promotion to theBritish rank of brigadier. This was declined. Thousands of displaced BNA men who

were not accepted into the new army were recruited instead into the People’s VolunteerOrganisation, the paramilitary wing of the AFPFL. The AFPFL had at its disposal

stockpiles of weapons concealed from the British. Mountbatten knew they were

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armed because he had provided some of their weapons but only in 1967 did he become

aware of the intention to use them if Britain resisted the demand for independence.36

Mountbatten’s own version of what happened in Burma at the end of the war was

different. If a mistake had been made, he later claimed, it did not rest with his recog-nition of Aung San but with what he deemed the premature ending of the British Mili-tary Administration. Events took a turn for the worse according to Mountbatten after

October 1945 when civilian government was restored and Sir Reginald Dorman-Smithappointed governor. Dorman-Smith was hostile to Aung San, and wanted him put on

trial as a war criminal for the execution of a village headman in 1943. Despite the laterefforts of Rance, Dorman-Smith’s successor as governor from the end of August 1946

until independence in January 1948, the damage, according to Mountbatten, had beendone. Aung San and the AFFPL never recovered the confidence in Britain that Mount-

batten had worked so assiduously to foster. Indeed, had it not been for theDorman-Smith governorship, Mountbatten believed the question of Burma leavingthe Commonwealth at independence would not have arisen.37 Relations with the

AFPFL certainly deteriorated when Dorman-Smith was governor. His personal anti-pathy towards Aung San was matched by his determination to hold in check the

political ambitions of the AFPFL. But despite this Mountbatten’s subsequent conjec-ture about the Commonwealth was a leap of faith on his part. Faced at the time of

independence by the two hostile communist factions, it would have been impossiblefor an AFPFL government to remain within the Commonwealth on the basis of

allegiance to a foreign king. Mountbatten may not have realised the gravity of the com-munist threat in Burma from his position as viceroy in India. Nevertheless, in June

1947, together with Lord Killearn, Britain’s special commissioner in Southeast Asia,and Malcolm MacDonald, governor-general in Malaya, he lent support to Rance’sattempts to persuade the British government that a new form of Commonwealth

association was necessary to enable countries like Burma to remain members.38

Attlee’s Labour government was unmoved. Burma’s continued membership of the

Commonwealth was deemed desirable but not vital. Burma left the Commonwealthat independence in January 1948. India stood in a different category. A formula was

devised in 1949 enabling India to become a republic but remain a member of theCommonwealth by recognising the British monarch as the Commonwealth’s political

head.What Aung San personally thought about the Commonwealth question remains a

matter of speculation. At the end of an AFPFL Convention in May 1947, he wrote to

Arthur Bottomley, parliamentary under-secretary at the Dominions Office, who hadbeen an observer in February at the Panglong conference in the Shan States when

Aung San negotiated to bring the nationalities (with the notable exception of theKarens who boycotted the proceedings) within the constitutional process of creating

a Union of Burma. Aung San’s letter to Bottomley read:

You may see that we have decided upon independence. But that does not mean thatwe have no desire to maintain close relations with the United Kingdom and her


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people. You may rest assured that when the proper time comes, I will throw myweight on the side of lasting Anglo-Burmese friendship.39

On 16 June a republican resolution moved by Aung San was carried in Burma’sConstituent Assembly. Just over a month later Aung San was dead, gunned down

with five of his cabinet colleagues by the henchman of a political rival in suspiciouscircumstances which continue to raise questions about those involved and theirmotivation.40 Aung San’s May 1947 letter was sent by Bottomley to Mountbatten in

December 1964. For Mountbatten the letter confirmed his belief that had Aung Sanlived, Burma would not have left the Commonwealth. At the time he also viewed it

as vindication of the attempts he had already made to persuade Burma to return.Mountbatten was well placed to make the attempt. It was not only his wartime role

which earned him Burma’s gratitude. As India’s governor-general in 1948 he securedthe return to Burma of King Thibaw’s ornate ivory chair which had been looted from

the palace at Mandalay when Britain defeated the kingdom of Burma in 1885–86 anddeposed Thibaw, the last Burmese monarch, and a replica of the gilded Lion Throne,last used when Thibaw addressed the Hluttaw (Council of State) in the Great Hall of

Audience in the palace which had been destroyed together with much of the palace’swooden structure in fighting against the Japanese in March 1945.41 In a country where

symbols of national pride and identity carry more than usual significance, preciselybecause so many of them have been lost, this gesture was deeply appreciated. On a

visit to Burma in 1956 Mountbatten received the appellation, ‘The Highest and theGreat Glorious Commander of the Most Exalted Order of True Law’.42

Above all, however, Mountbatten had formed a friendship with General Ne Win, hisBurmese counterpart as chief of defence staff. They first met in June 1945 when Ne Win

and Than Thun (who later led the communists against the AFPFL) accompanied AungSan to a meeting with Mountbatten in Rangoon to discuss arrangements for the demo-bilisation of the BNA. Mountbatten was the senior by 11 years but they had much in

common. Both were flamboyant, gregarious, enjoyed sport (Ne Win’s passions weregolf and horse racing),43 and were keen to portray themselves as dynamic men of

action. Ne Win especially was fond of female company, but equally enjoyed tellingbawdy jokes in all-male company. He was not without a more conventional sense of

humour. He frequently likened doctors to economists; they could tell roughly what adisease was but had no idea how to cure it. His friendship with Mountbatten deepened

over the years. Ne Win was a regular private visitor to Britain, often for medical treat-ment or tests. He had a guesthouse in Wimbledon and a stay at Broadlands was usuallypart of his itinerary. Letters to Mountbatten in the early years began ‘Dear Lord Louis’;

by the 1970s this had become ‘My dear friend’.For British diplomats especially, Ne Win was a figure both of fascination and suspi-

cion. He was commander-in-chief and defence minister at the time of independence.This was a dangerous period for Burma. The writ of the AFPFL government scarcely

extended beyond the capital, and large tracts of the country were in the hands of com-munist insurgents and ethnic minority groups. The role of the army in rescuing the

government enhanced Ne Win’s prestige, and added significantly to his political

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influence. He formed a caretaker military government in 1958, reinstated U Nu as

prime minister in 1960, but then ousted the civilian politicians in 1962, this time per-manently. From then until ostensibly he stood down after demonstrations in 1988,

Ne Win remained convinced politicians were incapable of ruling the country andholding it together. Only the military he believed were possessed of sufficientpatriotism to perform both tasks. As befitting someone whose entire life was deter-

mined by astrological signs and predictions, Ne Win was also a fatalist. In 1967 hetold Angus Ogilvy, Princess Alexandra’s husband, he realised his government was

incompetent. However, if he allowed in foreigners to lend assistance there would bea coup within four or five years. In other words, he knew his regime was bad but

regarded the alternative as worse.44

On his visits to Britain, Ne Win had regular audiences with successive prime min-

isters and the Queen. When Mountbatten broke the news on board the royal yachtBritannia after a visit to Burma in 1972 that Ne Win was parting company from hiswife, Daw Khin Mae Than, a vivacious individual known affectionately to her Euro-

pean friends as Katie, the Queen, Prince Philip and Princess Anne were said to beshocked.45 Katie died of liver disease in Fulham hospital in September 1972. She

had been ill for a number of years. At an audience at Buckingham Palace in 1968,Ne Win startled the Queen with a vivid description of his wife’s symptoms.46

Harold Macmillan thought NeWin ‘rather like a Scotch golf pro’. A Foreign Office offi-cial described him in May 1960 as ‘an outstanding Asian statesman’, while another

observed in April 1961 his action in returning power to an elected government in1960 was ‘unique in post-war Asia’.47 Nicholas Fenn, who served at the Rangoon

embassy between 1959 and 1963 and later returned as ambassador, captured hispersonality in 1964:

A complex character, a roue turned puritan; a leader who has little patience withadministrative details but who demands efficiency from his subordinates; a nationalfigure who dislikes public fanfare and imagines he longs for quiet privacy but resentsreal or imagined slights. He is moody, violent tempered and suspicious of themotives of his subordinates and associates. Like most Burmese, he is a xenophobicnationalist, with little respect for foreign situations or concern for foreign affairs,although he enjoys life in England and frequently visits this country. Nonetheless,his motives in taking over the Government of Burma from civilian leadership aresincere in that his objective is to build a prosperous and powerful Burmese State,dominated by Burmans to the exclusion of all foreigners, whether they be European,Indian, or Chinese.48

Mountbatten first raised the question of the Commonwealth when Ne Win visited

Britain in July 1960. He reminded him, as he was fond of repeating, ‘they were twoof the only people alive who knew of the early negotiations with General Aung San

for Burma to remain within the Commonwealth’.49 Ne Win responded that oppositionpoliticians in Burma, formerly senior AFPFL figures, would exploit any attempt to revive

the issue of Burma being in the Commonwealth. Mountbatten returned to the charge onNe Win’s next visit in May 1961. During the interval Dean Rusk, the United States sec-

retary of state who served on the Burma–China frontier during the war, suggested it


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might aid regional stability if Burma returned to the Commonwealth. Whitehall had last

considered this question in 1956, reaching the conclusion nothing would be gained.Even a proposal by the then ambassador in Rangoon for Burma to be given greater pri-

ority in British foreign policy had been rejected.50 The Foreign Office reached much thesame conclusions in 1961. For Britain it was sufficient the Burmese now appeared torealise, as they had not at the time of independence, that membership of the Common-

wealth and neutrality in foreign affairs were not incompatible. Mountbatten was not sat-isfied with this. He asked Ne Win in May 1961 if further thought had been given to the

Commonwealth and told him that with his ‘prestige and position’, he alone could bringBurma back in. Ne Win suggested the issue was problematic because the communists

were still a threat and there was China’s reaction to consider.51 The matter went nofurther. Mountbatten had been engaging in wishful thinking. A leader as distrusting

of foreign powers as Ne Win had no intention of bringing Burma back into the Com-monwealth. If Ne Win did not reject Mountbatten’s overtures it was only because he didnot want to offend him. The General never committed himself. Whenever subsequently

he visited Britain, government briefs remarked how he enjoyed talking about golf, andhow irritable he became if anyone raised the Commonwealth.52

Mountbatten visited Burma a number of times, including a trip in February–March1967 during the filming of his life. The most significant visit took place in February

1964. Ne Win had extended an invitation in 1962 but this was postponed becauseof the Cuban missile crisis. For the Foreign Office the visit in 1964 was as an oppor-

tunity to influence Ne Win personally and Burmese government policy more gener-ally. This was the second occasion upon which the Foreign Office had used a public

figure in an effort to steer the General in a particular direction. In 1951, at thebehest of U Nu, who expressed concern Ne Win might be colluding with communistswith a view to establishing himself as another Bonaparte, Malcolm MacDonald, then

British commissioner-general in Southeast Asia, was deputed to warn the Generalabout the dangers of flirtation with communists. In a report of his discussion, Mac-

Donald reached the conclusion Ne Win was not a communist himself but aBurmese patriot. He had no way of knowing if the General realised the purpose of

the discussion.53 Almost certainly he was aware of this rather unsubtle attempt to per-suade him to reveal his true colours. And this had a bearing on his encounter with

Mountbatten in 1964.Briefing Mountbatten before the visit the Foreign Office told him, ‘there are one or

two things you might be able to say to the General at present which we certainly

could not advise H.M. Ambassador or the Foreign Secretary to say’. What troubledthe Foreign Office was not Burma’s neutrality in foreign policy. Officials acknowledged

that the facts of geography had placed Burma in much the same relationship to China asFinland was to the Soviet Union. Burma, it was said, had shown great courage in its

recent dealings with China. More worrying was the internal situation. The ForeignOffice had two concerns. First, in order to construct a specifically Burmese Way to

Socialism, Burma’s government had embarked on a programme of extensive nationali-sation. British companies and individuals with assets in the country had fallen victim to

new laws prohibiting the repatriation of capital. Company profits and investment, and

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the salaries and pensions of individuals, were under threat. Secondly, the Foreign Office

was anxious about Burma’s development as an authoritarian state. Burma’s headlongrush to socialism was damaging because it was divisive. If Burma were to become

another Yugoslavia and Ne Win another Tito, Britain would rest content. But theForeign Office was not confident on either score. Only the communists, it seemed,would benefit from current Burmese policies. Mountbatten was asked to suggest to

Ne Win he needed allies other than the military, and that politicians and ethnic min-orities might be won over in preparation to restore civilian government through ‘a

kind of democratic national front’. He was advised to tread warily, and to concentrateon methods and tactics rather than questions of principle. The Foreign Office recognised

Ne Win was likely to respond by arguing democracy and capitalism had been tried andfound wanting, and that it was time to give authoritarian government and socialism a

chance. In which case it was suggested Mountbatten might attempt to persuade theGeneral away from his more ‘extreme socialising tendencies’.54

The meeting took place at Ngapali, near Sandoway, a beach resort on the Bay of

Bengal, one of Ne Win’s favourite retreats where he entertained guests. Mountbattenspoke as suggested in his official briefing, adding an idea of his own on the question of

foreign firms. He recommended a five-year plan under which the firms would paytaxes at the old rate and be allowed to remit reasonable profits and repatriate their

capital when the plan ended. Over the five years they would train local personnel.Ne Win listened politely to this, and Mountbatten’s other points, but refused to

accept any of them. He began by explaining he was an assassination target andnaming his would-be assailant. Control of trade and commerce, he insisted, had to

be transferred to the government, the army even, because he did not trust the civilservice, still less the politicians. Only when he had a secure grip on the country didhe intend to release political detainees, including U Nu who was in detention at a com-

pound near Mingaladon Airport on the outskirts of Rangoon. The General was con-vinced foreign firms – Indian and Chinese as well as British – had been treated too

favourably in the past; in return they had lined the pockets of the politicians. Eitherthat or they had found ‘fat jobs’ in the companies for the politicians’ friends.

Burma Unilever was singled out for particular criticism. While claiming Burmawould pay reasonable compensation, both to firms and individuals, he was insistent

that Burma had sufficient local expertise and did not require foreign assistance fortraining. On the wider political front Ne Win revealed that a general amnestyagainst the communists and ethnic minorities had just ended. So far the army had

been only partially deployed. Now its full force was about to be unleashed. Therewere no plans to reinstate civilian rule.55

Not to be deterred, Mountbatten followed up his discussion with a personal letter,going over the same ground and telling Ne Win he had the full backing of Britain, ‘for

we see in you the only hope for a stable administration in a key part of the world’.56 SirGordon Whitteridge, the ambassador, commented after the visit how Mountbatten’s

friendship with ‘the leader of this near totalitarian state is a valuable politicalasset’.57 The ambassador did not expect immediate results but ‘useful seeds’ might

have been sown. The reality was different, as Mountbatten himself realised. In


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December 1967 he received a letter sent from Thailand by the president of the Kachin

Independence Council. It appealed for British assistance against the Burmese govern-ment and reminded Britain of Kachin loyalty during the war. Seeking advice about his

reply, Mountbatten wrote to the Foreign Office:

Obviously I want to be as friendly as possible to these wretched people but I cannotget myself involved with Ne Win who warned me off last time from trying to help ininternal affairs in Burma. Though this was in quite a friendly way, it definitely was awarning.58

The Foreign Office advised a non-committal reply; anything else would compromise

Mountbatten’s friendship with Ne Win.Mountbatten was not the only distinguished British visitor to Burma in the 1960s.

Princess Alexandra went out in December 1961, beginning an association with Burmalasting over 20 years. The Princess was completing an official tour of the Far East, andthe main purpose of her visit was to pay respects at a war cemetery on the Burmese

side of the Burma–Siam railway. Just a few weeks short of her twenty-fifth birthday,she stayed for eight days. It was the first full royal visit since the war. Prince Philip had

made a stopover for a day only in Rangoon in 1958. As defence minister and chief ofstaff, Ne Win made the arrangements for Princess Alexandra’s visit. Together with his

wife, he had met the Princess in London earlier in the year. Evidently he was captivatedby her.

The tour followed a familiar itinerary. After official engagements in Rangoon, theroyal party moved on Taunggyi and Inle Lake in the Shan States, Mandalay, and

Pagan, the ancient capital. It ended with a visit to the coastal resort at Ngapali. Theambassador reported afterwards he had never known Ne Win ‘happier, friendlier ormore relaxed’. U Nu bore an austere countenance throughout but the president was

‘as happy as a schoolboy’, and the chief justice jokingly proposed an amendment tothe constitution to provide for a resident British princess in Burma. This was a good-

will visit, and it succeeded beyond expectations. The English Language newspaperThe Nation commented in a leading article:

Those of us who have been amazed by the attachment of the British people to theRoyal Family can begin to understand why . . . we have had a member of thatfamily in our midst . . . and have been completely won over by her charm andnatural grace. Princess Alexandra seems firmly installed as No 1 topic in teashopsand open bazaars. . . . Yesterday, National Day, recalled the break with the BritishEmpire, yet the British Princess continued to be regarded as a symbol of Britishgoodwill. . . . Burma as a whole is delighted with her.59

Princess Alexandra’s second visit in February 1967 took place in different circum-stances. Burma had been under military government for five years, and relations

with Britain had deteriorated sharply. A currency crisis in 1966 led to Burma’s depar-ture from the sterling area. Burma had run down its reserves from £56 million to

£4 million in just two years since 1964. Concerned about Burma’s insistence uponintroducing into trade contracts claims providing for gold or exchange guarantees

and even termination agreements in the event of sterling’s devaluation, Britain was

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on the point of expelling Burma from the sterling area when Burma decided to leave in

October 1966. Foreigners of all nationalities, individuals as well as companies, wereexperiencing difficulty withdrawing their assets from the country. There were

several hardship cases involving people whose entire life savings were held byBurmese banks. Many foreigners were asked to leave and subjected to indignities atthe airport. It was forbidden to take jewellery out of their country (it still is

without official sanction); even wedding rings had to be left behind. In one celebratedcase, Professor G.H. Luce, a retired British academic and distinguished historian of

ancient Burma who had lived in the country for most of his career with a Burmesewife, was denied access to his pension and for a time he was not allowed to ship his

extensive library collection to Britain.60

Both the Foreign Office and the embassy in Rangoon were initially uncertain about

the advisability of Princess Alexandra’s 1967 visit. The Princess had accepted a privateinvitation from Ne Win and her intention afterwards was to travel to Hong Kong.Concern was expressed about her presence being seen as an endorsement of

Burma’s policies, in which case some of the adverse comment in Britain aboutBurma might rub off on her. After much internal deliberation, during which the

embassy, much to the ambassador’s annoyance, was not kept fully informed, theForeign Office decided the visit should go ahead. With relations between the two

governments strained and British interests closely involved, the trip was seen asBritain’s only means of mending fences. Princess Alexandra decided herself upon an

informal visit. She travelled from London by a scheduled flight, accompanied onlyby her husband, Angus Ogilvy, whom she had married in 1963, and two members

of her staff. Her husband was briefed beforehand on a number of pressing hardshipcases and he managed successfully to raise these with Ne Win. Otherwise, as oneForeign Office official commented, ‘we did not feel it right to burden them with

our problems’.61 The Princess and her husband discussed the visit with LordWalston, minister of state at the Foreign Office, but a briefing about the political situ-

ation in Burma was deferred until they were on the last part of the journey on a flightfrom New Delhi to Rangoon. Official engagements during a trip again lasting eight

days included laying a wreath at Aung San’s tomb, visiting a cemetery maintainedby the Commonwealth War Graves Commission to the north of the capital, and

attending part of the Union Day celebrations at State House. Tours were arrangedto Ngapali and Pagan. Princess Alexandra expressed a wish not to travel internallyby air. She was persuaded otherwise by NeWin, who feared for his safety if he travelled

by road or rail. After one internal flight the Princess was disconcerted to discover acrate of weapons beneath her car seat as she was driven away from the airport.62

The visit was not without amusing moments. The ambassador arranged a dinnerparty and thought it expedient to invite General and Madame Ne Win. Their attend-

ance was a coup for the embassy as Ne Win always maintained his distance from thediplomatic community, and rarely appeared in public. Accepting the ambassador’s

invitation, the General suggested all members of the Revolutionary Council mightlike to attend. To the last moment on the day, the embassy did not know whether

to expect 20 or 60 people to dinner. In the event 52 turned up, including a number


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of ADCs and bodyguards ‘who ate (and especially) drank separately’. When the

Princess and her husband visited Pagan, the ambassador was indignant becausealthough he knew where they had gone, the Burmese authorities did not notify

him. Shadow boxing with a Burmese government official ensued. He too knewwhere the couple were but, unable for security reasons to reveal anything about NeWin’s whereabouts, he was left to say the Princess ‘was enjoying looking at the coun-

tryside’. The General was said to possess a ‘pathological fear’ for his own safety. Theambassador believed the claustrophobic atmosphere at State House, with armed

guards and checkpoints at every turn, ‘made heavy demands on the tolerance and resi-lience’ of the Princess and her husband.63 It is impossible today to imagine a member

of the royal family travelling as Princess Alexandra did to Pagan. She was without anysecurity of her own, in a country effectively governed in an iron curtain manner. No

doubt the British authorities comforted themselves with the thought that if she waswith Ne Win, she was in the safest possible place.Assessing the wider significance of Princess Alexandra’s 1967 visit, it seems reason-

able to suggest she had become a bridge between two countries wanting to stay onterms but being pushed apart by divergent interests. The ambassador believed after-

wards that although the visit would not change Burma’s policies, it would at least per-suade Ne Win Britain bore him no ill will. Having in the last century extinguished

Burma’s monarchy because if it survived it would serve as rallying point for oppositionto British rule, the British government now saw advantage in deploying a member of

the royal family to ensure a difficult relationship did not reach breaking point. Thisexplains why, in 1973, when the Duke and Duchess of Kent offered to visit another

Asian country on their way back from Japan, the Foreign and CommonwealthOffice jumped at the idea that they should go to Burma.64 Princess Alexandraremained the main attraction, and made a number of subsequent visits. For Ne

Win, who doubtless imagined himself a new Burmese king in all but name, theallure of the British royal family in London remained irresistible.

III

Mountbatten’s legendary ability to communicate, to persuade and to charm were of

little use in his post-independence private and unofficial dealings with India andBurma. Menon’s insistence in January 1948 that as governor-general, he was not to

be specific about the Indian government’s proposals for the mediatisation of the prin-cely states was an early indication his views and advice would not always be welcome.Thereafter his efforts to influence Indian policy over the abolition of the privy purses,

and General Ne Win over Burma’s return to the Commonwealth and the authoritariannature of the regime over which he subsequently presided, were flawed because they

were politically motivated and constituted interference in the affairs of both countries.At best Mountbatten was listened to politely, and ignored. He realised himself how

ineffective he had become, and in the context of the privy purses he was seen in White-hall as a liability. Over Burma and the Commonwealth it is difficult to avoid the con-

clusion he was motivated primarily by an attempt to vindicate his 1945 decision to

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recognise the radical nationalist forces represented by Aung San and the AFPFL. His

efforts later to caution Ne Win about the dangers inherent in his government’sdrive to build a Burmese Way to Socialism were doomed to failure from the

outset. The Foreign Office’s proposal that Mountbatten might sway Ne Win lackedsubtlety. Mountbatten might have been a friend but Ne Win was bound to recall hisearlier encounter with Malcolm MacDonald. By contrast Princess Alexandra was in

a much better position to represent Britain in Burma. Even though she was aneutral political figure the symbolic significance of her visits was all too apparent.

And if so, more studies are needed of the role of the royal family in the promotionof British foreign policy in the late twentieth century.

Notes

I am grateful to the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives for permission to quote from private papersin the Mountbatten Archive at the Hartley Library in the University of Southampton. Referencesfrom these papers in the notes following are prefixed USL. I am also grateful to Dr ChristopherWoolgar and his colleagues at the Hartley Library for allowing me to see the papers at shortnotice at a time when the Library was undergoing refurbishment with reading room space ata premium. Official references from the Mountbatten Archive are quoted by permission of HerMajesty’s Stationery Office. References from The National Archives at Kew are prefixed NA. Thisarticle was prepared for a conference organised by the Centre for the Study of Britain and itsEmpire at the University of Southampton in July 2004 on ‘Earl Mountbatten and constitutionalmonarchy in the twentieth century’. A shorter version was presented at the conference. I amespecially grateful to HRH Princess Alexandra for an interview in May 2004 at which she recalledher visits to Burma.

[1] For background, see especially Philip Ziegler,Mountbatten Revisited (Austin, TX, 1995), 16–17;also Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (London, 1994), 91–101.

[2] The documents were extracts from the Viceroy’s weekly personal reports and the Viceroy’s staffmeetings. They were published inMountbatten and the Partition of India before the completionof the Transfer of Power series and before the publication of Philip Ziegler’s official biography.By agreement when the book appeared in 1982 it was published in India only.

[3] To this day members of the Mountbatten family are not welcome in Pakistan.[4] Strachey to Attlee, 11 Dec. 1950, in A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (BDEEP: London, 1995), part

II, doc.230.[5] NA, PREM 13/553 for details.[6] Thomson to Wilson, 3 March 1967, NA, FCO 73/125.[7] This article is not concerned with Mountbatten in his official capacities as commander-in-chief

of the Mediterranean Fleet (1952–54), first sea lord (1955–59) and chief of defence staff(1959–65). Rather it explores his influence in private and unofficial capacities. Although hewas chief of defence staff during his encounters with General Ne Win, his past associationcounted for more than his official position as he attempted to influence Burma’s military leader.

[8] Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer ofPower 1942–7 (hereafter TOP) (London, 1983), vol.XII, doc.65.

[9] Ibid., vol.XI, doc.264, Nehru to Ismay, 19 June 1947.[10] Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917–1947 (Cambridge, 1997),

248.[11] H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain–India–Pakistan (London, 1969), 368.[12] TOP, vol.XII, doc.234.


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[13] Note by J.S.H. Shattock (UK High Commission, New Delhi), 6 May 1948, of a conversationwith Menon on 5 May, NA, DO 142/485, no.10.

[14] Ibid., no.13, Shone to Noel-Baker, 5 May 1948.[15] Ibid., minutes by Laithwaite and Noel-Baker, 29 May and 1 June 1948.[16] Mountbatten’s comments, 24 May 1948, on Indian cabinet memo, No.130, CF/48, 22 May

1948, USL, MB1/D293.[17] Record of meeting with princes, 7 Jan. 1948, USL, MB1/D294, part 1. Alwar became part of a

united state of Matsya in March 1948, merging with Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli. In hispublished account Menon recalled inviting the four rulers to a meeting at Delhi on 27 Feb.‘They agreed’, he said, when he put the proposal to them. V.P. Menon, Towards the Integrationof the Indian States (London, 1956), 254. In a note for the Indian cabinet on 3 March 1948Menon described the negotiations as tortuous, USL, MB1/D294, part 2.

[18] Note for Mountbatten by Lt. Col. V.F. Erskine Crum, his conference secretary, 9 Jan. 1948, USL,MB1/D299.

[19] There is no account of the abolition of the privy purses of the princes. For general backgroundsee vol.4 of the new Cambridge History of India, Paul Brass, The Politics of India since Indepen-dence (1990).

[20] Minute by Garner of a meeting with Mountbatten, 26 July 1967, NA, FCO 37/44, no.4.[21] Mountbatten’s draft began by saying he had been ‘much perturbed’ by press reports about the

Indian government’s intentions, particularly ‘as I was so intimately concerned with this matter20 years ago’. It continued, ‘Perhaps I can give you some of the historical background.’ Theredraft was replete with such references as, ‘The last thing I want to do is add in any way toyour burdens, when you are dealing so courageously with the many problems confrontingyou’. Ibid., nos.7 and 15.

[22] This same point was made by P.N. Haksar, Mrs Gandhi’s private secretary, but the prime min-ister herself had no trouble receiving it as a private letter, NA, FCO 37/45.

[23] Garner to Freeman, 7 Aug. 1967, NA, FCO 37/44, no.25.[24] Rajagopalachari to Mountbatten, 8 Nov. 1968, NA, FCO 37/364, no.1.[25] Ibid., Mountbatten to Sir P. Gore-Booth, 27 Nov. 1968.[26] Mountbatten to McNamara, 8 Nov. 1968, USL, MB1/K233.[27] Ibid., Mountbatten to James, 23 Aug. 1969.[28] Mountbatten to Curran, 21 Dec. 1970, USL, MB1/K234.[29] Mountbatten to Mrs Gandhi, 22 March 1971, USL, MB1/K146.[30] Dhrangadhra to Mountbatten, 18 Sept. 1972, USL, MB1/K234.[31] For the correspondence with the palace and the FCO’s internal deliberations, see NA, FCO 57/

398 and FCO 57/509.[32] Mountbatten to Charles Musk, his banker at Coutts & Co., 1 June 1970, USL, MB1/K234.[33] Record of meeting with civil affairs officers on policy towards Burmese during BMA, 16 June

1945, reproduced in Hugh Tinker (ed.), Constitutional Relations between Britain and Burma:The Struggle for Independence 1944–1948 (London, 1983), vol.I, doc.203.

[34] Supreme Allied Commander to Chiefs of Staff, 27 March 1945, reproduced in ibid., doc.108.[35] A balanced account is Nicholas Owen, ‘Mountbatten at South-East Asia Command’, in C.M.

Woolgar (ed.), Mountbatten on the Record (Southampton, 1997), 21–51. Philip Ziegler,Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London, 1985), 317–23, is similarly restrained.Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 76–79, is hostile. The most detailed archival account isNicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War 1945–1950(Cambridge, 1998). The author is not concerned with the historical debate about Mount-batten’s actions but takes the view (62–77) that what became the AFPFL always held theupper hand.

[36] He was told by General Ne Win while in Burma in Feb.–March 1967 during the filming of hislife. Mountbatten’s reaction was that his policy in 1945 had spared Burma a civil war before

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independence. Philip Ziegler, From Shore to Shore: The Tour Diaries of Earl Mountbatten ofBurma 1953–1979 (London, 1989), 153.

[37] The Times published an article by Philip Howard on 2 Jan. 1969 attributing the following toMountbatten: ‘Yes, I made a tremendous error in allowing the civil government to take overin Burma after the war months before I should have. If I had still held on to the governmentmyself, Burma would still be in the Commonwealth: but I turned it over to people who muckedit up.’ Dorman-Smith demanded The Times publish a retraction and threatened legal action,but no apology was published or action taken. USL, MB1/K105; also Ziegler, Mountbatten,323. In 1955, however, Dorman-Smith was paid damages for a series of articles in ReynoldsNews – entitled ‘Lord Mountbatten’s Brilliant Career’ – which made the same point aboutthe Commonwealth. Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 77–78.

[38] Mountbatten to Rance, 21 June 1947, in Tinker, Struggle, vol.II, doc.407.[39] Bottomley to Mountbatten, 7 Dec. 1964, enclosing the original of Aung San’s letter to Bottom-

ley, 26 May 1947, USL, MB1/J41.[40] Kin Oung, Who Killed Aung San, 2nd edn. (Bangkok, 1996), discusses the various conspiracy

theories. On the Commonwealth issue more generally, see S.R. Ashton, ‘Britain, Burma and theCommonwealth, 1946–56’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 29 (Jan. 2001), 65–91.

[41] J. Bowker (ambassador, Rangoon) to Bevin, 16 March 1948, NA, FO 371/69470, no.4476.Mountbatten presented the Lion Throne at a ceremony in Rangoon. It was an enormousstructure, transported from India in 60 cases containing 450 pieces, and assembled in theBurmese capital. Burma had to wait longer for the return of the regalia looted from Mandalayin 1886. It consisted of 167 ceremonial items, mostly gold and silver, as well as articles ofclothing worn by Burmese kings and queens. The most important artefact was a sheatheddagger, known as Than Lyet, revered as one of five emblems of Buddhist kingship and saidto be have been handed down by the founder of the Konbaung dynasty, Alaungpaya (1752–60), to his successors. It was presented to Ne Win at a ceremony at the Foreign Office inNovember 1964. In his acceptance speech Ne Win remarked, ‘if we look back in history wewill find that it was common practice that a nation should enhance her prestige and gloryor enrich herself at the expense of other nations. In this respect Burma was no exception.’NA, FO 371/175141. The Victoria and Albert Museum (where it was kept in London), theForeign Office and the Department of Education all believed the regalia should have beenreturned much earlier. The stumbling block was the opposition of the CommonwealthRelations Office, which viewed the matter in the context of India’s outstanding claim to thecontents of the India Office Library and Records. In 1969 Ne Win sent Mountbatten a scalemodel of the Lion Throne carved in Burmese teak. Mountbatten thought it beautiful but hewas also embarrassed because he did not know what to do with it or where to put it,Mountbatten to Rance, 16 April 1969, USL, MB1/K237. It is now on display in the exhibitioncentre at Broadlands, the family home.

[42] Ziegler, From Shore to Shore, 17.[43] As Burma’s ruler Ne Win banned horse racing because he believed too much gambling was

damaging the country financially.[44] Minute by R.C. Samuel, 17 April 1967, NA, FCO 15/92, no.7.[45] Mountbatten to Sir D. Greenhill, 2 March 1972, USL, MB1/K63.[46] Minute by Sir P. Gore-Booth, 25 June 1968, NA, FCO 15/95.[47] Minute by J.W. Woodfield (private secretary to PM) to Macmillan, 31 May 1961 (Scotch golf

pro); K.M. Wilford minute to de Zuleuta, 25 May 1960 (outstanding Asian statesman); Wood-field minute to Macmillan, 24 April 1961 (unique in post-war Asia), NA, PREM 11/4650.

[48] Ibid., Fenn minute to Woodfield, 2 Oct. 1964.[49] Mountbatten to Lord Home, 27 July 1960, enclosing record of meeting with Ne Win, 14 July

1960, USL, MB1/J195.


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[50] Ashton, ‘Britain, Burma and the Commonwealth’, 83–86.[51] Mountbatten to Lord Home, 18 May 1961, NA, FO 371/159793, no.4.[52] ‘I understand that one thing which particularly irritates the General is when people talk about

Burma not being in the Commonwealth: this point should therefore be avoided.’ Woodfieldminute to Macmillan, 31 May 1961, NA, PREM 11/4650.

[53] Ashton, ‘Britain, Burma and the Commonwealth’, 81–83.[54] Sir G. Harrison to Mountbatten, 21 Jan. 1964, NA, FO 371/175115, no.5.[55] Ibid., no.10, Sir G. Whitteridge (ambassador, Rangoon) to J.E. Cable, 5 Feb. 1964, reporting on

Mountbatten–Ne Win talks at Sandoway, 31 Jan. After a discussion with Ne Win at London in1968, Henry Byroade, the outgoing US ambassador in Rangoon, observed that if politicianswere allowed to return to government in Burma, the military would feel let down. TheGeneral thought highly of the military, and needed their support. This, according toByroade, was the major obstacle to change, ‘because it is obvious that the military like theirnew status of power and privilege – and the longer this goes on the more difficult it will beto remove them from what should be civilian positions’. There was no point trying to influenceNe Win; indeed any attempt would have the opposite effect. Byroade to State Dept, 14 June1968, NA, FCO 15/95, no.43. During the years (1962–74) of Burma’s RevolutionaryCouncil when the military ruled, a Burma Socialist Programme Party had been nurtured asan administrative cadre and the only legal political party. In 1972 popular dissatisfactionwith the government led Ne Win and some of his assistants to drop their military titles andfunctions. Ne Win became prime minister, while continuing as chairman of the RC andBSPP. In March 1972 he told Mountbatten a new constitution would be put to the peoplewithin two to three years. This would enable him, as he was always fond of saying, to laydown his ‘unwanted’ burden. Mountbatten to Greenhill, 2 March 1972, USL, MB1/K63. Anew constitution was adopted after a referendum in January 1974. At elections for a People’sAssembly held at the end of January all official BSPP candidates were returned. The RC wasabolished in March and replaced by a State Council with Ne Win as chairman and head ofstate. Despite the changes, Ne Win’s power base remained the army.

[56] Mountbatten to Ne Win, 1 Feb. 1964, USL, MB1/J596.[57] Whitteridge to R.A. Butler, 4 Feb. 1964, USL, MB1/J41.[58] Mountbatten to Gore-Booth, 8 Jan. 1968, NA, FCO 15/89, no.2.[59] Sir R. Allen (ambassador, Rangoon) to Lord Home, 12 Dec. 1961, reporting on the visit and

quoting from The Nation, NA, PREM 11/3503.[60] On sterling area, see NA, T 312/1699. On jewellery and Luce, FO 371/175136.[61] A.J. de la Mare to L.J. Wakely (ambassador, Rangoon), 21 March 1967, NA, FCO 15/92, no.6.

A.L. Mayall, head of Foreign Office Protocol Dept, objected when Sir Peter Clarke, comptrollerto Princess Alexandra, asked the FO to upgrade the trip by spending more money on it, with ascreen on the flight from London, a private detective and preliminary reconnaissance. Mayallthought this unjustified for a private visit. Princess Alexandra herself was satisfied with a lowbudget trip. Walston recognised the importance of her travelling. NA, FO 372/8160.

[62] Interview with HRH Princess Alexandra, 6 May 2004.[63] Wakely to Brown, and Wakely to de la Mare, both 28 Feb. 1967, for reports on visit, NA, FCO

15/92, no.1.[64] E.G. Willan (ambassador, Rangoon) to FCO, Oct. 1973, for a report on visit, NA, FCO 57/562,

no.94.

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mountbatten, the royal family, and british influence in post-independence india and burma

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