motor image memorandum in support of petition of...
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ANALYSIS OF 3/16/2015 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION OF CERTIORARI
When Motor Image filed a Petition of Certiorari, the appeals court stated that the correct form should be a Memorandum. After filing a request for extension, here is the Memorandum.
We had filed our comments to their petition several months earlier, so they are now able to re-file with full knowledge of our rebuttal (I do not know if that was their plan, but based on the prior conduct of Motor Image, I assume it to be the case).
It is 17 pages of the same half-baked arguments but with some new rationales. They have references to some new technicalities that they claim applies here, but it is just the same nonsense.
I recommend keeping this Memorandum it by your bed. If you ever find yourself unable to sleep, just start reading and you will be in dreamland in no time at all.
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C.A Form No. 1
Sirs:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a Resolution of this Court (FIFTEENTH DIVISION) dated January 23, 2015:
CA-G.R. SP NO. 137315 M OTOR IMAGE PILIPINAS, INC., ETAL. vs. RTC BR. 160 PASIG CITY, ET AL, x---------------------------------------x
The petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply is GRANTED and the Reply filed within the period prayed for -ADMITTED.
The parties are REQUIRED to submit simultaneous memoranda within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(per agendum dated January 13, 2015)
WITNESS the Honorable RAMON M. BATO, JR., Chairperson , Honorable MANUEL M. BARRIOS, Senior Member and the Honorable ZENAIDA T. GALAPATE-LAGUILLES,* Acting Junior Member, this 23rd day of
January 2015.
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Jose Ma. R. Arcinas - reg. W/ re. Counsel for petitioners Arcinas & Arcinas Rm. 2K Edificio Enriquetta 422 N.S. Amoranto St. cor. D. Tuason Ave. 1114 Quezon City
·Paras and Manlapµ µiwyers - reg. W/ re.Counsel for responpent1402 Equitable Baitlc Tower8751 Paseo de Roxas, 1226 Makati City
Hon. Presiding Judge - reg.RTC, Branch 1601500 San Juan City
J. Sato, Jr.
wrb
/
EVANGEL E . LLAMAS
Julian Cohen - reg. Private respondent Triboa Bay, Villa 6 Subic Freeport Zone Subic 2209 Zambales
rk of Court
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MOTOR IMAGE PILIPINAS, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioner,
·.·�
-versus- CA-G.R. SP NO. 137315
RTC BR. 160 PASIG CITY, ET AL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUl\1
Petitioners, MOTOR IMAGE PILIPINAS, INC. ("MIPI" for brevity), and BENEDICTO G. ARCINAS ("ARCINAS" for brevity), by counsel, in
compliance with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated January 23, 2015, respectfully submit their Memorandum and state that:
PARTIES
Petitioner, MIPI is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with office address at No. 187 EDSA, North Greenhills, San Juan City while ARCINAS was the former President of
MIPI.
Public Respondent, RTC of Pasig City (San Juan Station) presided by the Hon. MYRNA V. LIM-VERANO, issued the two (2) Orders being assailed, and later on, an Order yet admitting a Second Amended Complaint. Private Respondent, JULIAN COHEN, (hereafter "COHEN") is of legal age, married and either an American citizen, British or Filipino as he alleged inconsistently in his Complaints.
STATEMENT OF FACTS/CASE
On 28 March 2009, Petitioner MIPI sold and delivered to one Rafael Cruz, a steel Silver 2008 Subaru Forester ("subject vehicle" for brevity).
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On 18 March 2013, COHEN filed a Complaint1 against MIPI (only) as defendant (as per caption of the Complaint), but alleged in the body
of the Complaint three (3) additional defendants, namely: ARCINAS, (in his official capacity); Laus Marketing Corporation and Motor Image Enterprises Pte. Ltd., a foreign corporation. Finding the same defective, Public Respondent RTC, directed Plaintiff motu proprio in an Order dated sometime on April 2014, to amend the Complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order, to reflect the identifies of alldefendants as alleged in the Complaint.
On 17 October 2013, Petitioner MIPI received summons 2,
together with a Compliance3 dated 20 April 2013, and an Amended Complaint4 dated 23 January 2013 filed by Respondent/Plaintiff on 24 April 2013 (as per stamp of Respondent RTC).
On 30 October 2013, Petitioners/Defendants filed an Answer5 to
the Amended Complaint with Counterclaim. On 3 January 2014, Defendant Laus Marketing Corporation likewise filed its Answer6 with Compulsory Counterclaim.
On 25 November 2013, Petitioners/Defendants filed a Motion to
Set for Preliminary Hearing Defendants' Special Affirmative Defenses7
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the Amended Complaint did not state a cause of action; that the Amended Complaint is barred by the statute of limitation as per existing jurisprudence and that the counsel of Respondent/Plaintiff was in violation of Bar Matter No. 1922 when he failed to state the required MCLE Compliance in the Complaint8 and the Amended Complaint9. After Comment and Manifestation of Respondent/Plaintiff and Reply of Petitioners/Defendants, the RTC issued the assailed Order of 25 February 201410, the dispositive portion of which read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants' Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Special and Affirmative Defenses is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
SO ORDERED."
1 Annex "D'' of the Petition 2 Annex "E" of the Petition 3 Annex "E-1" of the Petition 4 Annex "E-2" of the Petition s Annex "F" of the Petition 6 Annex "G" of the Petition 7 Annex "H'' of the Petition 8 Annex "D" of the Petition
9 Supra Note 4 10Annex "A" of the Petition
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On 25 March 2014, Petitioners/Defendants moved for reconsideration11 of the said Order, belying the RTC's declaration that grounds raised in Petitioners/Defendants Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing Defendants' Special and Affirmative Defenses12 (Annex "H"),
"are evidentiary matters which are better resolved in the main rather than in preliminary hearing." After Comment/ Opposition of Respondent/Plaintiff and Reply of Petitioners/Defendants, the Public Respondent RTC issued the assailed Order13 of 29 August 2014, the dispositive portion of which read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
so ORDERED. II
Left with no remedy of appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy, Petitioners/Defendants filed with this Honorable Court, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Ri1les of Civil Procedure.
In the meantime, on November 14, 2014 (after the present Petition was filed), Petitioners received a copy of a Motion to Admit the Second Amended Complaint14 filed by Private-Respondent attaching thereto a Second Amended Complaint 15, in effect, adding a new
Defendant, Autosales and Aftersales Company, Inc. (hereafter "AUTOSALES") and dropping Motor Image Enterprises Pte. Ltd. as party defendant, substantially altering the defenses raised in the Answer of herein Petitioners.
Despite Opposition of the Petitioners herein on the ground that Private-Respondent disregarded procedural requirements, the Public Respondent RTC issued an Order16 dated January 6, 2015, admitting the
Second Amended Complaint of the Private-Respondent.
Petitioners therefore, filed a Motion with Leave to Admit Supplemental Petition dated February 25, 2015, praying that the
Supplemental Petition be resolved together with the aforementioned
HAnnex "B" of the Petition 12 Annex "H" of the Petition
13 Annex "C" of the Petition 14 Annex "A" of the Supplemental Petition 1s Annex "A-1" of the Supplemental Petition 16 Annex "B" of the Supplemental Petition
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Petition and that the Second Amended Complaint be dismissed likewise on the ground that it states no cause of action against herein Petitioners/Defendants and that Private-Respondent's cause of action was barred by prescription .
After Comment/Reply on the Petition, this Honorable Court, through its Fifteenth Division, issued a Resolution, a copy of which was received by Petitioners on March 2, 2015, requiring the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Hence, this Memorandum.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS THE AMENDED AND THE SECOND AMENBED COMPLAINT ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
A. THE AMENDED AND THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINTDID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS HEREIN;
B. THE AMENDED AND THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINTARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS;
C. THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT MUST BEEXPUNGED FROM THE RECORDS, THE SAME BEING IN VIOLATION OF BAR MATTER N0.1922.
DISCUSSION
A. THE AMENDED AND THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINTSHOULD BE DISMISSED AS THE SAME FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONERS.
Breach of warranty could not be concluded from the allegations and annexes on the Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint.
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Private Respondent/Plaintiff, in his Amended and Second Amended Complaint considered "breach of warranty" as his first cause of action when he alleged that he advised Petitioners/Defendants of such breach, to wit:
"13. On 2 April 2012, Plaintiff sent a letter to defendant complaining of their unjust and underhanded approach who, through their employees, appeared to be set on denying his warranty from the time he brought his car. Hearing no feedback from defendants, plaintiff sent defendants another letter dated 10 April 2012 informing them of their obligations. From this demand, defendant refused and continue to refuse to Honor their obligations."
XXX
"15. In his letter dated 2 April 2012, plaintiff complained of defendants' cavalier attitude and lack of customer care. Plaintiff emphasized that defendant could have done better considering their representation to the public that their cars are superior in quality and that they honor their commitments."
XXX
"18. Plaintiff was distraught, insulted and hurt because his grievances were legitimately addressed to entities that represented Subaru. Sending his letter to Mr. Glenn Tan was the consequence of his position as an officer of defendant corporations. Nevertheless, it was only Mr. Glenn Tan who responded through the letter dated 17 April 2012."
In support thereof, Private Respondent/Plaintiff attached the demand letters dated 2 and 10 April 2012 as well as the letter Reply dated 17 April 2012 to the Amended and Second Amended Complaint (i.e. Annexes "8" "9" and "10" of the Amended and Second Amended
Complaint).
However, an examination of the 2 and 10 April 2012 demand letters (Annexes "8" and "9" respectively of the Amended and Second Amended Complaint) revealed that they were sent and addressed to individuals and entities other than the Petitioners/Defendants (i.e. Glenn Tan, an individual not associated with Petitioners/Defendants herein).
Indeed, a closer inspection of the said demand letters showed that Petitioners/Defendants MIPI and ARCINAS were not even included in the list of individuals and entities furnished a copy of the said letters.
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Neither did the letter from the legal counsel of Glenn Tan dated 17 April 2012 (Annex "10" of the Amended and Second Amended Complaint), further Private Respondent's/Plaintiffs cause of action. The said letter was a mere response to the 2 and 10 April 2012 demand letters, addressed to Glenn Tan; not to Petitioners/Defendants.
Well-settled is the rule that since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right of the plaintiff and a correlative duty of the defendant but also "an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right," the cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty17
• Otherwise stated, a cause of action has three elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff [Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139420, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 223, 231].
It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises. Accordingly, a cause of action on a written contract accrues only when an actual breach or violation thereof occurs [Lim Tay vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126891, 5 August 1998, 293 SCRA 634, 655].
Thus, based on the foregoing cases, there being no previous formal and written demands made on Petitioners/Defendants by Private Respondent/Plaintiff, the latter's cause of action for breach of express warranty, if any, accrued [only] upon the filing of the Complaint (18 March 2013). Nevertheless, as claimed by PrivateRespondent/Plaintiff himself and as may be gleaned from the Warranty Booklet (Annex "6" of the Complaint), the express warranty on the subject vehicle had expired on 29 March 2012, thus negating any
contractual relationship between the parties when the Complaint was filed.
Since Respondent/Plaintiff could no longer enforce the express warranty against Petitioner /Defendants when he filed the Complaint, it necessarily follows that the Amended and Second Amended Complaint
17China Bank Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 153267. June 23, 2005]; Texon Manufacturing v. Millena, [G.R. No. 141380, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 377, 380.]; Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. Opie [G.R. No. 57642, March 16, 1999, 171 SCRA 250]
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should be dismissed likewise for failure to state a cause of action against herein Petitioners.
The allegations and annexes in the Amended and Second Amended Complaint revealed that
it was through PrivateRespondent's own fault that the express warranty was voided.
The limits and terms of the warranty on the subject vehicle (Annex "4" of the Amended and Second Amended Complaint), which Private-Respondent based his cause of action provided the following conditions:
XXX
"To qualify for any warranty claims, you must send your Subaru in for regular services as recommended in the vehicle maintenance · ·· Schedule at the back of this Warranty and Service Booklet."
XXX
"Subject to the terms of warranty contained in this booklet during the warranty period, if any defect in material or workmanship is found or any component part of the new vehicle, Motor Image or its authorized Service Center shall repair or replace such defective parts free of charge."
Page 10 of the Warranty Booklet on the subject vehicle (Annex "6" of the Amended and Second Amended Complaint), provided "what is not covered" by the warranty as:
"This warranty does not cover x x x mishandling of the vehicle,
or unauthorized repairs and services. These include:
XXX
The lack of proper maintenance or the use of wrong fuel, oil lubricants
XXX
Private Respondent failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the warranty as shown by the following allegations in the Amended and Second Amended Complaint:
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"9. Because plaintiff resides in Subic, Olongapo City, service of his car was made with the nearest authorized dealer in Pampanga or Subaru Pampanga. However, defendants do not sell the required oil weight of SW-30 or the comparable oil weight of the lOW-30 as required and recommended by page 11-19 of the Service and Warranty Booklet (i.e. Annex 7, Owner's Manual page 11-19). Hence, plaintiff was forced to buy the recommended oil weight of SW-30 from a mall just to have his oil correctly changed. A copy of defendants' service invoice dated 15 August 2011 is hereafter attached to show that plaintiff purchased an oil filter at Subaru Pampanga." (underscoring ours)
XXX
"11. Even before the service personnel of Subaru Pampanga could look at the car or check their records, the Service Manager made it a point to immediately tell plaintiff that the said vehicle is no longer covered by warranty because the Motor Image service booklet did not have the 1600 km, 5,000 km and 10,000 km service stamps. However, plaintiff disagreed because maintenance schedule in the Subaru owner's manual required the first oil change only at 12,500 km. Petitioner was surprised where the Policy requiring three (3) oil changes before 12,500 · 1"'":"'
km came from." (underscoring ours]
Based therefore, on the foregoing allegations in the Amended and Second Amended Complaint and the corresponding annexes thereto, the express warranty of the subject vehicle had been voided because Private Respondent bought and used unauthorized oils from unauthorized dealers. Since the warranty of the subject vehicle was voided through Private Respondent's own fault, Private Respondent's cause of action for breach of express warranty must fail.
Private Respondent has no cause of action against Petitioner ARCINAS.
The An1ended and Second Amended Complaint impleaded ARCINAS in his official capacity as President of MIPI. Well settled is the rule that a corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and from that of other corporations to which it may be connected18.To disregard
lBJardine Davies, Inc. vs. JRB Realty Inc (463 SCRA 555,563); Irene Martel Francisco vs. Numeriano Mallen Jr. (G.R. No. 173169,September 22, 2010); Park Hotel vs. Soriano (G.R. No. 171118, September 10, 2012); Mcleod vs. NLRC (512 SCRA 222); Kukan International Corporation vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 182729, September 29, 2010).
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the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be established clearly and convincingly19.
Moreover, under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is required that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constitutJing fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be averned generally (Section 5 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The Amended and the Second Amended Complaint along with their annexes, however, did not contain any particular or general allegations showing that Petitioner ARCINAS committed any wrongdoings or at least participated in determining the coverage of the warranty.
Assuming, therefore, that Private Respondent's cause of actionJor breach of express warranty was true, the same could only be directed against Petitioner MIPI since the latter had a separate juridical personality from ARCINAS.
Public Respondent RTC should have dismissed the Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint based on the allegations and annexes found therein.
Private Respondent alleged in his Comment 20 that when Petitioners started to argue against the allegations on the Complaint by referring to their own interpretation of contracts and facts, the latter sealed the fate on the existence of Complainant's cause of action. To support the said allegation, Private Respondent cited the case of D.C. Crystal vs. Laya (170 SCRA 734), which stated, that:
"(It) is axiomatic that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on this ground (lack of cause of action) is regarded as having admitted all the averments thereof, at least hypothetically, the test of the sufficiency of the facts found in the petition, as constituting a cause of action, being whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof In determining the sufficiency of the statements in the complaint as setting forth a cause of action, only those statements in
the complaint, to repeat, may properly be considered and it is
19Irene Martel Francisco vs. Numeriano Mallen Jr. (G.R. No. 173169,September 22, 20:!.0);Kukan International Corporation vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 182729, September,29, 2010);Philippine National Bank vs. Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation (G.R. No. 167530, March 13, 2013). 20 Paragraph 6 of th� Comment
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on the subject vehicle (Annex "4" of the Amended and Second Amended Complaint);
Based, therefore, on the allegations and annexes of Private Respondent in his Amended and Second Amended Compfo.1Jt, the
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express warranty on the subject vehicle, began on 28 March 2009 (delivery of the subject vehicle), and officially ended (if not voided ealier) on 27 March 2012.
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The date stamped in the Complaint revealed that it wa� filttP. on . I. ,,.,./
18 March 2013, while the Amended Complaint was filed on 24 April ' I. ,:: I
2013 and the Second Amended Complaint was filed on 11 November 2014. Based, therefore, on their respective filing dates, all of the complaints were filed beyond the three-year warranty period. Thus, assuming that the allegations in Private Respondent's Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint were true, the same should be dismissed for having been filed beyond the three-year warranty period.
In the case of Engineering & Machinery Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals (252 SCRA 156, 166 [19961), it was held that:
''The prescriptive period for instituting actions based on a breach of express warranty is that specified in the contract, and in the absence of such period, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years applies (Article 1389, Civil Code.) P. 166
The ruling in the Engineering & Machinery Corp case22 was adopted by the Honorable Supreme Court in a similar case entitled Isidro vs. Nissan Motors Philippines (319 SCRA 759), to wit:
"Where there is an express warranty in the contract, as in the case at bar, the prescriptive period is the one specified in the express warranty, if any" (p.760)
The same ruling was again reiterated by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Jaime D. Ang vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 177874, 567 SCRA 53 [September 29, 2008]), wherein it was held that:
22 Ibid
The earlier cited ruling in Engineering & Machinery Corp. states that "the prescriptive period for instituting actions based on a brea<;h of, express warranty is that specified in the contract, and in the absence of
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such period, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years (Article 1389, Civil Code)." (p. 58)
Moreover, even statutes, particulc!rly the Consumer Act of the Philippines provides that the seller and the consumer may stipulate the period within which the express warranty shall be enforceable (Article 68 (e) ofR.A. 7394 (Consumer Act of the Philippines]). _. ·c
Based, therefore, on the above pronouncements of the Honorable Supreme Court together with the Consumer Act of the Philippines
(Article 68 (e) of R.A. 7394), clearly, Private Respondent's c�use of action for breach of express warranty was barred by the statutes of limitations when the Complaint, Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint were filed beyond the three-year warranty period .
Consequently, Public Respondent RTC in its Order23 dated 29 August 2014, cited and applied the case of Carlos B. De Guzman �s. Toyota Cubao, Inc.24, stating that:
"The Court has noted that the prescriptive period for implied and express warranties cannot be the same. In the Civil Code, a redhibitory action for violation of an implied warranty against hidden defects prescribes in six (6) months, while if it is based on an express warranty, the action prescribes in four (4) years."
Considering, however, that the portion cited by the Public Respondent RTC was lifted only from the Order of a Regional Trial Court cited in the Decision, and not part of its ratio decidendi, the same should not be given much weight. Instead, Public Respondent RTC may have cited the case of Natividad Villostas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 96271, 210 SCRA 490 (June 26, 1992]), which applied the general rule on rescission of contract, and stated that:
"The present case involves one with an express warranty. Consequently, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years (Article 1389, Civil Code), shall apply (Moles v. JAC, C.R. No. 73913, 169 SCRA 777 {1989]). Inasmuch as the instant case involves an express warranty, the filing of petitioner's amended answer on September 30, 1988 is well within the four-year prescriptive period for rescission of contract from September 13, 1986, which was the delivery date of the unit." (p.496)
23 Annex "C" of the Petition
24 G.R. No. 141480, 29 November 2006 [508 SCRA 408]
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But the more recent ruling of Engineering & Machinery·Corp25,
however, clarified the Natividad ruling26, stating that the four-year prescriptive period on rescission of contract will only apply in the absence of a stated period in the express warranty, which is not the case herein. The pertinent portion of the Engineering & Machinery Corp27
case stated, to wit:
"The prescriptive period for instituting actions based on a breach of express warranty is that specified in the contract, and in the absence
of such period, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years applies (Article 1389, Civil Code.) P. 166 [Emphasis ours]
But even if the Court were to consider the prescriptive period for breach of an express warranty to be four ( 4) years, the
Amended and Second Amended Complaint would still be barred by the statute of limitations. The date of the filing of the Amended Complaint (24 April 2013) and Second Amended Complaint (11 November, 2014) should be used as the basis of prescription and not the date of the filing of the Complaint (18 March 2013) as discussed in the cases below.
In the case of Peneyra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. L-68935, January 22, 1990), the Honorable Supreme Court held that inclusion of an additional party is a substantial amendment if it would alter the cause of action in the Complaint. The pertinent portion of the case stated that:
"The proposed inclusion of Corregidor College would necessarily alter petitioners' cause of action in that while petitioners alleged in their complaint:
That, the demolition being undertaken by the defendant is without any authority from the Board of Trustees nor from the proper government office concerned, in violation of the law, the only purpose of which is to harass the plaintiffs;
That, due to the unlawful acts of the defendants, not only in violation of the Board Resolution and of the law governing that matter, the herein plaintiffs were so humiliated before the eyes of the people and their rights and interest were prejudiced causing them irreparable damage for which they have to be compensated for loss of income and moral damages in an amount of not less than P 50,000.00;
2s 252 SCRA 156, 166 [1996]26 Ibid
21 Supra at Note 25
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Thus ascribing to defendant Dizon personal responsibility for the alleged damages suffered by them, the inclusion of Corregidor College would have the effect of transforming said personal responsibility into, a corporate and collective liability. Correspondingly, the amendmept would substantially affect the defense of defendant Dizon in his capacity as College president "
In the same way as in the Peneyra case28, Private Respondent
substantially altered his cause of action when he included AUTOSALES
as party Defendant since the Sales Invoice, Service Bill and Official Receipt pointed to AUTOSALES and not to LAUS MARKETING CORPORATION, which the Private Respondent initially claimed to be the authorized service center of Subaru products29
• Thus, Private Respondent's Motion to Admit the Second Amended Complaint stated that:
"2. x x x there is a need to include Autosales & Aftersales Company, Inc., which issued the Sales Invoice, Service Bill and Official Receipt to plaintiff when he had his car serviced in SubaruPampanga30" {Emphasis Ours)
Since it was AUTOSALES who issued the Sales Invoice, Service Bill and Official Receipt, it can only mean that it was the one who serviced subject vehicle and not LAUS MARKETING CORPORATION, which the Private Respondent claimed in his Amended Complaint to be the authorized service center for Subaru products.
Thus, as held in Republic vs. Marsman, ( 44 SCRA 418, April
27, 1972), to wit:
"While in the procedural sense, especially in relation to the possible necessity of and time for the filing of responsive and other corresponding pleadings, an amended complaint is deemed filed only as of the date of its admission, xx x , the self-evident proposition [is] that for practical reasons and to avoid the complications that may arise from undue delays in the admission thereof, such an amended complaint must be considered as filed, for the purpose of such a substantive matter as prescription, on the date it is actually filed with the court, regardless of when it is ultimately formally admitted by the court. After all, the only purpose of requiring leave of and formal admission by the court of an amended pleading after issues have already been joined as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues which ought either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of anoth'er proceeding, if they are not anyway indispensable for the resolution' of
28 Ibid.
29 Motion to Admit the Second Amended Complaint dated November 5, 2014 Page 2
paragraph 2. 30 Ibid.
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the original ones and no unnecessary multiplicity of suits would result; so, when the court ultimately admit, the amendment, the legal effect, for substantive purposes, of such admission retroacts as a rule to the date of its actual filing."
Furthermore, the amended pleading superseded the original pleading which was deemed withdrawn and no longer constituted part of the record. However, the filing of the amended pleading did not retroact to the date of the filing of the original, hence, tq;e statue of limitations runs until the filing of the amendment (Regala�:o,. Florenz. D [2005] Remedial Law Compendium p.198 citing the case of Ruymann, et al. vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 429).
The Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc., vs. S.R. Farms, Inc. (G.R. No. 161849, July 9, 2010), citing the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 119292, July 31, 1998, 293 SCRA 440,466 p.466), reiterated the above-mentioned doctrine, stating that:
"The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment"(µ. 338)
Therefore, considering that the Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint were filed on 24 Aprii" 2013, and 11 November 2014 respectively, both dates being more than four (4) years after the date of purchase of the subject vehicle ( on March 28, 2009), the same should be considered barred by the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, Public Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not apply the case of Feliciano vs. Canoza (629 SCRA 550, September 1, 2010), which mandated the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it appeared from the same or from the evidence on record that the action was [already] barred by the statute of limitations,
to wit:
''Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the action is already barred by the statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim." (p.558)
C. THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT MUST BEEXPUNGED FROM THE RECORDS FOR BEING IN VIOLATION' oj:':'BAR MATTER NO. 1922
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In Private Respondent's Comment31, he claimed that although Respondent's legal counsel, Atty. Siddharta JP III S. Pefiared6ndo, inadvertently omitted compliance of his MCLE, it did not change the fact that the latter complied and completed his MCLE requirements ,when the Complaint was signed and filed. In support of this, Private Respondent cited the purpose of Bar Matter 850, to wit:
"14. This requirement was made to ensure that all members of the BAR "kept themselves abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law". As previously explained, the inadvertence, does not change the fact that the undersigned has duly complied and completed his MCLE requirements when the complaint was filed- thus achieying the purpose· of BAR Matter 1922."
What Private Respondent cited, however, was the purpose behind Bar Matter 850 and not Bar Matter No. 1922. The purpose of the latter was mentioned in the case of Galicto vs. Aquino 1//32, which stated that:
"The purpose of requiring a counsel to indicate his IBP Number. and PTR Number is merely to protect the public from bogus lawyers. A similar construction should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which requires lawyers to indicate their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption"
The purpose of Bar Matter No. 1922, therefore, was not only to ensure that lawyers kept themselves abreast with law and jurisprudence but also to protect the public from bogus lawyers. Hence, the explanation of Private Respondent should not defeat the clear mandate of Bar Matter No. 1922, which provides that "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the re_cords".
Since the consequence of the violation would be the exp unction of the Complaint and the Amended Complaint, the result would still be the dismissal of the case. Indicating MCLE compliance in subsequent pleadings did not and should not cure the defect or prevent the consequences of the failure of counsel to indicate his MCLE compliance in the pleading.
Accordingly, Public Respondent RTC gravely abused its discretion when it refused to dismiss the Complaint and the Amended Complaint despite the Respondent/Plaintiff counsel's admission that he failed to
31 Corpment dated 25 November 201432 G.R No. 193978, 667 SCRA 150 [February 28, 2012]
16
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comply with the provisions of Bar Matter No. 1922. And if the effect of the violation would be that the Complaint and Amended Complaint be
, · ; I
expunged from the records of the case, clearly therefore, the; Second Amended Complaint must likewise be dismissed for having been filed
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way beyond the period allowed under the law for Respondent/ Plaintiff to file his complaint.
WHEREFORE, Petitioners reiterates reliefs prayed for in the Petition and Supplemental Petition.
Quezon City for City of Manila, March 16, 2015.
ARCINAS & ARCINAS
Counsel for the Petitioners 2K Edificio Enriqueta,
422 N.S. Amoranto St., cor. D. Tuazon Ave., Quezon City, 1114
By: "
JO MA. R. ARCINAS
IBP NO. 099 673, 01.14.2015, for 2015, Q.C. PTR 0.9164254, 01.08.15, Q.C.
Roll No. 32325 MCLE Cert. of Comp. No. IV-0014610, 03.26.13
and
IBP No. 099263 , · .21.2015, for 2015, Palawan Chapter PTR No. 0652308, 01.14.15, FOR 2015, Q.C
Roll No. 63533 MCLE Cert. of Compliance admitted to the Bar 2014
COPY FURNISHED:
ATTY. SIDDHARTA JP III S. PENAREDONDO PARAS AND MANLAPAZ LAWYERS 1402 BDO Equitable Tower 8751 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City NEVERBUYASUBARU.COM