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27 July 2018 Mosaic Warfare Dr. Tim Grayson Director, DARPA/STO Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited UNCLASSIFIED

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27 July 2018

Mosaic WarfareDr. Tim Grayson

Director, DARPA/STO

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

UNCLASSIFIED

2

Asymmetric Advantages ErodingUNCLASSIFIED

•Adversaries have had 25+ years after Desert Storm to analyze U.S. playbook and

develop competing weapon systems

Chinese KJ-2000

Chinese PL-15 Missile

Russian S-400 IADS

Iranian Fateh-110 SRBM

IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic MissileSRBM: Short-Range Ballistic Missile

© 2009 Zhenguan Studio

© lt.cjdby.net Source: UMNICK

Source: M-ATF

Chinese J-31 Stealth Fighter

Russian PAK-FA (T-50) Stealth Fighter

North Korean Musudan IRBM

Russian SS-N-26 Cruise Missile

© 2011 Alex Beltyukov

© 2010 EPA

Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0

GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2

ChineseSpace Robotics

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

Source: Wired

3

A modern complication: a slow reactionUNCLASSIFIED

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

Time to field exquisite DoD systems untenable,but there is hope

4

Shown: post-WWII new start aircraft developments

Sources: DARPA/TTO 2012 TTM study. D. Patt. “Start” defined as receipt of contract.

Tim

e-to

-Mar

ket

It’s not simply complexity or

software content driving increased time-to-market

time between projectsDistribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

UNCLASSIFIED

How we win – pivot to lethality

5

• lethality through diversity of options• impose cost/penalty for any adversary action• adversary left without good options – doesn’t play

• cannot expect to continue to cover down with invulnerable monolithic systems

• incremental improvement on current paradigm is untenable

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

UNCLASSIFIED

6

The promise and payoff of distributed, disaggregated SoS

senseC2

kill

sense1

sense2

C2

kill

first principlessee first ● shoot first ● wintake action with minimal riskbe resilient and adaptable (OODA)

Limitations:Vulnerable to evolving adversary kill-chainsDifficult to upgrade

Advantages:See first, shoot first via distributionHeterogenousAdaptableSpreads riskCan break adversary kill chain

UNCLASSIFIED

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

Distributed systems must be Mosaic to win

pieces, interfaces painstakingly engineered can only be assembled in one way

creates a distributed monolithretains legacy vulnerabilities, introduces new set

pieces, interfaces engineered for interoperabilitycan be assembled in many ways

creates an adaptable, resilient, distributed systemretains, improves legacy capability, mitigates vulnerabilities

7

UNCLASSIFIED

© Dotti Stone© Kyoshino

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

How do we make “joint multi-domain battle” fast and adaptive?8

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

UNCLASSIFIED

Mosaic Warfare = joint multi-domain lethality at speed9

Supplier

Consumer

S1

S12

S2C2

C1

S3

S4C3

S5

S6C4

S7C5

S8

S9

S10

S13S11S14

S15 S16S17 C6

C7

S18

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

UNCLASSIFIED

Mosaic technologies must address the entire combat lifecycle

10

todaymonths -

years

goaldays -

months

• What effects applied where will meet objectives?• How should assets be provisioned?• How, when will assets get there?

todaymonths -

years

goalhours -days

• What elements can deliver desired effect?• How can effects delivery be “verified” at mission-planning

speed given situation uncertainty?

todaydays -months

goalhours

• Employ effects chains during campaign• Integrate autonomous, semi-autonomous effects chains• Train humans to operate with Mosaic elements, chains

todayhours -days

goalmins -hours

• What assets are assigned to what effects chain• Optimize resources against competing demands, objectives• Abstract assets for allocation decision making

Decision

Composition

the

Mos

aic

“Sta

ck”

Mission Planning

Resource Management

Task Planning

Execution

todayhours -days

goalsecs -mins

• Task assignment for specific systems (e.g. within a swarm)• How can tasking be distributed to heterogeneous systems

in a way it can be understood?

todaymins -hours

goalms –secs

• How are systems physically connected (e.g. comms links)?• Can non-native software run on systems?• How can execution be monitored, verified in real-time?

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UNCLASSIFIED

The Pathway to Mosaic Warfare

11

Distributed Kill Chain System-of-Systems Adaptive Kill Web Mosaic Warfare

Example NIFC-CA SoSITE TBD TBD

Description Manual integration of existing systems

Systems prepped for multiple battle configurations

Semi-automated ability to select a pre-defined effects web prior to mission

Ability to compose new effectswebs at campaign time

Benefits • Extends effective range• Increases engagement

opportunity

• Enables faster integration and more diverse kill chains

• Allows pre-mission adaptation• More lethal, imposes

complexity on adversary

• Adaptable to dynamic threat and environment

• Scaling to many simultaneous engagements

Challenges • Static• Long to build• Difficult to operate and scale

• Each architecture static Limited ability to adapt

• Cannot add new capabilities on the fly

• Difficult to operate and scale

• Static “playbook”• Limited number of kill chains• May not scale well

• Scaling limited by human decision makers

t=1t=n

t=0

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

UNCLASSIFIED

12Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited