more evidence that empathy is a source of altruistic...

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1982, Vol. 43, No. 2, 281-292

Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0022-3514/82/4302-0281S00.75

More Evidence That Empathy Is a Sourceof Altruistic Motivation

Miho Toi and C. Daniel BatsonUniversity of Kansas

Additional evidence is provided that empathic emotion can evoke altruistic mo-tivation to help. To provide this evidence, we employed Stotland's (1969) tech-nique for manipulating empathy; subjects were exposed to a person in distressand instructed either to observe the victim's reactions (low empathy) or to imag-ine the victim's feelings (high empathy). As in previous research testing theempathy-altruism hypothesis, this empathy manipulation was crossed with amanipulation of ease of escape without helping (easy vs. difficult) to form a2 X 2 design. Results patterned as predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis.Subjects in the low-empathy condition helped less when escape was easy thanwhen it was difficult. This pattern suggested that their helping was directedtoward the egoistic goal of reducing their own distress. Subjects in the high-empathy condition, however, displayed a high rate of helping, even when escapewas easy. This pattern suggested that their helping was directed toward thealtruistic goal of reducing the distress of the person in need. Finally, analysesof subjects' self-reported emotional response provided additional support for thehypothesis that feeling a predominance of empathy rather than distress on wit-nessing someone in need can evoke altruistic motivation. Evidence for the em-pathy-altruism hypothesis continues to mount,

Is the motivation to help ever, in any de-gree, truly altruistic? That is, is a helper'sultimate goal ever to increase the victim'swelfare, or is the motivation underlying help-ing always egoistic, designed to increase thehelper's own welfare? This question, carry-ing as it does implications for one's view ofhuman nature (Hoffman, 1981), was a cen-tral question for many 18th and 19th centurysocial philosophers (e.g., Comte, 1875; Mill,1863; Smith, 1759). By around 1920, how-ever, theories of motivation based on behav-iorism or psychoanalysis were sufficientlysophisticated to provide an egoistic accountof any behavior that might appear to be al-truistically motivated. As a result, the ques-tion of the existence of altruism was shelvedby mainstream psychologists; it was assumed

We would like to thank Margaret Hancks, KarenO'Quin, Bobbie Pomonis, and Susan Winslow foi theirassistance in making the audiotapes used in this exper-iment. Virginia Pych, Patricia Schoenrade, and JackBrehm made helpful comments on an earlier draft ofthe manuscript.

Requests for reprints should be sent to C. DanielBatson, Department of Psychology, University of Kan-sas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.

to be either clearly answered in the negativeor clearly unanswerable. Continued domi-nance of psychology by modern descendantsof these early egoistic theories of motivationmay explain why when social psychologistsbecame interested in helping behavior in the1960s, they showed little interest in the clas-sic question of whether helping might everbe altruistically motivated.

Of course, the egoistic orientation of mod-ern psychology should not be dismissedlightly. It has prevailed for decades, and itcan easily account for helping that appearsto be altruistically motivated: Acting to in-crease another's welfare is simply an instru-mental egoistic response designed, ulti-mately, to increase the helper's own welfareeither by reducing the helper's pain causedby witnessing the victim's suffering (as sug-gested by Piliavin & Piliavin, Note 1) or byincreasing the helper's pleasure through re-sultant material, social, or self-rewards (seeBatson & Vanderplas, in press).

This straightforward egoistic answer not-withstanding, several social psychologists(Aronfreed, 1970; Batson, Darley, & Coke,1978; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978;

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282 MIHO TOI AND C. DANIEL BATSON

Hoffman, 1975, 1981; Krebs, 1975) haverecently resurrected the question of the ex-istence of altruism, and moreover, they haveproposed an answer in the affirmative. Spe-cifically, these researchers have suggestedthat the motivation to help is altruistic to thedegree that it is evoked by an empathicemotional response to the victim's distress(feeling sympathy, compassion, softheart-edness, etc.). This suggestion has producedthe empathy-altruism hypothesis: Feelingempathic emotion can lead to altruistic mo-tivation to help. But although these research-ers have been able to present consistent andvaried evidence that an empathic emotionalresponse increases the motivation to help,they have not been able to present any clearevidence that the nature of this motivationis altruistic, as the empathy-altruism hy-pothesis claims, for they have not been ableto show that the resulting helping is directedtoward the ultimate goal of increasing thevictim's rather than the helper's welfare.

More recently, Batson, Duncan, Acker-man, Buckley, and Birch (1981) have intro-duced an experimental procedure that per-mits a more direct test of the empathy-al-truism hypothesis. To determine whether themotivation to help resulting from increasedempathic emotion was egoistic or altruistic,they first manipulated empathy. They didthis differently in two separate experiments.In Experiment 1 they varied the similaritybetween subjects (female undergradutes)and a confederate, Elaine, whom subjectsobserved receiving electric shocks; in Exper-iment 2 they used a misattribution techniqueto vary the nature of subjects' perceivedemotional response—empathy versus per-sonal distress—to seeing Elaine take theshocks. Subjects in both experiments werethen given an unanticipated opportunity tohelp Elaine, by taking the remaining shocksin her stead. Half of the subjects in eachexperiment were easily able to escape seeingElaine suffer, even if they did not help; whengiven a chance to take her place, they werenot expecting to watch her take the remain-ing shock trials. For the other half, escapewithout helping was difficult; if they did nothelp, they were expecting to watch Elainetake the remaining shocks. Thus, in eachexperiment a 2 (low vs. high empathy) X 2(easy vs. difficult escape) design was used.

Batson et al. reasoned that within these2 X 2 designs, the ease-of-escape manipu-lation should produce different effects onhelping, depending on whether the motiva-tion to help was egoistic or altruistic. Whenescape is easy, the personal costs of guilt andshame for not helping should be relativelylow; but when escape is difficult, these costsshould be high. By definition, concern aboutthese costs is a major determinant of whetheran egoistically motivated individual willhelp; so if the motivation were egoistic, thenthere should be less helping under easy thanunder difficult escape. But also by definition,these costs are not a determinant of altru-istically motivated helping; so if the moti-vation were altruistic, then there should beas much helping under easy as under diffi-cult escape.

Applying this logic, if experiencing rela-tively high empathic emotion could inducealtruistic motivation, as the empathy-altru-ism hypothesis predicts, then the rate ofhelping across the four cells of a 2 (low vs.high empathy) X 2 (easy vs. difficult escape)experimental design should conform to a 1-cell versus 3-cell pattern; the rate should below in the low-empathy-easy-escape cell buthigh in the other three. Batson et al. foundprecisely this 1 versus 3 pattern in each oftheir two experiments.

Although Batson et al. interpreted theirresults as evidence that empathic emotioncan evoke altruistic motivation to help, theyreadily admitted that two experiments do notprovide sufficient evidence to justify accep-tance of the empathy-altruism hypothesis.For, to accept this hypothesis carries broadimplications, since few if any current theo-ries of motivation even allow, for the possi-bility of altruism (see Bolles, 1975, for a re-view of the current theories). Before accep-tance can be considered justified, it is onlyprudent to require that the evidence bestrong and varied. Accordingly, the presentresearch was undertaken to test the empa-thy-altruism hypothesis once again. Ourstrategy was to employ the same generallogic developed by Batson et al.—comparingthe rates of helping across a 2 (low vs. highempathy) X 2 (easy vs. difficult escape) fac-torial design—but to do so using a differentmethod of manipulating empathy and a dif-ferent need situation.

EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM 283

The Present Research

Batson et al. (1981) manipulated empathyeither by varying similarity between the sub-ject and the victim or by leading subjects tomisattribute their empathic emotion to aplacebo. But probably the best-known pro-cedure for experimentally manipulating em-pathy is the one developed by Stotland(1969). Stotland demonstrated that varyingthe perceptual set with which persons ob-serve someone in distress can influence theirlevel of empathic emotion. Persons in-structed to imagine how the victim feels (animagine set) become more physiologicallyaroused than persons instructed to observethe victim's movements (an observe set).Moreover, self-reports by participants inStotland's research indicate that the arousalexperienced in the imagine-set condition islabeled in a manner congruent with the per-ceived state of the victim; that is, the ex-perienced emotion is empathic.

In the present research we employed amodification of Stotland's (1969) procedurefor manipulating empathy. We varied theperceptual set of subjects as they listened toan audiotape describing the plight of anotherintroductory psychology student. The audio-tape was supposedly a pilot for a new, morepersonalized news program being consideredby the local university radio station. On thetape, a freshman at the university, CarolMarcy, was interviewed. The interview re-vealed that both of Carol's legs had beenbroken in an automobile accident and thatshe had spent the last month in the hospital.Now she was out, but because she hadmissed so many classes, Carol was faced withhaving to drop introductory psychology,which would put her a whole year behind inher program in elementary education. Afterlistening to the tape, subjects were given anunexpected chance to help Carol by volun-teering to spend time going over their intro-ductory psychology class notes with her,which would enable her to remain in thecourse. To manipulate empathy, some sub-jects were instructed to attend carefully tothe information presented on the tape (ob-serve-set condition); others were instructedto imagine how the person interviewed feltabout what had happened (imagine-set con-dition). In order to assess the impact of this

manipulation on subjects' empathic emotion,all subjects were subsequently asked to com-plete a questionnaire concerning their emo-tional response to the tape. Subjects com-pleted this questionnaire before knowingthat they would have a chance to help Carol.

As in the Batson et al. experiments, easeof escape was manipulated by varyingwhether subjects could anticipate seeingCarol in the future. In the easy-escape con-dition, subjects learned that because both ofher legs were still in casts, Carol was study-ing at home but could easily arrange trans-portation if the subject wished to help. Sub-jects in this condition who did not help hadno reason to expect to see or hear of Carolever again. In the difficult-escape condition,however, subjects learned that Carol was inthe same discussion section of introductorypsychology as they (discussion sections con-tained about 25-30 students) and that shewould be back in class next week, easily rec-ognizable in her wheelchair and casts. So,if subjects in the difficult-escape conditiondid not help, they could anticipate being re-minded in the future of Carol's unmet need.(Since Carol did not know that she and thesubject were in the same section, the subjectdid not have to fear verbal recriminationsor knowing stares, only recollection of Carol'sunmet need and knowledge that she wouldprobably have to drop the course.)

Hypotheses

We tested the following three hypotheses.Hypothesis 1. We predicted, first, that

subjects in the imagine-set condition wouldreport experiencing more empathic emotionwhile listening to the tape than subjects inthe observe-set condition. This hypothesiswas a statement that the set manipulationwould affect empathic emotion, as claimedby Stotland (1969).

Hypothesis 2. We predicted, second, thatsubjects in the observe-set condition woulddisplay an egoistic pattern of helping,whereas those in the imagine-set conditionwould display an altruistic pattern. That is,across the four cells of the 2 (observe vs.imagine set) X 2 (easy vs. difficult escape)design, a 1 versus 3 pattern of helping waspredicted; the rate of helping would be lowerin the observe-easy-escape cell than in the


other three. This prediction was a statementof the empathy-altruism hypothesis, ex-pressed in terms of the present experimentaldesign.

Hypothesis 3. We predicted, third, thata similar 1 versus 3 pattern would be ob-served across the four cells of a 2 (predom-inant distress vs. empathy) X 2 (easy vs. dif-ficult escape) design created by classifyingsubjects according to whether they reporteda relative predominance of feelings of per-sonal distress (e.g., alarmed, upset, dis-turbed) or feelings of empathy (e.g., sym-pathetic, moved, compassionate) while lis-tening to the tape. It was predicted thathelping would be lower in the distress-easy-escape cell than in the other three. This pre-diction was based on a second version of theempathy-altruism hypothesis, namely, thatfeelings of personal distress lead to egoisticmotivation to reduce one's own distress,whereas feelings of empathy lead to altruis-tic motivation to reduce the other's distress(see Coke et al., 1978). Batson, O'Quin,Fultz, Vanderplas, and Isen (Note 2) hadrecently reported support for this predictionby using the same research paradigm usedby Batson et al. (1981). We wished to putit to the test again, using our different re-search paradigm.

Were we to find consistent support for allthree of these hypotheses, we would havestrong additional evidence that empathicemotion leads to altruistic motivation tohelp.

Method

SubjectsEighty-four female introductory psychology students

at the University of Kansas participated in the experi-ment, partially fulfilling a class requirement. Only fe-male subjects were used because the person in need wasfemale, and it was assumed that the potential for em-pathy would be greater if both the person in need andthe potential helper were of the same sex. Twenty-onesubjects were assigned to each condition of the 2 (ob-serve vs. imagine set) X 2 (easy vs. difficult escape)experimental design. Assignment was by a randomizedblock procedure.1

Procedure

Subjects were run individually by a female experi-menter. On arrival, each subject was seated in a small

cubicle and asked to read an introduction to the study,sign a consent form, and fill out a Department of Psy-chology survey. The introduction presented the experi-ment as part of an ongoing project for pilot testing newprograms for the local university radio station. Subjectswere to listen and report their reactions to one of theavailable pilot tapes for each of two proposed programs:Bulletin Board, a program of announcements of upcom-ing events at the University, and News From the Per-sonal Side, a program attempting a more personalizedapproach to news events. The introduction explainedthat all the pilot tapes were based on real events, butnone of the tapes had or would be aired. The introduc-tion also explained that subjects would be asked to adopt

. a specific listening perspective while listening to the sec-ond tape because how people listen can influence theirreactions to broadcast material.

The Department of Psychology survey was ostensiblyunrelated to the pilot-testing project. It concerned stu-dents' reactions to their introductory psychology courseand was being administered by the Department in aneffort to make the course maximally responsive to theneeds and interests of students. Among other questions,the survey asked subjects to indicate their instructor'sname and the meeting time of their discussion section.This information was later used to create the escapemanipulation.

Listening to the Bulletin Board tape. When subjectshad finished reading the introduction and filling out thedepartmental survey, the experimenter returned, checkedto be sure that all instructions were clear, and informedsubjects that they would be listening to the "BulletinBoard tape first. (The order of tapes had supposedlybeen determined by chance.) The experimenter then hadsubjects select the particular pilot they would hear fromthe five available Bulletin Board tapes. Although all fivetapes were the same, subjects believed that each wasdifferent and that each would be heard only by the onesubject who selected it. After the subject made her se-lection, she was left alone to listen to the tape. It con-sisted of a rather bland SS-sec announcement of an up-coming lecture series in anthropology.

At the conclusion of the tape, the experimenter re-turned with two reaction questionnaires for the subjectto complete. The first was an emotional response ques-tionnaire; it consisted of 28 adjectives describing dif-ferent emotional states, The subject was asked to in-dicate on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely)how much she experienced each emotion while listeningto the tape. Included in the list were adjectives thatreflected feelings of empathy (e.g., sympathetic, moved,

1 Thirteen additional students were deleted from thedesign, 2 because of procedural errors and 11 becauseof suspicion (3 from the observe-easy-escape condition,2 from the imagine-easy-escape condition, 1 from theobserve-difficult-escape condition, and 5 from the imag-ine-difficult-escape condition). The proportion of sus-picious subjects did not differ reliably across conditions,X2(3) = 2.76, p > .40. Moreover, the same, albeit some-what weaker, pattern of significant effects was observedwhen the data were analyzed including all suspicioussubjects.


compassionate) and personal distress (e.g., alarmed,grieved, upset, disturbed). Consistent with the coverstory, the second questionnaire was a Bulletin Boardevaluation form. It asked the subject to indicate howinteresting, informative, and worthwhile she felt thebroadcast was. Having subjects listen to and evaluatethe Bulletin Board tape served to familiarize them withthe questionnaires and to strengthen the cover story;responses to the Bulletin Board questionnaires were notanalyzed.

Manipulation of listening perspective. After sub-jects had completed the Bulletin Board questionnaires,the experimenter returned with written instructions de-scribing the perspective they should adopt while listen-ing to the News From the Personal Side tape. The ex-perimenter remained blind to this manipulation. Sub-jects in the observe-set condition read:

While you are listening to the broadcast, try to listencarefully to the information presented. Try to be asobjective as possible, carefully attending to all theinformation presented about the situation and about

~ the person who is being interviewed. Try not to con-cern yourself with how the person being interviewedfeels about what has happened. Just concentrate ontrying to listen objectively to the information pre-sented in the broadcast.

Subjects in the imagine-set condition read:

While you are listening to the broadcast try to imaginehow the person in the news feels. Try to take theperspective of the person who is being interviewed,imagining how he or she feels about what has hap-pened and how it has affected his or her life. Try notto concern yourself with attending to all the infor-mation presented. Just concentrate on trying to imag-ine how the person interviewed in the broadcast feels.

Following Stotland (1969), we expected the imagine setto lead to a more empathic emotional response to Carol'splight than the observe set.

Listening to the News From the Personal Side tape.After reading and rereading the listening-perspectiveinstructions, subjects were again allowed to select theirparticular tape from the five available. As before, allfive tapes were the same, but subjects believed that eachwas different and that each would be heard only by theone subject who selected it. After the subject made herselection, she was left alone to listen to the tape.

On this tape a female announcer explained that shewished to get behind cold statistics about auto accidentsand consider effects of an accident on the life of a par-ticular individual. She then interviewed Carol Marcy,a freshman at the University who recently had both legsbroken in an auto accident. In response to the inter-viewer's questions, Carol explained that missing classeshad been the most tragic consequence of the accident;she had missed a whole month of school because of herlong hospitalization. Although she was behind in all herclasses, she was especially concerned about introductorypsychology. She had learned that she would have to dropthe course if she could not find another student in theclass to go over the lecture notes with her. And if shehad to drop, then she would be an entire year behindin her program of study in elementary education. Carol

ended by saying that it had always been her dream tobe an elementary school teacher, but now it appearedthat this dream might not -be realized.

At the conclusion of the tape, the experimenter re-turned with another copy of the emotional responsequestionnaire and with an envelope addressed to the"student listening to the Carol Marcy pilot tape." Theexperimenter gave the questionnaire and envelope to thesubject and explained in a somewhat flustered mannerthat the News From the Personal Side evaluation formhad apparently been misplaced. The experimenter wouldhave to go get another copy; while she was gone, thesubject should first complete the emotional responsequestionnaire and then open the envelope and read itscontents. The experimenter stated that she knew nothingabout the contents of the envelope but had been askedby the professor in charge of the research to give it tothe student listening to the Carol Marcy tape.

Carol's request for help. The envelope contained atypewritten letter from the professor in charge, a hand-written letter from Carol, a slip of paper, and an en-velope marked "Carol Marcy." The letter from the pro-fessor explained why Carol's letter was enclosed:

When I was previewing the pilot tapes for the NewsFrom the Personal Side program, I noticed that CarolMarcy needs the help of an Introductory Psychologystudent so that she can catch up on the material shemissed while in the hospital. It occurred to me thatsince you are an Introductory Psychology student, youmight be able to help her. Therefore, I contactedCarol and asked her if she would like to write you aletter explaining her situation and asking for yourhelp. At first she was reluctant to do so, because shedid not want to impose on you. But since she still hasnot found anyone to help her and the deadline is fastapproaching, she at.last agreed to write. Her letteris enclosed.

I would like to ask you to read it carefully, and torespond or not as you wish. Of course, your partici-pation in this study in no way obligates you to helpCarol; it is entirely up to you. Although the assistantconducting this study knows nothing about Carol'ssituation, if you wish to help you should fill out theenclosed card, place it in the envelope marked "CarolMarcy," and ask the assistant to give the envelopeto me.

The handwritten letter from Carol outlined her needand asked the subject to help her by agreeing to go overthe introductory psychology lecture notes for the pastmonth. Carol added: "My instructor said that it's notimportant how well you are doing in the class or whatsection you are in, what's important is that you arewilling to take the time to help me out." Carol's letteralso included the escape manipulation.

Manipulation of ease of escape. In the easy-escapecondition, subjects read:

Since I'm still in this wheelchair, the instructor toldme that I could get the material for the remainingclasses to study at home. That way I won't have, tocome to school in my wheelchair. But, of course, I'llbe happy to meet you wherever you want to go overthe notes.


In the difficult-escape condition, this passage was re-placed by:

I'm starting back to class next week. I'm in the [time]o'clock section on [day] with [instructor's name]. Iknow there are lots of different sections, but if you'rein the same one, I'm sure you won't have any troublepicking me out. I doubt if there are many studentsin wheelchairs with both legs in casts.

The time, day, and instructor information was the sameas that given by the subject on the Department of Psy-chology survey. Thus, subjects in the difficult-escapecondition thought that they would see Carol in the fu-ture, even if they did not help; subjects in the easy-escape condition did not.

Dependent measure: Agreeing to help Carol. Thedependent variable was whether the subject rilled outthe slip and gave the envelope to the experimenter, in-dicating a commitment to help by going over the lecturenotes with Carol. Responses were coded dichotomously:1 if the subject agreed to help, 0 if she did not.

Ancillary measures: Ratings of severity of need, lik-ing for Carol, and checks on the set manipulation.When the experimenter returned, she gave the subjectthe News From the Personal Side evaluation form tocomplete. This form was the same as the Bulletin Boardevaluation form, with the addition of four questions:How great is the need of the person interviewed in thebroadcast? In your opinion, how likable was the personinterviewed in the broadcast? While listening, to whatextent did you concentrate on listening to the infor-mation presented in the broadcast? To what extent didyou concentrate on imagining how the person being in-terviewed felt?

Debriefing. After completing this evaluation form,the subject was fully and carefully debriefed, thankedfor her participation, and excused.

Results and Discussion

Effectiveness of the Set Manipulation

To assess the effect of the listening-per-spective instructions, subjects were asked onthe News From the Personal Side evaluationform to rate the extent to which they con-centrated (a) on the information presentedand (b) on imagining how the person inter-viewed felt. As expected, the set manipula-tion affected responses to each of these ques-tions. On the 9-point response scale (1 = notat all, 9 = a great deal), subjects in the ob-serve-set condition reported concentratingon the information presented to a signifi-cantly greater extent (M = 7.63) than sub-jects in the imagine-set condition (M =6.62), F(l, 79) = 9.52, p < .003, whereassubjects in the imagine-set condition re-ported imagining how the person interviewedfelt to a significantly greater extent (M =

7.60) than subjects in the observe-set con-dition (M=6.22), F(l, 79) =11.44, p<.001. (One subject was excluded from theseanalyses because she failed to answer thesetwo questions.) Neither the ease-of-escapemain effect nor the interaction approachedsignificance for either question (all Fs < 2).These results suggested that the set manip-ulation was effective; subjects attended toand reported success in implementing thelistening-perspective instructions.

Although we were not able to think of adirect way to check the effectiveness of theescape manipulation, the experimenter ques-tioned subjects during debriefing about theiranticipated future exposure to Carol. Re-sponses indicated that the escape manipu-lation had the desired effect; subjects in thedifficult-escape condition consistently men-tioned that they would see Carol in class,while subjects in the easy-escape conditiondid not.

Perception of Carol's Need and Likability

On the News From the Personal Sideevaluation form, subjects were also asked toindicate the magnitude of Carol's need (1 =very little, 9 = very great) and how likableshe was (1 = not al all, 9 = extremely). Asintended, subjects in all four conditions per-ceived Carol's need to be great (overall M =7.38), with no reliable differences across con-ditions (all Fs < 1). Nor were there any re-liable differences across conditions in Carol'slikability (all Fs < 1.70); she was seen asmoderately likable in all conditions (overallM = 5.87). It appeared, then, that any dif-ferences we might observe in emotional re-sponses to Carol's plight or in helping couldnot be attributed to differences in the per-ceived severity of Carol's need or in likingfor Carol.

Hypothesis 1: Imagine Set Leads toGreater Empathic Emotion

Turning to our hypotheses, Hypothesis 1predicted that subjects in the imagine-setcondition would report greater empathicemotion as a result of hearing about Carol'splight than subjects in the observe-set con-dition. Previous research (Archer, Diaz-Lov-


ing, Gollwitzer, Davis, & Foushee, 1981;Batson & Coke, 1981; Coke et al, 1978;Batson et al., Note 2) has suggested thatthere are at least two qualitatively distinctemotional reactions to witnessing anotherperson in need: reactions of empathy and ofpersonal distress. Following Batson et al.(Note 2), we averaged subjects' responsesto three adjectives (sympathetic, moved, andcompassionate) to form an empathy index(Cronbach's alpha = .82) and averaged re-sponses to six other adjectives (alarmed,grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, and per-turbed) to form a distress index (Cronbach'salpha = .88).2 Averaging meant that scoreson each index were calibrated to the original7-point response scale (1 = not at all, 7 =extremely).

Next, again following Batson et al. (Note2), we created a single index of emotionalresponse by subtracting each subject's scoreon the distress index from her score on theempathy index. This difference score seemedto be a theoretically meaningful measure ofemotional response for two reasons. First,the logic underlying Hypothesis 3 was thatif personal distress leads to egoistic moti-vation and empathy leads to altruistic mo-tivation, then under easy escape, empathicfeelings should lead to helping, whereas dis-tress feelings should not. But what if ah in-dividual were feeling a fairly high degree ofboth empathy and distress? Presumably,such an individual would be in conflict, feel-ing some pressure to help and some to es-cape. Under these conditions, it seemed rea-sonable to expect that the person's behaviorwould be determined by the predominantemotional response. The difference measureprovided an index of this relative predomi-nance. A second, related reason for employ-ing a difference measure was that eventhough the adjectives contributing to theempathy and distress indexes loaded on dif-ferent factors in a factor analysis (see Foot-note 2), scores on these indexes were posi-tively correlated, r(81) = .63, p < .001,two-tailed. This relationship presumablyreflected individual differences in either re-sponse set or general emotionality. Butwhatever its source, by taking the differencebetween each subject's score on the distressand empathy index, we could obtain a mea-

sure of predominant emotional response ad-justed for these individual differences.

Creation of the empathy, distress, andpredominant emotional response indexes en-abled us to assess not only whether the setmanipulation affected self-reported empa-thy, as Hypothesis 1 predicted, but alsowhether it affected self-reported distress. Toclaim that listening-perspective instructionsinfluence empathy clearly implies a specificeffect that should not include other vicariousemotions, such as distress. We could checkfor this specificity by examining the effectof the set manipulation on self-reported dis-tress and on the index of predominant emo-tional response.

As expected, the set manipulation had asignificant effect on subjects' responses to the

2 Previous research using similar but not identicalemotional response questionnaires (see Batson & Coke,1981; Batson et al., 1981) had revealed a consistenttendency for six adjectives thought to reflect empathy(sympathetic, moved, compassionate, warm, soft-hearted, and tender) and eight adjectives thought toreflect distress (alarmed, grieved, upset, worried, dis-turbed, perturbed, distressed, and troubled) to loadhighly on separate, orthogonal factors. Consistent withthis previous research, a varimax-rotated, principal-component factor analysis of our subjects' responses tothese 14 adjectives (collapsed across experimental con-ditions) produced a clear two-factor solution (account-ing for 67% of the variance and all eigenvalues above1.0).-All six of the empathy adjectives loaded mosthighly on one factor, and all eight of the distress ad-jectives loaded most highly on the other, orthogonal fac-tor.

Yet we did not use all 14 of these adjectives in creatingour indexes of empathy and distress. Instead, we usedthe shorter three-item empathy and six-item distressindexes employed by Batson et al. (Note 2). They hadintroduced these shorter indexes because a number ofsubjects in their studies did not have time to rate all 28adjectives on the emotional response questionnaire. Thisresulted in many missing observations on the later ad-jectives and rendered these later adjectives unusable.Since the Batson et al. (Note 2) research had involveda test of Hypothesis 3 using a different research para-digm, it seemed desirable to be able to compare ourresults with theirs. Therefore, we decided to employ thesame shorter indices of empathy and distress that theyhad employed.

Our factor analysis provided reassurance that theseshorter indexes reflected the same two qualitatively dis-tinct emotions as the longer indexes. Loadings for thethree adjectives composing the empathy index were all.69 or above on the empathy factor; loadings for the sixadjectives composing the distress index were all .69 orabove on the distress factor.


Table 1Proportion of Subjects Helping in EachExperimental Condition

Listening-perspectivecondition

base-ot -escapecondition

Easy

Difficult

Observe

.33(21).76

(21)

Imagine

.71(21).81

(21)

Note, Numbers in parentheses are the number of sub-jects in each cell.

adjectives on the empathy index, F(\, 79) =6.36, p < .02; reported empathy was higherin the imagine-set condition (M = 4.67) thanin the observe-set condition (Af = 3.88).(One subject had to be eliminated from thisanalysis because she failed to rate all threeempathy adjectives.) The effect of the setmanipulation on the distress index was notsignificant, F(l, 77) =1.51, although re-ported distress was slightly higher in theimagine-set condition (M = 2.80) than theobserve-set condition (M = 2.45). (Threesubjects, including the one eliminated pre-viously, were eliminated from this analysisbecause they failed to rate all six distressadjectives.) Finally, the set manipulationhad a marginally significant effect on theindex of predominant emotional response; asexpected, the imagine set produced a relativepredominance of empathy over distress, F( 1,77) = 3.24, p < .08. For each of these mea-sures, there were no other reliable effects(all other Fs < 1.30).

Overall, this pattern of results seemedquite supportive of Hypothesis 1. As pre-dicted, subjects in the imagine-set conditionreported experiencing more empathic emo-tion than subjects in the observe-set condi-tion. Moreover, the effect seemed specific toempathy. The manipulation did not reliablyaffect reported personal distress, and eventhough responses on the empathy and dis-tress indexes were positively correlated, therewas a marginally significant difference inscores on the index of predominant emo-tional response; subjects in the imagine-setcondition reported more empathy relative todistress.

Hypothesis 2: Imagine Set Leads toAltruistic Motivation

Hypothesis 2 predicted that subjects in theobserve-set condition would display an egois-tic pattern of helping, whereas those in theimagine-set condition would display an al-truistic pattern. That is, across the four cellsof the 2 (observe vs. imagine set) X 2 (easyvs. difficult escape) design, a 1-versus-3 pat-tern of helping would be observed; the rateof helping would be lower in the observe-easy-escape cell than in the other three.

Table 1 presents the proportion of subjectswho volunteered to help Carol in each cellof the 2 X 2 design. As can be seen, the help-ing rates patterned very much as predicted.To provide a statistical test of this pattern,cell proportions were first converted to a nor-mal approximation using an arc sin trans-formation (see Langer & Abelson, 1972;Winer, 1971, pp. 399-400). Then a plannedcomparison was made, contrasting the ob-serve-easy-escape cell with the other three.As predicted, this contrast was highly sig-nificant, x2(0= 12.58, p<.001, and theresidual variance did not approach signifi-cance, x2(2) = .53. Moreover, between-cellcomparisons revealed that as predicted, therate of helping in the observe-easy-escapecell was lower than the rate in each of theother three cells, all zs > 2.50, all ps < .01,one-tailed; there were no reliable differencesamong the other three cells, all zs < 1. Thiswas precisely the pattern of significant ef-fects that we would expect if the observe setled to egoistic and the imagine set to al-truistic motivation to help, as predicted byHypothesis 2.

But was the effect of the set manipulationon the rate of helping when escape was easya result of the effect of this manipulation onself-reported empathic emotion, as the em-pathy-altruism hypothesis implies? Two ad-ditional analyses were performed in order toshed some light on this question; First, wecomputed partial correlations (point biseri-als) between scores on the empathy indexand helping, controlling for scores on thedistress index, and between scores on thedistress index and helping, controlling forscores on the empathy index. (Partial cor-relations were used to adjust for the previ-


Table 2Comparison of Effect of Set Manipulation on Helping When Entered Into Regression EquationBefore and After Indexes of Self-Reported Emotional Response (Easy-Escape Condition, N = 40j

Variable(s) entered into regression equation first

Set manipulation Indexes of self-reported emotion

Source

Set manipulation

Indexes of self-reportedemotion

Empathy indexDistress index

df

1, 38

1,361,36

''partial

.35

.23

-.19

MS

1.225

.461

.303

F

5.32

2.01J.32

P

.03

.17ns

df

1,36

1, 371,37

''partial

.28

.32

-.20

MS

.720

.998

.360

F

3.14

4.121.48

P

.09

.05ns

ously noted positive correlation between theempathy and distress indexes.) Consistentwith the empathy-altruism hypothesis, thesecorrelations revealed a significant positivecorrelation between self-reported empathyand helping for subjects in the easy-escapecondition, /•pvtul (37) = .32, p < .025, one-tailed, and a nonsignificant negative corre-lation between self-reported distress andhelping, rpartia, (37) =-.20, p<.\2, one-tailed. As expected, these same partial cor-relations for subjects in the difficult-escapecondition were very close to zero (bothrs = .03).

Second, using multiple regression, we con-ducted a simple path analysis similar to theone reported by Coke .et al. (1978, Experi-ment 2). This involved performing two step-wise multiple regression analyses on thehelping responses of subjects in the easy-es-cape condition. In one, the set manipulationwas entered as the sole predictor on the firststep, and the empathy and distress indexeswere entered on the second step. In the other,these two steps Avere reversed. These tworegression analyses, summarized in Table 2,allowed us to assess the degree to which theeffect of the set manipulation on helping wasmediated by subjects' self-reported emo-tional response. For to enter the set manip-ulation into the regression equation after theempathy and distress indexes would excludeany mediated effect from the mean squarefor the set manipulation. The difference be-tween the mean square for the set manipu-lation when entered first and when enteredsecond would, then, provide some indicationof how much of the effect of the set manip-

ulation on helping was mediated by the in-dexes of self-reported emotional response.

As can be seen in Table 2, entering theemotional response indexes into the regres-sion equation first caused a substantial re-duction (from 1.225 to .720) in the meansquare for the set manipulation, suggestingthat self-reported emotional response didserve a mediating role. Moreover, supple-mental analyses revealed that 89% of thisreduction could be attributed to mediationby self-reported empathy. At the same timethe regression analyses revealed that the setmanipulation had a marginally significanteffect on helping that could not be attributedto this mediation, F(l, 36) = 3.14, p < .10.3

Apparently, either measurement error ob-scured the extent of the mediation, or theset manipulation had some effect on helpingthat was independent of its effect on self-reported emotional response. (As expected,parallel regression analyses on the responsesof subjects in the difficult-escape conditionproduced no reliable effects—all Fs < 1.0.)

Hypothesis 3: Feeling a Predominance ofEmpathic Emotion Leads to AltruisticMotivation

To summarize thus far, we have evidencethat as predicted, subjects in the imagine-setcondition reported experiencing more em-pathic emotion than subjects in the observe-

3 This result was quite similar to that observed byCoke et al. (1978), who reported F(l, 30) = 3.18 fortheir arousal feedback manipulation when it was enteredinto a regression equation after self-reported empathy.


set condition (Hypothesis 1). Also as pre-dicted, the pattern of helping in the imagine-set condition suggested that the motivationto help was altruistic, whereas the patternin the observe-set condition suggested thatthe motivation was egoistic (Hypothesis 2).But a path analysis revealed that the effectof the set manipulation on the helping ofsubjects in the easy-escape condition, al-though mediated in part by the effect of thismanipulation on self-reported empathicemotion, could not be entirely attributed tothis mediation. The set manipulation ap-peared to have some effect on helping, in-dependent of its effect on empathy.

In light of this path analysis, it becameall the more important to test Hypothesis 3,namely, that feelings of personal distresslead to egoistic motivation, whereas feelingsof empathy lead to altruistic motivation tohelp. For to find that the effect of the setmanipulation appeared to be only partiallymediated by its effect on subjects' self-re-ported empathy raised the possibility thatthe imagine-set condition produced altruisticmotivation that was not a result of empathy.If this were true, then the support for Hy-pothesis 2 could not also be considered sup-port for the empathy-altruism hypothesis.Hypothesis 3 allowed us to address directlythe question of whether a predominance ofempathic emotion produced an altruisticpattern of helping.

To test Hypothesis 3, a new 2 X 2 designwas created by performing a median split ineach escape condition on the index of pre-dominant emotional response (empathy in-dex minus distress index), permitting us toidentify those subjects who reported beingrelatively distressed and those who reportedbeing relatively empathic. Then these twotypes of self-reported emotional response(predominant distress vs. predominant em-pathy) were crossed with the two levels ofease of escape (easy vs. difficult) to producea 2 X 2 design.

As it turned out, this classification of sub-jects based on self-reported emotion was notat all redundant with the original classifi-cation produced by the set manipulation.Twenty-two subjects from the observe-setcondition reported a relative predominanceof feelings of distress, and 18 reported a rel-ative predominance of empathy; 22 subjects

from the imagine-set condition reported pre-dominant distress, and 19 reported predom-inant empathy. The lack of relationship be-tween the original set manipulation andclassification according to predominantemotional response may seem to contradictthe previously noted marginal effect of lis-tening perspective on scores on the emotionalresponse index. Actually, it does not; it onlysuggests that the marginal effect was dueprimarily to effects within the lower andupper halves of the distribution rather thanto movement across the median. It also sug-gests that much of the between-subject vari-ance in emotional response was not a resultof the set manipulation. More positively, thelack of relationship suggests that the patternof results observed for the new 2 X 2 designcannot be dismissed as an artifact of thepattern in the original 2 X 2 .

Table 3 presents the rate of helping ineach cell of the new 2 X 2 design. As can beseen, the pattern is very much as predictedby Hypothesis 3. The planned comparisoncontrasting the distress-easy-escape cell withthe other three (arc sin transformation) washighly significant, x2(l) = 8.61, p < .001,and the residual variance did not approachsignificance, x2 = -60. Between-cell compar-isons revealed that as predicted, the rate ofhelping in the distress-easy-escape cell waslower than the rate in each of the other threecells, all zs > 2.04, ps < .02, one-tailed, andthere were no reliable differences among theother three cells, all zs < 1. Subjects whoreported a relative predominance of em-pathic feelings for Carol were very likely tohelp even when escape was easy, suggestingthat their motivation for helping was altruis-tic. But subjects who reported a relative pre-dominance of distress were significantly lesslikely to help when it was easy for them toescape without helping, suggesting that theirmotivation was egoistic. This pattern of re-sults was entirely consistent with Hypothesis3. It also provided reassurance that empathicemotion of the sort produced by the set ma-nipulation did indeed evoke altruistic moti-vation.

Implications

The purpose of the present research wasto test again the empathy-altruism hypoth-


esis, using the logic proposed by Batson etal. (1981) but using a different technique formanipulating empathy and a different needsituation. We employed a modification ofStotland's (1969) technique to manipulateempathy, varying the listening perspectiveof subjects as they heard about another per-son's need. Consistent with Stotland's earlierresearch, we found that subjects who wereinstructed to imagine how the person feltreported feeling more empathic emotionthan subjects who were instructed to con-centrate on the information provided. Wealso found that this increase in emotionalresponse was specific to empathic emotion;there was no significant increase in feelingsof personal distress, and even though self-reports of empathy and distress were posi-tively correlated, there was a marginally sig-nificant increase in relative empathy (self-reported empathy minus distress). Thesefindings supported Hypothesis 1.

By crossing this listening-perspective ma-nipulation with a manipulation of ease ofescape without helping, we were able to as-sess the nature of the motivation underlyinghelping in the observe-set and imagine-setconditions. The pattern of helping providedclear support for the hypothesis that focus-ing on the feelings of a person in need leadsto altruistic motivation to reduce that per-son's need. Subjects in the observe-set con-dition helped less when escape without help-ing was easy than when it was difficult. Thispattern suggested that the motivation ofthese subjects was directed toward the egois-tic goal of reducing their own distress. Sub-jects in the imagine-set condition, however,displayed a high rate of helping even whenescape was easy. This pattern suggested thatthe motivation of these subjects was directedtoward the altruistic goal of reducing thedistress of the person in need. These findingssupported Hypothesis 2.

Under easy escape, (a) the imagine-setcondition was associated with increasedhelping, and (b) partial correlations revealeda positive association between self-reportedempathy and helping. But a path analysissuggested that this effect of the set manip-ulation on helping was only partially attrib-utable to the mediating role of self-reportedempathy, raising some question as to whetherthe support for Hypothesis 2 should be taken

Table 3Proportion of Helping Among SubjectsReporting Low- and High-Empathic Emotionin Each Escape Condition

Ease-of-escapecondition

Easy

Difficult

Self-reportedrelative empathy

Low

.39(23).81

(21)

High

.71(17).75

(20)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are the number of sub-jects in each cell.

as support for the empathy-altruism hypoth-esis. To reassure ourselves that those sub-jects who experienced a relatively high de-gree of empathy were altruistically moti-vated, subjects in the two escape conditionswere classified into those reporting a relativepredominance of either distress or empathy,and this classification was crossed with theease-of-escape manipulation. The rate ofhelping in this new 2 X 2 design conformedto the predicted l-versus-3 pattern, suggest-ing that the motivation of those reporting apredominance of distress was egoistic,whereas the motivation of those reporting apredominance of empathy was altruistic.These findings supported Hypothesis 3 andprovided evidence that empathic emotion ofthe sort produced by the set manipulationdid indeed evoke altruistic motivation.

In combination, the evidence for Hy-potheses 1, 2, and 3 seems quite supportiveof the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Andwhen the present results are considered inconjunction with the results of the two ex-periments reported by Batson et al. (1981),in which other techniques were used to ma-nipulate the level of empathic emotion, andthe studies reported by Batson et al. (Note2), in which subjects' naturally occurringlevels of empathic emotion were measured,the evidence begins to look strong indeed.The results of each of those studies were alsosupportive of the empathy-altruism hypoth-esis.

Whether one considers the evidence nowstrong enough to justify the conclusion thatempathic emotion can indeed evoke altruis-tic motivation will likely depend, on one's


preconceptions about whether altruistic mo-tivation is possible. As we noted earlier, mostcontemporary theories of motivation do noteven allow for this ppssibility. But as theevidence for the empathy-altruism hypoth-esis continues to mount, it seems increasinglydifficult to deny.

Reference Notes1. Piliavin, J. A., & Piliavin, I. M. The Good Samar-

itan: Why does he helpl Unpublished manuscript,University of Wisconsin, 1973.

2. Batson, C. D., O'Quin, K., Fultz, J., Vanderplas, M.,& Isen, A. Influence of self-reported distress andempathy on egoistic versus altruistic motivation tohelp. Unpublished manuscript, University of Kansas,1981.

ReferencesArcher, R. L., Diaz-Loving, R., Gollwitzer, P. M.,

Davis, M. H., & Foushee, H. C. The role of dispo-sitional empathy and social evaluation in the empathicmediation of helping. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology. 1981, 40, 786-796.

Aronfreed, J. The socialization of altruistic and sym-pathetic behavior: Some theoretical and experimentalanalyses. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.),Altruism and helping behavior. New York: AcademicPress, 1970.

Batson, C. D., & Coke, J. S. Empathy: A source ofaltruistic motivation for helping. In J. P. Rushton& R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Altruism and helpingbehavior. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.

Batson, C. D., Darley, J. M., & Coke, J. S. Altruismand human kindness: Internal and external determi-nants of helping behavior. In L. Pe'rvin & M. Lewis(Eds,), Perspectives in interactional psychology. NewYork: Plenum, 1978.

Batson, C. D., Duncan, B. D., Ackerman, P., Buckley,T., & Birch, K. Is empathic emotion a source of al-truistic motivation? Journal of Personality and So-cial Psychology, 1981, 40, 290-302.

Batson, C. D., & Vanderplas, M. Helping. In D. Perl-man & C. Cozby (Eds.), Social Psychology. NewYork: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, in press.

Holies, R. D. Theory of motivation (2nd ed.). NewYork: Harper & Row, 1975.

Coke, J. S., Batson, C. D., & McDavis, K. Empathicmediation of helping: A two-stage model. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1978, 36, 752-766.

Comte, I. A. System of positive polity (Vol. 1). London:Longmans, Green, 1875.

Hoffman, M. L. Developmental synthesis of affect andcognition and its implications for altruistic motiva-tion. Developmental Psychology, 1975, // , 607-622.

Hoffman, M. L. Is altruism part of human nature? Jour-nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981, 40,121-137.

Krebs, D. L. Empathy and altruism. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 1134-1146.

Langer, E. G., & Abelson, R. The semantics of askinga favor: How to succeed in getting help without reallydying. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1972, 24, 26-32.

Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son, &Bourn, 1863.

Smith, A. The theory of moral sentiments. London: A.Miller, 1759.

Stotland, E. Exploratory investigations of empathy. InL. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental socialpsychology (Vol. 3). New York: Academic Press,1969.

Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental de-sign (2nd. ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Received October 26, 1981

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