MoralTalentandSecurity:DiachronicPerspectivesonChineseStrategicCulture

UndergraduateResearchThesis

PresentedinPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsforGraduation“withHonorsResearchDistinctioninPoliticalScience”intheUndergraduateCollegesofTheOhioStateUniversity

by

JayanT.Nairnair.86@osu.edu

TheOhioStateUniversity

April2016

ProjectAdvisor:ProfessorJenniferMitzen,DepartmentofPoliticalScience

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Since theendof theColdWar,Chinahasundergonearemarkable transformation.

Reapingthefruitsofthediplomaticopeningandeconomicreformsofthe1970sand‘80s,it

hasgrownsteadilyfromanisolatedandeconomicallystuntedstateoflittleimportforthose

withoutaregionalinterestinEastAsiaintoasignificanteconomicandmilitarypowerjust

beginningtowielditsinfluenceacrosstheglobe.Aspolicymakersandinternationalrelations

(IR)punditshaveturnedtheirattentiontothedarkhorseflexingitsnewly(re)gainedpower,

theirprimaryconcernisforecastingChina’sactionsininternationalsociety.Theiranalyses

andprognosticationsoftendisplayacertainsubtlebuttangibleanxietyarisingfromthefact

thatnobody iscertainhowtounderstandChina’s intentions(see forexampleManning&

Przystup2016,Revere2016andShi2015).

IntryingtomakesenseofthetheEastAsiangiant’sbehavior,academicsoftenturnto

culture as ourmain explanatory tool. Culture showspromisebecause it is “fitted” to the

contoursofthepuzzlingcase,showinghowthemassofcontradictionsthatweperceivein

China’sbehavioractuallymakesensewithinthestate’suniqueculturalclimate.Theturnto

culture answers someof the “howpossible”questionsof foreignpolicydecision-making,

givingusaprepackagedvariabletowhichwecanascribepuzzlingforeignpolicychoices.In

China’scase,cultureistypicallyinvokedintheformofConfucianism,asystemofsocialand

politicalthoughtthatfocusesonmoralityandappropriateconductastheorderingprinciple

ofastableandprosperoussociety.

Unfortunately, when dealing with Chinese culture as an explanation for Chinese

behavior, it isdifficulttoescapebinarythinkingaboutkeyaspectsofChineseculturelike

Confucian political thought. Some scholars like Morris Rossabi (1983), Scott Boorman

(1969),andPaulGodwin(1984)highlightthequintessentiallyConfuciancharacteristicsof

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Chinese foreign policy. These arguments focus primarily or exclusively on defensive

behaviorsandtherestricteduseofmilitaryforceatvariouspointsinChinesehistory,which

theyattributetoaConfucianbeliefsystemessentialtoChineseculture.Otherscholarslike

DennyRoy (1994, 1996),AllenWhiting (1983), andDengYong&WangFei-Ling (2004)

emphasizetheassertivenatureofChinesestrategicactiononthecontemporaryworldstage.

WheretheyaddressConfucianismatall, theydosointhenegative,citingtheCommunist

Revolution in the early 20th century as the end of Confucianism’s influence on Chinese

foreignpolicy.

EvenscholarslikeAlastairIainJohnston,whoareconsciousofthebinaryandstrive

toworkagainstit,struggletoescapetheall-or-nothingapproachtoConfucianisminChinese

foreignpolicy.AsheturnstotheMingDynastystrategiccanontomakeamoresystematic

reviewofculture’sinfluenceonChinesestrategicchoice,JohnstonidentifiesbothConfucian

and realpolitik elements in the security discourse.However, althoughhenotes that both

exist,hedismisses theConfucianelementsasmerelysymbolicandthus insignificant ina

largertheoreticalcontext.ByminimizingtheimportanceofConfuciansymbolicvocabulary,

hepaintsapictureofChinesebehaviorasmonochromaticallyrealist,largelyperpetuating

thebinary.

ChinesescholarLiuTiewa is theonescholar Ihave foundthatescapes the trapof

culturalreductionism.UnlikeJohnston,shedoesnotexcludethesymbolicoutofhand.This

allowsher to tella compellingstoryof subtlevariationasshe traces thedevelopmentof

Chinesepolitical thought from theendof the imperial throughDengXiaoping’s rule. She

highlightshowChinesestrategiccombinesarangeofconceptsdrawnfrombothtraditional

Chinese and Western sources. In her depiction of China’s culture of national security,

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ConfucianthoughtisneitherthesinglemostdefiningfeatureofChinesestrategicculturenor

anunimportant symbolic element that canbedismissed. Sheuses this subtlerpictureof

dynamism to explain China’s vacillation between assertiveness and withdrawal on the

internationalstage.

Liu’sastuteobservationsgivescholarstoolsforpuzzlingoutthemysteryofChina’s

intentionswithout depicting Chinese culture asmonolithically Confucian or Realist. This

nuancedviewisvitalbothforassessingtheglobalsecurityimplicationsofChina’sriseand

forcleansingour theoriesof the traceofOrientalismandRedScare ideology thatplague

manymonolithicconceptionsofChineseculture.However,whileLiu’sworkisempirically

ingenious, it lacks a satisfying grounding in theory. This lack of a theoretical foundation

makesitdifficulttoapplyLiu’sreasoningtheparticularitiesof20thcenturyChinathatshe

explicitlyaddresses.Thislimitstheusefulnessofherargumentinmakingsenseofpolitics

movingintothefuture.Inthispaper,ItakethenuanceanddynamisminChina’sstrategic

thought over time that Liu describes and provide a foundation for it by rooting it in a

discursivetheoryofstrategicculture.

FollowingLisaWedeen’s(2002)leadinconceivingofcultureas“semioticpractices,”

Idefinestrategiccultureasasystemofsignificationandtheassociatedpracticesofmeaning-

makingconnectedwithasocietyorstate’ssecurity,foreignpolicy,andgrandstrategy.Most

previousworkonstrategicculturelikeJohnston’shascharacterizedcultureasinternalized

preferencesandcausalbeliefsaboutthenatureofinternationalpolitics.Johnstontakesfor

granted that these preferences and beliefs exist in theworld andmisses how the causal

relationships themselves are symbolically constituted and imbued with meaning. This

furtherenablesaone-dimensionalormonolithicviewofthatculturebecausenomechanism

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of change is presented. By conceptualizing strategic culture as the semiotic practices of

security,Iopenthedoortomoresubtletyanddynamism.

Security meaning-making practices are performed discursively as the society’s

various members discuss security, strategy, and foreign policy with each other. These

strategic discourses consist of two types of content. First is the causal content that the

strategiccultureliteraturehastraditionallyfocusedon.Thisrelatesconceptssuchasspecific

actors and policy actions to each other in aweb of cause and effect that can be used to

evaluatetheefficacyofagivenpolicyoption.However,Wedeen’stheoryofculturepointsto

another aspect of these semiotic practices that the literature largely ignores, namely the

constitutivecontent.Thiscontentdefinestheboundariesandcharacteristicsoftheconcepts

inthecausalweb.Iwillarguethatbothaspectsofsecuritymeaning-makingareimportant

forunderstandingthewayasociety’scultureplaysintoitsforeignpolicy.

Inordertocaptureboththesecomponentsofstrategicculturaldiscourse,Iturntoa

techniquecalledpredicateanalysis(seeMilliken1999),whichusesthesyntacticstructure

universaltonaturallanguagestomapthecontoursofconceptsastheyrelatetooneanother.

WhereasJohnston’smethodofcognitivemappingfocusesonthecausal linkagesbetween

conceptswhoseconnotationsareassumedtobeself-evident,predicateanalysisdissectsthe

referencedconcepts’meanings. I apply this technique to thestrategic culturaldiscourses

underDengXiaopingandMaoZedong,usingthejuxtapositiontoillustratetheshiftsthatLiu

identifiesinherstudy.Ithenfocusinparticularonthechangingappearanceandsignificance

ofoneparticularconcept:themoralmaninpolitics.Theanatomyofthisparticularelement

underlinesConfucianism’sambiguousroleandcallsintoquestionthevalidityofmonolithic

modelsofChinesestrategicculturebyhighlighting itscapacity forandhistoryofmarked

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changesovertime.ThisnecessitatesamorenuancedreflectiononConfucianism’srole in

China’sforeignpolicytoday.

ApartfromvalidatingLiuTiewa’sobservationsabout20thcenturyChinesestrategic

culture, the theory of strategic culture developed here sheds light on contemporary and

futureChineseforeignpolicy.Thepredicateanalysismethodologyneednotonlybeapplied

tohistoricaltextsbutcanalsobeusedtoanalyzeongoingsecuritydiscourseinChina.This

allowsus to actually observe the shifts in strategic culture as they occur.Bymonitoring

changesinChina’ssecuritydiscourseastheyunfold,scholarsandpolicypunditscanglean

animmediatelyrelevantunderstandingofthestrategicprioritiesandlimitsofpossibilityin

China’sdiscourseofnationalsecurity.ThismaynotbeabletoanswerJohnston’snarrower

questionofpredictingChinesestrategicaction,butitcanspeaktothepoliticalmotivationof

thepaperinthatithelpsusunderstandChina’srise.

StrategicCulture&China

Strategiccultureemergedoutofthepost-Warliteratureoncognitivepsychologyand

operational codespioneeredby the likesofNathanLeites (1951).With its rootsplanted

firmlyintheapprehensionsurroundingtheColdWarnuclearstandoff,thestrategicculture

literaturewasfocusedontherealmofpoliticalpossibilityfromtheoutset.Itsdevelopment

waslessconcernedwithwhatstatesliketheUSSRwoulddothanwithwhattheycoulddo.

Ideasofrationalitygottheoristsandpolicymakerspartoftheway,buttherewasapersistent

concernthatsomemodesofbehaviorlayoutsidetheboundariesofrationalchoicetheories.

Strategiccultureaimedtopatchupthegapswhererationalityfailed.

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Since its initial formulation, the concept of strategic culture has developed into a

robustandvariegatedsectorofscholarship.JohnGlennpresentsahelpfulcategorizationof

theliterature(2009),whichhegroupsintofourmainschoolsofthought:epiphenomenal,

constructivist, poststructuralist, and interpretivist. Each of these approaches draws on a

differentconstellationofliteratures,definingstrategicculturedifferentlyandapplyingitto

avarietyofempiricalcases.Thefullrangeoftheliteratureextendsbeyondthescopeofthis

paper,sohereIwillfocusonthetwomajorworksthatapplystrategicculturetothecaseof

China,bothofwhichoperatewithintheconventionalconstructivistvein1.

AlastairIainJohnston’sworkfromthemid-1990sisthemostfamousexaminationof

Chinese strategic culture. In his 1995book, Johnston startswith a definition of strategic

cultureinspiredbyCliffordGeertz’sworkonreligiousculture:

“Strategiccultureisanintegratedsystemofsymbols(i.e.,argumentationstructures,languages,analogies,metaphors,etc.)thatactstoestablishpervasiveandlong-lastinggrand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy ofmilitary force in interstatepoliticalaffairs,andbyclothing theseconceptionswithsuchanauraoffactualitythatthestrategicpreferencesseemuniquelyrealisticandefficacious.”(36)

Althoughthisdefinitionishelpfulconceptually,itisnotimmediatelyobvioushowto

implementitanalytically.Johnstongoesontospecifythatstrategiccultureoperatesas“a

consistentsetofrankedpreferencesthatpersistacrosstimeandacrossstrategiccontexts.”

(1995,52-54).SowhileJohnston’sontologyofstrategiccultureincludessymboliccontent,

his implementationof it isnotunlikethepreferencerankingsofgametheoryandformal

modelling.

1ForotherexamplesofconstructivistapproachestostrategiccultureseeBarnett(1996),Berger(1996),andKatzenstein(1996a).

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Johnston’sunderstandingofstrategiccultureasenduringpreferencerankingsmakes

itreasonabletodigbackintohistorytofindtherootsthesepreferences.Soforhisempirical

analysis,JohnstonturnstoChina’sMingDynasty(ca.1368-1644CE).Heusesthetextsofthe

SevenMilitaryClassics,writtenoveraspanoffourteencenturies(fromtheSunZiBingFa,

ca.500BCE,totheTangTaiZongLiWeiGongWenDui,ca.900CE),ashisobjectsofanalysis.

Thesetextsconstitutedthecanonofmilitarythoughtthatgovernmentofficialswouldhave

beenexpectedtofamiliarizethemselveswithasaprerequisiteofhighoffice.Toanalyzethe

texts,Johnstonusesamethodcalledcognitivemapping,whichdrawsadiagramofallcausal

statements in the text (explicit and implied). These statements link policy actions to

outcomes,displayingwhat theauthorviewedas themostdesiredoutcomesandthebest

waysofattainingthoseoutcomes.Thatis,apreferenceranking.

ThecoreinsightofJohnston’smultifacetedstudyisthatChinadisplayedadual-track

strategiccultureundertheMingDynasty.ThecoreofthisstrategiccultureiswhatJohnston

dubs the parabellum paradigm. This mode of strategic thought is characterized by an

inherently oppositional and zero-sum view of interstate security and a preference for

offensive tactics. In addition to the parabellum paradigm, Johnston identifies a mode of

thoughtinspiredbyConfucianideologiesthatoverlaystheculturalrealistlogic.Thistrackis

characterized by restraint and a preference for defensive tactics. Although Johnston

acknowledgesthatbothpatternsofthoughtarepresentinthediscursivemilieuoftheMing

Dynasty,hedismissestheConfucianparadigmassymbolicandthusirrelevantforexplaining

strategicbehavior—apuzzlingmove,givenhisinitial,Geertz-inspireddefinitionofstrategic

culture.

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In his 1996 article, Johnston extends his approach to examine Chinese strategic

culture under Mao. Applying his cognitive mapping methodology to Mao’s writings on

militarystrategy,heidentifiessimilaroppositional,zero-sumlogicinMao’sthinking.Since

heisprimarilyconcernedwithverifyingtheparabellumparadigm’spersistence,hedoesnot

devotemuchtimetotheothertrackbutdoesnotethattheConfucianparadigmdoesnot

seemtoberepresentedinMao’sthought.Johnstontakesthisasconfirmationboththatthe

parabellumparadigmrepresentsthecoreofChinesestrategiccultureandthatthatcoreis

durableacrosseventhemostdramaticofregimeshifts.

Muchmore recently, Liu Tiewa has again taken up the study of Chinese strategic

culture. In her 2014 article, she critiques Johnston’s separation of the symbolic fromhis

conceptionofoperationalstrategicculture.Shearguesthatthisisanartificialdecomposition

and unfounded based on Johnston’s own definition of strategic culture that rides on the

symbolic.Insteadshearguesforwhatshecallsanintegratedconceptionofstrategicculture

thatfusesthesymbolicwiththeoperational.Shearguesthattakinganintegratedapproach

willrevealsignificantcomplexitiesthatarelostotherwise.

TurningtothecaseofChina,Liumovesthroughthedevelopmentsofthetwentieth

century and the accompanying changes in Chinese strategic culture, emphasizing the

compositenatureofChinesestrategicthought.Sheidentifiestheinitialinfluencesfromboth

ConfucianandDaoistpoliticalphilosophyand thengoeson to showthe incorporationof

perspectives from Marxist thought under Mao. Moving beyond the ground covered by

Johnston,Liu identifieselementsunderDengandHu thatweredrawn from theWestern

Liberal tradition.Usingselect casestudies fromtheKorean,Vietnam,and IraqWars, she

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showsthesevariousconceptualelementsinplayasChineseofficialsformulatetheirforeign

policies.

LiumakesacompellingcritiquethatJohnston’sworkonstrategicculturedoesnot

implementanintegrateddefinition,andsheshowsthemorevariegatedrealityofChinese

strategicthoughtthatcomestolightwiththeadoptionofanintegratedviewveryeffectively.

ThisnuanceallowshertoreconcileseeminglycontradictoryinstancesofChinesestrategic

behaviorthatJohnstonglossesover.However,strategiccultureinherusageisveryvaguely

defined. In fact, nowhere does she define the concept explicitly, and the theoretical

groundingofheranalysissuffersfromthisomission.Inreintroducingthesymbolictothe

studyofstrategicculture,shetreatsitaspracticallysynonymouswithpoliticalphilosophy.

Butshefailstoprovideamechanismbywhichthephilosophyandbeliefsinterfacewiththe

policymakingprocess.This leavesuswiththemessagethatthesymboliccontentmatters

andanunderstandingofthecomplexitywelosebyignoringitbutlittletonocomprehension

ofwhythisissoorhowtoproceedwithourstudyofitinthefuture.

IntegratedStrategicCulture

Taking up Liu Tiewa’s call for an integrated approach to strategic culture, in this

sectionIoutlineatheoreticallygroundedconceptionofstrategicculturethatintegratesthe

symbolicwiththeoperational.Symbolsareimportantfactorsinimbuingthepoliticalwith

meaning and significance, and excluding symbolic discoursesunnecessarily hamstrings a

theory’sabilitytoexplaintheconstitutionandsignificanceofstrategicaction.Intheinterest

ofanchoringthesymbolicintheconcrete,thistheoryalsoprovidesamodelofhowstrategic

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cultural symbolsdelineate theboundariesof thepoliticallypossible, aswell asaprocess

allowingthatconstitutiverelationshiptochangeovertime.

StrategicCultureasMeaning-Making

Developingsuchaninclusiveontologyofstrategicculturerequiresanexaminationof

symbols and their place in cultural processes. In the context of culture, a symbol canbe

definedasanobject(whetherphysicalorideational)whichdoesnotbearmeaninginandof

itselfbutwhichistiedtoanabstractmeaningbyintersubjectiveunderstanding.Thesymbol

presentsandembodieswhatitsignifiessuchthatinvokingthesignifiercallsupthatwhich

itsignifies.Humanlifeissaturatedwithsymbols.Theycanbephysicalobjectsorimages(e.g.

flags,religiousicons,weddingbands),events(e.g.9/11intheAmericanconsciousnessor

the1948NakbainthePalestinianconsciousness),orevenlinguisticsigns(e.g.letters,words,

andevenmetaphors).

Inthinkingaboutsymbols’roleinculturethen,itishelpfultoconceiveofcultureas

meaning-making,orasLisaWedeen(2002)putsit,“semioticpractices.”Ifsymbolsarethe

vehiclesofsocialmeaning,thencultureisthemeansbywhichthatsocialmeaningisenacted

ordeployed.Asociety’scultureconsistsofthesharedpracticesbywhichmembersofthe

societymakesenseofthetheworldaroundthemandtheiractionsinit.Wedeenusesthe

exampleofanindividualsowingseeds.Evenwithoutsymbols,theobservercanassessthe

causesandeffectsatplay.Butsurface-levelobservationcannotdeterminethemeaningthe

acthasfortheparticipantortheiraudience.Isitagame?Isitasolemnreligiousceremony?

Isitanactofmilitaryorsupernaturaldefense?

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Thisindeterminacyofsignificancedespiteclearmaterialconditionspointstothetwo

components of cultural systems. First is the causal content. This is the information the

outsidercangleanfrommerelyobservingtheact.Intheseedexample,theobservercansay

theparticipantisplantingcrops.Theactionofthrowingseedsintofreshlytilledearthhas

materialconsequences.Inalinguisticexamplesuchastheutterance,“Wherethere’ssmoke,

there’sfire,”thiscausalcontentwouldbetheif-thenstatementconnectingsmokeandfirein

an implied causal relationship. These relationships, if they are not objective, are at least

withinthegraspoftheobserver’ssubjectivity.

But the cultural system also contains a set of constitutive content which is not

immediatelyapprehensiblethroughoutsiderobservation.Thisisthesignificance(s)thatthe

acthasfortheparticipantsandtheiraudience.InWedeen’sseedexamplethiswouldbethe

webof association connected toplanting crops: collectivememories of planting seasons,

religiousandintellectualdiscussionofagriculture,etc.Inthelinguisticexamplethiswould

be the pragmatic connotation of commenting on someone’s assumed culpability. This

informationiscontextcontingentandoftencommunicatedverbally.

Ifboththeseformsofsocialinformationareintegraltoanunderstandingofculture,

thenwecandefinestrategiccultureasthevocabularyofsymbols,themeaningstheycarry,

andthesemioticpracticesthatdeploytheminthecontextofnationalsecurity.Inthisview,

strategiccultureincludesnotonlytherelationshipsbetweenpolicyactionsandobjects,but

also the significance of those actions and objects in the minds of the participants and

audience.Theparticipantshereareallpartieswhoparticipateinasociety’sforeignpolicy

discourse. This includes the policymakers typically focused on in the strategic culture

literaturebutalsonon-governmentalactors like journalistsandpolicyanalysis.Provided

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thereissomeformofdiscursivecommunicationbetweenthesepartiesandthoseenacting

policychoices,theiractionscontributetotheperformanceofnationalsecurityandthusfall

withinthepurviewofstrategicculture.

This definition of strategic culture allows the observer to reincorporate symbolic

discoursesintotheiranalysis.Althoughnotobservablefromasurface-levelobservationof

securitypractices,theyarestillindispensablepartsofthosepracticesbecausetheyconvey

theintersubjectivesignificanceoftheactions.Withoutunderstandingthesignificanceofan

action, theobservercannot fullyunderstandthe intentionalitybackingupthataction.An

agent’s goal is implicated inheractionsbecause theyareembedded ina culturalwebof

semioticassociations.Morethanjustmaterialcauseandeffect,semioticcontentshowsthe

meaningsthecauseandeffectbear.Significanceshowsnotonlywhattheactordid,butwhat

she was trying to do. So without the inclusion of the symbolic, the entire enterprise of

strategicculturalstudies,whichaimstoilluminatestates’intentions,isfutile.

Symbols&theBoundariesofPossibility

The importanceof signification for intentionality appliesnotonly for theexternal

observerof securityprocessesbut also for the individualsparticipating in them.Foreign

policyandtheperformanceofnationalsecurityisaninherentlycommunicativeprocess.In

ordertotakeanyaction,policymakersareforcedtocommunicatewitheachotherandwith

theiraudiences.Thepolicymakersneedtojustifytheiractionstothosetheyareaccountable

to:thegeneralpopulace,themilitaryleaders,and/orthewealthystakeholders,depending

onthenationalcontext.

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This justificationuses the symbolic vocabulary of strategic culture as itsmedium.

Makingforeignpolicyactionsintelligiblerequiresreferencingmeaningsthattheaudience

understandsandrelatesto.Althoughthejustificationcanbeaseparateactionorevent,itis

oftenrolled into thesamediscursiveact thatenacts thedecision.GeorgeW.Bush’s2001

speechdeclaringmilitaryactioninAfghanistancanactasanexample.Thelanguageofthe

speech—theverylanguagethatperformstheactionofdeclaringwar—alsogivesthataction

meaning. Bush connects concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘American prosperity’ to the newly

coalescingobjectof‘September11th,’assemblingtheirsignificancestorenderhisdeclaration

ofwarmeaningful.

Relyingonsymbolicvocabularytocommunicatepolicyactionsplacesanimportant

constraintonforeignpolicy.Tobesensible,asymbolmustexistinboththespeakerandthe

listener’sconsciousness.Atexampleatthelinguisticlevelwouldbeasequenceofsounds,

saydim.Thissequenceofsoundscarriesthemeaningofalackofluminescencetothespeaker

ofEnglish,butthesamesequencemeansapointorspottotheCantonesespeaker.Forthe

invocation of the sign dim to be effective, there must be a shared understanding of its

meaning.Atthepoliticallevel,wecanlookattheinstanceofeventslike9/11.Suchadate

onlyhassignificancesalienttojustifyinginvasionifthereisasharedunderstandingofthe

terrorist attacks that occurred and their psychological impact. Although this particular

meaningiswidelyshared,ahypotheticalaudienceunfamiliarwiththeattackswouldnotfind

thatsymbolcompelling.

Thisrequirementofsalienceplacesanimportantconstraintonpoliticalactors.Their

actionsmustbe justifiedusinga flexiblebutdefined setof symbols.Following this logic,

policymakerscannotundernormalcircumstancestakeanactionthatcannotbelinkedtoa

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sharedunitofmeaning.Ifthereisnoculturaltouchstoneforanaction,itisoffthetableof

normal politics, even if the policymakers can conceive of it as viable strategy amongst

themselves.Thismeansthatthecontoursofstrategicculturedefinethesetofsociallyviable

foreignpolicystrategiesthatofficialshavetochoosefrom.

Movingbeyondthecommunicationbetweenelitesandtheiraudiences,thereisstill

another,deeperconstraintthatstrategiccultureplacesonthepolicyprocess.Policymakers

consideralltheoptionsonthetable,butwhattheyevenseeasoptionsareculturallyand

linguisticallycontingentataveryfundamental level.Thisdrawsfromatheoryassociated

with20thcenturylinguistBenjaminLeeWhorf,aptlynamedtheWhorfianhypothesis2:that

languageitselfstructuresourcognition.Thishypothesis,whichchallengedtheconventional

understanding that cognition exists prior to and independent from the language used to

communicate it, has since been born out in numerous experimental and observational

studies (see for exampleBoroditsky2001).The reasoning is that language allowsuse to

parseand categorize theworldandby its labels and symbolsweareable to construct a

mentalmapofourselvesandourenvironment.

Ifthiscognitivestructuringholdstruedowntophenomenaasfundamentalascolor

perception(seeKay&Regier2006),thenitstandstoreasonthatitshouldholdforhigher

order symbolic systems like strategic culture. Imagine a hypothetical society that hasno

sharedsymbolicrepresentationoftheactofcompromise.Therearenostoriesrecounting

pastcompromisesandnovisualrepresentationofit.Theremaynotevenbealexicalitem

thatcarriesthemeaning.Insuchasociety,policyleaderswouldbehard-pressedtoconsider

2TheWhorfianhypothesishasattractedsomecriticismonthegroundsthatmanyofitsapplicationstendtowardstreatinglanguageasthesoledeterminantofbehavior.However,theoriginalhypothesis,whichIhaveusedhere,doesnotmakethesedeterministicclaims.

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itasanoption.Itdoesnotexistasaseparatecategoryofactionintheirmind.Itisnotacase

of considering and rejecting the option. The option does not even enter their field of

cognition.Thesymbolisnotonlynecessaryforcommunicatingactionbutalsoforconceiving

ofitaspossible.

These insights from linguistic scholarship on symbolic systems of communication

showthatadoptinganintegratedviewofstrategicculturethatreincorporatesthesymbolic

neednotdivorcetheconceptfromtherealitiesofmakingpolicy.Indeed,ifanything,viewing

strategiccultureasasemioticsystemplacesitatthecoreofstrategicpractices.Thissystem

definestheboundariesofthecommunicableandeventheconceivable.Byunderstandingthe

contoursofasociety’sstrategicculture,theoutsideobservercanunderstandtherealmof

political possibility within which they operate. Contrary to Johnston’s assumption, the

symbolicdiscoursesarenotirrelevanttotheformulationandimplementationofpolicy.They

makeitpossibleandassuchconstitutethepreconditionsofthecausalbeliefsthatJohnston

baseshisworkon.

IntegrationandDiachrony

Although this integratedviewbrings the symbolicback into the studyof strategic

culture,itdoesnotself-evidentlyallowforchangesliketheonesthatLiuobservesinChinese

strategiccultureoverthecourseofthe20thcentury.Someonecouldstillconceivablymakea

primordialistargumentusinganintegratedviewbyassumingaconstancyofthesymbolic

relationships.Afterall,thereasoningmightgo,symbolsmusthavesharedmeaningstobe

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intelligible,andusingasymboloutsideofitsagreed-uponmeaningrendersitnonsensical.

Howthencouldthesystemofsymbolseverchange?

Thekeyforaddressingthisargumentcomesfromacloserexaminationofthenature

ofthesesignsthatmakeupstrategicculture.Drawingagainfromlinguisticconceptionsof

semiotics, a sign consists of two parts: the signifier and the signified. The relationship

betweenthesignifierandthesignifiedisfundamentallyarbitrary.Thesignifierdoesnotbear

anyinherentconnectiontothesignified.Nothingabouttheword‘red’mustnecessarilyrefer

tothecoloroflightwithawavelengthbetween620and750nanometers.Thesignifierand

signifiedareconnectedbycommonconsensus.Putsuccinctly,thesigndoesnothavetobe

so;itissobecausewemakeitso.

Becausesignificanceiscontingentoncommonusage,itcananddoeschangeasthe

patternsof itsusagechange.Tobeclear, thisdoesnotnegatemypreviousassertionthat

intelligibilitydependsonconformingtonormofusage.Blatantre-appropriationofasign’s

meaning isstillnonsensical fromacommunicativeperspective. Invokingthesign ‘fish’ to

referencesarabbitwillafeweyebrowsandevokeafewlaughs.Unless,contextmakesthe

speaker’smeaningclear(forexample,bypointtotherabbitinquestion),thecommunication

willnotbeeffective.But incrementalshifts thataccumulate into largeshiftsarepossible.

TakethesemanticdevelopmentoftheEnglishword‘silly.’InitsAnglo-Saxonincarnationas

selligitcarriedthemeaningoftoday’sword‘blessed.’ThroughtheshifttoMiddleEnglish,

however, it’smeaningwasbroadenedbeyond religious contexts to include references to

children. Then as Middle English morphed into Modern English, the original religious

contextswereexcludedfromtheword’smeaning.Eachofthesemoveswaswithintherange

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of intelligibility for the speakers at the time, but in sum they shifted the role of the sign

substantially.

Bothtypesofincrementalshiftscanhappeninhigher-ordersymbolicsystemsaswell.

Foranexampleofabroadeningmove,taketheshiftingmeaningof‘security.’Historically,

the invocation of the signifier ‘security’ has been connected to safety from material,

specifically military threats. However, as the modern nation-state has developed, and

especially in the last century, numerous other concerns have been brought under the

umbrellaof ‘security.’OleWævercallsthis ‘securitization,’ theprocessofgroupingissues

intothesemanticfieldofsecurity(Wæver1993)3.

Thereareother,lesswell-studiedprocessesofexcludingconceptsfromagivensign’s

semanticfield.AnongoingexampleinNorthAmericansecuritydiscourseisthethesignifier

‘terrorism.’ In the 21st centuryAmerican (especiallyWhiteAmerican) consciousness, the

conceptof terrorismhasbecomedeeplyentangledwith the ideaof Islam.Thishascome

aboutthroughanaccumulationofspeechacts,andwhileitisnotauniversalassociation,it

is common enough to bewidely understood.However, in recent years, there has been a

consciousmoveonthepartofAmericanMuslimsandtheiralliestomovemainstreamIslam

outfromunderterrorism’sumbrella.MotivatedbyadesiretocounteractIslamophobia,this

discursivemoveredrawstheboundariesofthesign‘terrorism.’

Adeepenedunderstandingofsigns’mutabilityaddsanewdimensiontothestudyof

semiotic systems. In his seminal Course in General Linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure

3Scholarshaveexaminedtherhetoricalsecuritizationofvarioussectorsofpoliticsandtheconcreteimplicationsthatthatdiscursivemovehasonsecuritypractices.SeeforexampleElbe(2006)onHIV/AIDS,Trombetta(2008)onenvironmentalsecurity,andLéonard(2010)onthesecuritizationofmigration.

18

describeswhathecallsa“radicalduality”betweenan“axisofsimultaneities”andan“axisof

successions”(deSaussure1916;p.79).Endemictoallsystemsofvalues—systemswhich

equate things of different orders—in the context of semiotic systems, this divergence

describes thedifferencesbetweenhowsymbolsoperateatagiven time (thesynchronic)

from how their operation operates through time (diachronic). Although synchrony and

diachrony call for differentmodes of analysis, because they are dimensions of the same

phenomenon,theyareintertwinedwithoneanother.Strategicculturecannotbestudiedas

asystemofmeaning-makingwithoutacknowledgingboth.

By combining synchronic and diachronic perspectives, the question of strategic

culture’sdurability,whichJohnstonassumesandLiurefutes,beginstoresolveitself.Along

thesynchronicdimensionisthecontingentbutintersubjectivelyheldrelationshipbetween

strategicsymbolsandwhattheysignify.Alongthediachronicdimensionaretheprocesses

bywhichthatrelationshipisreshaped.Fusingthemgivesusapictureofstrategiccultureas

what Iwould term ‘plasticallydurable.’These systemsof significance cananddochange

substantially,butthatchangeisbeyondthepowerofasingleactortoeffect.Itrequiresa

shift in the whole collective’s understanding. So we begin to see strategic culture as

somethingwhich,whileitdoesnotstretchbackunchangedintopre-moderntimes,doesnot

changewitheveryturnofthesocialcurrentseither.

Takingaviewofstrategiccultureasasemioticsystemanditsaccompanyingpractices

ofmeaning-makingallowsustoanswerLiu’scalltoreincorporatesymbolicdiscoursesasa

central part of strategic culture. This revitalized symbolic phenomenon is not politically

toothless as Johnston treats it. Itmediateswhatpolicymakers can realistically enact and

communicateandevendelineateswhattheycanimaginepolitically.Critically,thissystemof

19

significationcanshiftovertime—notcapriciously,butgraduallyandenoughthatovertime

there emerge substantial differences. These synchronic and diachronic insights make

untenabletheviewthatstrategiccultureenduresimmutablyasasetofpreferencerankings.

ThisopensthedoortheoreticallytoLiu’sargumentthatChina’sstrategicculturedrawson

manydifferent sources,morphing significantly over the20th century and thus cannot be

understoodinsimplistictermsofstablemonolithicparadigmsofConfucianismorrealpolitik

asJohnstonandotherapproachit.

StudyingIntegratedStrategicCulture

Deployingan integratedconceptionofstrategiccultureandusing it tounderstand

specificcaseslikeChinarequiresthedevelopmentofanewmethodology.Theempiricsof

LiuTiewa’sstudyareconvincingbutunsystematic.Thereisnoconsistentobjectofanalysis

ormethodologyfordissectingtheselectedobjects.Herworkishelpfulforcritiquingexisting

assumptionsaboutstrategicculture,butitsusefulnessforapplicationbeyondLiu’sempirical

scope is limited. On the other side, Johnston’smethod is systematic but insufficient. His

technique of cognitive mapping only shows how concepts in a text are related to each

causally.Itdoesnotgiveanyinsightintowhatthoseconceptmeans.Thestudyofstrategic

cultureasasystemofmeaning-makingcallsforamethodologythatisbothsystematicand

abletocapturethesemanticfieldsofobjects,notjusttheireffectsononeanother.

Formyworkhere,Iutilizeadiscursiveapproachcalledpredicateanalysisasoutlined

by JenniferMilliken (1999). Predicate analysis takes advantage of a grammatical feature

shared across languages: the subject-predicate statement structure. The template of a

20

linguisticpropositionconsistsofasubject—anentitythatthepropositionconcerns—anda

predicate—apropertyascribedtothesubject. Inasimplepropositionsuchas“Chinaisa

large country,” the property of ‘being a large country’ is assigned to the subject ‘China,’

constitutingthesetofmeaningsattachedtotheword‘China’asitisusedinthatparticular

context. Understanding this semantic relationship allows the analyst to mine a text for

insight into the full range of notions involved in a given strategic symbol, showingwhat

meaningsareimplicatedwhenthesymbolisinvoked.

Predicatesattachedtoonesubjectcanalsomakereferencetoanother.Forexample,

in the proposition “Japan is occupying China,” the primary subject is ‘Japan,’ which is

described as occupying China. But this statement also provides information about the

semantic fieldof ‘China’because it framesChinaasbeingoccupiedby Japan. Inthiscase,

although‘China’occupiesapositionasagrammaticalobject,inadiscursivesenseitisstilla

subject, because the proposition conveys information to define its semantic field. This

featureofjuxtaposingmultiplesubjectsinasinglepropositionallowstheanalysttodraw

connectionsbetweenthevarioussubjectsdescribedinatext.‘Japan’and‘China’aredefined

inrelationtoeachother.

A complete predicate analysis of a text yields a concept map that describes the

contoursof the subjects and their relationshipswith eachother.Eachnode represents a

differentsubject,whosesignificanceisdescribedintermsofthepredicatesattachedtoit.

Linesconnectthesenodesdescribingtherelationshipsbetweenthem.Thisimprovesonthe

cognitivemappingmethodologythatJohnstonusesbecauseitcapturesbothcausalityand

constitution.Infact,ithintsthatthedistinctionbetweenthetwomaybeoverstated,since

21

thecausalrelationshipsbetweensubjectsarepartofthesamepredicatesthatconstitutethe

individualsubjects.

Iftheseconceptmapsderivedfrompredicateanalysisgiveusasynchronicpictureof

astate’sstrategicculturaldiscourse,thenwecanusemapsfromdifferentpointsintimeto

assessdiachronic changes in strategic culture.These changes canbe groupedunder two

aspects.First,agivensymbolmaybecomeassociatedwithdifferentmeaningsovertimeas

in the caseof securitizationdiscussed above. Second, a given conceptmaybe associated

differentsignifiersovertime.Anexampleofthis,whichwillbediscussedindetailinthenext

section,istheconceptofsocializationintoanethical/moralsystem,whichisreferredtoby

differenttermsthroughoutChinesehistory.

Becausethisapproachtostrategiccultureconceivesoflanguageanditsusageasthe

factorsconstrainingpolicy,itcanbeappliedtoanalyzeanypieceofdiscourseonsecurity

andstrategy.Insiderrecordsofthepolicymakingprocessarenotnecessarilyprivilegedover

publicstatementsaboutforeignpolicyastheyarewhenusingcognitivemapping,because

both are part of the same ideational milieu. Neither should present a view of strategic

thoughtthatiscontradictorytotheother’sportrayal.However,becausedifferentsectorsof

thestrategicdiscursiveenvironmentwillhavedifferentemphases,fordiachronicanalyses

itisimportanttoanalyzesimilarcrosssectionsforeachtimeperiod.

Application:DengXiaoping’sStrategicCulture

Bywayofillustration,Iapplythispredicateanalysistechniqueheretoanalyzethe

Chinese strategic cultureunder the administrationofDengXiaoping from1978 to1992.

22

Overthecourseofhistenure,Denggavefivemajoraddressesthattouchedonmattersof

nationalsecurityandmilitarystrategy. Inchronologicalorder, theseare:(1)“Speechata

PlenaryMeetingof theCentralMilitaryCommittee”《在中央军委全体会议上的讲话》on

December28,1977;(2)“RealizetheFourModernizationsandNeverSeekHegemony”《实

现四化，永不称霸》on May 7, 1978; (3) “Streamline the Army and Raise its Combat

Effectiveness”《精简军队，提高战斗力》onMarch12,1980;(4)“BuildPowerful,Modern,

andRegularizedRevolutionaryArmedForces”《建设强大的现代化正规化的革命军队》on

September19,1981;and(5)“SpeechataForumoftheCentralMilitaryCommittee”《在军

委座谈会上的讲话》on July4,1982.Thecombined full textof the speeches totalsabout

17,000charactersinlength4.

[Figure1:SchematicRepresentationofDengistStrategicCulture]

Afulldissectionofthesymbolsandsemioticpracticesdisplayedinthesetextscould

fillanentirebook,butIwouldliketotouchontwomainthemesvisiblefromthisoverview

of Deng’s strategic culture. First, in Deng’s conception of the fundamental nature of

internationalpolitics,weseeaninterestingmixofJohnston’sandLiu’sarguments.Dengdoes

speakofcooperationandsolidarity;whichLiupicksuponinherargumentthatDengdraws

fromWesterntraditionsofLiberalism.However,thissolidarityisonlypresentedbyDengas

apossibilitybetweenstateswithalreadycompatibleinterests(determinedbytheirposition

4ManythankstothestaffattheNationalLibraryofChinainBeijingfortheirassistanceinlocatinganddigitizingthefulltextsofthesespeeches.

23

inglobalstructuresofexploitation).InthisweseeareflectionofJohnston’sargumentthata

viewofpoliticsaszero-sumrunsthroughoutChinesehistory.

Second,fromthisoverviewwecangainsomeinsightintotheDengadministration’s

preferredmode of operation in foreign policymatters. Deng frames national security as

dependingonthreepillars:economicdevelopment,thedevelopmentofmodernizedarmed

forces,andtherallyingofpublicsupport.Allthreeofthesepillarsarearticulatedasdefensive

measures.Thegoalinmodernizingthearmyistobetterenableittoanticipateanddefend

against attacks from the main adversaries (the USA and USSR in Deng’s eyes). This

contributestoanoveralldefensiveorientationthatpermeatesDeng’sstrategicculture.Force

istobeusedprimarily(perhapsexclusively)asamodeofdefendingChinafromexternal

threats, not as a way of proactively furthering Chinese interests. This insight from a

constitutive examinationof Chinese strategic culture contrastswith the imageof amore

offensively oriented China suggested by Johnston on the basis of the causal beliefs he

identifies.

CultivatingTalentandBenevolence

HereIwouldliketofocusontheanatomyofaspecificsymbolthatappearsinChinese

strategiccultureunderDeng:rencai(人才).TypicallytranslatedintoEnglishas‘talent,’this

conceptdoesnotatfirstappeartohavemuchmoresignificancethantechnicalcapabilityand

politicalknowledge.Accordingtothisreadingoftheterm,Deng’sconcernwithcultivating

talentseemstobeprimarilyoneofhumanresourcedevelopment.

24

However, ifwe readhiswritingswith an eye towards sketchingout the semantic

boundariesoftheterm,weseeithasmoredepththantheglossof‘talent’wouldsuggest.For

example,inhisJuly4,1982“SpeechataForumoftheMilitaryCommissionoftheCentral

CommitteeoftheCPC”(Chinese:《在军委座谈会上的讲话》),DengXiaopingrelatesabrief

anecdote,whichIhavetranslatedbelow:

“The year before last, I wentwith Comrade Chen Pixian to the No. 2 AutomobileFactory.Therewasanassistantdirectortherewhoaccompaniedusandshowedusaroundthefactory.Hemadeagreatimpressiononme.WhatdoImeanbythat?Insuchalargeautomobilefactory,hewasthetechnicalbackboneoftheoperation,verycompetentinhiswork.BythisImeantodescribehiscapability.Atthattime,hewas38yearsold;nowheis40.Moreimportantly,hewasattackedduringthe“CulturalRevolution.”Hewasonewhoopposedthebeating,thesmashing,thelooting.Sincethen he has been a picture of good character, including his attitude towards theproblemsinourso-called“OpposeRightistTrendsofOverturningCorrectVerdicts”campaign.Thiskindofrencaiisparticularlyheartening.Thereisnolackofthissortofperson,and it iseasy todistinguish them. Inmakingpromotions, thesesortsofpoliticalqualificationsshouldbeourfirstpriority.”

DengXiaopingusesthisanecdoteasanillustrationofwhathemeanswhenhecalls

fortheChinesearmedforcestofocusoncultivatingandidentifyingrencai.Fromitwecan

gleanthatrencaiencompassestwomaincomponents.Oneisthetechnicalabilitythatthe

gloss‘talent’referstointuitively.ThisiswhatDengreferstoas‘capability’ornengli(能力).

Thesecondcomponent,whichDengranksasmoreimportant,ismoraluprightnessorgood

character.Dengreferstothisattributewhenhesaystheassistantdirectoris“apictureof

goodcharacter”orbiaoxianhaode(表现好的).Boththesetechnicalandmoralcapabilities

aresubsumedunderthedomainofthewordrencai.

25

Ifweexaminethisdeepenedunderstandingofrencai’sconceptualboundariesinlight

ofDengXiaoping’sstrategiccultureingeneral(seeFig.1),wecanseetheroleitplaysinhis

conceptionofnationalsecurity.Cultivatingrencaiisoneofthefourimmediatelyactionable

policiesthatwillbenefitChinesenationalsecurity.Heseesitasdirectlycontributingtothe

army’sabilitytomobilizeeffectivelyforcombat.Thisinturnisanimportantfactorinthe

militarymodernizationeffortsthatDengchampioned.Inhisview,China’snationalsecurity

dependeddirection on having amodernized army. So there is a causal chain linking the

cultivationofmoraltalenttomilitarystrength,greatersecurityfrominternationalthreats,

andultimatelyenhancednationalprosperity.

Thisreadingofrencai and itscontextbearsastrikingresemblance to thepolitical

writingsofMencius.AlsoknownasMengzi,Mencius(ca.372–289BCE)wasoneofthemost

prominent Confucian thinkers of ancient China. His expositions on Confucius’ teachings

formedakeypartofthecorpuswhichallImperial-eraofficialswereexpectedtomemorize

inorder toadvance incivilservice.Oneconcept inparticularstandsoutassalient to the

discussionofthemoralmaninpolitics:renzheng(仁政).Typicallytranslatedas‘benevolent

governance,’ this term refers to the political application of ren, an important part of the

Confucianmoralcomplex,closelyconnectedtotheideaofrighteousnessoryi(義).Ittoocan

beillustratedwithananecdotefromMencius’writings.

“KingHuiofLiangsaid,‘Asyou,Sir,know,amongthestatesunderheaven,nonewasstronger thanmyown state of Jin.But by the time it camedown tome,weweredefeatedbyQiintheeast,andmyeldestsonsdiedfromthatdefeat.Welost700lioflandtotheQin inthewest.WeweredishonoredbyChu inthesouth. IamdeeplyashamedofthesethingsandIwishforthesakeofthedeadtowashawaythisshameonceandforall.WhatshouldIdo?’

26

Menciusansweredhimsaying,‘Onecanhaveaterritoryofbut100lioneachsideandstill ruleasa trueking.Myking, if youput inplacebenevolentgovernanceof thepeople, use punishment sparingly, collect only light taxes, allowing the people toploughdeeplyandweedwithoutdifficulty, and if the strongmenwoulduse theirsparetimetocultivatefilialpiety,brotherlylove,loyalty,andtrustworthinesssuchthat theywouldservetheir fathersandbrothersathomeandbegoodservants totheir elders and princes outside the home, then they can be called upon tomakecudgelsandclubswhich theywoulduse toovercome thestrongarmorandsharpweaponsofQinandChu.Thoseothersrulerstaketheirpeopleawayfromtheirtimeforfarming,makingthemunabletocultivateinordertosupporttheirparents.Theirparentsthusfreezeandstarve;theirbrothers,wives,andchildrenscatter.Becausetheyoverwhelmtheirpeople,ifyouthekingweretogoandattackthem,whowouldbeamatchforyou?Therefore,itissaidthatthebenevolentmanhasnomatch.Ibegofyounottohaveanydoubtsofit,yourmajesty.’”

Here, as in Deng Xiaoping’s writings, we see a link drawn betweenmorality and

security.Cultivationofrenbytherulerofthestateleadstoa“trickle-downrighteousness”

whereby the people come to embody the same righteousness as the ruler. This societal

righteousness produces a stable domestic order, which allows the ruler tomobilize the

peoplemilitarilytoachievehissecuritygoals.ThisisnotanisolatedreferenceinMencius.

Theconceptofren is repeatedly connected to security, evenbeing framedasa sufficient

conditionforrulingeverythingunderheaven(tianxia天下).LikerencaiinDeng’sthinking,

rencanbefoundinmostpeoplebutmustbeactivelycultivated.

ItseemsveryclearfromthisjuxtapositionthatrencaiasitappearsinDengXiaoping’s

strategicculturaldiscourseisaConfucian-inspiredconcept.Althoughnotexplicitlyinflected

inConfucianterms(likelybecauseofthevolatilepoliticalclimateandantagonismtowards

traditional culture duringDeng’s time), its general semantic contours are the same. The

moralmanpresentedasthelynchpinofstatesecurityinboth.

27

Thisraisesthequestionofwhetherthishasalwaysbeenthecase.IfConfucianunits

of meaning appear in Chinese strategic culture under Deng Xiaoping, even occupying a

similarpositionconceptuallyas thekey toeffectivemilitarymobilization, thenonecould

argue thatConfucianismhasheld constant as an important influence inChinesepolitical

culturefromtheWarringStatesperiodthroughtheImperialeraandCommunistrevolution

into thepresent.Althoughthisargumentneednotassert thatConfucianismwastheonly

conceptualframeworkatplay,justdemonstratingthatitneverdisappearedwouldsupport

theideathatConfucianismisessentialtoChineseculture,consistentwithamonolithic,static

viewofChinesestrategicculture.

However,ifwelooktomodernChina’sothergreatmilitaryandpoliticalleaderMao

Zedong,weseeanimportantdifference.ThemoralmanisconspicuouslyabsentfromMao’s

writingsonmilitarystrategyand foreignpolicy.WhileMaodoes talkat lengthabout the

importance of training and the cultivation ofmilitary skill, his focus is not on themoral

dimensionoftraining.ThisisnottosayMao’sdepictionofnationalsecurityiscompletely

amoral.Hisdiscussionsoftrainingarealltingedwithadistinctmoralflavor.However,unlike

themorality ofMencius andDeng,Mao’s senseof right andwrong is not situated in the

individualbutinthepoliticalmovementasawhole.Thiscanbeseeninhisdiscussionsof

politicaltrainingofcadresinBasicTacticsor《基本战略》:

“In order to assure that all the independent actions of a guerrilla unit achievecompletevictory,asidefrombolsteringmilitarytraining,themostimportantthingisthatwemustmakecertainthattheofficersandsoldiershaveahighlevelof‘politicalconsciousness’and‘devotion’totheircause.Politicaltrainingistheonlymethodbywhichthisobjectivecanbeachieved.”

28

Andagainlateron:

“We must carry out political instruction directed toward the resurrection of ourpeople(stimulatethesoldiers'nationalconsciousness,theirpatriotism,andtheirlovefor thepeopleand themasses)andensure thateveryofficerandsoldier inaunitunderstandsnotonlythetasksforwhichheisresponsiblebutalsothenecessityoffightingindefenseofourstate.Wemustalsopayattentiontosupportingtheleaders,to maintaining the unit’s solidarity with genuine sincerity, to carrying out andcompleting the orders of one's superiors, and to maintaining an iron militarydiscipline. We must see that the multitude of the soldiers are of one mind andequippedwithboththeresolveandthewilltosaveourcountrytogether.Apartfromstrengtheningitsownfightingcapacity,aunitmustalsocarryoutpropagandaamongthemassesregardingtheplotsoftheinvadersandoftheenemy.”

AlthoughthereisasenseofrighteousnessthatMaothinksshouldbeinstilledinthe

troops,itsfocusisnotonthegoodcharacterofindividuals.Instead,itisamoralityderived

fromclassstruggle.Itscultivationisframedintermsofnationalconsciousness,patriotism

anddevotion to the cause.Nowhere is there a sense of the primacy of individual’s good

character or the implication that the state’s securitywill fall into place if that individual

moralityiscultivated.

Thehistoryofthissymbolofthemoralmanshowsaspecificinstanceofdiachronic

change inChinesestrategicculture.Themoralmanwasanelementcentral to traditional

ConfucianconceptionsofsecurityandinterstaterelationsduringtheImperialera.However,

thiselementdisappearsduringMao’s tenure,replacedbyaclass-basedsenseofmorality

drawnfromMarxist-Leninistthoughtandsituatedinthecollectiveratherthantheindividual.

This class-based conception of national security fades after Mao dies, and under Deng

Xiaopingthenotionofthemoralmanreemerges,butnowframedusingdifferentvocabulary

thatdisguisesitsConfucianroots.Thedisappearanceandsubsequentreappearanceofthe

29

moralmaninChinesesecurity-relatedsemioticpracticesillustratesthemutabilityweexpect

ifwe take an integrated view of strategic culture that includes symbolic discourses in a

systemofmeaning-making.

Synchronically, this conceptof themoralmanas the lynchpinofnational security

reorientsourunderstandingofChineseforeignpolicyunderDengXiaoping.Johnston’sclaim

thatChinahasbeencharacterizedbyculturallyenabledrealpolitikthinkingforcenturiesno

longerseemssensible. Instead,weseeapictureofDeng’sstrategicthoughtandpolicyas

focused on defensive capabilities supported and guided by an innate moral compass

cultivatedateverylevelofthepoliticalprocess,aspectsonlycapturedbyanapproachthat

focuseson culture’s constitutive content.But insteadof encouragingus to treatChinaas

defensivelyorientedinitsessence,arrivingatthisunderstandingthroughadynamictheory

of strategic culturepromptsus to turnour gaze forwardwith a sensitivity tohow these

discoursesshiftandchangetherealmofpoliticalpossibility.

Conclusion

In this paper I have contributed to the literature on Chinese strategic culture by

refutingthenotionthatChinesestrategicthoughtmusteitherbeessentiallyConfucianornot

Confucianatall.Specifically,IhavejoinedLiuTiewainrespondingtoAlastairIainJohnston’s

assertion that China has a realpolitik strategic culture that has endured for centuries.

AnsweringLiu’scallforanintegratedviewofstrategicculturethataccommodateschanges

overtime,Ihavedrawnfromlinguisticanthropologytounderstandstrategiccultureasa

systemofmeaning-makingpractices.Thissystemmediatespolicymakers’formulationand

30

articulationofpoliciesandhasthecapacitytochangeovertime.Thisprovidesatheoretical

grounding for the changes LiuTiewaobserved empirically but did not framewithin any

largertheory.

I developed predicate analysis as the ideal methodology for examining strategic

culture fromthevantagepointofsemioticpractices.By lookingat the thecharacteristics

assignedtoobjectsinthetextratherthanjusttherelationshipsbetweenobjects,thismethod

givesusgreaterinsightintotheconstitutivecontentofstrategicculturewithoutsacrificing

ourunderstandingofthecausalcontent.IthenappliedthismethodologytoDengXiaoping’s

writingsonmilitarystrategyandforeignpolicy.Theanalysispresentsanuancedpictureof

ChinesestrategicthoughtthatismoreinlinewithLiu’sviewthanJohnston’s.Thoughthere

are realpolitik elements present, there is an overall orientation of defensive restraint. In

particular, I lookedat theconceptof themoralman(rencai人才), the lynchpin inDeng’s

conceptionofsecurity.TracingthisclearlyConfucian-inspiredconceptdiachronicallyshows

thatConfucianism’sroleisfarfromstatic.

The conception of strategic culture presented here does not fit neatly into the

typologypresentedbyJohnGlenn(2009).AlthoughIhaveveryself-consciouslydrawnfrom

bothPoststructuralistandInterpretivistideasonstrategicculture,Ihavealsosoughttoalign

mystudywithGlenn’spresentationofConstructiviststrategicculturescholarshipinthatI

amsensitivetothedesireforgeneralapplicability.Mymodelofstrategicculturecaneasily

beappliedtootherstates,usingthesamemethodologiestoinvestigatethecontoursofother

strategic cultures. Synchronically, the focus could be on finding common strategic

vocabulariescross-culturally.Diachronically,theremaybeotheridentifiablediscursiveacts

likesecuritizationthatmodifythecognitivespaceofpolitics.

31

ButtheultimategoalofapplyingthelensofstrategicculturetoChinaistounderstand

theimplicationsofChina’srapidriseforglobalsecurity.Thisstudyshowsthattherearestark

limitsonwhatthepastcantellusaboutthepresentandfutureofChineseforeignpolicy.An

analysisofthepastcanshowuswhatthediscourseswere,butassumingtheystayconstant

isdangerous.IfwelooktoMao’seratoexplainChinesebehaviortoday,wewouldbeblind

totheConfucianelementsthatreemergedunderDengXiaoping.Lookingbackwardwhile

movingforward,wemayveryeasilyfallintothetrapofessentializingChinesecultureina

reductive,evenOrientalistway.

Theintegratedviewofstrategiccultureasmeaning-makingprovidesawayoutofthe

trap.Insteadofonlylookingintothepast,wecanlooktothepresentaswell.Culture—ofthe

strategicvarietyandotherwise—isnotablackboxthatcanonlybeunderstoodinretrospect.

It is an ongoing activity performed by living, breathing humans. The methodology of

predicate analysis need not only be applied to yellowed historical texts. By looking an

ongoingdiscoursesuchasXiJinping’sspeechesonSino-Japaneserelationswecanseethe

meaningsattachedtoChina’spolicyactions.Thesemeaningsarethekeytounderstanding

the intentionalitybehind thepolicies. It is this intentionality thatultimately answers the

question“WhatdoestheriseofChinamean?”.

AcknowledgementsThis projectwould not have been possiblewithout generous funding from theMershonCenterforInternationalSecurityandtheCollegeofArts&SciencesatOhioStateUniversitywhichallowedmetoaccessarchivesattheNationalLibraryinBeijing.Theargumenthasbenefitted from the invaluable advising of JenniferMitzen; constructive comments fromJenniferMayer,AnthonyGiddens,andMartinAlbrow;andemotionalsupportfromDavidLeeandStefanReindlduringthemosttryingpartsoftheresearchprocess.

32

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