monopoly & monopsony
DESCRIPTION
Chapter 11. Monopoly & Monopsony. Chapter Eleven Overview. The Monopolist’s Profit Maximization Problem The Profit Maximization Condition Equilibrium The Inverse Pricing Elasticity Rule 2. Multi-plant Monopoly and Cartel Production The Welfare Economics and Monopoly. Chapter Eleven. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
1
Monopoly&
Monopsony
Chapter 11
![Page 2: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2
Chapter Eleven Overview
1. The Monopolist’s Profit Maximization Problem• The Profit Maximization Condition• Equilibrium• The Inverse Pricing Elasticity Rule
2. Multi-plant Monopoly and Cartel Production
3. The Welfare Economics and Monopoly
Chapter Eleven
![Page 3: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
3Chapter Eleven
A Monopoly
Definition: A Monopoly Market consists of a single seller facing many buyers.
The monopolist's profit maximization problem:
Max (Q) = TR(Q) - TC(Q) Qwhere: TR(Q) = QP(Q) and P(Q) is the (inverse) market demand curve.
The monopolist's profit maximization condition:
TR(Q)/Q = TC(Q)/Q MR(Q) = MC(Q)
Definition: A Monopoly Market consists of a single seller facing many buyers.
The monopolist's profit maximization problem:
Max (Q) = TR(Q) - TC(Q) Qwhere: TR(Q) = QP(Q) and P(Q) is the (inverse) market demand curve.
The monopolist's profit maximization condition:
TR(Q)/Q = TC(Q)/Q MR(Q) = MC(Q)
![Page 4: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
4Chapter Eleven
A Monopoly – Profit Maximizing
• Along the demand curve, different revenues for different quantities
• Profit maximization problem is the optimal trade-off between volume (number of units sold) and margin (the differential between price).
Monopolist’s demand Curve is downward-sloping
![Page 5: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5Chapter Eleven
A Monopoly – Profit Maximizing
• Demand Curve:• Total Revenue:
• Total Cost (Given):
• Profit-Maximization: MR = MC
QQP 12)(
212)()( QQQPQQTR
2
2
1)( QQTC
![Page 6: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6Chapter Eleven
A Monopoly – Profit Maximizing
• As Q increases TC increases, TR increases first and then decreases.
• Profit Maximization is at MR = MC
![Page 7: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7Chapter Eleven
A Monopoly – Profit Maximizing
• MR>MC, firm can increase Q and increase profit
• MR<MC, firm can decrease quantity and increase profit
• MR=MC , firm cannot increase profit.
• Profit Maximizing Q: *)(*)( QMCQMR
![Page 8: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8
P0 P0
P1C
A B
Q0 Q0+1q q+1
Competitive Firm Monopolist
Demand facing firm Demand facing firm
A B
Price Price
Firm output Firm output
Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue
![Page 9: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9
The MR curve lies below the demand curve.Price
Quantity
P(Q), the (inverse) demand curve
MR(Q), the marginal revenue curve
Q0
P(Q0)
MR(Q0)
Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue Curve and Demand
![Page 10: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue Curve and Demand
• To sell more units, a monopolist has to lower the price.
• Increase in profit is Area III while revenue sacrificed at a higher price is Area I
• Change in TR equals area III – area I
![Page 11: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
11Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue Curve and Demand
• Area III = price x change in quantity = P(ΔQ)• Area I = - quantity x change in price = -Q (ΔP)• Change in monopolist profit: P(ΔQ) + Q (ΔP)
Q
PQP
Q
PQQP
Q
TRMR
![Page 12: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue
Marginal revenue has two parts:• P: increase in revenue due to higher volume-
the marginal units• Q(ΔP/ΔQ): decrease in revenue due to
reduced price of the inframarginal units.• The marginal revenue is less than the price
the monopolist can charge to sell that quantity for any Q>0
![Page 13: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
13Chapter Eleven
Average Revenue
Since
The price a monopolist can charge to sell quantity Q is determined by the market demand curve the monopolists’ average revenue curve is the market demand curve.
PQ
PxQ
Q
TRAR
)()( QPQAR
![Page 14: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
14Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue and Average Revenue
• The demand curve D and average revenue curve AR coincide
• The marginal revenue curve MR lies below the demand curve
![Page 15: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
15Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue and Average Revenue
When P decreases by $3 per ounce, (from $10 to $7), quantity increases by 3 million ounces (from 2 million to 5 million per year)
1Q
P
yearpermillionQPTR 35$57
ounceperQ
TRAR 7$
5
35
ounceperQ
PQPMR 2$)1(57
![Page 16: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
16Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue and Average Revenue
• Conclusions if Q > 0:• MR < P• MR < AR• MR lies below the demand curve.
![Page 17: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
17Chapter Eleven
Marginal Revenue and Average Revenue
• Given the demand curve, what are the average and marginal revenue curves?
bQaP bQaAR
PPQMR
)( bQ
P
bQa
bQbQaMR
2
)(
Vertical intercept is a
Horizontal intercept is b
aQ
2
![Page 18: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
18Chapter Eleven
Profit Maximization
• Given the inverse demand and MC, what is the profit maximizing Q and P for the monopolist?
QP 12 QMC
1,12 baHere QMR 212
QQMCMR 212
4Q 8412 P
![Page 19: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
19Chapter Eleven
Profit Maximization
• Profit Maximizing output is at MR=MC
• Monopolist will make 4 million ounces and sells at $8 per ounce
• TR = Areas B + E + F• Profit (TR-TC) is B + E• Consumer surplus is area A
![Page 20: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
20Chapter Eleven
Shutdown Condition
In the short run, the monopolist shuts down if the most profitable price does not cover AVC. In the long run, the monopolist shuts down if the most profitable price does not cover AC. Here, P* exceeds both AVC and AC.
![Page 21: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
21Chapter Eleven
Positive Profits for Monopolist
This profit is positive. Why? Because the monopolist takes into account the price-reducing effect of increased output so that the monopolist has less incentive to increase output than the perfect competitor.
Profit can remain positive in the long run. Why? Because we are assuming that there is no possible entry in this industry, so profits are not competed away.
This profit is positive. Why? Because the monopolist takes into account the price-reducing effect of increased output so that the monopolist has less incentive to increase output than the perfect competitor.
Profit can remain positive in the long run. Why? Because we are assuming that there is no possible entry in this industry, so profits are not competed away.
![Page 22: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
22Chapter Eleven
Equilibrium
A monopolist does not have a supply curve (i.e., an optimal output for any exogenously-given price) because price is endogenously-determined by demand: the monopolist picks a preferred point on the demand curve.
One could also think of the monopolist choosing output to maximize profits subject to the constraint that price be determined by the demand curve.
A monopolist does not have a supply curve (i.e., an optimal output for any exogenously-given price) because price is endogenously-determined by demand: the monopolist picks a preferred point on the demand curve.
One could also think of the monopolist choosing output to maximize profits subject to the constraint that price be determined by the demand curve.
![Page 23: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
23Chapter Eleven
Price Elasticity of Demand• Market A profit maximizing price is PA.
• Market B profit maximizing price is PB. Demand is less elastic in Market B
![Page 24: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
24Chapter Eleven
Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule
We can rewrite the MR curve as follows:
MR = P + Q(P/Q) = P(1 + (Q/P)(P/Q))
= P(1 + 1/)
where: is the price elasticity of demand, (P/Q)(Q/P)
We can rewrite the MR curve as follows:
MR = P + Q(P/Q) = P(1 + (Q/P)(P/Q))
= P(1 + 1/)
where: is the price elasticity of demand, (P/Q)(Q/P)
![Page 25: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
25Chapter Eleven
Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule
Using this formula:
• When demand is elastic ( < -1), MR > 0
• When demand is inelastic ( > -1), MR < 0
• When demand is unit elastic ( = -1), MR= 0
Using this formula:
• When demand is elastic ( < -1), MR > 0
• When demand is inelastic ( > -1), MR < 0
• When demand is unit elastic ( = -1), MR= 0
![Page 26: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
26Chapter Eleven
Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule• Given the constant elasticity demand curve and MC:
• What is the optimal P when Q = 100P-2?• What is the optimal P when Q = 100P-5?
baPQ b demand of elasticity Price
50$MC2100 PQfor 2 demand of elasticity Price , PQ
2
150
P
P
5100 PQfor100$P
5 demand of elasticity Price , PQ5
1100
P
P 50.62$P
![Page 27: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
27
Quantity
Price
a/2b a/b
aElastic region ( < -1), MR > 0
Inelastic region (0>>-1), MR<0
Unit elastic (=-1), MR=0
Chapter Eleven
Elasticity Region of the Linear Demand Curve
![Page 28: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
28Chapter Eleven
Marginal Cost and Price Elasticity Demand
• Profit maximizing condition is MR = MC with P* and Q*
• Rearranging and setting MR(Q*) = MC(Q*)
*)(*)( QMCQMR
PQ
PQMC,
11**)(
PQP
MCP
,
1
*
**
![Page 29: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
29Chapter Eleven
Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule
• Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule: Monopolist’s optimal markup of price above marginal cost expressed as a percentage of price is equal to minus the inverse of the price elasticity of demand.
PQP
MCP
,
1
*
**
![Page 30: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
30Chapter Eleven
Price Elasticity
• Monopolist operates at the elastic region of the market demand curve. Increasing price from PA to PB, TR increases by area I – area II and total cost goes down because monopolist is producing less
![Page 31: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
31Chapter Eleven
Elasticity Region of the Demand Curve
Therefore:
The monopolist will always operate on the elastic region of the market demand curve As demand becomes more elastic at each point, marginal revenue approaches price
![Page 32: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
32Chapter Eleven
Example:
Now, suppose that QD = 100P-b and MC = c (constant). What is the monopolist's optimal price now?
P(1+1/-b) = cP* = cb/(b-1)
We need the assumption that b > 1 ("demand is everywhere elastic") to get an interior solution.
As b -> 1 (demand becomes everywhere less elastic), P* -> infinity and P - MC, the "price-cost margin" also increases to infinity.
As b -> , the monopoly price approaches marginal cost.
Elasticity Region of the Demand Curve
![Page 33: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
33
Definition: An agent has Market Power if s/he can affect, through his/her own actions, the price that prevails in the market. Sometimes this is thought of as the degree to which a firm can raise price above marginal cost.
Definition: An agent has Market Power if s/he can affect, through his/her own actions, the price that prevails in the market. Sometimes this is thought of as the degree to which a firm can raise price above marginal cost.
Chapter Eleven
Market Power
![Page 34: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
34Chapter Eleven
The Lerner Index of Market Power
Definition: the Lerner Index of market power is the price-cost margin, (P*-MC)/P*. This index ranges between 0 (for the competitive firm) and 1, for a monopolist facing a unit elastic demand.
Definition: the Lerner Index of market power is the price-cost margin, (P*-MC)/P*. This index ranges between 0 (for the competitive firm) and 1, for a monopolist facing a unit elastic demand.
![Page 35: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
35Chapter Eleven
The Lerner Index of Market Power
Restating the monopolist's profit maximization condition, we have:
P*(1 + 1/) = MC(Q*) …or…
[P* - MC(Q*)]/P* = -1/
In words, the monopolist's ability to price above marginal cost depends on the elasticity of demand.
Restating the monopolist's profit maximization condition, we have:
P*(1 + 1/) = MC(Q*) …or…
[P* - MC(Q*)]/P* = -1/
In words, the monopolist's ability to price above marginal cost depends on the elasticity of demand.
![Page 36: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
36Chapter Eleven
Comparative Statics – Shifts in Market Demand
• Rightward shift in the demand curve causes an increase in profit maximizing quantity.• (a) MC is increases as Q increases• (b) MC decreases as Q increases
![Page 37: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
37Chapter Eleven
Comparative Statics – Monopoly Midpoint Rule
For a constant MC, profit maximizing price is found using the monopoly midpoint rule – The optimal price P* is halfway between the vertical intercept of the demand curve a (choke price) and vertical intercept of the MC curve c.
![Page 38: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
38Chapter Eleven
Comparative Statics – Monopoly Midpoint Rule
• Given P and MC what is the profit maximizing P and Q?
bQaP cMC
bQaMR 2 MCMR
cbQa *2b
caQ
2*
22
1
2
1
2*
cacaa
b
cabaP
![Page 39: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
39Chapter Eleven
Comparative Statics – Shifts in Marginal Cost
• When MC shifts up, Q falls and P increases.
![Page 40: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
40Chapter Eleven
Comparative Statics – Revenue and MC shifts
• Upward shift of MC decreases the profit maximizing monopolist’s total revenue.
• Downward shift of MC increases the profit maximizing monopolist’s total revenue.
![Page 41: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
41Chapter Eleven
Multi-Plant Monopoly
Recall:• In the perfectly competitive model, we could derive firm outputs that varied depending on the cost characteristics of the firms. The analogous problem here is to derive how a monopolist would allocate production across the plants under its management.
Assume:• The monopolist has two plants: one plant has marginal cost MC1(Q) and the other has marginal cost MC2(Q).
![Page 42: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
42Chapter Eleven
Whenever the marginal costs of the two plants are not equal, the firm can increase profits by reallocating production towards the lower marginal cost plant and away from the higher marginal cost plant.
Example:
Suppose the monopolist wishes to produce 6 units
3 units per plant with • MC1 = $6 • MC2 = $3
Reducing plant 1's units and increasing plant 2's units raises profits
Whenever the marginal costs of the two plants are not equal, the firm can increase profits by reallocating production towards the lower marginal cost plant and away from the higher marginal cost plant.
Example:
Suppose the monopolist wishes to produce 6 units
3 units per plant with • MC1 = $6 • MC2 = $3
Reducing plant 1's units and increasing plant 2's units raises profits
Multi-Plant Monopoly – Production Allocation
![Page 43: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
43
Quantity
Price MC1
MCT
3 6 9
•
3
6
Chapter Eleven
Multi-Plant Monopoly – Production Allocation
Example: Multi-Plant MonopolistThis is analogous to exit by higher cost firms and an increase in entry by low-cost firms in the perfectly competitive model.
Example: Multi-Plant MonopolistThis is analogous to exit by higher cost firms and an increase in entry by low-cost firms in the perfectly competitive model.
![Page 44: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
44
MC2
•
•
3
6
Chapter Eleven
Quantity
Price MC1
MCT
3 6 9
Multi-Plant Monopoly – Production Allocation
Example: Multi-Plant MonopolistThis is analogous to exit by higher cost firms and an increase in entry by low-cost firms in the perfectly competitive model.
Example: Multi-Plant MonopolistThis is analogous to exit by higher cost firms and an increase in entry by low-cost firms in the perfectly competitive model.
![Page 45: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
45
Question: How much should the monopolist produce in total?
Definition: The Multi-Plant Marginal Cost Curve traces out the set of points generated when the marginal cost curves of the individual plants are horizontally summed (i.e. this curve shows the total output that can be produced at every level of marginal cost.)
Example:
For MC1 = $6, Q1 = 3MC2 = $6, Q2 = 6
Therefore, for MCT = $6, QT = Q1 + Q2 = 9
Chapter Eleven
Multi-Plant Marginal Costs Curve
![Page 46: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
46Chapter Eleven
Multi-Plant Marginal Costs Curve
The profit maximization condition that determines optimal total output is now:
• MR = MCT
The marginal cost of a change in output for the monopolist is the change after all optimal adjustment has occurred in the distribution of production across plants.
The profit maximization condition that determines optimal total output is now:
• MR = MCT
The marginal cost of a change in output for the monopolist is the change after all optimal adjustment has occurred in the distribution of production across plants.
![Page 47: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
47
Quantity
PriceMCT
MR
P*
MC1
Chapter Eleven
Multi-Plant Monopolistic Maximization
MC2
![Page 48: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
48
Quantity
MCT
Demand
Q*1 Q*2 Q*TChapter Eleven
Price
MR
P*
MC1 MC2
Multi-Plant Monopolistic Maximization
![Page 49: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
49Chapter Eleven
Multi-Plant Monopolistic Maximization
Example:
P = 120 - 3Q …demand…MC1 = 10 + 20Q1 …plant 1…MC2 = 60 + 5Q2 …plant 2…
What are the monopolist's optimal total quantity and price?
Step 1: Derive MCT as the horizontal sum of MC1 and MC2. Inverting marginal cost (to get Q as a function of MC), we have:
Q1 = -1/2 + (1/20)MCT
Q2 = -12 + (1/5)MCT
![Page 50: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
50Chapter Eleven
Let MCT equal the common marginal cost level in the two plants. Then:
• QT = Q1 + Q2 = -12.5 + .25MCT
And, writing this as MCT as a function of QT:
• MCT = 50 + 4QT
Using the monopolist's profit maximization condition:
• MR = MCT => 120 - 6QT = 50 + 4QT
• QT* = 7• P* = 120 - 3(7) = 99
Multi-Plant Monopolistic Maximization
![Page 51: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
51Chapter Eleven
Example:
P = 120 - 3Q …demand…MC1 = 10 + 20Q1 …plant 1…MC2 = 60 + 5Q2 …plant 2…
What is the optimal division of output across the monopolist's plants?
MCT* = 50 + 4(7) = 78
Therefore,
Q1* = -1/2 + (1/20)(78) = 3.4Q2* = -12 + (1/5)(78) = 3.6
Multi-Plant Monopolistic Maximization
![Page 52: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
52Chapter Eleven
Cartel
Definition: A cartel is a group of firms that collusively determine the price and output in a market. In other words, a cartel acts as a single monopoly firm that maximizes total industry profit.
Definition: A cartel is a group of firms that collusively determine the price and output in a market. In other words, a cartel acts as a single monopoly firm that maximizes total industry profit.
![Page 53: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
53Chapter Eleven
The problem of optimally allocating output across cartel members is identical to the monopolist's problem of allocating output across individual plants.
Therefore, a cartel does not necessarily divide up market shares equally among members: higher marginal cost firms produce less.
This gives us a benchmark against which we can compare actual industry and firm output to see how far the industry is from the collusive equilibrium
Cartel
![Page 54: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
54Chapter Eleven
The Welfare Economies of Monopoly
Since the monopoly equilibrium output does not, in general, correspond to the perfectly competitive equilibrium it entails a dead-weight loss.
Suppose that we compare a monopolist to a competitive market, where the supply curve of the competitors is equal to the marginal cost curve of the monopolist
Since the monopoly equilibrium output does not, in general, correspond to the perfectly competitive equilibrium it entails a dead-weight loss.
Suppose that we compare a monopolist to a competitive market, where the supply curve of the competitors is equal to the marginal cost curve of the monopolist
![Page 55: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
55
MC
Demand
MRQM
PM
PC
QC
CS with competition: A+B+C ; CS with monopoly: A PS with competition: D+E ; PS with monopoly: B+D
A
BC
DE
DWL = C+EDWL = C+E
Chapter Eleven
The Welfare Economies of Monopoly
![Page 56: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
56Chapter Eleven
Natural Monopolies
Definition: A market is a natural monopoly if the total cost incurred by a single firm producing output is less than the combined total cost of two or more firms producing this same level of output among them.
Benchmark: Produce where P = AC
![Page 57: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
57
AC
Natural Monopoly falling average costs
Natural Monopoly falling average costs
Chapter Eleven
Quantity
Price
Demand
Natural Monopolies
![Page 58: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
58Chapter Eleven
Barriers to Entry
Definition: Factors that allow an incumbent firm to earn positive economic profits while making it unprofitable for newcomers to enter the industry.
1. Structural Barriers to Entry – occur when incumbent firms have cost or demand advantages that would make it unattractive for a new firm to enter the industry
2. Legal Barriers to Entry – exist when an incumbent firm is legally protected against competition
3. Strategic Barriers to Entry – result when an incumbent firm takes explicit steps to deter entry
Definition: Factors that allow an incumbent firm to earn positive economic profits while making it unprofitable for newcomers to enter the industry.
1. Structural Barriers to Entry – occur when incumbent firms have cost or demand advantages that would make it unattractive for a new firm to enter the industry
2. Legal Barriers to Entry – exist when an incumbent firm is legally protected against competition
3. Strategic Barriers to Entry – result when an incumbent firm takes explicit steps to deter entry
![Page 59: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
59Chapter Eleven
A Monopsony
Definition: A Monopsony Market consists of a single buyer facing many sellers.
The monopsonist's profit maximization problem:Max = TR – TC = P*f(L) – w*L
where: Pf(L) is the total revenue for the monopsonist and w*L is the total cost.
The monopsonist's profit maximization condition:
MRPL = P*MPL = P (Q/L) = TC/L = w + L (w/L) = MEL
Definition: A Monopsony Market consists of a single buyer facing many sellers.
The monopsonist's profit maximization problem:Max = TR – TC = P*f(L) – w*L
where: Pf(L) is the total revenue for the monopsonist and w*L is the total cost.
The monopsonist's profit maximization condition:
MRPL = P*MPL = P (Q/L) = TC/L = w + L (w/L) = MEL
![Page 60: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
60Chapter Eleven
Monopsony - Example
Q = 5LP = $10 per unitw = 2 + 2L
MEL = w + L (w/L) = 2 + 4L
MRPL = P*(Q/L) = 10*5 = 50
MEL = MRPL
2 + 4L = 50 (or) L = 12W = 2 + 2L = $26
![Page 61: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
61Chapter Eleven
Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule
Monopsony equilibrium condition results in:
where: is the price elasticity of labor supply, (w/L)(L/w)
Monopsony equilibrium condition results in:
where: is the price elasticity of labor supply, (w/L)(L/w)
wL
L
w
wMRP
,
1
![Page 62: Monopoly & Monopsony](https://reader036.vdocuments.site/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56813fe8550346895daad8d3/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
62Chapter Eleven
The Welfare Economies of Monopsony