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MONETARY POLICY PROSPECTS OCTOBER 2021 PABLO GARCIA – MEMBER OF THE BOARD

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MONETARY POLICY PROSPECTSOCTOBER 2021PABLO GARCIA – MEMBER OF THE BOARD

The Chilean economy has recovered its level prior to the outbreak of the social crisis and the pandemic, with an unprecedented speed compared to past recessions.

Imacec by sectors(seasonally-adjusted levels, Sept. 2019=100)

Total GDP in crisis episodes (*)(seasonally-adjusted series, index período -1=100)

75

80

85

90

95

100

105

110

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1982 1999 2009 2020

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

19 May. Sep. 20 May. Sep. 21

(*) Respective zero periods: 1981.4, 1998.4, 2008.4, 2020.2. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

May.

Total

Other goods

Mining

Trade

Manufacturing

Services

It is a broad based recovery across all firm sizes.

Sales by firm size (*)

(index, February 2020=100)

Sales of smaller firms have recovered the most, illustrating the effectiveness of credit support policies and the opening of the economy in recent months.

85

95

135

125

115

105

75

Jan.19 Jun.19 Nov.19 Apr.20 Sept.20 Feb.21 Jul.21

(*) Dashed vertical line shows February 2020 sales. For details, see Chapter V in September 2021 Monetary Policy Report.Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Internal Revenue Service (SII).

Medium Large Micro and small

(1) Conventional monetary policy is MPR related.(2) Figures encompass monetary and sovereign guarantee policies that sought to stabilize financial markets, including the FCIC-Fogape program, bond purchases, and domestic- and foreign-currency liquidity programs.Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Policy support to aggregate demand has been unprecedented.

Effects on GDP of measures adopted during the Covid-19 crisis(percent change with respect to same period, previous year)

2020 2021 H1

Conventional monetary policy (1) [0.2 - 0.8] [0.6 - 2,1]

Unconventional credit policies (2) [2.2 - 4.8] [2.7 - 4.4]

Fiscal policy 0.8 1.7

Total fiscal and monetary policy [3.2 - 6.4] [5.0 - 8.2]

Pension fund withdrawals 1.2 2.9

Total [4.4 - 7.6] [7.9 - 11,1]

Actual GDP -5.8 8.7

Counterfactual GDP [-10.2 ; -13.4] [0.8 ; -2.4]

Going forward, it will turn positive and then will begin to decline as

spending momentum subside

Output gap (*)

(level, percentage points)

The output gap closed during the second quarter of this year and has moved into positive territory.

(*) Dotted lines show projections of each MP Report. The June and September projections use the structural parameters updated in the June 2021 MP Report.Source: Central Bank of Chile.

MP ReportMar.21

MP ReportSep.21

MP ReportJun.21

-16

-12

-8

-4

0

4

8

19 20 21 22 23

Households' umulative income and liquidity injections (1)(billions of dollars)

Expenditures or foregone tax revenue by governments in response to Covid-19(percent of 2020 GDP)

The accumulation of massive pension savings withdrawals and fiscal transfers have significantly increased household liquidity.

-4.3

9.9

20.026.6

54.0

69.4

80.9

0

20

40

60

80

100

-20

20.II 20.III 20.IV 21.I 21.II 21.III 21.IV

(1) For details on the methodology, see chapter III in MP Report of September 2021. (2) Corresponds to Fiscal Monitor data for January 2021. (3) Difference between July and January 2021 delivery. Chile considers an additional 2.8% for IFE.Sources: International Monetary Fund, Ministry of Finance, Superintendence of Pensions and Central Bank of Chile.

Income IFE PF withdrawals Other Total 30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Mex

ico

Co

lom

bia

Peru

Bra

zil

Fran

ce

Ital

y

Ger

man

y

U.K

.

Jap

an

Ch

ile

Au

stra

lia

New

Zea

lan

d

U.S

.

2020 (2) 2021 (3)

The various stimulus measures have strongly boosted demand, which has resulted in higher-than-expected growth in private consumption.

60

80

100

120

140

160

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

(*) Projections contained in Economic Expectations Survey. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Durable goods consumption

Non-durables goods consumptionServices consumptionGFCF Construction and other worksGFCF Machinery and equipment

GDP second quarter 2021: actual vs market projection (*)(annual change, percent)

4

8

12

Apr.21 May.21 Jun.21 Jul.21 Aug.21

10

14

18

Apr.2021 May.2021 Jun.2021 Actual

Private consumption 2021: market projection (*)(annual change, percent)

Domestic demand(seasonally-adjusted series; index, 2019 average=100)

Labor market tightness is apparent, coupled with likely skill mismatches.

(*) Business Perceptions Report (BPR).

Sources: Central Bank of Chile and SABE Project of SENCE Labor Observatory and ISCI-WIC, University of Chile, based on websites trabajando.com and laborum.com.

Job postings and applications on the Internet(index, base 100=3 March 2020, moving 15-day average)

August BPR (*): Among firms wanting to hire, Generally, what happened with labor search?(percent of total respondents saying they had searched for labor in 2021)

0 10 20 30 40

Hired as desired

Hired, but with a different profile

Couldn't hire, candidates refused proposed terms

Couldn't hire, candidates did not fit desired profilel

Couldn't hire, no candidates

20

35

50

65

80

95

110

125

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Jan.20 May.20 Sept.20 Jan.21 May.21

Postings Applications (right axis) 140

The combination of higher labor demand and tight labor supply is consistent with the recent acceleration of annual nominal wage growth.

(1) Wage Index (IR) and Labor Cost index (ICMO). (2) Value above (below) 50 indicates an expansion (contraction) outlook. (2) Dashed horizontal lines show historical averages from January 2004 through May 2021 for each series. (3) Expectations for wages are six months ahead.

Sources: National Statistics Institute (INE) and Icare/Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez.

Nominal wages (1)(annual change, percent)

IMCE: Wage expectations (2) (3)(diffusion index)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Wage Index Labor Cost Index

30

40

50

60

70

80

20

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Construction Manufacturing

Inflation has been picking up.

Headline and core inflation (1)(annual change, percent)

Price hikes at July 2021(annual change, percent)

+8.0%

+9.4%

+10.4%

+18.6%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

(1) Dashed vertical line indicates statistical cut-off of June 2021 Report. (2) CPI without volatilityhas 65.1% share in total CPI basket. For more details, see box IV.1 in December 2019 MP Reportand Carlomagno and Sansone (2019).

Total CPI CPI w/o volatiles (2)

Core services inflation has also risen, especially when excluding administered and indexed items. Among volatile items, the new rise in fuel prices stands out.

Services CPI w/o volatiles (1)(annual change, average percent)

1

3

4

6

7 Excl. administered and indexed prices (11.7%)

Total (38.4%)

(1) In parentheses, share in total CPI basket. (2) Dashed vertical line indicates statistical cut-off of June 2021 MP Report. (3) Average price between Brent and WTI oil barrels.

Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, and National Statistics Institute (INE).

20

40

60

100

110

90

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Jan.19 Jul.19 Jan.20 Jul.20 Jan.21 Jul.21

CPI for fuels and oil price (2)(index, base 2018=100; dollars per barrel)

120 CPI fuels Oil (3) (right axis) 80

Core CPI (1) (2)

Inflation forecasts(annual change, percent)

CPI (1)

Annual inflation will end this year at 5.7%, and will be above 5% during the first half of 2022. Core CPI will peak around mid-2022.

(1) Dashed lines indicate forecast in respective MP Report. (2) Measured by CPI w/o volatiles.

Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

19 20 21 22 23

Effective

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

19 20 21 22 23

Jun.21 Sep.21Effective MP Report Jun.21 MP Report Sep.21

The Board decided to intensify the withdrawal of monetary stimulus to avoid the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances that could jeopardize the convergence of inflation to the 3% target. This is so because a scenario has emerged in which the Board has less room for maneuver, as a result of:

Inflation expectations dynamics

Rapid evolution of macroeconomic scenario

Sensitivity scenarios associated with higher pressures on prices

MPR corridor (*)(percent)

(*) The corridor is built following the methodology of Box V.1 of the March 2020 Report. Itincludes the FTS of August 26, the EES of August 10 and the quarter’s mean smoothedforward curve (statistical cutoff). The methodology corresponds to the extraction of theimplicit MPR considering the forward curve on the interest rate swap curve up to 2 years,discounting the fixed rates for each term at the simple accrual of the ICP.

Source: Central Bank of Chile.

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Jun

.20

Sep

.20

Dec

.20

Mar

.21

Jun

.21

Sep

.21

Dec

.21

Mar

.22

Jun

.22

Sep

.22

Dec

.22

Mar

.23

Jun

.23

Sep

.23

Corridor Jun.21

FTS

Forward

Corridor Sep.21

Corridor Mar.21

EES

MPR

The Board raised the MPR to 1.5% in August (+75bp), after raising it by 25bp in July, and anticipates that it will continue to withdraw the monetary impulse, bringing the MPR at levels similar to its neutral towards the middle of the first semester of 2022.

MONETARY POLICY REPORTSEPTEMBER 2021

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