monetary policy, bounded rationality and incomplete markets

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Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets Iván Werning, MIT Emmanuel Farhi, Harvard

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Page 1: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality

and Incomplete Markets

Iván Werning, MITEmmanuel Farhi, Harvard

Page 2: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Motivation

How is monetary policy affected byBounded Rationality?Incomplete Markets?Combination?

Paper: complementarities!

Page 3: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

MotivationHelps fix “bugs” of standard NK model

indeterminacy given interest rate paths (Taylor principle) Neo-Fisherian controversieseffectiveness of monetary policy dependence on horizon (“forward guidance puzzle”)effects of fiscal policy at ZLB (“fiscal multipliers puzzle”)explosive nature of long-lasting liquidity traps…

Page 4: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Bounded Rationality

Expectations management major (main) channel of policy transmission in NK model under RE

Realistic?

incomplete information or inattention to policy announcement?

less than full understanding of its future effects?

Page 5: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Bounded Rationality“Inductive”

learning: extrapolate from past data rationally or irrationally (Sargent; Evans-Honkapohja; Shleifer)incomplete info and inattention: ignore, underweight, cost to process info (Sims; Mankiw-Reis; Maćkowiak-Wiederholt; Gabaix; Angeletos-Lian)

“Eductive”

robustness (Hansen-Sargent)level-k thinking: think through reaction of others (Stahl-Wilson; Nagel; Crawford-Costa-Gomes-Iriberri; Evans-Ramey; Woodford; García-Schmidt-Woodford)

Level-k thinkingcredible and clear announcement policy changewith little past experienceagents think through consequences, with bounded rationality

Page 6: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Incomplete MarketsStandard NK model: representative agent or complete markets

Incomplete markets alternative (Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari)lack of insurance to idiosyncratic shocksborrowing constraints

Key for effects and channels of monetary policyhigh Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC)low intertemporal substitution

Large and active area in macro (Guerrieri-Lorenzoni, Farhi-Werning, Chamley, Beaudry-Galizia-Portier, Ravn-Sterk, Sheedy, McKay-Nakamura-Steinsson, Auclert, Werning, Kaplan-Moll-Violante etc.)

Page 7: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Complete Markets

Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectation

benchmark ?

Bounded Rationality ? ???

Page 8: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

OutlineGeneral concept of level-k

Representative agent with level-k

Incomplete markets without level-k

Incomplete markets with level-k

Start: rigid prices or effects of real interest ratesEnd: sticky prices and inflation

Page 9: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectations

Page 10: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectations

R.E. Equilibria. Solution for with

Page 11: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectations

R.E. Equilibria. Solution for with

Comparative static

Page 12: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectations

R.E. Equilibria. Solution for with

Comparative static

Page 13: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectations

R.E. Equilibria. Solution for with

Comparative static

Page 14: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectations

R.E. Equilibria. Solution for with

PE

Comparative static

Page 15: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectations

R.E. Equilibria. Solution for with

PE

GE

Comparative static

Page 16: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Level-k ThinkingLevel-1 thinking:

status quo REE

Page 17: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Level-k ThinkingLevel-1 thinking:

status quo REE

(almost PE effect! continuous time…)

Page 18: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Level-k ThinkingLevel-1 thinking:

status quo REE

(almost PE effect! continuous time…)

Level-2 thinking:

level-1 thinking

Page 19: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Level-k ThinkingLevel-1 thinking:

status quo REE

(almost PE effect! continuous time…)

Level-2 thinking:

level-1 thinking

Level-k thinking:

Note: REE is a fixed point!

Page 20: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Level-k ThinkingCoincides with PE for

Mitigates GE, less and less as increases

Converges to RE as

Determinate for any , without Taylor rule

Can generalize to aggregate consumption functions depending on state variable for incomplete markets (wealth distribution)

k ! 1

k = 1

k

k

Page 21: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Effects of Monetary Policy

Elasticities of output to interest ratesat different horizonsPE, GE, level-k

✏t,⌧ = lim�R⌧!0

�R⌧

Yt

�Yt

�R⌧

✏t,⌧ = ✏PEt,⌧ + ✏GE

t,⌧

✏kt,⌧ = lim�R⌧!0

�R⌧

Yt

�Y kt

�R⌧

✏kt,⌧ = ✏k,PEt,⌧ + ✏k,GE

t,⌧

Page 22: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Complete Markets

Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectation

benchmark ?

Bounded Rationality ? ???

Page 23: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Representative Agent

Representative agent (= complete markets)

Continuous timenot crucial, but… …partial equilibrium = level-1 thinking

Page 24: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets
Page 25: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

start at steady state

Page 26: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

change interest rate at

Page 27: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

change interest rate at

Page 28: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Bottom line: weak mitigation and horizon effects from level-k thinking.

change interest rate at

Page 29: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Complete Markets

Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectation

benchmark ?

Bounded Rationality ? ???

Page 30: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Incomplete Markets

See e.g. Werning (2015)

Benchmark neutrality result: “as if” rep. agent

Subtle dependence on cyclicality of income risk liquidity

Page 31: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Keynesian CrossLiquidity constrained cannot substitute, so…

Q: How can incomplete markets not affect aggregate response?

A: General Equilibrium vs. Partial Equilibriumsome do substitute and increase their spending……increases income all around……raises spending of liquidity constrained more…… increases income…. etc.

PE + GE = constant

Page 32: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Complete Markets

Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectation

benchmark small effects

Bounded Rationality small effects ???

Perpetual Youth

+Aiyagari

Simulations

Page 33: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Perpetual Youth ModelTractable model to easily visit all 4 squares!Continuum measure 1 of agentsOLG with Poisson death and arrival Preferences

Incomelabor income:Lucas tree dividend:

Budget with annuities

Page 34: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Perpetual Youth ModelAlternative interpretation

agents do not dielife separated by stochastic “periods”heavy discount across periods:

wish to borrow against future periodsbut cannot do so!

OLG ~ borrowing constraintsshort or interrupted time horizonsno precautionary savingslinear consumption function and aggregation

Page 35: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

equilibrium

individual consumption function

Perpetual Youth Model

aggregate consumption function

Page 36: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Steady StateSteady state

Comparative static (“MIT shock”)new path for interest ratecompute

rational expectations equilibriumk-level thinking

Page 37: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Mitigation and Horizon

Page 38: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Mitigation and Horizon

Page 39: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Mitigation and Horizon

Result. Complementarity between incomplete markets and bounded rationality.

Page 40: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Speed of ConvergenceRecall, level-1 = PE, level- = RELevel-k

Page 41: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Speed of ConvergenceRecall, level-1 = PE, level- = RELevel-k

Complementarity: Asymptotic convergence to RE slower for higher .

Page 42: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Bewley-Aiagari-HuggetAssumptions:

idiosyncratic income uncertaintyno insuranceborrowing constraints

Results:occasionally binding borrowing constraintsprecautionary savingsconcave consumption functions (varying MPC)

Monetary policy and bounded rationality?general theoretical characterizationnumerical simulations

Page 43: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Bewley-Aiagari-HuggetAssumptions:

idiosyncratic income uncertaintyno insuranceborrowing constraints

Results:occasionally binding borrowing constraintsprecautionary savingsconcave consumption functions (varying MPC)

Monetary policy and bounded rationality?general theoretical characterizationnumerical simulationsResult. Complementarity between incomplete

markets and bounded rationality.

Page 44: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Bewley-Aiyagari-Huggett ModelBewley-Aiyagari-Huggett economyDiscrete periods (quarters)

Calibrationincome process

steady state interest rates at 2%

choose to match outside liquidity to output 1.44 (fraction of borrowing constrained agents 15%), as in McKay et al. (2016)

log yt = ⇢ log yt�1 + ✏t⇢ = 0.966 �✏ = 0.017

2

Page 45: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Simulations

Page 46: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Simulations

Page 47: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Sticky PricesSo far: rigid prices or equivalently real interest rates

Now: sticky prices

Differences:additional GE effect: output-inflation feedback loop baseline representative agent features anti-horizoncan get big difference from level-k alone

Page 48: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Sticky PricesSo far: rigid prices or equivalently real interest rates

Now: sticky prices

Differences:additional GE effect: output-inflation feedback loop baseline representative agent features anti-horizoncan get big difference from level-k alone

Result. Complementarity between incomplete markets and bounded rationality.

Page 49: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

Simulations

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

s

0

2

4

6

8

10

%deviationfrom

Yss

RA k = 1

HA k = 1

RA k = 2

HA k = 2

RA k = 3

HA k = 3

RA k = 4

HA k = 4

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

s

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

%deviationfrom

Πss

RA k = 1

HA k = 1

RA k = 2

HA k = 2

RA k = 3

HA k = 3

RA k = 4

HA k = 4

Figure 3: Proportional output response ek0,t and inflation response eP,k

0,t at date 0 to a1% interest rate cut at different horizons t for the baseline incomplete-markets economy(dashed lines) and the complete-markets or representative-agent economy (solid lines).Different colors represent equilibrium output under level-k thinking with different val-ues of k.

Figure 4: Proportional output response ek0,t at date 0 to a 1% interest rate cut at a horizon of

t = 0, t = 8 quarters, and t = 16 quarters. Different colors represent equilibrium outputunder level-k thinking with different values of k. Different dots of the same color corre-spond to economies with different fractions of borrowing-constrained agents in steadystate. This variation is achieved by varying the discount factor b and amount of liquidityd and keeping the steady-state annual interest rate constant at 2%.

48

Page 50: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

SimulationsFigure 3: Proportional output response ek

0,t and inflation response eP,k0,t at date 0 to a

1% interest rate cut at different horizons t for the baseline incomplete-markets economy(dashed lines) and the complete-markets or representative-agent economy (solid lines).Different colors represent equilibrium output under level-k thinking with different val-ues of k.

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Fraction of borrowing constrained in the s.s.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

%deviationfrom

steady-state

output

Drop in R0

k = 1

k = 2

k = 3

k = 4

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Fraction of borrowing constrained in the s.s.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

%deviationfrom

steady-state

output

Drop in R8

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Fraction of borrowing constrained in the s.s.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

%deviationfrom

steady-state

output

Drop in R16

Figure 4: Proportional output response ek0,t at date 0 to a 1% interest rate cut at a horizon of

t = 0, t = 8 quarters, and t = 16 quarters. Different colors represent equilibrium outputunder level-k thinking with different values of k. Different dots of the same color corre-spond to economies with different fractions of borrowing-constrained agents in steadystate. This variation is achieved by varying the discount factor b and amount of liquidityd and keeping the steady-state annual interest rate constant at 2%.

48

Page 51: Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Markets

ConclusionComplete Markets

Incomplete Markets

Rational Expectation

benchmark small effects

Bounded Rationality small effects large effects