modified from silberschatz, galvin and gagne lecture 22 chapter 15: security
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Modified from Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne
Lecture 22
Chapter 15: Security
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2Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Security Services
Enhance the security of data processing systems and information transfers of an organization.
Counter security attacks.
Security Attack
Action that compromises the security of information owned by an organization.
Security Mechanisms
Designed to prevent, detect or recover from a security attack.
Aspects of Security
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3Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Enhance security of data processing systems and information transfers
Authentication
Assurance that the communicating entity is the one claimed
Authorization
Prevention of the unauthorized use of a resource
Availability
Data is available in a timely manner when needed
Security Services
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4Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Confidentiality
Protection of data from unauthorized disclosure
Integrity
Assurance that data received is as sent by an authorized entity
Non-Repudiation
Protection against denial by one of the parties in a communication
Security Services
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5Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Security Attacks
Informationsource
Informationdestination
Normal Flow
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6Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Security Attacks
Informationsource
Informationdestination
Interruption
Attack on availability
(ability to use desired information or resources)
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7Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Denial of Service
Internet
PerpetratorVictim
ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim) Sent to IP broadcast address
ICMP echo reply
ICMP = Internet Control Message Protocol
Innocentreflector sites
Smurf Attack
1 SYN
10,000 SYN/ACKs – Victim is dead
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8Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Security Attacks
Informationsource
Informationdestination
Interception
Attack on confidentiality
(concealment of information)
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9Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Packet Sniffing
Packet Sniffer
Client
Server
Network Interface Card allows only packets for this MAC address
Every network interface card has a unique 48-bit Media Access Control (MAC) address, e.g. 00:0D:84:F6:3A:10 24 bits assigned by IEEE; 24 by card vendor
Packet sniffer sets his card to promiscuous mode to allow all packets
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10Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Security Attacks
Informationsource
Informationdestination
Fabrication
Attack on authenticity
(identification and assurance of origin of information)
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11Principles of Computer Operating Systems
IP addresses are filled in by the originating host
Using source address for authentication
r-utilities (rlogin, rsh, rhosts etc..)
IP Address Spoofing
• Can A claim it is B to the server S?
• ARP Spoofing
• Can C claim it is B to the server S?
• Source Routing
InternetInternet
2.1.1.1 C
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2A B
1.1.1.3 S
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12Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Security Attacks
Informationsource
Informationdestination
Modification
Attack on integrity
(prevention of unauthorized changes)
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13Principles of Computer Operating Systems
When is a TCP packet valid?
Address / Port / Sequence Number in window
How to get sequence number?
Sniff traffic
Guess it
Many earlier systems had predictable Initial Sequence Number
Inject arbitrary data to the connection
TCP Session Hijack
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14Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Security Attacks
Message interception
Trafficanalysis
eavesdropping, monitoring transmissions
Passive attacks
Masquerade Denial ofservice
some modification of the data stream
Active attacks
Replay Modification of message contents
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15Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Feature designed to
Prevent attackers from violating security policy
Detect attackers’ violation of security policy
Recover, continue to function correctly even if attack succeeds.
No single mechanism that will support all services
Authentication, authorization, availability, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation
Security Mechanism
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16Principles of Computer Operating Systems
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17Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Cryptography as a Security Tool
Broadest security tool available
Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography
Means to constrain potential senders (sources) and / or receivers (destinations) of messages
Based on secrets (keys)
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18Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Secure Communication over Insecure Medium
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19Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Encryption
Encryption algorithm consists of
Set of K keys
Set of M Messages
Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
A function E : K → (M→C). That is, for each k K, E(k) is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages.
Both E and E(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
A function D : K → (C → M). That is, for each k K, D(k) is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts.
Both D and D(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext c C, a computer can compute m such that E(k)(m) = c only if it possesses D(k).
Thus, a computer holding D(k) can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding D(k) cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive D(k) from the ciphertexts
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20Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Symmetric key cryptography
symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share know same (symmetric) key: K
e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher
Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?
plaintextciphertext
KA-B
encryptionalgorithm
decryption algorithm
A-B
KA-B
plaintextmessage, m
K (m)A-B
K (m)A-B
m = K ( ) A-B
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21Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Symmetric Encryption
Data Encryption Standard
most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm
created by US Govt
Encrypts a block of data at a time
initial permutation
16 identical “rounds” of function application, each using different 48 bits of key
final permutation
DES operation
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22Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Symmetric Encryption (cont)
DES is breakable using brute force making DES more secure
use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum
use cipher-block chaining
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
symmetric-key NIST standard replacing DES, Nov 2001
processes data in 128 bit blocks
128, 192, or 256 bit keys
brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES
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23Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Asymmetric Encryption
Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys: public key – published key used to encrypt data
private key – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme Most common is RSA block cipher
Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
No efficient algorithm is know for finding the prime factors of a number
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24Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Public key cryptography
plaintextmessage, m
ciphertextencryptionalgorithm
decryption algorithm
Bob’s public key
plaintextmessageK (m)
B+
K B+
Bob’s privatekey
K B-
m = K (K (m))B+
B-
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25Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)
Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive D(kd , N) from E(ke , N), and so E(ke , N) need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
E(ke , N) (or just ke) is the public key
D(kd , N) (or just kd) is the private key
N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q (for example, p and q are 512 bits each)
Encryption algorithm is E(ke , N)(m) = mke mod N, where ke satisfies kekd mod (p−1)(q −1) = 1
The decryption algorithm is then D(kd , N)(c) = ckd mod N
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26Principles of Computer Operating Systems
RSA: Choosing keys
1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)
3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”)
4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: ed mod z = 1 )
5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d).
K B+ K
B-
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27Principles of Computer Operating Systems
RSA: Encryption, decryption
0. Given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above
1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute
c = m mod ne (i.e., remainder when m is divided by n)e
2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute
m = c mod nd (i.e., remainder when c is divided by n)d
m = (m mod n)e mod ndMagic
happens!c
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28Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Asymmetric Encryption Example
For example. make p = 7and q = 13
We then calculate N = 7 13 = 91 and (∗ p−1)(q−1) = 72
We next select ke relatively prime to 72 and< 72, yielding 5
Finally,we calculate kd such that kekd mod 72 = 1, yielding 29
We how have our keys
Public key, ke, N = 5, 91
Private key, kd , N = 29, 91
Encrypting the message 69 with the public key results in the cyphertext 62
Cyphertext can be decoded with the private key
Public key can be distributed in cleartext to anyone who wants to communicate with holder of public key
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29Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Encryption and Decryption using RSA Asymmetric Cryptography
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30Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Cryptography (Cont.)
Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
Asymmetric much more compute intensive
Typically not used for bulk data encryption
Many times a combination is used:
use public key cryptography to share a secret key.
use the secret key to encrypt the bulk of the communication.
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31Principles of Computer Operating Systems
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32Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Authentication
Constraining set of potential senders of a message
Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption
Also can prove message unmodified
Algorithm components
A set K of keys
A set M of messages
A set A of authenticators
A function S : K → (M→ A)
That is, for each k K, S(k) is a function for generating authenticators from messages
Both S and S(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions
A function V : K → (M× A→ {true, false}).
That is, for each k K, V(k) is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
Both V and V(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions
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33Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Authentication (Cont.)
For a message m, a computer can generate an authenticator a A such that V(k)(m, a) = true only if it possesses S(k)
Thus, computer holding S(k) can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing V(k) can verify them
Computer not holding S(k) cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using V(k)
Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive S(k) from the authenticators
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34Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Authentication – Hash Functions
Basis of authentication
Creates small, fixed-size block of data (message digest, hash value) from m
Hash Function H must be collision resistant on m
Must be infeasible to find an m’ ≠ m such that H(m) = H(m’)
If H(m) = H(m’), then m = m’
The message has not been modified
Common message-digest functions include
MD5, which produces a 128-bit hash
SHA-1, which outputs a 160-bit hash
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35Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Authentication - MAC
Symmetric encryption used in message-authentication code (MAC) authentication algorithm
Simple example:
MAC defines S(k)(m) = f (k, H(m))
Where f is a function that is one-way on its first argument
– k cannot be derived from f (k, H(m))
Because of the collision resistance in the hash function, reasonably assured no other message could create the same MAC
A suitable verification algorithm is V(k)(m, a) ≡ ( f (k,m) = a)
Note that k is needed to compute both S(k) and V(k), so anyone able to compute one can compute the other
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36Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Message Authentication Code
m
s(shared secret)
(message)
H(.)H(m+s)
publicInternetappend
m H(m+s)
s
compare
m
H(m+s)
H(.)
H(m+s)
(shared secret)
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37Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Authentication – Digital Signature
Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
Authenticators produced are digital signatures
In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive S(ks ) from V(kv)
V is a one-way function
Thus, kv is the public key and ks is the private key
Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
Digital signature of message S(ks )(m) = H(m)ks mod N
The key ks again is a pair d, N, where N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q
Verification algorithm is V(kv)(m, a) ≡ (akv mod N = H(m))
Where kv satisfies kvks mod (p − 1)(q − 1) = 1
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38Principles of Computer Operating Systems8: Network Security 8-38
Digital Signatures
simple digital signature for message m: Bob “signs” m by encrypting with his private key
KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m)--
Dear Alice
Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah blah blah)
Bob
Bob’s message, m
public keyencryptionalgorithm
Bob’s privatekey
K B-
Bob’s message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key
K B-(m)
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39Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Digital Signatures
suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature KB(m)
Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s public key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m.
if KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used
Bob’s private key.
+ +
-
-
- -
+
Alice thus verifies that:o Bob signed m.o No one else signed m.o Bob signed m and not m’.
non-repudiation: Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and prove that
Bob signed m. -
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40Principles of Computer Operating Systems
large messagem
H: hashfunction H(m)
digitalsignature(encrypt)
Bob’s private
key K B-
+
Bob sends digitally signed message:
Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed message:
KB(H(m))-
encrypted msg digest
KB(H(m))-
encrypted msg digest
large messagem
H: hashfunction
H(m)
digitalsignature(decrypt)
H(m)
Bob’s public
key K B+
equal ?
Digital signature = signed MAC
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41Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Authentication (Cont.)
Why authentication if a subset of encryption?
Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
Authenticator usually shorter than message
Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
Signed patches et al
Can be basis for non-repudiation
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42Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Key Distribution
Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
Sometimes done out-of-band
Asymmetric keys can proliferate
stored on key ring
Even asymmetric key distribution needs care
man-in-the-middle attack
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43Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography
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44Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Digital Certificates
Proof of who or what owns a public key
Public key digitally signed a trusted party
Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
Certificate authority are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions
They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on
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45Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Certification Authorities
Certification Authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E.
E registers its public key with CA. E provides “proof of identity” to CA.
CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA: CA says “This is E’s public key.”
Bob’s public
key K B+
Bob’s identifying informatio
n
digitalsignature(encrypt)
CA private
key K CA-
K B+
certificate for Bob’s public
key, signed by CA
-K CA(K ) B
+
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46Principles of Computer Operating Systems
Certification Authorities
when Alice wants Bob’s public key: gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key
Bob’s public
key K B+
digitalsignature(decrypt)
CA public
key K CA
+
K B+
-K CA(K ) B
+