modernizing the muscovite military: the systemic shock of 1698

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Modernizing the muscovite military: The systemicshock of 1698Graeme P. Herd a ba Deputy Director of the Scottish Centre for International Security (SCIS)b Lecturer in International Relations , University of AberdeenPublished online: 18 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Graeme P. Herd (2001) Modernizing the muscovite military: The systemic shock of 1698, The Journal ofSlavic Military Studies, 14:4, 110-130, DOI: 10.1080/13518040108430500

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FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY

Modernizing the Muscovite Military:The Systemic Shock of 1698

GRAEME P. HERD

In June 1698, while Peter I was abroad on the Grand Embassy, four strel'tsy regimentsgarrisoned on the Polish border rose and marched on Moscow, demanding a'regulation of service.' Although historians of early modern Russia have overlookedthis revolt, a re-examination of contemporary published and unpublished accountscalls for a reassessment. This article argues that the strel'tsy revolt was capable ofunseating Peter and that only timely intervention by the newly-created guardsregiments and their foreign mercenary dominated-officer corps ensured that the rebelsdid not reach Moscow. It analyses the critical impact of a Scottish mercenary general(Patrick Gordon) in shaping and implementing the response of the Russian militaryestablishment towards the uprising. Lastly, it evaluates the impact of the suppressionof the revolt upon the way in which Peter I perceived the modernization of theMuscovite political, economic and military system of governance.

Given the importance of the strel'tsy uprising of 1698 for mappingMuscovite conceptions of systemic transformation, it has received littleattention from historians of late modern Muscovy and Petrine Russia,particularly when compared to scholarly work on the events of 1682 and1689. Although Russian published primary sources on this episode arestrong,1 its significance has received scant analysis by secondary sources onthe Petrine period. To my knowledge, no monograph or journal article hasbeen published on this subject. Historians have tended to summarize anddismiss the episode in a few paragraphs between an extensive account of theGrand Embassy and the origins of the Great Northern War2 and, indeed,more recent works have treated the subject lightly.3 The most extensiveaccount by a western scholar is that of Lindsey Hughes in her biography ofSophia, Peter's half sister; here the account is viewed primarily through theprism of Sophia's involvement and alleged guilt in instigating the revolt,rather than the mechanics of the revolt itself."

This account will primarily focus on the evidence of three contemporaryforeign accounts of the strel'tsy uprising. The key source for the rebellion in

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.14, No.4 (December 2001) pp.110-130PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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MODERNIZING THE MUSCOVITE MILITARY, 1698 111

1698 remains the unpublished diaries of General Patrick Gordon ofAuchleuchries (1635-99).3 The little-cited History of Peter the Greatwritten by his son-in-law, Alexander Gordon of Auchintoul provides auseful source for cross-referencing the accounts.6 The well-known Diary ofan Austrian Secretary - Johann Korb's account - provides anothercontemporary perspective of these events.7 These contemporary sources areparticularly useful in supplying both the factual details of the revolt andpointing to an interpretation.

It should be stressed that although the three key eyewitnesses were inMoscow in 1698, they were written independent of each other. Korb enteredMoscow on 16 April 1698 in the retinue of his Ambassador Ignaz vonGuriant and provides a useful 'Moscow-based' perspective and assessmentof the significance of revolt. He witnessed the Preobrazhenskoe phase of theinquisition under Peter and is particularly forthcoming on the question ofSophia's 'guilt' and involvement. According to Patrick Gordon's diary, theymet on 19 April, 19 May, 5 June, and 12 July 1698. Moreover, Korb wouldhave been aware of the content of many letters Gordon sent to members ofthe Foreign Quarter, and so indirectly Gordon would have provided himwith a greater understanding of the mechanics, aims and objectives of theuprising. Korb could not have read either Patrick Gordon's diaries (he leftbefore Gordon's death in December 1699), or Alexander Gordon's account,which was published in 1755.

Although Alexander Gordon's account was published in the mid-eighteenth century, this should not obscure the fact that he first enteredMuscovite service in 1697 and, although in Tambov during the events ofJune 1698 (with Gordon's son Colonel James Gordon), Alexander returnedto Moscow on 8 October 1698. As Patrick's son-in-law Alexander wouldhave had direct access to Patrick's views, and indeed, attributes to Patrickthe view that 'higher hands' were at work in fermenting the revolt. He mayhave read Korb's account, which was published in 1700 but then banned byPeter in 1702 because of its western perception of a barbaric Russia at warwith her Protestant neighbour, but he does not cite it as a source in hisHistory. Patrick Gordon could not have read either Korb's account, nor thatof Alexander. As these three sources generally agree when discussingsimilar events, there is no reason to doubt that when the testimony of onesource includes particular details or events - not included in the othersources - it is not similarly accurate and truthful.

By 1698 Patrick Gordon was the highest-ranking military officer inRussian service, with over 45 years of mercenary experience, the vastmajority of them in Russia. He mixed freely with leading members of theBoyar elite, was a counsellor to Peter, played a leading role in 1689 events,the formation of the emergent navy and wargaming of the early 1690s, andD

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112 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

was one of three key commanders at the sieges of Azov in the mid-1690s.He was Russian speaking, had commanded strel'tsy at Azov and on theTavan expedition of 1697, comprehending strel'tsy strengths, limitationsand understanding fully the difference between the rhetoric of redress ofgenuine grievances and that of outright revolt.8

The June 1698 Strel'tsy Uprising

The death of the co-Tsar Ivan V on 29 January 1696 and victory followingthe surrender of the Turkish fort of Azov in June 1696 allowed for theconsolidation of the position of Peter as Tsar. Azov, as well as popularisingthe idea of reform, also provided the ostensible raison d'etre of the Grand(or Turkish) Embassy - the recruitment of foreign professional mercenariesto continue the war against the Ottoman Empire.9

Peter left Moscow at the start of his Grand Embassy on 10 March 1697and on his departure divided the command of Russia between three leadingBoyars, with Boyar Aleksei Semenovich Shein in overall command.10

Earlier that year it had been decided that Gordon, Shein and 'Kniaz LukaFiodorovity Dolgorukoy' would lead three armies south, in the hardestcampaigning year before the advent of the Great Northern War, to continuethe 'Tavanish expedition': '9 Regiments of the Streltsees ordered to go toservice 6 to Azov, 2 to Byalgorod and 1 to Kyov.'"

Following the fall of Azov the Turks counter-attacked across the BlackSea ('the pure and immaculate virgin'), striking Azov and the newly builtforts of Tavan and Kasakerim on the Dneiper.12 As Gordon marched south torelieve Azov and its newly appointed governor 'Kniaz Alexey PetrovitsProsarofsky',13 Peter was in constant contact with him, writing directly toGordon from Pskov, Novgorod, Mitau and Konigsberg. Thereafter lettersarrived forwarded from Moscow. In his replies Gordon informed Peter of theprogress of the army of nine strel'tsy regiments, those strel'tsy from Tambovand his Butirsky guards regiment: 'At my comeing being in sight and nearAzov I saluted it and with 3 shott of cannon.'14

As the coordinated Turkish naval and army counter-attack on Russianpositions on the Dnieper increased in effectiveness through September 1697,more strel'tsy regiments were rushed south to reinforce the fort of Azov: 'to wittAffonasse Czubanuf & Tichon Hundermark' .13 Their remit was, in the words ofPeter, 'to march in all haste to such places where the enemy was expected'.16

The Turks raised the siege of Azov on 15 October 1697 and the Russian armywas dismissed to winter quarters and Gordon returned to Moscow, careful toensure that the Moscow garrison received payment in arrears.

The Tambov and strel'tsy regiments were not so fortunate. On 1 April1698 the Tambov soldiers petitioned Gordon, who: 'diswaded to troubleD

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themselves with petitioning or being at expences untill his M.fajesty]returned'.17 On 3 April four unpaid strel'tsy regiments (Cherny, Chubarov,Kolzakov and Hundermark) followed suit.18 Gordon relates how 400 of the'Streltsees who were petitioners & those who had runnaway out of theArmy of Kniaz Michael Greg: Romodanovsky' came 'to the house of theirBoyar Kniaz Ivan Boris Troyuruf desireing to be heard'.19 Fourrepresentatives from the regiments were given an audience where theywere: 'remonstrating the great necessityes they had suffered and stilllaboured under, and aggravating all beyond measure, and that they arereduced almost to despaire'. Their plea for the redress of grievances was cutshort and 'their Boyar' ordered them 'immediately to service and to be goneinstantly'. The four regimental representatives disobeyed, were imprisonedand then promptly set free by their fellow strel'tsy: 'which caused a greatconsternation among the great men especially those in the Citty'.20

The following day the members of the Boyar Duma ('at the Kremlin inCouncil') were 'very apprehensive of danger,' but, as Gordon laconicallynoted: 'as the Russes are by nature apprehensive of danger so in this & thelike they have another design, which is by aggrevateing things of this natureto make their service and dilligence in appeasing, oppressing andovercomeing the difficulties appeare more illustrious and meritorious'.21

Indeed, events bore out this assessment, for on the appearance of: 'somehundreds of the Simonofsky Regiment haveing been sent to hasten away theStreltsees to service they not only resisted, but made themselves ready, andhaveing delivered up the ringleaders of the sedition were all gone bymidnight'.22

Gordon, perhaps conscious of the combustible nature of strel'tsygrievances, was quick to adjudicate and settle any lingering dissensionamong his own troops; on 5 April: 'after dinner passed the tyme withdecideing of controversies among the sojours'.23 He also wrote a letter toPeter detailing 'the passage of this last weeke'.

This letter may have addressed the nature of strel'tsy complaints,particularly the non-payment of wage arrears and the bitterness the strel'tsyfelt at service in winter. The redeployment of these regiments under thecommand of 'Kniaz Michael Greg: Romodanovsky' to the garrison ofVelikie Luki near the Lithuanian frontier, without any leave to visitMoscow, in order that Russia might 'project power' and provide support tothe previous election of Augustus II to the Polish, throne was deeplyresented.24

This reversed the privilege of strelt'sy returning to their families andsmall businesses in Moscow and other key provincial garrisons in the non-campaigning season. Moreover, the manual labour that characterisedstrel'tsy activity over the previous three years - siege warfare in the AzovD

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campaigns (1695-96), naval port construction at Taganrog (1696-97), andthe hardships endured in the 'Tavanish' campaign of 1697 andredeployment to Velikie Luki, were collectively considered to demean theirstatus as imperial guardsmen.23 Peter's response to the April 1698 mutinycan be gauged by the letter he wrote to Romodanovskii, their commander,in which he expressed his anger that ringleaders had not been tortured.26

The expulsion of strel'tsy representatives and supporters from Moscowby the Semenovskii guardsmen contributed to the proliferation of theirsimmering grievances and open dissension. On 8 June 1698 news reachedGordon that 'the 4 regiments of the streltsees at Toropets enclineing tomutiny & disobedience' had risen and marched on Moscow.27 On 9 June,Gordon had dined at the Austrian Legation where inevitably news of themutiny would have been discussed by the foreign elite, and that night Korbnoted in his Diary: 'Today, for the first time, a vague rumour of the revoltof the Strelitz struck terror.'28 By 11 June 1698, two captains having recentlyleft Toropets substantiate the rumour, reporting to Gordon that 'about 8,000of them'29 had 'resolved not to go to their designed places, but to go directlyto Moscow'.30 Korb reports that: 'Four Regiments of the Strelitz, which layupon the frontier of Lithuania, had nefariously plotted to change theSovereignty. The regiment of Theodosia abandoned Viasma, the Athanasianregiment quitted Picla, the Ivano-Tzernovio-Wlodomirian left Ostheba, andthe Ticchonian quitted Dorogobusa, in which places they were ingarrison.'31

This caused the Russian boyar elite to immediately convene a 'BoyarCouncil' where: 'It was resolved to send an army against them of horse &Foot, and that I [Gordon] should advance with the Foot befor, untill theCavaliery might be conveened.'32 At this meeting, Korb reports that GeneralAleksei Semenovich Shein 'agreed to accept the power they, the Boyars,would entrust to him, but upon condition that the decree approvedunanimously should be also confirmed by all the seals and signatures.Although what he required was fair, there was not one among them all thatdid not refuse to put his hand to this resolution. It was hard to say whetherthis was through fear or envy: but the danger was too near to admit delayand the dread was lest the seditious cohorts of the strel'tsy should penetrateinto Moscow.'33 In effect, Shein had ensured that all boyars who had signedand placed their seals under an unanimous decision to resist the rebellionwith force were firmly and publicly wedded to Petrine order. Potentially, theboyars could now be massacred as pro-Petrine supporters; Shein'sultimatum was therefore designed to pre-empt the creation of a 'Fifthcolumn' within the capital and bind the boyars to the tsar.

On the same day Gordon mobilised the bulk of the Moscow garrisonwhich he commanded. He gathered field artillery pieces, 500 of his ownD

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regiment and 'as many of each of the other three standing Regiments inMosco should be comanded. I accordingly ordered the officers & sojourswho must go.'34 The 'other three standing Regiments' refer to the threeremaining of Peter's new guards regiments, the Semenovskii, Ismailovskiiand Preobrazhenskii - Gordon's mobilized Butirskii constituted the fourth.

Korb dramatizes Gordon's call to arms:

The regiments of the guards got notice to hold themselves in readinessto march at an hour's notice, and that those who decline to act againstthe sacrilegious violators of the Majesty of the crown would be heldguilty of misprison of their crime - that no ties of blood or kindredheld binding when the salvation of the sovereign and the state were atstake - nay, that a son might slay his father if he rose to ruin thefatherland. General Gordon strenuously executed this Spartanmeasure, and exhorted the troops entrusted to him to perform theirnoble task, telling them how there could be no more glorious deedthan to have saved the sovereign and the state.33

On 12 June Korb notes that the Polish Envoy hosted a dinner for 'theImperial and Danish representatives, General de Gordon - who had to takeleave and quit the table to hasten to march against the rebels - theCommissary of Denmark, Colonels Blumberg and Grage, and several otherguests'.36 The foreign elite was thus well placed to provide accurate andinsightful accounts of the strel'tsy revolt.

On 12 June Gordon left Moscow and 'marched along with a body ofthree thousand foot, and good artillery, consisting of twenty-seven fieldpieces, from six to ten pounds'.37 Although Gordon had, with 'greatdifficulty, got the Generalissimo persuaded to march out of the capital at thehead of four thousand of the neighbouring gentry cavalry', this Russiangentry army appeared to play no active role in the eventual suppression ofthe revolt.38 Gordon notes that on 15 June: 'the Boyar [Shein] with thep[rinci]p[a]ll persons who were here came by me and stayed an howre ortwo then returned to Mosko'.39 Here they remained for the duration.

The task of defeating the strel'tsy was reserved to Gordon and the newguards regiments - his Butirskii (Gordonov) regiment, the Preobrazhenkii(commanded by Romodanovskii), Semonovskii and Lefortovo (createdIsmailovskii in 1730) - as well as the 'Gentlemen of his M.[ajesties] Court'and 'the household servant's of his M.[ajesty] and the writers [scribes]'which Gordon mobilized on 15 and 16 June. The mobilization of Peter'scourtiers, servants and members of the nascent Petrine administrationcreated an additional 1,200 troops that could be utilised: '96 HouseholdServants on horseback & 113 to Foot, and of writers 280 on horseback and741 to Foot'.40D

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The seriousness with which contemporaries understood the strel'tsythreat posed to the continuation of the Petrine order is attested by severalfactors, not least the mobilization of central chancellery officials for militaryactivity which was in itself an exceptional event. The Boyar Duma wasconvened the day that the news reached them and it exercised its power toquickly agree and implement a defensive plan. Gordon's diary specificallyrefers to Shein, Romodanovskii and Troekurov as core decision-makers andinstrumental in organizing Moscow's response to the threat posed by theuprising. They were wedded to the Petrine order through a combination ofideological conviction and the desire to maintain the status quo.

Prince Mikhail Grigor'evich Romodanovskii was created a Boyar Dumamember on 22 November 1677 and by 1696 he was the sixth wealthiestindividual lay landowner in Russia, Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurovbeing the eighth, and Aleksei Semenovich Shein the fourth.41 According toAlexander Gordon:

The generalissimo [Shein], together with the rest of the nobility andgentry were in the greatest terror imaginable the General [Gordon]told them not to be uneasy, for he was not without hopes of gettingthem [strel'tsy] persuaded to return to their duty; and that even in caseof the worst, he hoped to give a good account to them.42

Gordon was: 'obliged to leave one thousand foot to keep matters right inMoscow, and to guard the palace'43 as there was an upsurge in the incidenceof looting, arson and murder in the Foreign Quarter.44 Korb reports that forprecautionary reasons the 'Czarewicz' (Aleksei Petrovich) was escorted tothe fortress-monastery of the Trinity-St Sergius for his own protection.45

Troop mobilization was so rapid that only partial deployment fromMoscow was possible (one regiment without regular cavalry support) - asKorb noted: 'It appeared more advisable to march out against them than toawait an invasion so fraught with the veriest peril.'46 Gordon himselfimplicitly admitted the precarious loyalty of other strel'tsy regiments. In aletter to Peter he relates how he attempted to disguise 'our slowness' in aneffort to dissuade other regiments posted to the Lithuanian border underRomodanovskii's command from joining the rebellion.47 This impression isreinforced by Alexander Gordon, who noted: "The Strelitz who remained inthe army seemed much more elevated than the ordinary, shewing but littleregard to orders: so that he [Gordon] feared the worst.'48

By 16 June Gordon had marched his troops to the river Svidina. Achance meeting with a servant turned informant on 17 June providedvaluable intelligence of the rebels' intentions. The strel'tsy 'were marchingvery hard intending to gett to the Voscresczinsky [New Jerusalem]Monastery that night, which made me make as great hast as possible toD

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prevent them'.49 The fortress-monastery of New Jerusalem lay in thevicinity of Istra, 50 versts (33 miles or 46km) west of Moscow and wasstrategically important - its capture provided a springboard for theanticipated march on Moscow, as the strenuous efforts made by the strel'tsyto secure the monastery indicate.

An advance party of strel'tsy and Gordon accompanied 'with suchhorsemen as I had gott together' met outside the walls of the New Jerusalemmonastery, where he was handed: 'a list of their services, with aneaggavation of their grievances and a desire to come to Mosko to visitt theirhouses, wives & children and to petition for their necessities'. As the mainbody of strel'tsy were still '15 versts [10 miles or 16km] off and not likely toreach the Monastery that night', Gordon 'ordered the campe to be drawn outnear the Monastery in the most convenient place'. He then sent an urgentrequest to Moscow for more cavalry, only to be informed by his scouts thatthe strel'tsy had reached the Svidina and were 'passing it at a Ford.' Inresponse, Gordon intercepted the strel'tsy 'within two versts [Vh miles or2.1km] of the monastery.'30 Korb stresses the immediacy of the situation, for:'Had the rebels reached the monastery but one hour sooner, safe within itsstrong defences, they might perhaps have worn out the loyal troops with suchlong and fruitless labour that they might have lost heart, and Victory, hostileto Loyalty, might have set her garland upon the brow of Treason.'31

Gordon decided to negotiate with the strel'tsy, a decision that waspartially determined by the lack of options open to him: 'Fatigued with along march, and still without sufficient force, Gordon, setting wisdom in theplace of strength, strolled along the banks to talk with the Strelitz.'32 Nothingwas settled, and as night approached Gordon: 'with expostulations &faiewords advised and commanded them to returne over the River andcampe on the other syde, to which they would not agree'."Although thestrel'tsy would not have their disposition dictated to them and insisted incamping in a meadow on the Moscow side of the river 'leaving a strongguard in the Lane', some agreement was reached as 'promises made on bothsides, that no moveing should be this night'.

Gordon camped two of his regiments in a nearby village, two 'in theFields by the Moskoes way', one battalion was placed on standby and onedirectly opposite the strel'tsy encampment 'occupied an advantageousheight'.54 Alexander Gordon makes it clear that Gordon feared the strel'tsygrievances could 'reduce and corrupt any of his troops [and therefore] hadcaused the officers to patrole the whole night long)'.53

When all appeared quiet and there were no 'appearances of stirrs amongthem', Gordon, Mikhail Grigorievich Romodanovskii and six strel'tsydeputies 'consulted what should be done'. By 18 June a concord had beennegotiated. It was agreed that Gordon and the strel'tsy deputies would:D

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intimate to them that 1st they should returne and go to the places tothe which they had been ordered, 2 that they should deliver the 140fugitives who had run away from Veliky Luky to Mosco and also thering leaders of the stirres up of this mutiny & disobedience to hisM.[ajesty] Comands and that his M.fajestsy] should in the places inthe which they should go cause give them their usuall pay & bread ormoney according to the price currant there and that this fault of theirdisobedience should be pardoned them as also the others more guiltyshould not suffer any great punishment.56

However, when these terms were put to the strel'tsy as a whole: 'theyanswered that they were all ready to dy, or go to Mosko, albeit for 2 or 3dayes, and thence go wither his M.[ajesty] should declare'.57 Gordon 'usedall the Rhetorick I was master of to perswade them to submission, and tobring a petition of being guilty of transgressing his M.[ajesty's] commands',but the strel'tsy were equally adamant in their resolve.38 Indeed, thevolatility of the situation is noted: 'two old fellows among them began toaggravate their grievances & necessityes', causing 'a great deal of stirr'. Inan effort to break this impasse Gordon then suggested that each regimentshould individually decide whether or not they would comply with thegovernment's order. Yet 'they refused, saying they were of one mind'.59

Persuasion having yet again failed, Gordon intimated that he wouldwithdraw for 15 minutes and upon no further response, delivered anultimatum. Gordon ordered the strel'tsy to accept the conditions previouslyagreed with their nominated deputies or he 'should be forced to use violenceto reduce them'.60 The strel'tsy then delivered an ultimatum of their own,defiantly stating that: 'they recognised no master, and would listen to ordersfrom no-body: that they would not go back to their quarters; that they mustbe admitted to Moscow; that if they were forbidden [to enter Moscow], theywould open up the road with cold steel'.61

Alexander Gordon states:

they told him [Gordon], they neither had nor would alter theirresolution, but were determined (seeing they were so near) to visittheir wives. If that were all he told them, their wives should be sent tothem. They told him that there was no use for that, since besidesseeing their wives, they had all Of them affairs of their own to lookafter which they would put an end to before they could think ofreturning.62

At this point, it was 'with signes of comiseration' that Gordon deployedhis forces in an attempt to suppress this rebellion.63

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Suppression and Confessions

Gordon placed the 'Foot regiments & cannon to a convenient place andenvironed their Campe on the other hand with the Cavallierie'. A last appealwas made, but this appeal for a 'categoricall answer' was rejected.64 Indeed:'they rejected all propositions of accommodation and prepared for defence,bragging of being alike with us if wee should begin to use violence'.65 Thestrel'tsy began preparations for battle in a systematic and composed manner:'they drew up their array; pointed their artillery, dressed their ranks, and asif the strife in which they were about to mingle was a struggle with a foreignfoe, they proceeded it with customary prayers and an invocation to God'.66

In a well-controlled engagement which lasted an hour, Gordon defeatedthe strel'tsy. His artillery played a decisive role in reducing their battleformation and morale. Initially, however, 'Out of pure compassionthinking thereby to intimate them'67 the first volley was a blank, but thisstratagem 'backfired' as 'the first volley passing without wound orslaughter, only added courage to guilt. Vastly emboldened, they respondedby a discharge, by which some where laid lifeless, and severall werebloodily wounded.'68

The strel'tsy then moved onto the offensive and 'sallyed out with 5 or 6colours into a Lane.' Gordon responded by ordering 'Gen. Le Fort his Reg.tand 4 Companies of the Butirsky to secure the post'.69 Thereafter Gordonordered the use of live rounds which 'vomited such a perfect hurricane uponthem, that many fell, numbers fled away, and none daring enough to returnto fire them [strel'tsy artillery pieces]'.70

Surrender followed the fourth salvo of 'deadly bolts' and all prisonerscaptured: 'The horse, being of no use in the engagement, took a great manyprisoners; so that the rebels, being all on foot, not a single person escaped.'71

News of victory was immediately sent to Moscow.That the strel 'tsy refused to compromise suggests that historians ought to

examine 'the crimes upon which they were bent'.72 On 18 June 1698, 22rebels were killed outright by Gordon's cannon and 40 or so lay dying onthe battlefield, bringing the total death toll amongst the strel'tsy to around70.73 All survivors were available for torture designed to extract confessionsand assign guilt. The first session began with questioning on 19 June;torture was then introduced on 21 June and it was brought to a halt on 4 July.Gordon administered it under orders from Moscow, in a systematic andthorough manner.

But before it began, unsolicited accusations from among the strel'tsyprisoners produced the names 'of some of their ringleaders'. This promptedGordon to muster one of the defeated strel'tsy regiments 'and asking theopinion and votes of the p[rinci]p[a]ll persons and others as to their

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behaviours, they freely declared some to have been ringleaders andtroublesome mutineers'. The accused and the accusers were separated 'thegood on the one hand, and the bad on the other,' and this process repeatedwith each of the other three strel'tsy regiments.74

On 21 June torture of the ringleaders encouraged them to confess 'theirmalicious designes had they gott to Moskow'. Gordon reports that 24strel'tsy confessed and were found 'guilty of hainous Crimes as of aneintention when they were off to Mosko, of massacring some of thep[rinci]p[a]ll Boyars, forcing an augmentation of their salary or pay, and aregulation of their service'.75 Korb's account reinforces that of Gordon,adding that one rebel had admitted that the strel'tsy:

had the intention to set fire, sack and ruin the whole German Suburb,and when the Germans, without exception, had been got rid of bymassacre, to enter Moscow by force, to murder all there that wouldoffer resistance ... the necessity of defending the faith ... PrincessSophia Alexiowa was to be raised to the throne until Czarewiczshould have attained his majority and the strength of manhood.76

Gordon sent daily dispatches of 'all that passed' to Moscow77 and on 24June he also wrote 'in short all the Circumstances of this expedition' toPeter, sending this letter via a 'Mr Vinius' in Moscow.78 In his diary henoted: 'This and the following dayes except Sunday wee were everydaybusyed from morning to evening examineing business and many weretortured some whereof confessed.'79 On 27 June Gordon was instructed in aletter from Moscow 'to send the less guilty streltsees to diverseMonasateryes to be kept in prisons there'.80 The 'greater guilty' were to beexecuted 'by hanging' rather than beheaded. On 28 June Gordon wrote toMoscow 'for orders' concerning those between the 'greater' and 'lesser'guilty, whom Gordon characterizes as 'the Rest who were guilty of twicedeserting and clamouring and being troublesome'.81

Evidently he received orders to continue the judicious combination ofphysical torture and psychological pressure. In dealing with one strel'tsyregiment, Gordon commented: 'many examined & brought to the torture inCol. Hundermark's Regiment, but none of them would confess, to be moreguilty as another, but were all alike. So we ordained them to cast lotts, thatevery tenth man should dy, which they did. above 100 persons knuted in theafternoon.'82 Such pressure brought dividends and Gordon was able toidentify the 'ringleaders of the mutiny' with Hundermark's regiment andalong with 'those who had twice deserted & some others' were readied forexecution the following day. A further four were sentenced to be beheadedand only the 'sick and wounded were left in the Monastery, so that but 25persons remained there'.83D

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On 1 July: 'In the morning the 4 sentenced on Saturday Last werebrought out into the fields where the other were and beheaded. They allexcept some few, dyed very insensibly without speaking any thing, butcrossing themselves, and some takeing leave of the spectators.'84 Gordonthen calculated the total number of strel'tsy killed, wounded andimprisoned: '130 were executed, 70 were killed & dyed of their wounds,1845 persons sent to prison in diverse Monasteryes & 25 remained in the[New Jerusalem] Monastery'.85

Thus, by 1 July, 200 of the strel'tsy had died and 1870 were imprisoned.Taking into account the 72 executed on 2 July, the final figures are 272strel'tsy killed or executed, with 1870 imprisoned. As Gordon noted thathardly a single mutineer escaped, this indicates 2,342 were involved in therevolt. In other words, just over half the complement from the four strel'tsyregiments revolted.86

On 2 July Gordon reports a further: '72 persons hanged to fyre and tothree on gibberts' and that: 'a Okolnitse Kiaz Fiodor Ivanovitz Shachofsycame to the campe, and in a set speech, asked our healths and praised ourservice, with other usuall Compliements. 87 By 4 July those loyal troopsunder Gordon's command were paid and the 'expedition' against thestrel'tsy uprising was 'disbanded.' Alexander Gordon attributes thecomparatively restricted use of execution to Gordon's advice to Shein thatthe strel'tsy 'might be reserved till his Majesty's return, that the ground ofthis rebellion might be better divided into'.88 Indeed, according to Korb, theexecution of strel'tsy prisoners in late June early July 'was contrary toGeneral Gordon's and Prince Masatski's advice that the General proceed toexecute the rebels; as in the manner the chiefs of the revolt may, withoutsufficient examination, have been removed by premature death, fromfurther inquest'.89

In a brief and guarded letter 'writt to Lefort' on 30 June, Gordonmentioned the use of 'sharp inquisitions,' using the metaphor of a 'fire'being 'quenshed' for the suppression of the strel'tsy uprising: 'I wouldrather speak or tell of my contribution later. God be praised that a great firewas in the beginning quenshed and quietened. I wish with all my heart thatM.[ajesty] en. ve [envoy i.e. a reference to Peter in the Russianambassadorial suite?], with the whole Suite may be here soon.'90 This letter,along with those Gordon had written on 16 and 24 June, clearly suggeststhat it was from Gordon that Peter was first to hear news of the uprising inMoscow.91

It is likely that Gordon would have informed Peter that both sides in thisengagement appeared evenly matched as both commanded regimentalartillery, and both possessed cavalry elements. The strel'tsy had an officercadre and command structure, even if it was self-elected; they had expelledD

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all 'the loyal officers that happened to be among them, distributing militaryranks amongst themselves, - the readiest for the crime being fittest forcommand'.92

It is clear that the strel'tsy's morale was high, they were defiant andresolute, armed and dangerous. Indeed, Alexander Gordon argues that hadPatrick Gordon been murdered or held hostage while negotiating with thestrel'tsy - '(which they might have done without any difficulty)' - then'they would have carried their point, for there was none other who had theresolution to oppose them'.93

Their ideology was powerful and contagious. It appeared that thestrel'tsy petitioners evoked a persuasive sense of the traditional hierarchicalMuscovite military and political order - the Russian Orthodox Churchembodied spiritual power within the State under the true Russian Tsar, andthe loyal strel'tsy defended Church and Tsar against the infidel in the Southand corrupted Christianity in the West. In analyzing the language andrhetoric of strel'tsy petitions - particularly their invocations to God,readiness to use violence and force and preparedness die (martyrdom?) -they appear to employ the discourse of dissent that was strikingly similar tothat of Old Believer communities and monasteries. Strel'sty troops fromOlonets and Novgorod, for example, had been used by the state to suppressmonasteries and Old Believer communities that refused to embraceNikonian reform following the schism of 1666. They had also suppressed'unruly frontier men who refused to live within the social and administrativeorder of Muscovy' throughout the second half of the seventeenth century.94

On receipt of the news Peter hurriedly left Vienna for Moscow, slowinghis journey at Krakow after reading reports that the uprising had beencrushed, and reached the capital on 25 August 1698.95 The speed of Peter'sreturn took contemporaries by surprise, including Gordon who was visitinghis estate 30 miles from Moscow at 'Krasna Slobod'. He received news ofPeter's arrival on 2 September from a letter written by Lt. Colonel Leviston:'with notice that his M.[ajesty] was arrived the same day in Mosko and hadbeen in my house asking of me, whereof I caused hast with my preparationsto be gone the next day'.96

Gordon was the prime mover in suppressing the strel'tsy revolt and hadpersonally overseen the first phase of inquisition at the New Jerusalemmonastery. He possessed the fullest account of the strel'tsy uprising, andreturned to Moscow on 8 September, when: 'his M.[ajesty] sent for me &received me very graciously, he being in Colonell von Kraune his househere I stayed about 3 hours & came home at eleven aclock'.97

Had Gordon been in Moscow he may have been able to supply Peterwith an immediate and full account of the uprising that Peter demanded, his:'first anxiety, after his arrival, was about the rebellion. In what itD

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constituted? What the insurgents meant? Who had dared instigate such acrime? And as nobody could answer accurately upon all these points, andsome pleaded their ignorance, others the obstinacy of the Strelitz, he beganto have suspicions of everybody's loyalty, and began to cogitate about afresh inquisition.'98

It is not difficult to understand why Peter personally took command ofinvestigating the remaining strel'tsy mutineers. Once the strel'tsy hadentered Moscow, their traditional power base, it appears almost certain thatthey would have attempted to reassert the primacy of their political andmilitary role within Muscovy. In effect, any restoration of their 'regulationof service' could not have been effected unless Peter was eliminated frompower. If we take the restricted objectives of regulation of service at facevalue - an insistence upon their traditional custom of payment in moneyrather than in kind, campaigning one year in two and residing in winterquarters in Moscow with their families and small businesses - what was thelikelihood that Peter would have condoned this restitution on his return toMoscow? It may rather have been imagined that upon Peter's return toMoscow, the corrosive effects of even the limited Petrine perestroika of the1690s would multiply and eventually overwhelm what in Peter's eyesincreasingly came to represent reactionary and conservative traditionalists.

Moreover, even if we give some credence to the ostensible rationale ofrevolt, once the strel'tsy were within the city walls, any attempt to enactthese limited concessions would have entailed the murder of opposition -the powerful Naryshkin clan, other pro-Petrine boyars and foreigners.Under such conditions, Sophia and her Miloslavsky clan, who had beenmarginalized following the loss of the regency in 1689, would have becomethe symbolic, if not actual, centre of this power struggle. The strel'tsy werein effect instigating a coup d'etat beneath the cloak of conservatism andrestoration.

Forcible 'regulation of service', with Peter abroad, would havenecessitated a struggle for succession, and, in the absence of the law ofprimogeniture, strel'tsy action could be legitimized by the restoration ofSophia as regent. As Alexander Gordon commented, the strel'tsy 'giving outeverywhere that the Czar was dead and abroad and for that reason, itbehoved them to march to the capital, to choose a Regent to manage mattersduring the young Czar Alexis Petrowich's minority'.99

Indeed, Alexander Gordon indicated that even the ever-guarded PatrickGordon himself believed that 'the Strelitz must have encouragement fromhigher hands or they durst never have undertaken so bold an enterprize withso small number'.100

On 15 September Peter ordered Gordon's Butirskii regiment to bring thecaptured prisoners to Moscow from the various monastery prisons in whichD

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they had been taken.101 By 17 September, the name-day of Peter's half-sisterSophia, the second phase of the inquisition began in earnest: 'many streltseesbrought & pined his M.fajesty] intending a more severe inquisition as weehad done'.102 On 19 September another 'strict inquisition made among thestreltsees' was initiated under Peter's supervision,103 and on 20 September:'many were examined & pined, and some to be given notice to preparethemselves for death'.104 By 22 September Gordon reveals the relentless paceof the investigation and Peter's central role: 'many streltsees brought toexamination & the pine, his M.[ajesty] came to me in the evening and toldme many things concerning the examinations of the stretsees, stayed abouthalfe ane houre drunk one glass of sack and being called for departed'.105

Peter was particularly interested in establishing a direct and unambiguouslink between Sophia and the instigation of the strel'tsy revolt. Gordonindirectly confirms this, for on 23 September: 'In the afternoon was toPreobrasinsko in vaine, all being busy above [i.e. in the Kremlin] abouttakeing out some of the attendants on the Princess Sophia & putting the Queenin the [Novodevichy] Monastery.'106 The next day Gordon was: 'InPreobrasinsko see the maid Anna Alex, pined.'107

The routine of interrogation and execution continued - on 30 SeptemberGordon notes 'In Preobrasinsko many streltsees executed."08 '[S]trictexaminating' again took place on 7 October.109 On 12 October, '110 personsexecuted by diverse hands.'110 On 19 October: 'many executed. The greatAmbassade at Audience by his M. Majesty, my Regiment [Butirskii] releavedby the guards in the town.""

Conclusions

Simon Dixon has argued that Peter's 'commitment to innovation auto-matically branded those who resisted change as subversives' and in 1698 thatthe strel'tsy 'were motivated not so much by ideology as by resentment of theirconditions of service. But their lasting commitment to the Old Belief helpedto identify the schism with resistance and subversion in the tsar's mind."12

However, there was only one possible condition under which the strel'tsydemands could have been met - the removal of Peter I from power. Regimechange could not have been instituted successfully without ideologicalsupport and legitimacy. According to the prevailing discourse, if Peter werethe Anti-Christ, supported by the Sinful West, hellish mercenaries andheretical foreigners, then by implication opposition to the Petrine order waswith Christ in Holy Russia, protected by a heaven-sent strel'tsy and nourishedby the loyalty of a true boyar elite.113

In effect, for this revolt to succeed, it would have had to fuse togetherthe most conservative elements of the traditional Muscovite elite into a newD

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triangle of power. Conservative Boyar clans, Russian orthodox factions thatopposed Petrine attitudes and the strel'tsy would create a new power elite,each part dependent on the other. The uprising reveals the way in which thetraditional Muscovite political elite understood the reality of systemictransformation."4

It was experienced through the reinvention of past practices andbehaviour and opposition to efforts to break from the increasingly scleroticand self-enclosed 'thought world' of Muscovite traditionalism. Previousuncoordinated and ineffective opposition to nascent Petrine modernizationwould have consolidated into a new conservative regime. The strel'tsywould have been the instrument of conservative restoration, a clan leaderwithin the boyar elite (most probably Sophia) would have had to agree to beregent to Aleksei Petrovich, and Patriarch Adrian could legitimize the neworder with the blessing of Russian Orthodoxy. The year 1698 highlights aparadox at the heart of the 'orthodox' concept of Muscovite modernization.In an effort to preserve Muscovite conservatism — embodied not only by theregulation of strel'tsy service, but also more characteristically by service tothe tsar - this newly created troika would have had to negate traditionalnotions of kingship and the rightful role of a tsar within the state. The veryact of preservation would have undermined Muscovite traditionalism.

As it was, the method in which the uprising was suppressed provides afirst glimpse of what was to constitute the hallmarks of a developing Petrinemodernisation paradigm. It was to be imposed from above, applied withforce, implemented at speed and suffered largely in silence. A key paradoxat the heart of Petrine modernization emerges - Peter adopted theimprimatur of Muscovite traditionalism - the widespread use of terror andcoercion - in order to more effectively reform and transform a relativelyperipheral Muscovite principality into a Great European Power.

NOTES

1. Viktor I. Buganov, Vosstanie moskovskikh streltsov. 1698 god (Moscow: Nauka 1980)provides primary sources on the strel'tsy uprisings and is particularly useful for analyzingstrel'tsy petitions. See also: Mikhail M. Bogoslovskii, Petr I: Materialy dlia biografii, 5vols. (Moscow: Gos. sotsial'no-ekon. izd-vo, 1940-48), Vols. 2-4. The strel'tsy (literally'shooters' or 'musketeers') were the first regular units in the Muscovite Army, created inthe 1540s and 1550s by Ivan IV as the only elite armed corps to be based in Moscow(moskovskie streltsy) and provincial cities (gorodovye streltsy). He intended that theywould place loyalty to the Tsar above involvement in the feuding power struggles and clanpolitics of leading boyar groups. By the middle of the seventeenth century service hadbecome for life and hereditary. This enclosed elite military caste resided with their familiesin their own settlement (slabody) within Moscow with their well defined privileges,obligations and duties.

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2. Matthew S. Anderson, Peter the Great (London: Thomas and Hudson 1978) p.45,describes the June mutineers as 'disorganized and leaderless'. M. Raeff, Imperial Russia,1682-1825 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1971) p.5: 'Peter's regiments, commanded byGordon, went to give battle, and his artillery easily routed them near the Voskresenskymonastery 18/28 June 1698', while Pavel N. Miliukov, History of Peter the Great, Vol. 1,From the Beginnings to the Empire of Peter the Great (NY: Funk & Wagnalls 1968) p.229,contradicts this: 'the revolt was effectively and ruthlessly put down by Prince F. Iu.Romadanovsky, the tsar's Lieutenant in Moscow'.

3. Evgenii V. Anisimov, The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress through Coercion, trans.John T. Alexander (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1993) p.60; Alexander B. Kamenskii, TheRussian Empire in the Eighteenth Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1997) p.57; LindseyHughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Haven, CT and London: Yale UP 1998)p.454: 'Government troops suppressed the revolt.'

4. Lindsey Hughes, Sophia, Regent of Russia, 1657-1704 (New Haven, CT, and London, YaleUP 1990).

5. The unpublished diaries of Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries are housed in RossiiskiiGosudarstvennyi Voennyo-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA), Moscow, f. 846, op. 15, ed. khr.Vols. 1-6. The diaries have never been published in their entirety. An abridged threevolume German translation was published in 1849, though with many errors. See: M.A.Obolensky and C. Posselt (ed. and trans.), Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon,während seiner Kriegsdienste unter den Schweden und Polen vom Jahre 1655 bis 1661,und seines Aufenthaltes in Russland vom Jahre bis 1661 1699 (3 vols., Moscow-Leipzig1849). A one volume English version appeared 10 years later, but this mainly concentratedon the years Gordon visited Britain as Russian envoy while still in Russian service(1666-67 and 1686-87. See Joseph Robertson (ed.) Passages from the Diary of GeneralPatrick Gordon of Auchleuchries, A.D. 1635-A.D. 1699 (Aberdeen: Spalding Club, 1859).

6. Alexander Gordon, The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia, To which is prefixeda Short General History of the Country, from the Rise of that Monarchy: and its author'slife, 2 vols. (Aberdeen: F. Douglas and W. Murray 1755). Vol. 1 contains Books I-VIII,Vol. 2 Books IX-XVI. This understudied source has been translated and reprinted inGerman in Leipzig, by J.F. Jomius in 1765. For a recent analysis of the Scottish influencesin the reign of Peter the Great, see: Dmitrii Fedosov, 'Peter the Great: The ScottishDimension',' in Lindsey Hughes (ed.) Peter the Great and the West: New Perspectives(London: Macmillan 2000) pp.89-101.

7. Johann Georg Korb, The Diary of an Austrian Secretary of Legation at the Court of Peterthe Great, 2 vols., trans. Count Macdonnell [1863] (London: Frank Cass 1968).

8. Graeme P. Herd, 'Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries (1635-1699): A Scot in SeventeenthCentury Russian Service' (unpublished PhD Dissertation, Univ. of Aberdeen 1995).

9. For further discussion on western and Turkish influences on Petrine modernization andreform, see: Andrei Medushevskii, 'Administrative Reforms in the Russian Empire:Western Models and Russian Implementation', in Hughes, Peter the Great and the West(note 6) pp.36-50.

10. 'His Majesty appointed an army of 12,000 soldiers, of which most of the officers wereforeigners, to be quartered in the suburbs of Moscow, to keep the city in awe, commandedby General Gordon, who had entered in the Russian service in the time of his father, andwho, by his extraordinary behavior and success, had acquired both the love of the army andthe esteem of the whole nation.' Captain John Perry's Stale of Russia under the PresentCzar (London: B. Tooke 1716) p.156.

11. Gordon, Diary, 24 May 1697 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 110. The Belgorod, Sevskand Tambov razriads or military districts defended Russia from Tartar incursions intosouthern Muscovy.

12. See B.H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, Hamden: Anchon1965) p.22

13. Gordon, Diary, 24 May 1697 -RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 110. Prince Aleksei PetrovichProzorovskii was created boyar on 10 July 1690 and died 1705. Robert O. Crummey,Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613-1689 (Princeton UP 1983) p.211.D

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14. Gordon, Diary, 24 May 1697 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 110. Peter replied promptly:'his M. letters of grace to us for our making hast to Azov.' Gordon, ibid., 110ob.

15. Gordon, Diary, 20 Sept. 1697 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 146ob.16. Gordon, Diary, 9 Sept. 1697 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 138.17. Gordon, Diary, 1 April 1698-RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 187ob.18. The regiment of Col. Chubanov and Col. Hundermark had served under Gordon at the

siege of Azov (see footnote above). All regiments in the Russian army were named aftertheir colonels until the creation of Peter's four elite guards' regiments.

19. Gordon, Diary, 3 April 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 185ob. Prince IvanBorisovich Troekurov was 'their Boyar'; he headed the streletskii prikaz.

20. Gordon, Diary, 3 April 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 185ob. In analyzing why theyfailed Gordon noted 'the weakness of that party, and the want of a head'.

21. Gordon, Diary, 4 April 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 187ob.22. Ibid.23. Gordon, Diary, 5 April 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 187ob24. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.121. Buganov reports that on this occasion the strel'tsy

secretly established communication with Sophia, who wrote them two letters of support.25. Viktor I. Buganov, 'Strel'tsy Uprising of 1698', in The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian

and Soviet History, (ed.) Joseph L. Wieczynski, 60 vols. (Academic International Press1984) Vol.7, p.210, notes that the strel'tsy had to draw their own guns to Velikie Lukie dueto a shortage of horses.

26. M.M. Bogoslavsky, Pisma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo, 9 vols. (St Petersburg:Gos. tip., 1887-) Vol. 1, pp.724-7; Buganov, Vosstanie (note 1) p.376.

27. Gordon, Diary, 8 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196.28. Korb, Diary of an Austrian Secretary (note 7) Vol. 1, 121. See also: Gordon, Diary, 11 June

1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6,196ob.: 'news of the 4 Regiments of Strelets whichhad been in the Campe at Veliky-Luky and now at Toropets upon the dismission of the restof the army and orders for them to go to diverse Townes were discontent and causing toMutiny'.

29. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol. 3, p.122.30. Gordon, Diary, 11 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob.31. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.70.32. Gordon, Diary, 11 June 1698 -RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob. Romodanovskii wrote

a report of these events to Peter on 11 June 1698, which Peter received in Vienna 15 July:'Pismo Kniazia romodanovskago k Petru I, 11 iiunia 1698,' Nikolai Ustrialov, Istoriiatsarstvovaniia Petra Velikago, 9 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. II-go otd-niia Sobstv. Ego Imp.Vel., 1853-63), Vol. 3, pp.474-6.

33. Korb, Diary (note 7), Vol.2, pp.71-2. Shein was created a Boyar 9 April 1682 and died 12Feb. 1700.

34. Gordon, Diary, 11 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob.35. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.72.36. Ibid. Vol.1, pl25-26. See also: Gordon, Diary, 12 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol.

6, 196ob.: 'I dined by the Polls Envoy with the other Envoyes and ffriends.'37. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.123.38. Ibid. The negligible contribution of the old middle class service cavalry to the eventual

suppression of the revolt perhaps serves to underscore its growing obsolescence.39. Gordon, Diary, 15 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 197. Gordon, History (note

6) Vol. 3, 123 and J.L. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874(Oxford: OUP 1985) pp.99-100 both give the impression that 4,000 and 8,000 gentrycavalry respectively were mobilized by Shein in support of Gordon"s troops against thestrel'tsy uprising. It is clear from Gordon's own account that Shein and other leading boyarshad returned to Moscow by 15 June and the gentry cavalry failed to materialise.

40. Gordon, Diary, 15 and 16 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 197. Keep, Soldiersof the Tsar (note 39) pp.99-100, mistakenly asserts: 'General A. S. Shein, who was incharge of military affairs in Peter's absence, put together a force of 8,000 men, most ofthem gentry cavalry.'D

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41. Crummey, Aristocrats and Servitors (note 13) p.114, Table 1: 'Ten Wealthiest IndividualLay Landowners in Russia.'

42. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.125.43. Ibid. p.123. Two regiments of the conscripted elite 'selected' infantry (vybrannye) were

permanently stationed in Moscow and kept at full strength. In the 1660s and 1670s theseconsisted of 2,000 men each (half pikemen, half musketeers), reduced to 1,000 perregiment in the 1690s. It appears that at least one of these regiments was left in Moscow tomaintain order.

44. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, pp.125-6 reports such incidents, dated 16, 17, 18, 19 and 24June.

45. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.1, p.126.46. Ibid. Vol.2, p.72.47. 'Gordon to Peter, 29 June 1698' (old style) - Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh

aktov, Moscow (RGADA), f. 9, op. 5, no. 1, 411. To my knowledge this and other letters Icite from RGADA are unpublished. For published correspondence between Peter, Gordonand leading boyars, see: Bogoslavsky, Pisma i bumagi (note 26) Vol.1, pp.33-4, 505, 614,725, and 777.

48. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.123. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.77: 'the perfectlydetermined wickedness of the Strelitz'.

49. Gordon, Diary, 15 and 16 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 197.50. Ibid. 197ob.51. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, pp.73-4.52. Ibid. p.74.53. Gordon, Diary, 17 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 197ob54. Ibid. 198. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.75: 'Schachin constenting.'55. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.126.56. Gordon, Diary, 19 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 198. See also: Buganov,

Vosstanie (note 1) pp.40-1.57. Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698 -RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 198ob.58. 'After blaming somewhat the disobedience of the regiments, he discoursed largely of the

Czars clemency, telling them, that it was not by sedition and mobbing together, that thedesires of the soldiers should be made known to the Czar.' Korb, Journey into Muscovy(note 7) Vol.2, p.75.

59. Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 198ob.60. Gordon, Diary, 19 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 198. Korb relates that Gordon

was stung by the 'unexpected fierceness' of 'men that were predetermined to try thestrength of their arms'. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.77.

61. Ibid.62. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.126. This account is reinforced by that of Korb: 'But

Gordon's speech did not move the now hardened stubbornness of the false traitors; and theyonly saucily answered that they would not go back to their appointed quarters until theyhad been allowed to kiss their darling wives at Moscow and had received their arrears ofpay.' Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.76.

63. Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 198ob.64. Ibid.65. Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 199.66. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.2, p.77.67. Ibid., Vol.3, p.127.68. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, 78.69. Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 199. It is most likely that each

company had its own colours and so five or six companies of strel'tsy attacked LeFort'sregiment and four companies of Gordon's regiment, the Butirskii.

70. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.78.71. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.128.72. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p.76.73. Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 199.Dow

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74. Gordon, Diary, 19 June 1698 -RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 199ob.75. Gordon, Diary, 22 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 200.76. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.1, 82-83; Buganov, Vosstanie, pp. (note 1) pp.151-2.77. These 'messages' must have constituted the basis for Korb's account of the first phase of

the inquisition. See: Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, pp.81-2.78. Gordon, Diary, 24 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 200. Andrei Andreevich

Vinius had entered the Boyar Duma with the rank of dumnyi d'iak 24 March 1695.Crummey, using formal criteria and informal consensus, notes that Vinius, LeFort andGordon were three foreigners among the 49 that constituted the Petrine boyar elite of the1690s. See: Crummey, 'Peter and the Boiar Aristocracy, 1689-1700', Canadian-AmericanSlavic Studies 8 (1974) p.279, fn.13. Gordon directly refers to one fifth of this inner circlein the course of the uprising.

79. Gordon, Diary, 25 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 200.80. Gordon, Diary, 27 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 200ob.81. Gordon, Diary, 28 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 200ob.82. Gordon, Diary, 30 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 200ob..83. Gordon, Diary, 1 July 1698-RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 201.84. Ibid. 201ob.85. Ibid. 201.86. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar (note 39) 98, states correctly that the strel'tsy mutineers were

'some 2,200 strong'.87. Gordon, Diary, 2 July 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 201. However, in contradiction,

Bogoslovskii, Petr I (note 1) Vol.3, p.118 and Buganov, Vosstanie (note 1) p.404, reportthat between 18 June and 4 July 799 men were executed and 193 sentenced to lesserpenalties. Prince Fedor Ivanovich Shakhoyskoi was appointed okol'nichii 25 Sept. 1682.

88. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.128.89. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, p84.90. "General Patrick Gordon to Francis Lefort, Voscresenie, 30 June 1698' - RGADA, f. 11,

op. 2, no. 18, 1-1ob. Gordon, Diary, 30 June 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 200ob.91. Vinius, for example, wrote letters to Lefort on 8 July (RGADA, f. 11, op. 2, no. 1) and 16

(RGADA, f. 11, op. 2, no. 2) and 5 Aug. (RGADA, f. 11, op. 2, no. 4) and 12 (RGADA, f.11, op. 2, no. 4), while Admiral Lima wrote to Lefort on 6 July (RGADA, f. 11, op. 2, no.53).

92. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, 77. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.127: 'They turned off alltheir officers, and created new ones from among themselves.' Anderson, Peter the Great(note 2) p.45, erroneously dismisses the strel'tsy as 'disorganized and leaderless'.

93. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.127.94. Georg Michels, 'The Violent Old Belief: an Examination of Religious Dissent on the

Karelian Frontier', Russian History, 19, Mos. 1-4 (1992), p.229 (pp.203-29). See also:Georg Michels, 'The Solovki Uprising: Religion and Revolt in Northern Russia', TheRussian Review 51 (Jan. 1992) pp.1-15. The extent to which Old Belief and banditryspread from the dissenting monasteries and unstable frontier into the strel'tsy corps is asubject of further study.

95. Weekly reports of The London Gazette plotted the route of Peter's European tour, see: TheLondon Gazette, issue nos.: 3046; 3407; 3412; 3417 and, 3418 ('parted this place [Vienna]the 30th [July] on his return to Muscovy').

96. Gordon, Diary, 2 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 207ob; Korb, Diary (note 7)Vol.1, p.154.

97. Gordon, Diary, 8 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 208ob.; Korb, Diary (note 28)Vol.1, p.171: 'He bowed to earth twice, and was begging pardon for being so late to payhis Court, imputing the delay to the broken weather and storms. His Majesty the Czarraised him up, and when he would have embraced his knees, stretched him his handinstead.'

98. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.2, 86. Bogoslovskii, Petr I (note 1) Vol.3, pp.5-126 provides adetailed account of Peter's role in the inquisition.

99. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.122. See also: Nina B. Golikova, Politicheskie protessy

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pri Petre I (Moscow: MGU 1957) pp.131-2, 160-1, 101-2, as cited by Lindsey Hughes,'Attitudes towards Foreigners in Early Modern Russia,' Russia and the Wider World inHistorical Perspective', pp.10-11 (footnotes 52, 54, 65, 58 and 60).

100. Gordon, History (note 6) Vol.3, p.125.101. Korb, Diary (note 7) Vol.1, p.176.102. Gordon, Diary, 17 Sept.1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 209ob.103. Gordon, Diary, 19 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 209ob.; Korb, Diary (note

7) Vol.1, p.176: 'September 29. - The Czar himself examined a certain (?) pope, anaccomplice in the revolt, who, though menaced with the rack, has so far confessednothing.'

104. Gordon, Diary, 20 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 209ob.105. Gordon, Diary, 22 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 209ob.106. Gordon, Diary, 23 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 210.107. Gordon, Diary, 24 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 210. See, Gordon, History

(note 6) Vol.3, pp.129-30 for an account of a strelets's confession of correspondence'betwixt Princess Sophia and his master, by means of an old woman, who lived by thecharity of the cloisters'.

108. Gordon, Diary, 30 Sept. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 210ob.; Korb, Diary (note7) Vol.1, pp. 182-3.

109. Gordon, Diary, 7 Oct. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 211ob.; Korb, Diary (note 7)Vol.1, p.187.

110. Gordon, Diary, 20 Oct. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 212ob.111. Gordon, Diary, 7 Oct. 1698 - RGVIA, f. 846, op. 15, Vol.6, 211ob.112. Simon Dixon, The Modernization of Russia 1676-1825 (Cambridge: CUP 1999), Chapter

1, 'Modernization theory and Russian history', pp.1-13. Equally, it could be argued that thestrel'tsy's commitment to 'restoration' rather than reform automatically branded those thatchallenged the status quo as revolutionary.

113. For further discussion, see: Ju. M. Lotman and B.A. Uspenskij, 'The Role of Dual Modesin the Dynamics of Russian Culture (Up to the End of the Eighteenth Century)', in A.Shuckman (ed.) Semiotics of Russian Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: U. of Michigan Press 1984)pp.3-35

114. Alexander Kamenskii, 'The Systemic Crisis in Seventeenth Century Russia and the PetrineReforms', in A. Cross (ed.), Russia in the Reign of Peter the Great: Old and NewPerspectives (Cambridge: Study Group on Eighteenth Century Russia Newsletter 1998)pp.1-11.

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modernizing the muscovite military: the systemic shock of 1698

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