Ronald Watts is Professor Emeritus ofPolitical Studies and Fellow of the Insti-tute of Intergovernmental Relations, ofwhich he was Director during 1988–93,at Queen’s University, Canada. Email:rlwKqsilver.queensu.ca. He was Presi-dent of the International Association ofCentres for Federal Studies during 1991–98, and is currently a Board member ofthe Forum of Federations. His mostrecent book isComparing Federal Sys-tems(Second edition, 1999).

Models of federal power sharing

Ronald Watts

Introduction: the challenge ofmanaging diversity

Modern developments in transportation, socialcommunications, technology, and industrialorganisation have produced pressures at one andthe same time for larger political organisationsand for smaller ones. The pressure for largerpolitical units has been generated by the goalsshared by most societies today: a desire forprogress, a rising standardof living, social justice, andinfluence in the world arena,and by a growing awarenessof worldwide interdepen-dence in an era whoseadvanced technology makesboth mass destruction andmass construction possible.The pressure for smaller,self-governing politicalunits has risen from thedesire to make governmentsmore responsive to the indi-vidual citizen and to giveexpression to primary groupattachments – linguistic and cultural ties,religious connections, historical traditions, andsocial practices – which provide the distinctivebasis for a community’s sense of identity andyearning for self-determination. Given theseconcurrent dual pressures throughout the world,it is not surprising that more and more peopleshave come to see some form of federal politicalsystem, combining a shared government for cer-tain specified common purposes and auton-omous action by governments of constituent

ISSJ 167/2001 UNESCO 2001. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

units for purposes related to maintaining theirregional distinctiveness, as allowing the closestinstitutional approximation to the multinationalreality of the contemporary world. In such acontext, the objective of a federal political sys-tem is not to eliminate diversity but rather toaccommodate, reconcile, and manage socialdiversities within an overarching polity.

The need for such a reconciliation wasaccentuated at the end of the twentieth century

by the increasingly globaleconomy, which has un-leashed economic and polit-ical forces strengtheningboth supranational and localpressures at the expense ofthe traditional nation-state.Global communicationshave awakened desires inthe smallest and mostremote villages around theworld for access to the glo-bal marketplace of goodsand services. As a result,governments have beenfaced increasingly with the

desires of their people to be global consumersand local citizens at the same time. Tom Cour-chene has called this trend “glocalization”(Courchene 1995). Thus, the nation-state is pro-ving both too small and too large to serveall the desires of its citizens. Because of thedevelopment of the world market economy,self-sufficiency of the nation-state is widelyrecognised as unattainable and nominal sover-eignty is less appealing if it means that, inreality, people have less control over decisions

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that crucially affect them. At the same time,nation-states have become too remote from indi-vidual citizens to provide a sense of directdemocratic control and respond clearly to thespecific concerns and preferences of their citi-zens. In such a context, federalism with itsdifferent levels of government provides a wayof mediating the variety of global and localcitizen preferences.

The expanding number of journals and aca-demic organisations focusing on the study offederalism illustrates the increased contempor-ary interest (Watts 1998). Where 25 years agothere was in the world only one journal andtwo centres for research on federalism, thereare now several journals, and the InternationalAssociation of Centres for Federal Studies(IACFS) meeting annually now encompasses 23centres and institutes in 15 countries on fivecontinents. In addition the International PoliticalScience Association has for more than a decadehad a Research Committee on Comparative Fed-eralism and Federation. Among the areas whichhave been considered by these academicenterprises have been the kinds and degrees ofdiversity within federal societies, the differencesbetween territorial and non-territorial diversity,the differing impact of cross-cutting and ofcumulatively reinforcing social cleavages, theimpact of ethnic nationalism, the particularcharacteristics of bipolar societies, the trend toasymmetrical arrangements within federations,the increasing number of confederal associ-ations, federal financial arrangements, and therole of political parties in federal systems.

Major federal institutionalmodels

For the sake of clarity we may distinguish threeterms: “federalism”, “federal political systems”,and “federations” (Watts 1998).

“Federalism” is not a descriptive term buta normativeone and refers to the advocacy ofmulti-tiered government combining elements ofshared-rule and regional self-rule. It is based onthe presumed value of achieving both unity anddiversity by accommodating, preserving andpromoting distinct identities within a largerpolitical union (King 1982).

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“Federal political systems” is adescriptiveterm applying to a broad category of politicalsystems in which, by contrast to the singlesource of central authority in unitary systems,there are two (or more) levels of government,combining elements of shared-rule throughcommon institutions with regional self-rulethrough the constituent units (Elazar 1987). Thisbroad category encompasses a whole spectrumof more specific non-unitary forms including“federations” and “confederations”.

Within the spectrum of federal politicalsystems we may identify the following modelsinvolving elements of federal power-sharing(examples are listed in Table 1) (Elazar 1994;Watts 1999a).

Unions

These are polities compounded in such a waythat the constituent units preserve their integrityprimarily or exclusively through the commonorgans of the general government rather thanthrough dual government structures. Belgiumprior to becoming a federation in 1993 was anexample (with central legislators serving a dualmandate as regional or community councillors),and Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdomprior to devolution were another. Such systemsrecognise diversity but provide no opportunityfor autonomous regional self-government.

Constitutionally decentralisedunions

These are basically unitary in form in the sensethat ultimate constitutional authority rests withthe central government, but such unions provideconstitutionally protected subunits of govern-ment with some functional autonomy. Such sys-tems provide for a measure of regional or localself-government, but they are ultimately vulner-able to the overriding constitutional authority ofthe central government.

Federations

These are compound polities, combining strongconstituent units of government and a stronggeneral government, each possessing powersdelegated to it by the people through a consti-tution, each empowered to deal directly with

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Table 1. Examples of varieties of federal arrangements

Decentralised Associatedunion Federation Confederation Federacy statehood Condominium League

Antigua–Barbuda Argentina Benelux Economic Denmark–Faroes France–Monaco Andorra–France Arab LeagueCameroon Australia Union Finland–Aaland India–Bhutan and Spain Association of SouthChina Austria Caribbean India–Kashmir Italy–San Marino (1278–1993) East Asian NationsColombia Belgium Community Portugal–Azores Netherlands–Netherlands (ASEAN)Italy Brazil (CARICOM) Portugal–Madeira Antilles Baltic AssemblyJapan Canada Commonwealth of UK–Guernsey New Zealand–Cook Commonwealth ofNetherlands Comoros Independent States UK–Jersey Islands NationsPapua/New Guinea Ethiopia European Union UK–Isle of Man New Zealand–Niue North Atlantic TreatySolomon Islands Germany US–Northern Marianas Islands Organization (NATO)Sudan India US–Puerto Rico Switzerland–Liechtenstein Nordic CouncilTanzania Malaysia South Asian AssociationUkraine Mexico for RegionalUnited Kingdom Micronesia Cooperation (SAARC)Vanuatu Nigeria

PakistanRussiaSouth Africaa

Spaina

St. Kitts–NevisSwitzerlandUnited ArabEmiratesUnited StatesVenezuelaYugoslavia

aSouth Africa and Spain, while predominantly federations in form and practice, have not adopted the label “federation” in their constitutions.

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O2001.

26 Ronald Watts

US President Bill Clinton addressing the people of the Navajo Nation in Shiprock, New Mexico, on 17 April 2000,as part of his effort to bring computer technology and the internet to disadvantaged communities.Stephen Jaffe / AFP

the citizens in the exercise of its legislative,administrative, and taxing powers, and eachdirectly elected and accountable to its citizens.Currently there are some 24 countries that meetthese basic criteria, although in the cases ofSouth Africa and Spain their constitutions havenot adopted the label of “federation”. Feder-ations enable both strong general and strongregional governments, each directly responsibleto their citizens, but this is achieved at the priceof some tendencies to complexity and legalism.

Confederations

These occur where polities are joined togetherto form a common government for certain lim-ited purposes such as a defence or economicpolicy, but the common government is depen-dent upon the constituent governments. In con-federations the common government has onlyan indirect electoral or fiscal base since themember governments act as intermediaries

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between the common government and the citi-zens. Such a system, by requiring the assentof member governments for all major commonpolicies, reinforces their autonomy by compari-son with constituent units in federations, butthis means that the common government is ina weaker position to deal decisively with con-tentious subjects or to redistribute resources.Historical examples have been Switzerland formost of the period 1291–1847 and the UnitedStates 1776–89, both superseded by federations.The European Union is primarily a confeder-ation although it has increasingly incorporatedsome features of a federation.

Federacies

These occur where a large unit is linked to asmaller unit or units, but the smaller unit retainssubstantial autonomy and has a minimum rolein the government of the larger one, and wherethe relationship can be dissolved only by mutual

27Models of federal power sharing

agreement. An example is the relationship ofPuerto Rico to the United States. Such arrange-ments ensure a high level of autonomy for thesmaller unit, but at the expense of having littlesignificant influence on the policies of thelarger unit.

Associated states

These relationships are similar to federacies, butcan be dissolved by either of the units actingalone on prearranged terms. Consequently, thestability of these arrangements is less secure.

Condominiums

These are relationships in which a political unitfunctions under the joint rule of two or moreexternal states in such a way that the inhabitantshave substantial internal self-rule. An examplewas Andorra under the joint rule of France andSpain during 1278–1993.

Leagues

These are linkages of politically independentpolities for specific purposes that functionthrough a common secretariat rather than agovernment and from which members may uni-laterally withdraw. NATO is an example.

Joint functional authorities

These are agencies established by two or morepolities for joint implementation of a particulartask or tasks. The North Atlantic FisheriesOrganization (NAFO), the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA), and the InternationalLabour Organization (ILO) are three of manyexamples. Such joint functional authorities mayalso take the form of transborder organisationsestablished by adjoining subnational govern-ments. An example of this is the interstategrouping for economic development involvingfour regions in Italy, four Austrian La¨nder, twoYugoslav republics and one West German Landestablished in 1978. Another example is theinterstate Regio Basiliensis involving Swiss,German, and French cooperation in the Baselarea.

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Hybrids

Some political systems combine characteristicsof different models. The term “quasi-feder-ations” has sometimes been used for those sys-tems which are predominantly federations intheir constitutional structure and operation, buthave some overriding federal government pow-ers that are more typical of a unitary system.Examples include Canada, which initially in1867 was basically a federation, but includedsome overriding federal powers, which in thesecond half of the twentieth century have falleninto disuse. India, Pakistan, and Malaysia arepredominantly federations but their constitutionsinclude some overriding central emergencypowers. More recently, the South African con-stitution of 1996 has most of the characteristicsof a federation, but retains some unitary fea-tures. Another form of hybrid is one combiningthe characteristics of a confederation and feder-ation. A prime example is the European Unionafter the Maastricht Treaty, which is basicallya confederation but has some features of a fed-eration. Germany since 1949 has been predomi-nantly a federation, but its federal secondchamber, the Bundesrat, represents a confederalelement. Hybrids occur because statesmen aremore interested in pragmatic political solutionsthan in theoretical purity.

The applicability of any of these modelswill depend upon the particular circumstancesof each case. Factors that need to be taken intoaccount include the nature and strength of themotives for common action and shared rule andthe intensity and distribution of the pressuresand motives in the constituent units for auton-omous policy making and self-rule.

Variations among federations

Within the range of models that we maydescribe as “federal political systems”, as notedabove, federations represent one particularmodel. Their defining characteristic is that in afederation neither the federal nor the constituentunits of government are constitutionally subor-dinate to the other. Each order of governmenthas sovereign powers defined by the constitutionrather than by another level of government, eachis empowered to deal directly with its citizens

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in the exercise of its legislative, executive, andtaxing powers, and each is directly elected byand accountable to its citizens.

The generally common structural character-istics of federations are the following:

• At least two orders of government actingdirectly on their citizens.

• A formal constitutional distribution of legis-lative and executive authority and allocationof revenue resources between the orders ofgovernment that ensures some areas of genu-ine autonomy for each order.

• Provision for the designated representationof distinct regional views within the federalpolicy-making institutions, usually includingthe representation of regional representativesin a federal second legislative chamber.

• A supreme constitution not unilaterallyamendable and requiring for amendment theconsent of a significant proportion of theconstituent units either through assent bytheir legislatures or by regional majoritiesin a referendum.

• An umpire, usually in the form of courts orby provision for referendums (as in Switzer-land regarding federal powers) to rule ondisputes over the constitutional powers ofgovernments.

• Processes and institutions to facilitateintergovernmental collaboration in thoseareas where governmental powers are sharedor inevitably overlap.

The extent to which federation is theappropriate model to accommodate and managediversity in a particular situation will dependon the extent to which the social diversity isamenable to the institutional features of feder-ations as described above.

The applicability of federation as a politicalsolution may also depend upon the particularform of federation that is adopted. Within thebasic framework of characteristics identifiedabove as common to federations, there is con-siderable scope for variation, as evidenced bydifferences among existing examples (Duchacek1987). These variations are considered in thenext section. It must be recognised that evenamong federations there is no single pure orideal model. There have been many variationsand the particular form that is appropriate

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depends on the nature and extent of the socialdiversity to be accommodated.

Issues in the design offederations that affect theiroperation

The number and character of theconstituent units

The number and relative area, population andwealth of the constituent units in relation toeach other within a federation, all have con-siderable effect on its operation. Where thenumber of units is relatively large, for instance89 in the Russian federation or 50 in the UnitedStates, the relative political power and leverageof individual constituent units is likely to bemuch less than in federations of six units (suchas Australia and Belgium) or of ten provinces(such as Canada). Furthermore, those composedof only two units (such as Pakistan andCzechoslovakia before each split) seem to gen-erate sharp bipolarising tendencies that oftenresult in instability (Watts 1999a: 113–5).Where there are substantial disparities in areaand population among constituent units, theymay generate dissension over the relative influ-ence of particular regions in federal policy-mak-ing. In some instances, most notably India andNigeria, regional boundaries have been alteredto reduce such disparities and to make theregional units coincide more closely withlinguistic and ethnic concentrations. Disparitiesin wealth among regional units, making it diffi-cult for citizens to receive comparable services,can have a corrosive effect on solidarity withina federation; this explains why so many feder-ations have found some form of financial equal-isation highly desirable.

When considering the character of constitu-ent units, two other points arise for consider-ation. Traditionally, federations as a form ofterritorial political organisation have seemed tobe most applicable where diversities are terri-torially concentrated so that distinct groups canexercise their autonomy through regional unitsof self-government. Power-sharing among dis-tinct non-territorial groups (i.e., distributed allacross the country rather than concentrated inregional areas) has more commonly been asso-

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ciated with a consociational form of politicalorganisation in which the different groups affectpolicy primarily through their representatives ina central government. However Belgium, whenit became a federation in 1993, provided aninteresting experiment in which three territorial“regions” and three non-territorial “communi-ties” constituted self-governing governmentalunits within the federation (since then, the coun-cils of the Flemish region and the Flemish Com-munity have been merged into a single “Flem-ish Council”).

Another noteworthy recent development isthe number of federations which have them-selves become constituent units within a widerfederal or confederal organisation, thus creatinga multi-tiered federal organisation. The mostprominent example is the European Union,which contains among its members four fully-fledged federations: Austria, Belgium, Germany,and Spain. This has had an impact within eachof these federations upon the relative roles oftheir federal and constituent governments. Yetanother trend contributing to the tendency formulti-tiered federal systems has been theincreasing attention being given to the impor-tance of local governments, including in somecases such as Germany and India, the consti-tutional recognition of their role.

The distribution of legislative andexecutive authority and of financialresources

A key characteristic of federations is the consti-tutional distribution of legislative and executivejurisdiction and of financial resources, but theform and scope of the distribution of powersmay vary enormously. In some cases, such asCanada and Belgium, the exclusive jurisdictionof each order of government has been consti-tutionally emphasised, while in others, such asthe United States, Australia, Germany, and theLatin American federations, substantial areashave been constitutionally assigned to concur-rent jurisdiction. In some federations such as theUnited States, Canada, and Australia, executiveresponsibility for a particular matter is generallyassigned to the same order of government thathas legislative responsibility over that matter.In many of the European federations, on theother hand, most notably Germany, Austria, and

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Switzerland, there is constitutional provision formuch federal legislation to be administered bythe states. Thus, for instance, Germany is interms of legislative jurisdiction much more cen-tralised than Canada, but in administrative termsmore decentralised.

There are also variations among federationsin the allocation of taxing powers and revenuesources. Furthermore, federations vary in theemployment of financial transfers to assist con-stituent units and in the degree to which theseare conditional or unconditional, thereby affect-ing the relative dependence of the constituentunits upon the federal government. They alsovary in their emphasis on equalisation transfersto reduce financial disparities among their con-stituent units.

Apart from these significant variations inthe form of the distribution of legislative andexecutive authority and resources, there hasbeen considerable variety among federations inthe actual scope of specific responsibilitiesassigned to each order of government. The neteffect has been wide differences among feder-ations in the degrees of centralisation or non-centralisation. It is worth noting, as a broadindicator of the range of relative centralisation,that in a representative group of federationsfederal government expenditures (after transfers)as a percentage of total federal-state-localgovernment expenditures ranged in 1996 as fol-lows: Malaysia 85.6; Austria 68.8; Spain 68.5;United States 61.2; India 54.8; Australia 53.0;Germany 41.2; Canada 40.6; Switzerland 36.7;European Union 2.5 (Watts 1999b: 53).

Symmetry or asymmetry in theallocation of powers to constituentunits

In most federations, the formal allocation ofjurisdiction to the constituent units has beensymmetrical. However, in some federationswhere the intensity of the pressure for auton-omous self-government has been much strongerin some constituent units than in others, asym-metrical constitutional arrangements or practiceshave been adopted (Agranoff 1999; DeVilliers1994). Examples include the Canadian, Indian,Malaysian, Belgian, Spanish, and Russian feder-ations and the European Union. Two types ofconstitutional asymmetry can be distinguished.

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One is provision for permanent asymmetryamong the full-fledged units within a federation.This has occurred in Canada, India, Malaysia,and Belgium. In other cases, such as Spain andthe European Union, asymmetrical arrangementshave been seen as transitional, with the intentionultimately to arrive at a more uniform auto-nomy, but at “varying speeds”. Analysis of thevarious examples of asymmetry within feder-ations suggests that asymmetrical arrangementsmay become complex and contentious, as exem-plified by the efforts in the last three decadeswithin Canada to increase the autonomy of Que-bec. But experience also suggests that there maybe cases where constitutional asymmetry is theonly way to resolve sharp differences whenmuch greater impulses for non-centralisationexist in some regions than in others within afederal system (Watts 1999a: 68).

The nature of the commonfederative institutions

While the constitutional establishment ofregional units with self-government is an essen-tial feature of federations in order to accommo-date diversity, the character of representationand power-sharing within the federal institutionsis also an important aspect in the ability offederations to manage and reconcile diversity.A crucial variable among federations has beenthe legislature-executive relationship within thecommon shared institutions. The different formsof this relationship – exemplified by the separ-ation of powers in the presidential-congressionalstructure in the United States and most of theLatin American federations, the fixed-term col-legial executive in Switzerland, the executive-legislative fusion with responsible parliamentarycabinets in Canada, Australia, Germany (withsome modifications), India, Malaysia, Belgium,and Spain, and the mixed presidential-parlia-mentary system in Russia – have shaped thecharacter of federal politics and administration,and the role of political parties in coalition-building and consensus generation within theshared institutions in these federations. Theyhave also affected the nature of intergovern-mental relations. Within parliamentary feder-ations, for example, the general tendency tocabinet dominance has usually given rise to“executive federalism” where most negotiations

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are carried out between the executives of thegovernments within the federation.

A key issue is what special provisions aremade for the proportionate representation of thediverse groups in the federal executive, legis-lature (particularly second chambers), publicservice, and agencies. With regard to federalsecond chambers, in some federations the con-stituent units are equally represented, whereasin others there is not strict equality but aweighting to favour smaller units (to correcttheir small representation in the popularlyelected house). In the United States, Switzer-land, and Australia, the members of the federalsecond chamber are elected directly; in otherssuch as India and Austria they are elected bythe state legislatures; in Germany the Bundesratconsists of delegates of the state governments;and in yet others, for example Belgium, Spain,and Malaysia, there is a mixed form of selec-tion. The relative powers of federal secondchambers also vary, tending to be less in theparliamentary federations where the cabinets areresponsible to the popularly elected chamber.

In comparing federations to confederations,it is worth noting that in the former, where thefederal legislature and government are directlyelected by and accountable to the electorate, ithas been less difficult for federal governmentsto generate the support of the citizenry. In con-federations, such as the European Union, on theother hand, the intergovernmental character ofthe common institutions and their indirectrelationship with the electorate have led tocharges of a “democratic deficit”. Indeed, thepressures within the European Union to reducethe democratic deficit by enhancing the role ofthe European Parliament and by increasing theextent of majority voting within the Council,point towards making the Union less confederaland more like a federation in character. Thisexperience raises the question whether, giventhe contemporary predominance of democraticideals, confederal systems are likely to be tran-sitional rather than permanent systems.

The role of courts

With the exception of Switzerland, where thelegislative referendum plays a major adjudicat-ing role in defining the limits of federal jurisdic-tion, most federations and also the European

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Union rely on courts to play the primary adjudi-cating role in interpreting the constitution andadapting the constitution to changing circum-stances. But here too there are variations. Insome federations – the prime model being theUnited States, but Canada, Australia, India, andMalaysia and some of the Latin American feder-ations also serving as examples – a SupremeCourt is the final adjudicator for all laws. Inothers, there is a federal Constitutional Courtspecialising in constitutional interpretation. Ger-many, Belgium, and Spain provide examples.In most, there is a clear effort to ensure theindependence of the Supreme or ConstitutionalCourts from political influence. In a number ofcases, there is also an effort by constitutionalrequirement or by practice to ensure a measureof regional representation in the ultimate court.

Constitutional rights

Federations are essentially a territorial form ofpolitical organisation. Thus, as a means of safe-guarding distinct groups or minorities, they dothis best when those groups and minorities aregeographically concentrated in such a way thatthey may achieve self-governance as a majoritywithin a regional unit of government. But inpractice populations are rarely distributed inneat watertight regions. In virtually all feder-ations some intra-unit minorities within theregional units have been unavoidable. Wheresignificant intra-unit minorities have existed,three types of solutions have been attempted.The first has been to redraw the boundaries ofthe constituent units to coincide better with theconcentration of the linguistic and ethnicgroups. Examples have been the creation of theJura canton in Switzerland, the reorganisationof state boundaries in India in 1956 and sub-sequently, and the progressive devolution ofNigeria from three regions to 36 states. Asecond approach has been to assign to the fed-eral government a special responsibility asguardian of intraregional minorities againstpossible repression by a regional majority. Suchprovisions have existed in a number of feder-ations, particularly in relation to indigenous oraboriginal peoples. The third and most widelyused approach to protect intraregional minoritieshas been through embodying a comprehensiveset of fundamental citizens’ rights in the consti-

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tution, to be enforced by the courts. This patternis now found in most federations except inAustralia and Austria.

Intergovernmental relations

Within federations, the inevitability of overlapsand interdependence in the exercise by govern-ments of their constitutional powers has gener-ally required extensive intergovernmental con-sultation, cooperation, and coordination. Theseprocesses have served two important functions:resolving conflicts and providing a means ofpragmatic adaptation to changing circumstances.The institutions and processes for these interac-tions are being dealt with more fully by a num-ber of articles in this issue. The subject isreferred to here simply to note that there arevariations among federations in theseintergovernmental processes, particularly interms of the “executive federalism” that typifiesmost parliamentary federations and the moremultifaceted character of intergovernmentalrelations in those federations marked by theseparation of powers between the executivesand legislatures within each government. Thesedifferent arrangements affect the extent to whichregional units of government may effectivelyparticipate in federal power-sharing.

Conclusions

The successes and failures of federations duringthe past half-century point to four major lessonswhich have a bearing on the ability of feder-ations and more broadly federal systems to rec-oncile and manage social diversity.

• First, in the context of the contemporaryglobal scene, federations combining sharedrule and self-ruledo provide a practical wayof combining the benefits of both unity anddiversity through representative institutions.They are not a panacea for humanity’s polit-ical ills, however, and there have been somesignificant failures, of which account mustbe taken.

• Second, the degree to which federationshave been effective has depended upon thedegree to which there has been a widedegree of public acceptance of the need to

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respect constitutional norms and structures adopted or evolved gives adequateand the rule of law. expression to the desires and requirements

• Third, equally important for the effective of the particular society in question. Asoperation of federations has been the devel- emphasised throughout this article, there areopment of mutual faith and trust among the many variations possible in the applicationdifferent groups within a federation and an of the federal idea in general or even withinemphasis upon the spirit of tolerance and the more specific category of federations.compromise. Ultimately the application of federalism

• Fourth, the extent to which a federation can involves a pragmatic and prudentialaccommodate political diversity is likely to approach, and its continued applicability independ not just on the adoption of federal different or changing circumstances in thearrangements, but upon whether the parti- twenty-first century may well depend uponcular form or variant of federation that is further innovations in its application.

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Courchene, T. 1995.“Glocalization: TheRegional/International Interface,”Canadian Journal of RegionalScience18:1–20.

Devilliers, B. ed. 1994.Evaluating Federal Systems.CapeTown: Jutta & Co.

Duchacek, I. 1987.ComparativeFederalism: The Territorial

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Dimension, Revised edition.Lantham: University Press ofAmerica.

Elazar, D. J. 1987.ExploringFederalism. Tuscaloosa, AL:University of Alabama Press.

Elazar, D. J. ed. 1994.FederalSystems of the World: A Handbookof Federal, Confederal andAutonomy Arrangements, Secondedition. Harlow: Longman GroupLimited.

King, P. 1982.Federalism andFederation. London: Croom Helm.

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