DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR is a leading political scientist in Indonesia who was advisor to former president B.J.Habibie in 1998–99 and now advises

Vice-President Boediono. The views in this essay are her own.

The Asialink Essays 2012 Vol. 4 No. 6 Published by Asialink, Sidney Myer Asia Centre www.asialink.unimelb.edu.auAugust 2012 The University of Melbourne Parkville 3010 Australia essays@asialink.unimelb.edu.au

Indonesia is edging back into Australia’s foreign policy debate. The near-northern neighbour may not carry the hopes and fears about transformational trade and strategic weight that China and India do, however the growing relevance of Indonesia to Australia’s interests is not well understood.

After a period of complacency that relations between Australia and Indonesia have never been better – President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s conciliatory style smoothing bilateral frictions over drug arrests, terrorism, asylum seekers, and cattle trade – there now seems to be a sense Indonesia has more to offer Australia, and that Australia is not making the most of the opportunity.

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A PROBLEM OF MIXED MESSAGESAn Indonesian insider’s view of the Australian relationship

Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Partly this results from Australia’s

opposition searching for ways to

differentiate itself from the government

in foreign policy. Partly it stems from a

realisation by both Australian Labour and

the Coalition that Indonesia must play a

role in any solutions to the wave of asylum

seekers reaching Australia’s outlying

territories, most of them coming by boat

from Indonesia.

And increasingly, it derives from the

growing sense among strategic thinkers,

not just in Australia, that in the search for

“counterweights” to the growing power of

China, Indonesia cannot be ignored. With

its huge population and fast expanding

economy straddling strategic choke points

between the Indian and Pacific Oceans,

Indonesia is not only projected to become

one of the major world economies in a few

decades, it is also regarded as a global swing

state that will have increasing influence in

international affairs. Many other large and

small countries are already courting Jakarta

with trade and strategic interests in mind.

President Yudhoyono and his ministers

receive a queue of foreign leaders, and make

frequent visits abroad.

At government level, Australia is considered

to be a very close partner, and in fact the

two countries have signed a comprehensive

partnership agreement. They cooperate

very well in regional and international

forums, and on many issues Canberra and

Jakarta count on each other for support and

coordinate diplomacy to back each other up.

But it is fair to say that the relationship

− in terms of the attention paid to it − is

still quite asymmetrical. Australians,

particularly the media, tend to pay more

attention to happenings in Indonesia,

especially negative ones, than the other

way around. Except when there is high

bilateral tension – over East Timor, Papua,

or (in previous times) perceived media

insults to the Indonesian leadership − it

is hard to think of a time when relations

with Australia have become a contested

issue or even a topic of discussion among

Indonesian chattering elites. On any given

day it is quite rare for Australia to figure

prominently in the Indonesian media.

Many countries figure in Indonesia’s

international relations and Australia is just

one of many.

At the same time there is still some wariness

about Australia, a sense that dormant

issues can quickly flare up. Many people in

Indonesia are still suspicious of Australians

in general − not so much the Canberra

government, but elements of the Australian

public that make critical comments,

especially those questioning Indonesia’s

territorial integrity.

This is a leftover of the East Timor issue.

There is still a strong belief in some

Indonesian circles that the separation of

East Timor from Indonesia resulted partly

from Australian pressures. To add to this,

despite the 2006 Lombok Treaty between

President Yudhoyono and then Prime

Minister John Howard, there are continuing

concerns about Papua. We know there

are people in Australia who support the

Free Papua Movement. When something

negative happens in Papua it becomes an

issue in Australia.

There is a sense in Jakarta that too much

is expected of it around the ongoing issue

of asylum seekers. From the Australian

perspective, it always seems Indonesia

is not doing enough. From the Jakarta

perspective, Indonesia is a very open

maritime country, with naturally porous

borders. It also has a relaxed visa system in

order to promote tourism. It is, therefore,

quite easy for people from West Asia and

other places to enter as tourists or even

to enter Indonesia illegally then join the

refugee underground.

The capacity of Indonesian authorities

to monitor all the many small ports and

simple fishing boats, and pick out those

engaged in refugee smuggling, is still

limited. The capacity of Indonesian

page 2 / 4the asialink essays vol.4 no.3 — 2012 Australia and Indonesia dewi fortuna anwar

There is still some

wariness about

Australia, a sense

that dormant issues

can quickly flare

up. Many people

in Indonesia are

still suspicious

of Australians in

general.

agencies to tackle transnational threats to

security such as people smuggling and the

plunder of fishery resources is something

that needs to be built up and will take time

to become effective. Corruption among

officials has also made law enforcement

more difficult.

Indonesia and Australia look at the region

and the world from different historical and

cultural perspectives, and this sometimes

leads to our leaders speaking at cross

purposes. This was made quite clear during

the president’s recent visit to Darwin. While

Prime Minister Julia Gillard focussed on

security issues, the strategic environment,

the asylum seeker problem, President

Yudhoyono emphasised the opportunity

for Australia to expand economic ties,

promoting Indonesia as a land of market

opportunities for trade and investment.

For Indonesia, sustaining its economic

growth in the midst of a global downturn

and increasing competition is a priority, to

ensure both its development momentum

and political stability. After all, the majority

of Indonesia’s 240 million-plus population

are young people needing gainful

employment.

There is less preoccupation in Indonesia

than in Australia about the possibility of a

new Cold War between the United States

and China, or in upholding its own interests

in the face of a rising China and India. There

is also no rush to draw the United States in

closer. Indeed, Indonesia believes it needs

to engage China, just as it also engages the

United States, on its own terms.

Thus the immediate reaction from the

Indonesian government, through Foreign

Minister Marty Natelegawa, to last

November’s announcement of the posting

of US marines to Darwin was one of great

caution: to express the hope that such a

troop presence would not lead to increased

tension or add to misunderstandings.

Indonesia continues to stay true to its “free

and active” foreign policy in which the

stress on not being allied to any particular

military power remains a key feature of its

identity.

Within ASEAN Indonesia espouses the

concept of a “dynamic equilibrium” for

managing relations with the major powers.

There is also back chatter among some

Indonesian politicians, non-government

organisations and students who see the

Darwin positioning of the US marines not

so much as a counterweight to Chinese

influence, but rather aimed at enhancing

American leverage over Indonesia itself

− even that the real “target” is Papua.

This reflects Indonesia’s prickly sense of

insecurity about its territorial integrity and

the continuing touchy problem of Papuan

unrest, as well as its historical memories of

American and Australian involvement in the

Dutch attempt to separate Papua from the

rest of the former Netherlands East Indies.

The feeling of distrust is still there, quite

often missed in Washington and maybe in

Canberra where there can be a tendency to

look at the contemporary big picture and

retain only very short historical memories.

The big picture of China and the regional

balance of power needs to be filled in with

the detail of the other countries and their

many different stories.

The central government in Indonesia is

paying very serious attention to Papua.

It is trying to accelerate its development,

and with a rising level of violence everyone

realises we cannot allow it to be business

as usual in the handling of the region’s

politics. So it is something that Jakarta takes

very seriously, and while trying to address

problems internally, it is always on the

lookout for any signs that its partners might

not be totally committed to Indonesia’s

territorial integrity.

As for the debate in Australia about

“neglect” of Indonesia, it would be hard

to find many Indonesians worried about

being neglected. This is more a factor in

the Canberra perspective, about calibrating

relations with the various foreign partners.

page 3 / 4

The big picture

of China and the

regional balance of

power needs to be

filled in with the

detail of the other

countries and their

many different

stories.

the asialink essays vol.4 no.3 — 2012 Australia and Indonesia dewi fortuna anwar

Australia should have some comparative

advantage in capturing Indonesia’s

potentials. Historically, it has put a lot

of time and energy into developing the

world’s best corps of deep intellectual

expertise about Indonesia. It should be

able to leverage that expertise, not just

for strategic security considerations but

its own economic benefits. The drop in

interest in Indonesia, just at a time when

Indonesia is rising up, is mystifying.

—

The decline of Indonesian language study

in Australian schools and universities has

been raised during the visits of Indonesian

leaders, along with the unequal people-to-

people exchange. With more Indonesians

studying in Australia than vice-versa, over

time there will develop greater first-hand

knowledge of Australia among younger

educated Indonesians than is the case

with knowledge about Indonesia among

Australia’s elite.

This asymmetry in knowledge is not a

good trend. Australia is not doing itself

any favours by neglecting its knowledge

bank on Indonesian culture and language,

and its economic and social dynamics. As

ASEAN becomes more integrated, with

Indonesia a key component – Jakarta will

pull its weight more and more, not just in

the regional arena, but internationally.

page 4 / 4the asialink essays vol.4 no.3 — 2012 Australia and Indonesia dewi fortuna anwar