MINE LEGISLATION & SAFETY ENGINEERINGASSIGNMENT NO : 04

Q1 :TO WRITE ABOUT TEN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS (INDIA / ABROAD)

DEPARTMENT OF MINING ENGINEERINGNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ROURKELA

GUIDED BY : PROF. D. P. TRIPATHYPREPARED BY : SUDARSHAN PRADHAN110MN04007th SEMESTAR2013-14

CONTENTS

SL NO NAME OF ACCIDENTPAGE

1Bagdigi colliery 3-4

2Amlabad colliery4-5

3Orient No. 2 Mine , Illinois5-6

4Sunshine Mine ,Idaho6-13

5Willow Grove No. 10 Mine ,Ohio13-15

6Stag Canon Mine No.215

7Affinity Mine ,WV16-18

8Haulage Accident ,Loveridge19-20

9Crondal Canyan Mine Collapse 21-24

10Ferrell No. 17 Mine Explosion 25-27

11References27

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS :REPORT NO : 1Bagdigi CollieryDate of the Accident 29.6.1935Owner Anderson Wright & Co.of persons killed 19Place Jharia Coalfield

A total of 108 persons had entered the mine during the afternoon shift. At about 7 p.m. Chitoo Mia, one of the overmen, suspected that things were not as they should be and he ordered withdrawal of the men. Thereafter he proceeded to another area to withdraw the workmen employed there. By 8.30 p.m., 103 persons, including the other two overmen, had come out of the mine. There is no clear evidence as to what Chitoo Mia had suspected as he, along with the 4 remaining workers, died in the underground working.At about 8.50 p.m. when the Assistant Manager and a day-shift overman had entered the incline-cutting to go down the mine, a violent explosion took place and a great volume of flame, dust and pieces of coal were projected out of the inclines with great force. A total of 21 persons on the surface, including the Assistant Manager and the Overman, some men who were following them and some others who were sitting outside the inclines, were burnt or injured. 14 of them died later.No inflammable gas had ever been detected in the workings of the mine. All the workmen used naked lights. On the day of the accident it had been raining heavily and a retaining wall protecting the mine from a large tank and a nallah had collapsed shortly before the explosion. A large quantity of water suddenly entered into the upper seams which were on fire. The water generated gases and produced a reversal of the air in the mine which gradually filled the workings with an inflammable mixture of gases. The mixture was ignited either by the fire in the upper seams or the naked lights of the five persons who were entombed in the mine. The explosion was predominantly of inflammable gases but might have been augmented by coal dust.The Court of Inquiry made the following recommendations:-1.The Government should appoint, as soon as possible, a representative committee to enquire fully into the dangers arising from underground fires in coal mines and to report on the steps that should be taken to combat these dangers.2.Regulations should be framed requiring:-(a) Managements of all coal mines to take adequate steps to prevent air passing through a goaf or area in which there is a fire.(b) The provision of a mechanical ventilator in mines in which there is a fire.(c) The sending of a notice to the Inspector of Mines and the DistrictMagistrate when an influx of noxious gases occurs in a mine.(d) The use of safety lamps in districts of a mine in which there is a fire.(e) The precautions to be taken with respect to the danger of coal dust in mines in which there is an underground fire.(t) Restrictions on working of a seam below an area in an upper seam which is on fire so that the strata between the seams shall be maintained unbroken.3.The existing regulations should be amended to require inspection of fire stoppings and parts of the mine in which there is a fire, to be made with safety lamps and means of detecting CO.As a result of this accident, emergency safety regulations were framed which covered almost all the above recommendations.REPORT NO : 2Amlabad CollieryDate of the Accident 28.2.1921Owner Eastern Coal Co.Number of persons killed 11Place Jharia Coalfield

An explosion of firedamp occurred in a sinking shaft and 11 men who were at work at the bottom of the shaft were so severely burnt that they all died within two days. Three shafts, namely No.l, 2 & 3 Pits were being sunk and small quantities of explosive gas had been met with from time to time in all the three shafts. Work in No.1 & 2 pits was discontinued owing to water trouble but the sinking of No.3 pit continued. At a depth of about 44 m, a coal seam, about 1 m in thickness, was met and a small quantity of explosive gas was emitted. The gas bubbled through the water and after two days the emission ceased. The shaft was sunk through the seam to a depth of 46 m. Tests with flame safety lamp did not show the presence of gas.On 28th February, 13 shots loaded with gelignite were fired and after clearing of fumes and inspection of the shaft bottom, the sinkers descended and started loading the broken rock. When the seventh bucket was raised to the surface, an explosion took place at the bottom of the shaft and a rush of air and smoke and dust was emitted from the top of the shaft. Only slight damage was caused at the shaft top. The empty bucket was speedily lowered into the shaft and the men raised to the surface. All were suffering from extensive burns and in spite of prompt medical attention, all of them died within two days. From the statements made by the victims it appeared that the explosion was caused when one of the deceased struck a match to light a cigarette. After blasting, no lights had been taken into the shaft as the daylight fully illuminated the shaft bottom.The Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that blasting done a few hours before the explosion had released an accumulation of gas in the strata which was gradually diluted by air to come within the explosive range. The explosive mixture thus formed was ignited by the lighted match-stick of one of the victims.After the accident, instructions were issued that all the three sinking shafts were to be regarded as gassy mines and that no naked lights were to be allowed in them.

REPORT NO : 3Orient No. 2 Mine ExplosionWest Frankfort, IllinoisDecember 21, 1951119 Killed

The night shift entered the mine at the No. 4 shaft and the mantrips left the shaft bottom about 6:25 p.m. reaching the working sections about 20 to 30 feet minutes later. About 7:40 p.m., the explosion caused the death of 118 the men in the mine; 4 were rescued (1 of whom died) and 133 escaped uninjured.The night mine manager was on the surface at the No. 4 shaft when power went off in the mine and on the surface and smoke and dust came up the shaft. When the power came on in about 5 minutes he went to the shaft bottom and changed doors to put the stairway compartment of the upcast shaft in intake air. He warned all the sections on the south side of the mine by telephone to bring the men to the surface immediately but could not reach any of the north sections except the 11 and 12 north, 23 west north west. He then called the company officials on the surface.

Rescue work was started, and three injured men were carried out the new main north entries. One of these men died. Ten men in 1 north 24 west north erected a single canvas barricade across the entrance to No. 1 entry but did not otherwise shut of the openings to the place in which they took refuge. Nine were dead when found; but one was rescued alive at 5:40 a.m., December 24 and recovered.

A large force of rescue workers, crews and leaders came to the mine and the operations were fully organized. Explorations were made by apparatus crews, and ventilation was restored by erecting temporary stoppings. Some bodies were removed by apparatus crews, all being brought out by 2 p.m., December 26. The ventilation in the explosion area was completely destroyed, in that almost all stoppings and doors were demolished, as was one main overcast. Wires and air lines were blown down, and haulage equipment was damaged. Flame traversed the explosion area except the outer parts of new main north and main north entries.

The mine was gassy and methane was known to be in abandoned panels and sections of panels termed old ends. These areas were open to air currents which were used to ventilate active workings, and haulage roads were also on return air. Attention was called to this hazard in Federal mine inspection reports, the last having a date of July 31, 1951, which cited the following violation of the Federal Mine Safety Code.

Methane was detected in numerous abandoned entries (termed old ends) by means of a permissible flame safety lamp. The ventilation was short-circuited at No. 1 room in these abandoned entries generally. Trolley locomotives were being operated 150 to 300 feet outby the old ends.

All working sections affected by the explosion were ventilated by air that had passed by the entrances to abandoned workings. Three of these old ends were caving just previous to the explosion, releasing gas. A gas watchman was assign to watch one of these places on the day shift. At the time of the explosion a trip of empty cars was standing in the main ventilating door in the 3 and 4 south at 27 east north west. This took air pressure off the abandoned 3 and 4 south entries and let gas come out onto the active workings where it was ignited, probably by an area from electrical equipment near the junction of 3 south off 27 east north west and NO. 3 stub entry off 3 south. Ignition may also have been from smoking. The flame was propagated by coal dust and by gas from other worked out and abandoned areas. Accumulations of coal dust principally along the roadways were not removed or rendered inert by the application of enough rockdust. Watering methods were inadequate.

REPORT NO : 4

Sunshine Mining CompanySunshine MineKellogg, Shoshone County, IdahoMay 2, 1972 - 91 Killed

On May 2, 1972, a total of 173 men making up a normal day shift (7 a.m. to 3 p.m.) crew entered the mine and proceeded to work up to the time they learned of the fire. In the morning, miners Custer Keough and William Walty were engaged in enlarging the 3400 ventilation drift to decrease the ventilation resistance in the main exhaust airway. Their work consisted of drilling and blasting along the back and ribs, mucking, and rock bolting. An underground mechanic, Homer Benson, also reported to the 3400 level with an oxygen-acetylene cutting torch which was needed to remove old rock bolts along the drift, and transported it to the worksite with a small battery-powered locomotive. The worksite was west from the 09 vein bulkhead about 500 feet. Benson completed the cutting of the old rock bolts and arrived back at the 3700 level station with his equipment at 10:35 a.m. Keough and Walty ate lunch on the 3400 level at a presently unknown location.

Most of the salaried and day's pay personnel who normally ate their lunch from 11 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. did so at their normal locations. Harvey Dionne, Jim Bush, Bob Bush, Jim Salyer, and Fred (Gene) Johnson, mine supervisors, were in the Blue Room (supervisors' room) near the 3700 level No. 10 Shaft station. Arnold Anderson, Norman Ulrich, Gary Beckes, and John Williams were in the electric shop also near the 3700 level No. 10 Shaft station to the south.Leslie Mossburgh, Bill Bennett, Clyde Napier, Homer Benson, and Hap Fowler were in the drill repair shop located to the north of the No. 10 Shaft station on 3700 level. Greg Dionne, Tony Sabala, and Donald Beehner were in the pipe shop located at No.8 Shaft. James Lamphere was in the 3700 level warehouse. Pete Bennett and Kenneth Tucker were in the 08 machine shop in by the pipe shop. Don Woods was at the No. 10 Shaft chippy hoistroom. Morris Story and Jack Harris were also at 3700 level No. 10 Shaft station.

Floyd Strand, chief electrician; Kenneth Ross, geologist; Larry Hawkins, sampler; and John Reardon, pumpman, completed their morning activities at the No. 10 Shaft area. At 11:30 a.m., the above crew departed the No. 10 Shaft station on the 3700 level enroute to the Jewell Shaft on a man coach. Their route took them past the Strand substation, 910-raise, No.5 Shaft, and No.4 Shaft. They arrived at the Jewell station shortly after 11 :40 a.m. Shortly after lunch, at about 11:35 a.m., Ulrich and Anderson stepped out of the electric shop and smelled smoke. They immediately shouted to the Blue Room. Harvey Dionne and Bob Bush, foremen, came out and the four men started in the direction of the smoke which was toward the Strand substation. The smoke was discovered to be coming down the 910 raise. Harvey Dionne climbed up onto drift timber below the raise in an effort to spot fire. He was unable to detect any fire at that location. Jim Bush then arrived on a small battery-powered locomotive. Harvey Dionne, Jim Bush, and Ulrich proceeded toward the Jewell Shaft. They met Ronald Stansbury, haulage locomotive operator, who was proceeding from the Jewell Shaft. Stansbury was instructed to return to the fire door and close that door. Jim Bush and Harvey Dionne returned toward the 910 raise. Ulrich, who had accompanied Stansbury, manually closed the fire door near the Jewell Shaft and proceeded up the Jewell Shaft to the 3100 level station.

At about 11:40 a.m., Delbert (Dusty) Rhoads and Jim Salyer simultaneously telephoned Pete Bennett in the 08 machine shop. They notified Bennett of smoke and asked Bennett to check to determine if a fire was burning in the shop area. Bennett and Tucker, knowing there was no fire in the shop, went from the shop toward the 808 and 820 drifts. Bennett discovered the 820 crosscut was so full of smoke he could not enter. Bennett met Bob Bush at the 808 drift. Upon entering that drift they found the smoke was again so thick that they could travel but a few feet. They retreated and tried to return to the 08 machine shop. They encountered much heavier smoke than before upon returning to the 820 crosscut. Travel back to the 08 shop was impossible.

Bob Bush then instructed Bennett and Tucker to proceed to the Jewell Shaft. As Bennett and Tucker were walking out the 3700 level toward the Jewell Shaft they met Jim Bush and Harvey Dionne returning toward No. 10 Shaft. Bennett and Tucker also met Edward Davis at No. 4 Shaft and told him to leave the mine.

As Harvey Dionne and Jim Bush returned toward No. 10 Shaft, they attempted to go into the 08 machine shop area. They reached the 820 drift and proceeded about 100 feet into the smoke before being driven out. Harvey Dionne and Jim Bush decided to evacuate the men. Harvey Dionne then went back to make sure the air door was closed and prepare for evacuation at the Jewell Shaft. Jim Bush then headed back toward the 910 raise where he encountered Bob Bush, Wayne Blalock, and Pat Hobson, who were in a state of near exhaustion. Jim Bush then attempted to remove the three men from the mine. Jim Bush carried Bob Bush and Hobson under each of their shoulders and pushed Blalock in front of him. About halfway to the Jewell Shaft, Jim Bush himself was near exhaustion and had to leave all three men and go to the Jewell Shaft to try to get assistance.

Harvey Dionne, after returning to the Jewell Shaft, made the decision to remove restrictions over the No. 12 borehole to allow more fresh air to reach the lower levels.

Immediately afterward, according to the depositions made by survivors, Fred (Gene) Johnson, a shift boss, while at the 3700 level No. 10 Shaft, telephoned the mine maintenance foreman, Tom Harrah, at his office in the surface machine shop at about 12 noon, and (1) requested that the stench warning system be activated and that (2) oxygen breathing apparatus be sent into the mine. At this time, he also ordered the hoistman to prepare the cage for moving the men up to the 3100 level to get them out of the mine. The stench warning system was activated at 12:05 p.m. and the apparatus was gathered and transported down Jewell Shaft to the 3100 level station.

Because of the dense smoke between the 910 raise and No. 10 Shaft, the man (Don Wood) operating the No. 10 Shaft "chippy" hoist on the 3700 level was forced to abandon the hoistroom. Consequently, the "chippy" hoist was never used for evacuating men. Survivors, who later stated that their signals to the "chippy" hoistroom went unanswered and therefore assumed the signal system was inoperative, did not realize that the hoistroom could not be occupied.

According to the hoist log taken from the No. 10 double-drum hoist on the 3100 level, the first load of men was hoisted at 12:13 p.m. About 12 men rode the cage from the 3700 level to the 3100 level, including two cagers and three other men who had ridden up from the 4500 level. The cage arrived at the 3100 level at 12:15 p.m. and returned to the 3700 level where the remaining men boarded. They left the 3700 level at 12:16 p.m. and arrived at 3100 level at 12:17 p.m. Greg Dionne reboarded the cage and went down to the 4600 level with short stops on the 3700 level and 4400 level to pick up additional men including Delbert (Dusty) Rhoads, who, among others, had ridden the "chippy" cage down after lunch.

A full cage-load of men was sent up to the 3100 level from the 4600 level at 12:24 p.m. Greg Dionne remained on the 4600 level station. Byron Schultz, cager, reboarded the cage and went back down to 4600, arriving at 12:27 p.m., where another load of men boarded. Dionne remained at the station and Schulz rode up to the 3100 level, arriving at 12:30 p.m. Schulz reboarded at 3100 level and went to the 5000 level with a stop at 4600 to pick up Dionne and additional men. The cage then traveled back to the 3100 level arriving at 12:35 p.m. Delbert (Dusty) Rhoads and Arnold Anderson, mechanical and electrical lead men, possibly returned on this trip to the 3400 level. Another trip was made back to the 5000 level and returned at 12:44 p.m. Schulz and Dionne both returned to the 3100 level on this trip. The cage went back to the 5000 level and remained 12 minutes. The cage then went to the 5400 level and made a trip back to 3100 station.

All hoisting at No. 10 Shaft ceased at 1 :02 p.m. While on the 3400 level, Rhoads and Anderson were standing by and requesting permission to cut off the main exhaust fans on that level. Several persons listening on the mine telephone heard the request. A decision was never received.

The men hoisted from the lower levels of the mine were directed by Gene Johnson on the 3100 level to travel to the Jewell Shaft via that level to be hoisted to the surface. Gene Johnson had remained at the 3100 station to direct the crews to Jewell Shaft instead of the Silver Summit escapeway.

According to the depositions, men obtained self rescuers from storage boxes on the shaft stations. Some of the men reported they had difficulty in using the self rescuers and they discarded them. Many men were doubtless quickly overcome by carbon monoxide and smoke, and died before they were able to reach the Jewell Shaft.

At about 1 p.m., and within an hour after the stench warning system had been activated, the first group to attempt to locate and rescue additional survivors went underground. An apparatus crew of four men, Robert Launhardt, Larry Hawkins, James Zingler, and Don Beebner, went across the 3100 level from the Jewell Shaft. On the way toward No. 10 Shaft, the crew met Roger Findley, who was on his way out toward the Jewell Shaft. Findley was having difficulty breathing and was given oxygen. Zingler then took Findley out to good air.

The crew continued toward No. 10 Shaft and met By- ron Schulz, who appeared in serious trouble and pleaded for oxygen. Beehner responded and gave Schulz his face mask, but went down himself as he attempted to put his mask back on. Then Launhardt tried to assist Schulz, as Hawkins placed his mask over Beehner's face, meanwhile holding his breath as long as he could before taking another breath of air from his mask. When Hawkins tried to place his mask again to Beehner's face, he noticed blood gushing from Beebner's mouth and nose as he lost consciousness.

Hawkins' apparatus then malfunctioned and he attempted to make his way out. He went down twice before mustering the strength to jump onto the last car of a train which Launhardt was bringing out with Schulz aboard. All three reached the Jewell Shaft station and were hoisted.

While these events were occurring on the 3100 level, moves were undertaken by some of the miners to rescue fellow workers on the 3700 level. Jim Bush, a mine foreman, had called to the attention of some other miners that three men, Robert Bush, Blalock, and Hobson, were on the 3700 level. He, himself, had tried earlier to save them, but was unable to do so. According to depositions from survivors of the disaster, three men on the 3700 Jewell station, Ronald Stansbury, Roberto Diaz, and another man, started out to bring the men to safety. They left the station and proceeded along the 3700 level aboard a locomotive and coach. Bearing in mind a previous warning from Jim Bush to be careful and avoid running over one of the victims last seen by him lying across the track, the three men stopped their locomotive short of the fallen man who was later identified as Blalock. They then went ahead on foot. Stansbury went farthest in and located Bob Bush lying on the ground, but he, himself, was fast becoming overcome and therefore started to retreat. On the way back, as he was stumbling along, he saw one of his fellow would-be-rescuers, Roberto Diaz, down on the ground. Alternately crawling and stumbling, he reached some fresh air at No. 5 Shaft where he ran across Harvey Dionne, Paul Johnson, and Jasper Beare reentering the drift.

Stansbury informed them that, in addition to the three men that his group had tried to rescue, another man (Diaz) was down, making a total of four, one of whom was lying across the track.

Johnson and his companions then continued toward No. 10 Shaft. They boarded the locomotive and car which had been used and abandoned by Stansbury and his colleagues, but had to give it up when it struck a body lying across the track and was derailed. Realizing they could not help any of the stricken men, they started to walk back toward the Jewell Shaft. During the trip, Johnson, too, went down, adding to the list of persons who had already died in the disaster. Subsequently, Jim Bush, accompanied by Ulrich, made one more rescue attempt, protected only by self rescuers, but they had to abandon their efforts.

At 3:06 p.m., in order to eliminate recirculation and facilitate access to No. 10 Shaft, fans on the 3400 level were shut down from the 3700 level switch station. Four more bodies were found at the 3700 cable shop at this time. By 4 p.m., ventilation to the 3100 level No. 10 Shaft station had improved considerably and the air door was opened.

At 3:50 p.m., on May 8, an extensive cave-in was discovered in the 910 raise area on the 3700 level. In preparing to send men to the lower mine levels via the No. 12 borehole as part of its plan to carry out rescue and recovery operations through a fourth front, the Bureau had obtained two man-capsules from the AEC Nevada test site together with an engineer, Frank Solaegui, employed by Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Corp., an AEC prime contractor, who supervised use of the man-capsules at the Nevada Test Site, and could provide invaluable help with the rigging and use of the capsules in the Sunshine mine.

Each of these capsules had been designed to carry two men, and were brought to the mine because a man-capsule (or "torpedo" or man-cage) which was designed and built at the mine site turned out to be inadequate for the task, primarily because it did not provide an emergency escape hatch.

In order not to divert men from the other rescue and recovery operations, the Bureau gathered 22 additional men from nearly all its Metal and Nonmetal Health and Safety districts throughout the country. Shortly after 9 o'clock at night on May 8, the first two-man crew was lowered into the No. 12 borehole in the AEC capsule that was finally selected as most suitable for the operation. They discovered that the borehole not only was irregular and rough but contained many slabs of loose rock which could endanger the lives of any men making the descent. Therefore, as they were being lowered, they began to scale loose rock. In the first hour, they progressed less than 150 feet of the total 1,I00-foot distance, and were hoisted because of extreme fatigue. Crew after crew then followed, scaling the loose and jagged rock. By 3 a.m. on May 9, the capsule had descended only 450 feet. After the crews reached a depth of 580 feet, conditions improved. The remaining 520 feet of the corkscrew-shaped borehole was in better condition, and the manned capsule was able to reach the 4800 level shortly after 7 a.m. A fresh crew with equipment was then lowered and by noontime began exploring the 4800 level for survivors. This crew searched the area around the bottom of the borehole and the drifts west of cars, and one victim had fallen between the locomotive and the rib. The 4200 level self-rescuer cabinet had been entered, but no self-rescuers were found with these victims.

It was also observed that the self-rescuer boxes on 4600 level were empty. Also, it was evident that the persons on 5200 level had attempted to build a bulkhead with brattice cloth, and the drift walls west of the Alimak raise were seen coated with a tar-like substance.

The last bodies, making a total of 91 victims, were removed from the mine at 3:40 a.m. on May 13. Sunshine mine officials on May 15, 1972, provided Bureau officials with an updated accounting of mine personnel caught up in the disaster. They said 173 employees were underground when the fire was discovered. Of this number, 80 persons escaped, two survived, and 91 perished. The figure of 80 persons who actually escaped differed from figures reported earlier by the company. The final figure was determined when it was confirmed that only 13 of a possibIe 33 mechanics, only five of a possible 17 electricians were underground at the time of the fire, and four other employees did not go underground during the day shift on May 2. The difficulties experienced earlier in providing a reliable count of the number of persons underground at the time of the fire stemmed from the check-in, check-out system at the mine. On reporting for work, each mine worker normally picks up a cap lamp and battery specifically assigned to him. However, additional cap lamps are at times sent underground to replace those whose batteries become exhausted. Shift bosses also keep on their person, mainly for payroll purposes, a tally of individuals on the job, but in this case, many of the shift bosses perished with their crews.

Investigation of Possible Causes of Fire

Investigation of the cause and the origin of the fire has continued (on a periodic basis). In order to determine the probable cause of ignition, one must try to ascertain the location of ignition. The general opinion is that the fire originated in the 09 vein somewhere between the 3400 and the 3550 levels, presumably near the 09 crosscut on the 3400 level.

It is believed that when sufficient heat and fire had burned through a wooden bulkhead on the 3400 level 09 drift causing the bulkhead to collapse, smoke and gases were then picked up by the exhaust ventilation system and recirculated down the 910 raise and other raises along this route to the 3700 level and throughout the general working areas of the mine.

It is believed that the collapse of this bulkhead caused a short circuit of the ventilation, thus allowing the exhaust air to become the main source of air movement in the intake or fresh air system. This was unknowingly perpetuated by the closing of the fire doors on the 3100 level and the 3700 level. As the two main exhaust fans situated on the 3400 level continued to operate throughout the time of the fIre and were not shut off until 3:00 p.m. on May 7, when a fire fighting crew shut the main power feeder off at the 3700 level substation.

REPORT NO: 5Willow Grove No. 10 Mine ExplosionNeffs, OhioMarch 16, 1940No. Killed 72

On this Saturday morning 176 men were in the mine, when an explosion killed 66 by burns and violence and 3 by burns and afterdamp. Two others attempting rescue were asphyxiated, and 1 rescued man died 6 days later from effects of afterdamp. One man was severely burned and injured by the explosion, and two recovery workers were injured by a rock fall.

Twenty-two men overcome by afterdamp were rescued and revived, and 79 men trapped for 5 hours were released uninjured; 2 others escaped unaided. The explosion traversed the 22 south section and a short distance inby and outby 22 south on the main west haulage entries.

A telephone call to the surface from the dispatcher in the mine about 11:10 a.m. reported that smoke and fumes were coming down the main west and driving men from the underground shops and that they could not go through it to the airshaft to see if a motor or transformer was burning.

The assistant superintendent and the mining engineer drove to the airshaft and went down in intake air as the fan was blowing, noting only a burned smell in the air. They encountered burning fragments on the main west, stamped them out, and then found a badly burned man, who had staggered out from the explosion area. Other men from outside the affected section were found and helped to take the injured man outside. Help was called from available outside sources.

A motorman leaving 19 north and south junction with a loaded trip about 11:10 a.m. was enveloped in a cloud of dust and smoke; he put the controller on full and lost consciousness on the way out. At the outside loop the trolley pole flew off, and the trip coasted back into the mine about 900 feet. He was found by the superintendent and the outside foreman, who had gone in the pit mouth with two other men to investigate. The two outside men brought the motorman and trip out and revived him. The officials remained at a telephone at this point and talked to men at the dispatcher's shanty, who were being rapidly overcome. Some men from the shop and others gathered at the shanty hurried out and made it safely; those remaining, including the two oficials, were killed by the onsweeping smoke and fumes that reached the pit mouth and prevented entrance about 12 noon. The two officials attempted to get out but fell less than 100 feet from the outside. At 12:30 p.m. the air had cleared and their bodies were recovered. Efforts to revive them failed.

Gas-mask and working crews were organized and started an exploration and carrying ventilation into the explosion area. Men in unaffected parts of the mine were located and sent out. Many were unaware of any trouble. A group of 23 men was found overcome by afterdamp and removed. After fresh air was put onto the haulage roads, loading machines were used to clean up falls, continuing until March 28, when the last body was recovered. Apparatus crews were present, but no work was done under apparatus.

The explosion did not extend farther because of considerable expansion at 22 south and main west and because of the incombustible content of road dust in the main west headings.

A shot of pellet black powder in the left rib near the face of 8 west was fired in starting a room neck. An excessive amount of powder was used, and "bugdust" stemming as well as coal dust stirred up by this and preceding rock shot were ignited by the flame. Gas at the face of 7 west, black powder in a storage box on 24 south between 7 and 8 west, and coal dust in all the workings added to the explosion. Rock dust had been applied only on the main west haulageway. No water was used to allay coal dust.

The mine was classed as nongassy, and no flrebosses were employed, although section foremen had flame safety lamps. The company had a commendable safety record and an active safety program, but the latent explosion hazards were not recognized.REPORT NO : 6Stag Canon No. 2 MinePhelps Dodge and CompanyDawson, New MexicoOctober 22, 1913No. Killed 263

The mine, opened by drifts, employed about 300 men. Coal was undercut, mostly by machine but some by hand-pick mining. Permissible explosives were used, fired electronically from outside. The mine was dry, and sprays were placed at intervals to wet the dust; they were not effective beyond 6 feet. The mine was usually free from firedamp except for occasional pockets, coming from the roof. Open lights were used.

At about 3 p.m. blasts carrying smoke and dust burst out of the main openings. The explosion doors and one side of the fan house were blown out but were repaired in less than 2 hours.

Of the 284 men in the mine, 14 from an unaffected section came out safely, and nine others, unconscious near the bottom of the airshaft, were rescued by an apparatus crew about 8 p.m. They were revived by the use of pulmotors.

Two helmet men were lost that night when they overtaxed the oxygen supply by overexertion and going in farther than instructed. The oxygen was supplied at a fixed rate and when they tried to remove the oxygen bottles to breathe from them, they were overcome by afterdamp.The explosion originated in a dusty pillar section where an overcharged shot had been fired. The explosion was propagated by coal dust along the haulage roads and into most of the workings, except where water and inert dust in the roads caused it to die away.

The violence was not great, but cars were wrecked in some places and most of the stoppings blown out. Dynamite was used in blasting rock and may have been used in the pillar shot. The use of permissible explosives for all blasting, blasting only after the shift, and use of rock dust with the watering system were recommended.

REPORT NO : 7

Fatal Hoisting AccidentFebruary 7, 2013Affinity Coal Company, LLCAffinity MineSophia, Raleigh County, WV

On Thursday, February 7, 2013, at approximately 9:20 p.m., Edward L. Finney, a 43-year-old scoop operator was fatally injured when he was caught and pinned underneath a battery powered scoop at the bottom of a shaft where a 30 ton service hoist was utilized to transport miners and supplies into and out of the mine.

The accident occurred as the victim, who was operating the scoop, and two other miners were attempting to unload trash from the scoop bucket onto the hoist deck. While the scoop bucket was positioned on the hoist deck, the hoist began to elevate unexpectedly, causing the scoop to be suddenly raised off of the mine floor and then dropped when the scoops bucket slipped off of the hoist deck. The victim, who was positioned in the operators compartment of the scoop when the hoist began to elevate, was found underneath the operators compartment of the scoop after the accident.

On the day of the accident, Ron Short, Hoist Operator, performed the required daily examination of the 30-ton service hoist at 8:00 a.m. Short indicated in the examination record book that the hoist was in safe operating condition. The hoist was also examined by William Lusk, Certified Electrician, on the day of the accident as part of the weekly examinations required for electrical equipment.Again, no hazards associated with the hoist were noted in the record book for the weekly electrical examinations. Steve Colo III, Construction Foreman, held a brief meeting with Edward Finney,Scoop Operator, Brian Southern and Chris Donaldson, both outby Utility Men, prior to the men entering the mine on the evening shift on February 7, 2013.

Colo informed the crew of their job duties for the upcoming shift. He instructed the crew to pick up trash along the old intake entries on the west side of the service hoist, using the outby battery-powered scoop and a metal bucket insert. The scoop bucket insert, once filled with trash, was to be placed on the 30-ton service hoist and sent to the surface to be unloaded. According to Colos instructions, this cycle was to be repeated until all of the trash was removed from the designated area of the mine. The mines communication and tracking system indicated that Finney, Southern,and Donaldson arrived underground at the bottom of the service shaft at 3:06 p.m. to begin their work. The outby scoop they were to use was normally located on the east side of the service hoist, but it had to be moved across the hoist platform, to the west side, by opening both the east and west side gates. Once on the west side of the hoist, the scoop and men would then travel through a set of air lock doors and enter the intake air course where they were to pick up trash. Once in the intake air course, the crew picked up trash and placed it in the scoop bucket insert, where it was then taken to the service hoist and sent out of the mine. Southern stated in interviews that three or four loads of trash had been taken from the intake entries to the hoist prior to the time the accident occurred

A review of the mines electronic tracking system report shows that the scoop arrived at the bottom of the service shaft, along with Finney, Southern and Donaldson at 8:54 p.m. The tracking system also shows that three previous trips to the service hoist had been made by the crew prior to that time.Finney was operating the scoop and was moving the machine forward, bucket first, toward the service hoist to unload a bucket insert full of trash. As he approached the hoist, he positioned the scoop bucket on top of the hoist deck so that he could push the insert out of the scoops bucket and onto the hoist.

Donaldson and Southern were standing on each side of the scoop observing the operation. Donaldson, who was standing on the left side of the scoop and facing towards the hoist, stated that as the insert was being pushed out of the scoop bucket and onto the hoist, the hoist warning lights started flashing, indicating that the hoist was going to start. Donaldson then yelled run, get out, and ran past the scoop as the hoist was starting to elevate up the shaft, picking the bucket end of the scoop off of the mine floor. Southern, standing on the operators side of the scoop, observed that the warning lights were flashing after Donaldson had yelled and warned everyone to run. Southern immediately yelled for Finney to get out of the scoop, its starting up. Southern stated that the front end of the scoop was already approximately four feet off of the mine floor when he started running to get clear of the scoop. When Southern was behind the scoop, and out of danger, he turned to see if Finney had exited the scoop. He stated that Finney appeared to be falling, head first, to the mine floor about the same time the scoop bucket slipped off the hoist deck and fell to the ground, which created a lot of dust, making it difficult to see clearly. Southern immediately ran to check Finneys condition and found him to be unresponsive, as he was located underneath the operators deck of the scoop.Glenn Paugh, Maintenance Foreman, was working at the No. 2 High Voltage Disconnect Box when the accident occurred, and arrived at the scene approximately 4 minutes after the accident, and saw that Finney had received fatal crushing injuries. Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) Larry Reedy was 11 crosscuts away along the No. 1 Conveyor Belt at the time of the accident and arrived at the hoist at 9:24 p.m., as indicated by the Mine Tracking System.

EMT Chris Cadle was working on No.1 unit, received a call and arrived at the Hoist at 9:48 p.m. as indicated by the Mine Tracking System. Paugh energized the scoop in order to lift it off of Finney. Paugh, Reedy, and Cadle placed Finney on a backboard and transported him to the 19 man hoist on a four wheeled, rubbertired mantrip, where he was then taken to the surface. The Jan Care Ambulance Service had arrived at the mine site prior to the victim reaching the surface. Finney was transported via ambulance to the Blue Ridge Funeral Home in Beckley, WV, where Lisa Sadler, Medical Examiner, pronounced him dead at 9:50 p.m.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT

Zachary Bowman, Dispatcher at the Affinity Mine, notified MSHA of the accident at 9:37 p.m., on Thursday, February 7, 2013, via a telephone call to the MSHA notification hotline. Joe Mackowiak, Assistant District Manager for Technical Programs, was notified of the accident by the MSHA Call Center at 9:42 p.m. Mackowiak immediately called the Affinity Mine at 9:45 p.m. and spoke to Bowman concerning the accident. Mackowiak promptly issued a verbal 103(j) Order to Bowman, at 9:50 p.m. The affected area of the order was the 30- ton service hoist and the surrounding area. Mackowiak called William Bane, Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector and Accident Investigator; Fred Wills, Field Office Supervisor; and Rick Hayhurst, Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector and Accident Investigator to dispatch them to the mine. Upon arrival at the mine site, Bane modified the 103(j) Order to a 103(k) Order to ensure the safety of all persons during the accident investigation and to preserve all evidence at the accident scene.The investigation was conducted in cooperation with the West Virginia Office of Miners Health, Safety, and Training (WVOMHST) with the assistance of the operator and their employees. Persons with knowledge of the accident and those that participated in the investigation are listed in Appendix A of this report. Representatives of MSHA, WVOMHST, and company officials traveled underground to the accident site. Photographs, sketches, and relevant measurements were taken at the accident scene. Preliminary written statements were obtained from persons having knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the accident. Formal interviews with persons considered to have knowledge of the accident were conducted on February 14, 2013, at the Tamarack Conference Center, in Beckley, West Virginia.

REPORT NO : 8Fatal Powered Haulage AccidentFebruary 12, 2013Loveridge Consolidation Coal Company

On February 12, 2013, the afternoon shift started at 4:00 p.m. Kevin Carter, Shift Foreman (Sugar Run) assigned Clutter and Scott Shay, General Inside Laborers, to transport supplies from Sugar Run to Miracle Run. Clutter and Shay entered the mine at the Miracle Run Portal shortly after 4:00 p.m. They each took a locomotive (motor) and travelled from Miracle Run to Sugar Run. Shay operated the No. 55B motor (lead) and Clutter was operating the No. 51 motor (tail). They were delayed at No. 55 block near the Sugar Run Portal bottom due to water over the track. Upon arrival at Sugar Run, Clutter and Shay spoke with Tim Shaffer, Shift Foreman (Sugar Run). Shaffer told them to transport a trip of supplies needed for the Metz Portal to Miracle Run and bring back empty supply cars. The Metz motor crews would then take these supplies from Miracle Run to the Metz Portal. Shaffer instructed Clutter and Shay to evaluate the weight of the contents of the supply cars and determine if it was possible to transport everything in one trip. Clutter and Shay decided the supplies needed taken in two trips of four cars. The slope crew dropped the first four cars down the tail track. Clutter and Shay retrieved the four cars on Sugar Run bottom. Before leaving, they spoke with Shaffer again to decide where to place the empty supply cars when they returned. Shaffer instructed them to place the empty supply cars in the crossover entry. Clutter and Shay coupled the first trip and proceeded to Miracle Run where they transferred the supplies to the Metz supply motor crew. There were no issues encountered on the first trip. They then picked up six empty supply cars to take back to Sugar Run. Upon returning to Sugar Run, they putthe empty cars in the crossover and waited for the slope supply crew to drop the cars for their second trip. The slope crew dropped the other cars into the mine. Clutter and Shay discussed where to place the cars on the Miracle Run side. It was decided to place the cars from the second trip in the 60-pound spur at Miracle Run. They believed the 60-pound track spur was more level than the loaded track, and Clutter was concerned the trip could get away from them due to its weight and placing the trip in the spur with one motor. Clutter and Shay hooked onto the supplies and proceeded towards Miracle Run. The No. 55B motor was the lead motor heading toward Miracle Run. The trip was composed of four longwall shield carriers. The carrier behind the No. 55B motor contained a longwall tailgate drive motor, the next carrier contained longwall shearer drum and ranging arm, the third carrier contained longwall hydraulic hoses, and the last carrier contained electrical cables and reels. The No. 51 motor completed the trip. Just before reaching the Miracle Run bottom, the cars behind the No. 55B motor derailed between the No. 124 and 126 blocks.Clutter and Shay evaluated the derailment and decided to put the cars back on the track one at a time beginning with the end of the first car adjacent to the No. 55B motor (See Appendix I). They decided to use cribbing materials and airbags.Clutter and Shay began by separating the cars to make room for the airbag. Working on the wire side of the track, the air hose was extended and the airbag was placed under the coupler with the intention of lifting the car straight up. They placed the air bag on the mine floor and placed cribbing between the airbag and the coupler. When the car was lifted with the airbag, the trucks (wheels) were turned and the flange of the wheels would not clear the top of the rail. A slate bar was used to straighten the wheels to align them with the rail and force the flange over the rail. Shay stated that when Clutter barred the wheel, the car suddenly shifted approximately 3 to 4 inches toward the wire-side with tremendous force. When the car shifted, it contacted the slate bar, causing it to strike Clutter on the right side of his face and forehead. Shay asked Clutter if he was okay and received no response. Shay checked Clutter and saw that he was seriously injured and called Jack Saurborn, Dispatcher, for help. Saurborn radioed for anyone in the area to provide assistance and called for an ambulance Rocky Polce, Maintenance Foreman, arrived first at the accident scene. Shortly thereafter, Ernie Payne and John Nicholson, Mechanics, and Bob McBee, General Inside Laborer, also responded. First aid was administered and the victim was placed on a backboard and transported to the Miracle Run Bottom. While en route, Polce called the dispatcher and instructed him to call for a life flight. Clutter was taken to Miracle Run bottom, transferred to a mobile cart, placed in the elevator, and transported to the surface. The Grant Town Fire Department arrived approximately three minutes after Clutter arrived on the surface. Clutter was transferred to an ambulance and taken to a helicopter. Clutter was taken to Ruby Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 3:27 p.m. on February 14, 2013.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENTConsol notified the MSHA call center at 10:10 p.m. on February 12, 2013, that a serious accident had occurred at the mine. A non-contributing citation was issued for a violation of 50.10 because MSHA was not notified at once, without delay, and within 15 minutes. The call center notified John Hayes, Ventilation Supervisor at 10:14 p.m. who notified Greg Fetty, Staff Assistant. Fetty called the mine and verbally issued a 103(j) order at approximately 10:30 p.m. to ensure the safety and health of miners and preserve the accident scene until an investigation could be completed.Richard Vincent, Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, traveled to the mine to begin the investigation. Upon arriving at the mine, mine management briefed Vincent regarding the circumstances of the accident. Vincent traveled to the accident site and began the investigation in conjunction with the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety, and Training (WVOMHST), mine management, and the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA). Photographs, measurements, and sketches were made of the area. The accident investigation team assembled on February 22, 2013, and conducted interviews of persons having knowledge of the accident. A list of those persons who participated in the investigation is contained in Appendix A of this report. The team returned to the accident site periodically to continue the investigation, obtain measurements, map the area, and obtain photographsROOT CAUSE ANALYSISAn analysis was conducted to identify the most basic causes of the accident that were correctable through management controls. During this analysis, root causes were identified that, if eliminated would have either prevented the accident or mitigated its consequences. Listed below are root causes identified during the analysis and their corresponding corrective actions implemented to prevent a recurrence of the accident.Root CauseThe operator did not train the supply motormen on the task of using air bags andblocking when re-railing track mounted equipment.

Corrective ActionThe operator developed a written procedure to re-rail track mounted equipment. The operator trained all motormen in this new procedure which included the proper procedures for using air bags and blocking to re-rail track mounted equipment.

The mine operators policies and procedures did not ensure that safe work policies and procedures were followed regarding the proper use of airbags and blocking raised equipment when re-railing derailed cars.

REPORT NO : 9Genwal Resources, Inc. and Murray Energy CorporationCrandal Canyon Mine CollapseHuntington, UtahAugust 6, 2007 - 6 KilledAugust 16, 2007 - 3 rescue workers killed

Bloomberg - USABy Christopher MartinAugust 6, 2007Six workers were trapped underground in a Utah coal mine after a roof collapse this morning and rescue crews were working to free them.The miners were located about four miles from the entrance of mine, which is owned by closely held coal producer Murray Energy Corp.The workers had not yet responded to radio calls from rescuers, Mike McKown, a spokesman for Murray, based in Pepper Pike, Ohio, said today in a phone interview."We're working on three ways to get them out safely,'' McKown said.The force of the collapse was picked up by seismographs, prompting some initial reports that the accident had been caused by a weak earthquake.Seismic activity near the mine may have been triggered by a roof collapse within it, rather than a separate earthquake causing the roof to fall, said Walter Arabasz, director of the University of Utah seismograph stations.The rumblings he observed were "consistent with a mine-type collapse.''Although he doesn't have all the information needed, he said it appears there was a roof-floor closure or possibly a pillar failure at the mine that caused the roof and floor to flex.He's still waiting for an accurate timeline on the mine collapse."Since 1978, we have recorded approximately 20 mining- related earthquakes of 3.0 or above in that area of Utah,'' Arabasz said.This morning's tremble, with a 4.0 magnitude at its epicenter, was considered a "light'' earthquake.Rescue HelpRocky Mountain Power, a unit of PacifiCorp that owns a nearby coal mine, sent a rescue team and heavy equipment to the scene to help, said spokesman Jeff Hymas.No damage was recorded at their nearby Deer Creek mine, he said.Murray's Crandall Canyon mine is part of its Genwal complex, which produced 604,975 tons of coal last year, according to the U.S. Labor Department's Mine Safety and Health Administration.Mine safety regulators were notified of the accident at 5:40 a.m. New York time and have two inspectors inside the mine, said Dirk Fillpot, a spokesman for the administration.Rescue teams were within 2,500 feet of where the trapped miners had planned to be working, about four miles from the mouth of the underground facility, Fillpot said in an interview.Ten coal-mine workers have died in job-site accidents so far this year, a record low for this time of year, according to mine safety data.3 Killed and 6 Injured in Rescue Effort at MineNew York Times - United StatesBy DAN FROSCH and JENNIFER 8. LEEAugust 17, 2007HUNTINGTON, Utah, Aug. 16 Three rescue workers were killed and six others were injured last night when a seismic jolt caused a mine accident during an effort to reach six men who have been trapped at the Crandall Canyon Mine since Aug. 6, mining officials said.The jolt happened about 6:30 p.m., according to the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration.Officials said the surviving workers suffered injuries including cuts and bruises and chest injuries.At least 130 rescue workers are involved in the rescue operation, which has stretched 11 days.Though it is unclear how many were working at the time of the accident, all other workers had been evacuated and accounted for last night, said Tammy Kikuchi, a spokeswoman for the Utah Department of Natural Resources.Two of the injured men worked for the federal mine safety agency.Its a devastating to blow to what was already a tragic situation, said Mayor Joe Piccolo of Price, Utah, who said his father was killed in a mining accident 50 years ago.A flurry of ambulances and helicopters some from as far as 140 miles away in Salt Lake City descended on Crandall Canyon.As one ambulance left, emergency medical technicians could be seen administering aid to a worker.Gov. Jon Huntsman Jr., who was out of state at the time of the accident, rushed to Castleview Hospital in Price, about 25 miles from the mine, where six of the workers were originally taken and one of them died.Two workers were flown to the University of UtahHospital in Salt Lake City, which has a statewide trauma center, and two to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, where one was declared dead.A spokesman for the federal mining agency said it was unclear whether rescue operations would resume Friday.Rescue efforts have been plagued by frequent heaves and shudders in the mountain, which cause the walls to burst with debris.On Wednesday night, one jolt caused a rib of the mine to burst, burying half of a continuous mining machine, which was being used to clear a path toward the trapped miners.This mountain is still alive, said Robert E. Murray, co-owner of the mine and president of Murray Energy.The seismic activity has just been relentless.Seismic jolts, known as a bump in mining language, are often caused by compression of coal pillars and are most common in the deepest mines, like Crandall, where the pillars hold the most weight.Over the last two decades, mines in Utah have pushed past depths of 1,500 feet, which had been considered an impassable barrier with older technologies and a depth where some experts believe coal reaches risky weight-bearing limits.The men who were trapped in the Aug. 6 accident were working at depth of 1,800 feet when a movement of earth so strong that it had a magnitude of 3.7 caused a structural failure.In the recovery effort, 826 feet of rubble have been cleared from the collapse.Earlier Thursday, officials were briefly optimistic when listening devices called geophones detected five minutes of vibrations emerging from the mine on Wednesday, a sliver of hope in an agonizingly slow rescue effort.Richard E. Stickler, director of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, said Thursday that it was unclear whether the noise emanated from the mine and that an animal or breaking rocks could have caused it.We have no idea where the vibrations originated, Mr. Stickler said.He also said that although geophones had worked in tests, they had never successfully found a missing miner in an active mine.Officials expected a bore hole being driven 1,586 feet near the origin of the noise to take two days to complete.Three other bore holes have detected no signs of life.Dan Frosch reported from Huntington, Utah, and Jennifer Lee from New York.

REPORT NO. : 10Westmoreland Coal CompanyFerrell No. 17 Mine ExplosionUneeda, Boone County, West VirginiaNovember 7, 1980No. Killed 5

This is an interim report of the investigation of a coal mine explosion that occurred at approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 7, 1980, in the Ferrell No. 17 Mine, Westmoreland Coal Company, Uneeda, Boone County, West Virginia.

The explosion occurred in 1 east 2 south and resulted in the deaths of five miners.Rescue and recovery efforts commenced on November 7, 1980, and the bodies of the five miners were recovered on November 8, 1980.On November 11, 1980, the decision was made to build seals outby the affected area.

The seals were completed on November 13, 1980.On November 12, 1980, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) began an investigation of the explosion.The sealing of the area of the mine affected by the explosion prevented the MSHA investigators from completing the underground portion of the investigation.General InformationThe Ferrell No. 17 Mine, in the vicinity of Uneeda, Boone County, West Virginia was opened in 1972 into the Cedar Grove coalbed.The height of the coalbed varied from 32 to 60 inches.All mining consisted of development work until July 1980, when retreat mining began in 1st and 2nd right off 1 south.Belt conveyors were used for coal haulage, and track with trolley wire was used for transporting miners and supplies. Coal was produced at the face with continuous mining machines and transported to the belt conveyors by shuttle cars.There were six production units at the time of the explosion with none operating on the midnight shift.About 2,000 tons of coal was produced per day and 207 miners were employed on the surface and under .INVESTIGATION REPORTGary Neil, Midnight Shift Supervisor, had the overall responsibility for the activities on the third shift at Westmoreland Coal Company's Ferrell No. 17 Mine.

On November 6, 1980, at approximately 11 p.m., Neil reported for work at the Ferrell No. 17 Mine.Shortly after arriving at the mine, Neil telephoned McClure for the work assignments for the 12:0l a.m. to 8 a.m. shift on November 7. 1980.In addition to other work assignments, Neil was instructed by McClure to have track rails removed from 2 north 3 east, an area where mining operations had been discontinued.Neil instructed Workman to send five miners into 2 north 3 east to retrieve rails.Workman subsequently assigned Howard Gillenwater, designated crew leader, and four other miners the work of removing the rails from 2 north 3 east.

On Friday, November 7, 1980, at approximately 12:01 a.m., the midnight crews entered the mine.Howard Gillenwater, Freddie W. Pridemore, Carlos Dent, Howard Williamson and Herbert E. Kinder III, laborers, boarded their locomotive and traveled to 1 east to get a rail car located about six crosscuts inby the intersection of the 2 north and 1 east.They then proceeded to 2 north 3 east.Upon arrival in 3 east, the miners encountered a roof fall across the track entry about two crosscuts inby the intersection of 2 north and 3 east which prohibited further travel into 3 east.At 1:30 a.m., Gillenwater notified the dispatcher that he was leaving the inby end of the 2 north and was going to 1 east 2 south.

Neil, who was in 1 south 1 left section when he received the call from Gillenwater, left that section and traveled to 1 west 2 left to deliver a pipe wrench.After spending some time observing the miners, Neil left the section.He arrived at the intersection of 1 west and 2 left at approximately 3:30 a.m., at which time the mine electrical power went off.The dispatcher informed Neil that both the AC and DC power were off in the entire mine, but that he did not know what the problem was.Heater, who was in the 1 south 1 left section, called Neil and reported that the power was off and that he had felt a concussion of air. Neil received several calls from different miners throughout the mine that they had felt a concussion of air at about the same time the power went off.

Neil decided to walk back to the slope bottom and disconnect all transformers and directly connect the main power cable leading underground to one rectifier which would provide DC power to the trolley wire circuit.After the necessary switching of the power cables was completed, Neil informed Dolin to put the power back on in the mine, and the power stayed on.Neil told Price to get a mantrip vehicle and accompany him into 1 east.A deadblock was located in the trolley wire circuit of 1 east just inby 2 north.Neil placed a wire jumper across the deadblock so the inby trolley wire could be energized.They traveled into 1 east to within 8 or 9 crosscuts of 2 south when they met Blair.Blair informed them that he had encountered smoke near the outby end of 2 South.Neil and Price proceeded, on foot, in 1 east to 2 south where they encountered dense smoke.They immediately retreated to where they had parked the mantrip vehicle.

Neil and Blair made another attempt to travel into 2 south.Reportedly, they traveled about nine crosscuts into 2 south where they encountered permanent stoppings that had been blown out and dense smoke.They retreated to No. 40 crosscut in 1 east and waited for Price to return with Jones and McClure.Jones and McClure arrived at the mine and immediately went underground to 1 east where Neil and Blair were waiting.After confirming that an explosion had occurred, they instructed Connie Chewning, Safety Inspector, to call the mine rescue teams of Westmoreland Coal Company and request their assistance in the rescue and recovery operation.

REFERENCES1. http://www.usmra.com/saxsewell/ferrell.htm2. http://www.novamining.com/3. http://www.msha.gov/

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